North and South Korea are at it again

TLAM Strike · 11-23-10, 05:39 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by CCIP

And just the sheer amount of artillery aimed at Seoul...

Very few guns are aimed at Seoul. The DPRK has only one type of arty tube (the 170mm) that can reach Seoul from the DMZ. Their are only 17 hardened arty sites known to be within range of Seoul and capable of staging the 170mms. At these sites their are about 120 firing positions. That is not exactly a lot of targets to bomb or shell.

The real threat would be from Scud type missiles, but the ROK isn't exactly defenseless against those.

CCIP · 11-23-10, 05:44 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by TLAM Strike

Very few guns are aimed at Seoul. The DPRK has only one type of arty tube (the 170mm) that can reach Seoul from the DMZ. Their are only 17 hardened arty sites known to be within range of Seoul and capable of staging the 170mms. At these sites their are about 120 firing positions. That is not exactly a lot of targets to bomb or shell.

The real threat would be from Scud type missiles, but the ROK isn't exactly defenseless against those.

Really? Interesting, I had the opposite impression... I thought a lot of Seoul, or at least its northern suburbs, were well within the reach of the run-of-the-mill DPRK 155mm artillery at least. At least it was my perception that the arty was the North's trump in this, as opposed to missiles.

the_tyrant: well now, considering the North can build and export (relatively) sophisticated missiles, I think you're not giving enough credit to their ability to maintain the very basic, cheap and rugged Soviet howitzers that form the bulk of their artillery.

the_tyrant · 11-23-10, 05:46 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by CCIP

the_tyrant: well now, considering the North can build and export (relatively) sophisticated missiles, I think you're not giving enough credit to their ability to maintain the very basic, cheap and rugged Soviet howitzers that form the bulk of their artillery.

You do have a point, i'm not sure about the state of those guns
Ill come back later after i do some research on the topic

TLAM Strike · 11-23-10, 06:21 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by CCIP

Really? Interesting, I had the opposite impression... I thought a lot of Seoul, or at least its northern suburbs, were well within the reach of the run-of-the-mill DPRK 155mm artillery at least. At least it was my perception that the arty was the North's trump in this, as opposed to missiles.

The Northern most part of Seoul's suburbs are within range of the 170mms, Goyang is prob within range of the 130mms (Their longest range gun besides the 170mm but not the biggest) and MLRS, but the DPRK can't hope to hit downtown Seoul except with Scuds or airstrikes.

Its also doubtful all 120 sites are for just the 170mm guns. Some have been seen with MLRS. North Korea might not even have 120 of the guns, but I've found no evidence either way on that.

CCIP · 11-23-10, 06:40 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by TLAM Strike

The Northern most part of Seoul's suburbs are within range of the 170mms, Goyang is prob within range of the 130mms (Their longest range gun besides the 170mm but not the biggest) and MLRS, but the DPRK can't hope to hit downtown Seoul except with Scuds or airstrikes.

Its also doubtful all 120 sites are for just the 170mm guns. Some have been seen with MLRS. North Korea might not even have 120 of the guns, but I've found no evidence either way on that.

Just out of curiosity, how many 130mm guns do they have possibly available there? And what sort of MLRS systems are we talking about?

I don't doubt, by the way, that whatever the type and number, the North would lose all meaningful artillery capability at the DMZ very quickly should a conflict start anyway. Heck, they'd probably lose most if not almost all of it within the first hour. But it's those opening salvos that I always reckoned to be a real danger to the South.

Castout · 11-23-10, 06:44 PM

I think North has a lot of scuds that's capable of reaching Seoul if I'm not mistaken . . . . and if they able to armed it with nuclear . . .

CCIP · 11-23-10, 06:46 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Castout

I think North has a lot of scuds that's capable of reaching Seoul if I'm not mistaken . . . . and if they able to armed it with nuclear . . .

I think it's fairly safe to say that the North is probably nowhere near having either a reliable or a small enough nuclear warhead to be fit on a missile properly (their last "fizzle" test is definitely an indication). I don't think this is going to be a danger for at least a few years ahead; for now they're likely stuck with very large and therefore mostly undeliverable nukes (except possibly by bomber).

Raptor1 · 11-23-10, 06:54 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by CCIP

Just out of curiosity, how many 130mm guns do they have possibly available there? And what sort of MLRS systems are we talking about?

I don't doubt, by the way, that whatever the type and number, the North would lose all meaningful artillery capability at the DMZ very quickly should a conflict start anyway. Heck, they'd probably lose most if not almost all of it within the first hour. But it's those opening salvos that I always reckoned to be a real danger to the South.

Don't know how many of the 130mm guns they have (Doubt it's possible to find anything beyond estimates), but the MLRS systems they field seem to be mostly copies of the BM-21 and some variants of a similar self-designed 240mm system.

Ducimus · 11-23-10, 07:15 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by TLAM Strike

The real threat would be from Scud type missiles, but the ROK isn't exactly defenseless against those.

No they aren't. I know, because my red horse unit built up the areas those defenses sit. I won't say anymore then that. Point is, im quite sure scud's would be taken care of.

CCIP · 11-23-10, 07:32 PM

What's the stance of the US forces over there these days? If there is a sudden "major escalation", e.g. a full-on exchange of fire across the DMZ, can we assume that US assets in theater will be immediately committed alongside the ROK, or is that something that's gonna develop slowly? Are they still technically Combined Forces?

Oberon · 11-23-10, 08:03 PM

It's still a joint op, it was going to split in April 2012, but they've pushed it back to 2015.

If Kim comes over the border, what's left of him will be hit hard by US and ROK forces. As I was saying on another forum earlier today, I would be very surprised if any DPRK advance got further than Seoul. They have the manpower yes, but their equipment is terrible, morale is terrible and tactics are terrible.

The question is not can we beat Kim, but how far should we go? Do we drive them all the way back to Pyongyang and risk China stepping in? Or do we do a deal with China in which we stop at the DMZ and let China come in from the North under the guise of 'protecting' the DPRK but in reality to do a spot of regime rearranging?

CCIP · 11-23-10, 08:09 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Oberon

The question is not can we beat Kim, but how far should we go? Do we drive them all the way back to Pyongyang and risk China stepping in? Or do we do a deal with China in which we stop at the DMZ and let China come in from the North under the guise of 'protecting' the DPRK but in reality to do a spot of regime rearranging?

I think a lot of it will depend on the costs involved. If he can do serious long-term damage to the South's economy before being driven back, it will be a big blow to the ROK if that doesn't go along with the Kim problem being solved for good. I think a lot of the current status quo works on the fact that Kim's regime recognize that they cannot attack the South, seriously damage it and get away with it. But they can and do get away with the occasional scuffle, which the South cannot afford to escalate either. In some sense, the status quo right now is paradoxically the best thing that the two sides can hope for. The ROK gets to keep its economy running and Kim gets his concessions. No other solution, even a totally peaceful one, will keep both sides happier right now, sad as it is.

seanobrgp · 11-23-10, 08:21 PM

Not to divert the discussion away from military deployments and armaments, but I had some thoughts on the context of the situation that might be relevant. Of course, I'm only a college student and hardly an expert, so take my reading for what it's worth.

North Korea isn't as inscrutable as their reputation might suggest, but I feel the most important question arising out of the attack on Yeonpyeong is one we'll never have an answer to. Was the military acting of its own volition or were they given the consent of the Kim family? If the latter, then North Korea is continuing its practice of using external actions to further its internal narrative. The destruction of the Cheonan, for example, solidified the regime in the wake of its disastrous currency revaluation, and given their increasingly dire economic situation, they probably expected us to start a dialogue without requiring them to undertake verifiable nuclear disarmament. However, I think it's also plausible that the military is flaunting its independence as we close in on Kim Jong-un's ascent to power, and such a prospect would have serious ramifications for the entire region and the future of North Korea.

In the aftermath of the Cheonan incident, but before the evidence of his culpability was made public, Kim Jong-il made a visit to China, where everyone thought that he was requesting additional military and humanitarian assistance. If he or a high profile delegation are seen in China in the next month, I'd interpret that as a state endorsement of what occured. If no such visit is forthcoming, it could indicate fragmentation amongst the establishment -- or nothing at all. Such is the nature of North Korea.

Officially, the North Korean government is an institutional triumvirate: Choe Yong-rim is the country's premier and head of a Cabinet comprised of officials chosen by the elected Supreme People's Assembly. The Presidium Standing Committee of that Assembly has the authority to legislate when the body is not in session (it almost never is), and there is a judiciary of some form, though I don't believe it's ever been relevant. In actual practice, all of the power in the country is concentrated in the military establishment and Kim Jong-il's National Defense Commission, but I think it's important to remember that this is a rather new development in North Korean internal affairs. It wasn't until 1992 that the Commission was separated from the President's direct control, principally to allow Kim Jong-il, then serving as head of the Army, to oversee the entire military, and only the 1998 constitution made it an independent extension of the state endowed with executive authority accountable to no one. Though it may have been essential to maintaining the Eternal Leader's legacy, Kim Jong-il has only been a titular head of the Korean Worker's Party since 1997, never sought to proclaim himself President or establish any substantial political office, and his most intimate advisor -- the only man with his ear -- is O Kuk-Ryol, the military's most prominent figure. While everyone in the country is implicitly subordinate to him, Jong-il never made any effort to expand beyond the sphere of influence he was accorded while preparing to succeed his father; he simply re-defined the government to facilitate the military's preeminence, and I think that has made rule by anyone outside of it nearly impossible.

The tacit significance of the 3rd Party Congress and Jong-un's unveiling in September, then, may have been that Kim Jong-il intended to revive North Korea's much neglected political apparatus and shift the balance back to them. Kim Jong-un can lead North Korea as an ideologue on name alone, and by crediting him with pioneering CNC industrial efforts, declaring his birthday a national holiday, and portraying him publicly as the enigmatic heir to the family's legacy, they are already well on their way to accomplishing that. But Kim Jong-il must also be aware that the military won't accept Jong-un as a suitable replacement, so he has appointed Jang Song-thaek, his brother-in-law and a consummate party insider who endured a purge earlier this decade, as Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission. The intent is probably for Jang to serve as Jong-un's prince regent, bridging the gap between the country's political and military institutions until Jong-un can assert his independence and define his own style of leadership.

If Kim Jong-il has been unable to coalesce these interests, compensating for Jong-un's numerous inadequacies and transitioning the country away from strident military rule, then succession is imperiled and some form of insurrection is probably inevitable. But this is all conjecture: we only hear what North Korea wants us to hear, and if there are elements bristling at the prospect of another Kim, we won't know until they take distinguishable action. The Yeonpyeong incident could have been the first external sign of a fracture within the regime, an attempt to resuscitate diplomatic negotiations, or both. If Jong-il was attempting to stabilize the internal dynamic to allow for Jong-un's rise, it not only suggests that Jong-il isn't politically adept, but has to cast doubt on whether Jong-un will be allowed to come to power at all.

Platapus · 11-23-10, 08:28 PM

Kinda makes one think about what the South Koreans have on Yeonpyeong island.

yubba · 11-23-10, 08:21 PM

OMG, North vs South. Spy vs Spy, East vs West, when will it end ? I know when they ,who ever they, think they are, those who decide they are the rulers of the new world order, that think 2 thirds of us should die so that we don't suck up thier perious air. Question where do you fit in those thirds ? By the way bone up on your chinesse. Death by a thousand cuts, so what will Iran do ? TSA, Thousands Standing Around.

11-23-10, 06:44 PM	#6
Castout Silent Hunter Join Date: Nov 2006 Location: Jakarta Posts: 4,794 Downloads: 89 Uploads: 6	I think North has a lot of scuds that's capable of reaching Seoul if I'm not mistaken . . . . and if they able to armed it with nuclear . . . __________________ My blog: http://exposingsingapore.wordpress.com/

11-23-10, 07:32 PM	#10
CCIP Navy Seal Join Date: Apr 2005 Location: Waterloo, Canada Posts: 8,700 Downloads: 29 Uploads: 2	What's the stance of the US forces over there these days? If there is a sudden "major escalation", e.g. a full-on exchange of fire across the DMZ, can we assume that US assets in theater will be immediately committed alongside the ROK, or is that something that's gonna develop slowly? Are they still technically Combined Forces? __________________ There are only forty people in the world and five of them are hamburgers. -Don Van Vliet (aka Captain Beefheart)

11-23-10, 08:28 PM	#14
Platapus Fleet Admiral Join Date: Oct 2006 Posts: 19,362 Downloads: 63 Uploads: 0	Kinda makes one think about what the South Koreans have on Yeonpyeong island. __________________ abusus non tollit usum - A right should NOT be withheld from people on the basis that some tend to abuse that right.

11-23-10, 08:03 PM	#11
Oberon Lucky Jack Join Date: Jul 2002 Posts: 25,976 Downloads: 61 Uploads: 20	It's still a joint op, it was going to split in April 2012, but they've pushed it back to 2015. If Kim comes over the border, what's left of him will be hit hard by US and ROK forces. As I was saying on another forum earlier today, I would be very surprised if any DPRK advance got further than Seoul. They have the manpower yes, but their equipment is terrible, morale is terrible and tactics are terrible. The question is not can we beat Kim, but how far should we go? Do we drive them all the way back to Pyongyang and risk China stepping in? Or do we do a deal with China in which we stop at the DMZ and let China come in from the North under the guise of 'protecting' the DPRK but in reality to do a spot of regime rearranging?

11-23-10, 08:21 PM	#13
seanobrgp Swabbie Join Date: Oct 2010 Location: Newport, Rhode Island Posts: 5 Downloads: 0 Uploads: 0	Not to divert the discussion away from military deployments and armaments, but I had some thoughts on the context of the situation that might be relevant. Of course, I'm only a college student and hardly an expert, so take my reading for what it's worth. North Korea isn't as inscrutable as their reputation might suggest, but I feel the most important question arising out of the attack on Yeonpyeong is one we'll never have an answer to. Was the military acting of its own volition or were they given the consent of the Kim family? If the latter, then North Korea is continuing its practice of using external actions to further its internal narrative. The destruction of the Cheonan, for example, solidified the regime in the wake of its disastrous currency revaluation, and given their increasingly dire economic situation, they probably expected us to start a dialogue without requiring them to undertake verifiable nuclear disarmament. However, I think it's also plausible that the military is flaunting its independence as we close in on Kim Jong-un's ascent to power, and such a prospect would have serious ramifications for the entire region and the future of North Korea. In the aftermath of the Cheonan incident, but before the evidence of his culpability was made public, Kim Jong-il made a visit to China, where everyone thought that he was requesting additional military and humanitarian assistance. If he or a high profile delegation are seen in China in the next month, I'd interpret that as a state endorsement of what occured. If no such visit is forthcoming, it could indicate fragmentation amongst the establishment -- or nothing at all. Such is the nature of North Korea. Officially, the North Korean government is an institutional triumvirate: Choe Yong-rim is the country's premier and head of a Cabinet comprised of officials chosen by the elected Supreme People's Assembly. The Presidium Standing Committee of that Assembly has the authority to legislate when the body is not in session (it almost never is), and there is a judiciary of some form, though I don't believe it's ever been relevant. In actual practice, all of the power in the country is concentrated in the military establishment and Kim Jong-il's National Defense Commission, but I think it's important to remember that this is a rather new development in North Korean internal affairs. It wasn't until 1992 that the Commission was separated from the President's direct control, principally to allow Kim Jong-il, then serving as head of the Army, to oversee the entire military, and only the 1998 constitution made it an independent extension of the state endowed with executive authority accountable to no one. Though it may have been essential to maintaining the Eternal Leader's legacy, Kim Jong-il has only been a titular head of the Korean Worker's Party since 1997, never sought to proclaim himself President or establish any substantial political office, and his most intimate advisor -- the only man with his ear -- is O Kuk-Ryol, the military's most prominent figure. While everyone in the country is implicitly subordinate to him, Jong-il never made any effort to expand beyond the sphere of influence he was accorded while preparing to succeed his father; he simply re-defined the government to facilitate the military's preeminence, and I think that has made rule by anyone outside of it nearly impossible. The tacit significance of the 3rd Party Congress and Jong-un's unveiling in September, then, may have been that Kim Jong-il intended to revive North Korea's much neglected political apparatus and shift the balance back to them. Kim Jong-un can lead North Korea as an ideologue on name alone, and by crediting him with pioneering CNC industrial efforts, declaring his birthday a national holiday, and portraying him publicly as the enigmatic heir to the family's legacy, they are already well on their way to accomplishing that. But Kim Jong-il must also be aware that the military won't accept Jong-un as a suitable replacement, so he has appointed Jang Song-thaek, his brother-in-law and a consummate party insider who endured a purge earlier this decade, as Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission. The intent is probably for Jang to serve as Jong-un's prince regent, bridging the gap between the country's political and military institutions until Jong-un can assert his independence and define his own style of leadership. If Kim Jong-il has been unable to coalesce these interests, compensating for Jong-un's numerous inadequacies and transitioning the country away from strident military rule, then succession is imperiled and some form of insurrection is probably inevitable. But this is all conjecture: we only hear what North Korea wants us to hear, and if there are elements bristling at the prospect of another Kim, we won't know until they take distinguishable action. The Yeonpyeong incident could have been the first external sign of a fracture within the regime, an attempt to resuscitate diplomatic negotiations, or both. If Jong-il was attempting to stabilize the internal dynamic to allow for Jong-un's rise, it not only suggests that Jong-il isn't politically adept, but has to cast doubt on whether Jong-un will be allowed to come to power at all.

11-23-10, 08:21 PM	#15
yubba Admiral Join Date: Sep 2009 Location: in a neighborhood near you Posts: 2,478 Downloads: 293 Uploads: 2	OMG, North vs South. Spy vs Spy, East vs West, when will it end ? I know when they ,who ever they, think they are, those who decide they are the rulers of the new world order, that think 2 thirds of us should die so that we don't suck up thier perious air. Question where do you fit in those thirds ? By the way bone up on your chinesse. Death by a thousand cuts, so what will Iran do ? TSA, Thousands Standing Around.