From bad to worse: why the forgotten war is failing

[Skybird]

http://www.spiegel.de/international/...510674,00.html

(...)
The commander sits in a chair, his back to the television set, and points to a military map on the wall. "You see," he says, "I am responsible for an area half the size of Italy." Then he rattles off the relevant statistics. Of the 1,800 soldiers under his command, only 270 can go on patrol. If he sends two units out on patrol, they can easily find themselves operating 400 kilometers (249 miles) apart. "It's as if one of them were in Turin and the other in Venice," says the general.
(...)
The news that reaches Berlin from Afghanistan these days is simply too horrific. Members of parliament who have visited the country describe a place on the verge of collapse. Instead of declining, the problems of poverty, corruption, violence and sheer hopelessness are on the rise. Government institutions are virtually nonexistent in many parts of the country, the police are corrupt and overworked and the military isn't in much better shape. The effects of Western development aid go largely unnoticed by much of the population.
The security situation is also becoming more and more precarious. More than 5,000 people were killed in attacks or combat during the first nine months of this year alone. According to a United Nations report, acts of violence have increased by close to 30 percent this year. Three-quarters of the attacks are directed against Afghan soldiers, police officers and foreign troops, "in a deliberate and calculated effort to impede the establishment of legitimate government institutions," the UN report states.
The situation on the military front is unclear. In a Sep. 18 classified report labeled "Urgent" to the governments of European Union member states, the EU's special envoy in Kabul, Spain's Francesc Vendrell, identifies a "paradoxical trend." "While ISAF is achieving significant military successes against the insurgents, especially as a result of targeted attacks on Taliban commanders," Vendrell writes, "the unsafe zone in which the insurgents operate is growing." Even a weak Taliban presence is sufficient, Vendrell continues, to bring "normal government activities to an end" and to bring large segments of the population under the influence of the insurgents.
Vendrell's conclusions coincide with the results of a study by the Senlis Council, an international think tank, which conducted a survey in March of 12,000 Afghan men in the southern and eastern sections of the country, regions which have seen fierce fighting. The study's conclusions were devastating. In late 2001, the vast majority of Afghans believed that the Taliban had been defeated once and for all. Today only half of those surveyed are convinced that international forces will win the war against the insurgents in southern Afghanistan. It appears that although the Taliban is unlikely to win the war militarily, it is increasingly emerging victorious in the battle for public opinion. (...)

The German way had a good start as long as the conditions did not detoriate. When they did, Germany's trousers slipped down. Since close to six years, needed changes were not implemented by all nations committed to Afghnaistan, and needed support levels were missed by far by the international community. Where last winter I warned that the Afghanistan mission was running on a thin line between regaining previopusly detoriating chances for success, and total failure, I must conclude from analysis like this essay and personal feedback by people I know and who have to deal in that place professionally, that the Afghanistan war is lost for sure, since I see no realistic chance anymore that Western governments would ever give it the ressources and attention that it would take to throw around the rudder again. and that would mean an incrasing of committment on all levels and in all aspects, financially, economically, militarily, by several hundred percent. Guess yourself how realistic that is - not more realistic than to see the Us sending 300.000 additional troops into Iraq.

The plain down-to-earth conclusion: after six years of war, NATO states have lost two major internatio0nal engagements - totally, completely, and miserably. Western governments will squirm for another, probably longer time to come before finding some formulations and half-truths behind which they could hide when retreating. This will only delay the score becoming offical - it will not prevent it anymore.

Fools in office thought they could repair in a cheap, easy way, what a quarter of a century of constant war has destroyed. As fools they came, and as fools they will leave.

"Trapped in the Afghan maze."

[CB..]

i don't pretend to have any great in depth knowledge of the situation..but there is one fundamental thing that keeps cropping up..

"we" have a clearly defined military...which is seperate from the normal civilian population..and has it's own rules...and expectations..and definitions of victory and defeat...it also has expectations of what should happen when an enemy's countrys military is engaged fought and defeated....they surrender ...and the enemy civilian government then negotiates with the civilian government of the victorious nation..

the Afghans don't actualy have a clearly defined and seperate military "army" "airforce" etc...their fighters are for the most part civilians with weapons...with entirely different views on what consitutes victory and defeat...and no matter what else comes into play regarding the rights and wrongs of those civilians beliefs politics or anything else for that matter....the military CANNOT defeat the civilian population of any country...because civilians have no concept of military rules of engagement...
the goal posts for each side are not on the same playing "pitch"

they are not even fighting the same war....
the civilian population of any country cannot surrender...it's simply not possible there is no political mechanism that allows them to surrender..
so..neither side can win and neither side can lose...and only one side can withdraw...
too many people have died allready....

[JALU3]

So as in previous conflicts what have we learned . . . there is no substitute for victory and determined occupation and rebuilding once victorious. Without it, it allows, old factions, and new factions to be born, grow, and threaten the government which you attempt to establish. Unless you build a strong and stable government, built on good theories, and backed back a strong force, then that government will give way to those elements which will back themselves with greater force, thus replacing it.
In this case, we have not provided a strong enough force, and have allowed the government to remain weak. This means that there is no economic or physical security for the people. Thus the people seek those they believe will bring economic and physical stability.
That is not to say with a lot more effort we cannot reestablish Kabul's governance over its lands . . . however, if we do not do more . . . the current situation will continue to deteriate.
And let us not say that we cannot.
For we Can. We have larger economies, and greater access to resources then we did in the pass. Furthermore, we have more people, and a larger manpool which to draw forces which to create a stable and successful endeavor. The question is whether we have the combined willpower to take all these advantages, focus them, and bring our abilities to bear true weight on the situation.
At this junction we, as an international community, lack any willpower at all.

[Skybird]

Originally Posted by JALU3

So as in previous conflicts what have we learned . . . there is no substitute for victory and determined occupation and rebuilding once victorious. Without it, it allows, old factions, and new factions to be born, grow, and threaten the government which you attempt to establish. Unless you build a strong and stable government, built on good theories, and backed back a strong force, then that government will give way to those elements which will back themselves with greater force, thus replacing it.
In this case, we have not provided a strong enough force, and have allowed the government to remain weak. This means that there is no economic or physical security for the people. Thus the people seek those they believe will bring economic and physical stability.
That is not to say with a lot more effort we cannot reestablish Kabul's governance over its lands . . . however, if we do not do more . . . the current situation will continue to deteriate.
And let us not say that we cannot.
For we Can. We have larger economies, and greater access to resources then we did in the pass. Furthermore, we have more people, and a larger manpool which to draw forces which to create a stable and successful endeavor. The question is whether we have the combined willpower to take all these advantages, focus them, and bring our abilities to bear true weight on the situation.
At this junction we, as an international community, lack any willpower at all.

For most of history if not all, Kabul's power always ended at the border of the capital'S district. Beyond that, the tribes had and have the saying.

For the same reason the model of establishing a state in the way it was outlined in the opening paragraph, most likely will not work, or only would work for a limited period of time. It's like letting free sweetwater-fish in a pond of saltwater. Due to the immense cultural difference, we should not assume that recipes we used in rebuilding Western or comparable nations after wars in the past, would work here so easily as well. Note how many states that are so-called "failed" states display a comparable social-cultural environemnt comparable to the society Afghans have lived by for eons.

but that is achademical chatter. Point is that if we would have wished to keep the Taleban out once and forever, we would have needed to go in with much more determination, effort, ressources, forces (which then again would have meet growing resistance of the tribe leaders) and prepared to stay there instead of shifting the military focus to another place (America -> Iraq), whereas Germany thought that some gestures alone would do the job of securing endless thankfulness of the Afghans which then would take care of the Taleban themselves. Don't get your hands dirty, was the German motto. But the truth is: in Afghanistan rule only three masters: hunger and how to calm it, tradition and blood feud, and the greater number of rifles. these cannot be hindered by idealism alone. what use has building a school, if the children get ambushed and killed, and parents then do not dare to send their children to that place again. And wanting to limit poppy cultivation has no meaning if the income of farmers depends on it due to lacking alternatives and financial interests of warlords that can field more heavily armed armies than the Kabulistan government.

The list of priorities has been a terrible mess from the beginning. And this is true for ALL nations that got engaged there in any form. the will to do what was needed was not there in the beginning, and it is even smaller now. that Pakistan is accepted to interfere so massively in Afghanistan since decades, is of no real help either. It better is described as an additional obstacle, and support for the enemy. Don't be fooled by the current military sweep of the Pakistani along their border. It has no real meaning and is not representative for their intentions. It's immense American pressure that made them doing it, more or less against the will of major parts of the intel and military community. Also, in the past five years the Pakistani LOST all major engagements in the tribal areas in the long run, or saw their gains (intentionally?) being neutralized afterwards. No Pakistani military leader, so very many having storng sympathies for the Taleban anyway, is happy to push into these territories, knowing very well that the people there have the will and the means to make life extremely unpleasant for any invading governmental force. That's why they enjoyed almost autonomy for very long time: the government tried to ignore them and not to deal with them as best as it could.

[JALU3]

I have said this before, and I have said this elsewhere, and I shall say it again. They said that Japanese Culture was incompatible with democracy, yet Japan was able to become democracy after over a decade of heavy occupation, rebuilding, and guidence. Afghanistan has lacked that, and you're right . . . past efforts and current efforts have been miminal at best. Furthermore, what you are saying regarding secure and economy I cannot agree with you more.
Same would go anywhere else . . . what use is it to build a school when you cannot defend those who attend it, or who travel to attend it. Back when there was the sniper on the US East Coast in 2002, parents would not send their children to school, and some people stopped travelling, in order to garuntee their well being. Not until people felt secure to continue their daily lives did they decide to leave their homes to continue life. So it is anywhere else. Therefore, it's no suprise people don't wish to go to schools, some which were built with explosives directly in the walls. And then you mention the lack of economic advancement. Well if the only market which they can afford to feed their family is poppy, is it no suprise that market forces have lead them to continue to grow it. Look at what happened with the ill supported efforts at starting wheat production. They were only given the seeds, weren't assisted in getting it to market (as poppys are), aren't paid in advance for production (as poppys are), and those who were able to get the product to market found a weak price for their product. Therefore market forces lead them to continue to grow poppies. For groups backed by anti-government forces (taliban included), provide the economic backing which make poppy production economically viable for those farmers . . . and thus they reap profit once the product is sold.

Therefore, as I have stated before, to combat anti-government forces . . . it will take bringing physical and economic security in order to influence the populace to side with th Kabul government. Without either, the degredation of the country will continue unabatted. This goes with any nation in the world. Thus what is needed to end this degredation, I have already stated. Now the real question is whether the international community, including my nation, has the willpower to take our resources and back the government of afghanistan properly in order for it to bring physical and economic security.

[Skybird]

Well, I still think you are massively underestimating the power of local traditions, the ties of a tribal structure like to be seen in Afghnaistan, and last but not least the striking power (not necessarily militarily) of the ideology the West is up against. Also, japan was totally defeated, defenselss from A to Z, and has given up and surrendered collectively, totally, and was under undisputed influence and control of the victor. This is not the case in Iraq or Afghanistan, and never will be the case, since there is no way in which it could be acchieved without warfare on the scale of WWII again. Then, I dare say that beside the excesses of WWII, like Germany, Japan is a much more civilised culture than Afghanistan, with a higher level of moral and social, technological, educational etc. developement, whith a higher degree of humane morals and ethics, making the abyss between america and Japan look like a narrow pond, compared to the abyss between Quranic views of the world, and western civilisation. And finally, one need to look closer at Japanese politics and economy to see that these systems have gone a very different road than democracies in the West, and market societies in the West. the hidden powers behind the stage of official labels like democracy and market economy reveal almost unmoving, unchanging clans or blocks of interest groups who may compete with each other when being left alone, but towards the outside world are being allied in a spirit of unification, rallying and block-defending that is without a second example anywhere in the world, maybe with the exception of China, I don't know. Collective nationalistic block thinking and mutual support even between rivaling corporations, to defend against the outside, is extremely strong in Japan, stronger than anything economical that we know in the West. I have read authors saying that the Japanese democracy, if only looking close enough, compares closer to the democarcy they had in the former GDR, or the cooperation of different clans in the system of Mafias, than to democracies as being defined by Western constitutions.

But all that has no relevance for the situation in Islamic nations anyway. they do not compare neither to the post-war germany, nor the post-war Japan, nor do they have comparable starting conditions. One cannot compare tennis with football. and saying football matches could end 40 to love if only the team would unleash the needed ressources.