armored warfare in the PTO during WW2

[Weiss Pinguin]

Pulled the release switch? Imagine if the landing gear failed!

[Torvald Von Mansee]

Imagine if the P-38 got jumped by some Zeros, and had to make a series of hard turns!!

(Actually, a P-38 could just outrun them, probably)

[TLAM Strike]

Originally Posted by Torvald Von Mansee

(Actually, a P-38 could just outrun them, probably)

That is exactly what US pilots did against the Zero. Those hit and run tactics were called "Zoom and Boom".

[tater]

Bong's rule was to never let his airspeed drop below 300.

The trick is to keep your E state. Dive, attack, shallow climb away at high speed. Turn (gently), rinse, repeat.

Zero had issues with controls getting heavy at speed, which reduced it's ability to attack in this way. Still, a zero using good energy tactics is tough to beat since it had such a great ROC.

That's where the COST of its performance comes into play. It was incredibly vulnerable. The closest US plane was the F4F. Depending on the version, the F4F was slightly fast or slower at sea level. All had a lower ROC. All were far more survivable (some pilots lived through literally hundreds of rounds poured into their aircraft from a zero).

The ability to make a mistake, and LIVE to learn from it was priceless. Jap pilots in effect got to make NO mistakes, usually.

Their pilot training was excellent, but rejected too many pilots, and as a result, they could not afford to lose ANY aircrews since they didn't make new pilots fast enough.

The IJNAF in effect built exactly the wrong airplane. The US could make planes fast. The US could make pilots fast. WE could have afforded planes that did not protect the pilot in favor of other factors. The IJNAF needed to preserver PILOTS at all costs. Instead, they gave them an entirely offensive weapon that resulted in unsustainable losses of trained aircrews.

Note that this "offensive at all costs" philosophy was endemic to the jap navy at large.

[Torvald Von Mansee]

Originally Posted by TLAM Strike

That is exactly what US pilots did against the Zero. Those hit and run tactics were called "Zoom and Boom".

Heh...I am VERY familiar w/those tactics!!!!

[Weiss Pinguin]

Originally Posted by TLAM Strike

That is exactly what US pilots did against the Zero. Those hit and run tactics were called "Zoom and Boom".

From what I've read, slashing attacks were probably more common than the dogfighting seen in movies, etc., or at least were more popular with many of the great aces of the war. And from my experience in the virtual world, one pass from high altitude on an unsuspecting/vulnerable target is much more preferable to several minutes of both parties maneuvering into a firing position. It might look cool, but it can get way out of hand in a hurry.


Hmm, I need to get a decent joystick again, I haven't played Il-2 in so long it almost hurts

[Kazuaki Shimazaki II]

Originally Posted by tater

Note that this "offensive at all costs" philosophy was endemic to the jap navy at large.

A large part it probably came from the Washington Naval Treaty (the whole 10:7, 5:3 thing), which according to contemporary calculations basically doomed the Japanese naval combat potential to a level that ensures certain defeat in the scenario of a battle (never mind long war) with the United States, in short, there is zero combat stability. The so-called Fleet Faction has good cause to be unhappy.

The usual response, that maybe they shouldn't mind so much because the United States can outbuild them by much more than 5:3, I think, is weak. Naval warfare in the battleship era is the most attritionist of combat, so the change in percentage of success from 10:7 to 10:6 is much larger than the change from 10:6 down to say 10:3.

Given that, gambling that American internal politics would de facto prevent the fleet from going above 10:7 rather than being locked down by treaty to a 10:6 may have seemed attractive to the Fleet Faction. If they lose, it doesn't make much real difference.

Indeed, for much of the 20s and 30s America didn't work hard to build to its full allotment, suggesting this may be a better gamble than commonly credited.

Further, it would seem if not for the whole intercept thing, and the failure of Americans to remember that anything that a "bottom line" position as presented in the backroom (not even in public) to an ambassador represents a compromise that probably left at least half of the opposing cabinet in various states of dis-satisfaction, the Americans would have agreed to the 10:7 ratio.

I've yet to meet a source that tries to justify the American 10:6 stance beyond managing to crack codes, making it a moronic case of "We pushed because we can" rather than because of true strategic national interest. One can argue the Fleet Faction actually got the sum right from the angle of evaluating American interests and lines, only to be foiled by random American opportunism and greed.

Anyway, since then, the only crack out of a bleak situation is to increase strike potential within combat potential and hope for good rolls of die, which means, of course, "offensive-mindedness".

[Jimbuna]

Originally Posted by Weiss Pinguin

Pulled the release switch? Imagine if the landing gear failed!

How embarrassing when they landed if he got caught short mid flight

[tater]

I agree that the ratio played into the IJN's broken, Mahanian dcotrine, but face it, the Washington Treaty mostly affected Japanese morale. They simply did not have the capacity, or treasure to build a fleet any bigger than what they did.

IMHO, had the treaty been abrogated any earlier than it was, it would have made zero difference as they were spending more money than they had regardless.

[August]

Originally Posted by Platapus

Sounds like a pretty good doctrine.

2Lt Rice: Looks like you guys are going to be surrounded.
Winters: We're paratroopers, Lieutenant. We're supposed to be surrounded.

They're not well known outside the Paratrooper community but there were several Airborne operations in the PTO. The one to retake Corregidor Island was as tough as anything in the ETO.

[TLAM Strike]

Originally Posted by August

They're not well known outside the Paratrooper community but there were several Airborne operations in the PTO. The one to retake Corregidor Island was as tough as anything in the ETO.

Interestingly the USMC fielded its own Paratrooper unit for a while during the war. I think these are the folks your talking about.

[August]

Originally Posted by TLAM Strike

Interestingly the USMC fielded its own Paratrooper unit for a while during the war. I think these are the folks your talking about.

Actually I was talking about these guys:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/503rd_P...antry_Regiment

[Kazuaki Shimazaki II]

Originally Posted by tater

I agree that the ratio played into the IJN's broken, Mahanian dcotrine, but face it, the Washington Treaty mostly affected Japanese morale. They simply did not have the capacity, or treasure to build a fleet any bigger than what they did.

IMHO, had the treaty been abrogated any earlier than it was, it would have made zero difference as they were spending more money than they had regardless.

I'm not so sure whether it is a matter of Mahanian doctrine that no armed force wants to be treaty-bound into a position where it doesn't have a chance of winning against the "likely opponent" even in theory. As it is, the 10:7 they pushed for was supposed to give them only a calculated 50% defensive success chance, which is hardly the probability you want when you are on the defensive, even not counting the fact your enemy has much more industry. The fact the Fleet Faction was willing (apparently) to accept that says that (at least at that time) any nationalism they have is well-tempered by their realistic appraisal of their limitations, politically and economically. It is not asking too much to be given a 50% chance to defend the country, and the politicians denied them this.

As for their ability to exploit a 10:7 if it was given to them, it would only have been one or two battleships difference, and they were already building said battleships so I don't think it is going to break them. Besides, if what you say is true, and the Americans knew or even suspected it at the time, it makes them even more idiotic to have made a push that merely alienates.

Finally, no American should be dissing either Mahan (in any case, his ideas were very popular at that time and have not really been pushed out entirely even today) or the idea of spending more than they have

[tater]

The Japanese misread Mahan. This was their mistaken obsession with "decisive battle" while losing the notion of control of the sea.

They simply did not have the economy to do much better than they did. I suggest reading Kaigun, and there is some treatment of this in Combined Fleet Decoded as well as I recall (both are excellent books, regardless).

10:7 was after all the total USN at 10, and we had to split between 2 navies. While a few BBs might have brought them up to snuff, what difference does that make? It's be like the IJA adding elephant troops, lol.

What they needed was control of the seas. Destroyers and other escorts would have been a far better use of their VERY limited resources.

It's not just money, BTW, but raw materials. Short of a treaty, the US would likely have curtailed critical trade with Japan. Steel, and oil. Than means fewer ships as well. If we judged them to be massively building their navy, we'd have built more as well. They'd never catch up.

Could the IJN have built a few more ships, but the outcome would have been no different. The US built over 100 carriers during the war, nearly 800 DDs and DEs, the list goes on and on. The IJN could not have hoped to compete with the USN.

[Kazuaki Shimazaki II]

Regrouped slightly.

Originally Posted by tater

The Japanese misread Mahan. This was their mistaken obsession with "decisive battle" while losing the notion of control of the sea.

....

What they needed was control of the seas. Destroyers and other escorts would have been a far better use of their VERY limited resources.

Which they arguably won't have anyway if they lose the decisive battle - instead of having it pecked away with submarines, after the hypothetical enemy wins the battle it can simply impose the blockade with the fleet like Britain did to Germany.

I'm not sure if they read Mahan right or not (and in any case, surely any attempt to incorporate a foreign naval theory into your own defensive strategy will involve modifying it to suit your perceived requirements, so is there really a right or wrong?), but IMO the obsession with the "decisive battle" is partly because they are very well aware this is their best chance with their realities.

They did have a good number of destroyers, though they were strike-oriented rather than ASW-oriented. The lack of ASW emphasis, BTW, is endemic to a greater or lesser extent in every major navy.

10:7 was after all the total USN at 10, and we had to split between 2 navies. While a few BBs might have brought them up to snuff, what difference does that make? It's be like the IJA adding elephant troops, lol.

In the context of the 1920s, it would have bought them a 50:50 chance (by calculation) of winning operationally at sea. While of course, strategically the US could have rebuilt even if they lost, it'll still have been much better deterrence than a fleet with a (almost) zero percent chance by calculation, with corresponding greater available movement. And all for a ~10%-20% shift.

They simply did not have the economy to do much better than they did. I suggest reading Kaigun, and there is some treatment of this in Combined Fleet Decoded as well as I recall (both are excellent books, regardless).

It's not just money, BTW, but raw materials. Short of a treaty, the US would likely have curtailed critical trade with Japan. Steel, and oil. Than means fewer ships as well. If we judged them to be massively building their navy, we'd have built more as well. They'd never catch up.

We are talking the 1920s, not 1940. While they know they had competing interests, at that point it seems that the US is very far from "curtailing critical trade" or the like.

I'm well aware of the limitations of the Japanese economy. On the other hand, we are not talking about them "massively building their navy" to be say twice as large as it historically was. We are talking a ~10%-20% change, agreed by treaty, and the shift composed of ships they are actually already building, so it is more like the money wasn't completely wasted.

Could the IJN have built a few more ships, but the outcome would have been no different. The US built over 100 carriers during the war, nearly 800 DDs and DEs, the list goes on and on. The IJN could not have hoped to compete with the USN.

That's the kind of philosophy I've been arguing about in my first post. True, in a LONG war they are f*cked, but that was always true. The treaty, however, dooms them to lose even a short war, according to the mathematics. That's the perceived problem that IMO is a big part of the whole offensive-mindedness in the first place.