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Old 01-16-14, 11:21 AM   #1
Leandros
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I find German success in Barbarossa almost as difficult to believe as success in Operation Sealion. Barbarossa was based on a faulty assumption. That the Soviet Union would collapse in 6 months if struck hard enough. The Germans attacked on June 22nd. By mid-July it was already obvious that the assumption was incorrect. So in one sense, it is impossible for Barbarossa to succeed. No matter what changes are made to the plan, the Soviet Union will likely not simply collapse in 6 months.
These discussions are always interesting. I am a little surprised, though, that so many are so dead sure in their opinions. I ask you:

If Weserübung had not happened - would you have believed it could? The Germans were not teleported there.

If France, Holland and Belgium (Luxembourg, too....) had not been invaded and beaten in little more than a month - inclusive of the British Expeditionary Force - would you have believed it could?

If the German attack on Crete had not taken place, would you have believed a half massacred airborne division and piecemeally inserted mountain division could have destroyed or chased away twice as many Allied soldiers in prepared positions and with full knowledge of the assault from the island in 10 days?

If it hadn't happened would you have believed what happened in Singapore could have been possible?

If the SU had been broken by the German onslaught - would you have believed it possible?

Fortunately enough, Hitler, and Mussolini for that matter, didn't understand the importance of doing first thing first.

In my opinion, Barbarossa was a very close thing. What if the German generals had been allowed to use the German skill of maneuverability to improve their defensive positions when winter set in and Moscow had not been reached?

One little detail could have made a very big difference in the Leningrad area. If one looks at the map it is obvious. The German forces just made it to a narrow strip of the Lake Ladoga beaches. The Finns made it all the way to the River Svir between Ladoga and Onega. In the gap in-between supplies to Leningrad could still be moved, over the Ladoga ice in winter, by boat in summer. Hitler did not pressure the Finns in collaborating on closing this gap. He also had forces diverted to the Army Group Center lessening the possibility of achieving such a closure. Had it been closed Leningrad would have to fall within the winter (yes, dead sure......).

With Leningrad down large German forces would be released for a pressure eastwards to cut off the comm. lines to the Arctic Sea, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. German naval forces would be released, too, and ship's transport to Leningrad could be used to supply that flank.

Hitler did not invade England when he should have, Mussolini wasted resources against Greece that he should have used in the Desert.

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Old 01-16-14, 01:15 PM   #2
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In my opinion, Barbarossa was a very close thing. What if the German generals had been allowed to use the German skill of maneuverability to improve their defensive positions when winter set in and Moscow had not been reached?




But would the fall of Leningrad or even Moscow have meant the defeat of the Soviet Union? In 1941 the Soviet Union endured the capture of numerous major cities, a huge percentage of crucial raw materials, and the loss of four million troops. Yet it still continued to fight. It had a vast and growing industrial base east of the Ural Mountains, well out of reach of German forces. And in Joseph Stalin it had one of the most ruthless leaders in world history—a man utterly unlikely to throw in the towel because of the loss of any city, no matter how prestigious.

A scenario involving a street by street fight for either city also ignores the arrival of 18 divisions of troops from Siberia—fresh, well-trained, and equipped for winter fighting. They had been guarding against a possible Japanese invasion, but a Soviet spy reliably informed Stalin that Japan would turn southward, toward the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines, thereby freeing them to come to the Moscow front. Historically, the arrival of these troops took the Germans by surprise, and an unexpected Soviet counteroffensive in early December 1941 produced a major military crisis. If indeed they went directly at either of these cities, they may have garnered the strength to break in the gates, but in my opinion, the eventual urban fight for Leningrad or Moscow would have made Stalingrad look like a training exercise.
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Old 01-16-14, 01:49 PM   #3
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If Weserübung had not happened - would you have believed it could? The Germans were not teleported there.
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If France, Holland and Belgium (Luxembourg, too....) had not been invaded and beaten in little more than a month - inclusive of the British Expeditionary Force - would you have believed it could?
The germans had a good army, a good air force and a willingness to make very risky bets, they had beaten France in 1870 and made to the gates of Paris in 1914. So surprising yes, but still an outcome very much in the cards.
That said land and air forces could make up for a lot, but not the lack of a proper navy. Even with luck on their side Norway still crippled the Kriegsmarine surface forces and in the event the geography for the Luftwaffe was a lot more favorable than, say for an attempt on Ireland. Note also that France fell in the meantime and Britain had to be defended, if not the campagn might have lasted longer and naval losses could have been greater still.

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Hitler did not invade England when he should have
The basic condition was air supremacy, which was never achieved, to say nothing of the rest. And if the USSR was to be tackled, and it was the whole point of the war, 1941 was the year to do it.

Last edited by Marcello; 01-16-14 at 02:56 PM.
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Old 01-16-14, 02:24 PM   #4
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Also, while Napoleon did not get the details of naval warfare once you factor in the limitations he was operating under, that is insufficient resources to match the british ship for ship and a crippling shortage of trained manpower (being able to direct a ship of the line in a battleline is not something could be taught overnight) what he did was sound, if pretty textbook: build a fleet in being to stretch british resources. The alternative was investing more in commerce raiding. While the new french royal navy went in that direction planning wise after 1815 it is rather debatable it would have been all that more effective.
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Old 01-16-14, 07:08 PM   #5
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The basic condition was air supremacy, which was never achieved.
Over London, no - over the Channel, yes.

Supremacy was never asked for - local and timely superiority was. Luckily, Hitler did not understand the important differences of these parameters.

The Luftwaffe orders in case of a Seelöwe was a reversal to the tactics used before Sept. 7th.

Royal Navy losses to Luftwaffe action up till the summer of 1940 was so severe (considered the Royal Navy leadership) that they went to the extreme precaution of banning all daylight operations in the Channel after the Kanalkampf in July and August as the RAF could not give proper protection.

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Old 01-17-14, 03:35 AM   #6
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You COULD have the conquest of Britain be a goal of this mod's campaign sure, but you would be best pushing that to 1944 at least, otherwise all that would be left to you is sailing to America and hoping to find something there worth sinking.
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Old 01-17-14, 05:53 AM   #7
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You COULD have the conquest of Britain be a goal of this mod's campaign sure, but you would be best pushing that to 1944 at least, otherwise all that would be left to you is sailing to America and hoping to find something there worth sinking.
That would be terrible...........!

Here is an alternative. My suggestion for the Germans to accept an invitation from the Irish to establish sea and air bases there wasn't really for the purpose of an invasion of the UK, that would probably not be necessary. It was more like an increased twist on the stranglehold of the North-Western Approaches.

Of course, Churchill would not give in because of that, he still had his cognac and cigars. Much of the supplies to England would then have to go on a northernly routing, even north of Iceland.

As a consequence of this Bomber Command would have to forget about Germany and strategic bombing to concentrate all their efforts to neutralize the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe bases in Ireland, mainly by night bombing, also to go looking for U-boats, something they were quite averse to in RL. So, the battle is still on.

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Old 01-17-14, 01:47 PM   #8
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Although many believe the population of Ireland to be anti-British, that does not mean they would have provided any comfort to the forces of Nazi Germany. This is a myth that has appeared many times in fiction but in reality the Irish are (and always have been) a strongly independent people albeit with strong ties to both Great Britain and the United States. Large numbers of young men from Ireland travelled across the border to join the British Army and RAF - many more in Ireland provided all manner of help and support for their friends in the UK.

The Irish nation had gained its independence after a long and hard struggle - they would not readily to give it up - had an attempt been made to occupy Ireland, it might well have brought the USA into the conflict much earlier. Nevertheless, the possibility was regarded as a real threat by the British Government and thousands of troops and aircraft were stationed near the border in Northern Ireland ready to repel any such action.

But hey, this is a game and without the British in the conflict who would there be to sink? Before the end of World War II the vast majority of ships at sea flew flags of the British Empire - the game wouldn't be the same if there were only friendly or neutral ships to sink.

The game is a very good one based on the brave exploits of some of the most daring combatants in the conflict but we must never forget that in real life it wasn't a game. The Germans and their allies were following a power hungry madman on a course for certain destruction. The ordinary people of Germany and the countries that they occupied suffered unbelievably as a result. For those reasons, even in countries where a majority were sympathetic to the Nazi ideal, resistance and sabotage against them was carried out on a huge scale. My own father owes his life to an anonymous saboteur in a German munitions plant - the shell that should have blown him to Kingdom Come was a dud - examination by the UXB team revealed that the fuse had been deliberately sabotaged.
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Old 01-18-14, 06:45 PM   #9
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Although many believe the population of Ireland to be anti-British, that does not mean they would have provided any comfort to the forces of Nazi Germany.
I believe you......

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Nevertheless, the possibility was regarded as a real threat by the British Government and thousands of troops and aircraft were stationed near the border in Northern Ireland ready to repel any such action.
Oh, well, we saw how other British "repellings" developed during this period.......Thousands of aircraft...?...


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Old 01-17-14, 04:03 PM   #10
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Over London, no - over the Channel, yes.

Supremacy was never asked for - local and timely superiority was. Luckily, Hitler did not understand the important differences of these parameters.

The Luftwaffe orders in case of a Seelöwe was a reversal to the tactics used before Sept. 7th.

Royal Navy losses to Luftwaffe action up till the summer of 1940 was so severe (considered the Royal Navy leadership) that they went to the extreme precaution of banning all daylight operations in the Channel after the Kanalkampf in July and August as the RAF could not give proper protection.

Fred

Without an invasion there were good reasons to minimize warships losses in the Channel if that could be done. With an invasion everything that floats or flies would be thrown at it, losses be damned. The Kriegsmarine was in shambles so the Luftwaffe would have to carry the burden of dealing with both the RAF and the Home fleet pressing forward no matter how many ships they lost.And the bridgeheads might need support in the meantime too.
The Luftwaffe torpedo bomber force in 1940 was a rather pathetic affair, to the point that italian assistance was eventually required, and if I have understood correctly not much in the way of proper AP bombs were in the inventory until late 1940, which should be an hint of how much anti-shipping was taken seriously (not much). Sinking destroyers hampered by carrying out rescue ops or scoring own goals like Z1 is one thing, wiping out (and given the stakes, nothing less will do) large naval formations determined to push throught quite an other. German amphibious transport capability was already insufficient, losses would have crippling effects.

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Old 01-18-14, 05:06 PM   #11
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Without an invasion there were good reasons to minimize warships losses in the Channel if that could be done. With an invasion everything that floats or flies would be thrown at it, losses be damned. The Kriegsmarine was in shambles so the Luftwaffe would have to carry the burden of dealing with both the RAF and the Home fleet pressing forward no matter how many ships they lost.And the bridgeheads might need support in the meantime too..
The Home Fleet was never planned to intervene in the Channel. The RN had learnt their lesson. For the same reason many of their best destroyers would also be kept away from the Channel as those were integrated in the battleship and cruiser formations of the RN.

How much the Kriegsmarine was in shambles for the mission in hand can best be illustrated by the fact that they had assembled more than 3.000 vessels for the first day's assault.

Actually, according to some usually reliable sources - two being Churchill and Lord Alanbrooke, it is not at all sure that the RN would throw itself recklessly into a Channel struggle. Parts of the naval leadership was not keen to offer up their valuable ships to the Luftwaffe in case of an invasion. Their opinion was that the navys' mission was not to block an invasion but to secure British trade lines. That was the mission of the army. This fact has been much subdued after the war.

Even if they did, what RN had immediately available for a Channel struggle was pitifully little. Immediately being the key word..

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The Luftwaffe torpedo bomber force in 1940 was a rather pathetic affair, to the point that italian assistance was eventually required....)..
Hmm....another slight misconception. The Kriegsmarine had, in their Küstenfliegers, a quite professional torpedo-bomber force. Actually, their anti-ship torpedo capacity was larger than the Coastal Command's at the time. Even inclusive the Swordfish'es of the FAA. Up till Fall of 1940 quite a few Allied merchants had been sunk by Küstenflieger He115's. They used torpedoes bought or license-built from Norway. These torpedoes were built by the same Norwegian factory (Horten) that made those that sank the cruiser Blücher. Also, Italian Whitehead torpedoes were purchased in this period. Later, when the torpedo missions were transferred from the navy to the Luftwaffe (1941), torpedo training was for a large part moved to Grosseto, Italy. But, that was later. Many of the pilots of KG's 26 and 30 were transferred from the navy.
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......and if I have understood correctly not much in the way of proper AP bombs were in the inventory until late 1940, which should be an hint of how much anti-shipping was taken seriously (not much)..
No need to comment on this. Just go through the RN loss lists.
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Sinking destroyers hampered by carrying out rescue ops or scoring own goals like Z1 is one thing, wiping out (and given the stakes, nothing less will do) large naval formations determined to push throught quite an other.
This is an interesting point. Would the RN destroyers be better off if their PRI 1 target was the German invasion vessels...? What should they do, concentrate on the hundreds of small invasion vessels, the S and U-boats lurking around them - or the hundreds of Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine bombers....?
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German amphibious transport capability was already insufficient, losses would have crippling effects.
As a matter of fact their amphibious transport capability was more than sufficient. Where do you get this information from? Of more than 2.300 converted barges only 1.150 were planned for the first assault wave (all had bow or rear ramps). In addition to the barge fleet they had assembled 150 merchants of, in average, 4.000 tons displacement, 1.200 motor boats of various sizes, 300 coastal cutters and yachts (for Beach E), 450 tugs, more than 200 patrol boats (naval auxilliaries), 800 small storm-boats and a similar number of large engine-driven dinghies. Most the transport vessels had some sort of armament.

The Seelöwe operation wasn't some kind of game or fictitious idea. it was all there and ready to go. In the first wave nine reinforced infantry and mountain divisions, one panzer division shared between them, one complete paratroop division dropped concentrated around Lympne airport, extra specialist personnel added from home and 6th army divisions.

To this came the proper warships assigned to the operation. Approx. 25 light and heavy destroyers, 25 S-boats, 30 R-boats, 44 U-boats, 19 Type 35 minesweepers, 25 converted artillery ships and a number of Siebel ferries with anti-air detachments onboard. Available for later transport duties was also the minelaying force which was considerable.

A British War Ministry study in 1942 estimated the German transport capacity to be even much larger on sight.

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Last edited by Leandros; 01-18-14 at 07:01 PM.
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Old 01-18-14, 06:40 PM   #12
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Without an invasion there were good reasons to minimize warships losses in the Channel if that could be done.
But, you state that the Kriegsmarine was in shambles, the Luftwaffe's torpedo capacity was pathetic, they had no AP bombs and ....which should be an hint of how much anti-shipping was taken seriously (not much....)

...what was there to be afraid of...?

That said, the German supply traffic along the Continental coast went virtually unmolested in spite of Churchill's constant complaints about this. During daytime, too.


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