SUBSIM Radio Room Forums - "The 25th anniversary of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan"

SUBSIM Radio Room Forums (https://www.subsim.com/radioroom/index.php)

- General Topics (https://www.subsim.com/radioroom/forumdisplay.php?f=175)

- - "The 25th anniversary of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan" (https://www.subsim.com/radioroom/showthread.php?t=218517)

"The 25th anniversary of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan"

"It was the last hot conflict of the Cold War: the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan between Christmas 1979 and February 1989. 25 years ago today (15.02.), the last Soviet soldiers left the country, defiantly waving their banners and insisting they had not lost. A truce with Ahmad Shah Massud, the main northern mujahedin leader, had secured them an almost smooth withdrawal. The Soviet-backed regime held out unexpectedly for three more years, before collapsing after Yeltsin’s Russia stopped aid and major components of the armed forces defected to the mujahedin. Today, with the withdrawal of NATO combat troops looming, there is the question of whether history will repeat itself".

AAN’s (Afghanistan Analysts Network) Senior Analyst Thomas Ruttig, who was in Kabul in 1989, looks back and also scrutinises what advice former Soviet general have for today’s foreign forces.

http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/...m-afghanistan/
________

Take it away, fellow subsimers.

The graveyard of Empires.

Here's a page from an American and her visit to Afganistan in the 60s and it seems that it would be better if the Soviets had won.
The invasion was on the request of the government as help against the Mujahadeens and the country really went downhill after they retreated.

The link I refer to was posted 15/02/2015. It refers to an article from 15/02/2014. So for the math nazis, 26 years woudl be correct, true, but I "quoted" the original title from "2014" which I found here:
http://augengeradeaus.net/page/3/

It's likely that history will now repeat itself in the wake of the NATO withdrawal. One day I must read Peter Hopkirks 'The Great Game', the poignancy of which is underlined to me by this bit on wikipedia:

Quote:

After the fall of Kabul to Afghan mujahideen forces in 1992, the last Soviet-backed president of Afghanistan, Mohammad Najibullah, sought refuge in the capital's UN compound. In 1996, when the Taliban took the city, they promptly seized and murdered him. However, during his time at the UN compound, he began translating The Great Game into his mother tongue Pashto, so that "They [Afghans] can see how our history has repeated itself...Only if we understand our history can we take steps to break the cycle". Years later, Hopkirk was quoted as saying, "I’m not sure what became of Najibullah’s translation...I know that it found its way to India where his wife and children had been given asylum. Sadly, after that the trail goes cold.”

That proves just one thing

Markus

Wow, this is considered hard core porn now! Porn sholders! This lady would be stoned to death now, dressed like that!:dead:
http://denverpost.slideshowpro.com/a...JPG?1424461654

Actually that was part of the rift when the USSR got involved some Afghans more liberal others more traditional in fact a few of the super fundamental types beheaded some Soviet teachers prior to the 1979 invasion of course it was realty about Soviet speheres of influence and not all or even half of Afghans that fought the Soviets where hardcore Fundy I'm guessing that many of those guys immigrated to other countries once they saw that things where not going well in the early 90's. Of course its all ISI(Pakistani military intelligence) with the puppet strings. In the 80s they sold portions of the ammo supplied by the CIA then got more simply saying rounds complete (dope on rope CIA American dude) so they supplied the muhajdeen and made a massive profit to fund things pure genius.

Oh here is how the majority of the good muj got wasted ISI cut off thier supply and access to santuray in Paki. The rest are now selling you gasoline beer and tobacco often to a stranger they'll say they are from Pakistan really they are good guy Afghani vets

I reckon the lesson every government should heed (Britain probably being the first in modern times)....STAY OUT OF AFGHANISTAN.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Jimbuna (Post 2289766)

I reckon the lesson every government should heed (Britain probably being the first in modern times)....STAY OUT OF AFGHANISTAN.

You'd have thought we'd have learnt the first three times... :dead:

Quote:

Originally Posted by Oberon (Post 2289804)

You'd have thought we'd have learnt the first three times... :dead:

Most sobering:

Quote:

At first light on 6 January Elphinstone's column began to slowly move out of Kabul leaving Shuja Shah Durrani and his followers to their fate. As Akbar Khan had guaranteed safety to all concerned, the sick, wounded and infirm were also left behind. However once the rearguard finally left the cantonments, Afghans quickly moved in firing at the retreating troops while setting fire to the garrison buildings killing all those left behind.

On leaving the city, Elphinstone discovered that the escort promised by Akbar Khan had not materialised, neither had the food and fuel to help with the crossing of the Hindu Kush in winter. Major Eldred Pottinger pleaded with the sick British commander to turn back to Kabul as they still had time to take refuge in the fortress of Bala Hissar. But Elphinstone said there would be no turning back and they would proceed to Jalalabad. The column of 16,000 soldiers and civilians was now at the mercy of the Afghan tribes.

By the second day, sniping from the surrounding hills was taking its toll on the slow-moving column. Despite being well armed, the troops' progress was being hindered by the terrified civilians and camp followers. Small skirmishes were frequent. The Afghans succeeded in capturing some of the column's artillery while forcing the British to spike two of their three remaining pieces. In just 24 hours the column now had only one small gun and two heavier cannons left. Later that afternoon, Akbar Khan met Elphinstone, feigning ignorance to any treachery on his part. He told the British that he had been unable to provide the agreed escort because they had left their cantonments earlier than expected. Akbar Khan then asked Elphinstone to wait while he negotiated the column's safe passage with the Afghan chiefs who commanded Khord-Kabul pass 15 miles (24 km) from Kabul. Despite what had already occurred, the British commander agreed to the terms and waited. He also agreed to hand over three more European hostages to Akbar Khan.

Instead of hurrying forward, Elphinstone had moved only 6 miles (9.7 km) from Kabul. By now efforts to maintain military cohesion had also began to fail. When the column entered the narrow 4-mile pass the next day, they were shot at from all sides by Ghilzais armed with captured British muskets and their traditional jezails. It was now apparent Akbar Khan had not been negotiating their safe passage; it was actually a ruse to give the Afghans more time to get into position for an ambush. Throughout the third day, the column laboured through the pass. Once the main body had moved through, the Afghans left their positions to massacre the stragglers and the wounded. By the evening of 9 January, the column had only moved 25 miles (40 km) but already 3,000 people had died. Most had been killed in the fighting, but some had frozen to death or taken their own lives.

By the fourth day, a few hundred soldiers deserted and tried to return to Kabul but they were all killed. By now Elphinstone, who had ceased giving orders, sat silently on his horse. On the evening of 11 January, Lady Sale, along with the wives and children of both British and Indian officers, and their retinues, accepted Akbar Khan's assurances of protection. Despite deep mistrust, the group was taken into the custody of Akbar's men. However once they were hostages, all the Indian servants and sepoy wives were murdered. Akbar Khan's envoys then returned and persuaded Elphinstone and his second in command, Brigadier John Shelton, to become hostages, too. Both senior officers agreed to surrender, abandoning their men to their fate. Elphinstone died on 23 April as a captive.

By 12 January, the column had been reduced to 200 soldiers and 2,000 camp followers. The remaining troops, now led by Brigadier Thomas John Anquetil, reached the Jugdulluk crest only to find it blocked by tribesmen. A desperate attack was mounted but only two groups of soldiers eventually broke through the Afghan lines. While a 12-man mounted group moved forward to reconnoitre the plains towards Jalalabad, the other group, consisting of 20 officers and 45 European soldiers, mostly infantry from the 44th Regiment of Foot, found themselves surrounded on a snowy hillock near the village of Gandamak. With only 20 working muskets and two shots per weapon, the troops refused to surrender. A British sergeant is said to have cried "not bloody likely!" when the Afghans tried to persuade the soldiers they would spare their lives. Sniping then began, followed by a series of rushes; soon the hillock was overrun by tribesmen. An officer named Captain Souter was mistaken by the Afghans as a high-ranking officer because they thought he was wearing a general's yellow waistcoat. In fact the officer had wrapped the regimental colours of the 44th Foot around his body. He was dragged into captivity along with a sergeant named Fair and seven privates. The remaining troops were killed.[14]

On 13 January, a British officer from the 16,000 strong column rode into Jalalabad on a wounded horse (a few sepoys, who had hidden in the mountains, followed in the coming weeks). The sole survivor of the 12-man cavalry group, assistant Surgeon William Brydon, was asked upon arrival what happened to the army, to which he answered "I am the army". Although part of his skull had been sheared off by a sword, he ultimately survived because he had insulated his hat with a magazine which deflected the blow. Brydon later published a memoir of the death march. The pony he rode was said to have lain down in a stable and never got up. For several nights bugles were sounded from the walls of Jalalabad in the hope of guiding any further survivors to safety.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1842_retreat_from_Kabul

Quote:

When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains,
And the women come out to cut up what remains,
Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains
An' go to your Gawd like a soldier.
Go, go, go like a soldier,
Go, go, go like a soldier,
Go, go, go like a soldier,
So-oldier of the Queen!

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...f_an_army2.jpg

Quote:

Originally Posted by Dan D (Post 2289650)

"....the last Soviet soldiers left the country, defiantly waving their banners and insisting they had not lost....

<find> <Replace> Soviet with American

Has anything changed?

Quote:

Originally Posted by Oberon (Post 2289821)

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...f_an_army2.jpg

As an armchair-general I own the book „Military Blunders“ by Saul David which describes military disasters from ancient times to modern times of military history. The book is devided into 5 chapters:

incompetent commanders (e.g. Crimean war-charge of the light brigade)
catastrophic plans (e.g. Arnheim Fiasco)
interference by politcans (e.g.Stalingrad)
exaggerated self-conficence (e.g.General Custer)
troop failure (e.g.Kasserine Pass)

(my translations)

The book starts with the chapter „incompentent commanders“, subchapter: „Elphey Bey and the retreat from Kabul“, 1842, during the Frist Afghan-British war (1838-1842). Is that what you are refering too?

If so, military historians seem to agree that the incompetence of the commander was the reason for the British defeat.

Then my question would be: do the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the US-lead Nato occupation of Afghanistan belong into one of the five categories as described above, and if so, which one and why.

Aye, that would be the one, the 1842 Retreat from Kabul. Terrible mess that was, and well deserving of its entry in that book.
The NATO-Afghan war...I think would belong in three and four, with a touch of two. The actual invasion plans were sound, the military operations fairly straightforward. It was everything after that went wrong. NATO went into Afghanistan thinking that a) there would be minimal insurgent activity post-victory, and b) that they would be welcomed as liberators by the local populace and be able to westernise and 'free' the public. It backfired completely and while a great deal of Afghan general public are indeed much happier for the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan...they also know that when they leave, it's the Soviet withdrawal all over again.
The Soviet one, I honestly couldn't say, I think perhaps again an underestimation of the strength of the insurgent activity, although that was aided by the US.

Out of interest and since I haven't read the book, which commander do they refer to as incompetant in the Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava? The only one that I could think of, really, would be Captain Nolan for his vague response to Lucans question of what guns to attack. Raglans plan was good, but the communication between Raglan and Lucan was poor and that's primarily what lead to the disasterous charge. Although admittedly, Lucans refusal to commit the Heavy Brigade was rather daft although in hindsight probably saved a lot of them from being mown down.
Cardigan was a bit of a jerk, but it wasn't really his decision to mount the charge. :hmmm:

While incompetence for the British defeat might have been the reason it was the times that exacerbated it into a massacre. Back then garrisons were cut off from each other to a degree that is hardly imaginable today. Relief for a besieged outpost was months away, there was no ELINT to know about anything about what was outside the wire beyond the range of the mark 1 eyeball, the archaic medical technology of the time could not keep the troops healthy and their weapons were not nearly as effective to mention a few differences. Had Ephinstones Army marched in 2012 instead of 1842 it would have had a wildly different outcome.

Not to say that it couldn't be done. The retreat of the 10,000 Greeks out of Persia in 401bc is a great example of what can be done with competent leaders and disciplined troops.