As the new American president shook allied capitals all over the world, a Virginia-class submarine — the USS Minnesota — arrived at a port in western Australia for the first of many routine Australian port visits slated for American submarines this year. It seemed like a positive signal for the U.S.-Australian alliance. And, despite uncertainty over America’s commitments, officials in the Trump administration have praised the AUKUS security compact.
Still, these are the only sorts of Virginia-class submarines Australians should expect to arrive on their shores anytime soon: visiting American submarines crewed by Americans. Despite the promises of the first and core pillar of the AUKUS security compact, the United States simply won’t have enough Virginia-class submarines to spare. To make matters worse, the SSN AUKUS — meant to be Australia’s long-term solution — is likely to encounter significant delays and issues, similar to Britain’s past submarine programs, due to challenges in design maturity, production capacity, and technical complexities, making it an unreliable solution for Australia’s submarine needs. Faced with a stark reality, it is time for Australia to reconsider its options.
As readers of War on the Rocks likely remember, in September 2021, the Biden administration and its counterparts in Australia and the United States announced a new “enhanced trilateral security partnership” in 2021, called AUKUS. Made up of two pillars — one on submarines and the other on advanced technology sharing — it was and remains aimed at deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, mainly against China.
The crux of this is the transition from Australia’s older Collins-class submarines to nuclear-powered attack submarines. The party most directly affected was France’s Naval Group, which had been contracted with Australia to deliver a fleet of conventionally powered submarines (a variant of the nuclear-powered French Suffren design), to be produced in Australia — a deal worth tens of billions of dollars and representing a substantial French industrial investment. Needless to say, ties between Australia and France — itself a significant power in the Indo-Pacific — have never fully recovered, with the latter understandably perceiving this secretly negotiated deal with Washington and London as a dramatic betrayal. And Australia, having already spent $2.6 billion (Australian) on the project, was forced to pay over $800 million in penalties to Naval Group for reneging on the deal.
Under the latest AUKUS plans, Australia is promised three Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the United States at three-year intervals, starting in 2032, to fill the gap left by Australia’s aging Collins-class submarines. After this, a new class of submarine, known as SSN-AUKUS, is supposed to be on the way. It is based on a British design but incorporating technology from all three AUKUS nations. A further two Virginia-class submarines may be sold to Australia to cover any delays in the arrival of SSN-AUKUS. In order to make all of this happen, Australia is paying heftily, investing in both the American and British submarine industrial bases. This includes a $3 billion investment planned over the next four years. To be sure, this funding is also aimed at helping set up Australia’s own emerging submarine industrial base in Adelaide and to allow for Australian professionals to work in U.S. shipyards. But, over four years later, it is prudent for Australian leaders to finally look more critically at where this choice has taken Australia’s ability to project naval and undersea power.
The Virginias Aren’t Coming
The United States currently faces a significant shortfall in the number of operational nuclear submarines, as ageing Los Angeles-class submarines retire faster than replacement Virginia-class submarines can be commissioned. This makes it impractical for the United States to fulfill its promise of selling three to five Virginia-class submarines to Australia without degrading its own undersea capabilities. Key American leaders such as Sen. Roger Wicker, now the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, seemed to recognize this as early as 2023, but investments in America’s maritime and — specifically — nuclear submarine production capacity are coming much too late. The recent Government Audit Office report highlights shortcomings in the coordination and effectiveness of the significant sums being invested, including by Australia.
The pandemic had a dramatic impact on the two shipyards building Virginia-class submarines: General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries. In addition, many small industries in the supply chain were badly affected, resulting in a large backlog as partly built nuclear submarines accumulated in the shipyards. Outsourcing construction of modules to other U.S. shipyards will assist but it is doubtful that this will overcome the backlog or fill the gaps in capacity in the two major shipyards and their supply chains by the early 2030s. There is a similar backlog in shipyards undertaking maintenance on the in-service submarines.
The United States is struggling to clear the backlog and achieve a tempo of 2.3 boat deliveries per year, in order to sell Australia the three to five submarines required under AUKUS. The sale is conditional, however, because under the AUKUS legislation the U.S. president must certify to Congress 270 days before any sale that the transfer of a Virginia will not “degrade U.S. underseas capabilities.” Given the current shortfall in U.S. Navy nuclear submarine numbers and the difficult recovery ahead, selling a submarine, up-to-date for maintenance and with at least 15 years of reactor life remaining, is bound to degrade American capabilities.
