Speculate for $h!t$ and giggles...

[CaptainMattJ.]

Originally Posted by tater

The F4F is not the corsair, that is the F4U.

BuAer named planes by type, number (serially) of said type from manufacturer name code.

F = fighter

4F = 4th procured from supplier code letter F (Grumman) = "Wildcat"

F-4th from supplier U (Vought) = "corsair"

F-6F (6th from Grumman = "Hellcat"

(there were F5F prototypes built for the USN, but they were not built in production---procured even included prototypes).

Anyway, the lowly F4F never had a negative K/D vs the zero.

oh well then. Wildcats didnt fare well enough against zeros. sorry about the mix up. the wildcat just didnt have the speed, maneuverability, range, or climbing a zero could get. however these problems were quite easily overcome in the F6F Hellcat. and it still had great armor.

[sergei]

Originally Posted by CaptainMattJ.

the wildcat just didnt have the speed, maneuverability, range, or climbing a zero could get

Well, you're right about that.
But as soon as US fighter pilots stopped trying to 'dogfight' the Zeroes, they started to enjoy considerable success, despite their 'inferior' aircraft.
Heard of the Thatch Weave?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thatch_weave
It's interesting stuff.
Don't fight the enemy on his terms. If he has an aircraft that's more manoeuvrable than you, for the love of God don't try to out-turn him. You'll lose.

And there's the very important point that Japan did not have a proper system in place for replacing their combat losses.
The US would rotate some of their veteran flyers to other air groups, or back to the States, to train the new guys.
Japan never had any system like that, and would keep their combat vets flying until they got shot down. With each successive defeat they had less pilots with combat experience, and no-one to train the new guys.

Having superior equipment (be it planes, tanks, ships, whatever) is only one part of the equation.

[WernherVonTrapp]

Originally Posted by sergei

Well, you're right about that.
But as soon as US fighter pilots stopped trying to 'dogfight' the Zeroes, they started to enjoy considerable success, despite their 'inferior' aircraft.
Heard of the Thatch Weave?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thatch_weave
It's interesting stuff.
Don't fight the enemy on his terms. If he has an aircraft that's more manoeuvrable than you, for the love of God don't try to out-turn him. You'll lose.

And there's the very important point that Japan did not have a proper system in place for replacing their combat losses.
The US would rotate some of their veteran flyers to other air groups, or back to the States, to train the new guys.
Japan never had any system like that, and would keep their combat vets flying until they got shot down. With each successive defeat they had less pilots with combat experience, and no-one to train the new guys.

Having superior equipment (be it planes, tanks, ships, whatever) is only one part of the equation.

Ah, I was about to mention that sergei, but you beat me to it. Indeed, the Thatch Weave was a very successful defensive, (perhaps even offensive), tactic that proved more than a match for the Zero. It allowed the F4F pilots to keep their guns sighted in almost any direction. Developed (I think) during the Battle for Midway, it was destined to work against a Bushido mindset where the (one on one, mano y mano) tactic was just too ingrained into their everyday lives, let alone their battle tactics. In this respect, it was a foregone conclusion. Add to that, the fact that a completely intact Zero was found somewhere in the vicinity of Attu or Kiska. It was repaired and made flightworthy, and then, tested to the very limits of it's capabilities. It was through this testing that the pilots learned of a weakness in the Zero, (I think it was) turning to the right while in a dive, or maybe vice-versa. The F4F did more than just hold it's own against the Zeros and Oscars.
I remember reading something in one of my books that touched upon the reasons for Japan's inability to replace their seasoned pilots. It actually had more to do with their selection process than anything else. A lot of candidates, who probably would've made excellent pilots, were overlooked due to a, well, "technicality" best describes it in my mind.
On a side note, and with reference to the "quality vs. quantity" question, don't forget that by the beginning of 1944, the United States' Pacific Fleet was larger than the navies of all the warring nations, combined!

[sergei]

Originally Posted by WernherVonTrapp

I remember reading something in one of my books that touched upon the reasons for Japan's inability to replace their seasoned pilots. It actually had more to do with their selection process than anything else. A lot of candidates, who probably would've made excellent pilots, were overlooked due to a, well, "technicality" best describes it in my mind.

I hadn't heard of that.
You've intrigued me Wernher.
Don't leave me dangling like that
What was the 'technicality'?

EDIT:

Originally Posted by WernherVonTrapp

Indeed, the Thatch Weave was a very successful defensive, (perhaps even offensive), tactic that proved more than a match for the Zero. It allowed the F4F pilots to keep their guns sighted in almost any direction. Developed (I think) during the Battle for Midway, it was destined to work against a Bushido mindset where the (one on one, mano y mano) tactic was just too ingrained into their everyday lives, let alone their battle tactics.

That's a very interesting point, I hadn't even considered that.

[tater]

US pilots had the luxury to learn from mistakes. As a result, US pilots could improve over time. Japanese pilots didn't have a lot of wiggle room for mistakes as their planes sacrificed all pilot protection for "offensive" capability. Also, the huge range of IJN planes—a big "plus" for their design, did have a bad side. It meant they operated FAR from any sort of help if they did go down.

Note that at Midway US CV operations doctrine was still very much a work in progress, informed by their one real combat experience, the Coral Sea. They had very little time to integrate their new information, but they did so, and damn fast.

If you have any interest in early USN vs IJN air combat, Lundstrom's two "First Team" books are obligatory reading.

Japanese pilot training brings us back on topic. They were in a mode in the Pacific War that required a SHORT conflict. Their pilot training could not rplace losses, they didn't have the resources to fight a long war, or replace losses. As such, an alternate strategic plan that could have used what they had better, without putting them in a war of attrition that they could not possibly win is interesting.

[sergei]

Originally Posted by tater

If you have any interest in early USN vs IJN air combat, Lundstrom's two "First Team" books are obligatory reading.

Thanks for that, I'm always on the lookout for good books.

And yep, that's what I've read. The Japanese gambled everything on a short war, with the US rolling over and suing for peace shortly after the Pearl attack. Oh boy, did they ever misread that.

I guess it comes back to the point made earlier, they seemed to view the 'decadent Americans' of being incapable and unwilling to fight them.

As soon as it became apparent that the US completely stymied their plans by not just rolling over and giving up they were screwed.

EDIT:

Originally Posted by tater

US pilots had the luxury to learn from mistakes. As a result, US pilots could improve over time. Japanese pilots didn't have a lot of wiggle room for mistakes as their planes sacrificed all pilot protection for "offensive" capability. Also, the huge range of IJN planes—a big "plus" for their design, did have a bad side. It meant they operated FAR from any sort of help if they did go down.

Another very good point I hadn't considered.
But I do remember reading that the US went to great lengths to rescue downed pilots.
On the Japanese side the attitude seemed to be - if you go down, too bad. It's in the hands of the gods.
Another reason for the quick decimation of their top line aircrew.

[tater]

Really, the choice of planes in many ways was bizarre. They went to great lengths to try and create incredibly good pilots. The USN pilots also had excellent training, but they culled fewer, so call it many "very good to great" pilots vs a handful of "only the great" for the IJNAF.

The IJN had such an investment in aircrews, they really should have done whatever possible to keep them alive. Planes can be replaced... for Japan, pilots were virtually irreplaceable.

As the war progressed, Allied pilots got better over time, and Japanese pilots got worse. Add in better Allied aircraft, and the slaughter becomes inevitable.

[WernherVonTrapp]

Originally Posted by sergei

I hadn't heard of that.
You've intrigued me Wernher.
Don't leave me dangling like that
What was the 'technicality'?

I was afraid someone might ask me that so, I was reluctant to even bring it up. Ugh, I hate looking things up in the books. OK, I think it was touched upon in my book, "Japanese Destroyer Captain", written by an IJN Naval officer who was present during every major surface engagement with the USPF. I'm trying to remember, off the cuff, so that I don't have to go foraging through the pages.
Ahh, I found it! Not exactly as I described (though I could've seen it in another book) so I'll post it verbatim, right from the book: "The problems of aviator training and radar developement were also neglected too long. By late 1943, when most of it's crack pilots, who should've been teaching, had already been killed in action. When the Navy belatedly started to train aviators on a mass-production basis, it discovered that the aircraft factories were unable to keep pace with the demand for planes.
All 100 of my students at the Torpedo School were college and university graduates who had originally volunteered for flight training and duty. After three months of preliminary air training, these men were all switched to surface assignments, and thus to my torpedo-boat class, simply because of lagging airplane production."
That's all I could find thus far so, I stand corrected until then.

@tater: "Note that at Midway US CV operations doctrine was still very much a work in progress, informed by their one real combat experience, the Coral Sea. They had very little time to integrate their new information, but they did so, and damn fast."

Absolutely. The USN, during the early years, had not yet learned how to use their carriers in battle. They hadn't learned how to coordinate their carrier air groups and use them in tandem with one another (i.e., torpedo bombers, dive bombers and fighters) which, ironically, and some would argue, was one of the reasons for our decisive victory at Midway.

[Stealhead]

I agree with the overall advantage that American pilots had.I am a but surprised that none has yet mentioned another obvious advantage that US pilots had rotation,they only had to fly x amount of missions before they rotated away from the combat zone(unless they willingly wished to stay) and either received additional training and often trained newer pilots them selves.This simple fact gave American airman a huge advantage because they learned from combat pilots and also this boosted morale as well.

Japanese and German pilots had no such luxury the ones that survived fought the entire war in some cases.

Some have argued that the best fighter of the war for the Japanese was the N1K2-J Shiden Kai not many where made but it was well armed and did have some actual protection for the pilot as did the Ki-84 of course they stared making planes with some actual protection too late to matter.

I am not sure I fully agree with some of what had been said.I have read in many places that the Zero was still a very serious threat to most any plane if you attempted to get into a maneuver dogfight with one.The US Navy never made a plane that was more maneuverable than the Zero they made planes that where faster,stronger,more well armed,and safer for their pilots.They simply did not play to the Zeros strengths they made their own.

The Thatch Weave is a fine of example of what I mean this tactic was used to force a Zero not fight at its strengths.Of course even the highest scoring ace in history Eric Hartman loathed Zero style maneuver dog fighting he called it a useless ballet.Better to zoom in kill him and zoom out.

@WernherVonTrapp That is true we where mostly still flying the Devastator at Midway I think the only thing that plane ever devastated was itself.
Though the very brave runs that they did make on the Japanese carriers did keep their Zeros at low altitude which allowed our SBDs to do what they did that day.Sometimes the only thing that you can give is your best you have to respect the Devastator pilots for what they did that day weaker men might turned tail and run without even trying.

[tater]

The Zero was certainly deadly if a pilot fought on the Zero's terms. The thing is that they did not do this for the most part. Being good on paper, or for a type of fight that doesn't happen is meaningless. The rest of the world was already moving to higher wing-loading planes designed for "energy fighting" (to use a modern term).

The Mitsubishi factory was absurd... it was in a port area, and the streets were too narrow for trucks. It had no airfield. So every single plane they built was shipped in PARTS (after being assembled, then disassembled) with ox carts to a nearby airfield. Nearby as the crow flies, but several hours by ox cart. Then they had to be assembled (again)

WTF. Seriously, WTF?

Why didn't they just bulldoze a road through some houses?

[sergei]

Originally Posted by Stealhead

I am a but surprised that none has yet mentioned another obvious advantage that US pilots had rotation,they only had to fly x amount of missions before they rotated away from the combat zone(unless they willingly wished to stay) and either received additional training and often trained newer pilots them selves.

I'm sure I said something like that

Originally Posted by sergei

The US would rotate some of their veteran flyers to other air groups, or back to the States, to train the new guys.
Japan never had any system like that, and would keep their combat vets flying until they got shot down.

[tater]

Originally Posted by CaptainMattJ.

oh well then. Wildcats didnt fare well enough against zeros. sorry about the mix up. the wildcat just didnt have the speed, maneuverability, range, or climbing a zero could get. however these problems were quite easily overcome in the F6F Hellcat. and it still had great armor.

Actually, the F4F was a very close match to the Zero. The -3 was faster at sea level (just barely), and both the -3 and -4 were better armed and armored.

Regardless, the F4F fared very well vs the Zero in RL. As I said, Lundstrom's two "First Team" books go over every single air engagement during the first year of the war that the USN was involved in. His books are meticulous, and he usually manages to ID the specific japanese aircraft, pilots, even crew, and which attack was vs which aircraft. he compares US and Japanese records, and sorts out the overclaims from the actual kills.

The F4F was NEVER in the hole vs the Zero. never. From day one the USN pilots in the F4F held their own vs the Zero. So yes, on paper the Zero had several advantages as you mention, but in RL combat, it faired dead even to WORSE than the F4F.

Regarding Thatch, you need to remember that the first time USN pilots saw a Zero was the Coral Sea. The next time was Midway. The "learning curve" to figure out what NOT to do vs the zero was basically ONE combat (and they didn't do terribly at the Coral Sea).

Add up all the time involved, and it took the USN pilots what, 30 minutes to figure out how to counter the Zero?

The amazing thing is also that the F4U, and f6F—the two planes that WTF pwned the Zero—were both designed before the war started.