"The 25th anniversary of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan"

[Oberon]

When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains,
And the women come out to cut up what remains,
Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains
An' go to your Gawd like a soldier.
Go, go, go like a soldier,
Go, go, go like a soldier,
Go, go, go like a soldier,
So-oldier of the Queen!

[Dan D]

Originally Posted by Oberon

As an armchair-general I own the book „Military Blunders“ by Saul David which describes military disasters from ancient times to modern times of military history. The book is devided into 5 chapters:

1. incompetent commanders (e.g. Crimean war-charge of the light brigade)
2. catastrophic plans (e.g. Arnheim Fiasco)
3. interference by politcans (e.g.Stalingrad)
4. exaggerated self-conficence (e.g.General Custer)
5. troop failure (e.g.Kasserine Pass)

(my translations)

The book starts with the chapter „incompentent commanders“, subchapter: „Elphey Bey and the retreat from Kabul“, 1842, during the Frist Afghan-British war (1838-1842). Is that what you are refering too?

If so, military historians seem to agree that the incompetence of the commander was the reason for the British defeat.

Then my question would be: do the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the US-lead Nato occupation of Afghanistan belong into one of the five categories as described above, and if so, which one and why.

[Oberon]

Aye, that would be the one, the 1842 Retreat from Kabul. Terrible mess that was, and well deserving of its entry in that book.
The NATO-Afghan war...I think would belong in three and four, with a touch of two. The actual invasion plans were sound, the military operations fairly straightforward. It was everything after that went wrong. NATO went into Afghanistan thinking that a) there would be minimal insurgent activity post-victory, and b) that they would be welcomed as liberators by the local populace and be able to westernise and 'free' the public. It backfired completely and while a great deal of Afghan general public are indeed much happier for the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan...they also know that when they leave, it's the Soviet withdrawal all over again.
The Soviet one, I honestly couldn't say, I think perhaps again an underestimation of the strength of the insurgent activity, although that was aided by the US.

Out of interest and since I haven't read the book, which commander do they refer to as incompetant in the Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava? The only one that I could think of, really, would be Captain Nolan for his vague response to Lucans question of what guns to attack. Raglans plan was good, but the communication between Raglan and Lucan was poor and that's primarily what lead to the disasterous charge. Although admittedly, Lucans refusal to commit the Heavy Brigade was rather daft although in hindsight probably saved a lot of them from being mown down.
Cardigan was a bit of a jerk, but it wasn't really his decision to mount the charge.

[August]

While incompetence for the British defeat might have been the reason it was the times that exacerbated it into a massacre. Back then garrisons were cut off from each other to a degree that is hardly imaginable today. Relief for a besieged outpost was months away, there was no ELINT to know about anything about what was outside the wire beyond the range of the mark 1 eyeball, the archaic medical technology of the time could not keep the troops healthy and their weapons were not nearly as effective to mention a few differences. Had Ephinstones Army marched in 2012 instead of 1842 it would have had a wildly different outcome.

Not to say that it couldn't be done. The retreat of the 10,000 Greeks out of Persia in 401bc is a great example of what can be done with competent leaders and disciplined troops.