An Alternate History Idea

[Aktungbby]

Originally Posted by Leandros

But......what shall the U-boats do now......?

Fred

The key to the whole thing is world domination which means across the "English speaking pond" and into the Western Hemisphere! Since the Fascist regime under COL. Perón is available as of 1941(with Evita) this is the proper geographic base for the IX U-boots' longer range; (Bye Bye Falklands and St Helena) They can strike the African coast (Freetown-Capetown) more readily as well. Throw in the oil rich Dutch Antilles: (Bonaire, Curacao and Aruba) after the fall of Holland and Venezuela is cut off as well and the Panama Canal becomes a turkey shoot. The type VII's operate out of Iceland, Norway and the Azores and Ibeza in the Baleares, chopping off the Mediterranean "at the the gut", Gibraltar, under Fascist Franco.
The real key is sea power; Napoleon never got it and der Fuhrer, an admitted "coward at sea" is copying every mistake of his predecessor, including a winter war in Russia.

[Dread Knot]

Originally Posted by Leandros

In my opinion, Barbarossa was a very close thing. What if the German generals had been allowed to use the German skill of maneuverability to improve their defensive positions when winter set in and Moscow had not been reached?

But would the fall of Leningrad or even Moscow have meant the defeat of the Soviet Union? In 1941 the Soviet Union endured the capture of numerous major cities, a huge percentage of crucial raw materials, and the loss of four million troops. Yet it still continued to fight. It had a vast and growing industrial base east of the Ural Mountains, well out of reach of German forces. And in Joseph Stalin it had one of the most ruthless leaders in world history—a man utterly unlikely to throw in the towel because of the loss of any city, no matter how prestigious.

A scenario involving a street by street fight for either city also ignores the arrival of 18 divisions of troops from Siberia—fresh, well-trained, and equipped for winter fighting. They had been guarding against a possible Japanese invasion, but a Soviet spy reliably informed Stalin that Japan would turn southward, toward the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines, thereby freeing them to come to the Moscow front. Historically, the arrival of these troops took the Germans by surprise, and an unexpected Soviet counteroffensive in early December 1941 produced a major military crisis. If indeed they went directly at either of these cities, they may have garnered the strength to break in the gates, but in my opinion, the eventual urban fight for Leningrad or Moscow would have made Stalingrad look like a training exercise.

[Marcello]

If Weserübung had not happened - would you have believed it could? The Germans were not teleported there.

If France, Holland and Belgium (Luxembourg, too....) had not been invaded and beaten in little more than a month - inclusive of the British Expeditionary Force - would you have believed it could?

The germans had a good army, a good air force and a willingness to make very risky bets, they had beaten France in 1870 and made to the gates of Paris in 1914. So surprising yes, but still an outcome very much in the cards.
That said land and air forces could make up for a lot, but not the lack of a proper navy. Even with luck on their side Norway still crippled the Kriegsmarine surface forces and in the event the geography for the Luftwaffe was a lot more favorable than, say for an attempt on Ireland. Note also that France fell in the meantime and Britain had to be defended, if not the campagn might have lasted longer and naval losses could have been greater still.

Hitler did not invade England when he should have

The basic condition was air supremacy, which was never achieved, to say nothing of the rest. And if the USSR was to be tackled, and it was the whole point of the war, 1941 was the year to do it.

[Marcello]

Also, while Napoleon did not get the details of naval warfare once you factor in the limitations he was operating under, that is insufficient resources to match the british ship for ship and a crippling shortage of trained manpower (being able to direct a ship of the line in a battleline is not something could be taught overnight) what he did was sound, if pretty textbook: build a fleet in being to stretch british resources. The alternative was investing more in commerce raiding. While the new french royal navy went in that direction planning wise after 1815 it is rather debatable it would have been all that more effective.

[Leandros]

Originally Posted by Marcello

The basic condition was air supremacy, which was never achieved.

Over London, no - over the Channel, yes.

Supremacy was never asked for - local and timely superiority was. Luckily, Hitler did not understand the important differences of these parameters.

The Luftwaffe orders in case of a Seelöwe was a reversal to the tactics used before Sept. 7th.

Royal Navy losses to Luftwaffe action up till the summer of 1940 was so severe (considered the Royal Navy leadership) that they went to the extreme precaution of banning all daylight operations in the Channel after the Kanalkampf in July and August as the RAF could not give proper protection.

Fred

[Rammstein0991]

You COULD have the conquest of Britain be a goal of this mod's campaign sure, but you would be best pushing that to 1944 at least, otherwise all that would be left to you is sailing to America and hoping to find something there worth sinking.

[Leandros]

Originally Posted by Rammstein0991

You COULD have the conquest of Britain be a goal of this mod's campaign sure, but you would be best pushing that to 1944 at least, otherwise all that would be left to you is sailing to America and hoping to find something there worth sinking.

That would be terrible...........!

Here is an alternative. My suggestion for the Germans to accept an invitation from the Irish to establish sea and air bases there wasn't really for the purpose of an invasion of the UK, that would probably not be necessary. It was more like an increased twist on the stranglehold of the North-Western Approaches.

Of course, Churchill would not give in because of that, he still had his cognac and cigars. Much of the supplies to England would then have to go on a northernly routing, even north of Iceland.

As a consequence of this Bomber Command would have to forget about Germany and strategic bombing to concentrate all their efforts to neutralize the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe bases in Ireland, mainly by night bombing, also to go looking for U-boats, something they were quite averse to in RL. So, the battle is still on.

Fred

[GJO]

Although many believe the population of Ireland to be anti-British, that does not mean they would have provided any comfort to the forces of Nazi Germany. This is a myth that has appeared many times in fiction but in reality the Irish are (and always have been) a strongly independent people albeit with strong ties to both Great Britain and the United States. Large numbers of young men from Ireland travelled across the border to join the British Army and RAF - many more in Ireland provided all manner of help and support for their friends in the UK.

The Irish nation had gained its independence after a long and hard struggle - they would not readily to give it up - had an attempt been made to occupy Ireland, it might well have brought the USA into the conflict much earlier. Nevertheless, the possibility was regarded as a real threat by the British Government and thousands of troops and aircraft were stationed near the border in Northern Ireland ready to repel any such action.

But hey, this is a game and without the British in the conflict who would there be to sink? Before the end of World War II the vast majority of ships at sea flew flags of the British Empire - the game wouldn't be the same if there were only friendly or neutral ships to sink.

The game is a very good one based on the brave exploits of some of the most daring combatants in the conflict but we must never forget that in real life it wasn't a game. The Germans and their allies were following a power hungry madman on a course for certain destruction. The ordinary people of Germany and the countries that they occupied suffered unbelievably as a result. For those reasons, even in countries where a majority were sympathetic to the Nazi ideal, resistance and sabotage against them was carried out on a huge scale. My own father owes his life to an anonymous saboteur in a German munitions plant - the shell that should have blown him to Kingdom Come was a dud - examination by the UXB team revealed that the fuse had been deliberately sabotaged.

[Marcello]

Originally Posted by Leandros

Over London, no - over the Channel, yes.

Supremacy was never asked for - local and timely superiority was. Luckily, Hitler did not understand the important differences of these parameters.

The Luftwaffe orders in case of a Seelöwe was a reversal to the tactics used before Sept. 7th.

Royal Navy losses to Luftwaffe action up till the summer of 1940 was so severe (considered the Royal Navy leadership) that they went to the extreme precaution of banning all daylight operations in the Channel after the Kanalkampf in July and August as the RAF could not give proper protection.

Fred

Without an invasion there were good reasons to minimize warships losses in the Channel if that could be done. With an invasion everything that floats or flies would be thrown at it, losses be damned. The Kriegsmarine was in shambles so the Luftwaffe would have to carry the burden of dealing with both the RAF and the Home fleet pressing forward no matter how many ships they lost.And the bridgeheads might need support in the meantime too.
The Luftwaffe torpedo bomber force in 1940 was a rather pathetic affair, to the point that italian assistance was eventually required, and if I have understood correctly not much in the way of proper AP bombs were in the inventory until late 1940, which should be an hint of how much anti-shipping was taken seriously (not much). Sinking destroyers hampered by carrying out rescue ops or scoring own goals like Z1 is one thing, wiping out (and given the stakes, nothing less will do) large naval formations determined to push throught quite an other. German amphibious transport capability was already insufficient, losses would have crippling effects.

[Leandros]

Originally Posted by Marcello

Without an invasion there were good reasons to minimize warships losses in the Channel if that could be done. With an invasion everything that floats or flies would be thrown at it, losses be damned. The Kriegsmarine was in shambles so the Luftwaffe would have to carry the burden of dealing with both the RAF and the Home fleet pressing forward no matter how many ships they lost.And the bridgeheads might need support in the meantime too..

The Home Fleet was never planned to intervene in the Channel. The RN had learnt their lesson. For the same reason many of their best destroyers would also be kept away from the Channel as those were integrated in the battleship and cruiser formations of the RN.

How much the Kriegsmarine was in shambles for the mission in hand can best be illustrated by the fact that they had assembled more than 3.000 vessels for the first day's assault.

Actually, according to some usually reliable sources - two being Churchill and Lord Alanbrooke, it is not at all sure that the RN would throw itself recklessly into a Channel struggle. Parts of the naval leadership was not keen to offer up their valuable ships to the Luftwaffe in case of an invasion. Their opinion was that the navys' mission was not to block an invasion but to secure British trade lines. That was the mission of the army. This fact has been much subdued after the war.

Even if they did, what RN had immediately available for a Channel struggle was pitifully little. Immediately being the key word..

Originally Posted by Marcello

The Luftwaffe torpedo bomber force in 1940 was a rather pathetic affair, to the point that italian assistance was eventually required....)..

Hmm....another slight misconception. The Kriegsmarine had, in their Küstenfliegers, a quite professional torpedo-bomber force. Actually, their anti-ship torpedo capacity was larger than the Coastal Command's at the time. Even inclusive the Swordfish'es of the FAA. Up till Fall of 1940 quite a few Allied merchants had been sunk by Küstenflieger He115's. They used torpedoes bought or license-built from Norway. These torpedoes were built by the same Norwegian factory (Horten) that made those that sank the cruiser Blücher. Also, Italian Whitehead torpedoes were purchased in this period. Later, when the torpedo missions were transferred from the navy to the Luftwaffe (1941), torpedo training was for a large part moved to Grosseto, Italy. But, that was later. Many of the pilots of KG's 26 and 30 were transferred from the navy.

Originally Posted by Marcello

......and if I have understood correctly not much in the way of proper AP bombs were in the inventory until late 1940, which should be an hint of how much anti-shipping was taken seriously (not much)..

No need to comment on this. Just go through the RN loss lists.

Originally Posted by Marcello

Sinking destroyers hampered by carrying out rescue ops or scoring own goals like Z1 is one thing, wiping out (and given the stakes, nothing less will do) large naval formations determined to push throught quite an other.

This is an interesting point. Would the RN destroyers be better off if their PRI 1 target was the German invasion vessels...? What should they do, concentrate on the hundreds of small invasion vessels, the S and U-boats lurking around them - or the hundreds of Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine bombers....?

Originally Posted by Marcello

German amphibious transport capability was already insufficient, losses would have crippling effects.

As a matter of fact their amphibious transport capability was more than sufficient. Where do you get this information from? Of more than 2.300 converted barges only 1.150 were planned for the first assault wave (all had bow or rear ramps). In addition to the barge fleet they had assembled 150 merchants of, in average, 4.000 tons displacement, 1.200 motor boats of various sizes, 300 coastal cutters and yachts (for Beach E), 450 tugs, more than 200 patrol boats (naval auxilliaries), 800 small storm-boats and a similar number of large engine-driven dinghies. Most the transport vessels had some sort of armament.

The Seelöwe operation wasn't some kind of game or fictitious idea. it was all there and ready to go. In the first wave nine reinforced infantry and mountain divisions, one panzer division shared between them, one complete paratroop division dropped concentrated around Lympne airport, extra specialist personnel added from home and 6th army divisions.

To this came the proper warships assigned to the operation. Approx. 25 light and heavy destroyers, 25 S-boats, 30 R-boats, 44 U-boats, 19 Type 35 minesweepers, 25 converted artillery ships and a number of Siebel ferries with anti-air detachments onboard. Available for later transport duties was also the minelaying force which was considerable.

A British War Ministry study in 1942 estimated the German transport capacity to be even much larger on sight.

Fred

[Leandros]

Originally Posted by Marcello

Without an invasion there were good reasons to minimize warships losses in the Channel if that could be done.

But, you state that the Kriegsmarine was in shambles, the Luftwaffe's torpedo capacity was pathetic, they had no AP bombs and ....which should be an hint of how much anti-shipping was taken seriously (not much....)

...what was there to be afraid of...?

That said, the German supply traffic along the Continental coast went virtually unmolested in spite of Churchill's constant complaints about this. During daytime, too.


Fred

[Leandros]

Originally Posted by GJO

Although many believe the population of Ireland to be anti-British, that does not mean they would have provided any comfort to the forces of Nazi Germany.

I believe you......

Originally Posted by GJO

Nevertheless, the possibility was regarded as a real threat by the British Government and thousands of troops and aircraft were stationed near the border in Northern Ireland ready to repel any such action.

Oh, well, we saw how other British "repellings" developed during this period.......Thousands of aircraft...?...


Fred

[Marcello]

How much the Kriegsmarine was in shambles for the mission in hand can best be illustrated by the fact that they had assembled more than 3.000 vessels for the first day's assault.

I was referring to warships, not the barges & miscellaneous.Not that they did not have quite a number of problems and delays assembling those.

Their opinion was that the navys' mission was not to block an invasion but to secure British trade lines.

I would recon the majority had grasped that if an invasion had suceeded trade lines would be largely a moot point. As of 1st July there were over thirty destroyers and five cruisers, a fairly respectable force, based at Harwich, Portsmouth Sheernessh etc. earmarked for anti-invasion operations even if that meant that just twenty something destroyers were left on duty on the western approaches. Also that the Royal navy was not hanging off the beaches in the Channel en masse misses the point that an amphibious operation on such scale required a stream of supplies and reinforcements beyond the intial landings. Disrupt/destroy those and the beacheads are in a world of trouble.

They used torpedoes bought or license-built from Norway. These torpedoes were built by the same Norwegian factory (Horten) that made those that sank the cruiser Blücher.

All the sources that go in detail over the engagement such as "Heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper class" note that the torpedoes used against the Blucher were Whitehead types (from the early 1900s as far as I have read elsewhere), which naturally says nothing for the reliability or lack thereof of the F5. If Oscarsborg fortress actually used modern torpedoes I would not mind a source as I have a bit of personal interest in torpedoes .
The the u-boat torpedoes had had less than stellar performances during the norwegian campaign as well.

Up till Fall of 1940 quite a few Allied merchants had been sunk by Küstenflieger He115

About 7-8 merchants in 1940, with about 150-160 torpedoes spent to achieve that by accounts. Is such a record something to boast about?
The FAA of course would smash the bulk of the italian battlefleet at Taranto few months later, that with all the favorable circumstances was what I would call a bit tad more impressive.

No need to comment on this. Just go through the RN loss lists.

As a matter of fact I have, and frankly I am not impressed by the Luftwaffe anti-shipping capabilities.Nor are most people that have looked at them:a few merchants, a few destroyers some of which stationary or in very constrained conditions, largest warship sunk was a single light cruiser apparently.
To gauge that the Luftwaffe could accomplish one needs only to look at the attack carried against the Home fleet on the 9th April. 88 He 111 and Ju-88 sank one destroyer which had put itself in bad position, HMS Rodney was hit by a bomb which failed to penetrate the armored deck, some near misses on cruisers and not much else. While it gave the british some pause the inability to cause serious losses it does not bode well for german chances of stopping a determined british attack.
The Stuka were a bit more effective,provided that they were left alone, of course they lost nearly one fifh/sixth of the force early in August and were withdrawn to lick their wounds...
It should be noted that we are not under the assumption that the Luftwaffe has beaten the RAF to a bloody pulp as per usual Sealion requirement, so it is not like the Luftwaffe bombers can do some kind of indisturbed day long target practice against the RN. And once the RN and the german forces mix the Luftwaffe has a fairly interesting target identification problem. Imagine Stuka pilots having to decide at altitude whether something looks like a british destroyer or a german torpedo boats while knowing that a Spitfire might get behind them at any moment...

...what was there to be afraid of...?

Look,aside from the fact that even the u-boats usually avoided the Channel, it is not like I have been arguing that thee Luftwaffe could not sink ships at all , just that it would be very hard pressed, to say the least, to stop the RN from attacking in force. In general there were good reasons to keep clear of the Channel under ordinary circumstances (mines, batteries) however losses that would be undesiderable in other circumstances would become acceptable when national survival was directly at stake.

As a matter of fact their amphibious transport capability was more than sufficient. Where do you get this information from?

Frankly the logistics of Seelowe were threadbare at best.The initial proposed force had to be downsized despite army objections due to lack of sufficient transport. The germans had no LSTs or similarly suitable vessels for conveying large amounts of motor transport, divisional artillery etc.. Conventional vessels needed ports to be captured in first place to be used efficiently and there were relatively few harbors available in the invasion area with limited capacity and quite likely they would not be captured intact in first place.There were no mulberries or similar of course.

Approx. 25 light and heavy destroyers

Ehm, some of the earlier torpedo boat types could maybe pass themselves for very light destroyers, maybe. Stuff like the Type 35 or the Type 37 were nothing but conventional torpedo boats with fairly minimal artillery armament. The RN too had a hundreds of armed vessels below the destroyer threshold for that matter if you want to count every two bit boat with a gun on the german side.

The Seelöwe operation wasn't some kind of game or fictitious idea.

No, it was such a long shot that even a political and military leadership that made betting the farm and burning their bridges behind them at every step the cornerstone of national policy thought it could not be pulled off under existing conditions. Occasionally even Hitler and his minions had an attack of common sense.

[GJO]

Originally Posted by Leandros

Oh, well, we saw how other British "repellings" developed during this period.......Thousands of aircraft...?...


Fred

Oh dear! Did I fail with punctuation? Thousands of aircraft would have made a difference but whereas the Army could and did provide thousands of troops, aircraft were still in short supply at that time. The Brits do have a pretty good record at repelling though - can anyone remember the last successful invasion?