Again a Western country bends over

[Freiwillige]

I am sure that terrorism as a whole got little from Libya in the 80's when we bombed Khadafi.

No I am sure it was more to do with Cough Cough Isreal and Western politics towards Cough Cough Isreal.

Osama Bin Laden brought his Terrorism to U.S. soil for the the crime of U.S. boots being on the holy soil of Saudi Arabia during the first gulf war.

[Cohaagen]

Originally Posted by Freiwillige

I am sure that terrorism as a whole got little from Libya in the 80's when we bombed Khadafi.

No I am sure it was more to do with Cough Cough Isreal and Western politics towards Cough Cough Isreal.

Osama Bin Laden brought his Terrorism to U.S. soil for the the crime of U.S. boots being on the holy soil of Saudi Arabia during the first gulf war.

???

[CaptainHaplo]

Just one more example of the current administration's intent to not offend anybody, unless it be somoene like the UK (over the Falklands) or Israel (over the 1800 homes in East Jeruselem)..... Staunch friends its ok to offend - but people who have called for and been party to attacks on innocents people, ours or others, we must do all we can to keep them from being offended....

Cohaagen - its because of Reagan that the spot you were describing isn't still a target - know why - because the cold war is over - thanks to that anecdote quoting, jelly bean eating president. So your welcome - even though your likely not couth enough to say thank you....

[Skybird]

Originally Posted by CaptainHaplo

Just one more example of the current administration's intent to not offend anybody, unless it be somoene like the UK (over the Falklands) or Israel (over the 1800 homes in East Jeruselem).....

That administration has just accused and criticised Germany for anti-Muslim sentiments, and accused europe in general for anti-muslim "discrimination". Somebody in washington does not know what he is talking about.

I have given Obama his time to show what he is aiming at. I was not optimistic over him, never was, but I was willing to give him a chance. That he failed in acchieving some certain things, in parts may be due to inherent resistances of the matters that are beyond his control. But for the orientation of his global and foreign policies, and the split-tongued stand of his regarding climate, all of which is visible now after over one year, he is in full responsibility. His ideas in parts are dangerous, and extremely - most extremely - islamophile, bordering self-denial, and declaring holy what is totally hostile to freedom and justice, female equality and reasonability. And over these things he has totally lost me, so now I find myself opposing him completely.

Different to the hyped expectations her ein europe, I did not expect miracles of him. But that he would deliver such a threatening record, is dissappointing even for me.

I hope he does not win the next elections. Which does not mean that I will like his Republican challenger any better, it depends on the person, of course. but if venomous primitives of the kind of Palin are all what the Republicans can show up with, then the next elections will be a no win-no-win-situation for america, and the rest of the world.

[Stealth Hunter]

Originally Posted by CaptainHaplo

Just one more example of the current administration's intent to not offend anybody, unless it be somoene like the UK (over the Falklands) or Israel (over the 1800 homes in East Jeruselem)..... Staunch friends its ok to offend - but people who have called for and been party to attacks on innocents people, ours or others, we must do all we can to keep them from being offended....

It's not really Obama's fault that the Brits and Israelis are so touchy over a stance of neutrality. It's not our problem. The issue of the Falkland Islands has always been between Argentina and Britain since the 1800s; they just want us to voice our support for them so they can take the islands, or at least gain support from other nations because the United States' opinion is still valued for something since it's a superpower. We are obliged to do nothing; they are obliged to do nothing. The Israelis are no different; our situation with them is no different. And that's how simple it is.

And as far as "people who have called for and been party to attacks on innocents people, ours or others, we must do all we can to keep them from being offended" goes... evidently you must view the Brits and Israelis as perfect little angels who have never violated an international law before by killing civilians/innocents intentionally...

Though there was that time back during the 1920s when the British and Churchill (when he was still a war minister) were in favor of using newly developed weapons "against recalcitrant Arabs as an experiment". Delayed action bombs, particularly efficient against children, were used as part of this experimenting, but Churchill preferred using the shock and awe tactic and use of chemical weapons, enthusiastically arguing for use of poison gases on "uncivilised tribes". He stated and I quote:

"I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. We have definitely adopted the position at the Peace Conference of arguing in favour of the retention of gas as a permanent method of warfare. It is sheer affectation to lacerate a man with the poisonous fragment of a bursting shell and to boggle at making his eyes water by means of lachrymatory gas.
I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes. The moral effect should be so good that the loss of life should be reduced to a minimum. It is not necessary to use only the most deadly gasses: gasses can be used which cause great inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave no serious permanent effects on most of those affected."

And yes, the gas was tested: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/apr/19/iraq.arts

This is of course neglecting to mention what the Indians under Gandhi (and indeed Gandhi himself) had done to them when they nonviolently protested British colonial rule of a province that was rightfully theirs and was unfairly taken nearly a century and a half before.

Israel gets away with crap with the Palestinians all the time. This article sums them up the best, as far as recent times are concerned: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009...rimes-guardian

Not to say we're innocent little angels either, because we've committed our fair share of crimes and injustices against innocents (especially the Native Americans and African-Americans).

Originally Posted by CaptainHaplo

Cohaagen - its because of Reagan that the spot you were describing isn't still a target - know why - because the cold war is over - thanks to that anecdote quoting, jelly bean eating president. So your welcome - even though your likely not couth enough to say thank you....

Reagan ending the cold war. As laughable as the claim that he was the reason the Berlin Wall fell. The Soviet Union collapsed over a few decades (similar to the death of the Roman Empire; it took time), since the 1960s really. For one, the military was not what it once was; the war in Afghanistan had taken a hefty toll on them back in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Poor economic management was also to blame. Elaborating, the mills and industrial plants that churned out millions of weapons, tools, equipment, etc., from the 1940s to the 1960s were gradually breaking down in quality. With time, they became old and problematic. The government's central planning could no longer properly provide for everyone and shortages were common for most households. The standard of living was incredibly low compared to other surrounding countries, and this only made the people even more rebellious towards their overlords (though the amount of corruption in the bureaucracy certainly didn't help).

Their military still had some power, skill, and control, but everything else was just useless. And as a result, the people grew fed up with it. It was inevitable that any small push in any direction would make the whole thing collapse onto itself. A country as large and complex as the Soviet Union does not fall simply because of the actions of one man in one short time. It takes many combined problems over the course of ages to truly produce anything bad for a government that great. Much like our economy now: it was so large and complex that it took the combined efforts of numerous things to reduce it to what it is now.

He gave a speech about the Wall and Soviet Union, he put on his tough-guy acting skills (he did get something useful out of Hollywood after all), and people bought it without bothering to investigate any further the reasons for the fall of Communism in Europe- let alone the death of the Soviets. Reagan was an actor. A good, convincing actor. But an actor nevertheless, not a president. He could convince people that he was a president, but his flattering words and moving speeches did not solve anything. They never do. All they do is waste time, no matter who the person is that's doing the talking. They can inspire and provoke emotion, but they do not get anything done. The taking of action gets sh** done, precisely what Reagan lacked and precisely what the people of Germany and Russia had.

And indeed what Mikhail Gorbachev had. Perestroika intentionally brought down the Soviet Union from what it had been. As far as his actions at the Wall are concerned, he could have had all those people shot if he wanted. It was well within his abilities. Yet, he didn't.

[Cohaagen]

Originally Posted by Stealth Hunter

He stated and I quote:

"I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. We have definitely adopted the position at the Peace Conference of arguing in favour of the retention of gas as a permanent method of warfare. It is sheer affectation to lacerate a man with the poisonous fragment of a bursting shell and to boggle at making his eyes water by means of lachrymatory gas.
I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes. The moral effect should be so good that the loss of life should be reduced to a minimum. It is not necessary to use only the most deadly gasses: gasses can be used which cause great inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave no serious permanent effects on most of those affected."

And yes, the gas was tested: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/apr/19/iraq.arts

"Despite Claims, UK Did Not Gas Iraqis In The 1920s, New Research Finds"

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases...1022064745.htm

Indeed, my copy of the tediously exhaustive "Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History" contains no reference to it, and mentions Fascist Italy's use of chemical weapons in Abyssinia as:

"the only time a European power has used such weapons since the end of World War I"

So let's put an end to this myth once and for all. Yes, it is attractive to use it as a prop against the absurd and unjust Iraq War, and I have heard it many times. It is, however, an urban myth at best, and bull**** at worst.

The Chigago Journals articles referenced above provide a long-overdue critical analysis of the claim:

http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi...10.1086/605488

[Stealth Hunter]

Originally Posted by Cohaagen

"Despite Claims, UK Did Not Gas Iraqis In The 1920s, New Research Finds"

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases...1022064745.htm

Indeed, my copy of the tediously exhaustive "Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History" contains no reference to it, and mentions Fascist Italy's use of chemical weapons in Abyssinia as:

So let's put an end to this myth once and for all. Yes, it is attractive to use it as a prop against the absurd and unjust Iraq War, and I have heard it many times. It is, however, an urban myth at best, and bull**** at worst.

The Chigago Journals articles referenced above provide a long-overdue critical analysis of the claim:

http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi...10.1086/605488

There's a very good book you should check out on this subject. It was written by Professor Victor G. Kiernan of the University of Edinburgh and released in early 1998, titled Colonial Empires & Armies: 1815 - 1960. He has a section focusing on nothing but Mesopotamia, in which he shows that the gassing of Iraqi civilians and Kurds by the British was not conducted by traditional artillery means, which is one of the claims some have made over the years, but by means of the aeroplane. Mr. Douglas asserts that such stories are merely allegations, but Professor Kiernan provides quotes from some of the men serving over there to show that gas was used on people deemed troublesome. I quote from his works:


(pp. 194-197)

Above all, reliance was being placed on the new military technology to magnify manpower. It had been pushed forward rapidly by the Great War, which in this way fortified imperialism as much as in other ways it weakened it. During its course electrified as well as barbed wire was made use of on a turbulent section of the north-west frontier. The armoured car showed its paces in the Afghan War, though only available in limited numbers, `It possessed great fire power and mobility', the army reported, `while offering a small and almost invulnerable target to the enemy.' `Motor machine-gun batteries' were also now in service. A grander chariot of wrath was the tank, an avatar of the elephant of older Indian warfare. But the true deus ex machina was the aviator, who had made his appearance in various colonial theatres during the Great War.

. . . .

To empire men of [General L.C.] Dunsterville's generation, aviation promised, as his book makes clear, to be the trump card, the perfect means of keeping colonial peoples on the strait and narrow path. In the government this view had champions in [Colonial Secretary Lord] Milner and [Secretary for War and Air Winston] Churchill. . . The aim was to turn Iraq, whose defence was being entrusted to the RAF, into a showpiece of the new philosophy.

It was in new territories where colonial rule had as yet no infrastructure that air forces could be looked on most of all as a short cut to control. In Iraq the British Mandate found few welcomers, and there were complications both in the north, where oil was expected, with Kurdish rebels, and in the south with Wahhabis, Muslim zealots raiding across the nebulous border from the new neighbouring Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A variety of operations were soon being undertaken by the RAF, on its own or in conjunction with ground forces under its direction. They were breeding a new type of soldier, a technician in uniform. A good specimen was the L.A. Simmons who joined the RAF as a 'skilled driver' in 1923, and spent 'two and a half quite unforgettable years' with armoured car units in Iraq, before moving on to Egypt. He rose to flight lieutenant. The army was not concerned to notice that it had some enquiring minds now in the fold. No one told Simmons and his friends that they would be getting out of a train at Ur of the Chaldees. 'There was little or no "Briefing" in those days, eveyone was kept in the dark about what was going on.' He arranged to have newspaper cuttings sent out from home, in order to get some clue to what he was doing.

His No.4 company of armoured cars had its base at Hinaidi, close to the capital of Baghdad. Far-ranging patrols were carried out, by sections each of four cars, four Fords with Lewis guns, and a tender with radio and provisions. A car had a crew of five, all of whom had to be able to drive it and to handle any of its weapons. 'Our "armoureds" were greatly respected everywhere', he wrote. 'When men on the ground spotted those sandmen in too much strength for them to eliminate they radioed for planes to come and bomb them out with mustard.'


There is also Air Power & Colonial Control in Iraq: 1920 - 1925 by Dr. D. Omissi. He mentions the same things Professor Kiernan did but also adds a few things on as to what their motives for using the gas were.


(pp. 19-20)


Whatever shape the future administration of Iraq might assume, there were many within the British government who could justify, in various ways, a continued British presence in the country, although their reasoning was often challenged by those sections of the press and public who deplored a lengthy occupation. Mesopotamia had only been wrested from the Turks with the sacrifice of many lives and much money, and some clear advantage had to be derived if the imperial victories, and defeats, were to seem worthwhile. A secure route to India across the Middle East offered a useful alternative to the main links by mandatory relationship and the repeated denials of British occupation. As the Royal Navy gradually converted from coal-burning to oil-burning ships, it became more and more difficult to obtain supplies of high quality fuel. Dependence upon the production of the United States and Mexico was a strategic embarrassment which might best be averted by the development of Mesopotamian reserves. The motive power of these hopes for British policy in the early 1920s is not diminished by the fact that they were never entirely fulfilled.


(pp. 20-21)


The cost of the large Mesopotamian garrison was thought excessive by almost all British politicians, but it was much less clear how to limit the occupying forces without loosening the imperial hold over at least part of the country. In August 1919 Churchill had warned that the garrison of 25,000 British and 80,000 Indian troops would have to be drastically cut, and in November 1919 he suggested that British power could be more cheaply maintained if mechanized forces replaced some units of foot. He advised that the infantry garrison be reduced to a small force in a fortified camp near Baghdad, with blockhouses at other important points, while mechanized units-on land, on river and in the air-patrolled the rest of the country. This was the first of several similar schemes proposed by Churchill over the next two years.


But Churchill persisted in his attempts to find cheaper method of holding Mesopotamia. By early 1920 the garrison still included 14, 000 British troops, besides Indians, and expenditure was then running at about £18 million a year. Driven by this financial imperative, Churchill now began to think along more radical military lines. In mid-February he asked [Chief of the Air Staff Hugh] Trenchard whether he would be "prepared to take Mesopotamia on": the bat an increase of five or six million pounds in the air force estimates and appointment of an Air Officer as Commander-in-Chief. Churchill believed that the country could be cheaply policed by aircraft armed with mustard gas bombs, supported by as few as 4,000 British and 10,000 Indian troops; and he invited Trenchard to submit a scheme along those lines. Trenchard obliged, as he wanted to find an independent peacetime role to secure the future of his obliged, as he wanted to find an independent peacetime role to secure the future of his fledging service. The Air Staff drew up a plan by which Mesopotamia would be garrisoned by ten air force squadrons, mainly concentrated in and around Baghdad. Regular troops would be used only to guard air bases and perhaps for some limited co-operation with the bombers, as it would be "unnecessary to put our boys' lives at risk in the event the gas canisters be used". As Trenchard pointed out, aircraft could strike swiftly into areas barely accessible to ground forces and not have to worry about weapons repercussions; they could distribute propaganda and could obtain early observational intelligence of tribesmen masses. Churchill outlined his scheme to the House of Commons on 22 March.


(pp. 22-23)


[President Woodrow] Wilson's skepticism about air control might have been discounted as his usual scaremongering were it not for the outbreak of a full-scale uprising in Mesopotamia in the summer of 1920. It is impossible to accept the assertion of [Professor Elie] Kedourie that the rising was the product of "encouragement from outside" and was important only in so far as external agitation "succeeded in magnifying its extent and significance". On the contrary, the revolt shook the very foundations of British rule in Mesopotamia, and brought about major changes in political and military policy. The rising, mainly a response to British tax policy, began in Rumaitha in early July and insurrection was general along the lower Euphrates by the middle of the month. After a column composed mainly of the 2 Manchesters was almost entirely destroyed by a tribesmen ambush, a division of Indian reinforcements was hastily summoned to Basra, but the first of these reserves did not arrive until 7 August. The situation was at its most serious during the last week of August when the rebellion spread to the upper Euphrates and to the countryside around Baghdad: there were also the first signs of unrest in Kurdistan. At the height of their effort the tribesmen fielded about 131,000 men, of whom perhaps half were armed with modern rifles. Their leaders were drawn mainly from those groups whose power had waned under British rule: Shia mujahids, former Ottoman civil servants and ex-officers of the Turkish armies. The leading Arab patriots in Baghdad and the wealthy merchants of Basra, men with more to lose, stood aloof and awaited the event. For the British the crisis had passed by mid-September after supplies for the RAF had arrived, but heavy fighting continued on until the end of the following month.

Before the rebellion the squadrons of the Royal Air Force had already been active in the policing of Iraq. Lieutenant-General Aylmer Haldane praised the "admirable work of the RAF under extremely arduous conditions" after bombers had used gas to suppress unrest in Kurdistan in the winter of 1919-20 and again the following spring. Aircraft also patrolled the British line of communications between Baghdad and Mosul and took punitive action against the Sufran tribe in the Diwaniyah area when they further used mustard gas on the insurrectionists there. But the 1920 rebellion convinced several observers that aircraft could not replace ground troops as the main imperial police force in Iraq. Haldane acknowledged that aeroplanes had proved proved of great value during the revolt for reconnaissance, close support, pursuit, rapid communication, bombings, and demonstration; but he denied that aircraft alone could force the submission of tribes who were committed to rebellion. [Civil Commissiner] Arnold Wilson believed that the main cause of the revolt was the perceived military weakness of the imperial forces after the reduction of the garrison: "to kick a man when he is down is the most popular pastime in the East, sanctioned by centuries of precept and practice". He also suggested however, that the "use of aeroplanes and chemical weapons against recalcitrants" had created deep currents of resentment which had surfaced in rebellion. In August 1920 the Times ran a leading article which stated that the revolt had tested the methods of air control and found them wanting; and this before they had even been tried.

Both Churchill and Trenchard tried to vast the most flattering light upon actions of the Royal Air Force. During the first week of July there were fierce fighting around Samawa and Rumaitha on the Euphrates but, Churchill told the Cabinet on 7 July, "our attack was successful...The enemy were bombed, gassed, and machine-gunned with effect by aeroplanes which cooperated with the troops.'"During the blockade of Rumaitha, aircraft attacked rebel positions and dropped ammunition and food to the beleaguered imperial garrison.




Finally, Dr. Peter Sluglett, a leading historian on modern Iraq from London, wrote in his book Britain in Iraq: 1914 - 1932. I quote:




(pp.262-270)


The first aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps had arrived in Mesopotamia in 1916 to counter the Ottoman Turks. In the first months, their use was confined to reconnaissance and guidance of artillery fire, but gradually the advantages of using aircraft in offensive operations became as apparent in the Middle East as they had become on the Western Front. The notion that aeroplanes had their uses in checking disturbances in areas considered impenetrable by ordinary troops began to gain currency, not to mention their merits of speed and agility which could allow them to strafe soldiers. In April 1919:

"Bombing still continues to be carried out. No sooner has one area been subdued than another breaks out into revolt and has to be dealt with by aeroplane..all these tribal disturbances have been dealt with from the air with their gas loads... thus the Army has been saved from marching many weary miles over bad country and sustaining casualties."

The advantage of air control, its speed, its great savings in time, personnel and expense were to become increasingly obvious over the following years. Even traditional military men were brought round: General Haldane, Commander-in-Chief in Baghdad wrote to Churchill in Hune 1921:

"Indeed, I now think that had I had sufficient aircraft last year I might have prevented the insurrection spreading from beyond the first incident at Rumaitha."

As Secretary of State for War, Churchill instructed Trenchard to prepare a scheme for the maintenance of internal security for Mesopotamia. Churchill envisaged a series of landing grounds in the middle of defended areas, thus doing away with the long lines of communication which had bedeviled the campaign during the war. After a tour of the country, Sir Geoffrey Salmond, brother of the first Air Officer Commanding in Baghdad, concluded that the scheme was suitable in principle:

"It must be taken as an essential part of our position in Mesopotamia that the civil administration of this country is only possible because military force exists. The task which the RAF will be called upon to undertake is to maintain the status quo without imperiling the civil administration, even though the worst situation should arise, namely a general rising throughout the country, an improbable event."

In spite of Salmond's predictions, the improbable did take place: the insurrection began a few months later and heavy fighting and considerable loss of life resulted. Hence the arguments for the air scheme became even stronger, in terms of the general war-weariness and the desperate need for economy now pressing in upon Whitehall. Churchill, now Colonial Secretary, strongly advocated the policy, which was finally adopted in August 1921, and scheduled to take effect after October 1922. Britain's obligations as Mandatory power were to be carried out by employing squadrons of the RAF together with a number of armoured car companies and battalions of Levies. This garrison was under the Air Officer Commanding, who was himself responsible to the High Comminssioner and not to the Air Ministry. Apart from the saving of money involved, Trenchard considered that the air scheme was based on the principle that:

"..if the Arabs have nothing to fight against on the ground and no loot or rifles to be obtained, and nobody to kill, but have to deal with aeroplanes which are out of their reach, let alone the hells of chemistry that they might release, they are certain to come in and there will be no risk of disasters or heavy casualties such as are always suffered by small infantry patrols in uncivilized countries by savages."

However, the principles of air control were the subject of protracted controversy. The opposition put up by the War Office was largely based on lines of demarcation, but even within the Colonial Office misgivings were expresses which were in fact substantially justified during the period of the Mandate. One official asked:

"How far would it be legitimate or desirable for British Forces to help the Arab Government put down risings or to enforce obedience?....suppose the middle Euphrates area revolts against the Amir and pushes out all the Amir's officials and sets up a Shia administration: is the Mandatory to help restore the Amir's authority?"

Churchill informed Cox in June, 1921:

"Aerial action is a legitimate means of quelling disturbances and of enforcing the maintenance of order but it should in no circumstances be employed in support of purely administrative measures such as the collection of revenue."

In practical terms, the preservation of "internal security" was equivalent to extending the area of authority of the Iraq Government. In order to achieve this, parts of the country which were more or less anarchic and had rarely paid taxes had to be pacified. To the Kurds, and to the tribesmen of the Middle and Lower Euphrates, the policy pursued by Britain and the Iraq Government seemed in practice little different from that of the Turks. For the tribesmen, "Government" meant the twin evils of taxation and conscription, both of which they had almost succeeded in keeping at arm's length in Ottoman times. After the Occupation, it became clear that the Civil Administration was determined not only to impose taxes but also to collect them, and where the Iraq Government could afford to do so without damaging local susceptibilities, it also showed energy in this respect.

Inevitably, gas bombing developed into an instrument of repression. As a result of several operations in Iraq in 1923 and 1924, the Harmsworth and Beaverbrook presses, which were strongly opposed to any further British involvement in the Middle East, seized on the vigorous peacekeeping activities of the RAF as a further argument to "Quit Mesopotamia", and there were a number of embarrassing Parliamentary Questions. Lansbury fulminated against this Hunnish and barbarous method of warfare against unarmed people, but he was not alone in his attacks on the policy:

"Lord Curzon has interested himself in this question. I gather that Lord Curzon was not satisfied that there is any real difference between gas bombing for non-payment of taxes and gas bombing for non-appearance when summoned to explain non-payment of taxes."

In August 1924 the Labour Minister for Air presented to Parliament a Note on the Employment of the Air Arm in Iraq, apparently an attempt at a blanket answer to these criticisms. In described the circumstances under which RAF assistance could be requested, and the administrative procedures involved, emphasizing that aeroplanes were only to be used if all other mans had failed. The alternatives to air control were dismissed as impossibly unwieldy and expensive. The Note claimed that air defence was cheap, that it provided "a method of control more effective and less costly to life and suffering", and that if enabled gas bombing was about to take place, the local population was always warned in advance by leaflets being dropped to enable them to take cover, so that "the compulsion exercised by the air arm rests more on the damage to morale and on the interruption to the normal life of the tribe than on actual casualties."

Both the principles and the abuses of the system in practice are best illustrated by studying a single operation. The largest offensive mounted by the RAF in Southern Iraq during the 1920's was the action taken against the Bani Huchaim confederation in Samawa qadha in the late autumn and winter of 1923-24. In the autumn of 1923, the authorities attempted to collect taxes in the Samawa qadha for the first time for many years. There was no suggestion that there had been any serious unruliness or disorder in the area, and the fact that British Officers were able to tour freely confirms this. Glubb, who was then Special Service Officer at Hillah, discovered that the serious water shortage in the area was largely due to the diversion of the channels by Shal'lan abu Chon, the most powerful local sheikh who, like his associate Abd al-Wahid Sikkar, envisited the qadha and the mustasarrif was rarely seen. The tribes themselves were:

"exceptionally poor... it is a regrettable fact that Government at the moment presents itself to their minds as a kind of absentee landlord which never concerns itself with them except periodically to demand revenue."

Glubb suggested that it would be sensible to talk to the local leaders, listen to their grievances, and make whatever adjustments were possible.

At the same time, however, (as is evident from the dates of the letters) the Administrative Inspector, Diwaniyah, was recommending that punitive action should be taken for non-payment of taxes. Units of the Iraq Army and police were moved into position well before it was suggested that the "rebels" should be summoned to Samawa. The letter sent by the Ministry of Interior to the Administrative Inspector stressed that the latter should "be careful not to impose collection of revenue as the main condition since if it is found necessary to bomb them it must be for defiance of Government orders and not to increase the exchequer", the distinction which Lord Curzon had found so hard to appreciate.

A week or so later Moore, the S.S.O. at Samawa, made another tour of the area, listening to complaints:

"In each mudhif (tribal guest-house) we heard the same opinions and grievances that have been embodied in Captain Glubb's report...albu Jayyash in particular were loud in their praise of the old days when water was fairly distributed and a man could feel reasonably safe in his house."

Nevertheless, late in November, the sheikhs of several subsections of the Bani Huchaim confederation were "peremptorily'"summoned to Samawa at 48 hours' notice and required to give a deposit of money as surety of their tribes' good behaviour. Two of the three sheikhs who arrived confessed that they had long lost the ability to control their tribes, an answer which although considered unsatisfactory was more than likely to be true. The necessary guarantees could not be found, and arrangements were accordingly made for the RAF to bomb the area with mustard gas so as to encourage obedience to Government. The casualties may appear unimpressive by today's standards, but over a two week period 344 people were killed and an unspecified number wounded.

A few weeks after the end of the operation Glubb, perhaps the most perceptive observer of local conditions, wrote to Air Headquarters:

"It is regrettable but it appears almost inevitable that aerial action should be associated with the payment of taxes. First, the tribesman thinks of Government merely as an institution which periodically descends upon him demanding money. If he sees Government applying coercion to any individual to any individual or tribe he naturally concludes that it is with the object of extracting money. Secondly, the average minor Government official seems to have much the same idea of his duties…. The association of punitive action with the payment of taxes cannot be avoided. It can, however, be mitigated by constantly impressing on individuals that Government has no right to tax the community unless it gives something in return. I have very rarely heard an official take credit to himself for improving agriculture in his district, or public health."

A further acute analysis was written by another RAF Intelligence Officer in April 1924:

"The primary cause of the recent outbreak was the growing irritation at demands for revenue which the tribes' poverty and ****lessness makes them unable to meet. That they in fact have little or no money is reported from all sources, both official and unofficial. Whether they would pay if they had is another question, but it seems at least possible that they would squander less recklessly what little they get if they saw a more tangible return for their repayment of revenue. At present many of them feel that they are merely supplying pay for some tomato-eating Effendis in Baghdad."

Soon after the operation had ended, an official report was sent to London by the Air Officer Commanding in Baghdad. In a Minute on the report, the Deputy Chief of Air Staff suggested that before it was circulated to other Government departments, certain passages should be omitted, amongst which was the following:

"Although the tribes had been continually lawless and disobedient it appeared necessary before punitive action was taken that some definite instance of insubordination should take place."

The tone of the Minute itself is not reassuring:

"If this report as it stands were to get into the hands of undesirable people, harm might be done not only to the Air Force but also to the Government (i.e. H.M.G.) the whole operation might be regarded as forcing an unnecessary and unprovoked quarrel on the people in order that drastic punishment might be carried out at a time when no definite claim could be fixed on these people and when the country was quiet and the main communications working normally, even to the extent that; Political Officers could go. I think that certain paragraph should not be sent out without further consideration."

Later operations in the same area further suggest that these operations had simply been a form of exemplary punishment. In 1925, a squadron of aircraft was used to help the police in the sheep count, undertaken to collect the koda, or animal tax. The air diary records:

"This is the first serious attempt to exercise civil authority over the turbulent Bani Huchaim since the Samawa operations in 1923...It is interesting therefore to note that small police columns with aircraft co-operation were able to operate successfully on such a scale in this areas without encountering opposition."

If the first offensive had been in any way successful, it seems strange that two years had had to elapse before any further attempts were made to extend Government authority in the area. However, the deterrent effect had struck deep: in 1930 the S.S.O Diwaniya commented:

"Although only a few desperate criminals are now prepared to resist the police, whole sections of the tribes might assist their criminal relatives against the police were it not for the threat of aeroplanes gassing them into the grave. This form of punishment will always be remembered in the Samawa qadha."

There are also photographs of some of the gas attacks. These particular examples are from photographer H.D. Girdwood, who went with a Manchester Regiment (note the heavy uniforms in desert terrain; the Manchesters were never given proper desert wear until 1927, only "spine pads" that supposedly were supposedly to prevent sunstroke) during the first few insurrections along the Euphrates; previously, he was a war photographer who had been at Paschendaele, the Somme, Vimy Ridge, Ypres, and more.







These photographs are from 1927, during drilling exercises. Note that they had received their new equipment.






So... yeah...

[Cohaagen]

If debate is won solely through smothering the opposing argument under sheer weight of cut n' pasted text from the first page of a Google search, then there is no doubt you have carried the motion, Stealth Hunter. If, however, one is interested in hard facts, physical evidence, photographs, eyewitness accounts, direct reference to specific events, well...

Posting enormous chunks of text - complete with irrelevancies - does not make up for a complete lack of proof, no matter how intellectually intimidating you might wish its appearance to be. In that entire post (and I did read it all) you've come up with one on-the-spot reference to someone talking about soldiers requesting mustard gas (nothing about it being deployed), and the same old claim about bombing which first surfaced in 1986. If you had read the very recent and thorough paper I linked to, you'll have seen that this is exactly the kind of after-the-fact inference it deals with.

The popular and attractive image of the evil empire hosing down jundies with poison gas is a case of falsehood repeated until it becomes (in the popular mind, at least) true.

Neither is your case helped by posting photographs purportedly of gas attacks in "Mesopotamia" which are actually a mixture of scenes from the Somme, East Africa, Loos, etc. The captions about "retreating Huns" are a bit of a giveaway.

[Skybird]

Gadaffi.

Lockerbie. Murder in 270 cases. Official apology refused until today.

Supports Hamas until today.

Members of his family behave like shyt when visiting other countries, there are allegations of attempted gang rape and severe physical violence.

Hijacking and helding hostage of innocent Swissmen and calls for open jihad against europe, because the Swiss were impertinent enough to arrest his son after acts of the above description.

Calls for demographic conquest of Europe: "We have 50 million Muslims in Europe. There are signs that Allah will grant Islam victory in Europe - without swords, without guns, without conquests. The 50 million Muslims of Europe will turn it into a Muslim continent within a few decades. "

Held Bulgarian doctors and nurses a long time as hostages, to blackmail Bulgaria for the paying of money after the collapsing Lybian health system was responsible for the infection of 400 children with HIV. The prisoners were terrorised, were electrotortured, two of the nurses later reported to have been raped repeatedly, and all lived under the terror of being threatend with death, and that their families would be killed by terror commandos. Needless to say that the Bulgarians were completely innocent in the "intentional infection" of children with HIV.

Supports Tuareg groups, and Muslim militias that are involved in the slaughtering of Christian villagers in Niger.


That's what comes to my mind just at first thoguht aboiut the man. I know there is much more.

Yes, we really should apologise to this murderous dog. France, in its determination to replace the lost Napoleonian empire with turning Europe into Eurabia which in it's blinded arrogance hopes to dominate then (an old longterm political strategy formulated by de Gaulle), kneels before him, delivered modern ATGMs, helicotpers, and signed a deal for the delivery of a French nuclear reactor.for civilian use only, of course.

Of course.

I do not buy into this constant hacking at the French over their claimed cowardice or weakness, that is nonsense. But the damage they do to Europe is what makes me despising France more and more. that france gets eaten up from within by the ghost it has called, is no comfort, since all other nations will follow it's fate with just a short delay - Britain and France are in the lead in this process, but they won't stay alone.

[Cohaagen]

Originally Posted by Skybird

Gadaffi.

Lockerbie. Murder in 270 cases. Official apology refused until today.

The apology:

http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Sky...20080641100633

And the compensation:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/uk/3150793.stm

Your nutty American mirror-images (they needn't be named) have mostly disappeared - presumably discredited - so why don't you do the right thing, Skybird, and can the incessant political claptrap?

[Skybird]

A deal was made to break diplomatic deadlock over Lybia'S isolation, and money was payed. Lybia has never accepted responsibility for the terror strike, nor apologised, only said "it accepts responsibility for actions of it'S authorities", without refering to Lockerbie, and thus evading any linking of it'S declaration to Lockerbie. Also, Lybia never has given details on the strike. The Lybian prime minister explicitly denied that Lybia was accepting any guilt.

Also, the "compensations" where not unconditional, but were demanded by Lybia to be linked to actions by the UN and the US. A certain part was only to be released if the Un would end sanctions to Lybia, a seocnd share was to be relased if the US would end it'S sanctions, and the rest would only be payed if the US deletes Lybia from it's list of terror-sponsoring states.

Not that an apology would mean anything, btw. The Lybian support for murder gangs, terror groups and genociding militias goes on until today.

[XabbaRus]

Originally Posted by Freiwillige

I am sure that terrorism as a whole got little from Libya in the 80's when we bombed Khadafi.

Hmm so where did the IRA get most of its weapons from in the 80s?

That administration has just accused and criticised Germany for anti-Muslim sentiments, and accused europe in general for anti-muslim "discrimination".

Perhaps the administration had read some of your rants

Yes, we really should apologise to this murderous dog.

Indeed you should, unless of course you don't want his countries oil.

France, in its determination to replace the lost Napoleonian empire with turning Europe into Eurabia which in it's blinded arrogance hopes to dominate then

Crazy doesn't even come close to describing that statement.

Just one more example of the current administration's intent to not offend anybody, unless it be somoene like the UK (over the Falklands) or Israel (over the 1800 homes in East Jeruselem).....

Errrrr...the Falkland issue is entirely consistant with the policy of every US administration since WW2and the east Jerusalem issue is your "ally" once again shafting the US over a promise it had given to many previous administrations.
So what a surprise, that post has very little bearing on reality.

Don't waste your time Tribesman.

A racist in Germany is like a grain of sand in Sahara.

Don't waste your time Tribesman.
A racist in Germany is like a grain of sand in Sahara.

Considering that Sky consistantly rants about peoples religions and you consistantly rant about peoples nationalities how different are you?