Quote:
Originally Posted by sergei
Well, you're right about that.
But as soon as US fighter pilots stopped trying to 'dogfight' the Zeroes, they started to enjoy considerable success, despite their 'inferior' aircraft.
Heard of the Thatch Weave?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thatch_weave
It's interesting stuff.
Don't fight the enemy on his terms. If he has an aircraft that's more manoeuvrable than you, for the love of God don't try to out-turn him. You'll lose.
And there's the very important point that Japan did not have a proper system in place for replacing their combat losses.
The US would rotate some of their veteran flyers to other air groups, or back to the States, to train the new guys.
Japan never had any system like that, and would keep their combat vets flying until they got shot down. With each successive defeat they had less pilots with combat experience, and no-one to train the new guys.
Having superior equipment (be it planes, tanks, ships, whatever) is only one part of the equation.
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Ah, I was about to mention that sergei, but you beat me to it. Indeed, the Thatch Weave was a very successful defensive, (perhaps even offensive), tactic that proved more than a match for the Zero. It allowed the F4F pilots to keep their guns sighted in almost any direction. Developed (I think) during the Battle for Midway, it was destined to work against a Bushido mindset where the (one on one, mano y mano) tactic was just too ingrained into their everyday lives, let alone their battle tactics. In this respect, it was a foregone conclusion. Add to that, the fact that a completely intact Zero was found somewhere in the vicinity of Attu or Kiska. It was repaired and made flightworthy, and then, tested to the very limits of it's capabilities. It was through this testing that the pilots learned of a weakness in the Zero, (I think it was) turning to the right while in a dive, or maybe vice-versa. The F4F did more than just hold it's own against the Zeros and Oscars.

I remember reading something in one of my books that touched upon the reasons for Japan's inability to replace their seasoned pilots. It actually had more to do with their selection process than anything else. A lot of candidates, who probably would've made excellent pilots, were overlooked due to a, well, "technicality" best describes it in my mind.
On a side note, and with reference to the "quality vs. quantity" question, don't forget that by the beginning of 1944, the United States' Pacific Fleet was larger than the navies of all the warring nations, combined!