Radar questions

[BigWalleye]

Originally Posted by Rockin Robbins

WWII submarine skippers agreed and operated accordingly, as I've already shown.

Certainly Enright did, and very successfully. But others,, IIRC, were more circumspect. I don't recall the specific references, but I remembrr a couple of first-person accounts where the possibility of alerting the enemy to the sub's presence was discussed. This would be of more concern when penetrating a harbor than in open waters. Sometimes just the fact that there is something there is more information than you want the other guy to have. And I suspect that the pros and cons of continuous search were a hot topic for discussion at the Gooneyville Lodge.

We have to bear in mind also that the enemy's capabilities in this regard were a matter of open speculation at the time. Nobody knew. And many invented boogiemen. I recall that one of the early radar-equipped boats got a pasting from escorts and the skipper was absolutely certain sure that the radar had tipped them off - long before, as we now know, the IJN even had operational radar detectors.

So you go in lit up like the Fourth of July. I'll run silent much of the time, with random aperiodic sweeps. And we will probably both be playing the game the way RL skippers historically operated.

[Rockin Robbins]

Keep in mind it's not like you run on the surface with spotlights going and they can see where you are to shoot at you. It's like they're listening to an AM radio station and they know they're within 15 miles of a submarine somewhere. There's a difference between being all lit up like a party boat and running radar. You can turn toward the light and target on it. You can't do any such thing with the radar signal.

It's the difference between knowing a position and knowing it's somewhere in a circle of 15 miles radius. The latter is just about worthless information. It's true that you might have some sharper lookouts on duty with a sense of urgency where you might be a bit complacent if your don't know there's an enemy 15 miles away.

But it was war and there was a sense of urgency all the time. What you didn't know could and regularly did kill you. And the Japanese were masters of optical detection, especially at night.

And knowledge is not always helpful. Shinano was doing the right thing before they detected the radar signal and adjusted right into the loving arms of Archerfish. Without radar there would have been no kill. Sometimes the presence of knowing the enemy is out there but you have no idea what he's up to puts on enough pressure to force the mistake.

Leaking information in general is much less important than the character of that information and what you get in return for leaking it. Radar was the game changer for American submarines. It, more than any other factor, contributed to victory. That's why we should use it.

When Tang's radar broke, O'Kane sent a sarcastic message to Pearl that basically said "Damn, our radar is broke and now we won't sink diddly squat." He was telling the naked truth. He also said that lack of radar changed him from the hunter to the hunted.

Patton said memorably that the best way to deal with fear for your life is to make your enemy more afraid for his. My radar says "I'm here, I know all about you and you don't know squat about me until something goes BOOM!" Fear is appropriate here.

[BigWalleye]

Originally Posted by Rockin Robbins

Keep in mind it's not like you run on the surface with spotlights going and they can see where you are to shoot at you. It's like they're listening to an AM radio station and they know they're within 15 miles of a submarine somewhere. There's a difference between being all lit up like a party boat and running radar. You can turn toward the light and target on it. You can't do any such thing with the radar signal.

It's the difference between knowing a position and knowing it's somewhere in a circle of 15 miles radius. The latter is just about worthless information. It's true that you might have some sharper lookouts on duty with a sense of urgency where you might be a bit complacent if your don't know there's an enemy 15 miles away.

But it was war and there was a sense of urgency all the time. What you didn't know could and regularly did kill you. And the Japanese were masters of optical detection, especially at night.

And knowledge is not always helpful. Shinano was doing the right thing before they detected the radar signal and adjusted right into the loving arms of Archerfish. Without radar there would have been no kill. Sometimes the presence of knowing the enemy is out there but you have no idea what he's up to puts on enough pressure to force the mistake.

Leaking information in general is much less important than the character of that information and what you get in return for leaking it. Radar was the game changer for American submarines. It, more than any other factor, contributed to victory. That's why we should use it.

When Tang's radar broke, O'Kane sent a sarcastic message to Pearl that basically said "Damn, our radar is broke and now we won't sink diddly squat." He was telling the naked truth. He also said that lack of radar changed him from the hunter to the hunted.

Patton said memorably that the best way to deal with fear for your life is to make your enemy more afraid for his. My radar says "I'm here, I know all about you and you don't know squat about me until something goes BOOM!" Fear is appropriate here.

Maybe I've been dodging wasserbomben in the ATO too long! I know that the earliest Japanese radar detector was just a radio. But I assumed that later versions and shore-based models would provide bearing information, because it is so easy to do and completely mechanical. (It's just an RDF for radar frequencies.) With a bearing and rough range from signal strength, you have a crude position. That's way more information than "There's something out there."

Didn't the IJN have directional radar receivers?

[Rockin Robbins]

Originally Posted by BigWalleye

Didn't the IJN have directional radar receivers?

No. Otherwise Shinano, very late in the war, might have turned away wouldn't they? They had signal strength indicators at best.

"I'm here and you have no idea what I'm up to" is the most intimidating message you can send the enemy. People under pressure make mistakes and there's no better way to put the pressure on. Once you know they detected you maybe it would be even more intimidation if you turned it off for awhile. "Did he submerge? Was it even real? Is my detection equipment faulty?......" (In a perfect world that's when the BOOMs come) With speculation comes stupid moves that you can exploit. Of course the game does what it does but if you're role playing you would use such things.

If you find yourself in a fair fight you just didn't plan adequately. And there are few situations more lopsided in your favor as when you're running radar and they detect you. The odds are MUCH better than if you are not running radar and they do not detect you. It's your responsibility not to give the sucker an even chance. Leverage that advantage for all it's worth. Failure to do so is dereliction of duty.

[BigWalleye]

Originally Posted by Rockin Robbins

No. Otherwise Shinano, very late in the war, might have turned away wouldn't they? They had signal strength indicators at best.

"I'm here and you have no idea what I'm up to" is the most intimidating message you can send the enemy. People under pressure make mistakes and there's no better way to put the pressure on. Once you know they detected you maybe it would be even more intimidation if you turned it off for awhile. "Did he submerge? Was it even real? Is my detection equipment faulty?......" (In a perfect world that's when the BOOMs come) With speculation comes stupid moves that you can exploit. Of course the game does what it does but if you're role playing you would use such things.

If you find yourself in a fair fight you just didn't plan adequately. And there are few situations more lopsided in your favor as when you're running radar and they detect you. The odds are MUCH better than if you are not running radar and they do not detect you. It's your responsibility not to give the sucker an even chance. Leverage that advantage for all it's worth. Failure to do so is dereliction of duty.

So would you say that Dick O'Kane was derelict for operating as he himself described? He certainly makes it clear that he used his radar cautiously and, like any stealth platform, gave a high priority to limiting all emissions to preserve the advantage of surprise. Remember that O'Kane was awarded the CMH, 3 Navy Crosses, and 2 Silver Stars.

[Rockin Robbins]

You have to separate hindsight from the view in the jungle. O'Kane certainly used his radar during attacks and for making setups as the resulting accuracy was deemed a slam dunk. Hence his statement that amounted to "my radar is broke and now I won't sink diddly squat."

The only difference was that O'Kane valued visual searches because they were apparently much more effective than in the game with high periscope extending the horizon (not in the game) and much better visual acuity than we have in the game. Even Fluckey talks about visually observing airplanes in complete safety for several minutes before a decision to continue as is or to dive. We don't have a true balance in the game and have to be careful about our judgments.

So O'Kane, before he made contact, wanted complete anonymity and ignorance on the part of the enemy, even at the cost of information on his side. Enright and Fluckey seem to be more in favor of giving a little to get a lot. But you can understand that superstition, hunch and general paranoia where your life is at stake if you're wrong would tend to trump any dispassionate calculation of advantage and odds. And you also have to factor in that the difference between the captains we discuss and the losers finding no targets was due to the aggressiveness and tolerance for danger that these skippers were willing to tolerate, in contrast to those who lurked below the surface all day and then ran around at night with half charged batteries and not fully prepared to fight. These guys weren't afraid to intimidate the enemy. And they weren't afraid to be seen by an aircraft--that's why they spent so much time on the surface. They were very willing to trade a little danger for finding more targets. I'll bet O'Kane figured out how much of the time he could leave the radar off and still not miss any targets in his search area. These guys weren't the kind to hide to survive.

The important thing is that once the great skippers were in action they used the radar to its full advantage. And the action starts with first detection by the enemy, whether it be seeing a periscope, detecting a radar signal, or hearing a very loud BOOM.

But with hindsight it should be very clear to everyone that just leaving the radar on will sink more targets than any other strategy. They can't fix your position and train any weapons from your radar signal. But your radar makes your weapons more than twice as deadly. In real life, the use of radar and its detection by the Japanese did strike fear and cause mistakes on their part because of its potent intimidation factor. In war, you should be something of a bully. Fair play is for dead people.

[BigWalleye]

Originally Posted by Rockin Robbins

In real life, the use of radar and its detection by the Japanese did strike fear and cause mistakes on their part because of its potent intimidation factor. In war, you should be something of a bully. Fair play is for dead people.

I have reread both O'Kane and Fluckey and I can not find a single example of an attack where either of these very aggressive skippers intentionally used radar emissions to "spook" the enemy in the way that you describe. And you have to admit that Fluckey, had he done so, could be counted on to have mentioned the fact. Shinano-Archerfish was a serendipitous occurrence, not a deliberate tactic. It happened once, and the details weren't available until after the war. (BTW, if you have a first-person account of such intentional use in WW2 - by anyone - I'd really like to read it. Thanks.)

O'Kane, on the other hand, repeatedly stresses the importance, to him, of maintaining the advantage of stealth. His comments on the need for EMSEC (as it would now be called) are far more extensive than the few I quoted in my previous post. Concealment, stealth, invisibility (call it whatever you wish) is critical to the submarine's mission. If it were not, you could build a far more efficient surface torpedo platform. Stealth is both an offensive and a defensive advantage. As anyone who has ever played a sibsim knows, you can't hunt effectively while being hunted. Once you make the enemy aware of your presence, he has a whole arsenal of tools to prevent you from using your offensive weapons effectively. So, instead of making your presence known, so as to maybe cause the enemy to make a mistake, it is better (in O'Kane's judgment and FWIW, I agree) to keep him completely unaware of your presence until the moment of attack. An alert, combat-ready enemy may spook and make a mistake, or he may not, and, if he doesn't, he knows you are around and is actively trying to find and neutralize you. An enemy who doesn't think there is a hostile force anywhere nearby is less alert and not actively trying to locate and deal with you. This is the essence of stealth tactics, which are most definitely not purely defensive.

As for striking fear in the enemy, what is more fearsome than the sudden enormous explosion of a torpedo which strikes without warning when everyone on board is feeling safe and unaware of an enemy anywhere nearby? Or as O'Kane put it:

"Again, we had one objective: To make our presence known only by our torpedo detonations."

But with hindsight it should be very clear to everyone that just leaving the radar on will sink more targets than any other strategy.

Hindsight is something none of us can avoid. Trying to minimize the element of hindsight was Ducimus' rationale for creating the "alternative history" which is TMO. But that doesn't mean that we have to embrace the knowledge that hindsight gives us and play the game with an aggressiveness beyond that of the boldest RL skippers, just because we "know" the historical truth. There is a quote which I am fond of offering on this forum:

"Realism isn't about the settings. It's about how you play the game." - Rockin' Robbins

[merc4ulfate]

"I'll run silent much of the time, with random aperiodic sweeps. And we will probably both be playing the game the way RL skippers historically operated."

Except you'll be playing like Pinky Kennedy fought and Rockin Robbins and I will be playing like Morton and O'kane.

Play it safe it you want to but unorthodox tactics in real life sunk the most tonnage.

[BigWalleye]

Originally Posted by merc4ulfate

"I'll run silent much of the time, with random aperiodic sweeps. And we will probably both be playing the game the way RL skippers historically operated."

Except you'll be playing like Pinky Kennedy fought and Rockin Robbins and I will be playing like Morton and O'kane.

Play it safe it you want to but unorthodox tactics in real life sunk the most tonnage.

“I liked patroling without emitting any radar or other signals....”

“...just by chance, for Tang had made no electrical emissions that the enemy might detect....”

“The conversation revolved around limitations of radar usage....”

“’Radar signals on the APR-1, Captain.’ Our new radar detector, installed during our refit, was responsible. Though nondirectional, like our SD, it would keep us posted on the presence of enemy radar. Best of all, it emitted no signal of its own to betray our presence.”

“Surely an island outfitted with a search radar would also have the relatively simple receivers to detect the radar of an enemy. Our caution may have been excessive, but our quick SJ searches were covering the critical areas.”

“Again, we had one objective: To make our presence known only by our torpedo detonations.”

This night, I penned normal night orders, ‘...The SD radar is secured and will be turned on only with my permission. The SJ heaters are on. Require sweeps and reports by the operator every 10 minutes and search continuously commencing a half hour before morning twilight till daylight....Do not be lulled by the 2500 miles between us and the enemy’s front door. He can be here just as surely as we will be there.”

All of the passages quoted are from Clear the Bridge: The War Patrols of the USS Tang”, written by Richard H. O’Kane, RAdm, USN (Ret).