Secrets of the Bismark

10-20-09, 01:42 AM

Concerning the intact POW
After the hunt, POW was drydocked again for finishing works. The dockworkers were quite astonished to find a hole below the waterline and after tracing it, they found a 38 cm dud sitting in a quite crucial sport below turret B. Had it gone boom POW would have also gone boom.

Concerning the faulty aft portion
Lützow and Prinz Eugen got their tails shoot of by torps. The german engineers had overlooked the fact that the keel didn't stretch so far, so it was a strukturly weak spot for almost all german fighting ships. Bismarks tail also broke of during sinking, as the layout of wreckage on the seabed explains.
Scharnhorst got hit a bit foreward, which flooded parts of her engine compartment, the wreck has still gotten his tail (but not the bow - other story).

Concerning self-sinking
Evidence is not conclusive. During Camerons media-expedition it was shown that large parts of the outer hull had been broken of by the impact on the seabed. This allowed an inspection of the torpedo-bulkhead which looked intact. But some parts of the Bismarks are sitting almost to the waterline in the seabed, so until the ship isn't excavacated and raised there might still be some holes of deep running torpedos buried. For the sake of the argument lets say, the Bismark wouldn't have sunk without the British but the Germans have lend a helping hand in sinking this ship.

Guns layout
The german admirality wanted an equal firing cover at 360°. Thats why 4 turrets were installed. For the medium calibers, the Germans didn't have an all-purpose-gun like the Americans with their 5". So different calibers were installed with different goals. Why different bores were installed for the 10,5 cm flak beats me.

Tactical situation
Raeder was an admiral of the old guard. For him battles were fought above the sealevel, not bellow. In the 1930's he had Hitlers ear and Hitler liked big ships (after the war scetches with his initials were found, which showed ships with 60 cm guns). Would the German navy have accepeted her status as cruiser navy and neglected building big ships in favour for subs, the war might have gone otherwise.

Brag · 10-20-09, 08:10 AM

Ha! This turned into a good and informative debate--Well done, chaps.

Freiwillige · 10-20-09, 09:40 AM

Allot of the Bismarck's mystique is as much about the situation as it was the ship.

For example the Tirpitz is the same class of ship but her name doesn't compare to the Bismarck in fame and legend.

The Idea that the Bismarck defeated the British navy's very symbol of power.
Then outnumbered and against her will she was forced to sail into the very forces pursuing her, Fighting to the last of her ability!

Its very much like a Wagnerian opera. And a great story because its one of the few cases where honor and glory can be claimed by both sides.

To the KMS Bismarck and HMS Hood

Dread Knot · 10-20-09, 10:28 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Pacific_Ace

Had Bismark made it into the North Atlantic in battle worthy condition the consequences would have been immense and cannot be underestimated. This was 7 months before Pearl Harbor, UK could conceivably have been forced to end the war.

Yeah...I love this. One German battleship was magically going to do what 300 submarines under Donitz couldn't do later. Or the existing fleet of German pocket battleships and auxiliary cruisers which sank a lot more ships than the Bismarck ever did. Or the entire German High Seas fleet in WWI either.

I kind of blame the elevation of the Bismarck as some sort of supership on the James Cameron documentary he made after diving on the Bismarck's wreck. In it he characterized the warship as the German equivalent of the "Death Star." (even down to an Achilles Heel exploited by a Swordfish pilot apparently gifted with The Force.

) As talented as Cameron is a filmaker and storyteller I don't think he qualifies as a naval historian.

In the big picture I feel Bismarck was a extravagant ship Germany could ill afford and in the end was ill used as a commerce raider. It doesn't take a 15" shell to sink a lowly merchantman.

Freiwillige · 10-20-09, 11:52 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Dread Knot

Yeah...I love this. One German battleship was magically going to do what 300 submarines under Donitz couldn't do later. Or the existing fleet of German pocket battleships and auxiliary cruisers which sank a lot more ships than the Bismarck ever did. Or the entire German High Seas fleet in WWI either.

I kind of blame the elevation of the Bismarck as some sort of supership on the James Cameron documentary he made after diving on the Bismarck's wreck. In it he characterized the warship as the German equivalent of the "Death Star." (even down to an Achilles Heel exploited by a Swordfish pilot apparently gifted with The Force.

) As talented as Cameron is a filmaker and storyteller I don't think he qualifies as a naval historian.

In the big picture I feel Bismarck was a extravagant ship Germany could ill afford and in the end was ill used as a commerce raider. It doesn't take a 15" shell to sink a lowly merchantman.

Two myths keep popping up in this discussion.
1. (The Bismarck class was not designed to go against other capital ships.)
WRONG! That is exactly what she was designed for.

2. (She was designed for commerce raiding.)
Her tactical use by the Kriegsmarine due to the war situation against convoys was a valid tactic. When the Bismarck was designed she was designed for a war with England in 1944,45 or 46' under the Z-Plan.

Had the timetable of war been met by the Z-plan then Germany would have had many more capital ships.

Also the Bismarck in the Atlantic would not have been an outright war winner but her influence in the convoy's area could cause dispersal which in turn would leave the U-boats happy pickings.

Another thing I had just found out was that the Kreigsmarine had another plan that lost out. Wait a few more months and send out the Bismarck, Tirpitz, Gneisneau, Scharnhorst, Prinze Eugen, Admiral Scheer and Hipper.

In the End the leadership of the Surface fleet was impatient and decided to act with just the Bismarck and prince Eugen.

Had they sent out the whole fleet the British would have been hard pressed to maintain controll of the Atlantic without sacrificing the Med to keep the Atlantic. Could have been as epic as Jutland!

10-20-09, 12:12 PM

$0.02 worth of opinion before departing this discussion…

The entire Bismarck episode is certainly an epic worthy of Wagner but the very drama of the common narrative tends to camouflage many aspects of the events. Any novelist taking the story to his publisher would, in all probability, be shown the door, hallway and the street in quick succession.

Every historical event gets spun in a way to benefit the side relating those events. Usually when two sides are compared this spin is considerably different and so discussion centers on the differing points of view. In the case of the Bismarck myth it behooved Britain and Germany to spin the story precisely the same way and so the narratives reinforce each other.

It certainly benefits the German telling that Bismarck was a superior warship capable of wresting control of the sea-lanes from Britain and winning the war. This hides her short legs and design shortcomings since if these are admitted, the question would be: Why was a capital ship so unsuited to operations against commerce be sent on such a mission?

The logistical problems of achieving and maintaining sea-control without a maritime choke point to canalize shipping or air superiority cannot be admitted for the uncomfortable question: How would a single battleship sortie actually stop convoy traffic for long enough to starve Britain into surrender?

The uber-battleship myth allows us to ignore these questions or consider them irrelevant but the actual mechanism by which Bismarck would realistically ‘win the war’ has escaped all but the most rabid Bismarck fanboys. It also allows responsibility for what happened to be placed on Adm Lutjen’s shoulders, effectively absolving OKM and providing the illusion that their strategy was really sound had it been properly executed. Commerce raiding by surface ships could never be decisive without strategic sea-control and German battleships could never establish this in the North Atlantic except on the most local and transient basis.

Ironically the uber-battleship narrative also benefits the Royal Navy for we tend not to look deeper and ask uncomfortable questions such as:

Why was Hood sent into a surface action with some nine tons of rocket fuel stored in sheet metal lockers directly forward of X-turret and on the deck-head over the above water torpedo tubes? (Her 4” UP anti-aircraft rocket ammunition)

Why with two-fold superiority in gunnery firepower and ten-fold superiority in ship-killing torpedoes available, did Adm Holland bungle the action at the Denmark Straights so badly? With almost 15-hours of daylight ahead the precipitous advance on Bismarck and Prinz Eugen was as unnecessary as it was unwise as was detaching his destroyer flotilla during the night. Concentrating on Hood’s alleged weaknesses allow Holland’s actions leading up to the engagement to be ignored.

Why did Adm Wake-Walker handle the shadowing of Bismarck in such a pusillanimous manner? Particularly when compared to the shining examples of Harwood’s pursuit of Graf Spee in 1939 and Kelly shadowing and even actually engaging SMS Goeben and Breslau in 1914 with HMS Gloucester.

How can the Admiralty explain the comedy of errors that was the movement of the Home Fleet following the loss of Hood?

The conventional narrative largely ignores or glosses over these questions and many others probably because the answers might show the Royal Navy operation in a very unfavourable light. There is no disrespect intended but an objective telling should include warts and all however the nature of the Bismarck drama ensures that it has been largely shorn of its warts so that the leadership of both sides emerge with great credit rather than being managers of a complete naval fiasco.

Winston Churchill, who must bear considerable responsibility for the British actions during Exercise Rhine once wrote: “I know History will be kind to me for I intend to write it.”

This is certainly true of the Bismarck myth.

Freiwillige · 10-20-09, 01:54 PM

Nice post

10-20-09, 01:42 AM	#1
gmuno Stowaway Posts: n/a Downloads: Uploads:	Concerning the intact POW After the hunt, POW was drydocked again for finishing works. The dockworkers were quite astonished to find a hole below the waterline and after tracing it, they found a 38 cm dud sitting in a quite crucial sport below turret B. Had it gone boom POW would have also gone boom. Concerning the faulty aft portion Lützow and Prinz Eugen got their tails shoot of by torps. The german engineers had overlooked the fact that the keel didn't stretch so far, so it was a strukturly weak spot for almost all german fighting ships. Bismarks tail also broke of during sinking, as the layout of wreckage on the seabed explains. Scharnhorst got hit a bit foreward, which flooded parts of her engine compartment, the wreck has still gotten his tail (but not the bow - other story). Concerning self-sinking Evidence is not conclusive. During Camerons media-expedition it was shown that large parts of the outer hull had been broken of by the impact on the seabed. This allowed an inspection of the torpedo-bulkhead which looked intact. But some parts of the Bismarks are sitting almost to the waterline in the seabed, so until the ship isn't excavacated and raised there might still be some holes of deep running torpedos buried. For the sake of the argument lets say, the Bismark wouldn't have sunk without the British but the Germans have lend a helping hand in sinking this ship. Guns layout The german admirality wanted an equal firing cover at 360°. Thats why 4 turrets were installed. For the medium calibers, the Germans didn't have an all-purpose-gun like the Americans with their 5". So different calibers were installed with different goals. Why different bores were installed for the 10,5 cm flak beats me. Tactical situation Raeder was an admiral of the old guard. For him battles were fought above the sealevel, not bellow. In the 1930's he had Hitlers ear and Hitler liked big ships (after the war scetches with his initials were found, which showed ships with 60 cm guns). Would the German navy have accepeted her status as cruiser navy and neglected building big ships in favour for subs, the war might have gone otherwise. Last edited by gmuno; 10-20-09 at 08:54 AM.

10-20-09, 08:10 AM	#2
Brag Navy Seal Join Date: Nov 2006 Location: Docked on a Russian pond Posts: 7,072 Downloads: 2 Uploads: 0	Ha! This turned into a good and informative debate--Well done, chaps. __________________ Espionage, adventure, suspense, are just a click away Click here to look inside Brag's book: Amazon.com: Kingmaker: Alexey Braguine: Books Order Kingmaker here: http://www.subsim.com/store.html For Tactics visit:http://www.freewebs.com/kielman/

10-20-09, 09:40 AM	#3
Freiwillige The Old Man Join Date: Mar 2008 Location: Phx. Az Posts: 1,458 Downloads: 24 Uploads: 0	Allot of the Bismarck's mystique is as much about the situation as it was the ship. For example the Tirpitz is the same class of ship but her name doesn't compare to the Bismarck in fame and legend. The Idea that the Bismarck defeated the British navy's very symbol of power. Then outnumbered and against her will she was forced to sail into the very forces pursuing her, Fighting to the last of her ability! Its very much like a Wagnerian opera. And a great story because its one of the few cases where honor and glory can be claimed by both sides. To the KMS Bismarck and HMS Hood

10-20-09, 12:12 PM	#6
Randomizer Stowaway Posts: n/a Downloads: Uploads:	$0.02 worth of opinion before departing this discussion… The entire Bismarck episode is certainly an epic worthy of Wagner but the very drama of the common narrative tends to camouflage many aspects of the events. Any novelist taking the story to his publisher would, in all probability, be shown the door, hallway and the street in quick succession. Every historical event gets spun in a way to benefit the side relating those events. Usually when two sides are compared this spin is considerably different and so discussion centers on the differing points of view. In the case of the Bismarck myth it behooved Britain and Germany to spin the story precisely the same way and so the narratives reinforce each other. It certainly benefits the German telling that Bismarck was a superior warship capable of wresting control of the sea-lanes from Britain and winning the war. This hides her short legs and design shortcomings since if these are admitted, the question would be: Why was a capital ship so unsuited to operations against commerce be sent on such a mission? The logistical problems of achieving and maintaining sea-control without a maritime choke point to canalize shipping or air superiority cannot be admitted for the uncomfortable question: How would a single battleship sortie actually stop convoy traffic for long enough to starve Britain into surrender? The uber-battleship myth allows us to ignore these questions or consider them irrelevant but the actual mechanism by which Bismarck would realistically ‘win the war’ has escaped all but the most rabid Bismarck fanboys. It also allows responsibility for what happened to be placed on Adm Lutjen’s shoulders, effectively absolving OKM and providing the illusion that their strategy was really sound had it been properly executed. Commerce raiding by surface ships could never be decisive without strategic sea-control and German battleships could never establish this in the North Atlantic except on the most local and transient basis. Ironically the uber-battleship narrative also benefits the Royal Navy for we tend not to look deeper and ask uncomfortable questions such as: Why was Hood sent into a surface action with some nine tons of rocket fuel stored in sheet metal lockers directly forward of X-turret and on the deck-head over the above water torpedo tubes? (Her 4” UP anti-aircraft rocket ammunition) Why with two-fold superiority in gunnery firepower and ten-fold superiority in ship-killing torpedoes available, did Adm Holland bungle the action at the Denmark Straights so badly? With almost 15-hours of daylight ahead the precipitous advance on Bismarck and Prinz Eugen was as unnecessary as it was unwise as was detaching his destroyer flotilla during the night. Concentrating on Hood’s alleged weaknesses allow Holland’s actions leading up to the engagement to be ignored. Why did Adm Wake-Walker handle the shadowing of Bismarck in such a pusillanimous manner? Particularly when compared to the shining examples of Harwood’s pursuit of Graf Spee in 1939 and Kelly shadowing and even actually engaging SMS Goeben and Breslau in 1914 with HMS Gloucester. How can the Admiralty explain the comedy of errors that was the movement of the Home Fleet following the loss of Hood? The conventional narrative largely ignores or glosses over these questions and many others probably because the answers might show the Royal Navy operation in a very unfavourable light. There is no disrespect intended but an objective telling should include warts and all however the nature of the Bismarck drama ensures that it has been largely shorn of its warts so that the leadership of both sides emerge with great credit rather than being managers of a complete naval fiasco. Winston Churchill, who must bear considerable responsibility for the British actions during Exercise Rhine once wrote: “I know History will be kind to me for I intend to write it.” This is certainly true of the Bismarck myth.

10-20-09, 01:54 PM	#7
Freiwillige The Old Man Join Date: Mar 2008 Location: Phx. Az Posts: 1,458 Downloads: 24 Uploads: 0	Nice post