![]() |
SUBSIM: The Web's #1 resource for all submarine & naval simulations since 1997 |
![]() |
#46 |
Silent Hunter
![]() Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: Jakarta
Posts: 4,794
Downloads: 89
Uploads: 6
|
![]()
I think North has a lot of scuds that's capable of reaching Seoul if I'm not mistaken . . . . and if they able to armed it with nuclear . . .
__________________
|
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
#47 |
Navy Seal
![]() |
![]()
I think it's fairly safe to say that the North is probably nowhere near having either a reliable or a small enough nuclear warhead to be fit on a missile properly (their last "fizzle" test is definitely an indication). I don't think this is going to be a danger for at least a few years ahead; for now they're likely stuck with very large and therefore mostly undeliverable nukes (except possibly by bomber).
|
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
#48 | |
Navy Seal
![]() Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Stavka
Posts: 8,211
Downloads: 13
Uploads: 0
|
![]() Quote:
__________________
Current Eastern Front status: Probable Victory |
|
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
#49 |
Rear Admiral
![]() |
![]()
No they aren't. I know, because my red horse unit built up the areas those defenses sit. I won't say anymore then that. Point is, im quite sure scud's would be taken care of.
|
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
#50 |
Navy Seal
![]() |
![]()
What's the stance of the US forces over there these days? If there is a sudden "major escalation", e.g. a full-on exchange of fire across the DMZ, can we assume that US assets in theater will be immediately committed alongside the ROK, or is that something that's gonna develop slowly? Are they still technically Combined Forces?
|
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
#51 |
Lucky Jack
![]() |
![]()
It's still a joint op, it was going to split in April 2012, but they've pushed it back to 2015.
If Kim comes over the border, what's left of him will be hit hard by US and ROK forces. As I was saying on another forum earlier today, I would be very surprised if any DPRK advance got further than Seoul. They have the manpower yes, but their equipment is terrible, morale is terrible and tactics are terrible. The question is not can we beat Kim, but how far should we go? Do we drive them all the way back to Pyongyang and risk China stepping in? Or do we do a deal with China in which we stop at the DMZ and let China come in from the North under the guise of 'protecting' the DPRK but in reality to do a spot of regime rearranging? |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
#52 | |
Navy Seal
![]() |
![]() Quote:
|
|
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
#53 |
Admiral
![]() Join Date: Sep 2009
Location: in a neighborhood near you
Posts: 2,478
Downloads: 293
Uploads: 2
|
![]()
OMG, North vs South. Spy vs Spy, East vs West, when will it end ? I know when they ,who ever they, think they are, those who decide they are the rulers of the new world order, that think 2 thirds of us should die so that we don't suck up thier perious air. Question where do you fit in those thirds ? By the way bone up on your chinesse. Death by a thousand cuts, so what will Iran do ? TSA, Thousands Standing Around.
|
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
#54 |
Swabbie
![]() Join Date: Oct 2010
Location: Newport, Rhode Island
Posts: 5
Downloads: 0
Uploads: 0
|
![]()
Not to divert the discussion away from military deployments and armaments, but I had some thoughts on the context of the situation that might be relevant. Of course, I'm only a college student and hardly an expert, so take my reading for what it's worth.
North Korea isn't as inscrutable as their reputation might suggest, but I feel the most important question arising out of the attack on Yeonpyeong is one we'll never have an answer to. Was the military acting of its own volition or were they given the consent of the Kim family? If the latter, then North Korea is continuing its practice of using external actions to further its internal narrative. The destruction of the Cheonan, for example, solidified the regime in the wake of its disastrous currency revaluation, and given their increasingly dire economic situation, they probably expected us to start a dialogue without requiring them to undertake verifiable nuclear disarmament. However, I think it's also plausible that the military is flaunting its independence as we close in on Kim Jong-un's ascent to power, and such a prospect would have serious ramifications for the entire region and the future of North Korea. In the aftermath of the Cheonan incident, but before the evidence of his culpability was made public, Kim Jong-il made a visit to China, where everyone thought that he was requesting additional military and humanitarian assistance. If he or a high profile delegation are seen in China in the next month, I'd interpret that as a state endorsement of what occured. If no such visit is forthcoming, it could indicate fragmentation amongst the establishment -- or nothing at all. Such is the nature of North Korea. Officially, the North Korean government is an institutional triumvirate: Choe Yong-rim is the country's premier and head of a Cabinet comprised of officials chosen by the elected Supreme People's Assembly. The Presidium Standing Committee of that Assembly has the authority to legislate when the body is not in session (it almost never is), and there is a judiciary of some form, though I don't believe it's ever been relevant. In actual practice, all of the power in the country is concentrated in the military establishment and Kim Jong-il's National Defense Commission, but I think it's important to remember that this is a rather new development in North Korean internal affairs. It wasn't until 1992 that the Commission was separated from the President's direct control, principally to allow Kim Jong-il, then serving as head of the Army, to oversee the entire military, and only the 1998 constitution made it an independent extension of the state endowed with executive authority accountable to no one. Though it may have been essential to maintaining the Eternal Leader's legacy, Kim Jong-il has only been a titular head of the Korean Worker's Party since 1997, never sought to proclaim himself President or establish any substantial political office, and his most intimate advisor -- the only man with his ear -- is O Kuk-Ryol, the military's most prominent figure. While everyone in the country is implicitly subordinate to him, Jong-il never made any effort to expand beyond the sphere of influence he was accorded while preparing to succeed his father; he simply re-defined the government to facilitate the military's preeminence, and I think that has made rule by anyone outside of it nearly impossible. The tacit significance of the 3rd Party Congress and Jong-un's unveiling in September, then, may have been that Kim Jong-il intended to revive North Korea's much neglected political apparatus and shift the balance back to them. Kim Jong-un can lead North Korea as an ideologue on name alone, and by crediting him with pioneering CNC industrial efforts, declaring his birthday a national holiday, and portraying him publicly as the enigmatic heir to the family's legacy, they are already well on their way to accomplishing that. But Kim Jong-il must also be aware that the military won't accept Jong-un as a suitable replacement, so he has appointed Jang Song-thaek, his brother-in-law and a consummate party insider who endured a purge earlier this decade, as Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission. The intent is probably for Jang to serve as Jong-un's prince regent, bridging the gap between the country's political and military institutions until Jong-un can assert his independence and define his own style of leadership. If Kim Jong-il has been unable to coalesce these interests, compensating for Jong-un's numerous inadequacies and transitioning the country away from strident military rule, then succession is imperiled and some form of insurrection is probably inevitable. But this is all conjecture: we only hear what North Korea wants us to hear, and if there are elements bristling at the prospect of another Kim, we won't know until they take distinguishable action. The Yeonpyeong incident could have been the first external sign of a fracture within the regime, an attempt to resuscitate diplomatic negotiations, or both. If Jong-il was attempting to stabilize the internal dynamic to allow for Jong-un's rise, it not only suggests that Jong-il isn't politically adept, but has to cast doubt on whether Jong-un will be allowed to come to power at all. |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
#55 |
Fleet Admiral
![]() |
![]()
Kinda makes one think about what the South Koreans have on Yeonpyeong island.
![]()
__________________
abusus non tollit usum - A right should NOT be withheld from people on the basis that some tend to abuse that right. |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
#56 |
Admiral
![]() Join Date: Jun 2010
Location: Canada
Posts: 2,272
Downloads: 58
Uploads: 0
|
![]() ![]() my estimates (battle for Seoul) assuming North Korea attacks first, using 2000 forces: First phase (red lines) 0-10 hours: are the first wave of North Korean attacks. Localized breakthroughs could be achieved, but no significant progress by the north Korean armies. North Korean artillery would cause a certain amount of damage to Seoul. However, the majority of North Korean guns would be destroyed by air-strikes and counter-battery fire. Second phase (blue lines) 10-24 hours: South Korean localized counter attack. South Korean strategic reserves are used. Reserves and militia are mobilized. At the end of this phase, south Korean forces would dig in at the green line Third phase (brown lines) 24-96 hours: South Korean forces would take back and restore prewar positions. American forces start to arrive. Both sides dig into their prewar defense lines, creating a short-lived stalemate. South Korea destroys most of the North's air power. Continued air strikes would cause damage to North Korean Forces Forth Phase (black lines) after 96 hours: South Korea drive into North Korea with assistance from international forces what do you guys think? |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
#57 |
Fleet Admiral
![]() |
![]()
You forgot the part where the South Koreans will be greeted as liberators.
![]() Hey, it worked for us... kinda. ![]()
__________________
abusus non tollit usum - A right should NOT be withheld from people on the basis that some tend to abuse that right. |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
#58 |
Admiral
![]() Join Date: Jun 2010
Location: Canada
Posts: 2,272
Downloads: 58
Uploads: 0
|
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
#59 | ||
Navy Seal
![]() |
![]() Quote:
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?162240-Bluffer-s-Guide-North-Korea-strikes!-%282009%29 Quote:
Just read on ID today that we have 5 CSGs and 2 ARGs within up to 9 days travel of Korean waters right now... ![]() |
||
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
#60 |
Navy Seal
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
|
|