armored warfare in the PTO during WW2

[tater]

The Japanese misread Mahan. This was their mistaken obsession with "decisive battle" while losing the notion of control of the sea.

They simply did not have the economy to do much better than they did. I suggest reading Kaigun, and there is some treatment of this in Combined Fleet Decoded as well as I recall (both are excellent books, regardless).

10:7 was after all the total USN at 10, and we had to split between 2 navies. While a few BBs might have brought them up to snuff, what difference does that make? It's be like the IJA adding elephant troops, lol.

What they needed was control of the seas. Destroyers and other escorts would have been a far better use of their VERY limited resources.

It's not just money, BTW, but raw materials. Short of a treaty, the US would likely have curtailed critical trade with Japan. Steel, and oil. Than means fewer ships as well. If we judged them to be massively building their navy, we'd have built more as well. They'd never catch up.

Could the IJN have built a few more ships, but the outcome would have been no different. The US built over 100 carriers during the war, nearly 800 DDs and DEs, the list goes on and on. The IJN could not have hoped to compete with the USN.

[Kazuaki Shimazaki II]

Regrouped slightly.

Originally Posted by tater

The Japanese misread Mahan. This was their mistaken obsession with "decisive battle" while losing the notion of control of the sea.

....

What they needed was control of the seas. Destroyers and other escorts would have been a far better use of their VERY limited resources.

Which they arguably won't have anyway if they lose the decisive battle - instead of having it pecked away with submarines, after the hypothetical enemy wins the battle it can simply impose the blockade with the fleet like Britain did to Germany.

I'm not sure if they read Mahan right or not (and in any case, surely any attempt to incorporate a foreign naval theory into your own defensive strategy will involve modifying it to suit your perceived requirements, so is there really a right or wrong?), but IMO the obsession with the "decisive battle" is partly because they are very well aware this is their best chance with their realities.

They did have a good number of destroyers, though they were strike-oriented rather than ASW-oriented. The lack of ASW emphasis, BTW, is endemic to a greater or lesser extent in every major navy.

10:7 was after all the total USN at 10, and we had to split between 2 navies. While a few BBs might have brought them up to snuff, what difference does that make? It's be like the IJA adding elephant troops, lol.

In the context of the 1920s, it would have bought them a 50:50 chance (by calculation) of winning operationally at sea. While of course, strategically the US could have rebuilt even if they lost, it'll still have been much better deterrence than a fleet with a (almost) zero percent chance by calculation, with corresponding greater available movement. And all for a ~10%-20% shift.

They simply did not have the economy to do much better than they did. I suggest reading Kaigun, and there is some treatment of this in Combined Fleet Decoded as well as I recall (both are excellent books, regardless).

It's not just money, BTW, but raw materials. Short of a treaty, the US would likely have curtailed critical trade with Japan. Steel, and oil. Than means fewer ships as well. If we judged them to be massively building their navy, we'd have built more as well. They'd never catch up.

We are talking the 1920s, not 1940. While they know they had competing interests, at that point it seems that the US is very far from "curtailing critical trade" or the like.

I'm well aware of the limitations of the Japanese economy. On the other hand, we are not talking about them "massively building their navy" to be say twice as large as it historically was. We are talking a ~10%-20% change, agreed by treaty, and the shift composed of ships they are actually already building, so it is more like the money wasn't completely wasted.

Could the IJN have built a few more ships, but the outcome would have been no different. The US built over 100 carriers during the war, nearly 800 DDs and DEs, the list goes on and on. The IJN could not have hoped to compete with the USN.

That's the kind of philosophy I've been arguing about in my first post. True, in a LONG war they are f*cked, but that was always true. The treaty, however, dooms them to lose even a short war, according to the mathematics. That's the perceived problem that IMO is a big part of the whole offensive-mindedness in the first place.

[tater]

The whole notion of a quick win for Japan was wrong-headed from the start. Even the IGHQ thought this to be true (1960s interview, quoted in Combined Fleet: Decoded).

The Washington Treaty was modified in 1930, and again in 1936 by the London Treaties (when the Japanese pulled out anyway). So 1936 is sort of my baseline anyway. More ships built in 1923 after the Wash. Treaty would not have changed much. It;s not like they were ready or willing to go to war at that point anyway.

Look at the reality. They went to war in 1941 because the US had just passed a new naval building program through Congress (Stark plan), scheduled to start putting ships at sea in 1943. This after the Vinson plan for brining the USN to treaty limits from 1934 to '42. The ships that started to really swamp the IJN in 1943 were for the most part already ordered before the war started. The IJN decided that they needed secure oil (their 10 million barrel strategic reserve was inadequate to wage war with, and mostly came from the US), and they realized that starting in 1943 they'd never have any hope of naval victory.

So 1922 changes little, IMO. They'd not have been ready, or even highly motivated to wage war in the 20s.

Regardless, the USN was already engaged in the 1916 building program in 1922. This 1916 program would have given the USN 50 first line BBs to the UKs 42. Japan's unrestricted plan was the eight-eight-eight fleet with 3 groups of 8 BBs and BCs. 24 ships (they only ever started the 8-8 plan of 16, however, 8-8-8 was their dream fleet). The Washington Treaty limited mostly the USN. While it was a problem for the 8-8-8 fleet, Japan decided it was more sensible to sign than get into an arms race they could not possibly win with the US. They were entirely right.

[tater]

BTW, WRT the 1916 plan, I should have said BBs and BCs, not just BBs (for the 50 and 42 US/UK ship numbers).

[Kazuaki Shimazaki II]

Originally Posted by tater

The whole notion of a quick win for Japan was wrong-headed from the start. Even the IGHQ thought this to be true (1960s interview, quoted in Combined Fleet: Decoded).

I hadn't read Combined Fleet: Decoded yet, but I must wonder what the justification was, and to what extent they thought that at the time versus post hoc when the result was known.

Beforehand, the idea of psychologically "shocking" America out of the war with a "quick win" was optimistic thinking, but incorporating and gambling on the surprise and the psychological (either in shock or endurance) as a factor is a neverending ploy by the inferior side in material that nevertheless feels they have to fight - and often it succeeds, especially if you are willing to bleed: Russo-Japanese War is a example that's closer to shock, and Vietnam and Afghanistan more of the endurance category.

Look at the reality. They went to war in 1941 because the US had just passed a new naval building program through Congress (Stark plan), scheduled to start putting ships at sea in 1943. This after the Vinson plan for brining the USN to treaty limits from 1934 to '42. The ships that started to really swamp the IJN in 1943 were for the most part already ordered before the war started. The IJN decided that they needed secure oil (their 10 million barrel strategic reserve was inadequate to wage war with, and mostly came from the US), and they realized that starting in 1943 they'd never have any hope of naval victory.

In other words, right up until 1940 or 1941 or so (when even a moron can see a war's going to be on), America was going well under capacity, thus suggesting that in fact, America may be restrained from its full military potential by its own internal politics about as well, perhaps even better than a treaty.

So 1922 changes little, IMO. They'd not have been ready, or even highly motivated to wage war in the 20s.

I take a longer view of all this than you do and see 1922 as one of bigger "buttons" in a series that America got to push that affected Japan's development, a strategic version of a early branch-choice in a AVG that looked relatively harmless but winds up dumping you to a Bad End. Besides, the 1922 Treaty became the basis of the 1930 Treaty and then 1936 and so on. The 1922 settlement was settled in terms more favorable to Japan, then it is likely the position would be better than 1930, then there would less pressure to quit the treaty, less chance of feeling obliged to leave the international community, less chance of war ... etc.

Regardless, the USN was already engaged in the 1916 building program in 1922. This 1916 program would have given the USN 50 first line BBs to the UKs 42. Japan's unrestricted plan was the eight-eight-eight fleet with 3 groups of 8 BBs and BCs. 24 ships. The Washington Treaty limited mostly the USN. While it was a problem for the 8-8-8 fleet, Japan decided it was more sensible to sign than get into an arms race they could not possibly win with the US. They were entirely right.

Oh, restricting the Americans by a treaty isn't such a bad idea. Agreeing to the 10:6 instead of the 10:7 (which America would apparently have went along with if not for them getting ideas that they can push for a 10:6) is a crummy idea. By the naval theory of that time, a 10:6 isn't much better than the ~10:5 or worse that you suggest would have happened in an unrestricted scenario.

If anything, ironically perhaps going there would have resulted in yet another sea-change in Japanese naval employment now that the possibility of winning using strike tactics is cleanly eliminated.

(As a nitpick: 50 "first-line" US BBs would have been pretty optimistic. Assuming they finish both the Lexingtons and the S. Dakotas, that'll still only make 60 BBs and BCs made by the US. To get 50 "first-line BBs" you'll have to reach all the way back to about BB-11, which is the predreadnought Missouri...)

[tater]

The IJN was actually better off post 1922 than it would have been without the treaty. The Diet was being stingy with funds, the Tokyo earthquake required massive (expensive) rebuilding, etc.

The IGHQ stuff was interesting. In meeting before ww2, they IGHQ estimated the chances of Japanese success in a war with the US at 10%. They concluded that losing was likely to result in (their own words), "national death." Yamamoto was in no way alone in thinking that war with the US was not a good idea. They felt backed into a corner WRT naval power. The Stark Plan was the death-knell of any chance at meeting the US on acceptable terms, and even that assumed great success in the attrition strategy (picking off USN elements heading West, then "decisive battle" in home waters). Had there been no treaty limitations, the IJN would have built more, and bigger ships in the 20s and 30s perhaps, but that would have triggered USN building even earlier. As it was, the US wasn't even up to Treaty limits during that period. The IJN pulling out in 1936 sealed the deal for USN increases.

Starting the war was a helluva roll of the dice.