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Sailor Steve

05-07-19, 08:22 PM

Wednesday, May 7, 1919

PEACE CONGRESS

Trianon Palace, Versailles, Protocol No. 1, Plenary Session, 15:00

Nations Represented:

United States of America
Great Britain
France
Canada
Australia
South Africa
New Zealand
India
Italy
Japan
Belgium
Brazil
China
Cuba
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
The Hedjaz
Honduras
Liberia
Nicaragua
Panama
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Serbia
Siam
Czechoslovakia
Germany

M Clemenceau, President of the Congress, speaking in French, makes the following speech:

“Gentlemen,

This can be neither the time nor the place for superfluous words. You see before you the accredited Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, both small and great, which have waged without intermission for more than four years the pitiless war which was imposed on them. The hour has struck for the weighty settlement of our accounts. You asked us for peace. We are disposed to grant it to you. This volume, which the Secretary-General of the Conference will shortly hand to you, will tell you the conditions which we have fixed. Every facility which you may require for examining its text will be granted to you, including of course the usages of courtesy commonly practiced among all civilized peoples.

In order to acquaint you with another aspect of my thought, I am compelled to add that this Second Peace of Versailles, which is about to become the subject of our discussion, has been too dearly bought by the peoples represented here for us not to be unanimously resolved to secure by every means in our power all the legitimate satisfactions which are our due.

I will now make the Plenipotentiaries aware of the procedure in regard to discussions which has been adopted. If, thereupon, anyone desires to offer any remarks, he will, of course, be permitted to speak.

There will be no oral discussions, and their observations must be furnished in writing. The German Plenipotentiaries have a period of fifteen days within which to hand in their written observations, both in French and English, on the Treaty as a whole, the headings of which are as follows:

League of Nations.
Geographical boundaries of Germany.
Political Clauses for Europe:
Belgium, Luxembourg, Saar Basin, Alsace-Lorraine, Austria, Czecho-Slovak State, Poland, East Prussia, Denmark, Heligoland, Clauses in regard to Russia and Russian States, Recognition of new European States.
Political Clauses for Countries outside Europe:
General Renunciation Clause, Colonies, Siam, Liberia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey and Bulgaria, Shantung.
Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses.
Prisoners of War.
Responsibility and Penalties.
Reparation and Restitution.
Financial Clauses.
Economical Clauses.
Aerial Navigation.
Ports, Waterways, Rivers and Railways.
Organization of Labor.
Guarantees and Occupation of territory.
Final Clauses:
Fulfillment of the Armistice; end of the war; state of peace.
Before this period of fifteen days expires the German Delegates will be entitled to send their replies or to put questions in regard to these matters. The Supreme Council, after examining the observations which may be furnished within the period laid down, will send a written reply to the German Delegation, stating the period within which it must hand in its final reply on all questions.

I will add that, when the Plenipotentiaries of the German Empire have given us a written reply, let us say within two, three, four, or five days, we shall of course not await the expiration of the fifteen days’ delay before acquainting them in turn with our answer. In order to lose no time, the discussion will be started as soon as possible in the form which I have described.

If anyone has remarks to make in this connection, we shall be at his disposal, as soon as this speech has been translated.”

(This speech is translated into English and German.)

(The text of the Conditions of Peace is handed to the principal German Plenipotentiary by the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference.)

Count Brockdorff-Rantzau (Germany) reads in German the following statement, which, at his request, is translated, sentence by sentence, first into French and then into English:

“Gentlemen,

We are deeply impressed with the lofty character of the task which has brought us together with you, namely, to give the world a speedy and enduring peace. We cherish no illusions as to the extent of our defeat - the degree of our impotence. We know that the might of German arms is broken. We know the force of the hatred which confronts us here, and we have heard the passionate demand that the victors should both make us pay as vanquished and punish us as guilty.

We are required to admit that we alone are war-guilty; such an admission on my lips would be a lie. We are far from seeking to exonerate Germany from all responsibility for the fact that this world war broke out and was waged as it was. The attitude of the former German Government at the Hague Peace Conferences, their actions and omissions in the tragic twelve days of July, may have contributed to the calamity, but we emphatically combat the idea that Germany, whose people were convinced that they were waging a defensive war, should alone be laden with the guilt.

None of us will wish to assert that the calamity dates only from the fateful moment when the Heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary fell a victim to the assassin’s hand. During the last fifty years the imperialism of all European States has chronically poisoned the international situation. The policy of retaliation and that of expansion as well as disregard of the rights of peoples to self-determination, contributed to the disease of Europe, which reached its crisis in the world war. The Russian mobilization deprived statesmen of the possibility of effecting a cure and placed the decision in the hands of the military authorities.

Public opinion in all the countries of our adversaries is echoing with the crimes which Germany is alleged to have committed during the war. Here, again, we are ready to acknowledge wrong which has been done. We have not come here to belittle the responsibility of the men who conducted the war politically and economically, and to disown breaches of international law which have been actually committed. We repeat the declaration which was made in the German Reichstag at the beginning of the war: wrong has been done to Belgium and we wish to redress it.

Moreover, as regards the methods of conducting the war, Germany was not alone at fault. Every European nation knows of deeds and persons on whose memory their best citizens are reluctant to dwell. I do not wish to answer reproaches with reproaches, but if it is from us that penance is demanded, then the Armistice must not be forgotten. Six weeks passed before we obtained it, and six months before we learnt your conditions of Peace. Crimes in war may not be excusable, but they are committed in the struggle for victory, in anxiety to preserve national existence, in a heat of passion which blunts the conscience of nations. The hundreds of thousands of non-combatants who have perished since the 11th November through the blockade were killed with cold deliberation, after victory had been won and assured to our adversaries. Think of that, when you speak of guilt and atonement.

The measure of the guilt of all participants can only be determined by an impartial inquiry by a neutral Commission, before which all the principal actors in the tragedy should have their say, and to which all records should be disclosed. We have demanded such an inquiry and we repeat the demand.

Though we stand alone at this Conference, without Allies, and confronted by our numerous adversaries, yet we are not defenseless. You yourselves have brought us an ally: Justice, which was guaranteed to us by the agreement relating to the bases of Peace.

Between the 5th October and 5th November, 1918, the Allied and Associated Governments abandoned the idea of a peace of violence and inscribed the words ‘Peace of Justice’ on their banner. On the 5th October, 1918, the German Government put forward the principles of the President of the United States of America as a basis of Peace,1 and was informed on the 5th November by Mr Lansing, Secretary of State, that the Allied and Associated Powers had accepted this basis with two specific reservations. President Wilson’s principles therefore became binding upon both belligerent parties - upon you as well as upon us, and also upon our former allies.

These principles taken individually demand of us grievous national and economic sacrifices; but the sacred and fundamental rights of all nations are protected by this agreement. The conscience of the world is behind it; no nation will be permitted to violate it with impunity.

On this basis you will find us prepared to examine the Peace Preliminaries which you lay before us, with the fixed purpose of sharing with you the common task of rebuilding that which has been destroyed, of righting the wrongs that have been done, first and foremost the wrong done to Belgium, and of pointing mankind to new goals of political and social progress. In view of the bewildering number of the problems which beset the fulfillment of our common purpose, we ought to refer the principal questions individually at the earliest possible moment to special Commissions of experts, for discussion on the basis of the draft presented by you. In this connection it will be our chief task to build up anew the shattered human energy of the nations concerned, by international protection of the life, health, and liberty of the working classes.

I consider our next aim to be the restoration of the territory of Belgium and Northern France, which were occupied by us and devastated by the war. We solemnly accepted the obligation to do this, and are determined to carry it out to such extent as may be agreed upon between us. To do this we are thrown back on the cooperation of our former adversaries. We cannot complete the task without the technical and financial participation of the victors; you can only carry it through with our aid. It must be the desire of impoverished Europe that reconstruction should be carried out as successfully and economically as possible. This desire, however, can only be fulfilled by means of a clear and business-like understanding in regard to the best methods. The worst method would be to continue to have the work done by German prisoners of war. Such labor is certainly cheap. It would, however, cost the world dear, if hate and despair were aroused in the German people at the thought of their captive sons, brothers, and fathers continuing to languish in their former bondage after the Peace Preliminaries. We can attain to no enduring Peace without the immediate settlement of this question, which has dragged on far too long already.

Our experts on both sides will have to study how the German people can best meet its obligation of financial reparation without breaking down under the heavy load. Such a collapse would deprive those entitled to compensation of the advantages to which they have a claim, and would entail irreparable confusion in European economic existence as a whole. Both victors and vanquished must be on their guard against this threatening danger and its incalculable consequences. There is only one way of warding it off: unreserved recognition of the economic and social solidarity of peoples, of a free and comprehensive League of Nations.

Gentlemen, the lofty conception that the most terrible calamity in the history of the world should bring about the greatest advance in human progress has been formulated and will be realized. If the goal is to be attained, if the slain in this war are not to have died in vain, then the portals of the League of Nations must be thrown open to all peoples of good will.

The German nation is earnestly prepared to accommodate itself to its hard lot, provided the foundations agreed upon for peace remain unshaken. A Peace which cannot be defended in the name of justice before the whole world would continually call forth fresh resistance. No one could sign it with a clear conscience, for it would be impossible of fulfillment. No one could undertake the guarantee of fulfillment which its signature would imply.

We will examine the document submitted to us with all good will, and in the hope that the final result of our meeting can be subscribed by us all.”

(As nobody else asks leave to speak, the President declares the session adjourned at 16:00.)

Sailor Steve

05-07-19, 08:39 PM

Wednesday, May 7, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Grand Hotel Trianon, Versailles

Meeting of the Supreme War Council, 16:15

(This consists of the Leaders of Britain, France, Italy, and The United States - AKA the Council of Three, plus Italy.)

1. The Council has before them a document communicated by Mr Lloyd George at the morning meeting.

President Wilson asks if there are any islands besides New Guinea in the Pacific, the mandate of which went to Australia.

Mr Lloyd George says there are a number of smaller islands to the east of New Guinea.

M Simon said he agrees with Mr Lloyd George’s proposals subject to a reservation in regard to the Cameroons. Some inconvenience will arise to France as a Mandatory State owing to the fact that a part of the Cameroons will pass under the direct and unrestricted sovereignty of the British Empire. He then produces a form of agreement that he has prepared.

Mr Lloyd George deprecates the reference to the agreement of the 4th March 1916 in Article 1 of M Simon’s draft as he understands that there was not complete agreement about this.

M Clemenceau says he prefers Mr Lloyd George’s text.

M Simon draws attention to the fact that the British text makes no allusion to the portion of the Cameroons which Germany had forced France to give up in 1911 and which ought not to be subject to a mandate.

Mr Lloyd George says that this matter ought to have been raised in connection with the Peace Treaty. As it has not been raised it is difficult to prevent it being subject to a mandate.

M Simon says that if he understands the matter right there is a joint clause in the Treaty of Peace according to which all previous treaties with Germany disappear. This will cover the territory in question.

Mr Lloyd George points out that France and Great Britain in his draft are entitled to make recommendations to the League of Nations on this matter.

M Simon objects that Mr Lloyd George’s text provides that France should have the mandate of the Cameroons except in regard to one part.

Mr Balfour points out that this part only concerns the rectification of the frontiers.

Mr Lloyd George proposes that the difficulty will be entirely met by deleting the second paragraph relating to the Cameroons and altering the first paragraph to read as follows:

“Togoland and Cameroons. France and Great Britain shall make a joint recommendation to the League of Nations as to their future”.

2. S Orlando observes that in Mr Lloyd George’s scheme Italy is excluded from participation in the mandates in Africa. He has spoken of this question before and has said that if mandates are a burden Italy is ready to accept them. If mandates have advantages, then Italy has the right to share them. Moreover, Article 13 of the Treaty of London provides that Italy should obtain equitable compensations in those parts of Africa that specially concerned her in the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa.

M Simon then reads Article 13 of the Treaty of London.

Mr Lloyd George says he can state at once that he fully recognizes the validity of Article 13 and that the British Government is prepared immediately to enter into discussions on this matter. It is no use their doing it, however, unless France is prepared to.

M Clemenceau agrees.

Mr Balfour points out that the phrase in Article 13 of the Treaty of London refers to augmentation of British and French territory and not to mandates which, strictly speaking, are not an augmentation. He does not press the point however.

(Mr Balfour withdraws at this point.)

The following decisions are reached:

1) Togoland and Cameroons. France and Great Britain shall make a joint recommendation to the League of Nations as to their future.

German East Africa. The mandate shall be held by Great Britain.

German South West Africa. The mandate shall be held by the Union of South Africa.

The German Samoan Islands. The mandate shall be held by New Zealand.

The Other German Pacific Possessions South of the Equator excluding the German Samoan Islands and Nauru, the mandate shall be held by Australia.

Nauru. The mandate shall be given to the British Empire.

German Islands North of the Equator. The mandate shall be held by Japan.

2) That an Inter-Allied Committee consisting of one representative each of the British Empire, France and Italy should be formed to consider the application of Article 13 of the Treaty of London, dated 26th April, 1915.

3) That the above decisions should be published.

Jimbuna

05-08-19, 07:30 AM

8th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Successes by General Denikin in S. Russia.

Numbers killed and wounded in Egyptian rioting published.

Journalist Edward George Honey proposes that a moment of silence should be observed to commemorate the anniversary of the Armistice signing.
https://i.imgur.com/9lnjFCc.jpg

Members of the Czechoslovak Legion, currently defending the Trans-Siberian railway against the Communists, in Vladivostok.
https://i.imgur.com/Ty6NJqz.jpg

Navy-Curtiss Flying Boat NC-3 at Halifax, Nova Scotia, during its first trans-Atlantic journey in 1919. The NC-3 was in Halifax from May 8, 1919 to May 10, 1919.
https://i.imgur.com/sMijN7v.jpg

Sailor Steve

05-08-19, 12:14 PM

Thursday, May 8, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. During a discussion on the subject of the meeting with the Germans on the previous day M Clemenceau says that he has heard on good authority that Count Brockdorff-Rantzau said he would not sign the terms of peace.

M Clemenceau raises the question as to whether Brockdorff-Rantzau’s proposal for joint Commissions to examine the proposals on technical matters in the Treaty of Peace should be adopted.

President Wilson says he thinks that Brockdorff-Rantzau’s proposal was related to the responsibilities of the war rather than to technical matters.

M Clemenceau says that the Commission he had proposed on this matter was a neutral one: he had really made two proposals. He then reads the draft of a reply which was to the following effect:

1) The proposed neutral Commission on responsibilities for the war would be contradictory to the articles in the Treaty of Peace on this subject.

2) In regard to the proposal for technical commissions he must inform Brockdorff-Rantzau that verbal communications are and remain excluded. The German delegation must have its own Commissions and send replies to the Secretary-General.

(Before finally approving this draft it is agreed that the text of Brockdorff-Rantzau’s statement on the subject should be consulted.

Later in the meeting Brockdorff-Rantzau’s statement is available from which the following extract is read:

“Having regard to the disconcerting multiplicity of the problems which are raised by this aim pursued in common we must as rapidly as possible have the principal matters discussed by special expert commissions on the basis of the draft which you are submitting.")

Mr Lloyd George suggests that this does not constitute a definite proposal which needs be replied to.

M Clemenceau agrees that it would be better to take no notice.

President Wilson agrees and suggests that one possible interpretation of the phrase is that if the Germans sign the Treaty they will want the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers in carrying it out.

(It is agreed that no reply should be made to this statement in Brockdorff-Rantzau’s speech.)

2. President Wilson reads a summary prepared by the American Delegation of the present position in regard to the settlement of the territorial boundaries of former Austro-Hungarian territory, as well as Bulgarian territory. The summary points out that the American, British and French experts are agreed in regard to Bulgaria, the Greek frontiers, the Czechoslovakian frontiers, the Romanian frontiers, and the Yugoslavian frontiers. The question of the frontiers between Belgium and Holland have not been dealt with. In regard to the Polish frontiers, agreement has not been reached, except with regard to Germany and the frontier between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. The frontiers of Albania and of Russia were also unsettled.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the best plan would be the one he had suggested on the previous day, namely, deal first with the frontiers of Austria and of Hungary, and to determine their boundaries and their conditions. Once these are out of the way, the more contentious questions which arose between the Allies can be dealt with.

President Wilson points out that once peace is made with Austria and with Hungary, and once these countries have been made separate, and the Treaties of Peace with them had been completed, the present Conference will have no further authority. To leave it to the component parts to arrange matters between themselves would cause very serious trouble. He urges the importance of retaining the peace-making power in the present Conference.

Mr Lloyd George says that the difficulty can be surmounted by inserting an Article in the Treaty of Peace binding Austria and Hungary respectively, to recognize the States contiguous to them within the boundaries arranged by the Allied and Associated Powers as a whole.

President Wilson points out that this clause would not bind the new States to respect the decision of the principal Powers. If they do not, this will mean launching out in a new sea of negotiation.

Mr Lloyd George said that if his Italian colleagues will pardon him, and he doe not ask them to agree or to disagree in what he is about to say, the present atmosphere was not a favorable one for settling the more controversial questions. There is great public excitement, which was partly artificial and partly genuine. The best plan would be to give time for that to subside. It was not essential to peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria and Hungary that these controversial questions should be settled.

President Wilson says that he is anxious to arrange that the boundaries between various States should not be left to separate agreement. He proposes, therefore, that it should be provided in the Treaty of Peace that Austria and Hungary respectively should recognize the States contiguous to them, within boundaries which should be stated, where possible, but where they could not be stated, are determined by some definite authority, for example, the League of Nations.

Mr Lloyd George suggested that the League of Nations ought not to be burdened at the outset with these tremendously difficult problems. They should be settled by the Allied and Associated Governments.

President Wilson suggests the best plan would be to have them settled by the principal Allied and Associated Governments. The important thing is that the latter should not divest themselves of their authority.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that the matter can be dealt with on these lines. Austria and Hungary are both starving and Peace Treaties with them ought to be concluded as soon as possible. The only part of Brockdorff-Rantzau’s speech on the previous day which had made him feel uncomfortable was the passage where he had alluded to the starvation which had occurred since the Armistice had been signed.

M Clemenceau says that his statement has to be proved.

Mr Lloyd George says that, at any rate, there is no doubt that Austria and Hungary are starving.

President Wilson tells M Clemenceau that we ought not to blink at facts because we are annoyed with Brockdorff-Rantzau. There is no doubt people have been starved because through no-one’s fault it had not been possible to get the Treaty of Peace ready earlier.

Mr Lloyd George draws attention to an Article by M Hervé in the Victoire, in which he said that after reading the summary of the Treaty of Peace, he withdrew all his attacks on the slowness in preparing the Treaty of Peace.

M Clemenceau tells President Wilson that he can give him an order to visit women from fourteen years of age to sixty who had been violated by the Germans.

Mr Lloyd George said that Sir Ernest Pollock had told him that documents before the Commission on breaches of the laws of war had been so bad that only parts of them were read. The Commission had become perfectly sick with reading them.

M Clemenceau says that they have an awful case against the Germans.

President Wilson sums up the decision as regards the boundaries as follows: Wherever they can be fixed, this shall be done, but where they cannot be fixed, the High Contracting Parties shall be bound to accept what the principal Allied and Associated Powers decide.

(There is no dissent from this.)

Mr Lloyd George raises the case of the Ukraine. Can the principal Allied and Associated Powers settle that?

President Wilson says they can settle the boundary between the Ukraine and Poland. One difficulty is that the Ukraine declared herself independent of Russia.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is part of the general Russian question, and he hopes that a special day will shortly be set apart for discussing this.

President Wilson suggests that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to make a comprehensive inquiry and to make recommendations as to all the frontiers of former Austro-Hungarian territory, except those specially concerning Italy.

Baron Sonnino recalls that there is one portion of the frontier between Yugoslavia and Austria which is closely connected with the Italian problem. He thinks the best plan would be for the Foreign Ministers to examine what the experts had proposed and to make recommendations.

(It was agreed:

1) That the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to consider at once, and to make recommendations in regard to the territorial boundaries of Austria and Hungary, and of the new States created out of former Austro-Hungarian territory, and States contiguous thereto, as dealt with in the reports of the various Commissions set up by the Preliminary Peace Conference.

2) That the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to hold their first meeting on this subject on the afternoon of to-day, May 8th.)

(Although no formal resolution is adopted, it is also substantially agreed that the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary should contain an Article binding the High Contracting Parties to recognize the frontiers of the various States formed out of the former Austro-Hungarian territory, within boundaries which should be fixed, wherever possible, but in cases where it is not possible to fix them in time for the Treaties, within such boundaries as might be decided by the principal Allied and Associated Powers.)

3. Mr Lloyd George suggests that this question should be referred to the same group of financial experts which had dealt with Reparation under the instructions of the Supreme Council, in connection with the German Treaty of Peace.

S Orlando says he understands that the reparation experts are meeting to consider this subject on that very day, more particularly in connection with the scheme that he himself had proposed for a debit and credit account in regard to the countries formerly constituting part of the Austrian Empire.

President Wilson says that nevertheless there would be no harm in approving Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal.

(The following resolution is agreed to:

That the group of financial experts which, under the immediate direction of the Supreme Council completed the Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Germany on the subject of reparation, shall re-assemble to prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council draft Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary.)

4. Financial Clauses in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties

(There seems to be some notes missing, as this section repeats word-for-word the one above.)

5. Mr Lloyd George suggests that the Drafting Committee should be asked to start work on the Austrian Treaty and on the Hungarian Treaty.

President Wilson says that the Drafting Committee are entitled to a rest after their very heavy labors in preparing the German Treaty.

(This is agreed to.)

6. After a short discussion, a resolution on the following lines is agreed to:

That the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, with whom shall be associated representatives of the Naval and Air Services of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy, should prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers draft military, naval and air articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary.

(It is also agreed that the exact text of this resolution should be left to M Clemenceau, who will then forward it as an instruction to the Military Representatives.)

7. After a short discussion, a resolution on the following lines is agreed to:

That the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles should prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers a draft Convention in regard to the military occupation of the territories West of the Rhine, as provided for in Article 432 of the Treaty of Peace presented to the German Plenipotentiaries.

It is also agreed that the military representatives should invite the co-operation of a Belgian representative.

The exact terms of the reference to the Military Representatives is left to M Clemenceau, who undertakes to give the necessary instructions.

8. After a short discussion, a resolution on the following lines was agreed to:

That the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles should prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers a scheme for the size of the Army of Occupation of the German territory West of the Rhine, as provided for in Articles 428 and 429 of the Treaty of Peace presented to the German Plenipotentiaries.

It is also agreed that the Military Representatives should invite the co-operation of a Belgian Representative.

The exact terms of the reference to the Military Representatives is left to M Clemenceau, who undertakes to give the necessary instructions.

9. Sir Maurice Hankey reports that the Supreme Economic Council has forwarded various resolutions for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, dealing with such matters as: Supply of Raw Materials to Czechoslovakia and Poland, Blockade of Germany and Hungary, and other matters.

He suggests that the most convenient procedure for dealing with these questions would be for the Supreme Council to meet the principal representatives of the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr Lloyd George points out that all these questions are bound up with the elaboration of some scheme for providing credits for European countries, in regard to which he had already submitted a scheme.

President Wilson agrees, but says it will be necessary to find some alternative proposal, as the scheme submitted by Mr Lloyd George did not commend itself to the United States experts.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the British Government is in the position not only of owing large amounts to the United States, but of being guarantors of what other countries owe to the United States. Great Britain is both a creditor and a debtor nation, but if she can collect all that is due to her from other nations, the balance would be on the right side. Hence, he feels in a good position to make this proposal. He points out that the United States of America had made large profits out of the belligerents during the early part of the war, when she had not herself been a belligerent. He does not say this in any spirit of criticism whatever, as she is merely in the position that Great Britain had been in 1870.

President Wilson pointed out that the wealth which the United States had drawn from these sources had not gone to the Government, but to particular financiers and to particular classes of the nation. Congress would take the view that the Government ought not to accept on behalf of the nation any obligations because certain interests in the nation had made profits.

Mr Lloyd George says that unless the United States of America and Great Britain agree on some scheme for re-starting Europe, a very serious state of affairs will arise.

(It is agreed that the leading representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers on the Supreme Economic Council should be invited to attend at 10.30 on the following day to raise the various questions referred to the Supreme Economic Council.)

10. Mr Lloyd George reads a telegram he has received from the Allied Naval Armistice Commission in London, to the effect that the Germans were continuing to delay the surrender of German merchant-ships in Spain by raising questions affecting cargoes, and neglecting to instruct their Captains to hand over the ships to the representatives of France.

On April 21st a warning had been sent to the German Government that if the matter was not expedited a reference would be made to the Supreme War Council. A consultation had since taken place at Rotterdam, but as no action had resulted the matter was now brought before the Supreme War Council with a recommendation that pressure should be put on the Governments concerned to proceed with the delivery to France of these ships.

President Wilson suggests that the pressure of the present treaty should be enough. In two weeks the Germans will be compelled to sign the whole treaty. He had only wanted to give them time to read and digest it, and get used to the idea that it would have to be accepted. He had never contemplated any additional matter being added.

(After some discussion it is agreed that Admiral Wemyss, on behalf of the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, should be instructed, through the Armistice Commission, to draw attention to the failure to carry out this undertaking, and, in the event of no satisfactory reply being received, to make recommendations as to the action to be taken.)

11. President Wilson asks if it is necessary to go into the question of breaches of the laws of war in connection with the Austrian and the Hungarian Treaties.

Baron Sonnino says that there are a certain number of personal cases, although the question was less serious than in the case of Germany.

Mr Lloyd George points out that it has been agreed that the Austrian Emperor was not in any way responsible for the war.

S Orlando says that there was a terrible record of crimes against some Austrians.

Baron Sonnino points out that there are some bad cases in connection with submarines.

President Wilson asks if it is possible to distinguish German from Austrian submarines.

Baron Sonnino says that in most cases it is not possible, but there is evidence in some cases.

Mr Lloyd George points out that someone in Austria-Hungary must have taken the decision and given the necessary authority, so that there ought to be clauses in the Treaties on this subject.

(This is agreed to.)

12. It is agreed that the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways should be instructed to prepare articles for inclusion in the Treaties with Austria and with Hungary.

Sailor Steve

05-08-19, 07:05 PM

Thursday, May 8, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers

1. M Pichon says that it would be convenient to begin with the frontiers laid down for Romania, and he will ask M Tardieu to explain the finding of the Committee.

a) Mr Balfour thinks that before examining the particular reports it might be desirable to define what Austria and Hungary are to be, in terms of territory. He starts with the case of Vorarlberg. Is it to be Swiss or Austrian? In the former alternative, if Vorarlberg is allowed to split off, how is the Conference to prevent other fractions of previous Austrian territory to follow suit, in order to alleviate the debt on the population or for any other reason whatever? Before the Treaty can be made with Austria or Hungary this question must be settled in principle.

Baron Sonnino says that as far as he is concerned, Vorarlberg is part of Austria. He has no knowledge of this territory as an independent unit. Its recognition as such would lead to the secession of other populations, and result in endless confusion.

Mr Balfour says that if he understands Baron Sonnino rightly, it is intended that the discussion should result in a definition of Austria.

Baron Sonnino says that it should result in a definition of Hungary as well as Austria.

Mr Balfour agrees that the method of defining the frontiers by adopting the results reached by the territorial committees might perhaps be the best. The circuit would then be complete and the various difficulties arising on the way could be considered.

Mr Lansing says that in his view the Council is dealing with the territory which in 1914 had been the domain of Austria and Hungary. It was recognized that this territory was to be dismembered, that Austria and Hungary were to be made separate States, and that their lands were to be limited by new States, whose frontiers were to be determined. No definition of Austria and Hungary, therefore, appears necessary. The definition will arise automatically as a result of establishing the new States.

Mr Balfour said that the question still remains what will the conference do if any other part of Austrian or Hungarian territory wishes to split off like Vorarlberg?

Mr Lansing says that this question will have to come before the conference when it arises. In his opinion the population cannot be allowed to secede in order to avoid paying taxes.

Mr Balfour thinks that in the Treaty there should be a clause covering such cases. He points out that there is to be a plebiscite in Vorarlberg in fifteen days, and that the Conference is doing nothing to stop it.

M Pichon observes that the French Government has several times been informed by the Swiss Government that the adhesion of Vorarlberg is not desired. On the last occasion the Swiss Government said that they would not welcome Vorarlberg, unless a crushing majority in the plebiscite practically forced their hands. The question, however, has not yet arisen, and it does not appear necessary for the Council to deal with it before it arises. He will therefore ask M Tardieu to begin his explanation of the boundary adopted by the Committee for Romania.

(After a short discussion it is decided not to consider the boundary of Romania on the Russian side, but only to deal with its boundary on the Hungarian side.

Mr Lansing said that in his opinion when the delimitation of Romania and Russia is made, it will be necessary that Russia should be represented. The Peace Conference cannot adjudicate on territory belonging to a State with whom the powers represented were not at war.)

b) M Tardieu says that he will explain the finding of the Committee in respect of the Romanian-Hungarian boundary in Transylvania. Referring to the map attached to Report No 13 he explains that the red line indicates the demands of the Romanian Delegation, and the blue line the recommendations of the Committee. There have been long discussions on the subject of the frontier in question, occupying no less than twelve meetings. He will explain in a few words the reasons which had prevailed with the Committee. Had the demands of the Romanian Delegation been accepted without modification, a very large number of aliens would have been attributed to both sides. These numbers were halved by the recommendations of the Committee. Ethnologically, therefore, he thinks that the results obtained are satisfactory. It had also been thought reasonable to keep within Romanian territory a main line of communication running from North-East to South-West; from Szatmar-Nemeti to Nagy-Varad, while a parallel line connecting Szeged and Debreczen was left in Hungary.

Mr Lansing asks where the proper ethnic line would be.

M Tardieu says that the population is very mixed and that the blue line represents an equitable compromise. A truer line might perhaps in some cases be 20 kilometres east but on the whole, as he had explained, he thought the line would be satisfactory.

Mr Lansing asks why a more accurate ethnic line cannot be followed.

M Tardieu explains that it would cut the railway line and suppress continuous communication.

Mr Lansing asks if anywhere west of the line there can be found a preponderant Romanian population.

M Tardieu says that this might occur in certain isolated places.

In reply to further questions M Tardieu says that some 600,000 Hungarians would remain under Romanian rule while some 25,000 Romanians would remain within Hungary.

Mr Lansing expresses the view that this distribution did not appear very just; in every case the decision seemed to have been given against the Hungarians.

M Tardieu says that any other adjustment would have been all in favour of the Hungarians and correspondingly to the detriment of the Romanians. The whole question has been discussed with the very greatest care - the solution was adopted unanimously and represented, he thinks, the best that could be done in very difficult circumstances. In some places where the Committee had thought it possible for new lines of communication to be built they had adhered more strictly to ethnographical considerations, but on the main part of the frontier, by reason of the mountainous ground, it was impossible to substitute new lines for those already existing. By reason of the way in which the Hungarians were grouped in Transylvania, it was absolutely impossible to avoid attributing large numbers of them to the future Romanian State.

Mr Lansing says that he appreciates the efforts of the Committee to make an equitable distribution. After further consideration, he withdraws his criticisms and makes no objection to the recommendations of the Committee.

Mr Balfour also states that he raises no objection.

It is not possible for the Council to go over in detail the whole work of the Committee. As long as the Council is satisfied that the Committee has done the utmost to find an equitable solution, he feels that nothing can be done to improve the resolution, unless there had been disagreement within the Committee itself.

Baron Sonnino also expressed his agreement.

(No other objections being raised to the finding of the Committee, the frontier between Romania and Hungary, as proposed by the Committee from the former frontier of Russia at Khotin to the point of contact with the Danube is accepted.

It is decided that the frontier as between Romania and Yugoslavia in the Banat should be reserved for future discussion.)

The hope is expressed that a solution of the latter question will be reached by agreement between the Romanian and the Yugoslav Government.

c) M Tardieu says that the eastern frontier of Hungary has now been determined. There remains the southern frontier between Hungary and Yugoslavia. Referring to the map attached to Report No. 2 of the Committee he pointed out that there is a very considerable variation between the demands of the Yugoslavs and the recommendations of the Committee. The Committee had certainly excluded a large number of Slavs from the area to be attributed to Yugoslavia, but they are not in sufficient numbers in the Committee’s opinion to justify the line claimed by the Yugoslavs.

The Committee has therefore unanimously adopted the blue line from west of Mako to the point of intersection with the former boundary between Austria and Hungary.

M Pichon asks if any criticisms of this line are forthcoming.

No criticisms are made and the boundary proposed by the Committee from the angle west of Mako to the point of intersection with the former boundary between Austria and Hungary is accepted.

Baron Sonnino asks whether anything has been done regarding the boundary between Austria and Hungary.

d) M Pichon says that no Commission has been charged with this subject.

Mr Lansing questions whether it is necessary to make any alteration in this boundary.

Mr Balfour says that it might possibly be necessary to do so, as he understands that there is a German population in Hungary which might wish to join Austria. If so, it might be desirable to be prepared to deal with this eventuality.

Baron Sonnino points out that to date neither Austria nor Hungary has raised the question.

Mr Balfour said that the question does not greatly interest the Allies, unless the financial or economic terms are to differ as between Hungary and Austria. In that case, some trouble might arise.

Baron Sonnino says that he can see no reason why any difference in the treatment of the two countries should be made.

Mr Balfour says that if the Treaties in both cases were identical, it might not be necessary for the Conference to define the areas of the two states. In the other alternative, it might be desirable to do so.

M Pichon thinks it is unnecessary to deal with the question at once.

Mr Lansing says that, in his view, certain economic questions might arise which, unless the frontiers have been adjusted, might cause difficulties. As these two countries are now to be separated, he thinks it would be well to ask a Commission to make a report to the Conference as to whether the previous boundary lines require to be changed or not. The Conference will therefore be prepared beforehand to deal with any proposal that might be made either from the Austrian or from the Hungarian side.

Baron Sonnino says that if either the Austrians or the Hungarians had raised the question, he would be inclined to agree. As neither had done so, he could see no reason for setting a Commission to work. As far as he is concerned, he accepts the old frontier. Should either side desire an alteration, he would then be prepared to recommend examination by a Commission.

Mr Lansing observes that neither the Austrians nor the Hungarians are present to raise the question. He suggests that, as the Allies had so often been unready to deal with emergencies when they arose, they should in this case take steps to be prepared in advance.

Baron Sonnino points out that full liberty had been left to the Serbians and the Romanians to compose their differences. It was only should they disagree that the Conference would step in. He suggests that the same procedure be adopted regarding Austria and Hungary. He sees no reason for stirring them up. The Hungarians were not represented but had made a very considerable fuss about their frontier with Romania. It appears to him quite gratuitous to suggest to them that they should raise needless trouble. The two countries had not quarreled for fifty years over this frontier; their present Governments are very insecure and the time seems very inopportune for thrusting a controversy upon them.

Mr Lansing says that his suggestion is that the question should be dealt with without rousing either the Austrians or the Hungarians.

Baron Sonnino says that if it cam be done without the knowledge of either he would not object.

M Pichon said he understands the suggestion to be that a Committee should be asked to deal objectively with a possible rectification of boundary between Austria and Hungary.

(It is decided that a Commission be appointed to collect information regarding any possible rectification of frontier between Austria and Hungary which might be proposed by either of the parties concerned. The object of the investigation is to be to place the Council in a position to settle rapidly any trouble that might arise between Austria and Hungary on this subject. No action will be taken unless the question is raised by Austria or Hungary.)

e) M Laroche explains that the finding of the Committee was unanimous. From the point where the ancient boundary between Hungary and Austria met the Danube to the confluence of the Ipoli and the Danube, the frontier between Hungary and Czechoslovakia follows the stream. The reason for giving this frontier to Czechoslovakia is obvious. It is necessary to endow the new State with wide access to this important international waterway. A suggestion had been made to give up to Hungary the Grosse Schütt in exchange for a bridge-head across the Danube at Pressburg. This solution had been unanimously rejected.

Mr Lansing asks whether the population of the Grosse Schütt is Hungarian.

M Laroche replied that it is partly Hungarian and partly German, but that this area is closely connected economically with the Czechoslovak hinterland. The people desire to maintain connection with the Czechoslovak State, in order to save their economic interests. The problems in this region are complicated and have been studied very carefully at a great number of sittings. The Committee has adopted what appears to be the most reasonable solutions and unanimous agreements had been reached on all points.

Mr Lansing points out that, as a result of the findings of the two Committees, some two million Hungarians are to be placed under alien rule in Romania and in Czechoslovakia.

M Laroche observes that, as far as the Czechoslovak Committee is concerned, it has so reduced the claims of the Czechs that only 855,000 Hungarians instead of 1,300,000 would become subjects of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand a great number of Czechs and Slovaks lived outside the boundaries of the new State. According to M Benes, no less than 638,000 Slovaks would be left in Hungary. This figure might be exaggerated, but the number was considerable, and might be regarded as a guarantee for the good treatment of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia.

(After some further discussion, the line proposed by the Committee, from the intersection of the former boundary between Austria and Hungary up to the angle formed by the meeting of the Romanian and Ruthenian territory, is accepted as the Northern frontier of Hungary.)

f) Mr Balfour says that the problem of dealing with the Ruthenians is one which had not been settled. The Ruthenians had some affinity with the Slovaks, but not enough to be included without some precautions in the same State. Some kind of local autonomy has been suggested for them. The definition of the expression “some form of autonomy” is still sought. There are, he was told, some 400,000 Ruthenians. They are considered too few to form an entirely separate state. On the other hand, it might be desirable to save them from the various annoyances arising from association with a larger and, to some extent, alien population in the same State. The precise means of dealing with this difficulty has not been thought out. A similar difficulty however, will arise not only in the Peace with Austria and Hungary but elsewhere.

M Pichon says that the Committee had referred the question of Ruthenian autonomy to the Supreme Council. He suggests that a Commission be asked to make recommendations as to the form of autonomy suitable to the Ruthenians.

Mr Balfour thinks that the question might perhaps be referred to the Committee dealing with the rights of minorities.

Baron Sonnino said that he has no knowledge of this Committee, on which there is no Italian representative.

Mr Lansing says that he would prefer to name a new Commission with local knowledge of the area in question. He proposes that the question be referred to the Committee on Czechoslovakia.

Mr Balfour asks whether it is proposed to proceed in this manner whenever the question of autonomy should arise.

Mr Lansing says that he would support this, provided that the Council had the opportunity of examining the proposals, in order to ensure that contradictory principles were not applied in the various cases.

M Laroche says that the Committee on Czechoslovak Affairs will ask the Czechoslovak Government for its proposals. Should these proposals not meet with the approval of the Committee experts can be consulted and the Ruthenians themselves can be asked to make their own suggestions. As far as the Treaty is concerned, all that need be stipulated is that the territory of the Ruthenians be ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers.

(It is decided that the Committee on Czechoslovakia be asked to make recommendations regarding the future status of the Ruthenians in relation to the Czechoslovak State.)

2. The frontiers of Hungary having been defined by the above resolutions, it is decided that the question of the frontiers of Austria should be discussed on the following day.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

05-09-19, 07:11 AM

9th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Afghans repulsed by British troops.

Curtiss NC-4 flying boat begins its journey as the first aircraft to fly across the Atlantic Ocean over a course of 19 days.
https://i.imgur.com/B9Mb9ep.jpg

Verdun, France.
https://i.imgur.com/iKziDg8.jpg

Spectators run towards Lt Elmer Bowling as he nears the ground in Van Cortlandt Park in the Bronx after making a 1500 foot parachute jump from a captive balloon in a demonstration to entertain wounded soldiers, New York.
https://i.imgur.com/3vaESzT.jpg

Qinghua students burn Japanese goods in the field in front of the gym in protest against the Treaty of Versailles and the 21 Demands.
https://i.imgur.com/97WQaub.jpg

Ship Losses:

Factor (United Kingdom) The cargo ship collided with Ursus ( United Kingdom) in the North Sea 6 nautical miles (11 km) north east of Scarborough, Yorkshire and sank.
Peter (United States) Placed in a slough at Chena, Territory of Alaska in the autumn of 1918 before the onset of ice for the winter of 1918–1919, the 458-ton scow was carried away, crushed, and broken up by ice when the ice broke up in the spring while the river was unusually high.

Sailor Steve

05-09-19, 09:34 AM

Friday, May 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 10:30

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. Lord Robert Cecil, speaking on behalf of the Supreme Economic Council, and on the invitation of President Wilson, states the general economic problem confronting the Associated Governments. He says that the most important part of the problem is to get Europe to work again. A great proportion of the population are out of work in most countries in Europe. It is useless merely to provide food; in fact the danger to social order is likely to become worse and not better if people are merely fed. It is essential that raw materials should be made available. Poland might be taken as a typical case. Her great textile industry, on which Lodz for instance is absolutely dependent, is entirely stopped for want of cotton and wool, although her factories and their machinery are practically intact. The trouble is simply that she has no money to buy raw materials and no exports (a large part of which formerly went to Russia) to send in exchange for them. Even agriculture is affected by the absence of raw materials, as the want of proper boots and clothing for agricultural laborers reduce their capacity to work. The problem then is how to provide credit. Personally he would not advise giving unlimited funds or even limited funds uncontrolled to the Polish Government who might spend them on military undertakings.

The problem, therefore, is twofold

a) to devise means of providing money, and

b) to devise means for seeing that it was used to set industry going.

As far as he can see the position is getting worse and not better. What he said of Poland, which he had taken merely as an instance, is generally true of Germany and other countries in Europe and the problem must be treated as a whole. Personally he regrets that there has not been a further relaxation of the Blockade some time ago. The problem is largely psychological and the continuance of the Blockade with a consequent feeling of distrust all over Europe is a large part of the difficulty. In the case of Belgium, for instance, it is clear that the provision of credit in itself is not sufficient as credits had there been offered without effecting a solution.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether prices do not constitute a large part of the difficulty, i. e. the anticipation that prices will fall has the effect of holding back orders.

Lord Robert Cecil agrees that this is a part of the difficulty but he says it is clear that it is necessary for a serious attempt to be made at once to see that raw materials are obtained by the countries to which he referred. This is mainly a financial problem.

2. In addition, however, Lord Robert Cecil desires to make two following specific proposals with regard to the Blockade:

a) That semi-public communications should be at once entered into with the border neutrals with a view to securing from them such undertakings as would, if necessary, enable the Blockade to be re-imposed even more effectively than before.

b) That a public statement should at once be issued making clear what modifications in the Blockade have already been made and concluding with a statement that all the rest of the Blockade against Germany will be removed the moment Peace was signed.

(It is agreed that the above action (a) and (b) should be taken, it being understood that the removal of the Blockade will not apply to Bolshevist Russia.)

3. Lord Robert Cecil, continuing, says that, personally, he has no specific financial proposal to make and considers the problem is one to which the experts should devote themselves at once. He wishes, however, to refer to a special and important difficulty in the case of Germany. We have provided Germany with the full amount of food she has paid for. In addition we have large quantities afloat for which payment had not been arranged. The Germans had always warned us that they could not find sufficient money to pay for their rations up to the harvest, and the attempts to help the situation by allowing exports had broken down. A paper has been prepared by the Finance and Food Sections of the Supreme Economic Council for delivery to the President of the German Financial Commission. This paper after describing the exact present position concludes with the statement that shipments will at once be stopped unless the German Government takes certain immediate measures to provide further gold. This memorandum includes the following statement as to the present position:

(i) Food delivered to May 10 £19,050,000
(ii) Foodstuffs afloat on May 10 or landed for delivery £14,850,000
(iii) Loading for May delivery £ 5,100,000
(iv) Balance collected for May delivery £13,750,000
(v) Foodstuffs collected for June delivery by German tonnage £10,670,000
(vi) Further United Kingdom supplies available for june £5,000,000
Total: £68,420,000
The payment situation is as follows:

Millions
(i) Original payments in gold and neutral currencies 6
(ii) First deposit in Brussels 11
(iii) Second Brussels deposit 7½
(iv) Further deposit promised 10
Total: 34½

showing a deficit of over £30 million even when the further deposit promised is paid.

In answer to a question by Mr Lloyd George, Mr Hoover states that he thinks that if the Germans could find £75,000,000 sterling in all (i. e. about £7,000,000 more than the amounts required for the supplies referred to above) they could with the addition of their foreign credits manage to carry through to the harvest.

Lord Robert Cecil continuing, states that one difficulty results from the smuggling of German private securities abroad. Some of these are said to be taken by aeroplane; others to have got across into the occupied territory and so to neutrals.

Mr Norman Davis says the German Government are in fact continuing to requisition securities.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether a large part of the Brazilian debt is not in fact in German hands.

Mr Keynes states that the part so held does not amount to very much. The German Government has obtained about £1,000,000 from this source.

It is resolved that the Memorandum prepared for communication to the German Financial Commission should not be presented in view of the possible effect at this moment of a formal document of that character on the Peace negotiations. It is agreed, however, that the representatives of the Associated Governments should discuss the question verbally with the German representatives along the lines of the statement.

4. President Wilson considers that the general financial problem cannot be discussed to a conclusion at the present meeting but that further expert advice must first be obtained. On his motion it was resolved that:

“A Committee composed of two economic advisers from each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers be requested to submit a systematic suggestion with regard to the means of assisting the nations which are in immediate need of both food, raw material and credit”.

5. Lord Robert Cecil raises the question of the control of the Danube. He states that the river is at present partly under French and partly under British control, that there is general agreement that it is desirable to co-ordinate the control under a Commission of Four representing the four principal Associated Governments, but that a decision is required as to who should act as Chairman of this Commission. He himself hoped that Admiral Troubridge would be chosen.

Mr Hoover explains the practical obstruction to barge navigation resulting from the present complicated permit system, and he agrees with the proposal.

M Clemenceau states that he considers it necessary that the whole should be under the supervision of the Military Authorities but that subject to that he thinks it would be suitable that Admiral Troubridge* should be Chairman of the Commission, and he agreed to write to General Franchet d’Esperey suggesting that he should propose the appointment of Admiral Troubridge to this position.

6. Mr Hoover raises the question of the restriction on export of food from the Banat to Austro-Hungary. He pointed out that the need for food in the latter country is desperate and that the Associated Governments are in fact with Hungary having much difficulty importing food from great distances.

At the same time there is actually a surplus of food in the adjacent Banat for which there are sufficient commodities in Austro-Hungary to provide payment. The Serbs, however, are refusing to allow the export of this food.

(It is agreed that M Clemenceau should communicate with the Serbian Government intimating that the Associated Governments regard it as of great importance that facilities for the export of foodstuffs from the Banat to German-Austria and, if a stable Government is established, to Hungary, should at once be given.)

*This is the same Admiral Thomas Troubridge who was court-martialled in 1915 for declining to pursue the fleeing SMS Goeben in the very first days of the war. He was exonerated, and despite never having a sea command again went on to a fairly good naval career.

Sailor Steve

05-09-19, 11:15 AM

Friday, May 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:25

Meeting of the Council of Four

(Mr Hurst is introduced.)

President Wilson points out that the text of Article 430 of the Treaty of Peace differs from the instructions on the subject which were given to the Drafting Committee. The instructions to the Drafting Committee were as follows:

“In case either during or after this 15 years’ delay, the Inter-Allied Commission of Reparations recognize that Germany refuses to execute the whole or part of the conditions agreed upon by her according to the present Treaty, the international re-occupation of part or the whole of the areas defined by Article 2 will take place immediately.”

Article 430 of the Treaty reads as follows:

“In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the 15 years referred to above, the Reparation Commission finds that Germany has failed to observe the whole or part of her obligations under the present Treaty, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Associated forces.”

The essential difference between the two texts, President Wilson points out, is that in the Article in the Peace Treaty the words “Germany has failed to observe” have been substituted for the original words “Germany refuses to execute”.

Mr Hurst points out that the change is a very small one. It is an Article in regard to which no action will take place for at least five years, and then it will only affect a relatively small area of territory.

Mr Lloyd George points out that there is a considerable difference between refusal and failure to execute the Treaty.

President Wilson points out a further difference, namely, that the original draft, though loosely worded, is only intended to apply to Reparation, whereas Article 430 applies to the whole Treaty. The Reparation Commission has nothing to do with anything but Reparation. He agrees, however, that the original text was partly misleading.

Mr Hurst says that this will entail the modification of Article 430, and no doubt an opportunity will arise during the negotiations with the Germans. The alteration will be to Germany’s advantage, so that Germany is not likely to object. He undertakes to arrange for a Meeting of the Drafting Committee in the afternoon, and to present a fresh draft by the following morning.

President Wilson asks whether the word “may” should not be substituted for “will” in the last line.

M Clemenceau asks what the original text was.

Mr Hurst says it was “will”.

M Clemenceau said he would prefer to adhere to the original text, owing to the effect of a change on the French people.

Mr Hurst says the difficulty can be surmounted by using the future tense in the French text.

(It is agreed that the Drafting Committee should prepare a fresh draft of Article 430 to be presented to the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the following morning.)

(Mr Hurst withdraws.)

(It is agreed in the afternoon to discuss the action to be taken in the event of a failure on the part of the Germans to sign the Treaty of Peace.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to circulate a memorandum by Marshal Foch.

He circulated at the Meeting the memorandum by the Allied Admirals on the Naval action to be taken.)

Sailor Steve

05-09-19, 01:35 PM

Friday, May 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers

1. M Pichon says that the Council of Foreign Ministers will complete the examination of the remaining territorial frontiers of Austria, as presented in the reports of the Commissions appointed by the Conference. Questions have been left over from the meeting held on the previous day and he will ask the Council to commence with the examination of the frontiers between Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Mr Lansing inquires whether the members of the Committee on Czechoslovak questions have reached a unanimous conclusion on this question.

M Laroche says the Committee are unanimous in recognizing that the frontier between Czechoslovakia and Austria should, in principle, coincide with the administrative boundaries which formerly separated Bohemia and Moravia from the Austrian provinces. With respect to various rectifications asked for by Czechoslovakia in this frontier, the Committee are of opinion that for the most part these demands can only be decided by a boundary Commission on the spot. The Committee has, however, unanimously recommended that the town of Gmünd should be given to Austria, while the railway station of Gmünd should go to Czechoslovakia, for the reason that the railway station forms an important junction. The distance between the railway station and the town is about two miles, so that the inconvenience caused by this arrangement would not be very great. Furthermore, the Committee considers it to be of great importance that Czechoslovakia should be able to control the course of the Morava river in order to be in a position to construct canals to serve the provinces of Moravia. It has been recommended, therefore, that the frontier should be drawn so as to leave the Morava entirely within Czechoslovak territory, it being understood, on the other hand, that the railway which follows the Morava at varying distances would be left entirely within Austrian territory.

One important question, however, remains to be provided for in the Austrian Treaty, namely, the renunciation by Austria of the northern provinces of Galicia and Teschen, whose boundaries have not yet been delimited.

(It is agreed to accept the recommendations of the Committee on Czechoslovak questions in regard to the frontier between Czechoslovakia and Austria.)

M Tardieu says that the Committee has carefully studied the Yugoslav claims to the Austrian provinces of the valley of the Drave. After examining the ethnographical, historical, economical and political conditions, it has decided upon the following solutions for the two boundary regions which formed distinct basins, having as their respective centers, Marburg and Klagenfurt.

The United States, British and French Delegations note that the district of Marburg is inhabited by a population in which the real Slovene element possesses the majority. On the other hand, the Italian Delegation considers that Marburg, of which it recognizes the German character, depends on the Austrian economic system, and cannot therefore be detached from it without disturbing the economic life of the region and compromising the maintenance of peace.

In consequence, the United States, British and French Delegations propose to assign to Yugoslavia the basin of Marburg; while the Italian Delegation opposes to this proposal the reservation of principle formulated above.

The United States, British and French Delegations noted that the basin of Klagenfurt is inhabited by a mixed population, composing important Slovene elements, particularly to the east of Klagenfurt. This basin, moreover, constitutes a geographical entity separated from the south by the natural barrier of the Karawanken mountains. For this reason the basin, and not particularly the town, of Klagenfurt, constitute an association of economic interest more closely connected with the districts situated to the north than with those situated to the south. Nevertheless, the United States, British and French Delegations consider that the information at present in their possession does not appear to be sufficient to allow them to determine with certainty the natural aspirations of the nations of this district. On the other hand, the Italian Delegation considers that the Klagenfurt basin forms an integral part of the Austrian geographical system from which it cannot be separated, without disturbing the life of the region and compromising the general peace. For the above reasons, the Committee proposes that the frontier between Yugoslavia and Austria should follow the course of the Karawanken mountains from a point south-east of Eisenkappel as far as the Klagenfurt-Laibach road. At the same time, the United States, British and French Delegations propose that a local inquiry or consultation (under conditions to be determined by the Allied and Associated Governments) should be held, in order to afford the inhabitants of the Klagenfurt Basin an opportunity of protesting, should they wish to do so, against inclusion in Austria, and demanding union with Yugoslavia. The Italian Delegation, however, opposes to this proposal the reservation of principle formulated above. It declares, moreover, that in its opinion, any question of a consultation or inquiry, as well as of a plebiscite, bears an eminently political character which removed it from the competence of the Territorial Committees.

S de Martino invited the attention of the Council to the importance of Marburg as a railway center. In his opinion, the questions of Klagenfurt and Marburg were intimately connected. Consequently the two problems should be studied together and the study should be continued right up to the Italian frontier.

Mr Balfour says that before accepting S de Martino’s proposal he wishes to inquire whether the arrangement in regard to the boundaries in the district of Marburg had not been something in the nature of a compromise, whereby it had been agreed that a triangle situated to the north of Luttenburg should be left to Austria in exchange for Marburg and the adjoining territory, which was to be included in Yugoslavia. As a result, he considers that the Council cannot consider one question without the other, as it was by taking the two questions together that a compromise had been reached.

M Tardieu agrees that the question should be considered as a whole.

M Pichon inquires whether the Commission should not be authorized to study the question up to the Italian frontier.

Baron Sonnino considers that this can be done here and now. The Council of Four had charged the Council of Foreign Ministers to accept the proposals submitted by the Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Yugoslavia, or to put up their own recommendations in regard to matters requiring amendment.

M Tardieu explains that the Committee had thought that a study of the frontiers beyond the Klagenfurt-Laibach road must involve the consideration of Italian claims which had been reserved by the Council of Ten.

Baron Sonnino says that if he has correctly understood the question, the Committee in fixing the frontiers between Austria and Yugoslavia had given careful consideration to the position of the existing railway lines in these regions, with the result that it had decided to leave the railway line between Klagenfurt, Assling and Trieste free, that is to say, outside the territories allotted to Yugoslavia. Now, to give effect to this principle, it would be necessary that the frontier which had been delimited up to the Klagenfurt-Laibach road should thence proceed in a southerly direction, remaining east of Assling, until it met the Italian frontier. In other words, it was essential that the whole of the railway line from Klagenfurt to Trieste, via Assling, should remain in Austria until it reached the Italian frontier. In his opinion, this was the idea which the Committee had meant to follow in accordance with the principle accepted in regard to railway communications by other Commissions. Under this arrangement one important direct railway line of communication would exist between Trieste and Vienna, whilst the other railway lines more to the east would pass through Yugoslav territory.

Mr Lansing says the Council of Foreign Ministers had received no specific reports on these various questions. The Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Yugoslavia had not reported on the particular questions under consideration. He proposes, therefore, that these should first be referred to that Committee for examination.

Baron Sonnino says that he will be prepared to accept Mr Lansing’s proposal. He would point out, however, that the Council of Four had directed the Council of Foreign Ministers to report on these very questions. Should his colleagues, nevertheless, insist on referring these questions to the Committee, he would bow to their decision, but only on the understanding that the terms of reference to the Committee should clearly lay down the principle he had just enumerated, namely, that the main line of railway communication between Trieste and Vienna, via Assling, and Klagenfurt should pass wholly through Italian and Austrian territory.

M. Pichon inquires whether the Commission should also be charged to deal with the question of the Italian frontiers in these regions.

Baron Sonnino replies in the negative. He invites the attention of his Colleagues to the fact that the Supreme Council has decided that all frontier questions affecting Italy should be settled by that Council. Consequently the reference to the Committee would relate only to the part between the Klagenfurt-Laibach road, where the Committee had previously stopped, and the frontier of Italy. Now, the principle which governed the Committee appeared to be to leave the Railway line between Trieste and Vienna outside Yugoslav territory. He thinks that question can, therefore, be accepted at once. Otherwise it should, in his opinion, be referred forthwith to the Supreme Council and not to the Committee on Yugoslavia.

Mr Lansing maintains that there is nothing either in the report or in the maps submitted by the Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Yugoslavia, which supports Baron Sonnino’s contention.

Mr Balfour says that he understands Baron Sonnino to state that the Councils of Foreign Ministers are not competent at present to decide questions relating to the Italian frontiers. In this view he entirely concurs with Baron Sonnino, at all events as far as Great Britain and France were concerned, since there exist the additional complication in regard to the Treaty of London. On the other hand, for the Council to decide at this stage that a certain railway line must be left out of Yugoslavia and included in Italy and Austria seems to him to be hardly justifiable with the information at present available.

Baron Sonnino agrees that the Committee would be quite unable to discuss such a question, especially if the Foreign Ministers themselves could not do so. Consequently in his opinion the question should be referred to the Supreme Council.

M Pichon remarks that Mr Lansing has not said that the present Council were not competent to consider the question. He had merely asked that the Yugoslavia question should be referred to the Committee for study and report.

Mr Lansing agrees. He explains that he feels himself at present incompetent, because he has received no advice from his experts either on the ethnological aspect of the case or in regard to the Railways.

Baron Sonnino says that he asked himself what the Committee would do when it reached the Italian frontier, since it would not be competent to deal with the question further. The Committee could, therefore, only deal with another 20 kilometres of country beyond the Klagenfurt-Laibach road.

Mr. Balfour inquires whether it would not be an advantage that the question should be examined by a Committee before it comes under consideration either by the present Council or by the Supreme Council. So far the question has not been examined by the Committee because the Italian Delegation had held the view that for political reasons Committees should not do so. He quite agrees with the view put forward by the Italian Delegation in regard to the question of international policy: but the Committee could give the ethnologic and economic aspect of the case which will greatly help the Council to deal with the larger questions. For instance, the area which the Italians desired should be given to Austria and not to Yugoslavia was, he understood, largely inhabited by Yugoslavs.

That is a question on which the Committee could furnish a statement.

Again, the Italian Delegation maintains that for economic reasons a direct line of communication between Trieste and Vienna and Bohemia should pass wholly through Italian and Austrian territory without crossing Yugoslavia. That constitutes partly an economic point. Surely the two questions can be looked into by a competent Committee of experts. He understands that to be the suggestion made by Mr Lansing.

Mr Lansing agrees that Mr Balfour has correctly interpreted his proposal.

Baron Sonnino says that provided the Council of Ministers are willing to accept the lines proposed by the Committee on Yugoslav affairs, he will, himself, withdraw the reservation made by the Italian Delegation in regard to the districts of Marburg and Klagenfurt.

M Tardieu points out that two reservations have been made: one by the Italian Delegation in regard to the Klagenfurt Basin, which the Delegation considered should remain Austrian on account of its forming an integral part of the Austrian geographical and economic system. On the other hand, the United States, British and French Delegations, considered that a local inquiry or consultation should be held in order to afford the inhabitants of the Klagenfurt Basin an opportunity of protesting, should they wish to do so, against inclusion in Austria and of demanding union with Yugoslavia. It will be seen, therefore, that the Committee has not made any definite proposals. The Italian Delegation considers that the Klagenfurt Basin should be included in Austria, whereas the other three Delegations proposed that a line should be drawn south of the Klagenfurt Basin up to which the inquiry or consultation should proceed.

Mr Balfour inquired whether the procedure adopted in the case of Malmedy could not be followed in the present instance. Malmedy had been incorporated in Belgium, but provision was made in order to allow the inhabitants to protest against their inclusion in Belgium within a certain time; reference would then be to the League of Nations which would decide. He thought that procedure might be found a convenient method of dealing with the problem of Klagenfurt.

Baron Sonnino points out that the two cases are very different. In Malmedy there was a question of bringing Germans under Belgian sovereignty; whereas the people of Klagenfurt already formed part of the Austrian State.

M Pichon interprets the views of the Council to be that the question should be referred to the Committee on Yugoslav affairs to report as soon as possible, giving precise details to enable a decision to be taken.

M Tardieu points out that the Committee can give ethnic and statistical data relating to this region but it cannot give particulars relating to the railway line which would join the Italian frontier at an unknown point.

Mr Lansing agrees that the Council only requires the Committee to give ethnological and economic information.

(It is agreed that the Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Yugoslavia should submit recommendations in regard to the frontiers between Yugoslavia and Austria, up to the Italian Frontier, based on ethnic and economic considerations; the Committee should submit their report on the morning of the 10th May, 1919.)

2. M Pichon reads the following letter which he had addressed to the Chargé d’Affaires of the Netherlands Government in Paris, dated 9th May, 1919:

“In a note dated 4th April, 1919, you were kind enough to inform me that the Royal Netherlands Government was prepared to take part in a discussion on the subject of the revision of the Treaties of 1839.

I am directed to inform you in reply to the Note above mentioned that the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Great Powers has decided that a Conference, including the five Ministers of Foreign Affairs of those Powers, together with the representatives of the Netherlands and of Belgium should meet as soon as possible, in Paris, in order to examine the question of the revision of the Treaties of 1839.

I regret that up to the present, it has not been possible to fix exactly the date on which these discussions could commence; but as soon as the Supreme Council is in a position to reach a decision thereon, I shall have the honor of informing you immediately.

Pray accept, mon cher Chargé d’Affaires, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Pichon”

(It is agreed that M Pichon should forthwith issue a further communication to the representatives of the Netherlands and Belgian Governments, inviting them to attend the meeting as above arranged on Monday, 19th May, 1919.)

3. M Pichon draws attention to the following letter dated 6th May 1919, which had been addressed by the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference to the American, British and Italian Delegations:

“The Secretary-General of the Peace Conference has the honor to forward herewith a copy of a letter which has been addressed to him by the Secretariat of the Belgian Delegation. In this letter the Belgian Delegation requests the Allied and Associated Powers not to recognize the new German flag in the event of the Colors of the latter being as announced, namely, the same as those of the Belgian flag. This question could, if so agreed, be placed on the Agenda paper for the next meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Mr Balfour says he cannot see what this has to do with the Peace Conference. It will obviously be impossible to add a new Article to the Peace Treaty on this question. He thinks the matter should stand over until the Germans had committed the anticipated outrage.

M Pichon suggests no action should be taken until Germany has declared her intention in the matter.

Baron Sonnino thinks that once Germany has decided on her action it will be far more difficult to insist on a change being made. In his opinion it will be easier to warn Germany beforehand and inform her that the Allied and Associated Governments endorse Belgium’s protest.

Mr Balfour draws attention to the fact that a letter on this subject had been addressed by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American, British, French and Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs in March last. To this letter the British Government had already forwarded the following reply, dated 8th May, 1919, which he thought fully met the case:

“I have the honor to refer to the Note of March 15th last in which Your Excellency called attention to a statement which had appeared in the neutral press that the German Republican Government intended to adopt for the Republican Flag the same colors as the Belgian national Flag.

Your Excellency asked for the assurance that His Britannic Majesty’s Government would not recognize such a flag.

In reply I have the honor to say that His Majesty’s Government while feeling it would be difficult to make a demand of the German Government not to choose red, black and gold for the national colors, are of opinion that the Allies might insist that these colors, if adopted, should be so arranged that no confusion between the Belgian and German Flags would be likely to arise”.

M Pichon explains that the French Government has also answered in the same sense.

(The question is then adjourned.)

4. M Pichon said that the following letter, dated Spa, 1st May, 1919, had been addressed by the Head of the Belgian Mission to General Nudant, President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission, on the subject of the retention and publication by Germany of the documents taken from the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

“In compliance with instructions from my Government I sent to the President of the German Armistice Commission, under date of 10 April, 1919, a protest, of which I sent you a copy in regard to the retention and the publication by the Germans of documents belonging to the Department of Foreign Affairs of Belgium.

The note of which I send you a copy herewith, reiterates my protest. The Minister of Foreign Affairs believes that joint action by the Allies seems to be indispensable, and he asks whether it would not be possible to obtain the intervention of Marshal Foch against this open violation of the Armistice Agreement.

I have the honor to beg you to be so good as to investigate the possibility of satisfying this request”.

M Pichon, continuing, says that a clause in the Armistice exists which apparently deals with this question. Consequently, it would be sufficient to request Marshal Foch to enforce the provisions of the Armistice.

Baron Sonnino points out that Article 19 of the Armistice referred to by M Pichon merely deals with economic questions. It requires the immediate return of all the documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, touching public or private interests in the invaded countries.

Mr Lansing inquires whether any of the documents referred to by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs had actually been published in Germany.
M Pichon invites attention to the following letter, dated Spa, 1st May, 1919, addressed by the Head of the Belgian Mission to General von Hammerstein, President of the German Armistice Commission:

“In my note of 10 April, I protested against the retention by the German Government, and the publication of political circulars or other documents of public interest belonging to the Belgian Government and I again requested the immediate return of all copies now remaining in Germany, as well as the cessation of the work of publication which is manifestly contrary to the letter and spirit of Article 19 of the Armistice Convention.

Up to the present time, I have as yet received no reply in regard to this matter.

The Minister of War informs me that, according to a report in the “Rhine and Westphalia Gazette” of 2nd April last, two fresh volumes of these circulars have appeared.

I reiterate my protest against this open violation of the Armistice Agreement, and I urge General von Hammerstein to inform me as to the measures taken by the German Government in compliance with the justifiable and repeated requests which I have made in regard to this matter.”

Mr Lansing proposes that Marshal Foch should be asked to report what Powers he possesses under the Armistice.

(It is agreed that correspondence received from the Head of the Belgian Mission at Spa, quoted above, should be referred to Marshal Foch with a request that he should report to the Council what powers he possessed under the Armistice to insist on the return of the documents taken from the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)

5. Mr Balfour said that all the information which he received from Estonia as well as that received by the American Delegation goes to show that some kind of assistance and encouragement should be given to Estonia which for four months has been struggling against Bolshevism. Estonia does not require men; she requires equipment, food, and money, though not much. A small allowance of money, with some indication from the Allied and Associated Governments, that they support their cause would encourage the Estonians to continue their struggle against Bolshevism. In his opinion, the Allied and Associated Governments should recognize the Estonian Government as a de facto Government, and in addition they should even be prepared to give a certain amount of assistance in the work in which that Government was engaged. The matter is one of pressing urgency, as the fate of Estonia is hanging in the balance. These remote people are quite unacquainted with the temper of the Allies in Paris. He proposes, therefore, that some form of encouragement should forthwith be given to the Estonian Government by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The British Government has been giving naval assistance and stores to the Estonians, and largely owing to that small contribution, the Estonians have been able to carry on their struggles. But the British Government cannot continue this action except in conjunction with the Allied and Associated Governments. The British Government has already acknowledged the Estonian Government as a de facto Government, but as far as he knows this has not yet been done by any of the other Allied and Associated Governments. However, deeds are more important than words and he felt some action should be taken in the direction indicated.

Mr Lansing said that his recollection was that Great Britain had recognized the Estonian Government as a de facto Government about a year ago and had again confirmed the recognition in September last. The French Government had taken very much the same course.

M Pichon explains that the French Government has not so far recognised the Estonian Government, but it had had unofficial dealings with Estonian representatives and had thereby acted as if according recognition to a de facto Government.

Mr Lansing points out that at the bottom of the whole question lay a very important principle of policy. The recognition of de facto Governments in territories formerly Russian, constitute in a measure a dissection of Russia which the United States of America had carefully avoided, except in the case of Finland and Poland. In the case of Poland Russia herself had acquiesced.

Mr Balfour says he would, under the circumstances, withdraw his suggestion for the recognition of Estonia if the United States of America objects thereto, especially as he was more interested in the question of obtaining some material assistance for the Estonians.

Mr Hoover said that the Food Commission had established a systematic distribution of food in Estonia but the problem is inseparable from that of public order and means of communication. The Estonian Government, at the present moment, only possesses three locomotives, two of which are broken down and unserviceable. As a result, the people are dying of starvation, and it is impossible to get food into the interior of the country. The Army has succeeded up to the present in maintaining its position: it is sadly in need of ammunition, clothing and supplies, which were not available at the present time. The high rate of casualties is due almost entirely to death from starvation. The scenes witnessed in Estonia are most heartrending. The problem cannot be encompassed without means of transport and the restoration of public order. Humane and not political considerations should prevail.

Mr Balfour inquires whether Mr Hoover would not add to his statement of the requirements of Estonia a certain amount of financial assistance. Furthermore, he would be glad to know whether Mr Hoover has any plans for improving means of communication.

Mr Hoover explains that a section of the Supreme Economic Council deals with questions relating to communications. He thinks a certain number of Armistice locomotives and wagons obtained from the Germans could be set aside for work in Estonia. In this connection, he would invite attention to the fact that the Germans had converted the Russian into the German gauge which will greatly help in arriving at a solution. Food supplies can be sent to Estonia by the United States of America in accordance with the powers conferred by Congress, but no direct money loans can be made by the United States Government as no authority exists. In regard to shipping, the British control a large quantity of German tonnage which can be put aside for the purpose of bringing munitions and supplies to Estonia. He thinks the whole question is one of cooperation between Allies and if authority is given to the Supreme Economic Council and to the Military Authorities, a solution will be found without difficulty.

Mr Lansing proposes that the matter should be referred to the Supreme Economic Council to prepare definite plans.

Mr Balfour thinks that something more will be required. He thinks that the Supreme Economic Council, the War Department and the Admiralty should be instructed to prepare the necessary plans: the Supreme Economic Council to be authorized to take action without again referring the matter to the Council. He realizes that the American Government can do nothing in the way of advancing hard cash: but they did a great deal in the supply of food. On the other hand, only a very small amount of money, some £200,000 would make a great difference and he inquires whether France, Great Britain and Italy would be able to supply this sum.

Baron Sonnino does not think that Italy could advance any money for this purpose.

M Pichon points out that it would be necessary for him in the first place to obtain the sanction of the Budget Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. He would have to address a certain request to that Committee shortly and he would then take the opportunity of pressing for an advance for this purpose.

Mr Lansing points out that in this connection the United States of America is already spending £400,000 a month in relieving the situation in Estonia.

Mr Balfour says that he had intended to make it clear that the United States Government cannot give money as such for technical reasons. But it is giving much larger sums of money in the shape of food and assistance. He would add that he was, himself, in M Pichon’s position. He would suggest that Great Britain should give an advance but he would have to get the permission of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Prime Minister. He will, however, do what he can.

Mr Hoover asks permission in the next place to invite attention to the situation in Latvia and Lithuania. The Germans had arrested the Government of Latvia and the British naval authorities had prevented food supplies from entering the country. The difficulty arose from the fact that the Germans were living on the civil population; they were not fighting the Bolsheviks, and they prevented the local authorities from organizing the country.

The Bolsheviks have now retreated from Riga because no food is available. As a result the town of Riga is now in the hands of mobs and atrocities of a hideous nature are being committed. The American Food Commission are in a position to send food but this cannot be landed without the help of the Navy, since no Government, not even a Bolshevik government exists.

Captain Fuller reports that the British Admiralty is fully aware of the situation in Riga. A week or 10 days ago an invitation had been received from the Germans asking that the British Navy should help them to recover Riga, the conditions being that the British forces should act in conjunction with the German forces.

Mr Balfour thinks that Mr Hoover had not suggested that the British Navy should act in conjunction with the German forces: all he wanted was that the British Admiralty should send ships to Riga to ensure the landing of food.

Captain Fuller replies that it will not be possible to assure the landing of food at Riga unless the town itself is also occupied.

Mr Hoover says that he feels certain that if food is landed at Riga the Bolsheviks will promptly return.

Mr Balfour thinks that the question stands as follows. Food can only be got to Riga under the protection of the British Navy. In addition, the town must be protected against attack because as soon as food is available in the town the Bolsheviks would enter. The British Admiralty are of the opinion that Riga cannot be protected by marines, consequently, it will be necessary to consider whether any other forces are available to maintain order in the town.

Mr Hoover points out that a humanitarian policy would allow the Germans to do the work on land in co-operation with the British Navy acting at sea.

M Pichon thinks it will be impossible to accept German co-operation.

Mr Lansing maintains that unless a solution can be found the Allied and Associated Governments will be responsible for the death of the people. Should the British Admiralty refuse to cooperate with the Germans purely from fear of giving the latter some economic advantages, it would be wholly responsible for the deaths that would occur.

Mr Balfour thinks that Mr Lansing has spoken under some misconception. The British Admiralty has not considered either the economic or any other advantages. But so long as war lasts, it is rather a strong order to expect the British and German forces to co-operate. Everyone must feel the strength of the appeal made by Mr Lansing. But volunteers can be found to go to the scene of action if only paid. Consequently, inquiries should be made as to whether other forces are available before the Allies can agree to march shoulder to shoulder with the Germans, with whom they are still at war.

M Pichon entirely agrees with Mr Balfour’s standpoint. In Finland, in Russia, and in Scandinavia, other elements can be found to constitute volunteers to do the work required.

Mr Lansing says that, paradoxical as it might seem, the Allied and Associated Governments are, by the Armistice, Allies of Germany in the Baltic provinces. The reason the Germans had been asked to stay there was because the Allied and Associated Governments did not want them to leave.

M Pichon thinks it was one thing to tell the Germans to stay where they were and quite another thing to join and fight with them.

Mr Lansing inquired wherein lies the objection. Is it sentiment or danger to Allied forces?

M Pichon thinks it is both. In his opinion it would be very bad from a moral point of view. Furthermore, there is great danger in our troops supporting the action of the Germans in Russia.

Mr Lansing agrees that the point is that the Allies do not wish to support the Germans in Russia. At the same time, thousands of people are starving in Estonia. In his opinion, it is essential to put ideas of humanity above those of sentiment and to do everything possible to prevent people from starving.

Mr Balfour maintains that the question is not so simple as Mr Lansing believes. The Germans have been behaving disgracefully in the Baltic provinces and are acting for their own political ends. They are everywhere preventing and hampering the policy of the Allies which is to encourage the local people to do what they can to organize themselves. Sufficient reason might not exist to force the Allies to occupy Riga, but sufficient reason exists to justify an endeavor to obtain volunteers to do the work required. This is clearly better than to assist the Germans who were merely furthering their own political objects. He agrees that everything possible should be done to save the population from starving, but if it is true that volunteers are available, Mr Lansing and the Allies should be able to find some means to make use of them.

Mr Hoover thinks that the organisation of a mercenary army would require a considerable time.

Mr Lansing points out that he has heard what Mr Balfour has said in regard to the condition of Estonia with considerable interest. The American authorities have investigated the charges brought against the Germans and they have found that the Germans have been behaving far better than had been reported. General Von der Goltz appears to be behaving with considerable good faith, confining himself merely to military matters. The political situation is wholly due to the people quarreling among themselves. They have been trying to get a Cabinet that represented all parties, including the Baltic Barons. In his opinion, there exists no danger of German misbehavior.

Mr Balfour inquires whether Mr. Lansing intends to imply that the statement relating to the disarmament of the Letts by the Germans is untrue.

Mr Lansing replies that the Germans had certainly disarmed the Letts when a movement against the Government had been started.

M Pichon thinks the Allies at present posses no means to land forces to maintain order as suggested by Mr Hoover. He thinks that the Commanders of the local Allied Naval Forces should be called upon to make an inquiry and to report as to the means that could be taken to relieve the situation.

Mr Balfour invites attention to the curious difference existing between the information received from Estonia by Mr Lansing and himself. Under these circumstances he thinks it would be a good thing for the Delegates of the various countries who have representatives in the Baltic Provinces to join and consider the information received by their various representatives.

Mr Lansing suggests that Mr Hoover should be authorized to call such a meeting together and obtain a report. He would point out, however, that the question is also a food one.

Mr Balfour says that both Naval and Economic authorities will be available to represent the American, British, French and Italian views. These delegates should meet together to consider the facts available and submit a definite policy to be followed.

Mr Lansing thinks the proposal would be acceptable. But he thinks that even if the Germans were devils in Hell the people should still be fed. In his opinion, that was the only question regarding which the Commission should be asked to suggest the best policy, that was to say, the Commission should be appointed merely to report how best the Allied and Associated Governments could feed the people.

Mr Balfour thinks that the terms of reference to the Committee should not be such that the feeding of the people alone should be considered, and that no consideration should be given to the existing state of affairs in the country.

M Pichon agrees with the views expressed by Mr Balfour. He thinks the question should be considered as a whole; no aspect of the case should be neglected.

(It is agreed that a Committee consisting of an American, British, French and Italian, Economic, Naval and Military Representative should be appointed to report on the best means of keeping and maintaining order in the Baltic States and revictualling the population.

It is further agreed that the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and France should consider the question of making a small money advance estimated at a total of £200,000 to the Estonian Government.

The following are appointed to form part of the Committee, with instructions to report as promptly as possible:

United States of America:
Mr Hoover.
Admiral Benson.
Colonel Logan.

Great Britain:
Sir E Howard.
Sir W Goode.
Admiral Hope.
General Thwaites.

France:
M Seydoux.
Admiral de Bon.
Colonel Georges.

Italy:
Admiral Grassi.

6. M Seydoux says that the Supreme Economic Council has for some time considered the question of the removal of the blockade restrictions on Hungary. It has been proposed to re-open relations with Hungary when the blockade restrictions on Austria had been removed. But on account of Bolshevik outbreaks in Hungary it had been found impossible on the 2nd April to give effect to this proposal. Indeed, it had been found necessary to insist on closing the frontier between Austria and Hungary. Now that the Government of Bela Kun is about to be upset, he thinks steps can be taken to remove all commercial restrictions. Hungary is self-contained up to a certain point, but the supply of food and raw materials is becoming an urgent problem. It appeared, however, that a considerable quantity of breadstuffs and meat exist in the Banat and surrounding countries in excess of requirements of Greater Serbia, and is consequently available for export to Hungary. As a result of a study of this question the Supreme Economic Council has decided to inquire from the Council of Foreign Ministers whether the time has not now arrived for the lifting of the blockade on Hungary. Furthermore, the Eastern Sub-Commission of the Blockade are taking measures to prevent the passing of food and other raw materials from Hungary into Russia.

Mr Hoover points out that the proposal referred to by M Seydoux has been reached by the Supreme Economic Council on the supposition that the Bela Kun Government would fall at once. So far that has not happened; but the Supreme Economic Council asks for a mandate to act as soon as that Government should disappear. The information available went to show that two days ago it appears certain that the Bela Kun Government will be upset. Unfortunately, the invitation to Austria to attend the Peace Conference has been interpreted to include the Hungarian Government with the result that Bela Kun’s Government has again been put on its feet.

Mr Balfour draws attention to the fact that no invitation has so far been delivered to the Hungarian Government.

M Pichon expresses the view that the authority asked for by the Supreme Economic Council could be granted - that is to say that as soon as the political situation permits, and order was reestablished in Hungary, the blockade should be removed.

Baron Sonnino inquired what interpretation should be placed on the words “reestablishment of order”. He inquired whether an unofficial notification could not be allowed to leak out that the blockade would be raised as soon as the Government of Bela Kun was overthrown.

Mr McCormick thinks that if Bela Kun is put out of office the blockade could be removed. In his opinion the matter was one of the greatest importance, as Hungary was the last barrier that is still standing and preventing the reestablishment of normal economic conditions in Southern Europe.

Mr Balfour thinks that the Supreme Economic Council and the General Staff should be the judges in regard to the re-establishment of order.

(It is agreed to authorize the Supreme Economic Council to take all preparatory measures to remove the blockade restrictions on Hungary without further reference to the Supreme Council as soon as the General Staff informed them that order has been reestablished in the country.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

05-10-19, 02:58 AM

Friday, May 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. Sir Maurice Hankey hands M Clemenceau the draft of a letter prepared at M Clemenceau’s request, and agreed to by Mr Hoover and the British Experts, inviting M Pashich to permit the export of foodstuffs from the Banat to Hungary.

M Clemenceau approves that the terms of the letter carry out the decisions reached in the morning, and undertakes to despatch it.

2. The Council has before them the following documents:

1) A Note from Marshal Foch as to the military action to be taken in the emergency contemplated if the Germans decline to sign the Treaty.

2) A Note from the Naval Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on the Naval steps to be taken in the same contingency.

Mr Lloyd George points out that no very drastic proposal was contained in either of these documents.

President Wilson says that what is most disturbing him is that a certain period of time is allowed for the execution of the naval and military clauses, the maximum amount allowed being three months for the destruction of certain fortifications. For this period after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, a much larger force will have to be maintained on the Rhine than thereafter. As far as he can recollect, his military advisers estimate it at 30 divisions. The United States’ share of this would be such that they would have to stop sending troops home. By June 1st they will have reached the minimum contingent to be supplied by the United States - some 6 or 8 divisions. This is rather a serious problem and serious not only to the United States of America. It will mean a number of transports lying idle for some three months. Once ships are fitted as transports they were unsuited for commercial purposes. It will probably not be worth while to convert them for commercial purposes and then reconvert them for transport purposes.

Mr Lloyd George says that General Wilson had told him he was anxious and rather alarmed at the rapid withdrawal of the United States forces. He had asked him to speak to General Bliss on the matter before it was raised at the Supreme Council.

President Wilson says that at present the United States are shipping 300,000 men a month homewards.

Mr Lloyd George speculates as to the number of troops required for the occupation of Berlin. These are possibilities that ought not to be excluded from purview, and this was the reason for General Wilson’s anxiety.

M Clemenceau thinks 6 divisions will be enough.

Mr Lloyd George thinks to this it will be necessary to add the occupation of the Lines of Communication. He asks the distance, however, from Berlin to the Rhine, and to the sea.

Sir Maurice Hankey estimates the distance from Frankfort to Berlin at about 250 to 300 miles, and the distance from Berlin to Stettin about 90 miles.

(The discussion is adjourned at this point and resumed later. It will be more convenient to continue the record at this point.)

Mr Lloyd George says he would like the Military representatives at Versailles specifically to consider what forces would be required for the occupation of Berlin. It is unnecessary for the Council to commit itself to a decision because it asked for this information. In his view, there is a good deal to be said for the occupation of Berlin if Germany refuses to sign the Treaty. It will be the outward and visible sign of smashing the Junkers. They will never be convinced otherwise. He feels sure of this after hearing Brockdorff-Rantzau’s speech.

President Wilson says the hope rests on the remainder of Germany ridding themselves of the Junkers. Apart from Brockdorff-Rantzau, the other German delegates had looked reasonable men.

Mr Lloyd George points out that nonetheless they had allowed the Junker to take the lead. They could not free themselves from the sense of servitude to the Junkers.

President Wilson thinks that Mr Lloyd George’s theory is correct that the insolent parts of Brockdorff-Rantzau’s speech had been his own and the reasonable parts supplied by the other delegates.

Mr Lloyd George points out that there is no cohesion or unity of thought in the document.

M Clemenceau suggests that Marshal Foch should be invited to the Council to give his views as to the amount of force required for the occupation of Berlin.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that Marshal Foch should also be asked to consider whether the Poles ought to make any advance on Berlin.

(It is agreed that Marshal Foch should be heard at 11:00 on the following day.)

3. President Wilson presents a military problem to his colleagues.

The United States, he says, as agreed between the Allied and Associated Powers some time back, has been trying to send supplies to the civilian population of Siberia from Vladivostok. By agreement between the Allies and a Mr Stevens, who, long ago in the days of the old regime had been in Siberia, had become the head of a somewhat inconvenient Commission to run the railroads of Siberia. The United States had agreed to police the railroads as far west as Irkutsk. The position was that the United States Government did not believe in Kolchak. The British and French military representatives in Siberia, however, were supporting him. Kolchak had become irritated by the presence on the railway of United States soldiers, whom he regarded as neutrals. Moreover, the impression had got abroad among the peasants of Siberia that the United States was the standard of a free Government which they ought to imitate. When they saw the attitude of neutrality taken by the United States soldiers, they thought there must be something wrong with the Government of Kolchak. Further, the Cossacks were out of sympathy with the United States soldiers and he suspected that the Japanese would be glad to have a collision between the Cossacks and American soldiers. As a consequence of this state of affairs the United States Government found itself faced with the two following alternatives:

1) To take sides with Kolchak and send much stronger forces to Siberia.

2) To withdraw.

If the former alternative were adopted and the United States increased their forces it was certain that the Japanese would increase theirs still more. The original agreement had been that the Japanese and the United States should send roughly equivalent forces. When the United States sent 9,000 men the Japanese sent 12,000 men. He had not objected to this slight discrepancy, but the numbers of Japanese had subsequently gone up to 70,000, which had afterwards been reduced to a nominal 30,000. This, however, left a great disproportion. If the United States troops continued merely to guard the railway and to maintain, as it were, a neutral position, he was advised that collisions were bound to occur. If United States soldiers were attacked, it could not be expected that they would do nothing. If they were withdrawn, the field would be left to the Japanese and Kolchak, who was supported by the Allies.

He then reads a series of telegrams from General Graves commanding the United States forces in Siberia, bearing out the above summary of the position, and pointing out that if the present policy were continued, there would almost certainly be a collision between the United States troops and Russian troops.

Mr Lloyd George says that this strengthens his view as to the need of arriving at a policy in regard to Russia. Kolchak is advancing westward at a very remarkable rate. He is in a position either to move Northwards and join hands with the forces based on Archangel, or to march on Moscow.

President Wilson says he has always been of opinion that the proper policy of the Allied and Associated Powers was to clear out of Russia and leave it to the Russians to fight it out among themselves.

Mr Lloyd George asked that before a decision should be taken, the Council should hear M Tchaikovsky.

President Wilson agrees.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that President Wilson should send a reply to General Graves asking him to take no action for the moment, as the whole problem is being considered by the Allied and Associated Powers.

President Wilson says the risk of this is that there might be a collision between the United States and Russian troops. He suggested that the Allied and Associated Powers should simultaneously ask Kolchak what his program is.

Mr Lloyd George suggests he might be asked two definite questions:

1) Will you allow the peasants to retain the land or do you propose to restore the old seigneurial rights?

2) Are you prepared to revive the Constituent Assembly?

President Wilson, in regard to the first point, says that a few days ago he had asked a very Russophile friend whether the peasants had really got the land out of all the chaos in Russia. His friend had replied that they had only got it in a very inequitable way, each man having seized the land nearest to him. The difficulty would not only be to distribute the land to the peasants, but to systematize the existing distribution involving in some cases dispossession of individuals and groups.

(After some further discussion during which Mr Lloyd George produces a map showing the great advance that Kolchak’s troops had made, it is agreed that Mr Tchaikovsky should be heard on the following day at noon.)

Mr Lloyd George undertakes that Mr. Philip Kerr, who knows his address, should summon him.

4. Sir Maurice Hankey reports that he has communicated to the Secretary-General the decision of the Supreme Council that the Commission on Responsibility for Breaches of the Laws of War should be asked to prepare draft articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria. In reply, he had merely received articles to the report of the Commission, with a letter stating that these were intended to apply equally to the cases of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Sir Maurice Hankey points out, however, that these draft articles had been superseded by other articles prepared by the Supreme Council.

(After a short discussion it is agreed:

1) That Articles 228, 229 and 230 of the Conditions of Peace handed to the German Delegates should be taken by the Drafting Committee as the basis for the preparation of corresponding articles in the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary.

2) That the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary should contain no article corresponding to Article 227 of the Conditions of Peace, handed to the German representatives, since it is not desired to arraign the Emperor of Austria.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

5. Sir Maurice Hankey produces a report signed by Admiral Benson, Admiral Hope, Admiral de Bon, Admiral Grassi and Admiral Isaur Takechita on the subject of the disposal of submarines. With the exception of Admiral de Bon, it is unanimously recommended that all the submarines, submarine salvage vessels and docks surrendered by Germany should be broken up. Admiral de Bon does not, however, agree in this view and considered that the destruction of submarines and the future of submarine warfare cannot be separated.

(The subject is postponed for future consideration.)

6. Sir Maurice Hankey reads the following letter from Lord Cunliffe:

“Dear Sir Maurice; It has been suggested that before the Committee which is to report on what Austria could and should pay can make any real progress the “Big Four” must decide whether the new States, Poland, etc., are to bear any portion of the costs of the war.

Could you get this point settled? Yours very truly, Cunliffe.”

(The subject is postponed for further consideration.)

7. Mr. Lloyd George says he has a letter from Sir George Riddell drawing attention to the risk that when the German delegates make communications to the Allies, German journalists will telegraph them to Germany where efforts will be made to influence public opinion throughout the world in favor of the German point of view.

M Clemenceau says he did not much care if they do.

(It is agreed to take no action.)

8. Sir Maurice Hankey produces the formula which he has drafted in an attempt to give effect to a decision which, broadly speaking, he thinks had been arrived at on the previous day, concerning the Recognition of New States in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties.

There is a short discussion in the course of which S Orlando said he would like to consider the draft carefully before taking a decision.

(The Meeting is then adjourned.)

Jimbuna

05-10-19, 05:55 AM

10th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Bolsheviks again repulsed in Archangel region.

Royal Air Force Handley Page Type O heavy bomber on patrol near Bonn in occupied Germany.
https://i.imgur.com/2UCONJ9.jpg

James Reese Europe, American ragtime and early jazz bandleader, is fatally stabbed after an argument, just months after he had returned from Europe.
https://i.imgur.com/ZRom8Sp.jpg

Sailor Steve

05-10-19, 01:34 PM

Saturday, May 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand are introduced.)

1. M Clemenceau explains to Marshal Foch that the Council has under consideration the possibility, though not probability, that Germany might refuse to sign the Terms of Peace. They want Marshal Foch’s views as to the means available and the action to be taken in such an eventuality.

Marshal Foch said that on April 24th last he had held a meeting with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Belgian, British, French and American Armies. and they had made a sum of their total forces. It had been established that, for the whole of the month of May, at least 40 divisions with 5 cavalry divisions will be available to operate on the front of the Rhine. He requires 8 days’ warning to put them in a state to march. The reason for this is that many men are on furlough and many officers are away on commissions or leave. Everything is prepared, and, at the end of 8 days, the army will be ready to march. If and when the moment comes to intervene the action to be taken will be organized according to the objects aimed at. If it is a case of a regular Government refusing to sign, it will be necessary to strike at the center of that Government. For example, Weimar and Berlin. It might be, however, that the situation will be less clear and that the German Government might say that it cannot decide or that it requires a plebiscite. Still, if the resistance is that of a regular Government at Berlin or Weimar, this resistance must be broken. The shorter roads should be followed with the maximum possible forces. The army will start from its bases at Cologne and Mainz. Advancing from this base line towards Weimar and Berlin, the army will penetrate a zone very favorable to its advance, as its flanks will rest to the north on the River Lippe and to the South on the River Main. This zone is so advantageous for the advance that the enemy might be expected to capitulate before the armies reach their objective. Further, by advancing from the Rhine along the valley of the Ruhr, the result will be achieved of considerably reducing the enemy’s financial resources. Advancing from the Rhine by the valley of the Main, the armies of the Allied and Associated Powers will cut Germany off from Bavaria, and, in addition, will be in a position to join hands with the Czechoslovaks. This is a perfectly feasible and not dangerous operation, and might achieve results without bringing the operations to a conclusion. These lines of advance will take the Allied Armies into the heart of the German Government. In reply to M Clemenceau, he says that he envisages action by the Czechs, which will be combined.

General Weygand, in reply to Mr Lloyd George, says that the Czechs have 3 complete divisions formed, but these are now disposed along the Hungarian frontier. They have also several brigades, but a good deal of organisation will be required.

Marshal Foch says that information on this point has been asked for. He then explains his plan by reference to a large map. He adds one advantage to those he has already given, namely, that if, for any reason, the march has to be stopped, a line can be established on the River Weser parallel to the Rhine where the armies can rest in conditions very similar to those prevailing on the Rhine. In reply to President Wilson, he says there are no fortified places on the way and that neither Weimar nor Berlin are seriously fortified. In reply to Mr Lloyd George he says that he certainly contemplates action by Polish troops which are already in occupation of Posen. In reply to President Wilson, he says that the nominal strength of the German forces is 450,000 men, but they are disarmed and dispersed and practically Germany can offer no resistance at all. In reply to Mr Lloyd George, he adds that he does not contemplate action by sea, as this is not feasible with modern artillery. He sums up by saying that, with 8 days’ warning, he is prepared and is in accord with the various Commanders-in-Chief for an advance with incontestable superiority of forces and with his flanks secured. He will undertake to cut off Bavaria from Germany.

M Clemenceau asks whether he anticipates any danger from the mass of the working population.

Marshal Foch says mainly in regard to their feeding.

M Clemenceau alludes to Marshal Foch’s request for 8 days’ warning. This might be difficult for the Governments to give. He asks if Marshal Foch could reduce it, so that if the Governments see the storm coming they could give an order which would be followed by action in less than 8 days.

Marshal Foch says that this was practicable by stopping leave in the Armies.

Mr Lloyd George points out that if leave is stopped and the men come back, the Germans will at once know it.

M Clemenceau says that this would not be a bad thing.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that it might be done in such a way that Cologne and Mainz should see what was happening.

Marshal Foch says that he has prepared a series of measures with the object of impressing the German people. Next week, for example, he proposes to go to the Rhineland and inspect the troops.

General Weygand said that the great difficulty is that, if the Germans are given warning, they will denude the railways both of material and personnel, which will make the advance very difficult. Consequently, under Marshal Foch’s directions, he has prepared a surprise operation with motor cars and cavalry, in order to leap forward at a moment’s notice and seize certain junctions and important places. This could be done in a few hours.

Marshal Foch say that he contemplates a surprise operation of great range, which involves very few troops and which will produce a surprise and considerable effect. He is now studying the execution of this measure, but it involves having 2 or 3 divisions in each army ready to march at a moment’s notice and this can only be done by cancelling leave.

M Clemenceau asks when the plan could be ready.

General Weygand said it can be ready tomorrow.

M Clemenceau says there is no need for it for 10 or 12 days but it ought to be got ready.

Marshal Foch says he can stop leave in, say, 2 divisions of each army, which will be enough to carry out this part of his plan.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that it might be an advantage to have some demonstration at an early stage. The Germans are now making up their minds. Possibly they think that the Allied and Associated Powers would not march.

M Clemenceau says that this is exactly what the Germans are saying. They believe the French Army incapable of marching and that the United States Army is going home.

Mr Lloyd George says that it might be too late 10 days hence and he thinks some action ought to be taken now to show that the Allied and Associated Powers have made their minds up. He would like a demonstration made within a day or two. The most impressive form of demonstration would be to bring the cavalry to the front.

Marshal Foch says that his cavalry are too few for a great demonstration, but he proposes himself to make an immediate visit to the Commanders-in-Chief of the various armies in such a way that while apparently secret, it will be known to everyone and all Germany will be puzzling to know what he was up to.

President Wilson suggests a secret journey with careful leakage.

Marshal Foch says that this was what he intends.

Mr Lloyd George asks what he proposes to do about cancelling leave.

Marshal Foch says that during his trip he proposes to ask each Commander-in-Chief to stop leave in 2 divisions of his army and to get these divisions ready to march. In reply to Mr Lloyd George, he says that he can start any day next week.

M Clemenceau says the sooner the better.

President Wilson agrees in this.

M Clemenceau says he has received two documents, one of which states that Scheidemann and Ebert will sign and the other that they will not sign.

Mr Lloyd George says that the demonstration should be immediate, in order that Germany might know that we meant business. Monday will be too late. The Germans are making up their minds and it is important to influence them before they settle down in an attitude of refusal.

Marshal Foch points out that nothing can happen before the 22nd, when the Germans might refuse the peace terms, so that if he commences his visit on the 12th that will be soon enough. He will be back by the 18th.

M Clemenceau says that he is already receiving papers from the Germans. He suggests that Marshal Foch should support his tour by troop movements.

Marshal Foch agreed, and adds also movements of munitions.

Mr Lloyd George points out that it will take some time for the Germans to know that Marshal Foch is there The German mind is not a quick one. Consequently, Monday is, in his view, too late for Marshal Foch’s start.

M Clemenceau agrees with Mr Lloyd George that it is important to press the Germans as soon as possible.

President Wilson and S Orlando also agree.

Marshal Foch undertakes to leave at the earliest possible moment.

(Marshal Foch, accompanied by General Weygand, withdraws.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, 10 May, 1919.

Sailor Steve

05-10-19, 05:14 PM

Saturday, May 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:45

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. S Orlando says that he accepts the draft which had been submitted by Sir Maurice Hankey on the previous afternoon on the subject of the recognition of the various States formed out of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and contiguous States.

2. M Clemenceau says that Mr Venizelos has asked that the Allied Powers should evacuate Corfu.

S Orlando, Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson agree.

(It is agreed that the Allied forces should withdraw from Corfu.)

3. S Orlando reminds President Wilson of a request he made to him on the previous day that he should prepare a text of a reference to the Committee dealing with Reparation in regard to Austria and Hungary.

President Wilson says that he has not had time up to the present, but that he will take it in hand as soon as possible.

4. Sir Maurice Hankey hand S Orlando a revised draft of Article 430 of the Treaty of Peace presented to the German Delegates, which had been prepared by the Drafting Committee, as well as an English translation of the Drafting Committee’s Note.

(The following text submitted by the Drafting Committee is approved:

“In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under Part VIII (Reparation) of the present Treaty the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Associated Forces.”)

M Clemenceau undertakes to transmit this to the Germans through Colonel Henri, to be substituted for the original Article.

5. M Clemenceau hands round a communication he has received from the German Delegation, making some preliminary comments on the Treaty of Peace.

President Wilson suggests the following reply:

“In reply to the general objections which the German plenipotentiaries present to the provisions of the Treaty, it is only necessary to remind the German plenipotentiaries that we have formulated the terms of the Treaty with constant thought of the principles upon which the armistice and the negotiations for peace were proposed. We can admit no discussion of our right to insist upon the terms of the peace substantially as stated. We can consider only such practical suggestions as the German plenipotentiaries may have to present.”

(Further consideration of the matter is postponed until the afternoon Meeting.)

6. M Clemenceau reads the following note from the Japanese Delegation:

“The Japanese delegation presents its most respectful compliments to His Excellency, Monsieur Georges Clemenceau, President of the Conference of Peace, and has the honor of expressing to him its desire of being represented on the committees which are going to be set up to examine the observations which the German plenipotentiaries may have to make concerning the conditions of peace.”

(It is agreed that the Japanese request should be granted.)

7. Sir Maurice Hankey reports that the Secretary of the Japanese Delegation, Mr Saburi, had called on him that morning and had presented a verbal request from Baron Makino that a representative of the Japanese Delegation should be invited to attend the meeting of the Supreme Council when any question relating to the disposal of German warships or submarines was under consideration.

(It is agreed that this request should be granted.)

8. President Wilson says that Mr Lansing knows the Austrian Delegate, Professor Lammasch, very intimately, and knows him to be a very reliable man. Professor Lammasch is not well, and has asked that his wife and daughter might be allowed to accompany him to St. Germain.

M Clemenceau says he had already received a similar request, and had taken on himself to grant it. He says that the Austrian Delegates are expected on Wednesday.

9. Mr Lloyd George hands S Orlando a copy of the document signed by M Clemenceau, President Wilson and himself, in regard to the proportions in which receipts from Germany should be divided between the Allied and Associated Governments in accordance with Article 7 of the Reparation chapter of the draft Treaty with Germany. S Orlando undertakes to give it his careful consideration.

Sailor Steve

05-10-19, 07:38 PM

Saturday, May 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 12:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

(Mr Tchaykowsky is introduced.)

1. Mr Tchaykowsky says that he has spent 28 years of his life in England and 4 years in the United States of America, so that half his life has been spent in English speaking countries.

President Wilson says that the Council is very anxious to have his views as to the best policy to be pursued towards Russia. All those present are friends of Russia and anxious to help her, and would be glad of any suggestions Mr Tchaykowsky might have to offer.

Mr Tchaykowsky remarks that this is a large order.

President Wilson says that perhaps it would guide Mr Tchaykowsky if he was to state the difficulties. The principal feature in the situation is the growing strength of Kolchak and his rapid advance westward, which might presently enable him to get in touch with forces to the north and perhaps those to the south. He and his colleagues, however, are not entirely satisfied that the leadership of Kolchak is calculated to preserve what ought to be preserved of the new order of things in Russia. They have some fear that it will result in a policy of reaction and military power.

Mr Tchaykowsky says that he has already had the pleasure of presenting assurances on this point, both from Kolchak and from Denekin. Yesterday, a further definition of his policy was received from Denekin, who made his suggestion at the instigation of the various Attachés. This had appeared in the newspapers. He then handed in the original which had been received on May 8th.

M Clemenceau says that he had not seen this before.

Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson are in the same position.

Mr Tchaykowsky said that it was a despatch from Mr Neratoff to Mr Sazonoff, dated the 5th May, 1919, and had emanated from Constantinople.

(The document is then read by President Wilson.)

"On the initiative of the Allied and Associated Governments, the Commander-in-Chief (General Denekin) has communicated to the Head of the United States’ Mission, as well as to the Heads of the other Missions, the following decisions suggested by the said representatives, and he asked them to bring to the notice of their respective Governments the aims pursued by the Commander-in-Chief in South Russia in his struggle against the Soviet. His program was as follows:

1) The suppression of Bolshevist anarchy and the restoration of order in Russia.

2) The reconstruction of the Russian Army and of a united Russia.

3) Convocation of the Russian National Assembly, elected on universal suffrage.

4) Decentralization of administration. Local autonomy subject to a Central Government.

5) Religious liberty.

6) Land Reform.

7) Labor legislation, protecting the laboring classes against oppression either by the Government or by capitalists."

This bore the signature of the Commander-in-Chief and had been published locally.

This, continues Mr Tchaykowsky, is the fullest declaration that had yet been made. He explains that Mr Sazonoff is the head of General Denekin’s foreign department, but, during his absence in Paris, Mr Neratoff is acting for him.

President Wilson suggests that probably the military representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers had only suggested that the program should be communicated to Paris.

M Tchaykowsky says that this is Denekin’s program. Kolchak’s declarations are clear enough as to his aims.

President Wilson says that Kolchak’s proclamation had been in very general terms, particularly in regard to land reform. He did not obtain a distinct impression from it.

Mr Tchaykowsky says that in Siberia the land question is not nearly so acute as it is in European Russia. In the first place, the population is thin and there is plenty of land. In the second place, communal management of the land is in force. Hence, the land question is not so vital nor so epoch-making there as in European Russia. In the Northern regions also, there is the land problem. All they can do at present, until a Constituent Assembly has settled the fundamental principles, is to satisfy themselves that land temporarily taken should not be returned unless the interests of the State demand it. For example, in Archangel, there is a very important cattle breeding ground on which a considerable part of the population is dependent for its living. To deprive them of their forage and hay would be very detrimental to the public interest. In case of the appropriation of such land, the State would step in and see that the public interest did not suffer. The same applied to timber. There was an old law by which any peasant could obtain from the Government a plot of forest land for gradual cutting. In 40 years, this land became communal. Some peasants had spent a good deal of money and labor on such land and during the revolution both would be lost if the plot be seized. Here again, the State had to protect the rights of the worker who contracted with the State. The policy they pursued generally was to allow the occupied land to be kept until a Constituent Assembly finally decided the principles. The provisional government is the guardian of the common interest. It allows renting of land but does not allow its sale, since purchase is the foundation of ownership. It is quite clear to him that Kolchak is acting on the same principle and leaving the final dispositions to a Constituent Assembly.

Mr Lloyd George suggested that two things are essential. First, the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, which should be a bona fide Assembly and not gerrymandered. The suffrage should not be twisted about to suit particular interests, as had been the case in Germany, where the suffrage had been divided into three classes. The first thing, therefore, is to see that the Assembly was on a bona fide basis, and then the land question can be safely entrusted to it. The second essential is to define the attitude of the Central Government towards the small States, such as Finland, Estonia, Estland, Livonia, Lithuania, etc.

Mr Tchaykowsky says that in regard to Mr Lloyd George’s first point, he understands that the doubts and apprehensions that are felt arise from the fear of a military dictatorship menacing the functions of the Constituent Assembly. Once it has spread over political matters, military power might refuse to sign away its authority. There might be arguments at work. This, he understands to be the foundation of the doubts that were felt. As for Kolchak, in a speech to the Zemstvos, he had promised to resign his position immediately there was a chance of getting a Constituent Assembly. No one could ask more of him than that. Siberia, he points out, is more democratic than other parts of Russia. There has been no class of nobles or of large landowners, although there had been a few millionaires, but they do not now exercise former authority. There is only a small middle class and the bulk of the population consists of peasant proprietors. There is practically no reactionary class. The only reactionaries in Siberia are the military element and had only come temporarily. It is on this population that Kolchak is dependent in his government and for his military success. This was why Kolchak, although a dictator, both in a military and political sense, is constantly announcing democratic measures. This, indeed, is essential to his position. Denekin’s position is quite different. In his part of Russia, there are large numbers of landowners, from which class his military officers were largely drawn. This makes General Denekin’s declaration all the more significant. In reply to President Wilson, he says that Kolchak is much stronger than Denekin, who has largely exhausted his recruiting resources and can only be strengthened from outside. Kolchak, on the other hand, is entering a populous district and region from which he will be able to draw his recruits.

Referring to Mr Lloyd George’s second point, Mr Tchaykowsky says that the question of the relations between the Central Government and the smaller States is a most delicate and unsatisfactory one in Russia. One result of the over-centralization of Czardom and the treatment of those States by the Bolshevist population has been that all the national groupings that have sprung up have been seized by a fashion of independence. But when they look at the question coolly and view their economic position, they are far from suggesting any such solution. Economically, these small States are weak and they must inevitably fall into dependence on someone else. The Lithuanians, for example, he understands, have already received large sums from the Germans. The same would apply to Estonia and Latvia. He had had several conversations with Estonian representatives in Paris and they admitted the truth of this. They at first said that since Germany had overrun Estonia, they must consider themselves free of any ties with Russia and start afresh. He had replied that he understood their standpoint but could not admit such a tabula rasa argument since Reval stood at the gate of the Finnish Gulf and since it had been built by Russian energy. Eventually, they had promised that, if when the day came for the final reckoning, Russia would treat them as equal to equal and not as obligatory members of the Russian State, they would be prepared to deal. They had sent a telegram in this sense to the head of their Government, but, owing to the serious situation there and the elections, the reply had been delayed. In reply to Mr Lloyd George, he said that Estonia had two representatives in Paris. He believes, also, that Lithuania has representatives. These representatives have no authority to decide questions, but can negotiate.

Mr Lloyd George asks if Kolchak had a representative in Paris.

Mr Tchaykowsky says that all four Russian delegates have been confirmed by Kolchak, but Prince Lvov had been particularly delegated from Siberia. Mr Sazonoff in a similar way represented General Denekin. The constitution of Denekin’s Government at the present time is rather complicated. He himself has written several letters to members of Denekin’s Council, and had tried to persuade them to adopt the following principles:

i) To devote the energy of the Commander-in-Chief, principally to meeting the enemy;

ii) To organize the right system of power, the essential element of which is a clear demarcation between their military and their political functions.
The full power belongs to the Commander-in-Chief, but he ought to use all his energies for military operations, and not to interfere in policy nor to allow his subordinates to do so. The political Government, however, ought to have a military department to deal with such matters as the recruiting training and supply of the Army. He knows this well, because they have had great difficulties in Archangel region in this respect. Now, however, their system is functioning perfectly.

Mr Lloyd George reads the following quotation from a Memorandum from the Foreign Office, dated May 1st, 1919:

“The most recent telegrams refer to the fact that over 90% of the burgher population and 80% of Russian peasants are co-operators loosely associated with the right wing of the Socialist Revolutionary party, who greatly resent the indifference to public support shown by Kolchak’s Government, and more particularly condemn the Rinov policy of attack on all representative institutions, which is doing the greatest harm”.

He asks who Rinov is.

Mr Tchaykowsky says Rinov is not a Minister, and he does not know who he is. It is very difficult to judge of matters of this kind from a distance of thousands of miles.

Mr Lloyd George then continues to read:

“They are, however, represented as in no way objecting to recognition of Kolchak’s Government by us, as long as it is conditional on his taking a broader public basis.”

Mr Tchaykowsky says that he is a cooperator himself, and is indeed president of several Cooperative organizations. As far as he knew, however, the above information is contrary to the facts. He has personal friends in Siberia, who are high up in the Cooperative movement, and these are supporting Kolchak actually from the head offices of the Co-operative Societies. They would not dare do this if Kolchak were unpopular, as the Co-operative Societies are democratic in their organisation.

Mr Lloyd George again quotes from the same document:

“Kolchak’s recent brilliant successes on his front are neutralized to a certain extent by the growing unrest in his rear.”

Mr Tchaykowsky says he has a question to ask. Did this information come direct from Siberia, and, if so, what was the date of the report?

Mr Lloyd George reads the following note by Lord Curzon explaining the position of the memorandum from which he had quoted:

“As on many previous occasions I circulate this note by an able writer in the Foreign Office, not as committing the Foreign Office or the Secretary of State, but as representing the views of an expert authority.”

Mr Tchaykowsky says that this kind of report is often heard. Some facts took place, and were then exaggerated. For example, Kolchak himself is treated as the man who had carried out the coup d’etat. This is not correct. Others had carried out the coup d’etat, and had then forced the position of dictator on Kolchak by urging that if he would not accept it, his country would go to pieces. Kolchak had not pushed himself into it. In reply to Mr Lloyd George, he says that Kolchak is an Admiral who had during the war commanded with distinction at Sevastopol. He does not know exactly from what class he is drawn. Most of his Ministers are former Socialists.

President Wilson asks whether the people who carried out the coup d’etat are now Kolchak’s guides and counselors.

Mr Tchaykowsky says they are, and he mentions as an instance one of the Ministers who had been a well-known Social Revolutionary. His own position, he says, is very delicate in this matter. He stands between the two parties, and he does not want to be in the position of an arbitrator saying which was right and which was wrong. He stood only for the State, and his own position is midway between the parties.

Mr Lloyd George says that as President Wilson had explained, the Allied and Associated Powers do not want to associate themselves in the establishment of a militarist régime in Russia. He asks if Mr Tchaykowsky has any information about General Yudenich.

Mr Tchaykowsky says he had been a very successful General in the Army of the Caucasus. He is a man who can be thoroughly trusted in military matters, and he is a man who is not prepared to be guided by reactionaries, of whom there are some in Finland.

Mr Lloyd George asked whether, if General Yudenich were given the means to take Petrograd, he can be trusted to maintain the democracy there.

Mr Tchaykowsky thinks he can, and says that in any case he and his friends would look after that.

S Orlando asks whether Mr Tchaykowsky has considered the constitution in Russia of a Federated State comparable to the United States of America. Was this possible, he asked, in this vast country?

M Tchaykowsky says that absolutism in Russia has proved itself impossible. It means an absolute faith in the Head of the State, as though he were a god on earth. This had died out. No one ever speaks of it now. It is essential, however, to eradicate the most anarchic feelings in Russia, and some think that this can only be done by having a Constitutional Monarchy.

Mr Lloyd George asks whom they would choose for the throne.

Mr Tchaykowsky says there is no candidate. It is a mere abstract proposition. He himself does not wish it. Whether this temporary event should take place or not, he is convinced that Russia will eventually become not only a Republic, but a Federated Republic. He had made a speech twelve years ago in Chicago, where he had said that in ten years Russia would become a Republic. This had come true.

(General Wilson enters at this point.)

General Wilson explains on a map the military situation.

(The following addition is kindly furnished by Mr Tchaykowsky with his corrections):

In the course of this conversation Mr Tchaykowsky says, in reply to Mr. Lloyd George’s question, that it is very essential for the Russian interest now that Petrograd should be taken by an anti-Bolshevik force.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that this could be done by a Finnish force.

M Tchaykowsky says that if the appearance of Finns in Petrograd be inevitable, then Russian forces should also be there; otherwise a very delicate and complicated situation would arise seeing that the Finns are now claiming Russian territories.

General Wilson here produces a map on which he points out the line showing the present extent of the Finnish claims. It includes not only the whole of Carelia but the whole Murman Coast and the Kola Peninsula, also cutting the White Sea from the Kerne Town to the Gorge of the Sea.

Other approaches to Petrograd being mentioned, Mr Tchaykowsky answers some detailed questions as to the number of Russian forces available among the Russian prisoners of war now in Germany and also among Russian troops in Estonia.

Sailor Steve

05-11-19, 02:04 AM

Saturday, May 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George's Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Three with General Bliss (United States), General Wilson and Captain Fuller (Great Britain), and Mr Venezelos of Greece

Mr Lloyd George suggests it would be best to begin by obtaining full information as to the present situation.

Captain Fuller says that the following warships are at present at Smyrna:

British: One light cruiser, two destroyers, two sloops. One light cruiser, one leader, four destroyers have been ordered to the Aegean.

French: One battleship, one cruiser. One battleship is due to arrive on May 18th.

Greek: One battleship, one cruiser, one destroyer.

Italian: One battleship, six small vessels.

Admiral Kakoulides in Kilkis is proceeding to Constantinople from the Black Sea to confer with Commander-in-Chief. Transports for from 12,000 to 14,000 men were assembling at Kavalla. They have left Athens, but their arrival at Kavalla has not yet been reported. More transports are being sent from Athens to convoy the material, but the date of their departure has not yet been reported.

Mr Venezelos says that 14,000 Greek troops are available at Kavalla. He hopes that the whole of the transports will arrive at Kavalla this evening. They will then commence to embark.

Captain Fuller says that their embarkation should occupy from 24 to 36 hours. He agrees with Mr. Lloyd George that the whole force should be embarked by Monday evening.

Mr Lloyd George asks how long the material will take to embark? There iss no time to lose.

General Bliss thinks that 48 hours will be enough for the embarkation of the material, if, as he understands, there are no horses.

Mr Venezelos suggests that if the matter is urgent the troops can be embarked and the transports can sail without waiting for the impedimenta. This is only a case of the occupation of a town and not of big military movements.

General Wilson thinks that sufficient transport can be requisitioned in Smyrna for the purpose of distributing the food.

Captain Fuller says that the forts are on the hills outside the town.

Mr Venezelos, in reply to President Wilson, says that not more than 24 hours will be required for the voyage from Kavalla to Smyrna.

Mr Lloyd George asks if, when the Turks are told that Smyrna will be occupied, they will be told that the forts were to be handed over? He believes that the French have a considerable landing party of blue-jackets or marines on board their ships. The Turks will probably raise less objection to the surrender of the forts to the French or the British than to the Greeks.

M Clemenceau says he does not mind whether it is the French or the British.

Mr Lloyd George says he does not either.

President Wilson asks if there is not a danger from the lack of unity of command?

Captain Fuller says that the whole of the transport and escort and landing operations will be under the supreme command of Admiral Calthorpe, who is the Allied Commander-in-Chief in that part of the Mediterranean.

M Clemenceau said that the Greek troops are under their own command.

Mr Lloyd George says that orders should be given for the forts to be handed over to the Greek troops when they had arrived.

President Wilson says he understands it has been agreed that both the Turks and Italians are to be informed just before the landing. The Allied representatives should be instructed to inform both by Monday night.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Italians ought to be told in Paris.

General Wilson suggests that Admiral Calthorpe should be instructed to inform the Turks that the forts are to be handed over under the terms of the armistice. They should be told that the forts are to be handed over to Allied troops, for, if they were not told they would have a legitimate right to resist.

General Bliss asks what objection there is to warning both the Turks and the Italians in time to ascertain their attitude? The chance of a conflict is much greater if they have no warning. Not to warn them is to invite disaster.

Mr Lloyd George says that there is no fear of resistance by the Italians. The danger is that the Italians will egg the Turks on to fight. He asks Mr Venezelos’ view.

Mr Venezelos says he disagrees with General Bliss. If the Italians are told beforehand they will tell the Turks. He advises that the Turks should be told only 12 hours before the landing. Admiral Calthorpe will direct the movements of the transports, and he will know at what moment to make the communication.

General Wilson suggests that the Italians will probably insist on joining in the landing as Allies.

General Bliss points out that the Italians cannot put many men ashore.

General Wilson points out they can bring up plenty of troops from Rhodes.

President Wilson says he foreshadows a difficulty if the British Admiral goes to Smyrna, having reached an understanding only with the Greek Commander. If the Italian Commander has no instructions to cooperate, an awkward situation will arise. The Italian Commander will have received no instructions to take orders from Admiral Calthorpe.

Captain Fuller points out that Admiral Calthorpe is Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. Before giving any order to the Italians he will, of course, have to consult the Italian commander.

President Wilson says that we do not want the Italians to land their troops.

General Wilson says it will be very awkward if the Italians have a battalion on the spot and want to land. Is our Admiral to be instructed to forbid it?

Captain Fuller points out that Admiral Calthorpe will very likely remain at Constantinople and delegate the command to the French Admiral.

Mr Lloyd George says in that case the French Admiral will have command over the Italians as well as the other allied forces.

President Wilson points out that, in that event, the Italians will ask why they are not to cooperate. They will also ask why the forts are to be handed to the Greeks.

General Bliss anticipates that, in the absence of any definite instructions, the Italian Admiral will say to himself that he does not want to lose the trick, and he will anticipate trouble with his own government if he does not take part in the landing. If, however, he knows beforehand, there will be no friction. Without instructions he feels sure the Italian Admiral will insist on participating in the landing.

President Wilson says that in his place he would certainly do so.

Mr Lloyd George remarks that if the Italians are informed on Monday their Admiral will know before Tuesday, and with the greatest expedition a landing could not take place before that day.

Mr Venezelos urges the importance of Admiral Calthorpe going specially to Smyrna as Commander-in-Chief of the Allies in the Aegean. The Commander of the Italian ships would then never think of opposing him unless he had instructions from his own government. He believes that if the Italians are notified only some hours beforehand all would go well, on condition that the French occupy the forts.

President Wilson agrees that Admiral Calthorpe’s personal authority will not be questionable, but if he deputes his authority to someone else, it is more doubtful.

Mr Lloyd George says that Admiral Calthorpe, in that case, ought to be told to go to Smyrna.

Captain Fuller undertakes to do this.

Mr Lloyd George recalls, however, that it is also important that Admiral Calthorpe should inform the Turks of what is taking place. Should he, he asked, do this by deputy?

Mr Venezelos says he has received a dispatch from the Greek representative at Constantinople, who have discussed the whole matter with Admiral Calthorpe, who has told him that he wants to go to Smyrna, but that this is difficult owing to the absence of Admiral Seymour in the Black Sea, which prevents him from leaving.

Captain Fuller says that it has not been possible to release the British ships from the Black Sea to go to Smyrna, consequently Admiral Seymour is detained. In reply to Mr Lloyd George he says that perhaps Admiral Seymour can be brought down to Constantinople, but it will take three days for him to come from the Crimea.

Mr Lloyd George considers there is a great deal to be said for Admiral Calthorpe being at Smyrna. He agrees with Mr Venezelos that in that case the Italians were much less likely to make difficulties.

Mr Venezelos and M Clemenceau agree.

General Wilson expresses doubts as to whether 12 hours is a long enough warning to the Turkish Government. They do not function very rapidly and the Commanders of the forts might not receive warning to hand over. In this case they will be justified in resisting. The difficulty might be got over by an order issued locally.

General Bliss is inclined to favor this.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether they will obey an order given locally under the armistice?

Mr Venezelos suggests that the Turks should be asked to surrender the forts to the Allied forces under the terms of the armistice 36 hours before the operation takes place. 24 hours later they should be informed that Allied troops were about to arrive.

Captain Fuller says that the landing party will be a French one. In reply to President Wilson he says he believes there are two forts.

General Wilson expresses doubts as to whether the size of the landing party is sufficient to deal with two forts.

Captain Fuller says there is little information about the forts.

(At this point there is considerable discussion about the forts.)

Captain Fuller reads a draft of the instructions which he understands he is to send to the Admiralty for transmission to Admiral Calthorpe.

(These instructions are slightly modified during the discussion.)

(President Wilson withdraws, and shortly after Admiral de Bon, who has been summoned by telephone, arrived.)

Professor Mantoux (the official Interpreter), at M Clemenceau’s request, explains the situation to Admiral de Bon.

M Clemenceau asks if the Turks can be warned without warning the Italians also?

Mr Lloyd George says that if the Italians were informed on Monday they will communicate it to the Turks.

Mr Venezelos suggested that the Turks ought to be informed in regard to the forts on Monday afternoon.

Admiral de Bon pointed out that Admiral Amet is at Constantinople.

Mr Lloyd George says that in this case it will be unnecessary to recall Admiral Seymour from the Crimea. He asked what is the strength of the French landing party available.

Admiral de Bon says it is from 300 to 400 men.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that this is enough unless the Turks intended to fight. If they should fight then a much larger number will not be sufficient.

General Wilson asks whether the Italians in Paris will be informed that no Italian troops are to be landed?

Mr Lloyd George says that this difficulty should be surmounted by telling Admiral Calthorpe that the landing party is to consist entirely of French forces so as to avoid mixing up nationalities.

The following is a summary of the decisions reached:

1) At the Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers on Monday afternoon the Italian representatives should be informed of the action to be taken, and should be asked to issue instructions to place their Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna under Admiral Calthorpe’s orders:

2) Captain Fuller should make a communication on the following points to the British Admiralty, in order that instructions might be given to Admiral Calthorpe:

a) That, in view of the presence of Italian ships at Smyrna, it is very desirable that Admiral Calthorpe should be at Smyrna just prior to and during the operations.

b) That it is presumed that the Greek troops will arrive at Smyrna not before Wednesday morning, May 14th.

c) That the Italian representatives will be informed on Monday afternoon, as stated above.

d) That Admiral Calthorpe should arrange with Admiral Amet at Constantinople to make the following communications to the Turks:

i) Thirty-six hours before the Greek troops are due to land at Smyrna, the Turks at Constantinople are to be informed that the forts at Smyrna are to be handed over to Allied detachments.

ii) Twelve hours before the Greek troops are due to land at Smyrna, the Turks at Constantinople should be informed that Allied troops will be landed at Smyrna in accordance with the armistice terms, and that these movements have been decided on in view of reported disorders in the neighborhood of Smyrna.

3) Admiral Calthorpe should also be informed that the forts will eventually be turned over to the Greek troops.

e) Admiral Calthorpe should be instructed to arrange that no men are to be landed from Italian ships, nor should any British parties be landed. The landing parties for taking over the forts should be entirely French, thus avoiding the mixing up of nationalities.

f) Admiral Calthorpe should, as soon as possible, report the date and time at which transports would leave Kavalla, and the date and time of their expected arrival at Smyrna, so that, if they are due at Smyrna later than Wednesday morning, the Supreme Council can adjust the time for informing the Italians in Paris to correspond.

(Note: A communication in the above sense has been sent to the Admiralty, London, and Admiral de Bon is instructing Admiral Amet to follow Admiral Calthorpe’s directions in this operation.)

Sailor Steve

05-11-19, 02:36 AM

Saturday, May 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. M Clemenceau hands round two notes on the Peace Terms which have been forwarded by the German Delegation.

President Wilson produces the draft replies which he has prepared.

It was agreed:

i) To approve the replies prepared by President Wilson;

ii) That both the Notes and the Replies should be published at once.)

2. M Clemenceau produces a report that has been sent to him by the Ministry of Marine, signed by Admiral Benson, Admiral de Bon, and Admiral Hope in regard to the measures to be taken to maintain order in Slesvig during the operation of the plebiscite. The Admirals have come to the conclusion that it is not their function to decide which nation should have the command of the Allied force. The report had been called for by a Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on April 30th.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that as the matter is not urgent, it should be postponed.

(This is agreed to.)

3. M Clemenceau produces a report containing the results of consideration given by the Council of Foreign Ministers to the boundaries of Austria and Hungary.

Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson ask that before the report is discussed, it might be circulated.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to reproduce and circulate the report.)

4. Mr Lloyd George asks what impression Mr Tchaykowsky had made.

President Wilson says that he had not been as definite as he himself would wish. He had received the impression that Kolchak’s advisers had inclined to the Right as soon as they had got power. This very often happenes.

Mr Lloyd George says he got the impression that Mr Tchaykowsky does not quite trust Denekin. He does evidently like Kolchak, though he himself had not got a very clear impression of Kolchak’s “entourage”. He does not think public opinion will allow us to abandon Kolchak even if he should establish a reactionary Government, because the world would say that the establishment of order was so important. It would be awkward to be placed in the position of supporting a Government that we do not believe in.

President Wilson says he thinks a fresh view ought to be obtained of Kolchak. He does not like being entirely dependent upon the views of British and French military men.

Mr Lloyd George points out that Colonel John Ward, who commands the Middlesex Battalion, is a Labour Member of Parliament.

(After some discussion President Wilson undertakes to ask an American gentleman named Mr Morris, who was at present at Tokyo, to proceed as rapidly as possible to Omsk in order to gather as much information as he could about Admiral Kolchak’s political intentions.

He undertakes to instruct him to consult Colonel Ward, and Colonel Johnson, Commanding the 5th Hants. Battalion, as to their view of the political situation.)

President Wilson says that Kolchak’s program is all right viewed in the background of M. Tchaykowsky's mind. What, however, does it look like, he asks, viewed in the background of Admiral Kolchak’s mind?

Mr Lloyd George says he feels sure that a soldier is bound to get to the top in Russia. Even if the Bolsheviks ultimately prevail, it would probably be by military action.

5. Sir Maurice Hankey again brings forward Lord Cunliffe’s letter asking for a decision as to whether new States such as Poland are to bear any portion of the costs of the war. He is informed that a decision on this point is essential before the experts on Reparation by Austria and Hungary could proceed with their inquiry, and he is also informed that this is the most backward part of the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties.

President Wilson says that his first and sentimental idea is that Poland ought to be let off altogether. Poland has been caught, as it were, in three nets - the Austrian, the German, and the Russian, and had in consequence suffered dreadfully. It seemed only common justice to leave her out from any share of costs of the war or reparation. The same does not apply to other parts of Austria-Hungary, but he does not know on what basis their share of reparation is to be reckoned. He asks whether they are to take a share of the national debt or only of reparation?

Mr Lloyd George says that their share of the national debt should be regarded as cancelled, as the Allied and Associated Powers are not concerned in this.

President Wilson suggests that reparation should be worked out on the same principles as for Germany, by categories of damage.

Mr Lloyd George says that if put in the same categories as for Germany, the Austrian reparation will become merely collateral to Germany, and to that extent they will relieve Germany of her debt.

President Wilson says that one of the elements in his mind is that in fairness to Italy, to make Austria collateral would increase the possibility of adequate reparation to Italy.

Mr Lloyd George said that Italy is in exactly the same position as Great Britain.

S Orlando agrees.

President Wilson says the difficulty is that there will not be enough to go round, and this is the argument for making Austria collateral.

Mr Lloyd George says that if Germany’s capacity to pay is adequate, all would agree that to make Austria collateral would be a relief. Even if Germany’s resources are inadequate, this would provide some relief. He suggests that the claim for Austria and Hungary ought to be on a different basis. It ought to be assumed that Austria could not pay the whole of the damages, and it would be better to lay down definitely how much Austria and Hungary were to pay.

President Wilson hopes that a moderate sum will be named.

M Clemenceau asks who is to estimate the amount.

President Wilson says theoretically this could be done, but he does not know whether the sources of information are sufficient to enable the sum to be estimated and allotted.

Mr Lloyd George says it will be very dangerous to impose an unknown liability on these new countries.

President Wilson asks whether the Reparation scheme for Germany could not be applied in some way; so as to make Austria’s share collateral but independent.

Mr Lloyd George proposes, without prejudicing the decision, that the experts should be asked to report as to how much the whole group of countries in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire could pay.

President Wilson suggests that the experts should be asked to report whether it would be feasible to form a conclusion as to how much the whole group; omitting Poland, could pay, and, in the event of this not being feasible, to add to the suggestion an outline of the proportion to be paid by each component part.

Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau agree.

M Orlando says that it is a very complex question, which will have to be referred to experts. For example, considering the case of war debts only, it will be very difficult to ascertain the precise situation of the several States formed out of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. It will be found that some had a war debt, and others had not, and the situation would be very confusing. The best plan is to put the matter in the hands of experts, who should be asked to take as the basis of their work that all the States except Poland should pay: on this basis the experts should estimate the capacity of the whole group to pay. Then they should examine the distribution of liabilities, as well as of means of payment. The Germans might have the right to complain if they did not know how much their former allies were to pay. This is an additional reason for dealing with the problem reasonably.

Mr Lloyd George says there is another reason. All the Allied Powers have incurred heavy debts for the emancipation of these races. They have been freed not by their own efforts, but by those of the Allies. Their only share in the war had been to fight against us. Without taking a final decision as to the case of Poland, he thinks the inquiry should be extended to Poland.

President Wilson says that Poland has been prostrated by the war almost as much as Belgium. He does not think that she ought to bear any part of the Austro-Hungarian war debt. He does not think that any of the new countries should bear a part of the Austro-Hungarian war debt, but only a part of reparation.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to draft a decision on this matter for consideration.)

6. Sir Maurice Hankey says he has been asked by the British representatives on the Committee which is preparing the Financial Clauses for the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties to obtain authority to consult the Czechoslovaks and other States concerned.

(It is agreed that the Committee considering the Financial Clauses should have authority to consult the Czechoslovaks or delegates of any other State represented at the Peace Conference.)

------------------------------------------------------

German Objections to Draft Conditions of Peace
Deutsche Friedensdelegation.
[May 9, 1919.]
German Note

The German Peace Delegation has finished the first perusal of the Peace Conditions which have been handed over to them. They have had to realize that on essential points the basis of the Peace of Right, agreed upon between the belligerents, has been abandoned. They were not prepared to find that the promise, explicitly given to the German People and the whole of mankind, is in this way to be rendered illusory.

The draft of the treaty contains demands which no nation could endure, moreover, our experts hold that many of them could not possibly be carried out.

The German Peace Delegation will substantiate these statements in detail and transmit to the Allied and Associated Governments their observations and their material continuously.

Brockdorff-Rantzau

Reply

The Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers have received the statement of objections of the German plenipotentiaries to the Draft Conditions of Peace.

In reply they wish to remind the German Delegation that they have formed the Terms of the Treaty with constant thought of the principles upon which the Armistice and the negotiations for peace were proposed. They can admit no discussion of their right to insist upon the Terms of the Peace substantially as drafted. They can consider only such practical suggestions as the German plenipotentiaries may have to submit.

10 May, 1919.

Sailor Steve

05-11-19, 03:16 AM

Saturday, May 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers

The Council has before it a Report from the Italian Delegation giving reasons why the frontier between Yugoslavia and Austria should follow a south south-easterly direction reaching the frontier granted to Italy by the Treaty of London in such a manner as to leave to Austria the upper part of the valley of the Save as far as Radmannsdorf.

1. M Pichon asks M Tardieu whether he has any additional explanations to make to the report.

M Tardieu said that the Report has been circulated and that it explains itself.

Baron Sonnino says that in his opinion the solution finally proposed by the Committee in Part II of the Report appears to him somewhat complicated. Italy, in the interest of the port of Trieste, wished that there should be uninterrupted communication between that port and German-Austria and Bohemia. For this purpose the Railway line should not pass through the territory of any third State which had no direct interest in the development of the line and possibly an adverse interest. Similar considerations had been given weight in dealing with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc. No doubt this might involve the delivery of a certain number of Slovenes to Austrian rule, but similar instances are not lacking elsewhere. For instance, the town of Marburg had been given to Yugoslavia though it contained from 18,000 to 20,000 Germans. He does not wish to delay peace with Austria, and for that purpose, he would, if necessary, agree to the solution proposed, but he pointed out that it is no real solution; it is only a postponement.

M Pichon says that it has the advantage of rendering an early signature of peace with Austria possible. The ultimate attribution of the territory could then be settled among the Allies.

Baron Sonnino says that the alternatives are to give the territory in question, namely: the triangle surrounding Klagenfurt, to Austria or to Yugoslavia. If it were to go to Austria, why not decide at once? Were it to go to Yugoslavia, either at once or later, the economic trouble to which he had alluded would inevitably ensue. There is a third possibility, to attribute it to Italy; but this is not desired by Italy, who wished to avoid the inclusion of non-Italian populations, except in cases of territories required for Italian safety.

Mr Balfour says that he does not wish to express any strong dogmatic views, but he wishes to suggest a few points. He feels some difficulty in meeting the views of the Italian Delegation, and in disregarding those of the French, British and American delegations. The Italian solution involves not only the separation of some Yugoslavs from the bulk of their nation, but their surrender to an enemy State. It is difficult to justify the handing over to an enemy the natural subjects of a State it was intended to create. Secondly, he understands that the frontier proposed by all but the Italian Delegation follows the crest of a high range of hills. This crest forms the natural frontier between Yugoslavia and Austria. The Italian proposal would bring the Austrians south of the range. This, on the face of it, is an extraordinary thing to do in dealing with a hostile State. The proposal appears to violate both ethnographical and geographical considerations. It is not a parallel case to that of the Brenner, the acquisition of which by Italy could be justified on geographical grounds, though open to criticism on ethnological grounds. In this case both ethnology and geography agreed, and both were to be violated. The only answer to these objections is that one of the two railway lines connecting Trieste and the north passes through this tongue of territory. It was assumed that if this tongue of territory belonged to Yugoslavia, it might be utilized to obstruct the trade of Trieste with the North. This is a serious argument, as undoubtedly all the Allies wished to promote the trade of Trieste. There was, however, one qualification to this, namely: that there is another railway line connecting Trieste with German-Austria. This line, it is true, was inferior to the more easterly line. Still it exists and is an element in the situation. A further qualification is that the Allied Powers in dealing with Poland had been faced by a similar, but yet more vital, railway problem. The arrangement with Germany makes it possible that the only main line of communication between the capital of Poland and the sea will be intercepted by German territory. This possibility had been contemplated, and in the event of its being realized, arrangements had been thought out to safeguard the traffic. The Polish case is obviously a stronger case than the one in question, as the most vital interests of the whole country are in jeopardy. It cannot be held that the railway line from Trieste to the North affects Italian interests to this extent. If, therefore, the provisions made for Poland are sufficient, similar provisions ought to be adequate for Trieste. Lastly, he wishes to draw attention to a very serious aspect of the delivery of this territory to Austria. It will give the Northern powers access to a region from which they could advantageously invade Yugoslavia. He does not think that Italy will readily grant such an advantage to any of her own enemies. The Council cannot, he thinks, decide this case against the Yugoslavs until this military problem has been studied. The remarks just made represent the reflections suggested by the report just put forward by M Tardieu. Before concluding he wishes to say that he sympathizes most cordially with the Italian wish to develop Trieste. All wish to see Trieste prosperous, and possessed of free access to all the countries north of it.

Mr Lansing inquires whether he is wrong in understanding that both of the railway roads are single tracks.

M Laroche says that both lines have a single track, but that tunnels have been made on the Eastern line (Trieste-Assling) for a double track.

Mr Lansing says that he has little to add to the very full consideration given to the subject by Baron Sonnino and Mr Balfour. As to the principles on which the solution ought to be based, he agreed with Mr Balfour. In the case of the Brenner Pass the Council had decided to give precedence to topographical over ethnographical considerations, and had given to Italy territory including a large number of Austrian-Germans. They are now asked to change their principles, and to decide against a natural boundary. It seems to him that a similar argument might be used in the case of Fiume. If this territory must not be Yugoslav, because the Yugoslavs might use it to interrupt communications with an Italian port, the Hinterland of Fiume, it might equally be argued, must not be Yugoslav because the railways feeding the port might similarly be interfered with.

Baron Sonnino says that he does not admit the cases are parallel. In this instance the railway is to pass through a band of territory about 20 kilometres broad. The Yugoslavs will not be interested in the railway at all, and if they possess this strip they might seize the opportunity of neglecting the line in order to favour traffic to another part. In the case of Fiume, however, the whole trade must come through territory which no one suggested should be withheld from Yugoslavia. The contest is really between two ports, and the natural flow of commerce to each should be kept as far as possible separate, and no entanglement between them should be allowed. This is the only way to secure the development of both.

As to the ethnological point, in Poland, some 300,000 Germans are to be made subjects of the new Polish State, and about 280,000 Hungarians are to be Romanian subjects, as the inevitable accompaniment of some hundreds of kilometres of railway.

Mr Lansing observes that the process of giving to friends rather than to enemies is being reversed. This territory was being taken from the Yugoslavs to be given to the Austrians.

Baron Sonnino observes that the Slovenes are not his friends in a greater degree than the Austrians.

Mr Lansing retorts that America regards them as friends.

Baron Sonnino says that the new States should be considered neither as friends nor foes. Should German Austria, for instance, join the Danubian Confederacy, the Austrians might come to be regarded as friends. Should they join the German Confederation, the Austrians would be counted among foes. The question is really one of permanent commercial relations. Further, if the question of friendship is raised, he claims a share for Italy.

Mr Balfour says that he heartily endorses the last sentence.

Mr Lansing agrees but points out that the question is an Austrian rather than an Italian problem.

Baron Sonnino says that it was an Italian question in as much as it concerned Trieste, Istria and the Adriatic.

Mr Lansing says that he is struck by the fact that if Austria were brought so far south, she might feel she had a claim to reach salt water.

Baron Sonnino observes that she would only be brought some 20 kilometres nearer the sea.

M. Pichon inquired whether any practical solution can be found.

Baron Sonnino says he is ready to accept the proposal made by the Committee at the end of the second section of the Report. He is ready to do this in a conciliatory spirit to avoid obstructing the signature of a Treaty with Austria. He would have, however, a small amendment to make. He would stipulate that the triangle, the ultimate fate of which is to be reserved, should not be made so wide as to include the western line from Trieste, and thereby to leave in suspense the whole of the railway communications between Trieste and the north. In other words, the triangle should not include the line from Trieste to Villach via Udine and Tarvis.

Mr. Lansing proposes that the formula suggested by the Committee be accepted with a proviso that the limit of the territory be to the east of Tarvis.

M Tardieu observes that the Committee has constantly kept in view the desirability of preserving uninterrupted communication between Trieste and Austria.

Mr Balfour says that he is ready to accept the view that it is the business of the Conference to see that direct and free railway communication be assured between Trieste, German-Austria, Bohemia and the north generally.

Baron Sonnino says that on this understanding he would agree to the draft of the Committee.

Mr Balfour says that his remark should not be interpreted as a pre-judgment on the question of territorial sovereignty. By direct and free communication, he does not mean necessarily to imply that railway lines are not to pass through ground belonging to a third State.

Baron Sonnino says that he accepts the proposal of the Committee on the understanding that due consideration is given to the necessity of preserving the railway communications of Trieste towards the north. He will make no concession in advance regarding the question of territory just mentioned by Mr Balfour.

Mr Lansing points out that the Report of the Committee proposes that the frontier line should pass north of the tunnel of Rosenbach. He thinks that it would be better to have the frontier line along the ridge over the tunnel.

(After some discussion it is agreed to omit the last clause of the first paragraph of the Committee’s recommendation in part II of the Report.)

M Pichon suggests that the Committee should formulate a proposal, after taking into consideration the above discussion, for reference to the Council of Heads of States, and that no further reference need be made to the Council of Foreign Ministers, should the Committee reach a unanimous decision.

(This is agreed to.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

05-11-19, 09:48 AM

11th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Successes by General Denikin in S. Russia.

German delegates protest against Terms officially.

Illustration by Louis Sabattier depicting Parisians demolishing the fortifications of Paris after the end of the war to make parks.
https://i.imgur.com/P7WVXu3.png

Ship Losses:

Lyubimets (Soviet Navy Red Movement) The gunboat was shelled and sunk on the Kama River by artillery. She was raised post-war and scrapped.

Sailor Steve

05-11-19, 11:24 AM

Sunday, May 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

05-12-19, 07:11 AM

12th May 1919

Aftermath of War

National Assembly meets in Berlin.

Australian troops marching in front of Buckingham Palace for a victory parade.
https://i.imgur.com/UDrLliv.jpg

Sailor Steve

05-12-19, 03:56 PM

Monday, May 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. M Clemenceau reads a letter he has from Brockdorff-Rantzau (Lead German Negotiator) on the subject of Labour Legislation, together with a draft reply.

Mr Lloyd George says that the reply is a matter of some importance and should be carefully studied. It would be a serious matter for France and for Great Britain if the Germans were to work 10 hours while we were limited by law to 8 hours.

President Wilson says that as an 8 hours man he doe not share this view. The United States’ experience had been that men could produce more in 8 hours than in 10.

Mr Lloyd George agrees generally, but says that in some forms of labor, for example, cotton, he does not think the principle applies. In regard to coal, for example, the British experience had been that the adoption of shorter hours had lessened output.

President Wilson agrees in regard to unskilled labor, but not in regard to cotton. He thinks the real argument is that it would be disadvantageous to the Allied and Associated Powers to have the sympathy of their working classes excited in favour of the German working classes, thus setting up a sympathetic connection between the two.

Mr Lloyd George suggests the question should be referred for a reply to the Labor Advisers of principal Allied and Associated Powers.

(It is agreed that the letter from the German Delegation should be referred to a Committee of Labour Experts which should include M Colliard, of the French Delegation, Mr Barnes of the British Delegation and Mr Robinson of the United States Delegation.)

S Orlando undertakes to nominate an Italian representative.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General.

2. M Clemenceau reads a letter he has received from the German Delegation on the subject of Prisoners of War, but the question of the reply is postponed until the afternoon.

3. Sir Maurice Hankey hands round the draft of a letter to Lord Cunliffe on these subjects.

(The letter is approved, signed by M Clemenceau and dispatched to Lord Cunliffe.)

4. S Orlando says he has a question of special interest to Italy to raise in connection with reparation by Austria and by Hungary, namely, the question of the tonnage in the Adriatic. In his view, the same distribution of the enemy tonnage cannot be applied in the Adriatic as in the case of the German tonnage. The reason of this is that in the Adriatic whether the ships serve Italian interests or Yugoslav interests, there is this common bond between them that if they are taken away from the Adriatic, it would deal a death blow to Italian ports and to Yugoslav ports. Hence, the portion of the Austrian-Hungarian tonnage in the Adriatic must not be dealt with on the same principles as the German tonnage. In reply to M Clemenceau, he states that these ships have been sequestrated by the Allies and used in the Mediterranean for the benefit of the Allies. The question now arises as to whom they should belong in the future. It will mean ruin to all the ports in the Adriatic if they are taken away from that sea.

M Clemenceau says he does not quite understand what is proposed.

Mr Lloyd George says that surely S Orlando does not suggest that Italy, while obtaining a share of the German ships, should also appropriate all the Austrian ships remaining in the Adriatic. If this is done, the Northern Powers being excluded from any share in the Austrian ships, while the Italians receive not only the whole of the Austrian ships but their share of German ships also, will not be fairly treated.

S Orlando says that the question of the Austrian ships will not make an addition to the Italian tonnage, since they have a special economic use which is quite distinct from the Italian mercantile developments. To say to Italy that the acquisition of these ships will compensate her losses is not fair because, in fact, Italy would be acquiring certain ports that had essential shipping needs of their own. These ships would have to be appropriated as they had been in the past for the services of these ports.

Mr Lloyd George says he does not mind if Italy would stand out of the German claim altogether and take her chance of recouping herself from the Austrian-Hungarian Mercantile Marine. Most of the fighting with Germany had been done by Great Britain and France but, nevertheless, it had been decided to give Italy a share of the shipping. If Italy is to have a share of the ships of the nation she had not fought and in addition to have all the merchant ships of the nation she had fought, he really cannot understand what logical basis is being acted on.

President Wilson says that what S Orlando is claiming iss that the Adriatic fleet should not be removed from that sea.

Mr Lloyd George says it would be equally fair and right to say that North sea ships were not to be removed from the North sea. The German ships plying in the North sea were just as essential there as the Austrian shipping was in the Adriatic. Nevertheless, the British Government had never thought of making such a demand.

S Orlando wishes to put the question in another aspect. He greatly regrets the effect of his proposal on Mr Lloyd George as he is firmly convinced of its justice. Italy is now to have Trieste which was a great commercial sea port. If, however, Trieste was to be handed to Italy but its mercantile fleet is to be taken away, Italy would receive a ruined city. It had been rightly decided that Alsace-Lorraine was not to contribute towards reparation. Alsace-Lorraine was not a maritime country but was a riverside country and in that case it had been decided that the river craft should not be included in the German craft ceded for reparation, but should be left to Alsace. All he asks is the application of the same principles to Trieste since without these ships Trieste would be a ruined city.

M Clemenceau points out that Great Britain had lost a very formidable tonnage.

S Orlando says Italy had also.

M Clemenceau says that the Italian losses were not comparable to the British.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that the British losses were larger in proportion even than the Italian.

M Clemenceau says he entirely agrees with the views expressed by Mr Lloyd George.

President Wilson asks what exactly S Orlando intended by the Trieste mercantile fleet.

S Orlando says the merchant ships registered at the port of Trieste.

Mr Lloyd George says he is not familiar with what had been decided about river craft on the Rhine, but he would point out that these cannot be used anywhere else, whereas the ships registered at Trieste could for the most part be used in any part of the world. If Italy gives notice of this proposal, he will object to Italy having any share of the German ships. During S Orlando’s absence it had been agreed to share the German ships equally. Now Italy says that she is quite prepared to share equally in the German ships, but must have also all the Austrian and Hungarian ships. He must enter a strong protest against this proposal.

S Orlando says he regrets that his ideas of justice do not correspond with those of Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau. He then reads the following extract from Annex III of the Reparation Clauses in the Treaty with Germany:

“The ships and boats mentioned in paragraph 1, including all ships and boats which

(a) fly, or may be entitled to fly, the German Flag; or

(b) are owned by any German national, Company or Corporation, or by any Company or Corporation belonging to a country other than an Allied or Associated country, and under the control or direction of German nationals; or

(c) which are now under construction
(i) in Germany;
(ii) in other than Allied or Associated countries for the account of any German national, Company or Corporation.”

All he asks is that the same basis should be applied to the Austro-Hungarian nationals, but it should not apply to any citizen of Trieste, since these were becoming Italians.

Mr Lloyd George says that what S Orlando meant was that, as in the German treaty only ships belonging to German nationals were being taken, the ships registered at Trieste must not be taken, since the inhabitants of Trieste became Italian citizens.

President Wilson points out that they will not be Italian citizens until the Treaty is signed.

Mr Lloyd George says he is quite unable to understand how this proposal can be made. Hundreds of thousands of tons of Allied shipping had been sunk in carrying wheat and coal and munitions to Italy, and yet the Allies are not to participate in the tonnage received from Austria. Under this scheme Trieste and Pola are to be ruled out, because they were to become Italian, and the only ships to be taken were those in Sebenico and Spalato and other Yugoslav ports. In fact, as the Yugoslavs had now become Serbs and were Allies, the principal Allied and Associated Powers would be ruled out altogether.

M Clemenceau agrees that if this principle is adopted they would never touch a penny.

Mr Lloyd George says he hopes it will never be necessary to tell this story in Parliament, in order to explain why Great Britain could get no part of the Adriatic Fleet.

S Orlando says that it would be impossible for Italy to deprive Trieste of her Fleet so that the result would be that the rest of Italy would get no reparation for the ships lost.

Mr Lloyd George says that the most dangerous voyage during the war had been that to Italy, and the British mercantile marine had lost very heavily in these narrow seas. He entirely disputes that Trieste would be ruined any more than any other port. If there is a chance of trade and business being done, ships of all flags will go there.

President Wilson points out that Austria by this treaty is likely to be deprived of all access to the sea, as are the Czechs and other parts of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. Consequently, by the application of S Orlando’s principle all the ships belonging to Czechs and Hungarians will be divested of their nationality.

S Orlando asks if he would be free, as Mr Lloyd George suggested, to abandon the Italian share of the German commercial fleet and accept instead the whole of the fleet registered at Trieste and Pola.

Mr Lloyd George says there are two principles of reparation.

(1) that Italy should put in a claim against the Germans for damage inflicted on her by Germany and another claim against the Austrians and Hungarians for damage inflicted by Austria and Hungary; or,

(2) to share in the total amount for reparation. Possibly there might be a third principle, namely, that Italy should look to Austria for the whole of her reparation, while Great Britain and France looked to Germany. He knew of no other principle except those three.

S Orlando says that the least he can ask is that Italy’s share of the ships should include the ships at Trieste.

President Wilson asks if he makes this demand whether the amounts were in the proper proportion or not.

S Orlando replies yes.

Mr Lloyd George says that S Orlando’s intention is, supposing Italy receives 100 ships, that these ships should be picked out from the Trieste ships. This is a question which might be discussed.

5. M Clemenceau says that there only remains the Greek affair, on which some explanation should be given. During the absence of the Italian delegates from Paris, the Greeks had asked us to agree to a disembarkation at Smyrna, which we conceded. As a consequence, a concentration of ships had taken place, he believed at Kavalla. There was no question of making a reparstition affecting Smyrna, but we desired that the Greeks should be able to land to protect their co-nationals from massacres; many such had lately taken place. We considered it convenient that British, French and Italian detachments should take part in the landing. So far as we know there were at Smyrna many Italian warships, 6 or 7.

S Orlando says there are only 2.

M Clemenceau says that we should not wish that the British, French and Italian disembarkation should be made in a different manner. France had there only a small force, and we should not like the Italians to land a much larger detachment. We could not do that without warning S Orlando in order to ask him to make appropriate dispositions.

S Orlando asks if it was a question of a Greek, French, British, and Italian landing.

M Clemenceau says that the Greeks would occupy Smyrna, but, he repeats, we did not pretend to give an indication of any repartition of territory.

Mr. Lloyd George says we proposed that the occupation should be a Greek occupation, to suppress massacres lately perpetrated against Greek subjects.

M Clemenceau repeats that the Greeks had asked permission to make this landing.

President Wilson, interrupting, says that the original suggestion had not come from the Greeks. The Council had suggested to the Greeks that they should land their troops to prevent massacres.

M Clemenceau says: Yes, that is right. In these circumstances, and in order to prevent a conflict, and to keep the best possible order, Admiral Calthorpe had been asked that he should go from Constantinople to Smyrna. According to his information, the Italians had already disembarked some time back some sailors at Smyrna, and then they had been withdrawn.

S Orlando says he had no information to this effect.

M Clemenceau said that what was intended was that simultaneously with the Greek occupation there should be a disembarkation of Italians, French and English, leaving the custody of the city to the Greeks.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Allied disembarkation was solely for the occupation of the forts, and that they would be replaced by Greeks, when they would embark again. It was natural that there should not be more commands in a single place. The command at Smyrna would be Greek.

(Turning to Colonel Hankey, he asks if Turkey had been warned.)

Sir Maurice Hankey says it had not.

Mr Lloyd George says that Sir George Riddell had received a letter from a British inhabitant of Smyrna, a thoroughly reliable man whom he himself knows quite well, giving a very bad account of Turkish atrocities on the Greeks, which included massacres and tortures.

S Orlando says he was not well up in this question, and would like to postpone his answer in the afternoon when he had talked it over with Baron Sonnino.

Mr Lloyd George says that according to his information, three Italian landings had taken place without any notice to their Allies, namely, at Makri, Marmaris, Budrum and at Scala Nuova. He asked if that was true and what was the reason for them.

M Clemenceau says that there was also a landing at Adalia.

Mr Lloyd George says we knew all about that.

S Orlando says it was on this question that he wished to consult Baron Sonnino, who knew all about the matter.

President Wilson asks that he would take particular note of the landings mentioned by Mr Lloyd George.

6. President Wilson asks Sir Maurice Hankey how matters stand as regards the preparation of the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties.

Sir Maurice Hankey replies that he had, in accordance with instructions, circulated the report of the Foreign Ministers on the subject of boundaries, and that this was ready consideration.

(It is agreed to meet on the same afternoon with the Foreign Ministers at the Quai d’Orsay and consider the boundaries of Austria and Hungary.)

Sailor Steve

05-12-19, 05:47 PM

Monday, May 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 15:30

Meeting of the Council of Four

(M Loucheur is introduced.)

1. M Loucheur draws attention to the revised edition of Article 430 of the German Treaty as approved by the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers on May 10th, which reads as follows:

“In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above, the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under Part VIII (Reparation) of the present Treaty, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Associated Forces.”

He points out that some portions of the Reparation Clauses ware scattered through the Treaty, and not included in Part VIII. He therefore asks for the omission of the words “under Part VIII”.

(It is agreed that the words “under Part VIII (Reparation) of the present Treaty” should be omitted, and that the following should be substituted:

“For reparation as provided in the present Treaty”. Article 430 of the Treaty should therefore read as follows:

'In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above, the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations for reparation as provided in the present Treaty, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Associated Forces.”')

2. Mr Lloyd George says that there was a demand from the British Parliament for the Treaty of Peace to be laid on the Table of the House. He had replied that he must consult his colleagues before he could possibly consent. Mr Bonar Law had given his view that as a summary had been published, the inference would be drawn if the Treaty was not published that the summary was inaccurate.

M Clemenceau says he had already refused to lay the Treaty, both to the Senate and the House of Representatives.

S Orlando said he did not like publication, as it made it so much more difficult to make changes.

Baron Sonnino agrees with this view.

President Wilson say that he could not lay the Treaty before the Senate until he returned to the United States.

(It is agreed that the text of the Treaty of Peace as handed to the Germans should not be laid before the legislatures of the Allied & Associated Powers.)

(M Loucheur withdraaws.)

3. President Wilson asks what was the decision of his Italian colleagues in regard to the questions put to them that morning.

S Orlando said he accepts in principle. He thinks it might be preferable to leave the troops of the Principal Powers on shore, and not to withdraw the British, French and Italian detachments, pending the final decision as to the disposal of Smyrna. That is the only alteration he asks for.

President Wilson says that the landing parties from the British and French ships will not exceed 200.

Mr Lloyd George says that the British detachment will not exceed 50.

Baron Sonnino says that their retention on shore would give the expedition an international character.

M Clemenceau asks who would have the command?

Mr Lloyd George says the Greeks.

President Wilson agrees that the command must be Greek, since Greece disposes of by far the largest force.

M Clemenceau thinks it unsuitable to place the troops of the Principal Allied Powers under Greek command. Nothing could be more to the point than the decision taken today that the landing was without prejudice to the ultimate disposal of Smyrna in the Treaty of Peace.

President Wilson thinks it undesirable to leave handfuls of men on shore.

Mr Lloyd George says that Sir George Riddell’s correspondent, to whom he had spoken in the morning, had himself seen Turkish troops firing at Greeks, and had seen two quite harmless people shot. There had been no rebellion or provocation.

President Wilson considers a continued joint occupation unwise.

S Orlando says he will not insist.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether the Turks will now be told?

President Wilson says they will be told 12 hours before the movement takes place.

Mr Lloyd George asks if the Greeks can leave at once?

President Wilson says he understands that they can. Cavalla is only 24 hours distant.

Baron Sonnino asks if the ships are already assembled.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is the case. The decision had been taken more than a week ago.

(It is agreed that the Greek force should start from Cavalla as soon as ready, and that an Italian detachment should take part in the landing of Allied forces. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate this decision to the British naval authorities for the information of Admiral Calthorpe, and to Mr Venizelos.)

Sailor Steve

05-12-19, 08:27 PM

Monday, May 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

1. M Clemenceau asks M Tardieu to explain the finding of the Committee on Yugoslav affairs.

M Tardieu gave an explanation of the finding of the Committee substantially identical to that given in I. C. 1821 and in I. C. 184.2

Mr Balfour asks whether any method of obtaining a plebiscite in the Klagenfurt Basin has been thought out.

M Tardieu replies that no methods have been suggested, as the Committee has not thought it necessary to propose any until the plebiscite had been accepted in principle.

M Clemenceau inquires whether the principle of the plebiscite was accepted.

President Wilson replies in the affirmative.

Mr Lloyd George also agrees.

Baron Sonnino expresses the view that if a plebiscite is resorted to in this area, there should be one in Marburg and in other doubtful corners along the proposed frontier.

Mr Balfour says that it is true there are other regions with mixed populations, but if the Conference is satisfied that it possesses sufficient knowledge to solve these problems without a referendum, he can see no reason why a plebiscite should not be resorted to in the isolated case of the Klagenfurt Basin if the Conference does not think itself sufficiently well-informed to decide its fate without one.

M Tardieu points out that the Commission has been unanimous not only regarding the rest of the frontier, but in recommending a plebiscite in this area.

President Wilson points out that the most urgent business before the meeting is to frame a clause for the Treaty. Some definite stipulation should be put down. He reads the draft prepared by the Committee on Romania and Yugoslavia:

“In the whole of the basin of Klagenfurt, as defined below, an Inter-Allied Commission will be charged by the five Allied and Associated Powers with the duty of ascertaining on the spot the wishes expressed by the inhabitants as to the attachment of their territory to that of the Yugoslav State.

If the conclusions of this Commission establish the formal desire of the population to be attached to the Yugoslav State, the five Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to give satisfaction to such desire”.

Mr Balfour agrees that all Austria need know is that the people in the area in question will be consulted.

S Orlando says that if he understands the clause aright, it meant that the fate of this territory is reserved until the conclusion of the labors of the Commission set up by it. On these terms he will accept the draft Article.

(The draft Article regarding the consultation of the population in the Klagenfurt Basin by an Inter-Allied Commission is accepted.)

M Tardieu then proceeds to explain the difficulty regarding the triangle south-east of Tarvis.

Baron Sonnino asks at what date the final attribution will be made. He expresses the opinion that the occasion of making a Treaty with Austria is the best moment for settling this.

Mr Balfour explains that the result obtained at the last meeting of the Foreign Ministers a compromise had been reached solely in order to obtain means of settling speedily with Austria. He agrees with Baron Sonnino that the final attribution of this territory must be made at some date. He suggests that if it is not settled immediately, it might be considered when the Conference came to decide on the boundaries of Yugoslavia.

M Clemenceau suggests that this course should be adopted.

Baron Sonnino adheres to the view that the matter should be settled immediately; not only is it an Italian interest, but it is also a first rate Austrian interest. It concerns the Austrians to know by what means they will communicate with the sea. The territory in question is a small mountainous wedge with a very small population. It is quite separate from the question of Fiume, and it could readily be decided in connection with the forthcoming Treaty with Austria.

President Wilson points out that two questions are involved. One is that of the ultimate sovereignty to be acknowledged by the population of the district. As this population was predominantly Yugoslav, the natural answer would be that the sovereignty should be Yugoslav. The second question is that of direct railway communication between Austria and Italy. In a similar instance the Conference had found no great difficulty in settling an almost identical problem. Arrangements had been made to ensure unimpeded transit between Eastern and Western Prussia.

Baron Sonnino points out that in order to give Czechoslovakia some 60 kilometres of railway, about 60,000 Magyars are to be subjected to Czechoslovak sovereignty. This had been done in order to ensure unimpeded railway communication between Czechoslovakia and Romania. Similarly, no less than 280,000 Magyars had been handed over to Romania, and in Poland, together with 100 kilometres of railway, some 100,000 Germans had been made Polish subjects.

(Considerable dissent is expressed from this statement. Such solutions might have been proposed by Committees, but have not yet been accepted by the Council.)

M Clemenceau says that the proposal which he asks the Council to accept or reject is that the limits of Austria should be fixed provisionally, and that the final attribution of the triangle in question be reserved until the frontiers of Yugoslavia are determined. This will be in accordance with the decision of the Foreign Secretaries of the previous Saturday.

(This is finally agreed to and the frontier of Austria as proposed by the Committee on Yugoslavia in the report is accepted.)

(The southern frontier of Hungary is also accepted.)

2. M Cambon makes a statement explaining the findings of the Committee on Czechoslovak affairs. He points out that the administrative boundary between Austria and Bohemia has been followed almost throughout. There are two small deviations. Firstly, at Gmund, the railway junction of which is to be left within Czechoslovakia. This junction is situated at some 4 kilometres from the town and is the junction of the two main lines serving Bohemia. The second deviation is near Feldsberg, at the join of the rivers Thaya and Morava. These two streams are the main arteries of Moravia and give access to the Danube. The line has therefore been drawn in such a way as to give the stream to Czechoslovakia, while the railway parallel with the stream which was necessary to Vienna is left within Austria.

M Clemenceau asks whether any objections are raised to the solution proposed by the Committee.

(No objections are raised, and the frontier proposed by the Committee is adopted.)

3. President Wilson points out that it will be necessary to specify the frontier between Austria and Hungary in the Treaty with the former. He reminds the Meeting that it had been decided to set up a Commission to investigate this matter in order to prepare the Conference for the raising of the question by either of the parties interested. He is informed that the Austrians will raise the question, and that the Allied and Associated Powers will be called upon to decide it. He reads the decision recorded in I. C. 182 Para. 1, D,4 and asked whether any nominations have been made.

(No nominations have been made.)

Baron Sonnino asks whether it would not be enough to require Austria to recognize the independence of Hungary, and Hungary that of Austria, without raising the frontier question at all.

President Wilson says that he is informed the Austrians will raise the question.

(After some discussion it is decided that Austria will be required to recognize the frontier of 1867 between Austria and Hungary, and that if any difficulty arises regarding this frontier, the Allied and Associated Powers might if necessary arbitrate.)

4. After a short statement by M Tardieu the frontiers of Hungary, as defined previously, are accepted.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

05-13-19, 12:17 PM

13th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Greek troops landed at Smyrna.

Estonian army moves on Petrograd.

Canadian troops in a camouflaged artillery position in Northern Russia, participating in the Allied intervention against the Communists.
https://i.imgur.com/K0UuUwN.png

German prisoners tasked with doing reconstruction work in the damaged town of Château-Thierry, France.
https://i.imgur.com/Yxa8xbK.jpg

The ruins of Rheims Cathedral in France.
https://i.imgur.com/9A2RCU9.jpg

Ship Losses:

Premier (United States) During a voyage from Grays Harbor, Washington, to Ugashik, Territory of Alaska, with ten crewmen and a cargo of 426 tons of lumber and salt on board, the 307.69-gross register ton, 141.7-foot (43.2 m) schooner was wrecked without loss of life at Cape Lutke on Unimak Island in the Aleutian Islands, about 18 nautical miles (33 km; 21 mi) east of Scotch Cap Light, during a snowstorm. The steamer Kvichak ( United States) rescued all on board, but Premier was pounded to pieces as the surf broke over her and became a total loss.

Sailor Steve

05-13-19, 11:37 PM

Tuesday, May 13, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Three

1. M Clemenceau says that three of the German Plenipotentiaries have left for Berlin, saying that they will not sign, but Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau, according to his information, said there was no way of avoiding it.

Mr Lloyd George draws attention to the speech by Scheidemann, reported in the French newspapers, from which, however, he says it is difficult to draw a conclusion as to whether he intended to sign or not.

2. President Wilson says that he has invited his experts to make a further study of the Italian claims. A proposal has been put before him, which he thinks will, at any rate, be acceptable to the Yugoslavs, and which is based on the idea of a plebiscite all down the Dalmatian Coast. He then produces some suggestions for the solution of Adriatic problems, which he understands emanated from the British Delegation. It so happens that their line, drawn quite independently, corresponds very closely to the line drawn by the United States experts. He then explains on a map the line proposed by the United States experts, the principal features of which (so far as can be gathered) are a departure from the Treaty of London in favour of the Italians in the region of the Sexten Valley; the proposal being to straighten the line and avoid a curve, thus closing up the only open valley through the Alps; the allocation of the railway junction of Villach to Austria, of Tarvis to the Italians, and of Assling to the Yugoslavs. The line continues thence along the crest of the mountains across the Istrian Peninsula, differing from the Italian claim; which takes in the southern slope of the mountains. The Treaty of London, President Wilson continues, had laid down that the line should be drawn along the point where the rivers flow eastward. As a matter of fact, they flow underground in this region, and the Italians drew the line at where the rivers emerged from underground. For this area between the line of the crest and the line of the outflow of the rivers, the United States experts proposed a plebiscite. In order to surmount the objection that the island of Cherso in Italian hands would strangle the Port of Fiume, the United States experts proposed that this island should be Yugoslav, but that a group of islands south of it, which they stated were ethnologically Italian, should go to the Italians. In the portion of Dalmatia claimed by Italy, they proposed that a plebiscite should be held on the understanding that any part should be Italian that declared in favour of Italy They proposed further, that a plebiscite should be held at Fiume, the population of Fiume being told that they would only assume Italian nationality after Italy had constructed an efficient port in Buccari, which is a good port a few miles to the southward of Fiume, rather enclosed by mountains.

Mr Lloyd George says that would settle the question of Fiume, as they would never create a rival port so close.

President Wilson, continuing, says there is some reason to believe that the capitalists who control shipping want to kill Fiume as a port. He does not see how the Italians could decline so favorable a plebiscite as one in which parts could elect to become Italian. His object is to find a formula by which a decision could be postponed and put into another process than the present Peace Conference.

M Clemenceau says he would like to find a formula also, but he is not sure of this plan. He thinks the Italians would agree to accept Zara and Sebenico without the islands, but the Yugoslavs want the islands above all.

President Wilson says that the decision from which he cannot depart is that the Conference has no right to hand over people to a sovereignty they do not wish. If, by hook or by crook the Italians obtain Fiume, how are the British and French then bound to give them Dalmatia?

Mr Lloyd George says that if the Italians obtain Fiume, the British and French are entitled definitely to say that they must give up Dalmatia.

President Wilson says the difficulty is that public opinion in Italy is far more inflamed about Fiume than about Dalmatia. He reads an interesting document, giving both the Yugoslav and the Italian version of the declaration made at Fiume in favor of annexation to Italy. From both accounts, it is clear that it is not general popular demand, but merely a declaration formed by a group of private persons, who, according to the Italian account, did get some kind of a meeting to endorse it. His view is that if Fiume is allowed to become Italian after the creation by Italy of an efficient Croatian port at Buccari, the Treaty of London would no longer be binding.

Mr Lloyd George describes a conversation he had with the Aga Khan, the head of an Indian Mohammedan sect, a man of immense wealth and vast knowledge. In the course of the conversation, the Aga Khan had said that the mistake made in the Treaty of Peace with Germany was in the handing over of so many Germans to the Poles, whom they regarded as an inferior race. He had also said that he knew Fiume well, and that it was in all respects an Italian town.

President Wilson says he has been informed by an American officer, who is thoroughly sympathetic to the Italians, that if he were in the place of the Italian Government and secured Fiume, the first thing he would do would be to clear out the so-called Italians and replace them with real Italians. They were like citizens of other countries, who had long resided abroad and had lost the real qualities of their nationality.

Mr Lloyd George says he wishes to explain the conception he has formed of the Italian case, which he thinks has never been quite understood. Italy has a good deal of national pride. The feelings they have spring not merely from their treatment in regard to Fiume, but over the whole field of the Treaty of Peace. They are not being treated quite as a great first class power. In fact, not quite as equals of the other great Powers. They realize that there are a certain number of backward people to be taken in hand by more efficient nations. They know the question has arisen, for example, as to whether the United States could take in hand certain parts of Turkey, an onerous and difficult task. No one however, was asking Italy to undertake this burden. Consequently, their pride of race was hurt. They know that the Japanese are being allowed to accept a mandate in the Pacific, but no one was saying to Italy “will you not take this backward people in hand.” It would be much better to settle the question of Fiume in this sort of atmosphere. The principal Allied and Associated Powers are the real trustees of the League of Nations looking after the backward races, and for a long time they will remain the trustees of the League of Nations.

(President Wilson agrees.)

We were saying to Turkey “we cannot leave you to run alone any longer; you have got into a rut; and you will remain in it until some big country comes along and pulls you out.” Gaul and Britain would have remained in such a rut if Rome had not come along and pulled them out. Asia Minor is now in exactly the same situation. The question now arises as to whether Italy should not be asked to take charge. The Italians, he points out, are an extremely gifted race. It is curious in this war how they have developed some of the qualities for which the Romans had been famous. For example, they are amazingly good engineers and had created the most wonderful roads.

President Wilson agrees that it was marvelous how they have maintained the war in the mountains.

Mr Lloyd George, continuing, says that this shows what gifts the Italian people have. Italy is a very poor country. It contains no coal and no iron. Yet it had produced a vigorous and manly race.

M Clemenceau refers to the remarkable emigration from Italy to the two Americas.

Mr Lloyd George says he has been trying to give his colleagues a picture of what is in his mind. Why should we not say frankly to the Italians “we have not quite worked you into the picture yet.” He thinks that the Italians have been underrated. Consider, for example, the question of police. The Greeks had asked the British Government to organize the police forces for them in the towns, and he believed that they were right, because the British are very good police. In the mountains, however, the Greeks have not gone to the British Government, but to the Italians for police. In Asia Minor, the Italian police would be working under conditions similar to those that had once prevailed in Italy, which had been infested with bandits. He is not proposing that Italy should be offered a mandate for the whole of Anatolia, but why, he asks, should they not be invited to police, and develop a part of Anatolia, where they will find a country not dissimilar from their own. He understands that inland there are great patches of desert, but they contain lakes, and, as in Mesopotamia, there are possibilities of irrigation. He is told that before the war, Italian emigration had been as great as 800,000 to 900,000 a year. Why should these not be diverted to Turkey, which had not the population to develop Anatolia. He feels that the whole frame of mind of the Italian representatives would change if the questions could be discussed as a whole. There is Somaliland. He knows there are difficulties in regard to this. Directly the question was raised, the French said they could not live without Djibouti, and the British said much the same. Turning to M Clemenceau, he says that if France could not give up something here, neither could we. He thought, however, something might be done here. The British experts claim that there are coal and oil, but Great Britain had plenty of coal and oil elsewhere. Moreover, there is a difficulty about Aden, which is dependent on Somaliland for its supplies of fresh vegetables and food. To this he had replied, that the Italians would probably produce far more food than anyone else.

President Wilson agrees that Mr Lloyd George has stated the case on right principles. He would like, however, to set out the plan in parts. Considering first the part of Anatolia, which needs supervision, he would like Smyrna and the adjacent district, as proposed in the report of the Greek Commission, to be united to Greece, in complete sovereignty. The same would apply to the Dodecanese. In addition, he would like to give Greece a mandate for the remainder of the territory claimed by Mr Venizelos.

(Mr Lloyd George at this point leaves the room to fetch a map.)

President Wilson explains his proposals on the map.

Mr Lloyd George then makes a suggestion on the following lines. The United States should take a mandate for Armenia; France should take a mandate for Northern Anatolia; Italy for Southern Anatolia; and Greece should be dealt with as proposed by President Wilson. The United States, he earnestly hopes, would also take a mandate for Constantinople.

President Wilson says he cannot settle this question until he has returned to the United States and definitely ascertained whether the United States would accept a mandate. He reminds his colleagues that it has been represented to him that certain influential and important elements in Turkey are very anxious that Turkey should not be divided, but that it must be subjected to guidance. There should be a single mandate for the whole. The principle is the same as that which he has contended in the case of the Arabs, namely, that the mandate should not be divided. He feels there was much to be said for this proposal.

Mr Lloyd George says that he does not think this can be done in practice.

President Wilson says that his idea is that the southern parts of Anatolia should be economically developed, involving a question of administration. In northern Anatolia, however, the mandate should be limited to advice and guidance.

M Clemenceau says that to be frank it is not so easy to distinguish between a mandate for development and administration, and a mandate for mere guidance.

President Wilson thinks there is a great difference between guidance and administration.

Mr Lloyd George then turns to the map of Anatolia. He points out that there is no very convenient port in the Italian sphere, and he urges it would be necessary to give them part of Makri.

President Wilson says it will be easy to draw the line so as to leave Makri to the Italians. He again repeats that he thinks the Greeks ought to have a mandate outside the purely Greek zone. He feels that the whole district included in the western slope of the mountains should be treated as one geographical unit, and ought not to be divided.

Mr Lloyd George says he understands the Italians attach importance to including Scala Nuova.

Sir Maurice Hankey, in reply to a question by Mr Lloyd George, says he has visited Ephesus, which was a short distance inland from Scala Nuova, and has also anchored in the Bay of Scala Nuova in a battleship. His recollection of it is a flat, alluvial plain, where the sea has receded, low-lying, with slight undulations, surrounded by hills. There is a railway, as well as a road, running from Ephesus to Smyrna, but he can recall no road across the plain, which is only traversed by mules. The population is scanty, and so far as he can remember, the villages are miserable collections of hovels, inhabited by Turks, although the hotels and better class people are Greek.

President Wilson says that the Greeks have hitherto never been taken, as it were, into the family of nations. He thinks that if they are given what Mr Venizelos had claimed - which he states very frankly, and with great ability - he fee;s that a new spirit would be put into the Greek nation. He feels that under leaders such as Venizelos they might make a success. It is, he thinks, true of nations as of men, that when given a big job, they will rise to the occasion.

Mr Lloyd George points out that they are very good traders in all parts of the world.

President Wilson says it would add a good deal if some cession could be made to the Italians in Somaliland.

Mr Lloyd George says that he personally would like to add Cyprus to Greece, although there are considerable difficulties. He thinks that such an act would deprive the whole transaction of any atmosphere of “grab”.

President Wilson says it would be great thing if Mr Lloyd George could accomplish that.

Mr Lloyd George says that of course the Turks have a right to be in Turkey, but they have no right to make it a wilderness.

President Wilson says that people who know the Turks well say that the body of the population are really docile people. They are all right so long as they are not put in authority. Under the guidance of a friendly power they might prove a docile people.

M Clemenceau agrees, but says he is very anxious not to cheat anyone out of what belongs to him.

President Wilson says that his conception of a mandatory for Turkey is a guide, but a guide which must be obeyed. If advice is rejected, it might be necessary to exercise pressure. Normally, the position should be one of guiding.

M Clemenceau said that the United States will not have an easy task in Armenia.

President Wilson says he has at the present moment before him reports on affairs in Armenia of such an appalling nature that he finds it difficult to read them.

M Clemenceau says that the first thing to be done is to decide what is to be allotted to Italy.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether the Turks will stand the Italians as mandatories. The Italians, he thinks, are a more efficient executive race than the Greeks, and always have been in history. The Greeks have had more ideas, but the Romans had been the superior executive nation.

President Wilson says that he is rather anxious about putting a superior executive race as mandatory round the Greeks at Smyrna. The effect might be ruinous.

M Clemenceau says a decision ought to be taken about Scala Nuova.

Mr Lloyd George undertakes to make inquiries about the possibilities of creating a port at Makri. He asks M Clemenceau to make inquiries also. If no port can be constructed at Makri, it might be necessary to give the Italians Mersina. What the Italians want is Heraclea, where there are some coal mines. Italy has no coal and no fuel. He understands that the Italians will be satisfied if, as part of their reparation from Germany, they can receive the German shares in the mines of Heraclea and Zunguldak. He asked M Clemenceau to consider this.

M Clemenceau undertakes to do so.

President Wilson asks if Mr Lloyd George can draw up a complete picture of the settlement.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that this would be the best plan. If President Wilson will draw up a scheme for Dalmatia, he will draw up a scheme for Asia Minor.

President Wilson says his idea is that if the Italians should get Fiume under the plebiscite he had proposed that they should surrender all claims to Dalmatia and the islands, except one group of islands inhabited by Italians South of Cherso, and the island of Lissa. The getting of Fiume will depend upon the Italians consenting to restrict the boundary to the crest of the mountains on the Istrian Peninsula. He asks if his proposal for a Greek mandate over the territory in the hinterland of the Smyrna region to be assigned to the Greeks, is acceptable.

Mr Lloyd George says his only fear was that the Mohammedan population is a very fierce one, and he doubted if the Greeks can handle it.

M Clemenceau says that in Crete a very strange thing has happened. Although there can be seen in Crete any number of Greek villages which had been destroyed by the Turks, and of Turkish villages destroyed by the Greeks in the past, when he had visited Candia he had been received by a Turkish mayor who was on the best of terms with the Greeks, and the two populations seemed to live in accord.

(Mr H. Nicolson [Harold Nicolson, assistant to the British representative, Sir Byre Crowe, on the Commission on Greek and Albanian Affairs] is introduced.)

Mr Lloyd George tells Mr Nicolson he has been invited in to hear the general lines of the proposals that have been made, in order that he might draft a proposition in regard to them.

President Wilson explains that his proposal is to unite to Greece in full sovereignty Smyrna and the surrounding district, as proposed in the report of the Greek Commission (as subsequently modified by agreement between the British and American experts so as to exclude the valley of the Meander and the country South of it), and in addition to give Greece a mandate over the larger area claimed by Mr Venizelos. Mr Lloyd George, however, has suggested that in order to give the Italians a harbor, the line should be drawn so as to leave Makri to them. The Dodecanese should be united to Greece in full sovereignty. Italy should have a mandate for the remainder of the Southern part of Anatolia, for which the Council would be glad if Mr Nicolson could draw a line on an economic basis.

Mr Nicolson, referring to a line drawn on the map which Mr Lloyd George has produced, says that this had only been very hastily drawn, and he could no doubt find a more logical basis if given a little more time. This line had been drawn so as to exclude the Baghdad railway from the Italian zone.

Mr Lloyd George says there is no reason to exclude the railway, because in any event the railway will have to pass through the territory included in several mandates, and arrangements would have to be made for it to become an international line.

(Mr Nicolson withdraws.)

President Wilson says that the Italians have always asked for a comprehensive proposal. He hopes, therefore, that the result of the present meeting will be to produce one. It will be a great advantage if something could also be said about Somaliland. He proposes that M Clemenceau should see M Simon, and that the French should take the initiative in some proposal.

M Clemenceau undertakes to see M Simon on the subject.

Mr Lloyd George repeats the objections which the British Colonial experts have to the cession of Somaliland.

3. (It is agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to consider and make recommendations in regard to the territorial boundaries of Bulgaria. They should be authorized to consult the representatives in Paris of the various nations concerned in this settlement.)

4. M Clemenceau hands round a letter from Count Brockdorff-Rantzau on the subject of Prisoners of War, together with a draft reply.

5. (It is agreed that the Indian Delegation should be heard in regard to Constantinople at the end of the present week.)

Hearing of the Indian Delegation Mr Lloyd George undertakes to endeavor to find someone who can state the Mohammedan case in regard to Constantinople in addition to the statement by the Maharajah of Bikaner and Lord Sinha. He thinks possibly some Mohammedan expert might be attached to the Indian Delegation.

6. Sir Maurice Hankey hands to M Clemenceau a communication from the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference enclosing a copy of a letter addressed by M. Pachitch to M Clemenceau, requesting that two milliards of francs out of the 20 milliards required from Germany as an installment in respect of reparation for damage should be allotted to Serbia.

Mr Lloyd George points out that Serbia is acquiring very large new territories.

(It is agreed that the question should be referred in the first instance to the Committee considering the question of Reparation in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties.)

7. (It was agreed that on the following day the Council should meet the principal Members of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways, in order to discuss and Railways the clauses prepared by them for the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties.)

8. Mr Lloyd George asks whether the Turks are to be invited to Paris, or whether they should be met somewhere else.

President Wilson says that as only some of the Allied and Associated Powers had been at war with Turkey, it might be better to agree on terms and then send a Commission to meet the Turks. His own position in the matter is that as a member of the League of Nations, the United States will have to guarantee the arrangement.

Mr Lloyd George says that their position is a good deal more than that, since he hopes the United States will accept the Mandate.

(It is agreed that in view of the pressure of work on the Drafting Committee, the Treaty with Turkey should not be put in hand just yet.)

Jimbuna

05-14-19, 08:03 AM

14th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Austrian delegates arrive in Paris.

German protest-Note against economic terms received.

Nurse Cavell's body brought to England; and buried after services in London, etc., 15th.

Afghans falsely sue for peace.

German demonstrators passing Hotel Adlon where Allied Missions were staying during a demonstration against peace terms. Berlin, 14 May 1919. Note a banner carried by members of the German National Youth League (Deutschnationaler Jugendbund).
https://i.imgur.com/cwSIqQU.jpg

Dining Hall at Fulham Palace. Fulham Palace was formerly the principal residence of the Bishop of London. During WWl the palace formed part of Fulham military hospital. It is now a museum. Photo by Sister Mary Latchmore, one of the nurses at the hospital.
https://i.imgur.com/W5cTIZM.jpg

Henry J. Heinz, founder of the American food processing company Heinz, has passed away.
https://i.imgur.com/YTd93Hw.jpg

Jimbuna

05-15-19, 08:06 AM

15th May 1919

Aftermath of War

British enter Afghanistan.

General Kolchak's army falls back.

Germans protest in Berlin in front of the Reichstag against the harsh clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.
https://i.imgur.com/GThsXB9.png

Greek troops land in Smyrna (İzmir, Turkey) to begin occupation of parts of the Ottoman Empire:.
https://i.imgur.com/Kiq9pBd.jpg

Reinterred: British nurse Edith Cavell, whose body was brought back to Britain from Belgium where she was executed during the war.
https://i.imgur.com/eVBf7AX.jpg

Ship Losses:

Derband (Soviet Union) Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War: The schooner was sunk by gunfire by the auxiliary cruisers HMS Kruger and HMS Emile Nobel (both Royal Navy) in the Caspian Sea.
Useyn Abdad (Soviet Union) Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War: The schooner was sunk by gunfire by the auxiliary cruisers HMS Kruger and HMS Emile Nobel (both Royal Navy) in the Caspian Sea.

Jimbuna

05-16-19, 07:01 AM

16th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Mr. Asquith answers Lord French (re: supersession by Lord Kitchener).

British drive back Afghans.

Greek troops escorting Turkish prisoners in Smyrna. Looting by Greek troops and minor clashes occur as Greek forces land in Anatolia.
https://i.imgur.com/Xq0fs2M.jpg

British officers conferring decoration for bravery upon soldiers of the Polish Murmansk Battalion, 16 May 1919. Note a boy-soldier amongst decorated troops.
https://i.imgur.com/gz18Mxe.jpg

30,000 workers in Winnipeg, Canada go on strike to protest working conditions in one of the largest general strikes in the country’s history.
https://i.imgur.com/y0mLa94.jpg

Sailor Steve

05-16-19, 11:28 AM

Wednesday, May 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. The Council has before it a letter from the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways, notifying the amendments necessary in their text to render it suitable for inclusion in the Treaty with Austria.

S Crespi, as President of the Commission, reports that, as the Commission has drawn up one text envisaging the enemy countries as a whole, their present letter is solely confined to notifying the alterations necessary to apply that text to Austria. No questions of principle have arisen and no new proposals are put forward.

2. On behalf of the Italian Delegation, however, he desires to delete in Article 61a (now Article 42) the reference to Article 45 (now Article 26) relating to the regime of railway Railway Regime tariffs as regards traffic to Adriatic and Black Sea Ports. By including this paragraph in Article 61a it is subjected to the possibility of revision, or reciprocity, after five years; but as Italy already gave reciprocity, the Italian Delegation thinks that the matter can be settled immediately and finally.

S de Martino explains that the Clause (last paragraph of Article 45) has no political bearing and is irrespective of the fate of the Adriatic ports in question. Before the war there existed a regime of tariffs which favored Austrian and Hungarian ports on the Adriatic as compared with German, etc., ports. Now in place of Austria as the hinterland to those ports there will be a variety of States, and unless the pre-war arrangements as a whole are maintained there will be a state of anarchy as regards railway rates, etc., which Germany will doubtless be able to utilize for her benefit. It is to prevent this that the Italians have suggested the clause in question which would maintain a pre-war tariff system. It does not fix the rates of freight, but merely the existing railway arrangements as a whole. If this is to be revised after five years the results would be deplorable to the States owning the Adriatic ports. The clause is of benefit to the whole of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy; and as Italy formally declares that she is ready to give reciprocity in the matter she desires that the possibility of revision after five years should be avoided.

Mr Lloyd George understands that the intention of the Italian Delegate is to make the clause (last paragraph of Article 45) permanent.

President Wilson draws attention to Article 61 (now Article 41) under which the Council of the League of Nations can recommend the revision of any clauses relating to a permanent administrative regime. It does not, however, appear to him that this will affect the matter since a railway tariff regime can in all probability not be considered as a permanent administrative regime. He sees no danger to Italy for the possible reconsideration after five years.

Mr Lloyd George agrees. He thinks it will be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain pre-war rates for more than five years, even if they could be maintained as long. Railway wages had doubled and increases in other costs would of necessity involve increases of railway rates unless the railways were to become bankrupt.

S de Martino says that they do not want to fix the rates of railway tariffs but only to keep the system as a whole in being. It is a matter of proportion.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that in practice the establishment of proportion would be very difficult.

He says that the British Delegation on the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways has gone into the matter very carefully and that they would never have agreed to this if they had thought that it was going to be permanent.

Mr Hudson says the American Delegation on the Commission had similarly only accepted the Italian proposal on the understanding that there was a time-limit.

S Claveille is entirely in favor of the inclusion of Article 45 (now Article 26) in the Treaty. He points out that railway rates are of three kinds:

1) General tariffs.

2) Special tariffs.

3) Export tariffs.

The object of the Italian proposal is that the proportion which the second and third categories bore to the first should be maintained for the traffic in question, and he thinks this should be a fairly simple matter. He pointed out, however, that Article 61a (Article 42) does not mean that the clause will be revised after five years. It simply means that the clause would in any case remain in force for five years and that after that time it would be revised only if the Council of the League of Nations thinks fit. As Italy is ready to accept reciprocity he does not think they would risk losing anything by allowing the reference to remain.

S Orlando suggests that in the interests of the stability of trade the period should be extended from five to ten years.

President Wilson emphasizes that the clauses as they stand only provide for the possible revision by the League after five years. Inasmuch as Italy would be in the League of Nations he thinks their position is abundantly safeguarded.

In view of these explanations
S Orlando withdraws the Italian proposal.

3. Mr Lloyd George wishes to raise a question of principle. Austria and Hungary now become land-locked States without access to the sea. They had just been discussing provisions suggested by the Commission to protect Trieste, etc., against attempts on the part of Austria or Hungary artificially to divert traffic from them. He wants to know whether there is any protection at all for Austria and Hungary as regards their access to the sea being cut off by artificial means. They have a right to get to the sea and he would like to know whether that was safeguarded in the Commission’s suggested clauses.

S Claveille said that in the Commission’s clauses there is no such guarantee, but this will be given by the General Convention which the Commission had been instructed by the Supreme Council to prepare. Enemy States agreed beforehand in the Treaties to accept this Convention, so that the general rights thereby conferred would apply to Austria and Hungary. He agrees that such countries should not be cut off from the sea and thinks that access is not only in the interests of those countries but of the ports through which their commerce would be carried on.

S Orlando agrees that guarantees must be given to the countries concerned.

President Wilson understands that there is a possibility of the General Conventions not being pressed on with.

Mr Lloyd George agrees. The Conventions might take many months to draw up and even longer to come into force. The Peace Treaty is, however, to be signed very shortly, and the matter now under consideration is one which affects the very life of the countries. They must have access to the sea; and as matters stand at present they have no guarantee that if they have some trivial dispute with the surrounding countries those countries might not cut them off. To refer them to a General Convention in the present indefinite conditions was not a satisfactory solution. He proposes that a clause should be inserted in the Treaty and that the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways should be left to produce a suitable wording.

President Wilson agrees.

(This proposal is accepted, and the Supreme Council nominates the following as a Committee to prepare a suitable article:

United States of America: Dr Hudson.

British Empire: Sir H. Llewellyn Smith.

Italy: S Crespi.

France: M Claveille.

4. The Supreme Council accepted the articles for inclusion in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties as submitted by the Commission, it being understood that the alterations made by the Supreme Council in the Articles submitted for the Treaty with Germany should also be made in the Articles for the Treaties with Austria and Hungary so far as they are applicable.

5. The following resolution, embodying the results of the meeting were initialed or signed, as shown below, for communication to the Drafting Committee.

The Supreme Council of the Allies, at a meeting at 11.00 a.m. on Wednesday, May 14th, accepted the clauses regarding Ports, Waterways and Railways, recommended by the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways, for inclusion in the Austrian Treaty, subject to the retention in Article 61a (now Article 42) of the reference to Article 45 (now Article 26) and to the inclusion of a new article safeguarding the right of Austria (and eventually Hungary) of access to the Sea. The drafting of this new article was entrusted to a small Committee nominated at the Meeting.

It is also decided that the alterations made by the Supreme Council in the Articles submitted for the Treaty with Germany should also be made in the Articles for the Treaty with Austria, so far as they are applicable.

W. W.
D. Ll. G.
G. C.
Orlando

Sailor Steve

05-16-19, 11:30 AM

Wednesday, May 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:45

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. Lord Robert Cecil states that there are two subjects for consideration; viz.,

(a) A Public announcement indicating the present position of the Blockade of Germany and stating that it would be raised in the event of signature of the Peace Treaty,

(b) a plan of the measures to be taken in the event of it being decided to re-impose the blockade. In referring to this plan Lord Robert Cecil draws attention to the proposal in the last paragraph that the Governments of the neutral countries contiguous to Germany should now be invited to consent to prohibit trade with Germany if called upon to do so. This would make it possible to exercise a more immediate and more effective pressure on Germany, if such pressure should become necessary.

2. Statement with regard to the present position of the blockade.

Mr Lloyd George draws attention to the words in the first sentence of the statement “as soon as the German representatives have signed the Treaty of Peace.” He suggests that after the signature of the treaty the German assembly might repudiate it.

M Clemenceau asks whether it would be necessary to wait for the approval of the Treaty by the Allied Parliaments, before raising the blockade. It was agreed that this would be unnecessary.

President Wilson proposes that the words quoted above should be amended to read:

“as soon as Germany has formally accepted the Treaty of Peace.”

It is agreed that the Statement should be published, subject to this amendment.

3. Measures to be taken in the event of reimposition of the blockade.

President Wilson states that this is not the time to discuss whether we should or should not reimpose the blockade in the event of Germany refusing to sign the Peace Treaty. In his judgment the most suitable means of pressure would be some kind of military occupation rather than blockade measures which would tend to reduce her population to starvation and despair. To have our armies in an area thus starved would not be an edifying spectacle. Blockade would be more terrible than military occupation and presents many inhumane features; if it were reimposed it would presently become distasteful to the world The President expressed grave doubts whether the blockade should be reimposed unless no other course were open.

Mr Lloyd George is of opinion that in any case the application of the blockade would only be necessary for a fortnight or three weeks. An excuse is wanted in Germany for signing the Peace Treaty. The fear of the reimposition of the blockade would provide such an excuse. Haase, for example is afraid of the blockade. There is a pressure in Germany against signing the Treaty, which is a very painful Treaty to sign.

Mr Lloyd George expresses himself as all in favour of a military occupation as a demonstration but not as the only means of pressure. Some parts of Germany would not mind a military occupation. After only a fortnight of the reimposed blockade there would be a general cry to Scheidemann of “Sign, Sign”.

4. On the question of the declaration of a formal blockade.

Lord Robert Cecil draws attention to the statement of the British Admiralty as to objections to such a declaration; he understands that the Admiralty view is that the ships now in commission are insufficient for the maintenance of a strictly “effective” blockade.

President Wilson says that the United States has never admitted the legality of the existing form of blockade. The Admiralty caveat was thus a little unacceptable.

Lord Robert Cecil says that whether the blockade is absolutely effective or not does not matter, what mattered was the general stoppage of trade.

President Wilson adds that there is a difference between blockade breaking and blockade running. Under the conditions indicated by the Admiralty there might be cases of blockade running: but a definite breach of blockade, such as would render it legally ineffective, would require a naval force which Germany does not now possess.

It is agreed that if blockade measures have to be reimposed a formal blockade should be declared. No definite decision is arrived at as to whether blockade measures should or should not be taken in the event of Germany refusing to sign the Peace Treaty: but it is understood that such preparations would now be made as would render it possible to give effect to the blockade measures proposed, in the event of its being necessary to take such action.

In particular it is agreed that the representation to Neutral Governments referred to by Lord Robert Cecil should be made now.

5. Lord Robert Cecil refers to the possibility of exercising economic pressure on countries which were appealing to the Allies for assistance and supplies, and were at the same time fighting with their neighbors in defiance of the wishes of the Council.

He cites the case of Poland which is at present engaged in operations against the Ukraine. He refers also to the food supplies withheld by Serbia in the Banat.

He suggests that the Council might on occasion think it desirable to notify the Supreme Economic Council that economic pressure should be applied in such cases.

It is agreed that this should be done and that the Supreme Economic Council should be free to take such action as seemed to them desirable in such cases.

Sailor Steve

05-16-19, 11:31 AM

Wednesday, May 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 12:15

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. S Orlando says that two questions have been raised by the Drafting Committee in regard to the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties. One of these questions concerns responsibilities for the breaches of the laws of war. Naturally, the clause in the German Treaty applying to the Kaiser is not applicable to The Austrian and Hungarian Treaties, and there is no equivalent Article. Where, however, some alteration is required as in the case where subjects of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire had committed crimes and had subsequently assumed some fresh nationality, such as Czechoslovak, or one of the other nationalities. Provision should be made that such persons should not escape trial.

President Wilson points out that no provision inserted in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties could compel the Czechoslovak Government to surrender people accused of crimes.

Mr Lloyd George draws attention to a mistake in Article 227 of the German Treaty, where it was stated that the special tribunal “will be composed of four judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers; namely, United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan”. The number four should, apparently, be five.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to call the attention of the Secretary-General to the above mistake, in order that the Germans might be notified.

2. S Orlando says that there is a second point to which he wishes to draw attention, namely, the language of the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties. He had consented to the German Treaty being drafted in the English and French languages, to the exclusion of Italian. In view, however, of Italy’s special position towards Austria and Hungary, he asked that the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties might also be drafted in the Italian language.

M Clemenceau says he has no objection.

President Wilson says he has no objection, provided that the Italian representatives of the Drafting Committee are fully qualified to prepare the necessary drafts.

S Orlando said that they were amply qualified.

(It is agreed that the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties should be prepared in the Italian, as well as in the English and French languages.)

3. The Council has before it a letter from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau, dated May 10th, on the subject of German Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians, together with a draft reply.

Mr Lloyd George says that he has no objection to the substance of the draft reply, but thinks it might be couched in more sympathetic language, particularly in regard to the portion relating to the graves of the fallen.

M Clemenceau asks if Mr Lloyd George would prepare a revised draft.

Mr Lloyd George undertakes to do this.

4. The Council has before it a letter from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau, transmitting a draft International Agreement on Labor Law, prepared by the German Government, together with a draft reply prepared by the Committee to which the question has been referred.

Mr Lloyd George says it is worth considering whether it would not be desirable to admit the Germans to the Labour Organisation before they were admitted to the League of Nations.

(It is agreed that before the draft reply is approved, the Committee should be invited to express their views on this question.)

5. M Clemenceau reads the attached résumé of three German Notes which have arrived in the night of 13th/14th May, 1919.

(It is agreed that these notes should be referred to the appropriate Committees set up by the Peace Conference to consider such questions.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to place himself in communication with the Secretary-General on the subject.)

6. President Wilson reads the following letter which he has received from Mr Lansing, relating to two pamphlets received from the Chinese Delegation:

“The Mission has received from the Chinese Delegation direct and also through the Secretariat-General two pamphlets, one of which sets forth China’s claim submitting for abrogation by the Peace Conference the Treaties and Notes by and between China and Japan of May 25, 1915 and the other presents for readjustment by the Conference a number of important questions, among which may be mentioned ‘the withdrawal from China of Foreign Troops and Police, the withdrawal of Foreign Post Offices and the Abolition of Consular Jurisdiction’.

The first pamphlet deals with a question growing out of the war, and one affecting not only American rights but those of other associated Governments, but it seems unlikely that the Claim can have consideration by the Conference.

The second pamphlet has to do with questions not directly related to the war and questions therefore still more unlikely to be considered by the Conference.

But in view of the present feeling in China in consequence of the decision in the Kiaochow Question, I beg to suggest that the Council of Four send the Chinese Delegation a written statement pointing out that it will be impossible for the Peace Conference to consider these matters, whose importance is fully recognized, and suggesting that they be brought to the attention of the Council of the League of Nations as soon as that body is able to function.”

(Mr Lansing’s proposal is agreed to, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to draft a letter for the signature of the President of the Conference.)

7. Mr Lloyd George says that Mr Arthur Henderson, as Chairman of the Berne Labor Conference, had approached him and asked if the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would receive a deputation from the Conference in regard to the Peace Terms.

He had replied to him that as Chairman of the Labour Conference he had already received a summary of the Peace Terms; that these Peace Terms had now been delivered to the Germans; and that consequently no useful purpose would be served by the deputation. He asked if an official reply might now be sent in the same sense.

(This is agreed to, and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to draft a letter, either from the President or from the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference.)

8. President Wilson says that since the communication which he had been asked to send to Luxembourg through the medium of an American Officer, no action had been taken in regard to the future status of Luxembourg. He then reads a document, the gist of which was that the people of Luxembourg want the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to receive a delegation, and do not wish to hold a plebiscite until after that.

M Clemenceau says it would be impossible to refuse.

Mr Lloyd George agrees.

President Wilson says the communication had no doubt been addressed to him, rather than to the President of the Conference, because he had been the medium for transmitting the previous communication from the Supreme Council.

(It is agreed that President Wilson should reply that the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would be glad to receive a deputation from the people of Luxembourg.)

9. Mr Lloyd George says that he has received from the British Representatives in Siberia reports as to the risk of trouble between the United States forces in Siberia and the Russian troops. The view of the British Representatives, which of course he could not confirm, was that the Russian General Ivanoff had done his best to smooth matters, and that the trouble is largely due to General Graves.

President Wilson says that General Graves was a man of most unprovocative character, and wherever the fault might lie, he feels sure it is not with him. The British representatives were, he would not say partisans of, but at any rate friendly to, Kolchak.

Mr Lloyd George says they might fairly be termed partisans.

Sailor Steve

05-16-19, 11:50 AM

Wednesday, May 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers

1. M Pichon says that the Belgian Minister in Paris had come to see him, and had inquired whether the whole Belgian Delegation was to be present at the first meeting on the 19th May, when the revision of the Treaty was to be considered, or whether M Hymans should be present alone. The answer had been, subject to confirmation, that the only Belgian plenipotentiary whose presence was necessary was M Hymans, who might be accompanied by any technical advisers he might consider requisite.

The next question had been whether the Belgian and Dutch Delegations would be called upon to make a statement of their points of view at the beginning of the first meeting, and which of the two would be asked to speak first. The answer had been that Belgium should take the initiative of starting the discussion.

The third question had been whether the Commission, comprising at the first meeting the Foreign Ministers of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, would nominate a technical sub-commission to elucidate the question. M. Pichon had replied to this in the affirmative, subject to confirmation, as in the case of the other replies made, by the Council. As Baron Gaiffier wishes to have a firm answer by the 14th, M Pichon asks whether the Council approves of the replies he had given.

Mr Balfour says that in his view the matter is very largely a question of form, and that he is prepared to leave it entirely to M Pichon as Chairman of the Council.

(This is agreed to, and the replies above quoted are approved.)

2. M Pichon asks which Commissions had dealt with the frontiers of Bulgaria.

M Cambon says that the Commission on Greek Affairs had concluded its work on the common frontiers between Greece and Bulgaria.

M Laroche says that the Serbian Commission is also ready. The Romanian Committee had thought that it was not within its terms of reference to deal with the ancient frontier between Romania and Bulgaria.

M Pichon says that the question to be decided is whether or not representatives of the countries concerned, Greece, Serbia and Romania, should be heard in the Council before the frontiers were settled.

Baron Sonnino asks whether the results obtained by the Committees had been unanimous.

M Laroche says that there had been unanimity except on a small point regarding the frontier between Serbia and Bulgaria. There had been complete unanimity in regard to Romania; there had been considerable difference of opinion in regard to the frontier between Bulgaria and Greece.

Mr Balfour inquired whether representatives of the countries concerned had not been heard by the Committees.

M Cambon replies in the affirmative.

M Pichon suggests that the best plan would be for the Council to hear an explanation of the reports of the Committees, and then if necessary to call in the representatives of the countries concerned.

(This is agreed to, and it is decided that the reports of Committees relating to the frontiers of Bulgaria should be heard on the following Friday at 15:00)

3. Colonel Georges says that on the 3rd April, 1919, the Inter-Allied Control Commission at Berlin had concluded that the retention of prisoners of war was impossible, and that the Germans should be allowed to organize their repatriation in their own way, provided none were forced to return home who might not wish to. This proposal had been submitted to the Allied Governments and accepted. On the 9th April an order had been given that this decision be communicated to the German Government. On the 17th April General Nudant had asked for details regarding the means adopted for carrying out the repatriation. An interchange of correspondence between General Nudant and the Berlin Commission took place on the 21st and 23rd April, and on the 6th May. This correspondence was sent to the Peace Conference by the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies, together with his remarks. The proposals in question were as follows:

1) A stream of transportation by rail through Poland, on one part and Czecho-Slovakia and Galicia, on the other for Great-Russians and Ukrainians.

2) Transport by coasting vessels for prisoners belonging to the Baltic Regions.

3) Transportation by sea to Archangel, to the Black Sea and Siberia, of other prisoners. The Berlin Commission has drawn up a plan for organizing these various streams of repatriation. This plan, together with the comments made on it, gives prominence to certain points, to which the attention of the Conference must be drawn.

a) The necessity of obtaining the consent of the Estonian Government to the landing of Russian Prisoners of War on its territory. A similar demand would have to be made to the Lettish Government.

b) The necessity of an agreement with the Polish Government regarding the passage of prisoners of war across Polish territory. A month ago the Polish Government had been unwilling, but it appeared by the news brought by General Malcolm, that this attitude had since been modified.

c) It would have to be recognised in principle that part of the tonnage under the control of the Entente Powers should be utilized for repatriation. M Pichon says there might be some difficulty in dealing with the Lettish Government under existing circumstances.

Colonel Georges continuing, observes that the liberty left to Germany of repatriating Russians in its own way, is not exempt from certain risks, the principal of which were the probable massacre of the Anti-Bolsheviks and the reinforcement of the Soviet Armies. This point had been very clearly set forth in a letter of April 19th, giving the views of the British War Cabinet. This decision, however, is based on the unanimous opinion of the representatives in Berlin, who has come to the conclusion on the spot that it is impossible to make a selection among the prisoners, and that it is desirable to act quickly and repatriate them en masse. Since then, the Berlin Commission appears to have modified its views. The proposals made by it appear to admit more and more the possibility of making selections and of organizing, at least by sea, provided tonnage could be found, distinct streams of repatriation for the various categories of prisoner. This being so, it would appear that repatriation should be so carried out as to make use of these possibilities. Humane considerations should also be given weight, and the anti-Bolshevik prisoners of war should not be handed over to the tender mercies of their enemies. There is also a military interest in avoiding any reinforcement of the Bolshevik troops, and in increasing the manpower of all Russian Forces faithful to the Entente. It would follow from this reasoning that an order of urgency should be established regarding the repatriation of these prisoners. Firstly, non-Bolshevik prisoners of war should have priority of repatriation to anti-Bolshevik areas. Anti-Bolshevik areas should be understood to mean the non-occupied portions of the Baltic provinces, Northern Russia, the Kuban Region, the Caucasus, and Siberia. The situation of the Ukraine is still too disturbed to place that country in that category. Secondly, until the situation in Russia becomes clear, repatriation of non-Bolshevik prisoners into a Bolshevik area should be deferred, still more that of declared Bolsheviks and agitators. If these principles were admitted, the following executive measures could be taken.

i) Baltic Provinces. Measures for repatriating about 8,000 men by rail across Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and by coasting vessels to Estonia. This process to begin as soon as the Governments concerned should agree.

ii) Northern Russia. In this direction, North Russians, 10,000; Western Siberians, 17,000; Eastern Siberians, 5,000; and subsequently Great-Russians could be dispatched. The expected junction of the armies of Kolchak and of the Russian Forces in the North would, ere long it is hoped, allow of the transport of the Siberians to their own country, via the Trans-Siberian, a cheaper method than transport by sea to Vladivostok. This plan for repatriation might begin by the dispatch of the Northern Russians as soon as the Conference has accepted in principle the allocation of a tonnage for the purpose, and as soon as the executive Committee has marked off the necessary ships.

iii) Kuban. Caucasus. 2,200 Tartars; 1,400 Cossacks; 2,000 Georgians; 1,000 Romanians, can be sent. The two former to Novorossiisk, the two latter to Batum. This scheme of repatriation is of less importance from a military point of view than the others. It can therefore be undertaken at a later date when tonnage was available.

General Malcolm says that he agrees with the scheme proposed by Colonel Georges in almost every detail. The decision of the Allied and Associated Governments had been taken more than a month ago, and some 1,500 Russians had already gone home. The remainder knew that they were entitled to expect repatriation. By the means suggested, reinforcements could be sent to the friendly forces in Russia, provided ships are supplied to supplement the land transport. This point could only be settled by the shipping authorities. Colonel Georges had suggested that transport by rail should be deferred, and that transport by sea should have precedence. He would suggest that transport by land should continue without interruption. About 600 a week could be repatriated in this manner via Tilsit and Vilna. So far, this had been well carried out under the supervision of British, French and Italian officers. A good effect had been produced, as the men arrived well supplied with food and clothing. This, moreover, had had the effect of putting a stop to trouble in the prisoners’ camps, which had begun to be serious. The number of Georgians and Armenians to be repatriated was small. They could go either via Hamburg or by Fiume, as the Ministry of Shipping might decide. The Georgians, moreover, said that they had a ship at their disposal, which would probably sail from Fiume. It had previously been thought that the Polish Government would object to any transit of Russian prisoners through Polish territory. This attitude appears to have changed. An invitation had been sent to an Allied Commission to come and study the question. It would be easy to send Allied officers in charge of parties of prisoners as far as the break of gauge in the line. The same could be done for Ukrainians through Czechoslovakia.

Mr Balfour says that many people are anxious lest the Bolshevik forces be reinforced by the return of prisoners of war. It is alleged that there are 500,000 Russian prisoners in Germany. If these were all to become Bolshevik troops, it would undoubtedly be a serious responsibility to send them back to Russia. Whether they are Bolsheviks themselves, or whether, on arriving in Russia, they are forced to fight for the Bolsheviks, is from this point of view immaterial. He does not make himself responsible for these arguments, but he would like to know how General Malcolm would meet them.

General Malcolm says that he thinks he could on this point speak not only for himself, but for his colleagues. Had they believed that there were as many as 500,000 Russian prisoners, they would have voted against their repatriation. There are not, however, he believes, more than half that number. Of these 60,000 come from non-Bolshevik areas. This leaves some 190,000 belonging to Central and South Russia. He believes that the Allies can afford to let all these return. Many would refuse to do so, probably as many as 50,000. The remainder would be repatriated by land and by a very slow process. On the other hand, those going by sea to non-Bolshevik areas would reach home much sooner. Our friends would therefore be reinforced before our enemies. Moreover, all these men were very home-sick. Any Government attempting to force them into military service would certainly have great trouble with them. They have been on an average some three years in captivity, and their military value is negligible. This consideration applies, of course, to those returning to North Russia and Siberia, as well as to those returning to Central Russia, but, in view of these considerations, he thinks the criticism alluded to by Mr Balfour is not very strong, and that the Bolsheviks would receive no serious military advantage from the repatriation of Russian prisoners in Germany.

(The proposals outlined by Colonel Georges and General Malcolm are accepted. It is agreed that M Pichon should take the necessary steps on behalf of the Council to obtain the co-operation of the Estonian and Lettish Governments, and that General Malcolm through the British War Office should request the Ministry of Shipping to furnish the requisite tonnage.)

4. Admiral de Bon reads and explains the report titled 'Admirals Report on the Measures Requisite for the Maintenance of Order in Schleswig'. He adds that the Italian Government has not been asked to cooperate in these measures, but that the cooperation of the Italian Navy would be welcomed should Italy wish to send a few light ships to join the Allied Fleet.

Baron Sonnino says that he has not seen the record of the Meeting of the 30th April, and that he is somewhat surprised at the exclusion of Italy from participation in these operations. He thinks it would have been more suitable had Italy been asked whether she would take a share.

M Pichon says that all would welcome Italian cooperation. The omission was due firstly to the absence of the Italian Delegation, and secondly to the feeling that Italy was perhaps not interested in the matter.

(It is commonly agreed that Italian cooperation would be welcomed.)

Mr Balfour says that apparently Fleets alone could not do all that was required. He is in some doubt as to where the additional troops are to come from.

Admiral de Bon says that it had been considered sufficient that each of the nations concerned should furnish one battalion.

Mr Balfour asks whether the respective General Staffs had been consulted. He is in some doubt whether a battalion could be furnished from Great Britain.

M Pichon says that he was about to make the same remark.

Admiral de Bon says that General Desticker had expressed no doubt as to the possibility of finding the troops required. He had only expressed some hesitation as to the quantity of troops required for the maintenance of order. Admiral Benson had said that he could supply 1,000 to 1,500 marines. He suggested that the question of the Commanding Officer should be settled, and that the question of obtaining the requisite troops from the various nations be left to him to negotiate.

M Pichon asks whether it would be necessary to refer the question of command to the Heads of Governments.

Mr White suggests that this question should be settled in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Admiral de Bon says that the question of command is easy to solve. As the British Fleet would bear the main part, he thought the command should be given to a British Admiral.

Mr White said that he had intended to make the same proposal.

Baron Sonnino says that he also agrees.

(It is agreed that the command of the whole force, both at sea and on land, requisite to maintain order in Schleswig during the consultation of the population, should be entrusted to a British Admiral. It would be his duty to settle with the respective Governments concerned all means required to execute the proposals contained in the Admirals’ report.)

5. M Pichon reads a proposal made by Mr Benes concerning Railway Clauses for Insertion into the Treaty with Austria and Hungary in Connection with the Czechoslovak Republic. He suggests this proposal be remitted to the Committee on Czechoslovak Affairs.

M Cambon thinks that it would be more suitable to refer it to the International Commission on Ports, Railways and Waterways.

Mr Balfour asks whether he is not right in supposing that according to Article 52 of the report of that Commission the first step in obtaining agreement relating to a railway connecting one country and another is that the railway administrations concerned should be asked to come to an agreement among themselves. It was only failing agreement between them that the Commission of experts stepped in. The case under consideration appears to be exactly the sort of case contemplated by the Article.

M Pichon says that he thinks Mr Balfour’s view might be adopted, and he is prepared, if the Council agrees, to tell Mr Benes to ask the railway administrations to work out a solution.

(This is agreed to.)

6. M Cambon explains that the Galician question was a very intricate one. The study of the matter has not been completed, and the Commission is not in a position to make a report. It is unlikely to be able to do so in time for the framing of the Treaty with Austria. As, however, it is desired that Poland should not have a common frontier with Austria or Hungary, it would appear sufficient to insert in the Treaty with Austria an Article to the following effect:

“Austria renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles to those of the territories situated beyond the frontiers of Austria as defined in Article … which previously formed the Province of Galicia.”

He would himself propose a slight alteration of this text. In spite of various efforts, the question of Teschen has not been solved, but, in any case, it is clear that Austria is not to have this region. He would therefore suggest that the last clause should read: “which previously formed the Austrian Provinces of Galicia and Silesia”.

Mr Balfour says that he entirely agrees, but his attention has been drawn to a slight omission. There is a strip of Ruthenia which should be provided for in the Article. This strip intervenes between Galicia and the part of Bukovina ceded to Romania. He would therefore suggest, in addition to the modification suggested by M Cambon, the addition of the words “as well as that part of Bukovina which has not been ceded to Romania”.

(After some discussion, the following draft Article is accepted:

“Austria renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles to those of the territories situated beyond the frontiers of Austria as defined in Article … which previously formed the Austrian Provinces of Galicia and Silesia, as well as to that part of Bukovina which has not been ceded to Romania.”)

7. Eventual Cession to the Polish Republic of a Part of the German Fleet: Mr Balfour expresses the opinion that this matter should be deferred until the Conference has decided on the fate of the German Fleet as a whole. It would be absurd to attribute any portion of it to a particular State before a decision had been taken on the fate of the whole.

(The question is therefore postponed.)

8. Occupation of Armenia by Allied Troops: M Pichon points out that this question is connected with a number of other questions which have not yet been settled. It would be a mistake, he thinks, to investigate this question in isolation from the question of Turkey, Asia-Minor, etc.

Mr Balfour, Mr White, and Baron Sonnino express their agreement.

(The question is therefore postponed.)

9. Request for a Hearing From Essad Pasha (This question is also postponed.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

05-16-19, 11:54 AM

Wednesday, May 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. The Council has before it two resolutions prepared for Mr Lloyd George by Mr Harold Nicolson of the British Delegation.

Mr Lloyd George explains that these proposals have been prepared as part of a comprehensive scheme to be presented to the Italian Delegation.

2. President Wilson says that he would accept the resolution contained in Appendix I in regard to the acceptance of a Mandate by the United States of America for Armenia and another for Constantinople and the Straits, subject to the assent of the Senate. The only alteration he wishes to make is the inclusion in paragraph 2 of the Italian Delegation among the Powers to agree on the frontiers of the mandate in regard to the Straits.

M Clemenceau also accepts Appendix I with this alteration.

3. Mr Lloyd George produces a map which had been prepared by Mr Nicolson of the British Delegation to accompany the resolutions in Appendix II.

President Wilson notes that, in this map, the valley of the Meander is included in the territory to be united to Greece. He agrees that this is the best arrangement. When the United States’ experts had proposed to cut this out of the Greek zone, they had done so in the Turkish interest and on the supposition that there would be an independent Turkish State. The present scheme, however, was not providing for a separate Turkey independent of mandate.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Italians would press very strongly for Scala Nuova.

President Wilson says that it would be inexpedient to have the Italians there in such close contact to the territory united to Greece.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the map does not give Mersina to the Italians. This raises the question of what port Italy was to have.

Sir Maurice Hankey reads the following notes about the ports of Marmarice, Karaghatch and Makri, which had been prepared in the Naval Section of the British Delegation:

“Marmarice. This magnificent harbor is completely land-locked, and affords secure anchorage with good holding ground for a large number of deep draft vessels. It is well adapted for use as a Naval Base. There appears to be no reason why it should not also be equally suitable as a commercial port, provided the communications to the interior were developed.

Karaghatch. This is also a fine harbor, but does not appear to be so suitable as Marmarice for a commercial port, owing to the rugged nature of the surrounding land. Communication with the interior is quite undeveloped.

Makri. This harbor though affording complete shelter is not so large as the two harbors mentioned above, and owing to neighboring marshes, the town is exceedingly unhealthy. It would appear to afford better facilities for reclamation and wharfage than Marmarice and Karaghatch, and communication with the interior is more developed. An Italian Syndicate shortly before the war was considering the question of constructing railways from Makri to Mougla, etc.

He also reads extracts from the “Mediterranean Pilot,” Vol. 5, and produces the charts.

President Wilson urges that the line should be drawn so as not to include the harbor of Marmarice, which he understands to have been the intention on the previous day.

(This is agreed to.)

(Mr Harold Nicolson enters.)

President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George gives Mr Nicolson the necessary instructions for re-drawing the map so as not to include Marmarice in the Italian zone. Mr. Nicolson is also instructed to revise Appendix II, page 2, so as to substitute Makri for Marmarice.

(Mr. Nicolson withdraws.)

President Wilson then reads Appendix II. In Resolution 3, the following sentence: “In view of the fact that the Turkish Government has not shown itself able to protect the interests of Christian populations under its sovereignty” is altered by the omission of the word “Christian” and the substitution of the word “the.” The name “Makri” was substituted for “Marmarice.”

Mr Lloyd George considers that the arrangement is now all right.

M Clemenceau also agrees.

President Wilson says it looked to him all right.

(The resolutions reproduced in Appendices I and II are approved, as the basis of part of an offer to be made to Italy.)

4. President Wilson points out that the boundaries of the Armenian Mandate have not yet been drawn. He suggests that the map in the ante-room, which had been drawn by American experts, provided suitable boundaries.

(The Council then adjourns to the ante-room and studied the map prepared by American experts.)

President Wilson points out that the Southern boundary is drawn so as to leave Alexandretta south of the Silesian [Cilician] boundary.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the Western boundary in the region of the Black Sea differs somewhat from the line prepared by British experts. He hands a map drawn by British experts to President Wilson, who undertakes to consider it in consultation with his own experts.

(The Council returns to the Library.)

5. M Clemenceau says that, in order to make a clean job of it, some arrangement ought to be made between General Allenby and the Emir Feisal. The latter had behaved very well since his arrival in Syria.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that, at the moment, the best plan would be to draw a map of occupation, showing what territories would be occupied by the various Powers concerned He suggested that there should be a small Committee to examine the question.

(M Clemenceau nominates M Tardieu.

Mr Lloyd George nominates General Sir Henry Wilson.)

6. M Clemenceau says that the French experts in the Foreign Office will not hear of any arrangement with the Italians about Djibouti.

7. President Wilson says it has been brought to his notice that the clause intended to have been included in the Reparation Clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. Part VIII, Annex 2 paragraph 2, have been omitted. He suggests, therefore, that the only thing to be done is to sign an agreement, of which he reads a draft.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it would be better to reinsert it in the Treaty of Peace.

President Wilson agrees that it might be put in an errata.

Mr Lloyd George proposes that it should be included when the final reply is given to the Germans. He does not like having too many documents on these subjects.

President Wilson agrees.

(The Agreement in Appendix III is initialed, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed, after obtaining S Orlando’s initials, to forward it to the Drafting Committee for incorporation in the final Treaty with Germany.)

(S Orlando’s initials are affixed the same evening.)

8. President Wilson informs Sir Maurice Hankey that it had been agreed during an informal conversation on the previous afternoon that the Drafting Committee should only take instructions from the Supreme Council to the principal Allied and Associated Powers in regard to the material for Articles to be inserted in the Treaties of Peace, and that these instructions should be initialed by the Heads of States.

9. Sir Maurice Hankey reads the following note from Mr Hurst, on behalf of the Drafting Committee:

“The present intention of the Drafting Committee is to insert the Covenant of the League of Nations and the draft Labour Convention and Resolutions in the Treaty of Peace with Austria in exactly the same with Hungary manner as has been done in the draft Treaty of Peace with Germany. If this is not in accordance with the wishes of the Council of Prime Ministers, we should be glad if you would let us know. I have ascertained from Lord Robert Cecil and Mr Barnes that the above is in accordance with their views. Some of the Allied and Associated Powers represented at the Peace Conference are not at war with Austria, but we are making them all parties to the Treaties and modifying the language of the first clause, so as to bring in statements as to the termination of the war and the resumption of the relations being not inconsistent with their being parties; consequently, it is quite feasible to insert the Covenant of the league of Nations without any alteration, as the signatories to the Austrian Treaty and to the German Treaty will be the same; no alteration, therefore, will be required in Article I and in the Annex to the Covenant.”

(The above is approved and initialed. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to Mr. Hurst, after obtaining S Orlando’s initials.)

10. Austria and the League of Nations President Wilson expresses the hope that M Clemenceau’s proposal would be adopted and that Austria would be inserted in the list of Nations invited to adhere to the League of Nations. He, himself, was strongly in favour of this proposal He doubted, however, whether the Supreme Council had the right to decide this without consulting a plenary meeting.

M Clemenceau says it ought not to decide in the absence of the Italian Representatives.

President Wilson agrees.

11. Mr Lloyd George asks what was the nature of the mandate contemplated for the Italians in Anatolia.

President Wilson says he has in mind the Moslem feeling about not wiping out the Turkish race. His idea had been Turkish State in the north of Anatolia and to put it under the supervision of France. He pointed out that, under the scheme of mandates as originally devised, there are three classes. One class consists of nations which were on the verge of being able to run themselves and only required a very loose mandate, a second class provides for less developed countries, and a third class provides for wholly dependent countries.

M Clemenceau asks what differences he contemplates in regard to the Turkish population in the Italian and French mandates in Anatolia.

President Wilson says he had understood that in the north the population was more purely Turkish.

Mr Lloyd George says that this was not the case outside the coastal districts.

President Wilson says that the awkward question to decide is that of sovereignty. If what Mr Lloyd George says is correct, it would be better not to extend the sovereignty of Northern Anatolia over Southern Anatolia, otherwise both France and Italy would have advisers at the Turkish capital dealing with different parts of Turkish territory.

Mr Lloyd George says that that is the great argument against dividing Anatolia.

M Clemenceau asked what sort of mandate is contemplated in each case.

President Wilson says it is substantially the same.

Mr Lloyd George read a memorandum which has been prepared by Mrs Balfour in consultation with experts in the Foreign Office, in which some sort of a condominium is contemplated.

M Clemenceau says that a condominium will never do. It is bound to give rise to difficulties and might even give rise to wars. He was reminded by Mr Lloyd George that there had been great trouble between France and Great Britain in Egypt, which might have resulted in war between the two countries but for his personal intervention.

Mr Lloyd George continues to read Mr Balfour’s memorandum, in which some international body for finance was proposed.

President Wilson is altogether opposed to that. In regard to a proposal in the memorandum providing for prior claims in regard to concessions for the mandatory Power, he points out that this is contrary to the principle provided for in the League of Nations’ Covenant for equal opportunity to all Nations in mandated territory. This does not mean that the United States of America would rush in everywhere. Direct American enterprise is certainly not to be expected in Anatolia. There would certainly be a natural priority to the Mandatory but there should not be a priority of claim.

Mr Lloyd George quite agrees and points out that it would be very unfair if the Italians had a priority of claim in Southern Anatolia when the British were compelled to give equal opportunity in German East Africa.

President Wilson says that his object all along has been to avoid even an appearance of grabbing. These considerations brought us face to face with the problem as to the form of political unity which was to exist in Southern Anatolia. His idea would be to organize it as a self-governing unit, to elect its own Governor-General with Konia as its capital. Otherwise, there would be the difficulty of a single capital in which the representatives of both Mandatories would live.

Mr Lloyd George says that another scheme is that the Sultan should remain in Constantinople exercising supervision over the whole of Turkey. France would then overlook one part of Anatolia, Italy another part, Greece a third, while the United States overlooked the Sultan. If Brusa is in the French Mandate and the Sultan ruled over the whole of Anatolia, it would create a very awkward situation for the Italians.

President Wilson says that Southern Anatolia would have to be constituted as a separate unit.

M Clemenceau asked who would appoint the Governor?

Mr Lloyd George suggested the Sultan under advice.

President Wilson asks if the Turks could not elect a Governor.

Mr Lloyd George says this would make it a Republic.

President Wilson says he has no objection to this.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that difficulties would arise in connection with the Khalifate in this case.

M Clemenceau said his objection to any scheme by which the Sultan nominated the Governor or to any scheme of election was that there would be a French and an Italian candidate and this would always give rise to friction and difficulty. He suggested that a Prince should be drawn from the Sultan’s family and appointed to rule in Anatolia. In any other scheme, there would be trouble all the time.

President Wilson suggests that the Italians should be left to choose a member of the Sultan’s family.

M Clemenceau said that Southern Anatolia would then be an independent State under an Italian Mandate.

(On President Wilson’s suggestion, it is agreed in principle that Anatolia should be separated politically into two parts, the method of separation being left for further consideration. It is also agreed that, as President Wilson had some information to the effect that there is a prospect of the Italians and Yugoslavs coming to an understanding on the Adriatic question and as the proposals in regard to Asia Minor were only part of comprehensive proposals to be presented to the Italian Delegation, the resolutions agreed to should not be presented to the Italian Delegation for the moment.

M Clemenceau undertakes to speak to S Orlando in this sense.)

12. Sir Maurice Hankey read the following letter from Mr Hurst, the British Representative on the Drafting Committee:

“You will remember the instructions that went to the Drafting Committee about the frontiers of Austria and Hungary and of contiguous countries. It is a paper marked Appendix II [III] to C. F. 4.2 The interpretation which we are putting on the second sentence is that the Big Four desire that the frontiers of a country like Romania who should, so far as possible, be set out in the Treaty with Hungary not merely the frontier between Romania and Hungary itself. That is to say, that the Northern frontier of Romania where it joins Russia and the Southern frontier where it touches Bulgaria will both be set out when a decision has been come to as to what that frontier should be. The same would apply even though the State concerned had no common frontier whatever with the enemy before with whom the treaty was made. For instance. Romania. Though Romania will not touch Austria, the Romanian frontiers would nevertheless be set out in the Treaty with Austria. This seems to follow from the second sentence of your paper, but I should like to make sure that we are right in this.”

(After a short discussion, it is agreed that Mr Hurst’s interpretation of the previous decision is correct, and Sir Maurice Hankey is authorized to inform him accordingly.)

13. M Clemenceau signs the following letter to the Head of the Chinese Delegation:

14 May, 1919.

“Your Excellency,

On behalf of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, I beg to acknowledge the receipt from the Chinese Delegation of two pamphlets, one of which sets forth China’s claim submitting for abrogation by the Peace Conference the Treaties and Notes between China and Japan of May 25th, 1915, and the other presents for readjustment by the Conference a number of important questions, among which may be mentioned the withdrawal from China of foreign troops and police, the withdrawal of foreign post offices and the abolition of consular jurisdiction.

In reply I am asked to state that while the Supreme council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers fully recognizes the importance of the questions raised they do not consider that they fall within the province of the Peace Conference and they suggest that these matters should be brought to the attention of the Council of the League of Nations as soon as that body is able to function.

I am
Your Excellency’s Obedient Servant

(Signed) G. Clemenceau

His Excellency Mr Lou Tseng-Tsiang,
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.”

14. M Clemenceau signs the following letter to Mr Arthur Henderson:

14 May, 1919.

“Sir,

I am asked by the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to inform you that they have considered your request, transmitted verbally through Mr Lloyd George, that the Supreme Council shall receive a deputation from the International Trades Union Conference in Berne.

In reply I am asked to state that as the summary of the Peace Terms is already published and has been communicated to the German plenipotentiaries, it is felt that no useful object would now be served by the proposed deputation.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) G Clemenceau

The Rt. Hon. A. Henderson.”

15. Sir Maurice Hankey reminded the Council that before the Meeting with the German Delegates the question had been raised as to the recognition of Montenegro, and that it had been agreed that a decision ought to be taken in regard to Montenegrin representation before the Austrian settlement was concluded.

Mr Lloyd George says that according to his recollection early in the Conference it had been agreed that the United States should send a Commissioner to investigate and report on matters in Montenegro.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to investigate this question.)

Sailor Steve

05-16-19, 02:09 PM

Thursday, May 15, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

...

Sailor Steve

05-16-19, 02:16 PM

Friday, May 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers

...

Jimbuna

05-17-19, 06:14 AM

17th May 1919

Aftermath of War

British Naval force defeat Bolshevik warships near Kronstadt.

French Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, visits occupied Cologne, Germany.
https://i.imgur.com/6mBFSPE.jpg

British artillerymen in action in the Third Anglo-Afghan War.
https://i.imgur.com/JgbM2nQ.jpg

British soldiers lower their heads at a burial of one of the comrades during the Third Anglo-Afghan War.
https://i.imgur.com/L8BSJlz.jpg

Members of the Polish Murmansk Battalion at Archangelsk, Russia being inspected by British Major General Frederick Poole, Commander of the North Russia Expeditionary Force against the communists.
https://i.imgur.com/VnG21lW.jpg

Sailor Steve

05-18-19, 12:35 AM

Saturday, May 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Three

1. Attention is drawn to the draft notes circulated by Sir Maurice Hankey on the subject of the proposed mandates in Asia Minor. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to make it clear in the revise of the Minutes that the decision is only intended as provisional, and as part of a proposal that it is contemplated to make to the Italian Delegates.

2. Mr Lloyd George says he has received information from Mr Venizelos sent by the Governor General of Samos, to the effect that the Italians had landed 500 men at Scala Nuova and occupied the Customs House. Consequently, they are now in possession of the whole coast of Asia Minor from Scala Nuova to Adalia. He feels that some immediate representation ought to be made to S Orlando on the subject.

President Wilson suggests that a joint memorandum should be signed by Mr Lloyd George, M Clemenceau and himself, addressed to S Orlando. This will give him an opportunity to look into the matter. He should be told that the independent action on Italy’s part is a matter of serious concern to the Allied and Associated Powers. If his explanations are not satisfactory, he should be told that Italian claims cannot be discussed. A joint communication of this kind would be more formal and more impressive than a verbal remonstrance.

Mr Lloyd George hands round a memorandum from Mr Balfour, which he describes as a powerful one, in regard to provisional decisions taken on the subject of Anatolia. He feels considerable doubt as to whether this provisional conclusion is a correct one. In any case, if the Italians continue on their present lines, it might be better to have only one mandate for Anatolia.

M Clemenceau says for his part he does not want it.

President Wilson produces an ethnographical map of Anatolia, and points out how much more mixed the population is in the southern half of Anatolia than in the north, where it is almost wholly Turkish.

Mr Lloyd George says it has to be borne in mind that the whole Mohammedan world will be aroused by this partition of Turkey, and this affects France just as much as it does Great Britain.

(It is agreed that Mr Lloyd George should prepare the draft of the memorandum for consideration, and possibly for subsequent presentation to S Orlando, on the subject of the Italian landings on the Coast of Asia Minor).

11:10

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. M Clemenceau reports that there is a very strong demand for the publication of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. He was informed that the Germans themselves had published certain portions, so that the text of these portions would soon be in the hands of the Press. Consequently, he had yesterday spoken to President Wilson and Mr Balfour on the subject, and had gathered that they were favorable to publication.

President Wilson says that he had only expressed himself favorable to the publication of those parts which the Germans had already published, and even so, he had insisted that the decision must be reserved until Mr Lloyd George returned.

Mr Lloyd George recalls that only a few days before he had raised this very question in consequence of a telephone message from Mr Bonar Law, and as a result of their discussion, an emphatic reply had been given that the Treaty would not be published. His objection was, that when the Treaty was once published, it was very difficult to alter it, and there might be some details which we ought to concede to the Germans, if it would make it more acceptable to them.

(At this point S Orlando and Count Aldrovandi enter.)

President Wilson says there is a great difference between what was published by the Germans and what we gave officially to our own people. Once we had published them to our own people, the Clauses assumed an official form, and made it very difficult to change.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the original Treaty had been somewhat defective and yet it was rather difficult to publish a different document to what the Germans had received. He was informed by Sir Maurice Hankey that it was physically impossible to publish the Treaty before Tuesday or Wednesday, as it could not be printed in London before then. By Wednesday, however, the German reply was due, and he thought the matter might be postponed until then. He did not like going back on a previous decision.

M Clemenceau says he will do whatever Mr Lloyd George wishes.

(It is agreed that the Treaty of Peace, as handed to the Germans, should not be published at present.)

2. Mr Lloyd George says that on the previous day he had addressed some British troops, and had pointed out to them how disastrous it would be to throw away the results of five years warfare, by not seeing the matter through. He had told them that in certain eventualities, it might be necessary to go to Berlin, and they had shown themselves to a man, quite ready to do so, if necessary. This was a division that had lost nearly 9,000 men in the advances of last year.

3. M Clemenceau hands in a list of material which could be supplied by the French Government, if it were so decided, in order to provide outfits for German Prisoners of War. He says that the remainder of the captured material had already been used to supply the German prisoners.

Mr Lloyd George says he was informed that the quantities that the British Government could supply were very small, but he had no details up to the present.

President Wilson says he had not received his list.

4. M Clemenceau hands to Sir Maurice Hankey for translation and circulation a draft, prepared by the appropriate Committee of the Conference, to Herr Brockdorff-Kantzau’s letter on the subject of the Saar Valley.2

5. Reparation. Reply to Brockdorff Rantzau’s Letter M. Clemenceau handed to Sir Maurice Hankey for translation and circulation a copy of a draft reply, prepared by the appropriate Committee of the Peace Conference to Herr Brockdorff-Kantzau’s letter on the subject of reparation.

6. M Clemenceau draws attention to a Memorandum prepared by Mr W.T. Layton, of the British Delegation, and circulated at the request of Lord Robert Cecil, on the subject of the supply of Armaments to the new States of Central and Eastern Europe.

Mr Lloyd George recalls that during the war the Ministers of Munitions used to confer together on such matters.

M Clemenceau suggests that the first step is to find out what is being done.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that M Loucheur and Mr Layton should confer on the subject.

M Clemenceau agrees.

S Orlando says he will nominate a representative.

President Wilson says that the United States of America has not supplied any armaments, except a few to General Kolchak.

S Orlando asked what the states affected are.

Mr Lloyd George suggests the Poles, Czechoslovaks, Romanians, Serbo-Croats, and he adds that the various nationalities formed out of Old Russia and Siberia should also be considered.

(It is agreed that M Loucheur, Mr W.T. Layton, and an Italian representative to be nominated by S Orlando should report on the facts as to what supplies of armaments or munitions have been or are being sent to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Serbo-Croatia, Montenegro, Greece, and the various States formed or forming out of the former Russian Empire, including Siberia.)

7. Mr Lloyd George points out that the reference to this Committee was closely connected with the reference to the Military Representatives at Versailles to consider the size of the military forces of the new States in connection with the Military Peace Terms of Austria and Hungary.

M Clemenceau said that this is a very difficult question, and it will be necessary in his view to secure the intervention of the League of Nations.

President Wilson thinks it will not be very difficult to get an agreement if all the nations are included in the group.

8. Attention is drawn by Mr Lloyd George to reports he has received to the effect that the supplies promised to Serbia were not reaching the Serbian Army.

(At M Clemenceau’s request, he undertakes to give M Clemenceau a memorandum on the subject).

9. President Wilson says that he has seen a report in the newspapers to the effect that the Polish Diet refused the view of Mr Paderewski in favour of stopping operations on the Ukrainian Ukraine front, as desired by the Allied and Associated Powers. Mr Paderewski had refused to accept the view of the Diet, and threatened to resign. If Poland continued fighting, he thought that the representatives of Poland ought to be asked to withdraw from the Peace Conference. His information, however, was entirely derived from the newspapers.

M Clemenceau doubts if this impression is correct. He has information to the effect that the Polish orders to continue fighting had been recalled.

Mr Lloyd George reads extracts from a telegram received from General Carton de Wiart to the effect that the military preparations are too far advanced, and public opinion is too firmly set for the operations to be stopped from Poland, and that hostilities can only be brought to an end by the direct intervention of the Peace Conference.

He then reads a comment by Lord Robert Cecil, suggesting that the Supreme Economic Council should on Monday inform Mr Dmowski that no further supplies will be sent unless hostilities ceased.

President Wilson said that Mr Paderewski has a letter in his possession from Mr Hoover, informing him that aid will only be extended to Poland so long as he is in charge.

Mr Lloyd George then reads extracts from a letter by General Botha, Chairman of the Polish-Ukrainian Armistice Commission, who points out that, the Supreme Council is being brought into contempt by the neglect of its decisions by the Poles, and that the League of Nations will become nugatory unless the present Conference can enforce its decisions. He points out that the Ukraine is the only state formed out of the old Russian Empire to whom no armaments have been supplied, though they are fighting the Bolsheviks.

M Clemenceau said that the Ukrainians are more than half Bolshevik themselves.

President Wilson agrees with General Botha, and points out the difficulty that there are no means of obtaining exact information.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers is carrying on temporarily, pending the formation of the League of Nations. Its orders cannot be defied without weakening the League of Nations itself.

President Wilson says it is the Conference, rather than the League of Nations, that would be discredited. The Conference is engaged in a final settlement, rather than on these temporary disputes. The fixing of the frontier between the Ukraine and Poland is a very difficult matter.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Ukraine is willing to stop fighting, and that it is the Poles who are making the difficulty.

President Wilson asks if General Haller’s Army is still being transported to Poland? Can the transport of the remainder be stopped? His own opinion was that if 2 Divisions have gone, that is enough for the present.

Mr Lloyd George says that Mr Paderewski ought to be supported, as he is a very honest and loyal man. He should be given an intimation that if the orders of this Council are not carried out, no further support will be given. He would do this through the Foreign Ministers.

President Wilson says it is important not to give even a superficial idea that Mr Paderewski is not being supported. He has played the game straight throughout. The message ought to be sent, not to Mr Paderewski, but to General Pilsudski, the Head of the Polish State.

Mr Lloyd George asks if it is possible to address the Head of the State.

President Wilson says that it is.

M Clemenceau asks President Wilson to draft a dispatch.

(It is agreed that President Wilson should draft for consideration a draft addressed by the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers to General Pilsudski.)

10. During the above discussion the question at arises as to what is the proper designation of the Council of Four.

Sir Maurice Hankey reports that he had been using the term “Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers”.

President Wilson demurred to the use of the word “Supreme”, which some of the smaller States disliked.

(It is agreed that in any future communications the nomenclature to be adopted should be “Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers”, but that no announcement should be made.)

11. President Wilson says that on the previous day he had seen Mr Benes and Mr Kramar. Mr Benes had given a very intelligent and unbiased description of the Teschen question. He had explained that the question of coal was only one part of the subject. In any case, most of the coal basin, of which the Teschen coal mines formed a part, must form part of Poland. There was an important question, however, owing to the fact that the only lines of railway running east and west in the north of Czechoslovakia run through Teschen territory.

Mr Lloyd George asks what the population is.

President Wilson says they had not gone into this question. Mr Benes had told him it is impossible for the Poles to agree with the Czechoslovaks as they had been asked to do. The reason is that in Poland it is a party question and no party could afford to give way. This is not the case in Czechoslovakia.

Mr Lloyd George asks if everyone there is agreed to grab all they can.

President Wilson says that one of the strongest arguments in favour of the Czechoslovaks is that this part of Teschen had been the acknowledged boundary of Bohemia in the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He has received a letter from Mr Hoover to the effect that the coal output of Teschen has been reduced owing to the uncertainties of the situation to 25% of the normal. Mr Hoover is urging him to suggest that some temporary international management should be adopted, in order to bring the output of coal up to the normal.

12. The Council has before them Report No. 2 of the Committee on New States.

President Wilson says that the only controversial part of the report arises in connection with Annex B, dealing with the subject of the Jewish Sabbath.

(After a short discussion, the first paragraph of Annex B is agreed to).

(Mr Headlam-Morley enters.)

President Wilson asks Mr Headlam-Morley to give his views on Annex B. He understands that he has been the supporter of this clause, and has stood alone on the Committee.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that he has conferred with representatives of the Jews on this matter. M Lucien Wolff, whom he had found to be the most moderate representative, is against the extreme claims of the Zionists, and was supported by Mr Neymer of the British Foreign Office. They all insisted, however, that the provisions in Annex B were of extreme importance.

President Wilson says that he and his colleagues are quite agreed as to the first paragraph.

Mr Headlam-Morley says the second paragraph had been suggested by Sir Esme Howard, who is himself a Roman Catholic.

President Wilson asks whether the object of this paragraph, which suggests that elections should not take place on a Saturday, was put in to prevent action by the Poles, which otherwise would amount to a virtual disenfranchisement of the Jews.

Mr Headlam-Morley replies that this is the case. He adds that his colleagues feel that this is rather a small matter to insert in a Treaty, and might be provided for by an exchange of Notes. In view of the great importance attached to it by the Jews, however, he himself feels that he would not be doing his duty if he did not bring it before the Council.

President Wilson says that Mr Miller, the American representative on the Committee, had suggested that in view of the Continental practice of holding elections on a Sunday, it would make Saturday rather more sacred than Sunday.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that arrangements might be made for the Jews to record their votes separately on another day.

Mr Headlam-Morley says he presumed an opportunity would be given to the Poles to make their comments on this matter, which was of great importance to them. He suggests that they should be given an opportunity to send a formal note on the subject, in order to place their views on record. If their note was of a favorable character, this might meet the case.

President Wilson thinks it will not. All sorts of technical difficulties would be raised about carrying out this decision. For example, in Romania, by a quibble over the use of the word “citizen”, the Jews had, in effect, been deprived of their rights. He feared that any sanction less formal than a Treaty would be read in such a way as to render it useless. It would be said that the assurances were informal and would be got around somehow.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the Committee has left out one clause, which the Jews had suggested, namely, that not only should they not have to work on their Sabbath, but that they should be allowed to work on the Christian Sabbath.

Mr Lloyd George thinks the Committee is right in this. To allow the Jews to work on Sunday would be regarded as an unfair advantage against the Christians. Such, at any rate, was the feeling in England, as regards the opening of Jewish shops.

President Wilson asks whether the last word of the first paragraph should not be “Saturday” instead of “Sabbath.”

Mr Headlam-Morley says that Sabbath was the correct word, but that the word before - “the” - is a misprint for “their”. The report is being reprinted, as it contains several inaccuracies.

President Wilson says that he, personally, is converted to the inclusion of Annex B.

Mr Lloyd George says it should be submitted to the views of the Poles.

President Wilson says he not only has a friendly feeling towards the Jews, but he thinks it is perfectly clear that one of the most dangerous elements of ferment arises from the treatment of the Jews. The fact that the Bolshevist movement had been led by the Jews was partly due to the fact that they had been treated largely as outlaws. They had no affection for a country where they were only permitted to live on tolerance, with every man’s hand against them. He therefore felt it was necessary to put them on a proper footing.

Mr Lloyd George says the proper thing is to do as the Germans are doing, and make an intelligent use of the brains of the Jews. He had noticed that half the German Delegates were Jews.

M Clemenceau says that the Council ought to hear what the Poles had to say about the matter.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the Committee had suggested that their report should be communicated officially to the Poles, and that the Committee might then be permitted to receive the Polish Delegation and discuss the matter with them. First, however, they wished to have the report approved in principle.

Mr Lloyd George urges that the report should be communicated to the Poles in Poland, as the Polish representative in Paris, Mr Dmowski, did not represent the democratic opinion in Poland.

President Wilson suggests that the Committee should be authorized to present their report formally to the Polish Delegates in Paris, and to discuss it with them while the report should also be transmitted to the Polish Government for observations.

Mr Headlam-Morley raises the question as to the right of appeal by minorities to the League of Nations. They think that this right is reserved nominally only for the Governments of States. They nevertheless feel that it would not be advisable that the Germans in Poland should only have the right to approach the League of Nations through the German Government.

President Wilson points out that one of the Articles of the League of Nations gives the representatives of every State the right to call attention to matters affecting the peace of the world, whether the Government is interested in them or not, and this was not to be regarded as an unfriendly act. By the application of this Article, the Jews of Poland will be able to induce their friends in other countries, such as the United States of America, Great Britain or France, to draw the attention of the League to their position. In any case, however, the League of Nations cannot change the minds of the people. Dislike of the Jews in Poland will continue in spite of everything.

Mr Headlam-Morley asked President Wilson’s permission to send him a memorandum on this subject.

President Wilson says he will be glad to receive it.

Mr Headlam-Morley says he hopes that the economic and financial clauses, which were under Consideration by the experts, will be ready very soon. He says that the Committee is about to proceed to its examination of the Preamble to Czechoslovakia.

(It was agreed:

1) To approve in principle Report No. 2 of the Committee on New States.

2) That the Committee should communicate the Report officially to the Polish Delegation in Paris, and should confer with them on the subject.

3) That the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference should telegraph the gist of the Report to the Polish Government, and invite its views.)

13. President Wilson says that Mr Vesnitch, when asked for explanation as to the reports of maltreatment of Montenegrins by the Serbians, replied that King Nicholas was surrounded by bad people. The answer was of course totally irrelevant, since King Nicholas was in France and was not taking any part in the administration of Montenegro. He himself is very anxious to get someone to represent Montenegro at the Peace Conference.

Mr Lloyd George asks what had occurred in regard to the investigations which President Wilson undertook on January 12th to make.

President Wilson says that the investigation had been undertaken, and that he is expecting the report in the near future.

(It is agreed to adjourn the discussion pending the receipt of the report expected by President Wilson).

14. The Council has before them the reply from the Committee composed of Mr Barnes, Mr Shotwell, M Fontaine and M G. de Grunne to the question referred to them by the Council, namely, as to whether Germany should be admitted to the Labour Organisation before she is admitted to the League of Nations.

Mr Lloyd George expresses agreement in the report of the Committee.

M Clemenceau also expresses himself in favour of the proposal that Germany should be admitted immediately after the Washington Conference.

President Wilson agrees, but suggests that it would be preferable to send it to the Washington Conference with a recommendation in its favour.

(It is agreed that the accompanying letter should be remitted to the Washington Conference with a favorable recommendation from the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate in this sense with the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference).

15. At the end of the Meeting a telephone message is received from the Secretariat-General to the effect that Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau is leaving for Spa this evening to confer with his Government and intends to return by Monday evening, May 19th.

16. The following decision is approved as carrying out the intention of the Council and is initialed by M Clemenceau, President Wilson, Mr Lloyd George and S Orlando.

(It is agreed that the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference shall not accept any decisions of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which does not bear the initials of M Clemenceau, President Wilson, Mr Lloyd George and S Orlando. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee).

17. At Mr Lloyd George’s request it is agreed to hear the Indian Delegation in the afternoon at 4:30 p.m.

Sailor Steve

05-18-19, 12:52 AM

Saturday, May 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:15

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. M Clemenceau says that he and his colleagues have been considering the action of the Italian Government in landing forces at Scala Nova and other places on the Coast of Asia Minor without consulting them. They have prepared a document which is now being reproduced, and which he will hand to S Orlando. He then makes a statement identical with the document.

S Orlando says that on the day when his colleagues had announced to him the decision to disembark forces at Smyrna, Mr Lloyd George had asked for details of the Italian landings elsewhere, and he had replied he knew very little about them, which was the absolute truth. He had then said he would consult Baron Sonnino. On the same afternoon, he had visited Mr Lloyd George at his flat, and Baron Sonnino had explained that these landings were carried out for dealing with disorders that had arisen. Nothing more had been said on the matter, which he had presumed to be disposed of. He would receive the communication which his colleagues had to make to him, and would discuss it with Baron Sonnino.

Mr Lloyd George says that on the previous occasion when this subject had been raised, all that had been heard of was a landing to repair a pier at Scala Nova, after which, the Italian forces had been re-embarked. This fresh news, however, was of a far more formidable nature, since 500 troops were reported to have been landed, the Italian flag had been hoisted, the Customs House occupied, and some of the troops pushed some distance inland. The occupation of Marmarice had only been reported by the Italian fleet, but these last reports were of definite landings. Moreover, they had occurred at a time when the three principal Powers associated with Italy had expressed themselves rather opposed to Scala Nova being in the Italian sphere, and in favour of it being in the Greek sphere. It had been a subject of discussion and no final decision had been taken. It was in this state of affairs that the Italian landing had taken place. In such conditions, it is difficult to take a decision in regard to Asia Minor or anywhere else. If such a thing were to happen in any dispute between France and Great Britain, it would create a most difficult situation. What he specially regretted was that this action tended to prejudice a discussion which he thought was going very well. He and his colleagues had been sincerely anxious to meet the views of Italy as far as they could, and he thought it was a very grave matter that this action should be taken, as it were, to jump the claim, when the matter was under discussion.

S Orlando says he quite understands the feelings of Mr Lloyd George, and thinks, giving the interpretation placed by him on this action by Italy, that he was dissatisfied. He, himself, had not the intention which Mr Lloyd George had suggested, and he deplored it. He had believed this landing to be merely a repetition of the same sort of thing as had occurred before, namely, a disembarkation to meet some local difficulty. He did not know of any serious landing of any considerable forces. He knew nothing of the landing of troops, the seizure of the Customs House, or the hoisting of the Italian flag, in fact, he had believed this to be a landing without any intention of prejudicing the future disposition of this territory. It is necessary, however, to preserve respect for each other’s opinions, and he repeats that he will study the memorandum and take whatever dispositions are necessary.

Mr Lloyd George says that he would like to add that he and his colleagues had deliberately kept Greek troops away from Scala Nova, because they thought it would be unfair to Italy for them to land while the question was sub judice.

(At the end of the meeting, the memorandum is communicated to S Orlando).

2. President Wilson says he has received a report of a great victory by General Denekin on the Czaritzen front. He claims to have captured 10,000 prisoners, 128 machine guns, and 28 field guns, which ought to account for a large part of the Bolshevist forces on this front.

Mr Lloyd George says that coming at the same time as the capture of Samara by Kolchak, this is news of great importance.

Sir Maurice Hankey calls attention to the expression of opinion by the Foreign Ministers that the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should consider the question of policy towards Russia.

President Wilson says he has communicated with the United States Ambassador at Tokyo, in order to arrange for the dispatch of Mr. Morris as promised.

(At this point the Council adjourns to the room upstairs, in order to hear the Indian Delegation, which is dealt with separately in a stenographic report. On the withdrawal of the Indian Delegation there is some conversation in regard to mandates in Asia Minor).

Sailor Steve

05-18-19, 01:22 AM

Saturday, May 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:30

Meeting of the Council of Four with the Delegates from India

Hon. E. S. Montagu: Mr. President and Gentlemen, I think I can first express our heartfelt thanks for this opportunity of stating our case, because we feel deeply that you gentlemen, who are pursuing the peace of the world in this room, are likely to endanger for a long time to come the peace of the world in the East unless you realize the strength of Mohammedan feeling against the sort of peace that we hear rumored as a result of the war with Turkey. The Government of India feel this particularly strongly; but I would propose today, with your permission, that you should hear the case from my Indian colleagues. The case is always the more forceful when presented by the inhabitants of the country itself, than by one who is privileged to represent them. I am accompanied here this afternoon by my two colleagues on the Imperial British Indian Delegation who are both Hindus. Their object in coming here this afternoon is to demonstrate by the words which they will address to you subsequently the depth and reality with which Hindu Indians sympathize with the case of Mohammedan Indians. I would ask you first to hear His Highness, The Aga Khan.

H. H., The Aga Khan: Mr. President and Gentlemen: As you are aware, there are seventy million Mohammedans in India; and if you include the countries that border India and are in relations with India intimately, there are seventy-five million. I am quite sure that in this particular subject of Turkey and the sort of peace that is concluded in the Mohammedan states, which unfortunately were led into the war by German machinations, they are deeply interested; and in this particular subject I think I am right in saying that we have the full sympathy of our Indian fellow-citizens who are not Mohammedans but who are Hindus, of which class both of my friends here are members. As you are aware, the fall of Turkey was a great deal due to our efforts from India. The larger number of troops sent against Turkey were Indian troops. It was Indian blood and Indian treasure, Mohammedan blood and Mohammedan treasure, which was shed and used to bring about that great result, and while that war went on, we were convinced, and we are still convinced, in spite of rumors to the contrary, that this war was a real crusade for modern principles of justice and fair play towards all men, and that behind the hatred and death of this war, lay the principle that you were preaching. That was the principle behind it. Now, we maintain that this principle of nationality is a sacred one and does not apply to one country and not to another, to big countries and not to small ones.

For these reasons we pray that where the Turkish race has its home, where it has been for centuries and centuries, such as Asia Minor, Thrace, the town of Constantinople and Asia Minor proper, which is the home of the Turkish-speaking race, we pray that that country should remain Turkish. We appeal to the principle of nationality. We appeal to your speeches. We appeal to the interests, the vital interests, of France and Italy in the development of their future commerce and industry in those countries, that the final break with these Mohammedan nations should not take place. We appeal to No. Twelve of, your Fourteen Points, Mr. President, and to the speeches that you have made, sir. We beg of you to bear in mind the principles for which we have fought, like all of you, and to apply them without fear or favor wherever they can be applied, and we believe that they can be applied, if you will put into this, our case, a judicial mind.

I will not go into other points which I am leaving for my friends here, but there are one or two points which I desire to mention. Germany will be invited sometime into the League of Nations. The German races, wherever there have been no mandates appointed for the Germans, have been promised that they will enter the League of Nations in the fullness of time. Now, the same ought to be promised to the Turkish races in the same condition. It does not matter whether Turkey is small or great, but if they are a nation, if they are one language, you mustn’t punish the future generations still unborn for the sins of the people of this generation.

Another point which I bring before your notice is the Eastern provinces of Turkey, the Northeastern provinces of Turkey, and the Southwestern provinces of the Caucasus of Russia. They are Armenians, Mohammedans, Kurds, Turks - they are so to speak the real Macedonia of the Eastern races. The frontier between Turkey and Russia even before 1877 was a purely political frontier. It was not an ethnological or geographical frontier south of the Caucasus. We appeal to you, sir, that whatever the form of government which is to be established for what is called Armenia, it should at least apply to the whole of those areas, and that it should be equality for all races, all religions and all peoples within those confines. There have been undoubtedly in the past in these countries terrible bloodshed and fighting and so on, but let us at least see that those things do not happen to the Armenians or to the other people. I don’t care particularly to mention them, but nobody now tries to decimate or reduce the Mohammedan population there, and they should have the same equal rights, no fear and no favor, but fair play.

These are the two points which I respectfully bring before you, and I am sure that there are seventy millions of my compatriots who feel them as strongly as I do.

Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu: May I just intervene to say that I presume you all realize that the Sultan of Turkey has a spiritual authority far exceeding his temporal possessions as Khalif of the Mussulmans, which makes his destiny and the fate of his people of peculiar and particular interest to the Mohammedans of the world, even though they are not connected with Turkey?

H. H. The Aga Khan: Especially in India. That relationship has been very intimate, and it has never been severed even during the war. While Mohammedan troops have been fighting against the Turks, they have been praying for the Sultan of Turkey as Khalif at the same time. They fought because they believed they were fighting for principles above that.

Nobody has proposed to punish the Germans, who are the main offenders of this war, by taking Berlin from them. The Austrian Germans are to have Vienna. Why should the Turks alone have their capital taken from them?

Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu: Mr. Aftab Ahmad, who comes from the Indian frontier, and who is a lawyer now, was a member of the Council of India.

Mr. Aftab Ahmad: Mr. President and Gentlemen, With your permission I shall observe that I feel the honor of being given this privilege of expressing my views on this momentous question,—the future of the Turkish Empire. I, as an Indian Mussulman, beg to say that the seventy millions of the Mussulmans of India occupy a special place in the great British Empire, which has played such a prominent part in bringing this war to a triumphant close. As citizens of the Empire the Indian Mussulmans have shed their blood and contributed their full share for the service and success of their Empire and the Allied cause. Not only in the other theaters of war, but even against Turkey herself, the Mussulmans of India fought for the principles of justice, freedom and self-determination - principles to which the great Allied Powers are definitely committed and to the benefit of which all races and creeds are equally entitled.

Having stood successfully the most severe test during a long period of trial and trouble, the Mussulmans of India are now naturally and, I think, rightly interested in the future settlement of the Turkish Empire, the only surviving Mohammedan power in the world and the seat and center of the dearly cherished Khalifate. But now it is said that the Turk is to be turned out of Constantinople, and that Asia Minor is to be cut up into pieces and distributed among France, Italy and Greece. We have also heard that Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria and Palestine are to be placed under non-Moslem governments. As regards Constantinople, Thrace and Asia Minor, we would earnestly appeal to the principles proclaimed by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain as bearing upon their war aims in general, and on this part of the Turkish Empire in particular.

His Highness has already referred to Point No. 12 of your Fourteen Points, and especially to the important speech delivered by our Prime Minister in January 1918, and with your permission I should just like to read a few words from your Point No. 12, that

“The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.”

And on the same point the Prime Minister was pleased to say in explaining and defining the principles for which Great Britain was fighting in this war,

“Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominately Turkish in race.”

I may be permitted to observe that these words have gone down deep into the hearts of millions of Mohammedans all over the world and nothing can eradicate them. They have put perfect faith and belief in these words, and they are anxiously waiting for the realization of the things which these words promise.

It is clear from what the Peace Conference has so far decided that the future of the enemy territories is settled upon the principle of nationality. We beg and pray that the same principle may be applied to the case of Turkey. It is needless to point out that these parts of the Turkish Empire are predominately Turkish in race, and it is not only the question of the sovereignty of the Sultan and the Khalifate, but the fate of the whole Turkish race, inhabiting these parts, is involved in your decision. Any such dismemberment of Turkey and subjugation of the Turkish race to foreign domination will be most strongly resented by the Moslems of India and will be regarded by them as due to the fact that Turkey is a Mohammedan power. This is sure to leave a sense of most bitter feeling in India and other parts of the Moslem world. There is no valid reason why Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria should be allowed to keep their capitals and Turkey should be deprived of sovereignty over Constantinople. We earnestly appeal that the Sultan should not only be allowed to possess complete sovereignty, but that in due course Turkey should be admitted to the League of Nations.

As regards Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria and Palestine, our prayer is that they should continue to be under a Mohammedan government. The Mussulmans in India and other parts of the world are most anxiously watching the settlement with a view to see how far the principles of justice and self-determination are given effect to in the case of these territories. In this connection the essential points which we would earnestly urge before this august body are:

1) Establishment of Mohammedan government, not only in name but in fact, based on the principle of self-determination.

2) Definite and effective provision for their unhampered economic development, protecting their natural resources against foreign exploitation.

3) Definite and effective provision for the spread and extension of modern education of all grades and kinds to secure moral and intellectual advancement of the people.

And, lastly, adequate representation of representative Mohammedans upon any body or institution which the League of Nations should set up for periodical inspection of territories under its mandate, so that in due course these territories may also be admitted to the League.

Such are the tests which Mussulmans will naturally apply to any settlement which the Peace Conference may be pleased to determine with regard to the Turkish Empire. We earnestly appeal that these essential points will be kept in view.

I may, in conclusion, be permitted to observe that upon the issue of your deliberations with regard to the future fate of Turkey depend, to a large extent, not only the future relations between the Indian Mussulmans and the Empire, but the situation in the whole Islamic world. We are most anxious to avoid the causes of that general unrest which is discernible in so many parts of the world at the present time and which may have most disastrous results.

Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu: Mr. Yusuf Ali was a member of the Indian Civil Service and was a member of the Government of India; and is now resident in London.

Mr Yusuf Ali: Mr. President and Gentlemen: My colleagues who have spoken before you have already placed our case before you from various points of view. There is one point of view, however, in which I think you might be interested and on which I propose to concentrate my attention. I have been a very close student of the vernacular papers in India, and especially the Mohammedan vernacular papers, and I have been struck with the fact that the chief interests of the editors, and therefore presumably of their readers, have been concerned mainly during this war with the doings and the future of the Mohammedan powers concerned. It is well known how much strain was put upon the loyalty of the Indian Mohammedans when Turkey went into the war against us, but I claim, and I venture to think that that claim is justified, that the Indian Mohammedans stood that test steadfastly and loyally; and I think that they are entitled to have a voice in the settlement of the Mohammedan countries that is now before you.

It may be asked, What is their interest? I will not at the present moment go into questions of ethnology and point out that among the various strains which compose the body of Indian Mohammedans there is a good deal of Turkish Blood and Turkish tradition. The word “Urdu” which is the name of the national language of the Indian Mohammedans, called in Europe “Hindustani,” is itself derived from a Turkish word meaning “camp,” showing the origin of that language, how it arose in the camps of the Turks and Tartars, who were a great power in the time of the Mogul Empire in India. To you, sir, it is superfluous for me to refer to the visit, the historical visit of Captain Hawkins in the reign of Jahangir, and how he mentions the language in which he talked to the Mogul court was Turkish. I do not wish to lay any particular emphasis upon this, but it will at least show you that there are Turkish affinities and that the Indian Mohammedans in feeling an interest in the Turks and in their empire are feeling an interest which is quite close to them.

But apart from that we have the Arabian strain and the Persian strain, and the Central Asian strain, and the Hindu strain among the Indian Mohammedans, but whatever the origin, we all feel that we have an interest in our brother Mussulmen. The tie of religion with us is, it seems to me, rather stronger than the tie of religion among many of the followers of any of the other great historical religions. In fact, religion seems to take almost the place of blood or nation, and you can understand and appreciate the position as regards the Indian Mohammedans feeling an interest in Turkey.

And then they also feel that the last Mohammedan power, as my friend Mr Aftab Ahmad has put it, the last remaining Mohammedan power if it vanishes will leave behind very large issues for which we venture to submit the world is not at present prepared. Here again it will be presumptuous for me to refer to the intricate political, economic and international questions which would justify us in making that statement. You gentlemen can deal with that much better than I can, but it is necessary to advert to the fact that this difficulty is present in our minds, and we base some of the arguments for favorable treatment of Turkey upon these very practical considerations.

Then there is the question of the declarations and pledges. Here I should like to say that we must take these declarations and pledges as they were understood by the Indian Mohammedans, as they would have been justified in understanding them, and I think I am right in saying that they universally expected that whatever settlement was arrived at after the war, it would not forever banish the hope of setting the Turkish and other peoples comprised in the Turkish Empire on their legs again.

Then there is the great question of the Khalifate. The Khalifate is a question on which perhaps it is difficult to speak briefly, but nevertheless, with your permission, I shall offer just a few remarks upon its practical aspect. I do not wish to go into history. I do not wish to go into theology. But I do wish to point out that the spiritual influence of the Khalifate, which is acknowledged in India by British subjects and by other subjects in other parts of the world, is intimately bound up with the prospects of educational and moral advancement among all the Moslem people, and if we handle that question in a manner that is prejudicial to the hopes and aspiration of the Moslem people, or if we cut off the whole of the old historical tradition, it is possible, indeed it is probable, that we shall make the advancement of the Moslem people more and more difficult.

Mr Lloyd-George: Is it hereditary?

Mr. Yusuf Ali: It is in theory elective, but in practice it has been hereditary. In India some of the papers recently raised the question of the spiritual organization of the Indian Mohammedans, and various suggestions and proposals were put forward, but I could not help noticing that they all related themselves to the historical growth of the spiritual head of Islam; and if we cut that off, I think that we shall find that the Indian Mohammedans will be placed at a great disadvantage, you may say owing to their own ideas, but they will in fact be placed at a great disadvantage in the race for future progress. We have at the present moment great and promising schemes for the self-development of India, politically, industrially and in other ways, and we wish and hope that the Mohammedans should take their rightful share in that self-development, but we feel that if extraneous causes, prejudices, if you like so to call them, in any way cut them off from taking their proper share as citizens of the British Indian Empire and of the British Empire, it would be a great calamity, not only to our own people, not only to the Indian Empire, but to the world at large.

It seems to us that sometimes Europe is apt to forget Islam, to forget the power that is behind it, to forget the force that it wields; and, at any rate, it is our duty clearly to point out that that power still exists, and if it is forgotten or neglected, it will only mean further complications in the future. We should like, therefore, that full consideration be given to the feelings and sentiments of the Indian Mohammedans on the question of the retention by the Turks of Constantinople and Thrace and Asia Minor, where they have substantially a Turkish population, and that the interests of the Mohammedans in all the other provinces should be so safeguarded that they have a reasonable hope of making further and further progress and entering into that committee of nations which is typified by admission when the time comes to the League of Nations.

H. H. The Maharajah of Bikanir: I should like, as a Hindu Indian, and as the ruler of one of the independent states of India under the King’s protection, to observe that the princes and the people, even though they are non-Moslems, will be found in general sympathy with the aspiration of their brother Moslems in India. And as one who has the honor of representing the Indian Princes at this Conference, I should like to point out that the premier prince in India happens to be a Mohammedan ruler who has influenced for the good not only the activities of his own state, but Moslem opinion throughout India, in favor, of course, of the King Emperor and also of the Allies. I should like to plead also very strongly for the retention of the Sultan in Constantinople, and to strongly deprecate any partition of Turkey proper.

I need not repeat two points which I had put down, but which have been brought out by His Highness, the Aga Khan, points concerning the tremendous loyalty of the Indian Mohammedans who formed a very considerable portion of the Indian Army, whose loyalty was taxed to the utmost. I can testify from having been with them in the field, both in France, where thousands of Indian Moslems lie now, and in Egypt. In Mesopotamia, in East Africa, West Africa, the Shantung Province, and in every theater of war, the Mohammedans have fought, and the point which His Highness brought out is a point which must appeal to all, that though they recognized the Khalif as their spiritual ruler, yet they fought against him: before and after fighting, every day, in the mornings and evenings, they were offering prayers for the Khalif, while still fighting for the King and the Allies in the cause of civilization.

The recent unrest in India is undoubtedly a reflex to a very great extent Of the tremendous feeling of the Mohammedans and their apprehensions in regard to the future of Turkey, about which all sorts of rumors are current, and I would beg with a full sense of responsibility to say that if the Sultan and the Turks are deprived of Constantinople and there is a partition of Turkey, there will be grave unrest, hatred and trouble in the future, not only for India, not only for the British Empire, but for the world at large.

Rt. Hon. Lord Sinha: Gentlemen, I do not think it necessary for me to occupy any of your time after the matter has been so fully dealt with by my colleague, The Maharajah of Bikanir, as well as by the three Mohammedan gentlemen who have had the privilege of addressing you. I can only remind you once again of the fact that there are seventy millions of Mohammedans in India, which comprise, therefore, more than one-fifth of the population of the country. These Mohammedans comprise among them some of the most war-like races in India, and furnish a very large proportion of the Indian Army, of that Army with which the victory over Turkey has been so successfully obtained. I am confident from what I have read and seen as regards the feelings of my Mohammedan fellow-citizens in India, and I am confirmed in that feeling by the discussions I have had both yesterday and today with the three gentlemen who have addressed you just now, that there is grave anxiety in India among the Mohammedans with regard to the rumored dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The Indian Mohammedan will not understand why, when the German is left in Berlin and the Austrian in Vienna, the Turk should be expelled from Constantinople. He will be apt, and I am afraid he will have reasonable justification for it,—he will be inclined to consider that after all he has fought against his religion and that, notwithstanding the professions of the various eminent statesmen who have declared the war aims and objects with regard to this war which has just terminated, that notwithstanding these declarations after all it has been, like in old times, the war of one religion against another. And what is more, and what is of great consequence to us in India, the Indian Mohammedan will have the belief that he has been made to fight by false promises, made to fight against the spiritual head of his religion and made to fight, therefore, against his own religion himself, which to him is a far more living faith than, I am sorry to say, it is with regard to many others. That is the danger which is such a menace to the British Empire, and therefore I submit it to the world at large, and I do not hesitate for one moment to ask you to give it your full and grave consideration. We in India are likely to be sufferers in the first instance no doubt from this feeling among the Mohammedans, but it will not be confined to India. The peace of the world will be gravely imperiled, and I therefore join my voice with that of my fellow-subjects in earnestly proclaiming that the Turks should not be dealt with more severely or less justly than the other enemies in this war.

Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu: I should like to give you some information which you may not have heard of the reality of the danger to the peace of the world which is thereby involved. It is only three days ago that I saw a representative of your Government, Mr President, who has been in captivity with the Bolshevists in Turkestan. He has come home after a most perilous journey, involving six sentences of death, and he tells me that all the way he traveled through that vast Mohammedan country he was struck by the various alterations in the tone of the Mussulman towards the Entente since the Armistice. They have heard these rumors of the dismemberment of Turkey, and he was struck by the anti-Entente feeling.

I don’t know whether you have heard of the very serious trouble that we have had in the Punjab in India, where certain Hindu seditionists, largely influenced I believe by outside influences, largely influenced, I believe, by Bolshevik influences, were stirring up the people to resist the laws of the land. The Mosques were thrown open to them, and the non-Mussulman, the non-believer, the Hindu, was invited into the Mohammedan pulpit to preach opposition to the laws of the Indian Government, a thing which never happened before in the history of the world, I should imagine, and it would have been regarded by the old-fashioned Mohammedan as a desecration of their Mosques. Now, this is due, not to one item, but to a whole series of items. The talk about Constantinople began it; the rumors of the landing of Italian and Greek soldiers in Asia Minor, the suggestions that the Mosque of San Sofia should be rededicated as a Christian Church, all these things have brought into these people’s minds the belief that despite what was said to them during the war, this war has turned out to be a war of non-Mohammedans against Mohammedans, a war of non-Moslem faiths against the Moslem faith; and the feeling which has been shown by my colleagues today merely makes me implore you to remember that that feeling, if it is not corrected by the terms of peace, may endanger the peace of the world throughout the East, and may add to the already dangerous elements in Russia.

Mr Lloyd-George: Surely, Mr Secretary of State, the Mohammedans of India must know that most of the fighting has been done among the Christians.

Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu: The fighting has been done among the Christians, but the peace terms dictated to our Christian enemies will strike them as so much more moderate than the peace terms which lead to the complete disappearance of our only Mussulman state. And did you see that the Turkish newspapers have published a statement that they thought the terms of peace to Germany very fair?

The President: I want to speak of one thing that has been mentioned, though it has not been dwelt upon, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding. That is the suggestion that entrance into the League of Nations should be left open as freely to Mussulman Governments as to other. There is really no difficulty upon that point; but I want to call your attention to the fact that the covenant of the League limits membership to self-governing nations, and that Germany is not admitted at once because we are not sure that she is a self-governing nation. It was the opinion among all the conferees on this subject that we must wait until we had conclusive proof that Germany was no longer under the government of a single individual or a small group of individuals, but under the government of her own people, and that therefore her disposition to the rest of the world and her ambitions were altogether altered before she could be admitted into the League. I for my part do not anticipate any opposition to the admission of any government that displays those changes. So that it is not a question of present political relationship.

Mr Lloyd-George: There will certainly be no religious question.

The President: Certainly not. It is merely a question of political form of government.

There is another matter that I would like to make clear in that connection: The whole theory of mandates is not the theory of permanent subordination. It is the theory of development, of putting upon the mandatory the duty of assisting in the development of the country under mandate, in order that it may be brought to a capacity for self-government and self-dependence which for the time being it has not reached, and that therefore the countries under mandate are candidates, so to say, for full membership in the family of nations. I think that is a very important fundamental idea of the whole mandatory conception.

H. H. The Aga Khan (or Lord Sinha): In these Mohammedan countries democracy is really part of their religion in a way. It is a historical fact that in Islam it was common for centuries, while in the Middle Ages it did not exist in many other countries, and those self-governing and democratic principles should be applied to these Mohammedans. They should be allowed to enter the League of Nations, and nothing should be done to prevent their remaining self-governing nations, just as Germany will enter when she changes her spirit.

Mr. Yusuf Ali: We are afraid, sir, that if the arrangements are as rumored, that will delay the process of their becoming self-governing, or will destroy their hopes altogether.

The President: Of course, I think we all recognize that the trouble in Asia Minor has been the rivalry and clash of nationalities and religions, and that the problem is complex because the mixture is so complex and the competition so sharp.

(The Indian Delegation withdraws)

Mr Lloyd George says that he is much impressed by the accumulating evidence of the unrest that would be caused in the Moslem world by the removal of the Sultan from Constantinople. Neither Great Britain nor France, as great Mohammedan Powers, can afford this unrest, and neither can the United States, if she is about to become a Mohammedan Power. If the Turkish capital were removed to Brussa and the Sultan with the Khalifate is established there, there would always be ferment and intrigue. He himself is in favour of keeping the Khalifate at Constantinople. The United States of America, the probable mandatory of Constantinople and the Straits, can be relied on to be absolutely impartial. He feels himself more or less pledged by the declaration he had made on behalf of the Turkish Government. M Clemenceau had sent him a telegram approving this declaration.

M Clemenceau says he cannot recall it.

Mr Lloyd George says he will let M Clemenceau have a copy. The British Empire had nearly a million men fighting the Turks when no-one else had more than two thousand. He asked his colleagues to consider the desirability of keeping the Khalifate at Constantinople.

Jimbuna

05-18-19, 07:39 AM

18th May 1919

Aftermath of War

M. Paderewski resigns Premiership of Poland.

Banquet of the League of Red Cross Societies given at the Hotel Ritz, Paris. May 18, 1919.
https://i.imgur.com/3U51ix8.jpg

Delegations of various organizations lay wreaths upon the statue of Jeanne d'Arc, in the Place de Rivoli. In the background, a corner of the Hotel Regina, the headquarters in France of the American Red Cross. May 18, 1919.
https://i.imgur.com/2uvKVmV.jpg

Guido von List, an Austrian occultist and early leader of the Pagan new religious movement of Wotanism, has passed away (his works become influential for occultist members of the Nazi Party and SS)
https://i.imgur.com/VPxrJQP.jpg

1919 Copa del Rey concludes with Arenas Club de Getxo defeating FC Barcelona.
https://i.imgur.com/lrY3Gle.jpg

Sailor Steve

05-18-19, 06:48 PM

Sunday, May 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

05-19-19, 07:15 AM

19th May 1919

Aftermath of War

General Pilsudski prepares to attack the Ukraine.

Some life returning to the damaged town of Reims, France.
https://i.imgur.com/wkUHMiW.jpg

Members of the Women's Royal Air Force (WRAF) boarding tenders to go to their billets in Cologne where they were based as part of the Allied occupation force.
https://i.imgur.com/aee60R1.jpg

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk lands in Samsun to organize a resistance against Allied occupation of Turkey, starting the Turkish War of Independence.
https://i.imgur.com/aNqqX0G.jpg

Ship Losses:

No. 5 (Soviet Navy) Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War: Battle of Troitsa: The floating battery was bombed in the Dvina River by British aircraft, beached, and scuttled.

Sailor Steve

05-19-19, 01:06 PM

Monday, May 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Three

Marshal Foch and General Weygand are introduced by M Clemenceau.

Marshal Foch reports that he has visited the Allied Armies in the occupation zone of the Rhine. He had first visited the French Army at Mayence. The French have eighteen divisions ready to march, three of which are in the Belgian zone. Not all these are complete with full cadres, but they have sufficient to start at once. There are a few men on leave who would have to be recalled. The men at the head were in a good frame of mind, and ready to do what is required at once. The army is fully equipped with munitions and transport. In short the French army is ready to march with fifteen divisions, besides three in the Belgian zone and three cavalry divisions.

To the left of the French army is the United States Army at Coblenz. This consists of the First Army composed of three divisions of Infantry, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd. After the 27th May, the 3rd Division will be withdrawn; hence the position is that three Divisions were available till May 27th, and thereafter two Divisions. In addition, if necessary, the 4th and 5th Divisions, which are about to be withdrawn, can be made available by countermanding the transport arrangements, which will commence their withdrawal on the 21st. By cancelling these arrangements, five Divisions can be made available. The United States divisions have everything complete; artillery, ambulances, ordnance, munitions. He offered the United States Commander-in-Chief a French cavalry Division, in order that he may maintain communication with the British Army on his left. The only thing which might be insufficient was the number of Divisions.

President Wilson points out that the American Divisions are 27,000 men strong.

Marshal Foch, continuing, says that to the left of the United States Army is the British Army at Cologne. It consists of ten Divisions which, however, are not ready to march without seven days’ warning. The officers who had conducted the campaign were being gradually replaced by young officers, but this process is not yet complete. The British Army lacks certain things, for example, guns on motor carriages and cavalry, but it will be ready to march after seven days’ warning. He asks Mr Lloyd George’s permission to draw General Wilson’s attention to the deficiencies, and to arrange matters with him as rapidly as possible so as to reduce the time within which the army can march.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Secretary of State for War is in Paris, and the best plan would be for Marshal Foch to see him.

Marshal Foch, continuing, said that north of the British Army is the Belgian Army, consisting of six infantry Divisions, and one cavalry Division, with three French Divisions already referred to in support. The Belgian Army is in excellent condition. It had lacked some motor transport, which the French Army had supplied, and it is now quite ready to march. From this review of the situation it resulted that the whole army would be ready to march as soon as the British effectives were completed, and a French cavalry Division moved to the left of the United States Army. At the same time the Polish Army is being rapidly transported. 192 trains have already passed, each conveying a battalion of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, or a battery of artillery, or supplies. About 100 trains remain to complete the transport. At the rate of 6 trains a day, 17 or 18 days would be required to complete operations. Hence in little over a fortnight the new Polish army would have been completely concentrated in Poland. It was well constructed with complete cadres. In reply to M Clemenceau he says that it contains at least 600 French officers. It is a new, fresh army, and it will be acting from a very advantageous geographical situation.

As regards the Czechoslovak army, he gathers from the correspondence that it is hoped to send at least one Division in the direction of Nuremberg, which will be able to join with the Allied troops marching eastwards from Mayence.

From the above the conclusion he draws, although it is open to reservation, is that it would be best not to launch the offensive until the whole of the Poles had been transported, as otherwise at the least hint of an offensive by the Allied and Associated Powers, the transport across Germany would cease.

The above is all he had to sas from a military point of view, but he wishes to report that Dr Heim, a representative of Bavaria, had asked a fortnight ago to see someone from GHQ. The day before yesterday he had reported that he was ready to enter into relations with the French representatives. Consequently an officer had been designated to meet him at Luxembourg, with instructions to hear what he had to say, but not to commit himself in replying.

In the course of a short subsequent discussion, Mr Lloyd George put the question as to how soon the Allied troops could march, supposing first that Marshal Foch were to arrange with Mr Churchill in the course of the day to make good the deficiencies of the British Army, and second, supposing the Germans were told on Thursday next that they must sign within five days, or the armistice would expire.

Marshal Foch says that if the British deficiencies are made good, the armies can march at the expiration of the five days.

Mr Lloyd George then authorized Marshal Foch to make any arrangements he could with Mr Churchill, so as to enable the army to march at the end of this period. He feels that if the order were given for them to march, the armies should be in a position to march at once.

(It is agreed that Marshal Foch should see Mr Churchill, the British Secretary of State for War, at once, and make all arrangements with him to put the British Army on the Rhine in a position to march without delay.)

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand withdraw.)

Sailor Steve

05-19-19, 06:36 PM

Monday, May 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:30

Meeting of the Council of Three

...

Sailor Steve

05-19-19, 06:39 PM

Monday, May 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

...

Sailor Steve

05-19-19, 06:43 PM

Monday, May 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 16:30

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers

...

Jimbuna

05-20-19, 11:18 AM

20th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Rhine Army ready to march into Germany in case of refusal of Peace Terms.

German troops again occupy Riga.

German prisoners put to the work of collecting unexploded shells in the former battlefields of France.
https://i.imgur.com/9tTU3nq.jpg

French children in the war-torn city of Reims wait for supplies to be distributed by the Red Cross.
https://i.imgur.com/S8vPiQP.jpg

Sailor Steve

05-20-19, 05:53 PM

Tuesday, May 20, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. The Council has under consideration the German note on the economic effect of the Treaty of Peace, and a draft reply agreed to by American, British, French and Italian representatives.

Mr Lloyd George considers that, in paragraph 2, a statement should be given as to Great Britain’s imports of food and iron ore, in order to show that Germany would only be in the same position as Great Britain had been in for years. In paragraph 5, Mr Lloyd George suggests that the actual figures of shipping losses should be given, in order to bring home to the German people the reasons why they would suffer in common with the rest of the world from the shortage of shipping.

President Wilson comments that the last paragraph is somewhat weak. If any part of the German case is true, it is a bad reply to point out that the millions of German citizens who had been engaged in military matters could turn their activities to works of peace.

Mr Lloyd George says that the case of Great Britain is the answer to this part of the German contention.

President Wilson points out the omission from sufficient emphasis on the fact that all countries would be embarrassed by lack of raw material owing to the shortage of shipping.

Mr Lloyd George says his general comment on the letter is that this is the most important of the replies to any of the German letters. It is very important to make a thoroughly good case, which should be supported by figures.

President Wilson agrees in this view. It should be pointed out how small the proportion of imports that Germany would lose would be to the total losses due to the war.

S Orlando said that Italy before the war could only import one seventh part of the raw materials she required in Italian bottoms. After the war, she could only import 1 fourteenth in Italian bottoms.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that someone with the gift of writing should be asked to re-draft the reply.

(After some discussion, it is agreed that Lord Curzon should be asked to re-draft the reply for the consideration of the Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.)

2. M Clemenceau signs a French translation of the reply to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter of May 13th on the subject of Reparation and Responsibilities.

(It was agreed that the two letters should be published as soon as they have been sent.)

3. Mr Lloyd George reads extracts from views expressed by Herr Dernburg, German Minister of Finance, on the Peace Terms, to Colonel Thelwall of the British Mission, Berlin.

4. Committee on New States: Reference to Drafting committee of Draft Treaty with Poland Sir Maurice Hankey reads a letter from Mr Headlam-Morley urging that the Draft Treaty with Poland attached Report No. 2 of the Committee on New States should be referred to the Drafting Committee.

(The following is accepted and initialed:

“It is agreed that the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference should carefully review the draft of a Treaty with Poland attached to Report No. 2 of the Committee on New States. The Drafting Committee should suggest any alterations that may seem to them advisable in order to carry out more effectively the principles and objects with which this Treaty has been drawn up. If there are any material alterations which the Drafting Committee wish to suggest they should confer with the Committee and render a joint report to the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.”

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward the resolution to the Secretary-General for the Drafting Committee.)

5. Mr Lloyd George reads a telegram from British GHQ, Constantinople, dated May 17th, to the effect that the Greeks on landing had been fired on by Turkish gendarmes and that firing had continued all day, the Greeks attacking and killing Turkish soldiers whenever they were seen. It was further alleged in the telegram that the wounded were killed and some of them thrown into the sea and that the Greek Officers had made no attempt to restrain their men.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to bring this to the attention of Mr Venizelos.)

6. The following resolution, carrying out the decision of the previous day, is initialed by M Clemenceau, President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George:

“The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have considered the attached letter from M. Fromageot and have agreed that the following words ‘during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied and Associated Power against Germany’, which had been omitted from the French text but retained in the English text of Article 232 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, should be re-instated in the French text.”

S Orlando, however, points out that the question had been examined by an expert Committee which had voted unanimously an American proposition in favour of the omission of the words quoted and the addition of other words at the end of the article. He asks if this had been in mind when the decision had been taken on the previous day. He suggests that before a final decision is taken, the experts should be seen.

President Wilson says he had some vague recollection of the incident. The proposal had been made by Mr Dulles, one of the American lawyers, whose thought had been for United States citizens on board the Lusitania who, unless some special provision was made, would get no reparation. From a pecuniary, though not from a sentimental, point of view, this was a relatively small matter. Whatever had been the attitude of the experts, however, it was evident that nothing had got into the Treaty.

S Orlando points out that M Fromageot’s letter explains that the purpose is to exclude the claims by New States.

Mr Lloyd George says this is not the case. He proposes that the decision of the previous day should be adhered to.

M Orlando reserves his consent, but undertakes to consider the matter with experts.

7. The Council has before them a copy of the reply by the Bolshevists to Dr Nansen’s letter, together with a Memorandum agreed to by Mr Hoover, Lord Robert Cecil, M Clémentel, and Professor Attolico, with a covering letter from Lord Robert Cecil to Sir Maurice Hankey.

After a prolonged perusal of this document M Clemenceau says he does not see how any change could be made in what the Council had tried to do. There is no doubt that the Bolshevists are now going down hill. Dr Nansen had suggested a humanitarian course, but Lenin was clearly trying to draw it into a political course.

President Wilson says that Lenin’s argument is that the price the Allied and Associated Powers are trying to exact for food was that their enemies should beat the Bolshevists by compelling the latter to stop fighting. What was really intended was to stop aggressive fighting by the Bolshevists, because this was inconsistent with food distribution. They were perfectly correct in claiming that the Allies were supporting Kolchak and Dennikin, and not putting pressure on them to stop fighting. Lenin’s argument is that for him to stop fighting is to sign his death warrant.

M Clemenceau points out that Lenin was not in the hands of the Allies.

President Wilson replies that if supplies are stopped, Kolchak and Dennikin would have to stop fighting too.

M Clemenceau says it is impossible to stop Lenin fighting, and his word cannot be trusted.

President Wilson says he does not feel the same chagrin that he had formerly felt at having no policy in regard to Russia. It had been impossible to have a policy hitherto.

Mr Lloyd George says there had been very little choice. There had been a lunatic revolution which certain persons, in whom little confidence was felt, were trying to squash. The only reason why the Allies had encouraged them was to prevent Germany from getting supplies. They are, however, now entitled to say, having supported us so far “you cannot leave us in the lurch.”

President Wilson says that the Americans had only gone to Siberia to get the Czechs out, and then the Czechs had refused to go.

Mr Lloyd George says that his Government’s object had been to reconstitute the Eastern front. They had succeeded in doing this, though somewhat East of the line on which they had hoped to establish it. Nevertheless, the reconstitution of the front did prevent the Germans from getting supplies, with which they might have broken the blockade. The feeling in Great Britain was that it was impossible now to leave these people in the lurch.

President Wilson says that at least pledges could be exacted for further support.

M Clemenceau fully agrees.

Mr Lloyd George agrees, and says it could be done in either of two ways:

1) By a formal dispatch;

2) By summoning the representatives of the various Russian groups now in Paris and putting the conditions to them.

President Wilson prefers the first proposal. The second would be contrary to the idea that had been at the basis of the Prinkipo scheme, namely, that it would not be fair to hear one party without hearing the other. His view was that a formal demand and notice ought to be sent to the various Russian groups. He had himself sent something that was almost equivalent to this, as he felt he was entitled to do.

(After some discussion it is agreed that Mr. Philip Kerr should be asked to prepare a draft for the consideration of the Council.)

Mr Kerr is sent for.

While awaiting Mr. Kerr President Wilson reads extracts from a document which had been alluded to at a discussion on the previous day, signed by Mr Kerensky and some of his friends, and which contained a number of proposals, including the following:

i) That the Powers should only help the various Russian groups on certain fundamental conditions for the establishing of Russia on a democratic basis with a constituent assembly, and Governments which declined to agree should not be supported.

ii) That as a Constituent Assembly could clearly not be called at the present time, Regional Assemblies should be elected on a democratic basis for the re-establishment of Local Government.

iii) That a representative mission should be sent by the Great Powers to Russia to give assurance of sympathy and assistance.

iv) That proposals for supplying food are harmful.

These proposals in short, President Wilson continues, are that the Powers should obtain an assurance from each group that it would be united with the other groups to form an all Russian Government on a constituent basis, and that in the meantime each group should do what it could in its own area.

Mr Lloyd George is afraid of splitting up Russia.

President Wilson says it is merely proposing to substitute a democratic for an autocratic basis.

(After some further discussion Mr Kerr entered.)

President Wilson informs Mr Kerr that the Council desired to make a further effort with Russia along the lines of definite assurance to the several groups as to what they were aiming at. They have been reading a document prepared by certain Russian groups in Paris who, though anti-Bolshevist, are suspicious of reactionary tendencies among the groups fighting the Bolshevists. These suggest that pledges should be demanded from the various groups fighting the Bolshevists to establish a government on a democratic basis. In the meanwhile it was proposed to establish a democratic Government in these Regions by setting up Provincial Central Assemblies. The idea of the Council is to embody these demands in a message to the several Governments, and they hoped Mr. Kerr would prepare a draft for their consideration.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the question of the Baltic Provinces had not been discussed. All the other Russian groups fighting the Bolshevists were violently opposed to any recognition of Estonia and Latvia and the other Baltic provinces. They alleged that to recognize them would be to tear up Russia and to bar access to the sea.

Mr Kerr asks what promise is to be given to the various Russian groups to encourage them to give these undertakings.

Mr Lloyd George says it is not a question of promising more, but of continuing the assistance which was now given.

President Wilson says that the dispatch should intimate that without satisfactory guarantees no further help would be given.

Mr Kerr asks if they are to accept the frontiers laid down by the League of Nations.

Mr Lloyd George says they must.

President Wilson says there is no other solution. He then produces a letter from Mr Hoover on the subject of the Baltic Provinces, where there is an appalling shortage of food. This was due, according to Mr Hoover, not to lack of financial or shipping facilities, but to the absence of order. He suggests that enough naval force should be given to provide for the protection of relief in the coast towns, and for its distribution along the coast. In this way the established governments should be helped to preserve order. The situation is so appalling from the humanitarian point of view, that he hoped the Council would be willing to hear a deputation composed of the British and the United States Naval authorities and himself.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that in the first instance Mr Hoover should discuss the matter with the Admirals.

(This is agreed to.)

(Mr Kerr withdraws with instructions to draft a letter for consideration.)

8. The Council has before it a draft reply prepared by Mr Philip Kerr, under instructions from Mr Lloyd George, to Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter of May 10th on the subject of prisoners of War.

(The reply is approved.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to ask the Secretary-General to translate it into French for M Clemenceau’s signature.)

(It is agreed that Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter, together with the reply, should be published after despatch to the Germans).

9. The Council has before them a letter from the Serbian Delegation urging that out of the initial one thousand million pounds to be paid by Germany, eighty-million pounds should be specifically assigned to Serbia, together with a Memorandum by the Committee considering the question of Reparation in the Austrian Treaty, to whom it had been referred on May 13th.

(The Memorandum of the Committee is approved, subject to the omission of the first paragraph of Clause 2, and the first four words of the second paragraph.)

Sailor Steve

05-21-19, 07:38 AM

Tuesday, May 20, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers

...

Jimbuna

05-21-19, 08:27 AM

21st May 1919

American troops piling 60,000 sacks of bran and oats destined for the U.S. Army of Occupation in Germany.
https://i.imgur.com/7gb2ke7.jpg

Ship Losses:

Demosthenes (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The minelayer was damaged and abandoned after the explosion of Revel ( Soviet Navy).
Gelma (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The auxiliary vessel was destroyed by the explosion of Revel ( Soviet Navy).
Moskvityanin (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The Emir Bukharski-class destroyer was sunk by ships of an improved British flotilla, or beached and abandoned after failures of gun and electrical systems during the battle, in Tyub-Karagan Bay in the Caspian Sea. The destroyer was bombed and damaged the next day by an aircraft from HMS Aladir Useynov. She was refloated on 10 January 1920 by White forces.
No. 2 (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The floating battery was shelled and sunk by HMS Kruger ( Royal Navy). 12 crewmen were killed.
No. 107 (Soviet Navy Red Movement) Russian Civil War: The gunboat was rammed and sunk on the Kama River by Tovarishch Markin ( Soviet Navy).
Revel (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The depot ship, loaded with a cargo of fuel, was shelled, caught fire and exploded.
Schastlivvy (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The patrol boat was wrecked while trying to decoy the British ships during the battle.
Tuman (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The mine carrier was destroyed by the explosion of Revel ( Soviet Navy).
Zoroaster (Soviet Navy Russian Red forces) Russian Civil War, Allied intervention: Battle of Alexander Fort: The vessel was destroyed by the explosion of Revel ( Soviet Navy).

Sailor Steve

05-21-19, 08:33 PM

Wednesday, May 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Three

1. M Clemenceau passes out copies of a request from the Germans for an extension of the time limit on signing the Peace Treaty.

2. French Chief-of-Staff General Albi is brought in. M Clemenceau has a dispatch from the French Military Mission at Prague saying that General Haller's Polish troops have attacked Ukrainian troops at Przemysl and are threatening Borislav. The Ukrainians have asked for help from the Czechs, but the Czechs in their turn are afraid of attacks by the Bolshevists should they agree to help.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is a breach of faith by General Haller, who had absolutely no right to take this action. He says that General Botha is much impressed with the Ukrainians’ case, and has suggested that the Council of Four should see the Ukrainians. The Poles are helping to crush an independent movement against the Bolsheviks.

President Wilson says that Mr. Hoover has suggested that the whole group should be informed that supplies of every kind would stop if fighting did not cease.

Mr Lloyd George says that Sir Esme Howard, who had always been favorable to the Poles, has sent him a memorandum advising that the Poles ought to be stopped on their present lines.

M Clemenceau asks if President Wilson’s memorandum has been sent to the Poles.

President Wilson reminds him that it had been suspended owing to the receipt of Mr Paderewski’s telegram.

Mr Lloyd George urges that the Ukrainian Delegation should be heard. These small nations are going straight to perdition, and adopting all the worst vices of which the Prussians had been accused.

President Wilson says that the first question seems to be to define the boundaries. Until that is done, it is difficult for the Council to take up an intelligible position for stopping the fighting between these States.

Mr Lloyd George advocates the stoppage of food and munitions as a means of bringing the fighting to an end. The Polish Ukrainian Armistice Commission has defined the boundary. General Botha told him that the Polish population in the Lemberg region was only about one-sixth of the total.

President Wilson says that Mr Paderewski has told him that Lemberg was Polish.

Mr Lloyd George says that according to General Botha, Lemberg is a Polish town in the Ukrainian district.

(It is agreed that General Botha and the Members of the Polish-Ukrainian Armistice Commission, as well as the Ukrainian Delegation should be seen on the same afternoon at 16:00)

(General Albi withdraws.)

3. President Wilson reads a draft reply to the German proposals on the subject of the League of Nations. This reply has been prepared by the appropriate Committee of the Conference, of which Lord Robert Cecil had acted as Chairman.

(The reply is approved. Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to inform the Secretary-General, and ask him to prepare a French translation for M Clemenceau’s signature.)

(It is at this point that Colonel Henri was seen.)

4. Mr Lloyd George hands round a scheme in regard to Italian claims, covering both Fiume and Turkey, which he has prepared for a basic of consideration. S Orlando has been called away to meet his colleagues on the borders of Italy, and has suggested that the opportunity might be taken for a private discussion between the other three members of the Council in regard to Italian claims, and it was for this reason that he had prepared this Scheme.

(There is a short adjournment for reading this proposal.)

Mr Lloyd George says that perhaps the Council would be glad to hear his reasons. He had discussed the matter for two days with some of his colleagues in the British Cabinet, who had come from London for the purpose. He first refers to the question of Asia Minor. He points out that there is undoubtedly a good deal of unrest in the Mohammedan world, in regard to the future of Asia Minor and Turkey generally. Great Britain is, perhaps, the greatest Mohammedan power. There were some 70 millions of Mohammedans in India and several millions in Egypt and the Sudan. There has lately been a good deal of trouble in both these countries. Now Afghanistan is in ferment, and the Amir has declared war. About one and a quarter millions of troops have been raised in India, a large proportion of the fighting men being Mohammedans. These had done the bulk of the fighting against the Turks. It is true there had been some French troops in Gallipoli and a large number of British troops had been used both in Gallipoli and in the subsequent campaigns against the Turks. Nevertheless, in the campaigns subsequent to Gallipoli, the Indian troops had preponderated. The Mohammedan world realized this. Undoubtedly, the partition of Asia Minor would cause anger in the Mohammedan world. The more he thinks the matter over, the less is he, as head of the Power which had done nine-tenths of the fighting against Turkey, willing to agree to the partition of Asia Minor. This was the view of the British Cabinet. Not only would it create permanent trouble in the East, but they had come to the conclusion that it would be unjust. The Allies have no more right to split up Turkey than Germany, in former days, had had to split up Poland. Germany had had exactly the same justification in the case of Poland as there was now in the case of Turkey, namely, that the Government was incompetent. The Allies had a perfect right to say that the Turks should not rule over alien races like the Greeks, Armenians and Arabs, whom they had always misgoverned. But this argument does not apply in those parts of Turkey where the population is overwhelmingly Turk. If Smyrna, and Constantinople and Armenia are ruled out, the population of Anatolia would probably be more than 90% Turk. As an instance of the danger of partition, he mentions the division of Bengal, which has caused trouble for years. Supposing Anatolia were divided, with the French in the North and the Italians in the South and the Sultan were at Brusa, would it be possible for the French to avoid interference? How could they help it with the Sultan in their sphere?

M Clemenceau himself has said that this was an impossible situation and had suggested that there should be two Sultans, one in the North and one in the South. But it is unjustifiable to tear the population in half. It will cause constant unrest and trouble throughout the Mohammedan world and the British Delegation cannot agree to it. He would like the same power which had the mandate for Constantinople to have the mandate for Anatolia. This is the view of the British Delegation after two days largely devoted to the study of the question. They considered that one power ought to control both, and that power should be the one in Constantinople. In Armenia and Mesopotamia and in Syria where there were non-Turkish races, other powers could govern. But in the case of Anatolia there should be some sort of Government by men of the Turkish race. Some sort of control, however, is desirable. Otherwise there might occur massacres of such Greeks and Armenians and the inhabitants of such other races as remained. The British Delegation would prefer America to exercise this control. The reason for this - and it is necessary to speak very plainly in considering these great problems affecting the future of the world - is that the United States of America would be more acceptable to the Mohammedan world than any other party. One reason was that America is known to have a very great respect for liberty and would consequently be expected to be very fair. Another reason was that America has no past in dealings with Mohammedans. This was not the case either with France or Great Britain. The Mohammedans are honestly afraid lest the Algerian experiment should be tried in Turkey, involving the complete subservience of Mohammedans to Christians. No doubt there would be the same feeling towards Great Britain. A second reason was that if France were given the mandate for Anatolia, Italy would have the right to complain under the Treaty of London. Italy fears lest France should regard herself as the only Mediterranean Power. This is really the basis of the whole of Baron Sonnino’s case. Italy must also be ruled out from a mandate for the whole of Anatolia. This is hardly arguable. To give it to France, however, would make the position of Italy impossible. Hence, he could see nothing for it but for the United States of America to accept the mandate.

If, however, the United States cannot see its way to accept a mandate, he sees no alternative but to continue the present system with the Turks in entire control. In reality, however, it would not work like the present system. America would have a mandate for Armenia and for Constantinople and it would not be possible for the Turk to remain absolutely free to misrule as he wished. As far as he knows the Turk never had perpetrated any very serious atrocities in Anatolia, even if he had never governed it particularly well. Moreover, the present system included certain restrictions on Turkish administration. There is a debt under an International Board; as France is the largest holder of the debt, the Board had a French President. This would continue. As regards concessions, this was probably a more nominal than real difficulty, since no one, except the United States, has any money. Hence, a scramble for concessions among the European Powers was a scramble for nothing. France has the Cameroons and Togoland to look after, both requiring a good deal of development. Moreover, his proposal gives France a provisional mandate for Syria until the report of the Commission is received. If the report is against France, there might have to be some reconsideration by the Powers in common. It is, however, essential for President Wilson to get home before very long, and the same applied to himself, and some provisional arrangement was necessary. These are his views, which had been prepared in consultation with his colleagues. He does not pretend that he had not vacillated. He had come to the conclusion, however, that any other solution would cause trouble to France and to Great Britain, and to the peace of the world. Hence, he cannot consent to the partition of Anatolia. Finally, until Russia is settled, he thinks it would be necessary for the United States to control the Caucasus also. The British are in control at present, but they cannot see their way to remain there.

He wishes to point out that these proposals are closely linked up with his proposals in regard to the Adriatic. In the interests of the peace of the world, he thought it would be worth while to press these on the Yugoslavs.

President Wilson points out certain inconsistencies in Mr. Lloyd George’s plan. Very good grounds are found in Asia Minor against handing over the population against its will to a Mandatory. But in the case of Yugoslavia the same principle is not applied. The only way to remove that inconsistency is to adopt the principle of the plebiscite which he had advocated. For example, in the case of the Islands, the only way to settle the question of which population predominates is by a plebiscite since the official statistics were disputed both by the Italians and the Yugoslavs. Whenever the Yugoslavs had been forced to intervene with a plebiscite, the figures had gone against the Italians. Even in regard to Lissa an inhabitant of that Island had told him that the population would not vote for the Italians. He, himself, all along had been willing to say to the Italians you must evacuate the whole territory which will then be put provisionally under the League of Nations, Fiume for the time being becoming a free City giving full access to the district served by the Port.

This access would continue until the construction of a Port of equivalent usefulness at Buccari. Then he would take the vote of the population in regard to Fiume.

In regard to the other territories, the League of Nations would arrange a plebiscite and Italy should be allowed to have any considerable district other than a mere Township that voted for her. This plan would square with the principles proposed by Mr. Lloyd George for Anatolia. His idea is the same as Mr Lloyd George had suggested in a conversation with him just before the meeting in regard to Silesia, where Mr. Lloyd George had suggested doubts as to whether the population was Polish in sentiment. There might be cases where the preference of the population was stronger than the nationality. For example, there might be people in Silesia who, though Polish in origin, prefer to remain German. The same principle might apply to the Adriatic. On the coast of Asia Minor on the Aegean littoral there is a considerable Greek population. He is fully in favour of giving the Turks complete access to the sea but he is apprehensive of extending Turkish sovereignty to the coast in the neighborhood of the Dodecanese. If Turkish sovereignty extended to these shores, the Turks would always remember that the Islands had not long since been taken from them.

To illustrate this, President Wilson brings out an ethnographical map of Turkey pointing out that the population of the coast was very similar to the population of the Island. There was a close similarity between Mr Lloyd George’s plan and his own proposals. He himself, had suggested that the Turks should retain full sovereignty in Anatolia but that the Sultan should be allowed to inhabit a reserved area in Constantinople in the territory of the Mandatory for the Straits. Nevertheless, he will not be hampered in his administration of Anatolia by the Mandatory of the Straits though he might sometimes be guided by the Mandatory’s advice. If the United States were the Mandatory of the Straits they would not in the least object if the Sultan were advised in stipulated matters by other Powers on the subject of the government of Anatolia.

Mr Lloyd George considered that if the United States could not take a Mandatory over Anatolia, it would be better for the Sultan to clear out of Constantinople. The Sultan’s Court and guards comprising a very large number of people, would be a great inconvenience to the Mandatory Power.

President Wilson suggests the guards might be limited in number. Since Saturday he has been considering the question very carefully and he doubts the advisability of accepting a Mandate for Anatolia. If the same Power is Mandatory in Constantinople and in Armenia, it would be very difficult for the Sultan to cause much trouble.

He then adverted to the Commission for Syria. The Delegates whom he had nominated were men of such standing that he could not keep them waiting any longer in Paris, consequently he had instructed them to leave for Syria on Monday and to await there their colleagues on the Commission.

Mr Lloyd George says the same applied to the British Delegates and he thinks he will give them the same orders.

M Clemenceau says in this case he must drop out. He says that the promises made to him have not been kept. General Sir Henry Wilson had apparently not been in a position to discuss with M Tardieu the question of the sphere of occupation in Syria.

In reply to Mr Lloyd George who had asks in what way the promises made to him had not been kept, he says that in the Autumn of 1918 when he saw how the British were acting in Syria, he had come to London and had asked Mr Lloyd George to say exactly what he wanted. Mr Lloyd George had said Mosul and Palestine. He had returned to Paris, and in spite of the objections of M Pichon he had conceded it. Then Mr Lloyd George had said that France and Great Britain would get along all right. Nevertheless they had not succeeded in getting along all right. Early in the year the proposal had been made for the evacuation of Syria by British troops and the substitution of French troops. Lord Milner had asked him to put this aside for the moment and had undertaken to discuss it with him. He had never done so. Then Lord Milner had promised to help M Clemenceau with Emir Feisal. He had never carried out his promise. After this, Lord Milner had produced a map by which Syria was divided in order to provide a railway for the British to Mesopotamia. Later, Mr Lloyd George had suggested that President Wilson should have part of Silesia. He had even agreed to this. Thus, he had given up Mosul and Silesia and some more territory for the sake of the British Railway.

Mr Lloyd George, interrupting, asks what M. Clemenceau's grievance was? What constitutes a breach of faith?

M Clemenceau continuing, say that the latest phase had concerned the withdrawal of British troops. It had been agreed to arrange for zones of occupation. It had been agreed that M Tardieu and General Sir Henry Wilson should study the question. After three days of consultation, General Wilson said that there could be no arrangement unless the limits of Syria were fixed. M Tardieu had quite properly said that this was not a matter that he could deal with.

France, having given up Mosul and some region required for the Railway and Silesia, thought she had a right to compensation. He had then suggested that France should have a Mandate over part of Anatolia. Of course he recognised that no promises had been given, but the idea had been proposed in the course of their conversations. He himself had just listened and had shown no undue hurry about it. Only yesterday it had been suggested that France should have a Mandate for the whole of Anatolia. Today however, Mr Lloyd George came forward with fresh combinations. He knew the cause of this. It was the arrival of Lord Curzon. He had heard all about this from London where Lord Curzon had spoken very freely. Lord Curzon was the fiercest friend France had in England. He regarded it as a good thing to take from France Mosul and part of Syria for a railway and Silesia, and to do nothing in return. He had another objection. Throughout this Conference his policy had been the closest union between France, Great Britain and the United States of America. He had made great concessions in this respect. Only this morning he had had a meeting of certain representatives from the right of the Chamber and he had reminded them of the great service that Great Britain and the United States had rendered to France, and had insisted that their close cooperation must be continued. Was it a good thing though that France should be excluded from Asia Minor because of the susceptibilities of the Italians? He had public opinion in France to consider. France being the country with the greatest financial interests of any country in the world in Turkey surely ought not to be expelled from Asia Minor on two such grounds as the Mussulman question and the Italian question. He, like his colleagues, had been impressed by the Mohammedan Deputation. He had a genuine respect for the Moslem religion, and the Deputation had made an impression on him. He had thought that something ought to be done for them. He had no proposal to make today, but while something might be done for the Turkish people, he is unable to accede to Mr Lloyd George’s proposals. He considers the two hypotheses which he attributed to Lord Curzon dangerous. He considers it dangerous to introduce the United States of America in Asia Minor. To say that the United States are to have a Mandate not only for Constantinople and Armenia, but for the whole country between them would cause a bad ferment and division in the whole of the European world. It would introduce the ideas of men who had not thought of the repercussion of these events in Europe. He did not know what the effect would be in the United States of America, nor could he speak definitely for any country but France, but as regards France, though the feelings in favour of the United States are strong and of long standing, this proposal, if carried out, would not produce a good opinion. He recognizes that the United States has done a great deal for France. They had struck the last blow in the war, and France was eternally grateful for it, but if the idea got about that Great Britain had brought the United States in to get France out, public feeling in France would not stand it. He does not say the idea was correct but that it will get about. Rather than sign any such agreement, he would not leave the Conference but it might be necessary for him to leave the Government. He does not say this in order merely to use a threatening argument, but he should not be doing his duty unless he gave this answer. He need hardly say that he is not going to conspire with S Orlando and Baron Sonnino in this matter but it would be impossible to prevent public feeling in France from joining with public feeling in Italy. It should not be forgotten that beyond the military and political decisions to be taken, there were human feelings and hearts to be considered, hence he begged that it would not be decided to keep France out as well as Italy by bringing in the United States of America. He is quite willing to admit, if his colleagues wished him to, that the Government of some other Power might conceivably be better in these regions but it is impossible to ignore Italy and the very bad consequent effect that such exclusion would have in France. When he had begun to speak he had had it in his mind to ask for time to examine the proposition coolly, and today he would make no proposal, but after having been led to believe that matters were to be arranged satisfactorily, this proposal had taken him by surprise.

If his colleagues really wish to induce him to believe that Mesopotamia and Palestine should go to Great Britain and Asia Minor to America, he is quite ready to think the matter over. He hopes his colleagues will not think he had forgotten the past. He would never allow any impression to be given outside that he had forgotten what Great Britain and America had done for France. He would do his duty to the Peace of the world, but he hoped before any further discussion, his colleagues would think these matters over.

Mr Lloyd George says that he must answer one or two of M Clemenceau’s observations. France has no right to complain of the loyalty of Great Britain which had given substantial guarantees for France’s security. Great Britain had volunteered to make these guarantees without any pressure being put upon her. She had volunteered to put her whole strength in support of France.

As regards the charge of a break of faith, this is without any foundation. On the occasion of the London visit, Mr Lloyd George had promised Syria to France provided that he gave up Mosul.

M Clemenceau said that France had had a definite agreement before as to Syria.

Mr. Lloyd George said that in London it had been agreed that Syria should go to France and Mesopotamia to Great Britain, but that Mosul, which was in the same watershed as Mesopotamia, should form part of that country and go to Great Britain. In his statement M Clemenceau had entirely ignored the article of his scheme which gave the Mandate for Syria to France. This is clearly stated in the document. Is this a case of bad faith? He recalled the proposal that he had made for a redistribution of the forces in Turkey in order to relieve the British Army which had a very large force there, occasioning demobilization difficulties. He himself, had gone away to London and for some reason he had never quite understood, the scheme had fallen through. On his return, President Wilson had proposed the Commission to Syria. The United States and Great Britain and Italy had their Delegates all ready. It was France who had never appointed their Delegates.

This is a formal document and had been signed by all of them. M Clemenceau had not carried out his part of the bargain. He did not say that M Clemenceau had not kept faith, but he certainly had not carried out the bargain.

As regards General Wilson’s conversations with M Tardieu, his account was that he had gone to M Tardieu with a map, as it was absolutely essential to delimitate the sphere of occupation. In this map the whole of Syria had been attributed to the occupation of France. M Tardieu replied he knew about the subject. Surely it was plain common sense to delimitate the spheres of occupation on a map. It was quite unwarrantable to charge him with a breach of faith because of this incident. As a matter of fact, no counter-proposal had been made by M Tardieu. As regards the railway to Syria, this was part of a proposal under which half the oil of Mesopotamia was to be given to the French. The railway was essential to the transport of the oil and was in the interests of the French. It had not been a bargain but was merely a proposal that was under discussion, and there was no breach of faith here. As regards Asia Minor, he had never heard of a French claim until the previous day. There had never been the smallest indication that France wanted a mandate for Asia Minor. The project had arisen out of a discussion of the Italian claims. M Clemenceau had himself made the proposal that France should have a mandate for the northern half of Anatolia. When the proposal was made, however, it was found that the claim included priority for concessions. Then President Wilson had pointed out that under the mandate scheme, priority for concessions was not permissible. It was not true that France had the greatest claim in Turkey. Within the last few days he had had the interests of the various Powers in Turkey examined, with the result that Great Britain was found to have the largest trade, Germany the second, France being a bad third. It was true that France had a large claim in the Baghdad railway, but the Baghdad line would not run mainly through the part of Anatolia which had been contemplated in the French mandate. It would run through all the mandated territory, American, French and British. Hence the basis of this claim was not in the French zone at all. He did not believe that French public opinion had made any claim for a mandate for Anatolia. He had carefully studied the French newspapers, and had only found one reference to it, namely, in the newspaper Temps, and he believed that to be Italian propaganda. He did not want to discuss in detail the agreement signed between Lord Grey and M Cambon, but he meant to point out that it had always been understood that the two countries were to do their utmost to attack the Turks. He had tried to carry out this part of the agreement. He had met M. Ribot and M. Painlevé, and Marshal Foch at Boulogne, and Marshal Foch had produced a plan by which the French were to attack from the north and the British from the south. The French Government, however, would not agree. Afterwards, a document had been prepared by the military representatives at Versailles. M Clemenceau, himself, however, had been against it. Hence, the whole policy was on the understanding of a co-operation in overthrowing the Turks, which had never been carried out on the French side. All sorts of plans had been discussed. At one time the British would have liked to have landed at Alexandretta, but could not go there, owing to French susceptibilities. There had been a project for a French landing at Tripoli, but the French had never gone there. Great Britain was the largest Eastern Power, and now the greatest of all Mohammedan Powers. This was the reason for the objections made to a French mandate over Anatolia. It was not in the least fair to suggest Lord Curzon was anti-French. It was not right to make a just peace in the West and not to make a proper peace in the East. It was solely in the interests of peace in the East that he had been unable to agree to a division of Anatolia. It was for this reason that he had come to the conclusion that the better plan would be for the United States of America to have the mandate. If M Clemenceau said that this was because Great Britain was jealous of France, he made a suggestion that was not a very worthy one to a Power that had done and guaranteed so much for France.

President Wilson says he hoped, in the first place, the consideration of this question would be postponed for a time, since great issues were involved. He would contemplate with the greatest uneasiness and distrust any misunderstanding that might arise in this matter. He must say at once that the United States would find it very difficult to take any part in Asia Minor where they had no material interests. Any part in the sacrifices and burdens of this mandate would be politically disadvantageous to America. Hence, America desired nothing in Asia Minor. What they did desire most of all was first, the accord between the great powers, and second, peace with the world. He hoped therefore, that the question would be viewed solely from these points of view. Mr Lloyd George’s plan might or might not be the best. But whether they agreed or disagreed in this particular plan, they must find one which would be best for the peace of the world. He had formed no judgement on the scheme for himself, and would think it over. He could only say at this stage, that he feared it is impossible for the United States to take a mandate for Asia Minor. It is difficult for her to take a mandate even for Armenia, where she had permanent interests of long standing, and where a good deal of money had been spent by Americans for the relief of the Armenian people. As regards Constantinople, he thinks that even some of the public men who were opposed to him politically would support him in taking a mandate. He does not, however, think that he can persuade them to accept a mandate for Asia Minor. Although he des not exclude the possibility of altering his opinion, his present conviction is that it would be better not to divide Anatolia, and that the Sultan should be left in Constantinople. If that causes too great complications, he should be removed to Brusa. His present judgement also is that it would be dangerous to bring the Turks to the coast in the neighborhood of the Dodecanese, supposing that these islands were to go to Greece. He suggested that instead of a mandate to the United States, something should be laid down to provide for giving advice to the Turks. What had been suggested was that the Sultan should accept advice in regard to certain specific matters, for example, finance, commercial matters and gendarmerie. In discussions with his United States colleagues, he had told them that France is already in the position of advisor as regards the Ottoman debt. He had told his colleagues that he thought the other processes of advice might come from the French Government, He thought that M Clemenceau had misunderstood his proposal that the United States Delegates on the Syrian Commission should proceed to Syria to await their colleagues. At any rate, they were men of such standing that he could not keep them waiting in Paris. If they did not go to Syria they must go back to the United States.

Mr Lloyd George says he thinks they ought to go to Syria.

M Clemenceau says that he is ready for the French representatives to go, as soon as the British troops in Syria had been replaced by French. The question had been referred to Sir Henry Wilson and M Tardieu. He does not think that General Wilson could have reported the result of this interview correctly. General Wilson had said that the limits of Syria must be fixed and M Tardieu had replied that only the Council of Four could do that.

Mr Lloyd George says that General Wilson had submitted a document to M Tardieu. There had been no breach of faith here.

Sir Maurice Hankey says possibly the misunderstanding was due to him. The conversation between General Wilson and M Tardieu had been interrupted in order that certain decisions might be taken, which could only be taken by the Council of Four. On the previous day, just as he was entering the meeting, a large map had been thrust into his hand, containing the proposal for the line of delimitation for Syria, which General Wilson had put forward. At the morning meeting he had had no opportunity to bring this matter forward, and there was no afternoon meeting and the map is still lying in the room.

Mr Lloyd George insists that the negotiations in regard to the railway are to the advantage of France. However, he must put a stop to these negotiations until the present misunderstanding is cleared up.

(It is agreed that the Syrian question should be discussed the same evening.)

(The Meeting then adjourns until 15:00 the same afternoon.)

Sailor Steve

05-21-19, 08:35 PM

Wednesday, May 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

...

Sailor Steve

05-21-19, 08:36 PM

Wednesday, May 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:45

Meeting of the Council of Four with the Polish-Ukrainian Commission

...

Sailor Steve

05-21-19, 08:37 PM

Wednesday, May 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 18:15

Meeting of the Council of Three

...

Jimbuna

05-22-19, 07:18 AM

22nd May 1919

Aftermath of War

Allies stern reply to German protest.

British tank passes through the streets of occupied Cologne, Germany.
https://i.imgur.com/2LGbOjT.jpg

A 12th Battalion tank, serial number 9339, on the Rhine embankment near the Hohenzollern Bridge in Cologne, 22 May 1919.
https://i.imgur.com/JL2dUkc.jpg

Demobilized British soldiers on a barge in Rotterdam on their way home.
https://i.imgur.com/Yq8lFip.jpg

Sailor Steve

05-22-19, 10:57 AM

Thursday, May 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr. Lloyd George’s Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Three

...

Sailor Steve

05-22-19, 10:59 AM

Thursday, May 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:45

Meeting of the Council of Four

...

Sailor Steve

05-22-19, 11:01 AM

Thursday, May 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

...

Sailor Steve

05-22-19, 11:01 AM

Thursday, May 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:15

Meeting of the Council of Four

...

Sailor Steve

05-22-19, 11:03 AM

Thursday, May 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 18:15

Meeting of the Council of Four

...

Jimbuna

05-23-19, 08:09 AM

23rd May 1919

Aftermath of War

Estonians within 30 miles of Petrograd.

American soldiers conduct combat drills with tanks at Camp Meade, Maryland.
http://i66.tinypic.com/ipmwpu.jpg

A Red Cross camp in Warsaw feeding Polish, Russian, German, and Austrian refugees.
http://i65.tinypic.com/208u0hu.jpg

Raymond Orteig, a New York hotel owner, offers a $25,000 prize ($383,000 today) for the first nonstop flight from New York to Paris (it is eventually won by Charles Lindbergh in 1927)
http://i67.tinypic.com/10e1w80.png

Sailor Steve

05-24-19, 04:45 AM

Friday, May 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

...

Sailor Steve

05-24-19, 04:48 AM

Friday, May 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:30

Meeting of the Council of Four with experts on Austria-Hungary

...

Sailor Steve

05-24-19, 04:52 AM

Friday, May 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:00

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers

...

Sailor Steve

05-24-19, 04:55 AM

Friday, May 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

...

Jimbuna

05-24-19, 06:47 AM

24th May 1919

View of Kabul, Afghanistan as British planes bomb the city as part of the Third Anglo-Afghan War.
http://i68.tinypic.com/2hn99gk.jpg

Sweden grants women the right to vote. Women suffragists in Gothenburg.
http://i67.tinypic.com/rumt84.jpg

Ship Losses:

Alexander (Soviet Navy Red Movement) Battle of Yelabuga: The transport was shelled and sunk on the Kama River by artillery.
Roshal (Soviet Navy Red Movement) Battle of Yelabuga: The gunboat was shelled and damaged on the Kama River by HMS Kent ( Royal Navy) and beached.
Terek (Soviet Navy Red Movement) Battle of Yelabuga: The gunboat was shelled and damaged on the Kama River by British and White Russian ships and beached. Captured by Whites and refloated ten days later.

Sailor Steve

05-24-19, 01:32 PM

Saturday, May 24, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

(M Tardieu and Mr Headlam-Morley are introduced.

1. Mr Headlam-Morley reports that, after further consideration, the Committee has come to the conclusion that the two replies to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letters of May 13th and May 16th, approved by the Council on May 22nd, and which had been prepared somewhat hastily, were susceptible of improvement in drafting. They had therefore ventured to incorporate the two replies in a single draft, which he now submitted. He and M Tardieu were in complete agreement and Dr Mezes had approved it in place of Dr Haskins, who was away.

(The revised reply is approved, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General, as superseding the reply forwarded on May 22nd, and for the following action:

1) To prepare a reply in French for M Clemenceau’s signature and for dispatch.

2) To communicate to the Drafting Committee in order that the necessary alteration may be made in the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

3) For publication as soon as signed and dispatched.

(M Tardieu and Mr Headlam-Morley withdraw.)

2. The Articles regarding the return of Prisoners of War, approved on the previous day for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria are initialed by the four Heads of Governments.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward them through the Secretary-General to the Drafting Committee.)

3. The Air Clauses approved on the previous day for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria, were initialed by the four Heads of Governments.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward them to the Drafting Committee through the Secretary-General.)

4. President Wilson asks that the clauses in regard to Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, recorded as approved on the previous day, might not be submitted for initials. He wishes to reserve them for the present, as he is inclined to think that United States officers ought not to take part.

5. After M Clemenceau, President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George have initialed the General Clauses, namely, Articles 47 to 50 of the Military, Naval, and Air Terms with Austria, S Orlando withholds his initials, on the ground that the Armistice of 3rd November, 1918, which had been drawn up hastily, had been found to omit certain of the islands included in the Treaty of London, and he wishes to have the Clauses re-examined by his military advisers.

(Note: There is a meeting between the Council of Four and their Economic Experts. That meeting is apparently not recorded, and this meeting continues after that one.)

6. President Wilson reads the following memorandum which he has received from Dr Mezes, pointing out alterations made by the Drafting Committee in Articles 102 and 104 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany:

“The Articles as drafted and as they appear in the Germany with the Treaty are given below in parallel columns, the divergences of importance being underscored:

Draft Treaty
Article 2. Article 102.
The Five Allied and Associated Great Powers undertake to establish the Town of Danzig together with the rest of the territory described in Article I as a free city. The City of Danzig, together with the rest of the territory described in Article 100 is established as a free city and placed under the protection of the League of Nations.

Article 4. Article 104.
The Five Allied and Associated Great Powers undertake to negotiate a Treaty between the Polish Government and the Free City of Danzig, which shall come into force at the same time as the establishment of said free city. A Convention, the terms of which shall be fixed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers shall be concluded between the Polish Government and the free city of Danzig.

The effect of the changes is to bring Danzig into existence as a free city as soon as the Treaty is signed. According to the draft, Danzig comes into existence as a free city only after its representatives and representatives of the Five Principal Powers have worked out its constitution, and further have negotiated a satisfactory Treaty between it and Poland. It may well be more difficult for the Five Great Powers to provide Danzig with a constitution drafted with the general interest in view, and also difficult, maybe impossible, to negotiate a satisfactory Treaty between Danzig and Poland if the former is set up as an autonomous and going concern immediately upon the signing of the Treaty and without further need of assistance on the part of these Powers.

If these points are well taken, it is important that the articles of the Treaty above set forth, should be modified so that they may accord with the draft.”

M Clemenceau, after consulting the French text, says that it is obviously a translation from the incorrect English text.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it possible that the Germans will make a strong resistance to the whole of the Clauses of the Treaty of Peace dealing with Poland. This will give an opportunity to the Allied and Associated Powers to make a correction.

(It is agreed that the Drafting Committee should be instructed to revise the articles in the final erratum or in the final Treaty of Peace handed to the Germans.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to prepare an instruction to the Drafting Committee for the initials of the four Heads of Governments in the afternoon.)

7. President Wilson says that he has sent a copy of Mr Philip Kerr’s draft despatch to Mr Lansing, who had replied that he considered the statement right, and that the United States were justified in joining in it. Mr. Lansing would have preferred to withhold the dispatch until a reply had been received from Mr Morris, who had been sent to Omsk. He himself, however, does not agree in this. He agrees, however, to the following addition to the paragraph numbered “fifthly”, at the top of page 5, which Mr. Lansing has proposed:

“and that until such settlement is made, the Government of Russia agrees to recognize those territories as autonomous, and to confirm the relations which may exist between the Allied and Associated Governments and the de facto Governments of those territories.”

(This is accepted.)

(It is agreed to discuss the question in the afternoon.)

8. President Wilson reads a despatch from the American Diplomatic Representative in Warsaw, showing Mr Paderewski still to be strongly favorable to the views of the Allied and Ukrainian Associated Powers, ending with a message that he had strongly defended President Wilson’s views.

Mr Lloyd George reads telegrams showing that General Haller’s Army is now being moved from the Ukraine to the Polish front, and that the Ukrainians had sent envoys to negotiate peace with the Polish Government.

Sailor Steve

05-24-19, 04:41 PM

Saturday, May 24, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:00

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers

1. M Pichon says that the first question on the Agenda Paper relates to the withdrawal of the German troops from the Baltic Provinces and Russian Polish Front. The question was raised by Marshal Foch in a letter dated 13th May 1919 which had been circulated on the 17th May 1919. He would call on Colonel Georges to state the facts of the case.

Colonel Georges says that in a letter dated the 9th May 1919, General von Hammerstein, the President of the German Armistice Commission, had informed the President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission that the German Government would, within a short time, withdraw all the fighting forces from Lettland and Lithuania. General von Hammerstein’s letter goes on to state that the German Government has already taken preparatory measures with a view to bringing about a suspension of arms with a consequential Armistice with the troops opposed to them: that the withdrawal of the troops would take place within a period sufficient to assure the security of the property of the German Empire in Lettland and Lithuania; and that the responsibility for the consequences following upon the evacuation of Lettland and Lithuania would fall upon the Allied and Associated Powers.

At the same time, the Polish National Committee had requested the Allied and Associated Governments to intervene with Marshal Foch in order that he might summon the German troops to evacuate the territories of Grodno and Suvalki and to retire within the territories of Germany.

Both these demands had reference to the interpretation to be given to Clause 12 of the Armistice of the 11th November, 1918, namely:

“All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Russia, Romania, or Turkey, shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1st, 1914, and all German troops at present in the territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable having regard to the internal situation of those territories.”

It appears, therefore, that on the one hand the Germans threatened to withdraw their troops from the territories in question; whilst on the other hand, the Polish Government on the strength of Article 12 of the Armistice, called for the evacuation of the zone at the back of the Polish forces.

Mr Lansing inquires whether the zone of Vilna was at present occupied by the Poles.

Colonel Georges replies that Vilna itself is at present occupied by the Poles; at the back of Vilna existed a zone which was traversed by railway lines, which were necessary for the despatch of supplies from Poland to the Polish forces on the Vilna front. It was an interesting fact, calling for serious consideration, that the Germans had remained in occupation of those railway lines, and that they had lately concentrated considerable forces in that quarter.

Mr Lansing inquired whether Colonel Georges referred to the railway line between Vilna and Grodno?

Colonel Georges replies that he would enter into that question in greater detail when dealing with the suggestion for fixing a line of demarcation between the Polish and German zones of occupation.

Colonel Georges, continuing, says that the object Marshal Foch had kept in mind in referring General von Hammerstein’s Note of the 9th May to the Council, had been to obtain a ruling in regard to the conditions which should govern the application of Clause 12 of the Armistice of the 11th November in regard to the Polish-German-Lithuanian front. These conditions are three in number, namely:

Firstly - The immediate evacuation by the German troops of the zone at the back of the Polish Army operating in the Vilna region;

Secondly - To draw the attention of the Germans that it is their duty to maintain their forces on Lithuania and Lettish fronts until the Entente should authorize them to withdraw the same;

Thirdly - To organize with as little delay as possible under an Anter-Allied control, the local forces in Lithuania and Latvia in order to enable these to take the place of the Germans on their respective fronts.

On the 23rd May, an agreement had been reached in regard to questions 2 and 3 above.

Mr Lansing inquires by whom this agreement had been reached.

Colonel Georges replies that the decision had been reached by the Foreign Ministers themselves at the meeting held yesterday.

Mr Lansing maintained that at yesterday’s meeting no mention had been made of Poland. The Ministers had only dealt with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

Colonel Georges agrees. He explains, however, that Poland is in no way involved. He has considered the question as a whole and had divided the same into two parts: the one, dealing with Latvia and Lithuania, which had been discussed and disposed of at Yesterday’s meeting; the other, relating to the Polish zone of occupation in the region of Vilna, which it was proposed should be settled at that meeting.

Mr Lansing inquires whether the question which Colonel Georges raised had anything to do with the dispute between the Letts and the Poles, who were at the present moment furiously fighting with one another.

Colonel Georges replied that the question under consideration was merely a German-Polish one.

Mr Balfour inquires whether the only problem to be brought before the Council on that date related to the withdrawal of the Germans from the territory now occupied by them at the back of the Polish lines.

Colonel Georges replies in the affirmative, since the rest of the problem had been settled on the previous day.

Colonel Georges, resuming, says that the Polish front under consideration begins south of the Lettish town of Vilkomir, then runs in a south-easterly direction, passing 40 miles to the East of the town of Vilna, whence it passes through Soli and proceeds in the direction of Baranovichi. The northern portion of this zone, the region of Vilna, was crossed by two railway lines - the Byelostok-Grodno-Vilna line, and the Suvalki-Olita line, which joins the previous one at Orany. These railway lines constitute the only means of communication between Poland proper and the Polish front in the region of Vilna. It is therefore, absolutely necessary that the Poles should have the full control and the free use of these railway lines. With that object in view, General Henrys had proposed that the Germans should be compelled to withdraw their troops from the territory in question, a line of demarcation, separating the Polish zone of occupation from the German zone of occupation, being laid down to the north, to pass through Lyudvinof, Balverjishki, Dersunishki, Jigmori, Chakiski, and south of Vilkomir. It is hoped that this will definitely put a stop to the concentration of German troops which continues to take place at Suvalki, and at Augustovo in the railway zone.

Mr Lansing says that he has been supplied with a map giving the line of demarcation proposed by General Henrys. That line had been referred to the Commission on Polish Affairs by whom it had been rejected. Consequently, he thought, much time would be saved if the proposed line of demarcation between Lithuania and Poland were not discussed further.

Mr Balfour inquires whether the line of demarcation now under discussion constitutes a military or a political line. In other words, is it a line which is to form the actual future political boundary between the States of Lithuania and Poland? Or, was it merely a temporary line which was to be laid down in order to ease the existing military situation? If the line is intended to represent the future political boundary line, he agrees with Mr Lansing that the Council is not competent at present to discuss the question. But, if the line were a purely military one, then he thinks Mr Lansing need feel no anxiety in arriving at a decision.

Mr Lansing holds that if the proposal is to lay down a temporary military line, the question should be referred for decision to the Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments. His information goes to show that the Lithuanians are actually in arms, ready to resist further Polish advances. Consequently, the Council should be very careful in dealing with this question.

Colonel Georges explains that the line of demarcation proposed by General Henrys was based solely on military considerations. The Polish front at present extends to the East of Vilna and it is impossible to leave all the lines of communication in possession of the Germans, as it would enable them at any moment to interrupt the flow of supplies to Vilna. Furthermore, in the event of an attack by the Germans, the possession of the lines of communication would at once constitute a serious menace to the Polish troops around Vilna. From a military point of view, the question requires immediate attention; but the solution of the military problem does not in any way imply a solution of the purely territorial question. The German troops occupying Lithuania to the north of the line of demarcation have no reason for occupying the railway to the south serving the Polish front, especially as the region in question was not German. Under these circumstances, Marshal Foch had recommends that the line of demarcation proposed by General Henrys should be accepted, thus separating the Polish and German zones of occupation. Marshal Foch, at the same time, proposes certain slight improvements in General Henrys’ line of demarcation, so as to follow more closely the administrative boundaries, especially in the district of Vilkomir. It is extremely urgent, however, that some line of demarcation should be adopted, and that constitutes the problem which the Council has been asked to solve.

Mr Lansing says that he quite understands the position and, in a general way, he accepts the proposals made. Nevertheless, it should be provided that the area around Suvalki and Augustovo, which is Lithuanian, should be occupied only by Lithuanian troops and not by Polish troops. In his opinion the Poles should be prevented from occupying Lithuanian territory just as much as the Germans.

Colonel Georges says that two obstacles could be opposed to Mr Lansing’s proposals. In the first place, the Lithuanians have no troops which could be spared to garrison the territory in question. The Lithuanian forces at the present moment consisted of 4,000 men guarding the Eastern front and 3,000 men at depots in the interior. In the second place, it has been proposed to organize Lithuanian forces in order to defend the Eastern front. Should those troops be employed, as suggested, to garrison the vast territory to be evacuated by the German troops, no troops would be left with which to defend the Lithuanian frontiers against the advance of Bolshevik forces.

Mr Lansing maintains that guarantees should be given that the Poles will not occupy the territory in question after the withdrawal of the Germans.

Colonel Georges explains that the zone to be evacuated by the Germans, including Suvalki, Augustovo and Seini, has been attributed to Poland by the Polish Territorial Commission. On the other hand, the Vilna zone is already occupied by Polish forces, and it is merely proposed that measures should be taken to prevent the Germans from going there. It has been suggested, in order to reassure the Lithuanian Government, that the Allied and Associated Governments should inform it that the occupation of these territories by Polish forces is purely a temporary measure necessitated by the existing military situation and that it would in no way prejudge the final settlement of the territorial question.

Mr Lansing thinks that the Council could accede to the demands made by the Polish Government: but General Henrys’ proposals go a long way beyond the demands put forward by the Polish Government.

Colonel Georges explains that there are two questions to be considered. Firstly, the request of the Polish Government aiming at the occupation and acquisition of the Augustovo-Suvalki-Seini zone. Secondly, the military question which calls for the temporary occupation by the Poles of the areas at present occupied by German troops, situated at the back of the Vilna front, where the Polish forces have set up a strong defensive line against Bolshevism. No reason exists why the zone at the back of that defensive line should be occupied by Germans, and the Allied and Associated Governments are, in accordance with the terms of Article 12 of the Armistice, justified in demanding the withdrawal of the German troops therefrom.

Mr Lansing says he agreed to the withdrawal of the Germans from the Augustovo-Suvalki-Seini zone: but the area so evacuated should, in his opinion, be occupied by the Lithuanians, to whom the territory in question belongs, and not by the Poles.

M Pichon invited attention to the decision reached by the Baltic Commission on this question, which read as follows:

“The withdrawal of the German troops provided for by the Armistice of the 11th November, must begin immediately in the Powyats (Districts) of Augustovo, Suvalki, and in that part of the district of Seini to the west of the river Marycha, districts which will in all probability be comprised within the future frontiers of Poland as well as in the district of Grodno.

“As regards the other territories affected by the line of demarcation of General Henrys, supplementary information should be obtained in regard to the political consequences of a withdrawal of the German troops in so far as the relations between the Lithuanians and the Poles are concerned so that as little really Lithuanian territory as possible may be occupied by Polish troops.”

He thinks that the recommendations therein contained have an important bearing on the objections raised by Mr Lansing.

Mr Lansing says he will accept the proposals made by the Baltic Commission.

Baron Sonnino thinks that the proposals just read likewise give effect to the wishes of Colonel Georges, who had asked that the Germans should withdraw from the Augustovo-Suvalki-Seini zone; the object in view being attained by laying down the line of demarcation proposed by General Henrys. He wishes, however, to inquire from Colonel Georges whether the line of demarcation is intended to ensure free communication with the Lithuanian troops, or with the Polish troops in the Vilna region.

Colonel Georges replies that the line of demarcation is intended to protect the Polish troops on the Vilna front, since the Lithuanians have no troops there. The demarcation line, however, is essential to prevent the Germans from spreading from Vilkomir into the Vilna region, in the same way as they had spread into the Augustovo and Suvalki zone. The acceptance of the recommendations of the Baltic Commission disposes of one part of the question under reference. He would have preferred that a settlement should have been reached in regard to the whole problem. Under the circumstances, however, he asks that a telegram should be sent to General Nudant at Spa to communicate to him the decision taken in regard to the Augustovo-Suvalki region, a copy of the same being sent to General Henrys, in order that immediate effect might be given to the decision taken.

Mr Lansing says that he, personally, will be prepared to go even beyond the recommendations of the Baltic Commission. He thinks the Germans should be instructed to withdraw from the whole of the disputed area between General Henrys’ line of demarcation and the ethnic boundary line, on the understanding that the Poles should not occupy the territories so evacuated.

Colonel Georges understands this to mean that no German should be permitted to occupy territory to the south of the line of demarcation proposed.

Mr Lansing agrees, but he adds that his proposal also implies that no Pole should be allowed to advance north of the ethnic line. The intervening region between the line of demarcation and the ethnic line would, under these conditions, be occupied by the Lithuanians.

Colonel Georges remarks that no Lithuanian troops would be available to occupy that area.

Mr Lansing says that, under those circumstances, the Germans should not be withdrawn. The only solution, therefore, would be to adhere strictly to the recommendations made by the Baltic Commission.

(It is agreed:

1) To accept the resolutions of May 19th by the Commission on Baltic Affairs with regard to the proposals in Marshal Foch’s letter of May 13th concerning the German forces in Latvia.

2) To forward a copy of the following resolution to General Nudant, President of the Permanent Armistice Commission at Spa, and to General Henrys, Head of the French Military Mission in Poland, for necessary action:

“The withdrawal of the German troops provided for by the Armistice of the 11th November, must begin immediately in the districts (Powyats) of Augustovo, Suvalki, and in that part of the district of Seini to the west of the river Marycha, districts which will in all probability be comprised within the future frontiers of Poland as well as in the district of Grodno.

As regards the other territories affected by the line of demarcation of General Henrys, supplementary information should be obtained in regard to the political consequences of a withdrawal of the German troops in so far as the relations between the Lithuanians and the Poles are concerned so that as little really Lithuanian territory as possible may be occupied by Polish troops”).

2. M Pichon says that a memorandum prepared by the British Delegation has been circulated that afternoon in regard to the control of sailings to Northern Russia. The Delegates have had no time to consult their experts. He asks, therefore, that the question should be adjourned to the next Meeting.

Mr Lansing agrees that the question should be adjourned. He wishes to inquire, however, whether the proposals contained in the memorandum, submitted by the British Delegation, apply only to Murmansk and Archangel.

Admiral Hope replies that the proposals relate only to the control of sailings to the White Sea ports.

Mr Balfour says that he understands the American, Italian and Japanese Delegations have no objections to offer to the proposals put forward by the British Delegation. Should the French authorities, after carefully studying the memorandum likewise have no objections to offer, he thinks the recommendations therein contained should forthwith be given effect to, without further reference to the Council.

Mr Lansing agrees to accept Mrs Balfour’s proposal on the understanding that it will not form a precedent.

(It is agreed that the recommendations contained in the memorandum submitted by the British Delegation in regard to the control of sailings to Northern Russia (White Sea ports) should be adopted, subject to the approval of the French authorities, which will be communicated direct to the British Naval authorities.)

3. M Pichon invites attention to a letter dated 16th May 1919, addressed by Dr Benes to M Clemenceau, containing a request from the Czechoslovak Delegation for the insertion of financial clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and Hungary. The proposals of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation had reference to four subjects, namely:

1) the pre-war debt;

2) the war debt;

3) the question of State property of liberated Czechoslovak territory; and

4) the question of Austro-Hungarian bank notes.

Mr Lansing proposes that questions (1) and (2) should be referred to the Financial Commission and questions (3) and (4) to the Commission on Reparations.

(In regard to the note received from the Czechoslovak Delegation, it is agreed to refer the draft dealing with (1) the pre-war debt and (2) the war debt to the Financial Commission, and the draft clauses dealing with (3) the question of State property of liberated Czechoslovak territory and (4) the question of Austro-Hungarian Bank Notes to the Reparation Commission.)

4. M Pichon says that in a letter dated 13th May 1919, M Hymans, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Belgium, had transmitted a demand of the Belgian Government for the restoration of objects of interest now in Austria. He proposes that the whole question should be referred to the Commission on Reparations for report.

Mr Lansing thinks that the request for the return of a picture by Rubens, known as “The Triptyque de St. Ildephonse”, requires some consideration. The work of art in question had apparently been sold to the Vienna Gallery for 40,000 Florins. He fails to see why that picture should now be restored to Belgium. In his opinion objects of value which had been stolen by Austria or taken for safe custody to Vienna should be restored, but he does not think that ruling should apply to objects of Art that had been sold, even under pressure.

Mr Balfour in this connection invites attention to the claim put forward by Belgium for the return of the treasure known as the “Fleece of Gold”. This treasure originally belonged to the ancient Dukes of Burgundy. In the course of centuries part of the Duchy of Burgundy became attached to the Crown of Austria, and accordingly orders were given by the Monarchy of Austria for the removal of certain treasures from the Duchy to Vienna. It does not appear quite clear on what ground Belgium claims to inherit property which had belonged to the Duchy of Burgundy.

Baron Sonnino invites attention to the fact that the question of the delivery of the “Fleece of Gold” to Belgium has already been considered by the Commission on Reparations and the following draft Article had received approval:

“Article XVI. In carrying out the provisions of Article VIII, Austria undertakes to surrender to each of the Allied and Associated Powers respectively, all records, documents, objects of antiquity and of Art, and all scientific and bibliographical material taken away from the invaded territory whether they belonged to the State or to provincial, communal, charitable or ecclesiastical administrations or other public or private Institutions.

Annex II. Objects and documents removed for safety from Belgium to Austria in 1794:

a) Arms, Armour and other objects from the Old Arsenal of Brussels.

b) The treasure of the “Toison d’or” preserved in previous times in the “Chapelle de la Cour” in Brussels.

c) Coinage, stamps, medals, and counters by Theodore van Berckel which were an essential feature in the Archives of the “Chambre des Comptes” at Brussels.

d) The documents relating to the map “carte chorographique” of the Austrian Low Countries drawn up by Lieut. Gen. Comte Jas de Ferraris.”
Under these circumstances he thinks there is no necessity for the Council to consider the demand of the Belgian Government, which had already been admitted by the Commission on Reparations.

(It is agreed that no action is required in regard to the demand of the Belgian Government for the restoration of certain objects of interest now in Austria, in view of the fact that a Clause had already been inserted in the Draft Reparation Clauses of the Treaty with Austria.)

5. Addition as an Annex to the Treaty of Peace With Germany of the French Note Relative to Zones

(The Council decides to adjourn this question without discussion.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

05-25-19, 06:21 AM

25th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Rising in Kurdistan; British officers captured.

Conditional recognition of General Kolchak's Government by Allies.

Vladimir Lenin addressing troops of the Red Army in Moscow.
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Estonian forces capture the city of Pskov after defeating the Estonian and Russian Red Armies. Estonian marines.
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Refugees from Odessa, Ukraine fleeing the advance of the Russian Red Army.
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Sailor Steve

05-25-19, 10:43 AM

Sunday, May 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

05-26-19, 07:35 AM

26th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Demonstration by ex-servicemen in London.

Afghan counter-offensive.

Economist John Maynard Keynes resigns as the representative of the British Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference in disgust of the harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty.
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German Prisoners of War made to construct the American war cemetery in Romagne, France.
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British triplane bomber Tarrant Tabor crashes after its first flight, resulting in the deaths of its two pilots.
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Sailor Steve

05-26-19, 01:02 PM

Monday, May 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. The Council has before them a letter addressed to Colonel House by Lord Robert Cecil, dated 24th May, on the subject of Aerial Navigation. In this letter, Lord Robert Cecil asks for certain amendments to the Covenant of the Nations which should be considered as drafting changes.

President Wilson expresses the view that these might be regarded as drafting alterations.

(It is agreed that the Drafting Committee should be instructed to make the following amendments to the Covenant of the League of Nations:

In several relevant paragraphs the term “military and naval” is replaced by “military, naval and air."

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to prepare an instruction to the Drafting Committee for the initials of the Four Heads of Governments.)

2. With reference to C. F. 30, Minutes 2 & 3,1 the attached errata to the Treaty of Peace with Germany are initialed by the Four Heads of Governments.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate them to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

3. With reference to C. F. 31, Minute 1,2 Sir Maurice Hankey states that the Japanese Delegation has agreed to the draft dispatch to Admiral Kolchak, subject to two very small amendments, namely, in paragraph 2 instead of the words “they are now being pressed to withdraw etc.,” is substituted the following: “some of the Allied and Associated Governments are now being pressed to withdraw etc.,” and paragraph 4 instead of the words “the last year” is substituted “the last 12 months.”

(These alterations are approved and the letter is signed by the Four Heads of State. The letter is then taken by Mr Philip Kerr to the Japanese Embassy, where it is signed by the Marquis Saionji. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate the letter to the Secretary-General with instructions to dispatch it, in the name of the Conference to Admiral Kolchak.

Note. The Marquis Saionji, when appending his signature, asks that the letter should not be published until a reply is received. Sir Maurice Hankey makes a communication in this sense to the Secretary-General.)

4. The general clauses, namely, Articles 47 to 50 of the military, naval and air clauses for inclusion in the Austrian Treaty, which had previously been initialed by the other three Heads of Governments, are initialed by S Orlando, who withdraws his previous objections.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward them to the Secretary-General, for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

5. A from the Austrian Delegation at St. Germain contained in is read.

Mr Lloyd George says he thinks a different procedure ought to be adopted with Austria from that adopted with Germany. The two cases are not really comparable. The Austro-Hungarian Empire has broken up, one half is friendly, and the other half, consisting of Austria and Hungary, he believes at any rate is not unfriendly. They are not in the same category as Prussia. Consequently, would it not be worth while, he asks, to give a different reply to what had been given to Germany? In his view, the question of compensation and the question of the military terms could not be ready for some time, perhaps 9 or 10 days. But a good many parts of the Treaty are ready, for example, the boundaries with Austria and with Hungary.

President Wilson says that the southern boundary of Austria is not yet ready.

Mr Lloyd George says it could be settled in a very short time. Ports, Waterways and Railways are ready, as are the Economic Clauses. He suggests that these should be handed to the Austrians, but that the question of reparation and the military clauses should be reserved and that the experts of the Allied and Associated Powers should be asked to meet the Austrian experts in regard to these. He does not mean that the Council of Four itself should meet the Austrians, but that our experts should meet their experts in regard to compensation and the military terms, which they should discuss with them on general lines.

M Clemenceau says that the experts will require very precise instructions.

President Wilson says that we know exactly what the experts think on the subject. He then reads a weekly list of outstanding subjects which has been prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey. He notes Sir Maurice Hankey’s statement that no communication had been made to the Drafting Committee about the boundaries between Italy and Austria.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that these should be settled today.

President Wilson says that, according to his recollection, there has been a general understanding that Austria should be treated somewhat differently from Germany. Consequently, he agreed with Mr Lloyd George’s proposal to get the experts together.

S Orlando asks if it would not be possible to have these questions roughly settled. He thought the outstanding questions could be arranged in 2 or 3 days, and then the negotiations could start. The difference of treatment to the Austrian Delegation would not be well understood in Italy, where Austria had always been regarded as the principal enemy. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had dissolved and the different States forming out of it are regarded with mixed feelings by Italy, some friendly and some otherwise. Austria, however, is regarded as the principal enemy. To adopt a different procedure would create a very painful impression in Italy. It would be felt there that the Italian contest with Austria was not taken very seriously. He agreed that in very rapid decision was necessary, but he did not see why one or two questions should not be left in suspense while proposals as to the remainder of the Peace Treaty were handed to the Austrians. To adopt a totally different procedure would create a very bad impression in Italy without any useful result. If in 3 or 4 days a sufficient portion of the Treaty could be assembled and handed to the Austrians, so as not to give an impression of a piecemeal presentation, he would not object.

Mr Lloyd George says that Italy must really understand the fact that the peace of Austria is entirely different from that of Germany. Supposing Bavaria and Saxony had broken off from Prussia before the war came to an end and had perhaps even fought against Prussia, it would have been impossible for the Allies to take the line they had. For one thing, there would have been no representatives of the German Empire to meet. Consequently, a different line must be pursued and he could not see why Italy should not agree to a different procedure. He doubted if either the question of the military terms or the compensation could be settled in 3 or 4 days. If so, the settlement would be a bad one.

M Clemenceau says that he is ready to make every effort to meet S Orlando, because he had learned from experience that, when the Allies were not in agreement with Italy, the immediate result was anti-French and sometimes even pro-German demonstrations in Italy that were extraordinarily disagreeable. He wants, above all things, to avoid any differences with Italy. When, however, S Orlando suggested that it had been agreed to adopt the same procedure for Austria as that for Germany, this was not the fact. S Orlando had not been present when the decision had been taken, for reasons over which his colleagues had no control. It was in his absence that the new procedure had been agreed on. All he sought was a reasonable agreement in a reasonable way. The Austrian Peace is very different from, and, in many respects, much harder to arrive at, than the German, for the reason that the country had fallen to pieces, raising all sorts of questions of boundaries and there were conflicts arising on the Polish front and elsewhere in the late Austro-Hungarian Empire. In Istria, he learned that trenches and barbed wire were being put up by both sides. President Wilson had come to Europe with a program of peace for all men. His ideal is a very high one, but it involves great difficulties owing to these centuries-old hatreds between some races. We had in Central Europe to give each what was his due not only between them, but even between ourselves. For example, to take the question of disarmament. S Orlando had been good enough to visit him on the previous day to discuss the question of Dalmatia; but the Yugoslavs would not agree to disarm themselves while Italy adopted her present attitude. He, himself, is not in a position to oppose Italy in this matter, because France had put her signature to the Treaty of 1915, but it is not a question that can be decided in two or three days. Referring again to S Orlando’s visit, he says the principal subject for discussion had been the anti-French manifestations in Italy. S Orlando said that there was an improvement, but since then he had received two dispatches from M Barrère which indicate the situation to be worse. There was a pronounced pro-German propaganda in Italy, where enormous sums were being expended by Germany. All this ought to be stopped and there is only one way to stop it. It is necessary to have the courage to tackle and solve the most difficult questions as soon as possible. It is not at all easy to do so and could only be done if S Orlando would take the standpoint that he must preserve the Entente with his Allies. He recalled that, in the previous weeks, he had a serious disagreement with Mr Lloyd George on the question of Syria when both had spoken very frankly. Nevertheless, both had concluded by saying that they would not allow their differences to upset the Entente. The same is not said in certain quarters in Italy. Hence, he maintains that these questions cannot be settled in three days. Consequently, it is impossible to meet the Austrians with a complete Treaty as had been done in the case of the Germans. If S Orlando would agree, he thinks a start might be made by getting discussions between the experts, which would gain time. It was very hard to settle all these extraordinarily difficult questions rapidly. President Wilson adheres to his principles as applicable to the Austrian Treaty. France and Great Britain admitted the principles, but also did not deny that they were bound by their signature of the Treaty of 1915. If S Orlando wanted a settlement, he must discuss it with the supreme desire to maintain the Entente and meanwhile a plan must be found to keep the Austrian Delegation quiet. We should tell them that the Treaty is not ready, but that it would be useful to have certain discussions with their experts. He does not want to embarrass S Orlando in Italy and if this would be the result, he would withdraw every word he had said, but he is very anxious that the Austrian Delegates should not return to Vienna.

S Orlando thanks M Clemenceau most sincerely for what he had said, which was absolutely frank and clear. He does not wish to refer in detail to the troubles in Italy. The impressions he has received from Italy differ from M Barrère’s reports, which, according to his own account, re exaggerated. Nevertheless, he does not deny that the situation in Italy is extraordinarily grave. It could be excused and justified if it was recalled how Mr Lloyd George before his visit to London had informed his colleagues that if he had to return to England without being able to show a considerable step towards peace, the position would be very serious. It is exactly the same now in regard to Italy. The trouble there arises from uncertainty. Once the Italian claims are settled it will be found that Italy is as sincerely loyal to the cause of the Entente as before. He is absolutely sure that the present disquieting phenomena in Italy are due to anxiety and uncertainty. Like M Clemenceau, he, himself, had decided to remain always with the Entente and to run all the personal risks involved. He feels he cannot be accused of adopting too uncompromising a spirit. He has always made every effort to reach an agreement, including the recent conversations with Colonel House and Mr Miller, where he had discussed proposals involving very grievous renunciations by Italy. He thanked M Clemenceau for his courageous words in favour of tackling the main problems, difficult and complex as they were. But, having regard to the excitement of public opinion, he asks why this should be still further excited by questions of procedure. In the present exciting state of affairs and in view of the exasperation in Italy, if questions of procedure are added, an irritation would be caused which would produce an effect contrary to what was desired. This was his only reason for anxiety.

President Wilson asks whether S Orlando in his remarks had not really suggested the way out. He had suggested to say to the Austrians that by Wednesday or Thursday all matters would be laid before them which could be settled directly, but that some questions that could not be settled directly would be reserved.

S Orlando says that President Wilson had correctly interpreted his views and he would accept his suggestions.

Mr Lloyd George says it only remains to divide the Treaty of Peace into two categories.

President Wilson says he had assumed that the only reserved questions would be the military terms and reparation.

Sir Maurice Hankey says that Mr Headlam-Morley had come to him that morning and had told him that the Economic Clauses were based on the assumption that Austria was to be a continuation of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, but that the Financial Clauses were drawn on the assumption that Austria was a new state. He had urged that the whole Treaty of Peace wants examination from this point of view.

Mr Lloyd George questions whether Mr Headlam-Morley’s description of the Economic Clauses is correct.

(It was agreed that the Treaty of Peace should be handed to the Austrians in the course of the present week, but that the military terms and reparation clauses should be reserved for discussion with Austrian experts.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to draft a reply to the Austrian Delegation to give effect to this decision.)

6. President Wilson draws attention to a copy of a letter he had received, which had been addressed by the Secretary-General to Mr Barnes in regard to the participation of Germany in the new Organization contemplated for Labor. From this letter he reads the following extract:

“Consequently, I would be grateful to you for informing the Washington Conference that Germany will be admitted after the closing of the Conference, and under conditions expressed in the letter of May 15th of the Labour Commission.”

This letter, President Wilson points out, does not carry out the decision of the Council, which had merely consisted in a recommendation to the Labor Conference at Washington that Germany should be admitted, but had left the final decision to the Conference.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to call the attention of the Secretary-General to this error.)

7. A letter is read from Marshal Foch somewhat in the Allowing sense:

At the Meeting of the 19th inst. the Council communicated to the Marshal a decision that after May 27th the Army under his command should be ready to advance, in the event of the German reply calling for immediate action. He was instructed to make his dispositions so that the advance might be in the best possible conditions. This implies the following:

(i) Administrative measures to ensure that the effectives were completed, by bringing back personnel on leave.

(ii) Tactical movements; that is to say, concentration of all the necessary forces.

(iii) Not to keep the troops waiting too long in expectation of movements; that is to say, it was desirable to take the last measures as late as possible, and not more than three days before they should be executed.
He recalled that he had been instructed to delay until May 30 the final measures so far as the French Army is concerned. Tactical measures, however, must begin on May 27th, hence it is necessary that he should receive orders before 16:00 today, so that he could either give a counter order or confirm his previous orders. Consequently, he asks to have May 30th confirmed as the date on which he is to resume his march, or otherwise.

President Wilson suggests the reply should be that three days’ notice would be given to Marshal Foch as soon as the Council knows if action is necessary.

Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau agree.

(M Clemenceau undertakes to instruct Marshal Foch accordingly.)

8. M Clemenceau says he has received a letter from Dr Benes, who wants to be heard on the Military and Financial questions.

(It is agreed that Dr Benes should be heard, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to draft a reply.)

9. M Clemenceau hands Sir Maurice Hankey a Note prepared for the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers by the Council of Foreign Ministers, dealing with Boundaries in the Banat.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to translate and circulate the Note.)

10. M Clemenceau hands Sir Maurice Hankey a letter received from the Marquis Saionji, asking that in ordinary circumstances Japan might be represented on the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to draft a polite reply to the effect that Japan would be invited whenever questions particularly affecting her were under consideration.)

11. M Clemenceau reads a Note from the Secretary-General, suggesting that the letter forwarded by the German Delegation on May 17th concerning provisions contained in Article 438 of the Conditions of Peace (Religious Missions) should be referred to the Committee appointed to deal with political questions outside Europe, composed of Messrs Beer (America), Macleay (British Empire), de Peretti (France), della Torretta (Italy), Chinda (Japan).

(This proposal is approved, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify the Secretary-General accordingly.)

12. A letter from the German Delegation, dated May 24th, on the subject of responsibility for the consequences of the war and reparation, is read.

(It is agreed that the letter should be sent to the Commission dealing with Reparations in the Austrian Treaty, which should be asked to advise the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as to the nature of the reply to be sent.)

Sailor Steve

05-26-19, 02:20 PM

Monday, May 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

M Lamont, M Tardieu and S Crespi attend to present the attached note from the Reparation Commission:

26 May, 1919.
[Note From the Reparation Commission to the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers]

The Commission, sitting this morning, has heard the Delegations of the Powers having special interests.

After the departure of these Delegates, the Commission, as a result of an exchange of views between Messrs. Lamont, Lord Sumner, MM Loucheur & Tardieu, think it necessary to ask the Supreme Council:

1. Whether General Smuts and Mr. Keynes, who have not attended this morning’s meeting, have been officially appointed by Mr Lloyd George, in the same way as MM Loucheur & Tardieu have been appointed by M Clemenceau, and Messrs Lamont, Baruch & Davis by President Wilson.

2. Whether the Commission is empowered to discuss the remarks made by the Delegations of the Powers having special interests, and eventually, to present before the Supreme Council new proposals both as regards the Reparation Clauses and the financial Clauses, and particularly as regards the reconsideration of the participation of small Nations in the burden of Reparations.

Mr Lloyd George asks that his decision on the first point might be reserved, as he had received a letter from General Smuts, and wishes to discuss the whole question with him before giving a reply.

In regard to the second point it is agreed that the Commission is empowered to discuss the remarks made by the Delegation of the Powers having special interests, and eventually to present before the Supreme Council new proposals both as regards the Reparation Clauses and the Financial Clauses, and particularly as regards the recommendation of the participation of small Nations in the burden of reparation.

Mr Lloyd George expresses the hope that the question should be re-discussed with an open mind, as though no decision had already been taken. He expresses his intention of instructing the British representatives in this sense.

At this point the members of the Committee on New States were introduced. The proceedings of this part of the Meeting are recorded as a separate Meeting.

Sailor Steve

05-26-19, 03:59 PM

Monday, May 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:15

Meeting of the Council of Four with Members of the Committee on New States and Experts

1. The Council has before them the draft articles prepared by the Committee on New States for inclusion in the treaties with Austria and with Hungary. Committee on New States.

It is pointed out that the clauses are the same as those already approved for Poland, except that the special clauses relating to the Jews are not included. These are believed to be unnecessary in the case of Austria, where the situation was different in that respect to the situation in Poland.

President Wilson raises the question whether it would not be better to include these clauses, even if unnecessary, in the Treaty with Austria to avoid giving offence to Poland, but did not press the point.

Mr Headlam-Morley asks whether Austria is regarded as a new State or as an old State, the inheritor of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Some parts of the Treaty appeared to have been drafted on the former hypothesis, some on the latter. It is dangerous to treat Austria as possessing the rights formerly belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He produces a Memorandum and some draft articles which he had prepared on the subject.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that there is a good deal in this idea, and proposes that the point should be examined by the Drafting Committee.

S Orlando says that the question will require careful consideration and that at first sight he is not favorably impressed by the suggestion. He thinks it is creating a new precedent.

M Clemenceau entirely supports S Orlando.

President Wilson thinks that S Orlando has not entirely realized the difficulty. The Austro-Hungarian Empire is in an entirely special position.

(It is decided to refer this point to the Drafting Committee who should be authorized either to deal with the matter themselves or to take such advice as might seem to them requisite.)

(The draft clauses relating to minorities are approved).

2. President Wilson says he has received no reply yet from the Luxembourg Government, but he read a press announcement according to which the reply was that the Luxembourg Government is ready to send a deputation to Paris, and would like to know on which day it would be received.

(It is agreed that the Deputation should be heard on Wednesday afternoon, May 28th.)

3. Sir Maurice Hankey says he has consulted the British member of the Drafting Committee, and that the whole Drafting Committee had considered subsequently the question of the date on which the Treaty of Peace could be handed to the Austrians, omitting the Military terms and the Reparation clauses. The Drafting Committee had expressed doubt as to whether the Treaty could possibly be ready by Saturday next. One reason for this is that the printing of the Treaty in the Italian as well as in the French and English languages increases the length of time required by the printers.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that it might be presented in typewritten form.

(It is agreed to discuss the matter with the Drafting Committee on the following day).

4. Sir Maurice Hankey hands round a draft reply which he had prepared under instructions from the Council. Certain amendments are suggested and Sir Maurice Hankey is asked to prepare a fresh draft.

5. S Orlando raises as a point of urgency the fighting which is continuing between the Austrians and Slovenes. He said that the Austrian Delegation at St Germain has made an appeal to the Allied and Associated Powers to intervene. Southern Boundaries of Austria. Carinthia.

(After a considerable discussion, in the course of which the appointment of an Armistice Commission is proposed and rejected, it is agreed that the best plan would be to settle the frontiers of Austria first, and then insist on the withdrawal of both forces behind those frontiers.

It is therefore decided to meet the Foreign Ministers and the Expert Commission which had considered this question on the following afternoon.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to circulate a document communicated by M Pachitch.)

6. Sir Maurice Hankey hands round a copy of a letter addressed by the Ukrainian Delegation to General Botha, together with General Botha’s reply (Appendix II). Polish-Ukrainian Armistice

(It was agreed that this question should not be discussed until Mr Paderewski’s arrival.)

7. M Clemenceau says he wishes to make a last appeal to his Italian colleague. The situation has fortunately not as yet reached the worst point of gravity. Nevertheless, it is necessary to present the terms to the Austrians very shortly, and consequently it is impossible to leave them much longer at St Germain without a conversation. Yesterday he had seen S Orlando, and had explained to him the gravity of the present situation for France as well as for Italy. S Orlando with his usual open-mindedness, had said that some proposal must be made. First, however, some definite conversations must take place. He does not want to anticipate S Orlando’s proposals, but he hopes that some proposal would be made to get out of the difficulty. It would be an immeasurable relief, even if an unsatisfactory solution could be reached, and this relief would extend not only to Governments, but to peoples. If S Orlando is not prepared to propose anything today, he hopes he would do so as early as possible.

S Orlando says that, as he had remarked this morning, it would be a veritable liberation to get a solution, and he is fully in accord with M Clemenceau on this, and he thanks him for raising the question. M Clemenceau had stated his own sentiments perfectly. M Clemenceau had asked what was the decision of Italy? When this question had been discussed here between April 15th and April 20th, a marked difference had been shown between the maximum demands of Italy and the common views of all the Allied and Associated Powers. On April 20th he himself had said that, given the situation in which Italy had to renounce everything outside the Treaty of London, he would insist on adherence to the Treaty of London with all that it involved. He recognised, however, that this would divide him and his Allies from President Wilson, for the Allies stated that they would adhere to the Treaty although they were not perhaps in accord with it. But President Wilson said that he was not in accord with it and not bound by it. Thus, a difference would be created between the United States on one hand, and France and Great Britain on the other, and this was very undesirable. From the Italian point of view, what he desired was some transaction which would involve an agreement, but, failing that, he must claim the Treaty, however undesirable. He would seek every way of conciliation. For example, there had been the proposals of Mr Lloyd George between April 20th and 23rd. Later, there had been the discussions between Col House and Mr Miller and himself. He desires ardently to get out of the difficulty with the agreement of everyone. But, if not, he must demand the Treaty of London.

President Wilson says that he fears they are somewhat in danger of getting into a cul-de-sac. He wants very earnestly to point out to his Italian colleague the situation as it presents itself to him as a whole. We cannot move in two opposite directions at once, and yet the Italians appear to be trying to do so. The Treaty of London was made in circumstances which had now altogether altered. He is not referring now to the fact of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but to the partnership of the world in the development of peace, and the attention which had been directed by plain work-a-day people to this partnership as a basis of peace. When the Treaty of London had been entered into, there had only been a partnership between a few Great Powers - Russia, France, Great Britain, with Belgium and Serbia, against Germany, Austria and Turkey. As Belgian and Serbian soil had been violated, the only voluntary partners were France, Great Britain and Russia. He understood that these Powers had wished to induce Italy to become a partner, and for this reason had entered into the Treaty of London. At that time the world had not perceived that the war was a matter of common concern. He knew this because his own people had gone through this phase. He himself, probably before most of his people, saw the effect that the war was going to have on the future destinies and political development of the world. Slowly, at first very slowly, the world had seen that something was being done which cut at the roots of individual liberty and action. When that was realized, there was a common impulse to unite against the Central Empires. Thus, there came into the war many peoples whose interest was absolutely separate from any territorial question that was European in character. They came in for motives that had no connection with territory or any advantage. They sought only the emancipation of the world from an intolerable threat. Then there came new ideas, and the people of the world began to perceive that they had a common purpose. They realized that it was not only Belgium and Serbia, but all the small States that were threatened. Next there was a realization of the rights of minorities and small groups of all kinds. The light broadened out into a perception of the final settlement that was at hand. It was about this time that he himself had made his address to Congress on the results of the war. His own address had taken place, he thought, three days after Mr Lloyd George’s address to the House of Parliament. The only difference between the two addresses was that he summed up his in 14 points. Both his speech and that of the Prime Minister of Great Britain contained the same line of thought and ideas. They stated in their speeches what was coming into the consciousness of the world. When the Armistice was reached, his own statements had been accepted as the basis not only of the Armistice, but also of the peace. These ideas had by this time taken possession of all the world, and even the Orient was beginning to share them. Then came the League of Nations as a practical thing. Up to then it had been regarded as of academic interest, and the nations of the world desired to achieve peace on that basis; hence, when the Peace conference began, the whole platform of the Peace had been laid down. This platform had no relation to the ideas which belonged to the old order in European politics, namely, that the stronger Powers could dispose of the weaker. Great Britain and France had no right because they were strong to hand over peoples who were weak. The new conception did not admit of this. If these principles were insisted on, they would violate the new principles. There would then be a reaction among the small nations that would go to the very heart of the Peace of the world: for all these small nations, when they saw other nations handed over, would say, “Our turn will come next.” One of the reasons for which the United States people had gone to war was that they were told that the old-fashioned methods were dead. Hence, if Italy insisted on the Treaty of London, she would strike at the roots of the new system and undermine the new order. The United States would be asked under the Covenant of the League of Nations to guarantee the boundaries of Italy, and they could not do so if this Treaty were insisted on. There was one question which would not be susceptible of solution. If Italy insisted on the Treaty of London, as M. Clemenceau had pointed out, we could not ask Yugoslavia to reduce her army below the point necessary to maintain her safety against Italy. Yugoslavia would never do it. It would be impossible to use force against her - against the very power whose violation had caused the outbreak of the present war. This process could not be repeated to accomplish the ends the Italians had in view. If he was to be the spokesman and the spiritual representative of his people, he could not consent to any people being handed over without their consent. But he could consent to any people being handed over who stated that they wished to be. He was willing that Italy should have any part on the eastward slope of the Istrian Peninsula whose population would vote to be attached to Italy. Only he could not assent to any population being attached that did not so vote. He wanted to point out to S Orlando that Great Britain and France could not hand over any part of Yugoslavia to Italy, and that it could not be a legal transaction, except in accordance with the general peace - that is to say, only in the event of all parties being in agreement. It was constantly urged in the Italian Press and by Italian spokesmen that they did not want to abandon the Italians on the other side of the Adriatic. Was it not possible to obtain all she desired by means of a plebiscite? There would be no risk to Italy to leave the operation of a plebiscite to be carried out under the League of Nations. Italy herself would be a member of the League of Nations, and there would be no possibility of her being treated unfairly. If Italy did not take advantage of this, she would be establishing her enemies on her eastern borders. Thus there would be a beginning again of the evils that had arisen in the Balkans. Beyond the boundaries of Italy would be the Yugoslavs with their eyes turned towards the population which had been placed under Italy by the powerful Western nations. It was impossible for Italy to adopt both methods. Either she must abandon the new methods altogether, or else she must wholly abandon the old methods and enter into the new world with the new methods under conditions more hopeful for peace than had ever before prevailed.

S Orlando says he has no difficulty in recognizing that President Wilson’s speech was perfectly logical, provided that his hypotheses were correct. What he disputes, however, is the correctness of these hypotheses. He cannot admit that the Treaty of London is a violation of the principles of justice and right. The Treaty of London had merely anticipated the boundaries which would have to be drawn. All through the present Conference terrible problems have presented themselves, involving ethnical, geographical, strategical and other considerations, and in every case great difficulties have had to be surmounted in order to reach a solution. The Treaty of London had merely anticipated these difficulties. The Treaty of London was indeed a compromise transaction. It was a compromise because of the renunciation by Italy of Fiume and half of Dalmatia. including the Italian towns of Spalato and Trau. It was a compromise because of the admixture of races. Hence, he could not admit the premise of President Wilson that the Treaty of London was, without discussion, a violation of right and justice. Whether it was good or bad, it was a compromise. Experience showed that for Italy it was a bad compromise, because Italy did not get satisfaction on Fiume. He deeply regretted this, but accepted it in a spirit of compromise. However, if the Treaty was not acceptable another solution must be sought. He much regrets that he cannot possibly accept a plebiscite. His first reason for rejecting it is that it would prolong the present state of anxiety in Italy. His second objection is the complexity of the problems. He cannot deny, for example, that on the eastern slope of the Istrian Alps, the majority of the inhabitants are Slavs. Consequently, a plebiscite would not give the right result to Italy. But in this case he had to seek a different principle from the ethnographical principle, namely, that the line of the Alps was the defense of his country. His third reason - and he does not wish to make comparisons detrimental to other peoples - is that there is a different state of culture in Yugoslavia from Italy, because there is a different state of civilization. It is quite true that Italian military authorities had, in many places, got on perfectly well with the inhabitants. But, nevertheless, in these conditions he cannot count with any confidence on the sincerity of the plebiscite. These are the three reasons why he cannot accept the proposal for a plebiscite. He is ready to try and find a solution, but he cannot see one at present. His conclusion unfortunately, therefore, is that an impasse has been reached. In these circumstances, what course is open to him? He has only his Treaty to make an appeal to. He was not a Shylock, demanding his pound of flesh from the Yugoslavs. Great Britain and France had given their adhesion to this arrangement. He cannot say he is satisfied with the Treaty and he regrets profoundly the difficulty it has created with the United States. But as no other way could be found out, he is bound to adhere to this attitude.

President Wilson says that he does not characterize the Treaty in the manner S Orlando had suggested, but only as inconsistent with the new order of settlements, namely, that the ethnical principle should be adopted except where other paramount considerations, such as the existence of the Alps, are introduced. If there is no doubt the principle of self-determination should be followed. He reminds S Orlando that, in the case of the Polish corridor, where very strong strategical considerations had applied, this territory had not been assigned to Poland, because there had been a solid German block, notwithstanding that the essential railway connecting Poland with the sea ran through this corridor. We had not even felt at liberty to assign the Port of Danzig itself to Poland. Moreover, he does not contemplate a plebiscite without effective supervision. If any plebiscite took place it would be carefully observed and overlooked, and no plebiscite under coercion would be accepted. In the most friendly way he wishes to ask whether if he, himself, stated his reasons publicly and made the proposal he had made this afternoon, that is, that the territory between the line of the crest of the Istrian Peninsula and the line of the Treaty of London should be granted a plebiscite, would S Orlando feel equally at liberty and justified in publicly stating his objections?

S Orlando says that he first wishes to dissipate a misunderstanding. When he had spoken of the intimidation of the Slavs, he had not spoken of anything which was likely to occur before or during a plebiscite. He spoke rather of the fears and apprehensions for the future, which would deter people from voting for Italy. Consequently, a genuine vote would not be obtained. It was not at the moment of the plebiscite that he anticipated constraint but in the future. So far as concerned Poland whatever the result of the plebiscite, some 1,700,000 Germans would be assigned to Poland. If the whole of the Italian claims are granted and the Austrian figures, notoriously inaccurate as they are, are taken as true, not half this number of aliens would be assigned to Italy. As regards President Wilson’s last question, he would naturally try and avoid any public statement, particularly at the present time when attempts were being made to reach a solution, but, if President Wilson should make such a public statement, he would reply as he had replied to-day and would give the same arguments.

President Wilson says that he hopes that before S Orlando reaches a final conclusion, he would consult with his colleagues. He hopes he would remember the difficulty of carrying out the Treaty of London, even if it were correct to. He had joined in creating a machine and method that could not be used for that purpose. He hopes that he would discuss the question again and that he is not tired of trying to find some new course.

S Orlando said that he could reply at once that whenever conciliation is proposed, he will not refuse. He therefore accepts President Wilson’s request.

M Clemenceau says that what strikes him is that S Orlando never made a proposal. From the beginning of these discussions he has never once made any definite proposal. He had made a claim to Fiume. He had applied the principle of self-determination to Fiume. But when he came to discuss Dalmatia he had dropped the principle. There was another contradiction in his method. He had claimed the Treaty of London as regards Dalmatia, but when it came to Fiume he had proposed to break the Treaty of London. Yet another argument was that, as President Wilson said, the Treaty of London was not really a solution. Supposing that France and Great Britain gave Italy the Treaty of London. It would not result in peace, and consequently did not provide a solution. Hence, the only solution put forward is not a solution. Hence, he feels that it is necessary for the methods to be changed. It might be a good plan to have a Committee of four people to examine every suggestion. If a conclusion is not reached, the Council would be the laughing stock of the world, and a position of real danger would be reached. The only solution proposed was one that would put the world in anarchy, and he hoped that when that happened nobody could say it was his fault. He cannot agree to a solution that was nothing at all but a continuation of war. Hence, he demands that the discussion should be continued. At the bottom, he is in favour of the maintenance of the Treaty of London. What President Wilson had said about the change of mind of the peoples of the world which had occurred during the war was a very serious consideration. In the earlier parts of the war, people had talked about seizure of territory, but afterwards had come the idea of the liberties of peoples and the building up of new relations. The Italians must recognize this. He is not speaking against the Italian people, but he feels it is time the Italians examined these aspects of the matter, and this is a subject to which he would call his Italian colleagues’ attention.

S Orlando says he is quite agreed to a continuation of the discussion.

M Clemenceau again insists that S Orlando never made a proposal. Today, all he could suggest was the Treaty of London, but this meant anarchy and the continuation of war. He asked S Orlando to make proposals.

S Orlando undertakes to do so.

8. The Articles for inclusion in the Treaties of Peace with Austria committee on New and Hungary, approved earlier in the afternoon, are initialed by the Four Heads of Governments.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward them to the Drafting Committee).

9. The Economic Clauses for insertion in the Treaties of Peace with Austria and Hungary, approved on the 24th inst., were initialed by the Four Heads of Governments. Economic Clauses in the Treaties of Peace With Austria & Hungary

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward them to the Drafting Committee).

10. The alterations in the Covenant of the League of Nations, approved at the morning meeting,3 (addition of Air to Naval and Military Clauses) are initialed by the League of Nations Four Heads of Governments. Alterations in the Covenant of the League of Nations

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward them to the Drafting Committee.)

Jimbuna

05-27-19, 07:06 AM

27th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Draft Treaty presented by Peace Conference to Poland.

Mohammed Said Pasha becomes Prime Minister of Egypt.

The “Big Four”—David Lloyd George of Britain, Vittorio Orlando of Italy, Georges Clemenceau of France, and Woodrow Wilson of the U.S.—who made all the major decisions at the Paris Peace Conference.
https://i.imgur.com/m7w81ck.jpg

British soldier patrolling the riverside in occupied Cologne, Germany.
https://i.imgur.com/soPk1BT.jpg

African American soldiers of the 505th Engineers reenact a capture of a German soldier.
https://i.imgur.com/CCzYoPx.jpg

British soldiers inspect a Greek prison in Smyrna (İzmir, Turkey) where they have incarcerated Turks.
https://i.imgur.com/0NM2lrE.jpg

Sailor Steve

05-27-19, 07:34 PM

Tuesday, May 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Three

Mr Lloyd George states that General Botha had come to him that morning and had indicated that he was very dissatisfied with the attitude of the Poles in regard to the Polish-Ukrainian Armistice. He had asked M Clemenceau to discuss Armistice this alone with President Wilson and himself because to speak quite frankly, he had some reasons to believe that M Clemenceau was not fully informed as to the attitude taken by the French authorities. He had grounds for the belief that the French Minister in Warsaw had encouraged the Poles in their recent attack on the Ukrainians. A fact which rather confirmed these suspicions was that General Botha reported that he had been unable to secure the attendance of the French representatives at meetings of the Armistice Commission, and this had occurred so frequently that it was difficult to believe that it was not deliberate. Then he quoted General Haller’s highly indiscreet speeches, indicating among other things, that Danzig must become Polish. Further, he said that he had that morning received a report to the effect that General Franchet d’Esperey on the 20th May had ordered forces up towards Czernovitz with a view to junction with the Poles, which seemed to indicate an attempt to squeeze out the Ukrainians. Finally, he thought it very curious that the Council had been informed that Mr Paderewski was returning to Paris last Friday and they had been put off from day to day and almost from hour to hour with reports that he was expected immediately, whereas in fact he was now in Prague. He was anxious that M Clemenceau should ascertain whether the agreed telegram had ever been dispatched to General Haller. It was very curious that no reply had been received.

President Wilson recalls the old plan of the so-called sanitary cordon which the Military Authorities had proposed to establish against the Bolsheviks, and which had been rejected. He thinks it possible that the Military Authorities were, nevertheless, trying to carry out this plan in fact.

M Clemenceau expressed incredulity, but promised to make the fullest possible inquiry.

(It is agreed:

1) That Colonel Kisch should attend at the Ministry of War at 14:30 in the afternoon where General Albi and General Mordacq would also be present.

2) That the attached telegram, drafted by President Wilson, the despatch of which had been reserved pending M Paderewski’s return, should be sent at once to Warsaw. Sir Maurice Hankey is directed to take the necessary action.)

Telegram

From: The President of the Peace Conference.

To: General Pilsudski, Head of the Polish State, Warsaw.

The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers feel that it is their duty to call the attention of the Government of Poland to facts which are giving them the greatest concern and which may lead to consequences for Poland which the Council would deeply deplore. The boundary between Poland and the Ukraine is under consideration and is as yet undetermined, and the Council has more than once informed the Polish Government that they would regard any attempt either by Poland or by the Ukrainian authorities to determine it, or to prejudice its determination, by the use of force, as a violation of the whole spirit and an arbitrary interference with the whole purpose of the present Conference of Peace, to which Poland, at least, has consented to leave the decision of questions of this very sort. The Council has, therefore, more than once insisted that there should be an armistice on the Ukrainian front, arranged in Paris and under the advice of the Council itself. Full conferences in that matter have been held between a carefully selected Inter-Allied commission and representatives of Poland and the Ukraine, and terms of armistice drawn up which have been formally approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The representatives of the Ukraine have accepted those terms, but the Polish military authorities, while acquiescing in principle, have in effect insisted upon such conditions as would amount to a settlement of the very questions in controversy, and have continued to use force to maintain their claims. This has inevitably made the impression on the minds of the members of the Council that the Polish authorities were in effect, if not in purpose, denying and rejecting the authority of the Conference of Peace. The Council feel it their duty, therefore, in the most friendly spirit but with the most solemn earnestness, to say to the Polish authorities that, if they are not willing to accept the guidance and decisions of the Conference of Peace in such matters, the Governments represented in the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Governments will not be justified in furnishing Poland any longer with supplies or assistance. If it is her deliberate purpose to set at naught the counsel proffered by the Conference, its authority can no longer, it is feared, be made serviceable to her. The Council will, of course, insist upon an absolute cessation of hostilities on the part of the Ukrainian military forces.

Paris, May 27, 1919.

Sailor Steve

05-27-19, 07:42 PM

Tuesday, May 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:15

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. After discussion with the Members of the Drafting Committee, it is agreed:

1) That the draft Treaty of Peace, omitting the military terms, and the clauses dealing with reparation and debt (since these wear a special aspect owing to the break-up of the Austrian Empire into several parts, which necessitates their examination from the point of view of their bearing on the interests and action of the several parts) shall be handed to the Austrian Delegates on Friday, May 30th, at Noon, and that the Drafting Committee shall proceed on this assumption.

2) That, as there was no time to print the Treaty in a final form, it should be handed to the Austrians in proof.

3) That, as there is not sufficient time to print the Articles of the Treaty with the three languages on a single page, the Drafting Committee should have authority to print the clauses in the three languages on separate pages.

4) That the Drafting Committee should devote themselves with the least possible delay to the consideration of the question referred to them on the previous day, namely, as to whether Austria is to be regarded as a new State, or as an old State, the inheritor of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and should adopt whichever method proved most workable for the drafting of the Treaty.

5) That the draft of the political clauses relating to the territory acquired by Italy from Austria for inclusion in the Austrian Treaty should be circulated at once by the Italian Delegation and considered that afternoon.

6) That Sir Maurice Hankey should arrange with the Secretary-General for the immediate communication the same afternoon to the Czechoslovaks and other new States of the political clauses in the Treaty which concerned them.

7) That the question of guarantees in the Treaty with Austria should be reserved, pending inquiry by S Orlando to his military advisers.

8) That Sir Maurice Hankey should ascertain whether the Credentials Committee had recognised the full powers of the Austrian Delegates as conferred in the name of German Austria.

2. Sir Maurice Hankey, in accordance with instructions, produces in the French and English languages a re-draft of the reply to the Austrian letter of the 24th May, asking that peace negotiations might be opened with the least possible delay.

(The letter is approved, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to arrange with the Secretary-General for its reproduction for M Clemenceau’s signature.

It is agreed that the Austrian Note and the reply should be published together as soon as the reply is dispatched.)

Sailor Steve

05-27-19, 07:57 PM

Tuesday, May 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:45

Meeting of the Council of Four

The Council has before them the Financial Clauses for insertion in the Treaty with Austria.

1. Mr Lamont says that in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Council the Delegates of the States which had previously formed part of the Austrian Empire had been summoned on the previous day to discuss the question of Reparation. The attitude of all the Delegates had been that they could not bear to be considered as an enemy State or to be classed in the same category as Austria in regard to Reparation. Their declaration had been listened to but no definite answer had been made. After the meeting Dr Benes had said in conversation that Czechoslovakia would be willing to consider favorably a proposal that she should share in the burden of the war provided that this proposal was not put forward in the form of a demand for Reparation. Dr Benes had been asked to devise a formula which would be satisfactory to him and this formula would in all probability suit all the four new Nations. It would, however, necessitate the making of separate agreements with each of them.

Mr Lloyd George says that he also has seen Dr Benes and had gathered that there would be no objection on his part to a contribution towards the expenses of the war which was a war of liberation for Czechoslovakia. Indeed there could be no objection to such a proposal seeing that Bohemia is a very rich country and could well afford to make some sacrifice for the sake of its liberty. It is essential that in some form or another these countries should contribute seeing that in Allied countries the burden of the war would fall in many cases upon peasantry who were poorer than the inhabitants of liberated countries. But there are good reasons for meeting the wishes of the new States in regard to the precise purpose to be assigned to their contribution.

Signor Crespi says that he accepted the principle especially in view of the fact that Trent and Trieste are also to be treated not as enemy countries but as being in most respects analogous to Alsace and Lorraine.

Signor Orlando says he thinks it is quite natural that these States should not wish to be regarded as responsible for the war of which they were the victims. It must be recognized that the Czechs have begun to take the part of the Allies even during the war and that they have made a useful contribution towards victory. He therefore has no objection to make to any proposal which is intended to recognize their special position.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that as there appears to be general agreement the Reparation Clauses for Austria should be drafted on this basis and that the experts in charge of them should have full power to negotiate with the component parts of the old Austrian Empire on this principle.

President Wilson suggests that the right phrase to use would be that the new States should be required to make a contribution towards the cost of their own liberation.

2. President Wilson says that he was advised that Article 1 had the effect of putting a permanent cloud on Austrian credit. He proposes that it should be modified by the insertion, at the beginning of the words “subject to such exceptions as the Reparation Commission may make”.

M Loucheur said that the only objection which he would have to this alteration would be that it might perhaps be inopportune to introduce such a modification, seeing that the clause as it stood was similar to the corresponding clause in the German Treaty, and that the text had been already presented to the Germans without any amendment.

President Wilson says that he sees no difficulty in making special arrangements with Austria, and that in fact it was the intention of the Allies to treat Austria differently from Germany.

Mr Lloyd George says that as a matter of fact the difference amounts to very little because even in the case of Germany certain exceptions had been admitted.

It is agreed that the words “subject to such exceptions as the Reparation Commission may make” should be inserted at the beginning of Clause 1.

3. M Loucheur proposes that a special clause should be inserted to deal with the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Sud de l’Autriche. The obligations of this Company in France amount to 1½ milliards and are in the possession of a vast number of people. The railway system belonging to the Company is to be split up into five separate parts which run through a number of the various new States. The regulation of the affairs of the Company is therefore a very complicated question which cannot be settled by the Council, but the view of the French Government is that the Treaty must provide for the making of such a settlement.

President Wilson asks whether this is a Government railway.

M Clemenceau explains that it is a private company.

President Wilson says that he sees great difficulty in accepting a clause which would make the Allied and Associated Governments a supervising authority in the case of one particular private company. He sees no reason for making special provisions in the case of South-Austrian railways, especially as he is informed that there are at least twenty International commissions already on which the United States had undertaken to be represented. A great number of similar questions are sure to arise under the Peace Treaties and it is impossible to make special provision for the settlement of each through international channels. It would be a very serious venture to enter into a control of a single corporation, and in fact the five different groups of the railway would know their interests and arrange their own difficulties a great deal better than any international commission would be likely to do.

Mr Lloyd George says that he thinks the Council should not be asked to interfere in order to safeguard the interests of these particular bond-holders. If private interests were to be safeguarded the principle ought to have been applied all round. In point of fact every legitimate interest is protected by Article 6 of the Financial Clauses which is so drafted as to include bond-holders. The Council cannot judge of individual corporations and he would hesitate very much before giving special protection to bond-holders of whom nothing was known and who might very well be speculating.

M Loucheur says that the French proposal is not intended to obtain special protection for the bond-holders. It was merely intended to provide a solution of a practical problem which was sure to arise. Here is a Company which is going to be split into five different pieces and it is necessary to say how this Company is to function and whether and in what manner it is to be allowed the right of exploiting the five separate parts. If the case is really covered by paragraph 6 of the Treaty the object of the French proposal is gained.

(It is agreed that the Financial Clauses should be included in the Treaty with Austria as drafted, subject to the amendment of Clause 1 as proposed by President Wilson.)

Sailor Steve

05-27-19, 08:36 PM

Tuesday, May 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Three

1. M Clemenceau says that he has made a very full investigation in regard to the various points raised by Mr Lloyd George at the morning meeting. The first point relates to the dispatch to General Pilsudski.

General Mordacq says that on May 22nd, M Clemenceau had given him the dispatch, which he had sent to the Head of the French Mission at Warsaw, with instructions that it was to be given both to General Pilsudski and to General Haller, and that he was to telegraph when he had done this. On the 23rd May, the Head of the French Mission had replied, asking for the dispatch to be repeated. This had been done and an acknowledgment had been asked for. No reply was received on Saturday and so a telegram had been sent asking whether the dispatch had been received. The reply had been that the dispatch could not be deciphered and it turned out that the wrong key had been used for deciphering. The right key to the cipher had then been communicated. On Sunday no reply was received, and a telegram was sent to ask whether the message had been received, deciphered and understood. It was only on Monday, the 26th, that a telegram had been received to say that the dispatch had been deciphered and understood, and the necessary action taken.

M Clemenceau says he has a telegram which shows that General Henrys said that General Haller had now done the right thing and sent his troops to the German front. He is not satisfied, however, about the treatment of the dispatch.

Colonel Kisch says that General Henrys said that General Haller’s troops had first been sent to the North of Lemberg but now they had been brought back to the German front.

M Clemenceau says that Mr Lloyd George’s story that the French Minister had supported the employment of General Haller’s Army on the Ukrainian front probably had its foundation in the fact that the French Minister presided at a Committee, one of the recommendations of which by a large majority was that the Allied and Associated Powers should not make a reservation about the employment of General Haller’s Divisions. General Henrys had said that M. Dmowski wanted the whole matter transferred to Marshal Foch, and this probably was the foundation of the idea that the French were supporting the action of the Poles. Rightly or wrongly the Poles believed that they had the support of Marshal Foch.

Mr Lloyd George recalls that Marshal Foch had wanted to send General Haller’s Army to Poland through Lemberg. He says he is perfectly satisfied now that the matter was in M Clemenceau’s own hands.

Sailor Steve

05-27-19, 08:47 PM

Tuesday, May 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. President Wilson says that the problem the Council is called upon to solve had reference to the frontiers between Austria and Yugoslavia in the region of Klagenfurt. He thinks the Problem could be stated as follows. As far as the so-called Klagenfurt Basin is concerned, it will be found that the economic boundary line runs south of the ethnic line. The ethnic line divides the Basin into two parts, a northern and a southern part. The southern part, although it contains a large number of Slovenes, is indissolubly tied up, economically, with the northern part. Furthermore, the southern part of the Klagenfurt Basin is itself cut off from the country to the south by one of nature’s most impressive lines of demarcation, namely, a mountain range, which was far steeper on its southern side than on its northern side, thus constituting a most serious barrier on its southern side.

In his opinion, the question of the delimitation of the Klagenfurt Basin resembles in every respect the case of the Italian boundary line, running down the Istrian Peninsula. In that case, although it is acknowledged that many Slovenes reside on the Italian side of that line, nevertheless, it has been agreed that nature had made that the natural boundary line of the Italian Peninsula. A similar situation presents itself here in the Klagenfurt Basin. The Slovene people in the southern part of the Basin, are, economically, intimately connected with the northern people. The question cannot, therefore, be considered merely from a political and ethnical point of view. In other words, the Council will have to decide whether an unnatural arrangement should be accepted for political expediency, or a natural arrangement, thus disregarding purely political consideration. He, personally, feels very much embarrassed to depart from the principle which he had agreed to follow in the case of the Italian settlement. He certainly has no desire to reconsider the arrangement made with Italy which followed the dictates of nature.

(After some private consultation, between the Heads of Governments, it is decided to postpone the further consideration of the question.)

2. It is pointed out that the question of Bessarabia has been omitted from the dispatch to Admiral Kolchak, and that this will probably cause difficulties with Romania, when the Dispatch to Admiral Kolchak is eventually published. Russia.

(After some discussion, the following addition to the dispatch is approved:

“Sixthly, the right of the Peace Conference to determine the future of the Romanian part of Bessarabia be recognised”.

The original Article “Sixthly” to be renumbered “Seventhly”.)

3. The Council has before them the a Note dated May 22, 1919, from the Secretary-General of the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways.

(The Articles for inclusion in the Treaties with Hungary are approved and initialed by the Four Heads of Governments.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward the Articles to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee after ascertaining that the experts are unanimous on the subject).

Jimbuna

05-28-19, 06:38 AM

28th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Counter proposals by German Government, published 15 June.

Emir of Afghanistan (Amanullah Khan) proposes Peace.

General Yudenich and Estonians closing on Petrograd.

Assortment of damaged tanks left in the railway yard of Villers-Bretonneau, France.
https://i.imgur.com/EZW2vXR.jpg

Armenians celebrate the first anniversary of the Republic of Armenia in Yerevan.
https://i.imgur.com/5QWPa6H.jpg

American pilots Elmer Fowler Stone and Walter Hinton completes the first transatlantic flight from Newfoundland to Lisbon, which took over 10 days.
https://i.imgur.com/PPYum0B.jpg

Sailor Steve

05-28-19, 11:46 AM

Wednesday, May 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George's Residence, 24 Rue Nitot, Paris 11:00

Meeting of Mr Lloyd George for Great Britain, S Orlando for Italy, with Colonel House representing the United States

1. The Meeting has before them proposals for the settlement of the Italian claims, which had been discussed between Colonel House and M Tardieu.

Mr Lloyd George apologizes for arriving very late to the meeting, and explains that he had been in Conference with President Wilson with a view to reaching a settlement.

S Orlando accepts this explanation.

Mr Lloyd George says that President Wilson would be glad if S Orlando would entirely separate the first page from the second page. The President is quite willing to discuss the question of Albania, but it was a new demand, and he cannot agree to it right away. He agrees that some mandate is necessary for Albania, but wishes the question to be considered as part of the question of mandates. There is no other country that could well take the mandate for Albania. Greece and Serbia are too closely involved in the politics of Albania. Neither France, Great Britain, nor the United States would care for it, and in his own view, Italy would certainly have the first claim. The President did not rule this out, but wanted to reserve it for further consideration. Turning to the first page of the proposals, Mr Lloyd George says that the President had had two main comments. The first referred to the constitution of the proposed Commission for the administration of Fiume. It was contemplated that there should be five members, two nominated by Italy, one by Fiume, one by the Yugoslavs, and one by the other Powers. The ultimate effect of this depended on what was meant by Fiume. If Fiume was taken to refer only to the old town, an Italian would be chosen, and consequently the whole district would come practically under Italian administration. The President therefore suggested that the Commission should be composed of two Italians, one Yugoslav, one elected by the whole state of Fiume, and one by the other Powers; that is to say, the representative of the Powers would be in a middle position, and would practically have a casting vote.

Next, as regards the islands. President Wilson commented if all except Pago were assigned to Italy, it would create great difficulties. The Yugoslavs are violent on the subject of the islands, and would never agree that all should go to Italy. This was more especially the case as the island of Veglia was to be assigned to Fiume, although it was not in the Treaty of London assigned to Italy. On the contrary, it had been assigned to Croatia, and President Wilson felt that this made a great difference. He suggested, therefore, that Italy should name one or two of the islands which were important to her from a defensive point of view.

Colonel House explains that one of the primary motives of President Wilson was that there should not be to the eastward of Italy a population which was bitterly opposed to her. He did not want the Yugoslav population to have an irredentist movement directed against Italy.

Mr Lloyd George asks which of the islands are most important to Italy.

S Orlando says he will examine the matter and referred to Lesina. He says that the islands were largely complementary to Zara and Sebenico. He would like to examine the question with his naval experts. In fact, he feels it would be necessary to examine the whole question with the Italian Delegation, and the sooner he did so the better. He would give an answer in the afternoon.

Mr Lloyd George says he will try to sum up the position. As far as he can judge, President Wilson is anxious to reach an agreement, and is prepared to recommend a reasonable agreement to the Yugoslavs. He considers the assent of the Yugoslavs essential. It will make all the difference, however, if President Wilson is prepared to urge the agreement on the Yugoslavs. Then the position would be that the Yugoslavs, and not the Italians, would be standing in the way. In his judgement, the great thing is for the Principal Powers to stand together. If there is any coldness between Italy on the one hand, and France and Great Britain on the other, the position will be a very bad one. He then sums up the proposal as follows:

The State of Fiume to be under the League of Nations, and to consist of a fairly large State, as indicated in the conversations which had taken place the previous evening. The State to be administered by the following: two representatives nominated by Italy, one nominated by the State of Fiume, one nominated by the Yugoslavs, and one nominated by the other Great Powers.

At the end or 15 years a plebiscite will be held, when the people would decide whether they would remain independent, or become Italian, or become Croatian. Probably they would vote to continue as they were.

The arrangement would be somewhat similar to the Saar Valley settlement and general military protection would be afforded by the League of Nations. The whole of Dalmatia would be left to the Yugoslavs.

S Orlando asks if Zara and Sebenico would not stand out. He had thought that these would be assigned to Italy.

Mr Lloyd George says he does not think President Wilson could possibly agree to this. His idea was that Zara and Sebenico should be free cities under the League of Nations.

S Orlando says that this made a great difference.

Colonel House repeats a suggestion made to him by Sir Maurice Hankey, that Zara and Sebenico might be attached to Fiume.

S Orlando does not like this proposal.

Mr Lloyd George does not think that President Wilson would agree to any proposal that did not leave the sovereignty of Zara and Sebenico under the League of Nations, if not under the Yugoslavs. If they are free ports under the League of Nations, they would be just as free to the Yugoslavs as to the Italians, and this is important as they give access to Dalmatia. The great difficulty appears to arise in connection with the islands. He urged upon S Orlando with the utmost insistence that in considering the question of the islands, he should confine himself to as few as possible, and only those necessary for the security of Italy, and that he should choose islands which had a large Italian population. The question of Albania is reserved.

Colonel House says that President Wilson’s idea had been that a Commission should report in regard to Albania.

S Orlando undertakes to consider the general proposal with his colleagues and give an answer at 16.30.

Mr Lloyd George hands to S Orlando a letter which he had written in reply to a letter he had received a few days before from S Orlando.

Sailor Steve

05-28-19, 02:09 PM

Wednesday, May 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:45

Meeting of the Council of Three

Colonel House and M Jules Cambon are also present

1. M Clemenceau says that M Cambon has received full powers from the Austrian Delegates, which are in the name of German Austria. The question that arises is as to whether they should be accepted for German Austria. His private opinion is that this is not a question to break on, but he thinks they ought to be asked to give them in the name of Austria.

President Wilson asks, if, in accepting the full powers, we could not reserve judgement as to whether the designation was a correct one.

M Cambon urges that there is only one Austria. There is the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Kingdom of Hungary etc., but Austria is Austria.

Mr Lloyd George urges that the other nations constituted out of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire should be consulted.

(It is agreed that M Jules Cambon should see the representatives in Paris, of the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs, and should report the result on the following morning).

(M Cambon withdraws.)

2. Colonel House and Mr Lloyd George report the result of their conversation with S Orlando just before this meeting.

(Colonel House withdraws.)

3. M Clemenceau reads a telegram from General Dupont, reporting preparations in Germany in the event of an Allied advance. He also reads another report, according to which Herr Dernburg had told a Member of the French Mission in Berlin that he did not say the Germans would not sign, but if they did sign, the present Government would be replaced by a Socialist Government, which would be unable to carry out the Treaty. Germany and the Treaty of Peace

4. M Clemenceau reports that, as agreed to on the previous day, he has instructed the French Diplomatic Representative at Warsaw that he is to let the Polish Government know that the four Principal Allied and Associated Powers are unanimous in stopping the advance of the Poles against the Ukrainians, and that they are not supported by the French Government any more than by any other Government. He says he has bad news from that front. He then reads a dispatch from Bucharest, according to which the Polish offensive has been pushed as far as Stryj, the objective being Stanislau. The Romanians are pushing north with the same objective. A desperate resistance must be expected on the part of the Ukrainians. If Poland is to receive Galicia, it would be a great scandal and due to the British and French munitions that had been sent there.

(It is agreed that Mr Paderewski should be seen at once on the subject. Captain Harmsworth is sent in a motor car to try and bring him before the end of the meeting. Captain Harmsworth, however, has not returned by 13:00, when the meeting is adjourned.)

5. President Wilson says he has news that, in spite of the representations that have been made, Italy is still sending troops to Asia-Minor.

Mr Lloyd George says that, when the question had been discussed at the Council, he had made it quite clear that if Italy did not withdraw her troops, he would disinterest himself altogether in Italian claims in Asia-Minor. He adheres to this.

M Clemenceau says that M Barrère had reported that the trouble in Italy about Smyrna was due to the fact that S Orlando had never let it be known that he had agreed to the Greek occupation.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Italians had occupied the zones in Asia-Minor in defiance of the Council.

M Clemenceau says that he has heard from General Hombert that Fiume has been occupied in the name of the King of Italy, and that all notices, etc., were issued in his name.

6. President Wilson reads a letter, dated 27th May, from the Austrian Delegation, asking that General Slatin might be permitted to have direct communication with the Commission concerned with Prisoners of War, with a view to a common and prompt solution being found in regard to these questions.

(It is agreed that the Prisoners of War Commission should be authorized to meet General Slatin.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to take the necessary action with the Secretary-General.)

7. Sir Maurice Hankey reads a letter from M Berthelot with an enclosure from M Bratiano.

(It is agreed that the following Article, already approved for insertion in the Treaty with Hungary, should be inserted in the Treaty with Austria:

“Romania accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the said Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of Romania who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion.

“Romania further accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the said Powers such provisions as they may deem necessary to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment of the commerce of other Nations.”

The above Article is initialed, and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for communication to the Drafting Committee.

Note. S Orlando had initialed this Article before the meeting.)

8. Sir Maurice Hankey reminds the Council that, on May 20th, they had approved the proposals of the Reparation Committee in regard to a request by the Serbian Delegation for one-tenth of the total of the first installment of reparation demanded from Germany. He had felt some doubt as to how this decision was to be translated into action, and had accordingly referred to Mr Keynes for advice. Mr Keynes had replied with a memorandum, from which Sir Maurice Hankey reads the following extract:

“Altogether, therefore, Serbia has already had, apart from other loans, a sum of nearly double that proposed in the memorandum as an advance in respect of indemnity receipts. She is also currently receiving money at a monthly rate greater than that recommended. I suggest, therefore, that, in view of these circumstances, no action is needed.”

Sir Maurice Hankey asks for instructions as to what action, if any, he should take.

(It is agreed that the question should be referred to a Committee, composed of Mr Keynes, M Loucheur and Mr Norman Davis, who should be asked to consider what executive action should be taken, and to make such communications as might be necessary to the Serbians.)

9. Mr Lloyd George asked if there was any objection to boots, munitions, etc., being sent to Estonia.

M Clemenceau says there is none.

10. President Wilson says he has received the draft Articles prepared by the Italian Delegation in regard to the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire to be transferred to Italy, together with some remarks by Mr Lansing. Among other things, Mr Lansing has proposed that several of the Articles should be referred to the appropriate Commissions of the Conference. This would involve some delay, so that these clauses could not be handed to the Austrians on Friday.

Mr Lloyd George says they could be sent subsequently. He insists strongly that the Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Polish Delegations should see these Articles.

(It was agreed:

1) To approve the suggestion of the American Delegation that certain of the Articles should be referred to the appropriate Commissions of the Conference.

2) That the draft articles should be communicated to the Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Polish Delegations, and any other Delegations concerned, for their remarks.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to arrange with the Secretary-General to give effect to this decision.)

11. It is agreed that a Plenary Conference should be held on May 29th at 15:00, to which should be invited the plenipotentiaries of the following States:

1) The Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

2) All States which were at war with Austria-Hungary.

3) The new States formed out of the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, and all States which are receiving territory from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is directed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General.)

11a. Sir Maurice Hankey reports that a summary of the Austrian Treaty is being prepared in the British Delegation.

M Clemenceau asks that Sir Maurice Hankey communicate a copy to M Tardieu, in order that it might be translated into French.

(It is agreed that the summary of the Treaty should be published after communication of the Treaty to the Austrian Delegates.)

12. M Clemenceau asks how long a time will be given to the Austrian Delegates to give their reply?

Mr Lloyd George urges the time should be short.

President Wilson thinks the same time should be given to the Austrians as had been given to the Germans. The Austrian Delegation had not nearly so many experts with them as the Germans.

13. President Wilson says he had read in the newspapers that 60 of the German Experts had left for Berlin.

M Clemenceau reports that this was the case. They had accomplished their work and their presence was no longer required.

Sailor Steve

05-28-19, 02:38 PM

Wednesday, May 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. Sir Maurice Hankey reads the following letter which he has received from the Chinese Delegation:

"May 28th, 1919.

Sir: On behalf of the Chinese Delegation I beg to make a formal request for a copy of the Minutes of the proceedings of the Council of Prime Ministers bearing upon the Kiaochow-Shantung question. Since my country is the party most directly concerned in it, I trust that the Council will see their way to comply with my request. Chinese Delegation’s Application for Minutes

I am, Sir,

Yours truly,

Lou Tseng-Tsiang"

He has contemplated a reply in the sense that the rule of the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers are not to communicate their Minutes, except to those persons who had been present at a Meeting. A copy of the Minutes of the Meeting at which the Chinese Delegates were present had been forwarded to Mr. Koo on April 23rd.

President Wilson says the letter had been forwarded at his suggestion and he is inclined to think that the Chinese Delegation are entitled to the Minutes for their confidential use.

Mr Lloyd George points out that, in that event, it would be necessary to give the Japanese Delegates a copy of the Minutes of the Meeting at which the Chinese had been present, and he does not consider this desirable.

Sir Maurice Hankey says he had informed the Japanese Delegation that he had no authority to communicate Minutes of Meetings other than those at which their Delegates had been present.

(It is agreed that Sir Maurice Hankey should prepare for the Chinese Delegates a Memorandum based on the Minutes, including the principal undertakings given by the Japanese Delegation.)

2. Mr. Lloyd George describes the proposals which he had asked S Orlando to consider, namely:

State of Fiume to be created under the League of Nations, to be administered by a Commission composed as follows:—

2 members nominated by the Italian Government.
1 member nominated by the Yugoslavs.
1 member nominated by the State of Fiume.
1 member nominated by the League of Nations.

The nominee of the League of Nations to have a casting vote. At the end of 15 years a Plebiscite to be held. Up to this point he understood that S Orlando could accept. There are, however, two difficulties, viz: the islands, and the towns of Zara and Sebe-nico. The Italian Government is prepared to give up its claims to Dalmatia, provided Zara and Sebenico could be ceded to Italy, or, as S Orlando had suggested earlier, put under an Italian mandate. S Orlando is also prepared to give up the three largest of the islands in the southern group, the remainder consisting of uninhabited rocks, as well as the island of Pago. S Orlando urges, however, that the island of Cherso was a continuation of the Istrian Peninsula and should be assigned to Italy. He states that the majority of the population was Italian, and asked that it should be assigned to Italy. Apparently, however, President Wilson’s information on this point is different.

M Clemenceau asked what would be the official language of Fiume.

Mr Lloyd George said the State of Fiume would decide that.

President Wilson says that S Orlando would know that he feels that the Government of the United States had no right to assign territory to anyone: he can only follow the principles on which the rest of the settlement had been based. He is ready to accept the suggestion for a free State of Fiume as the recognised basis of a proposal to Yugoslavia, on whose acquiescence the whole settlement must depend. He is willing to ascertain whether a settlement was possible on these lines. He realizes how serious an effort S Orlando had made to give up part of his original claims. Before putting the proposal before the Yugoslavs, however, he would like to ask whether he was at liberty to include the attribution of the islands of Veglia and Cherso to the Yugoslav State, but not Lussin, which is manifestly Italian in nationality. In the case of Cherso, however, according to an Italian ethnographical map which he produced, only the northern part is Italian. He would like to suggest that the Fiume State should include the eastern slope of the ridge on the Peninsula of Istria and include the island of Cherso, but not the island of Lussin, which should be assigned to Italy. The object of this proposal is to put the approaches to Fiume under the control of the State of Fiume. He would also, in making these proposals, like to have in mind that in arranging the Danzig settlement it had been necessary to guarantee to Poland the utmost freedom of access to the port, and the railway terminals and the railway approaches to the interior. Without such guarantees it would not be a free port, and, this must apply equally to Fiume. If, therefore, he could assume guarantees to the State of Fiume, under the supervision of the Allied and Associated Powers, it would greatly facilitate his conversation.

S Orlando said that he is glad, and it is a comfort to him that President Wilson has recognized the spirit of renunciation by Italy. As regards the freedom of the port of Fiume he could speak unequivocally. He had not the smallest objection to the complete freedom of the port, but, beyond that, he considered it a duty to provide for untrammeled communication with the interior. The territorial arrangements are a more delicate question and all possibility of misunderstanding must be avoided. He had received the document produced by M Tardieu. He had put all the pressure he could on the Italian Delegation to accept it, but this involves a considerable renunciation for Italy. On its receipt he had telegraphed to Rome. In spite of the difficulty he declared that, for himself he would take the responsibility to accept. But it would be very difficult to persuade his colleagues to accept reductions on this reduction. He had done his utmost to eliminate as many of the islands as possible. There was no difficulty about surrendering his claim to Lesina, Curzola, and Meleda, which are the only important islands in this group. This is as far as he could go, and he cannot make any further reductions on the document presented by M Tardieu. The islands of Istria were on a somewhat different basis. M Tardieu’s document reserved Zara and Sebenico for Italy. He is willing to give every freedom to these ports and to give an undertaking that no offensive bases should be established there. He would also accept the composition of the Commission for Fiume proposed by President Wilson, namely two nominees for Italy, one for Fiume, one for Yugoslavia, and one for the League of Nations. In conclusion he would accept M Tardieu’s document, reserving the second page as he had been requested, with the amendment in regard to the Commission proposed by President Wilson, and with the amendment as regards the relinquishment of the three big islands in the south. He would not say that further renunciations were impossible, but it would be very difficult for him to put them before his colleagues.

President Wilson says that he will do what he can as the friend of both parties to use this proposal as a basis for acceptance, and he will do it in the most friendly possible way.

Sailor Steve

05-28-19, 08:34 PM

Wednesday, May 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 17:00

Meeting of the Council of Four plus M Paul Hymans, Foreign Minister of Belgium with Delegates from Luxemburg

M Emile Reuter, Ministre d’Etat, Président du Gouvernement.
M Welter, Directeur General de l’Instruction publique.
M E Leclère, Conseiller d’Etat, Chargé d’Affaires de Luxemburg à Paris.
M Tony Lefort, Conseiller d’Etat, Chargé d’Affaires de Luxemburg à Berne.
M Funck, Conseiller de Gouvernement, Secrétaire de la Délégation.

M Clemenceau: You have, sirs, expressed the desire of being heard by us. We are ready to give you a hearing. In the name of the Council and of my Government, I thank you for having responded to our invitation.

We request that you speak without any reservation. You are before men who seek justice in a system of peace, and we shall act following the principles which have been enumerated by President Wilson, notably that universal peace must be organized upon the consent of the peoples immediately concerned.

Without any reserve, with complete freedom, you will be asked questions. You will answer with complete liberty. Our cooperation is at your disposal.

M Reuter: The Council will understand my emotion at this moment of starting to speak before it. I want first to express my gratitude for its kind invitation to come and state the desires of the small nation of Luxemburg before the Peace Conference.

Yesterday, the Luxemburg Government had the opportunity of conferring with the Chamber before leaving for Paris. It set forth in broad outline the program which it intended to develop here, and the Chamber unanimously gave its approval. The delegation will speak then in the name of our entire nation.

The Luxemburg nation desires first of all to continue its own life, independent and autonomous in friendship as intimate as possible with the Allied and Associated Powers. This independence has always been regarded by it as its most valuable possession and it does not consider doing anything in the way of being dispossessed of this great benefit. It has expressed the desire, transmitted to the Peace Conference, to enter the League of Nations. In its name, we have requested that cognizance be taken of those special conditions which ought to be imposed upon the nations desirous of joining this League.

We wish to determine freely the form and organization of our internal government. In order to give to our national constitution the most extensive, the strongest, and the most democratic basis, we have decided to declare our will in the solemn form of a plebiscite. This political plebiscite, already decreed by the Chamber, will decide between a republican government and a monarchical government by expressing the sentiment with regard to the maintenance of the dynasty.

The Luxemburg nation hopes that the great Powers will be willing to accept the solution which will be expressed in this manner. This hope is founded upon the principle that the President of the Peace Conference just a moment ago recalled to mind.

By the recent publication of the conditions of peace, we have learned that the Conference contemplates the abolition of our neutrality, neutrality which, moreover, was violated in 1914 by one of the guaranteeing powers. The Luxemburg nation would like to have recognized the consequences that this suppression will involve from the point of view of our internal government as well as from the international viewpoint.

With regard to our economic orientation, the Peace Conference has been informed that we have definitely broken off all connection with the German customs union. This rupture entailed necessarily orientation toward the Entente Powers, as has been requested by our Government from the first days of the armistice.

The solution considered ideal by the Luxemburg nation with regard to thoughts of this nature would consist of an economic alliance with France and with Belgium. By virtue of several decisions of our Chamber, we have had the honor of communicating this desire to the French Government and to the Belgian Government, adding that we were ready to enter into conversations with the delegates of these two Governments with a view to examining the bases of an economic union.

This union is considered as ideal by all groupings of the population, producers as well as consumers. Several years ago, the Luxemburg Government had appointed a commission made up of competent men—industrialists, agriculturalists and specialists chosen from economic groups—delegated to study the problem. The commission completed its work at the beginning of this year. In a report, which has been published, it concluded with the opinion that I am here to point out, emphasizing that at all events the interests of the majority of the groups of the country would demand an economic alliance with France.

These conclusions have been contested. The problem has been keenly debated as much in the press as in Parliament. A large number of pamphlets have appeared with one opinion or another in order to enlighten the population on the importance of the two solutions considered.

We have been obliged to communicate our views to the French Government and to the Belgian Government. The latter replied that it was ready to enter into conversations with us in order to examine the bases of undertaking an economic union. These conversations, begun several weeks ago, are continuing at this very time.

The French Government made a reply last January in the following manner:

It acknowledged the intention expressed by the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg of definitely breaking off its ties with Germany, and of its desire to unite economically with the Entente countries. However, the general situation did not seem at that time to permit the beginning of negotiations for this purpose; but as soon as the opportune moment did arrive, it would examine the proposal in a most favorable spirit.

Since that time we have not received any official communications from the French Government.

Different economic groups of our country are alike concerned about the question, for example, syndicates of agriculturalists, and certain workers organizations. With the exception of one local agricultural society, they arrived at a conclusion in favor of an economic union with France.

Again, recently, the Government requested the advice of an entire series of professional associations on the same question. It commissioned particularly the General Confederation of Labor to name a delegation which would be able, at the expense of the Government, to establish relations with the associations of the two neighboring countries, in order to get information on the advantages and the inconveniences that might result from such a union.

The Luxemburg metallurgical industry believes that it would find in France the essential materials for which it has need, and in which it will be deficient in about twenty years. On the other hand, it desires to have a market as large as possible for its products. For this purpose, it wishes economic union with the two countries, union which would assure it, moreover, of profitable returns.

The need itself would prevail so as to turn the metallurgical industry toward France because the latter has the reserves in which the industry suffers a deficiency. This industry would solicit, moreover, the concession of being permitted to obtain these minerals under the same conditions as the Lorraine industry, its neighbor and its competitor.

With regard to coal, the Government has ascertained, with considerable satisfaction, that the Peace Conference stipulated an advantage in favor of the Grand Duchy in that Germany will be obliged to supply the same quantity as before the war. We present our thanks to the Peace Conference for the consideration shown to our industries.

The duration of time for this supplying by Germany has not been fixed, nor has the price. Luxemburg hopes that the Allied and Associated Powers will again, in this respect, safeguard its interests in the same spirit as they have shown in the other questions.

The syndicate of the Confederation of Agricultural Tradesmen considers that France is the natural supplier of the potassium salts and the seeds for our agriculture. It believes also that the conditions of production of Luxemburg agriculture are very much the same as those of Lorraine agriculture.

The Treaty of Peace also provides, in favor of the Grand Duchy, for the right to export without restraint its products to Germany, during a certain time, if the Allied and Associated Powers require it. The Luxemburg Government requests the Peace Conference to impose upon Germany the importation of our agricultural products, which constitutes for us, at least during the transition period, a vital question.

Here now are the steps which this Government has taken up to the present to bring about solution of the economic problem. It hopes at least for the possibility of an economic union with the two neighboring countries. In case this union of three is admitted as possible, it desires to recognize in an indisputable manner the majority of the economic interests of the country. With this idea in mind, and following the proposals of the Council of State, it has brought before the Chamber the draft of a law for the organization of a referendum on the question of the economic orientation of the country. The special objective of this consultation is to establish in an incontestable way the side toward which the majority of the interests of the country leans, in order to settle the controversy which has divided them for several months.

This economic referendum has been proposed also in the hope that the expression of the national disposition would permit the Luxemburg nation to obtain with greater ease overtures on the part of the two countries with which it desires to enter into conversations. By no means did we fail to appreciate the inconvenience which would be involved in submitting to the nation such a problem, the conditions of which are not determined for the moment. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the great majority of people ask for this plebiscite with the twofold aim that I have had the honor of pointing out.

As a practical conclusion, we have the mission to solicit the benevolent approval of the Conference with regard to opening to the Luxemburg nation the way to conversations and negotiations, so that the economic orientation of the country may be established with full understanding of the advantages and in complete freedom.

We have had the honor of requesting the approval of the Conference with a view to obtaining reparation for the damages of all sorts, which have resulted in the Grand Duchy as a consequence of the German occupation. We hope to be understood especially by our future economic allies.

Not wishing to take unfair advantage of any more of your time which is precious, I close by expressing the hope that the earnest desires stated in the name of this small country, which has always treasured the friendship and protection of the Powers of the Entente, will be kindly received by the delegates of the Great Powers and that, following the friendly terms employed by President Wilson in his letter of invitation, the Council will do its utmost to render service to the Luxemburg nation.

M Clemenceau: If no one is going to speak, I should like to answer the speech by the chairman of the Luxemburg Delegation.

Three questions have been stated by him:

He has first of all appeared astonished that we have considered the question of neutrality.

The explanation of it is very simple. The war has demonstrated that neutrality was insufficient protection. The experiment has been tried with Belgium and Luxemburg. It is quite natural then that the Peace Conference, which has expressed itself on the main point of the problem, would have thought it was worth while solving it. Such is all that I have the right to say on this point with the conviction that I am expressing the sentiment of my colleagues.

With regard to the second point, I shall be distressed if the Luxemburg Government believes that there was a lack of consideration towards it in the fact that the French Government was not ready for economic negotiations. I am going to explain very frankly, and nobody here ought to be offended if I speak in this manner.

We desire to continue on the best terms possible with the people and the Government of Luxemburg. We know them well. There is a large number of Luxemburgers at Paris and in France, and many have shed their blood voluntarily for the Entente side. These things we can not forget; I am bound to declare it.

However, all this comes back again to the question of general policy. We wish to be on good terms with the Luxemburg people, but we maintain that it is to be likewise with the Belgian people. They threw themselves into the battle with an earnestness to which it is never superfluous to render homage. Because of it we have for them deep gratitude, and we desire that the peace bind tighter, in the strongest and most efficacious manner, the bonds which are formed within the community of a martial trades union, if I may speak thus. We possessed Belgian friendship during the war. We desire it very much in peace. We want especially that, in our conversations of all sorts with Luxemburg, Belgium be able to have its word. Simply, it is because it appeared to us that the political situation was not sufficiently clear that certain regulations were not relaxed and that we have deemed it preferable to put off the conversations to which you have alluded. There was no other reason.

You thus know the sentiments which guide us in requesting you to postpone the economic referendum. It appeared to us that it was necessary to permit the passing of time to soothe before considering the different aspects of a difficult question which interests Luxemburg as well as Belgium and France. We should have been very upset had the disposition of the Luxemburg people been expressed as long as the settling of the different opinions on the subject of the recent events of the war has not yet been accomplished.

That is why - speaking in my own name, but believing, after the exchanges of views on this subject, not in contradiction with my colleagues - I request that you postpone this economic referendum. The economic regime and the political regime are two connected questions which must be examined in their several aspects, and I believe that we, one and all, should be embarrassed if this examination were not completed. In any case, my country would want to express its opinion freely. I think, moreover, that the Luxemburg people themselves do not have an interest in expressing their sentiments before the connected questions are in some way cleared up.

I request that you carefully take into account the conditions under which this Conference is meeting. We emerged from the most terrible and bloody war that the world has known, and we came here with a program such as no other assembly ever had. All the questions for Europe, for Asia, and for Africa were admitted. All the old crimes of history, with the consequences that they have produced, were brought before our bar. In the great desire that we all have of making a peace of justice so that it is durable, it is certain that before turning to the question of Luxemburg - and I do not think of saying anything that might offend you - there were others which we considered first.

That is the spirit in which we request of you this postponement. For my part, I congratulate myself in as much as certain disagreements, and certain differences of opinion on the subject of Luxemburg are visible in the path of appeasement. All the world will profit from this happy result anticipated, and first of all the Luxemburg people.

You have spoken well in admitting that your nation, especially your metallurgical industry and your agriculture, would receive an advantage from a customs union with France. You have also shown your preoccupation - very important for you, no less for us - of grouping the economic relations of Belgium, France, and Luxemburg.

From this point of view, this is the background with which I enter into discussion with you. I am grateful for your presence. I am equally so for the presence here of M Hymans. If you desire a discussion of three upon the economic regime, France is ready to begin it.

M Hymans: We have informed the Luxemburg Government that we were ready to treat with them, and we have begun conversations which have touched only the economic question.

M Clemenceau: I do not require that others be in them. I should be distressed to be an intruder in this conversation of two. If it is necessary, I shall retire with proper discreetness. But since the head of the Luxemburg Government addressed to me an invitation and a small reproach for not having answered sooner, I state that we would be happy to meet for an accord of three. Nothing will establish a more stable and peaceful relationship between the working peoples of the north of France, of Luxemburg and of Belgium than an economic agreement between them. I do not know if you are of this opinion, but it is mine. It was in order not to be accused of interrupting the agreement which was being arranged, that we did not desire to reply sooner. If you will reserve a third chair for us, we shall be very happy to seat our friendship.

I have nothing more to say. You have explained with conviction the meaning of your rights which you wish to maintain. With our populations of the North and of Belgium, you are the people of constant toil. Now, the new Europe must live by steady toil. If these three countries are able to provide the example in setting aside rivalries of the past and in establishing a stable economic order, I believe that by it the peace of the world, for which the Conference takes pride in working, will have advanced a great deal.

M Reuter: The Luxemburg Delegation is able to do nothing but praise the proposal that comes from the President of the Peace Conference, who is as well President of the Council of the French Government. As I have had the honor of indicating, Luxemburg would see in the realization of a union of three, the economic ideal which would be completely to the advantage of the three countries.

The conversations going on until now between Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg have been entered into with the aim of exchanging information. It is a question of establishing the bases for an agreement to be concluded eventually. The Grand Duchy therefore would not consider it as any sort of inconvenience if the French Government became a party to these conversations. It would consider, on the contrary, this interposition as a fortunate event and advantageous to the interested parties.

The President has also expressed the opinion that the political referendum and the economic referendum are bound together in a certain sense, and that particular reasons recommended their postponement. Since this connection does not seem absolutely necessary, the Luxemburg Government eagerly desires that solution of the problem may occur as soon as possible, for it would help make the internal political situation of the Grand Duchy healthier.

I shall make a report to the Chamber upon the discussions which have taken place, and we shall not fail to inform the Peace Conference of the decision taken on this subject. I have listened with much interest to the very noble speech of the President on the subject of economic rapprochement between the three countries. It is work of great importance, worthy of engaging us, and thus I pledge myself to study it with infinite attention.

M Hymans: I have listened with care to the noble speech of M Clemenceau which has promised an economic union between the three countries: France, Luxemburg, and Belgium. It is a new idea which has abruptly come into prominence. It is very important from the political view as well as from the economic point of view. I am not able to express my opinion at this moment, but I shall think about it.

M Clemenceau: I have answered only the questions which you have presented.

M Reuter: I wish to add an observation of a practical nature. You request the postponement of the economic referendum; but it is probable that the Chamber, in session, will vote the law settling this measure.

M Clemenceau: You govern in your country as you understand it; no one is able to encroach upon your rights.

M Reuter: We are desirous of having a copy of the minutes of this meeting.

M Clemenceau: We shall get one for you; but it is understood that this document must remain secret.

M Reuter: I plan nevertheless to communicate it to a commission of the Chamber.

M Clemenceau: But then under the express condition that it remains absolutely secret.

(The session closes at 18:35)

Jimbuna

05-29-19, 09:36 AM

29th May 1919

Aftermath of War

German Naval losses in the war given.

Cavalry of the anti-Communist White Russian Don Army near Rostov-on-Don, Russia.
https://i.imgur.com/lh5W5Mr.jpg

Families reunite with returning soldiers of the 110th Field Artillery in Washington D.C.
https://i.imgur.com/9G20y8d.jpg

Russian prisoners of war still interned in Stargard, Germany (today Poland) waiting to be repatriated back home.
https://i.imgur.com/9Ikb53E.jpg

Sailor Steve

05-29-19, 03:15 PM

Thursday, May 29, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

President Wilson states that the Heads of Governments have reached a decision regarding the Southern frontier of Austria. This frontier was to be the frontier laid down in the Pact of London of 26th April, 1915, with the addition that the Sexten Valley and Tarvis should be Italian, and the junction of Villach should be Austrian. Using a prepared map he explains the line of the finalized border.

In the Klagenfurt area the red line is to be provisionally the frontier of Austria. In the area between the red and blue lines there will be a plebiscite within six months of the signing of the Treaty with Austria. The attribution of the area will be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the population. During the period required for the consultation of the population the area will be administered by an international commission in collaboration with the local Government. In reply to a question by a member of the Delegation he says that the fate of the area round Assling will be decided later in connection with the frontiers of Yugoslavia. The remainder of the frontier Eastward, as proposed by the Committee, was adopted.

(It is decided that the experts on Yugoslav affairs should meet promptly and draw up a text in accordance with the above decisions, to be sent to the Drafting Committee.)

Sailor Steve

05-29-19, 04:55 PM

Thursday, May 29, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. The Council has under consideration a letter dated May 28th, 1919, from Mr Hurst, the British Member of the Drafting Committee, addressed to Sir Maurice Hankey, on the subject of the Language of the Treaty of Peace.

(It is agreed that in the event of divergence between the English, French and Italian texts of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, the French text should prevail.

The Drafting Committee is authorized to insert a clause to this effect in the Treaty of Peace.

A copy of Mr Hurst’s letter was initialed by the four Heads of States and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate it immediately to the Secretary General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

2. The Council has before them a letter dated May 28th, 1919, from Mr Hurst to Sir Maurice Hankey, stating that the Drafting Committee has endeavored to cut out of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, phraseology which definitely committed the Allied and Associated Powers to either view as to the relations which the new Austria bears to the old Austria-Hungary, and for this purpose, they had cut out of Article 297 (e) (32 of the Draft Economic Clauses with Austria) the words “tel qu’il existait au ler Août 1914”.

S Orlando says this is not merely a question of drafting, but one of material importance, because it related to damage and who would bear the cost. He suggested that the question should be sent to the Reparations Commission.

President Wilson says that perhaps he has a different idea of the point from S Orlando. He understands that in the Treaty, Austrian nationals can only be made to pay for damage done by Austria. Consequently, by describing Austria as being the same as she existed on the 1st August, 1914, the field of payment is not really widened. Supposing an English firm suffers by loss in Prague, and this is paid out of Austrian funds in London, this would not be fair. The sum ought to be paid out of the property of Bohemians. It is not fair to impose on an Austria reduced to narrow limits, the cost of damages in other parts of the old Austria-Hungary. It is perfectly fair to link up Hungary, but not Bohemia, and other parts which had ceased to be hostile.

(After some further discussion, it is agreed:

1) To refer the question to the Reparations Commission for remarks.

2) That in the meanwhile, the words “tel qu’il existait au ler Août 1914” should remain provisionally in the Treaty of Peace, reserving the right to delete the words after receiving the views of the Reparations Commission.
Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate these decisions to the Secretary-General for the necessary action.)

3. The Council ha before them the following two documents, relating to the Articles previously approved for insertion in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties, with regard to telegraph and telephone services with the Czechoslovak Republic:

1) A letter dated May 26th, addressed by the Secretary-General of the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways to the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference, stating that the Technical Committee with Austria and which drafted the Clause, proposes, in order to make its terms clearer the following additions to paragraph 2: After the words “to demand new direct line” add “taking as a basis the reduced tariff provided for in Article 23, para. 5 of the International Telegraph Convention (as revised at Lisbon)”.

2) A letter addressed by Lord Robert Cecil to Sir Maurice Hankey, dealing with the same subject from the point of view of the League of Nations, and suggesting the following alterations:

Paragraph 5,

Omission of the underlined words in the following sentence:

“Whether concerning the conclusion of this Convention, or its interpretation or the interpretation of the present Article”

Addition of a new paragraph:

“In case of any dispute between the parties as to the interpretation either of the present Article or of the Convention referred to in paragraph 5, this dispute shall be submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice to be established by the League of Nations.

Lord Robert Cecil, in his letter, gave the following reasons for these changes:

1) The duties to be performed under paras. 5 and 6 not being of a legal character, could clearly be better performed by a single expert arbitrator backed by the authority of the League, than they could by the International Court.

2) But on the other hand, the interpretation of Treaties like this, which might create specific rights to find any detail, should be done by the International Court. It will exist for such purposes, and especially to deal with matters like this, which, if of minor importance, are extremely contentious.

(Both the above alterations are agreed to. The Article is initialed by the four Heads of Governments, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee).

4. M Clemenceau reports that an advance installment of the German counter proposals to the Treaty of Peace has been received and is being translated.

Mr Lloyd George presses the great urgency of translating and reproducing this rapidly. This can only be done if a large number of translators are set to work, as he is informed that even this advance installment consists of 87 printed pages.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to place himself in immediate communication with the Secretary General and with the Secretary of the United States Delegation with a view to as many persons as possible being employed to translate the Treaty.

5. S Orlando reports that the Drafting Committee has received no instructions as to the boundaries between Austria and Italy.

President Wilson says that according to his recollection it had been understood that the boundary would be that contained in the Treaty of London dated 26th April 1915, with rectifications giving the Sexten Valley to Italy as well as a certain region in the vicinity of Tarvis.

At this point there is some discussion as to the arrangements to be made in regard to Klagenfurt and President Wilson explained his proposals on a map.

(At this point the Council adjourns upstairs to meet the Experts for a discussion on the boundaries of Klagenfurt. On the conclusion of the Meeting, the Experts are left to draw the precise lines of demarcation on a map.)

After their return to President Wilson’s library, the following resolution is approved and initialed by the four Heads of State:

“The Drafting Committee are instructed to include in the Treaty of Peace with Austria the boundary between Italy and Austria as described in the Treaty of London, dated 26th of April, 1915, with the rectifications shown in the attached map, giving the Sexten Valley to Italy, as well as a certain region in the vicinity of Tarvis.

The Valley of Klagenfurt, including the Town of Klagenfurt, will be disposed of by means of a plebiscite within six months after the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Austria.

The question of the triangle, including Assling is reserved for the decision of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, and Austria is to accept their decision.”

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward this decision to the Secretary General for the Drafting Committee and to see that the map on which the Experts are working is also forwarded to the Drafting Committee.

6. With reference to C. F. 37 B., Mr. Jules Cambon makes the following report of his interview with the Serbian, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak Delegations:

“The question of knowing if the powers of the Austrian Delegation ought to be given in the name of the Republic of German Austria, or quite simply Delegates of the Republic of Austria, has been put before the Serbian, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak Delegations.

The Yugoslav Delegation is of opinion that the word 'German' ought not to figure in the title of the Austrian Delegation for the reason that the maintenance of this word would tend to encourage the belief that outside the Duchy of Austria there is an Austria; but Dalmatia used to form the Duchy and Croatia used to form part of the Kingdom of Hungary.

The Czechoslovak Delegation is still more explicit: it would attach great importance to the disappearance of the word ‘German’. In fact, if the maintenance of this word seems to lead to the reattachment of Austria to Germany, a point of view which interests more especially the Czechs, it would create a bond between the Germans residing in Bohemia and those residing in Austria and serve as a pretext for a pro-German division in part of the territories of Czechoslovakia.

The two Delegations consulted are of the opinion that the term ‘German Austria' should be suppressed. On the other hand it is necessary to bear in mind that all the Official Documents of the new Austrian Republic bear this mention of German Austria. It is thus that the law of the 14th March 1919 on the representation of the people has been framed in its Article 8:

"The President of the National Assembly represents the Republic of German Austria in regard to exterior relations, receives and accredits Envoys and ratifies State Treaties etc."

Consequently the question becomes more extended: the expression ‘German Austria’ is constitutional and in asking for its suppression one does more than ask for a simple modification in the credentials of the Delegates of the Republic.”

Mr Lloyd George agrees with M Cambon that the term 'German Austria' cannot be accepted.

President Wilson also agrees.

The following resolution is approved and initialed by the four Heads of States:

“The Drafting Committee is instructed to provide in the Treaty of Peace with Austria that the Allied and Associated Powers recognize the new State of Austria under the title of the ‘Republic of Austria.’”

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward this decision to the Secretary General for the information of the Drafting Committee.

(M Jules Cambon withdraws.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is engaged outside the Council Room during the following discussion.)

7. Notes sent up as a question of urgency by the Secretary General from MM. Krammarsch and Pasitch, urging the omission from the Treaty with Austria of certain political clauses, including clauses proposed by the Committee on New States, were considered.

(It is agreed to refer these clauses to the Drafting Committee and to give M Krammarsch and M Pasitch an opportunity of stating their views at the Plenary Conference in the afternoon. Verbal instructions to this effect are given to the Secretary General’s messenger by President Wilson.)

8. M Clemenceau hands Sir Maurice Hankey, for translation and circulation, two dispatches from the Armistice French Minister at Warsaw, in regard to General Haller’s Army. Poland.

9. President Wilson reads the following Note prepared for the Council by the Drafting Committee:

"Instruction of Supreme Council of 24th May, 1919, for Modification of Text of Articles 102 and 104.

The Drafting Committee has the honor to draw the attention of the Supreme Council to the following observations:

The modification of the text of Articles 102 and 104 of the German Treaty in such a way as to provide for the existence of Danzig as a free town only after the conclusion of the Treaty with Poland, and the elaboration of the constitution, does not appear to agree with Article 5 of the Instructions of 22nd April (now Article 105 of the German Treaty) according to which “from the coming into force of the present Treaty” the Germans inhabiting Danzig become “citizens of the free town of Danzig”, which pre-suppose apparently that the free town of Danzig will be in existence at that moment.

The terms of the instructions of 22nd April define the purpose of the stipulations in the following terms: “to establish the free city of Danzig”.

Under these circumstances, the Drafting Committee would be grateful if the Supreme Council would confirm the modifications it desires to have made in the Text in question.

For the Drafting Committee.
H Fromageot.

(It is agreed that the Drafting Committee should receive instructions that the other parts of the Treaty of Peace with Germany should be modified so as to conform with the decision for the modification of Articles 102 and 104 in such a way as to provide for the existence of Danzig as a free town only after the conclusion of the Treaty with Poland.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is directed to prepare an instruction for the Drafting Committee for the initials of the four Heads of States.)

10. Sir Maurice Hankey reports that this subject had originally been referred to the Military Representatives at Versailles, who had drawn up a Convention for submission to the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. On the date when this report was to come forward a letter had been received by Mr Lloyd George from Lord Robert Cecil asking that the Supreme Economic Council’s views might be heard. The Convention had then been remitted for discussion in the first instance between the British Military Representatives and the British representatives on the Supreme Economic Council. A report has now been received which has been agreed to in both cases reluctantly by Lord Robert Cecil and General Thwaites. Sir Maurice Hankey suggests that this revised report should be referred for consideration by the Military Representatives at Versailles together with representatives of the Supreme Economic Council.

President Wilson does not like this procedure as he feels that very large questions of policy are involved. He reads a letter he has received from Mr Noyes, the American delegate on the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission

Mr Lloyd George says he thinks that the whole question of the occupation of the Rhine provinces will have to be reconsidered and re-argued. The occupation of Russia by foreign troops had, according to many accounts he had received, created Bolshevism. This had happened both in Archangel and in the Ukraine. It seemed as though troops felt less responsible when in occupation of a foreign country than in their own country. The antagonism of the people was then excited. The army of occupation in this case would have to be maintained at German cost and this would subtract from the fund for reparation. Troops in a foreign country would cost two or three times as much as they would in the home country. Consequently, he takes the view that the prolonged occupation of German territory has been agreed to too readily. There would be no danger from Germany for the next fifteen years owing to German exhaustion. After that, however, the danger might recommence, for in fifteen years Germany would be much stronger than she is now. The Peace Treaty provides that the stronger Germany becomes the fewer troops will be in occupation of German territory.

M Clemenceau says he cannot agree to a reconsideration of what had been written in the Treaty.

Mr Lloyd George says that as one of the Powers which had inflicted defeat on Germany he intended to insist on reconsideration of this question and he is entitled to be heard.

President Wilson says his point of view is that we must insist on the civil life of the people continuing without interference.

M Clemenceau says he was willing to accept President Wilson’s point of view, but he is not willing to have the decision reconsidered.

President Wilson suggests that a special Commission composed of persons of political experience should be appointed to rewrite the Convention on the lines suggested in Mr Noyes’ letter.

S Orlando says that M Mantoux reminded him that during the German occupation of France in the War of 1870 they had not participated in any way in the civil occupation.

M Mantoux says that they had established garrisons and that was all.

Mr Lloyd George says that the question of the size of the army of occupation must be considered at the same time. At the present time he has not the slightest idea of what it was to consist.

President Wilson recalls that he had told M Clemenceau that he could not keep many United States troops on the Rhine, only enough indeed, to show the flag. Mr Lloyd George had said the same and it had been understood that France was to provide the necessary force on the understanding that it was an international force.

Mr Lloyd George says that it is, nevertheless, necessary to know what its size would be.

Sir Maurice Hankey reports that this question had been referred to the Military Representatives at Versailles, but that General Bliss had first postponed discussing the question until after a conversation between General Pershing and Marshal Foch on May 24th, and had subsequently stated that as no more American troops were being withdrawn for the present, it has no urgency and that in any case he cannot discuss it as for the moment it is before the President.

President Wilson says he feels sure that General Bliss would have no objection to a discussion of the strength of the total force, irrespective of the numbers to be supplied by each Power.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that civilians with political experience ought to be included on this inquiry also.

M Clemenceau suggests a Commission composed of four civilians and four military men.

President Wilson agrees, and pointed out how closely the two questions are interwoven. If the army were simply concentrated in garrison without interference with the administration, a relatively small force might be fixed, whereas if martial law were imposed and the troops dispersed, a much larger force would be necessary.

Mr Lloyd George then reads a letter which had been sent from the Secretary-General by General Weygand recommending that barracks should be built for the troops required for the occupation of the Rhine provinces and urging that this should be done at German expense.

(After some further discussion it is agreed:

1) That a Commission composed of a representative of the United States of America, to be nominated by President Wilson, Lord Robert Cecil for Great Britain, M Loucheur for France and the Marquis Imperiali for Italy, should be appointed to rewrite the draft Convention relating to the occupation of the Rhine provinces on the skeleton plan suggested in the letter from Mr Noyes, the American delegate on the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission, to President Wilson, dated May 27th, 1919, namely:

I. As few troops as possible concentrated in barracks or reserve areas with no “billeting”, except possibly for officers.

II. Complete self-government for the territory with the exceptions below.

III. A Civil Commission with powers:

(a) To make regulations or change old ones whenever German law or actions:

(i) Threaten the carrying out of Treaty terms, or

(ii) Threaten the comfort or security of troops.

(b) To authorize the Army to take control under martial law either in danger spots or throughout the territory whenever conditions seem to them to make this necessary.

2) That the following Military Representatives should be associated with the above Commission:

General Bliss for United States of America
General Wilson for Great Britain
Marshal Foch for France
General Cavallero for Italy,

for the purpose of making recommendations as to the total size of the Army of Occupation of the Rhine Provinces without specifying the strength of the force to be maintained by the various nations concerned.

3) That in view of the fact that the German counter provisions are now under consideration the two Commissions should be asked to report at the earliest possible moment.

Sailor Steve

05-29-19, 05:17 PM

Preliminary Peace Conference, Protocol No. 7, Plenary Session of May 29, 1919

The Session is opened at 15 o’clock (3 p.m.) under the presidency of M Clemenceau, President.

Present

For the United States of America:
The President of the United States
Honorable Robert Lansing
Honorable Edward M. House
General Tasker H Bliss

For the British Empire:
Great Britain:
The Rt Hon A J Balfour
The Rt Hon G N Barnes

Dominions and India:

Canada:
The Rt Hon Sir George Foster
The Hon C J Doherty

Australia:
The Rt Hon W M Hughes

South Africa:
Lieut-General the Rt Hon J C Smuts

For France:
M G Clemenceau
M Pichon
M L L Klotz
M André Tardieu
M Jules Cambon
Marshal Foch

For Italy:
S V E Orlando
Baron S Sonnino
The Marquis G Imperiali, Senator of the Kingdom, Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Italy in London
S S Barzilai

For Japan:
The Marquis Saionji
The Baron Makino
Viscount Chinda
Mr. K Matsui
Mr. H. Ijuin

For Belgium:
M Hymans
Mr van den Heuvel

For China:
Mr Lou Tseng-tsiang
Mr Cheng-ting Thomas Wang

For Greece:
Mr Eleftherios Veniselos
Mr Nicolas Politis

For Nicaragua:
S Salvador Chamorro

For Panama:
S Antonio Burgos

For Poland:
Mr Roman Dmowski
Mr Ignace Paderewski

For Romania:
Mr Jean J. C. Bratiano
Dr Vaida-Voevod

For the Serb-Croat-Slovene State:
Mr N P Pachitch
Mr Trumbitch
Mr. M R Vesnitch

For Siam:
The Prince Charoon
Phya Bibadh Kosha

For the Czechoslovak Republic:
Mr. Charles Kramar
Mr. Edouard Benes

The Minutes of the Sessions of the 28th April (Protocol No. 5) and the 6th May, 1919 (Protocol No. 6), are adopted.

The Agenda paper calls for the communication to the Allied and Associated Powers of the Conditions of Peace with Austria.

The President explains the objects of the Session in the following terms:

“Today we are only going to communicate the Conditions of Peace with Austria to you, with certain exceptions: firstly, the Military Clauses, which have been reserved for further discussion in view of the effect which they may produce on the States which used to form the Austrian Empire; secondly, the Reparation Clauses, which have been referred to the competent Commission; and lastly, the Political Clauses, which concern Italy. It cannot, moreover, be very long before these three portions of the Treaty are submitted to you; most of the work has been completed already and the conditions will of course be brought to your notice before they are handed to the Austrian Plenipotentiaries.”

Mr Bratiano (Romania) having inquired whether the communication to be made that day is that of the actual text of the Articles, or merely a summary similar to the one which was read before the handing of the Treaty to the German Plenipotentiaries. The President replies that the same procedure will be followed as in the case of Germany, and that a summary will be read to the Conference, which is, moreover, very close to the text of the Treaty. When this summary has been adopted by the Conference, the Treaty will be handed to the representatives of Austria.

Mr. Bratiano (Romania) states that he desires to present a wish, which he formulates in the following terms:

“On behalf of the Governments of Greece, of Poland, of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, of the Czecho-Slovaks and of Romania, I have the honor to beg the Conference to be so good as to adjourn for 48 hours the presentation of the Treaty to the Austrians, in order that we may make ourselves acquainted, from the actual text, with the conditions which it is desired to impose on Austria. We ask leave to ascertain what they are and to examine them before concurring in them, for, as in the case of the text communicated to the Germans, an oral statement necessarily cannot make everything sufficiently clear. Even now, if the text were read out, we should need time for reflection in order to be in a position to study the effects on each of our States.

Therefore, on behalf of those Governments, I beg the President kindly to move the Conference to postpone the handing of the Treaty to the Austrians, with a view to leave us 48 hours for examining the text. If the text were handed to us now, we should only need a postponement of 24 hours, but if we only receive it tomorrow, 48 hours would be necessary.”

As no one else asks leave to speak, The President states that he considers Mr Bratiano’s claim to be entirely justified, and that it had been hoped to communicate the actual text before the present Session, but that had not been possible. This text might be distributed to the Delegations concerned, and they, for their part, might offer in writing, as soon as possible, the observations which they wished to make. In order to give the necessary time asked for, the President proposes to adjourn the Session of the Conference to Saturday, the 31st May, at 3 p.m., and to fix Monday, the 2nd June, for handing the Conditions of peace to the Austrian Plenipotentiaries.

(This is decided.)

The Session is adjourned at 15.25 o’clock (3.25 p.m.).

The President,
G Clemenceau
The Secretary-General,
P. Dutasta.

The Secretaries,
J C Grew,
Mr P A Hankey,
Paul Gauthier,
Aldrovandi,
Sadao Saburi.

(The representatives of the Press were not admitted to this Session.)

Jimbuna

05-30-19, 09:02 AM

30th May 1919

General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, with French officers at Romagne, France for Memorial Day.
https://i.imgur.com/aVoDOn1.jpg

HMS Impregnable, a 19th-century warship, used as a training ship for the Royal Navy.
https://i.imgur.com/Ipd6ubr.jpg

American engineers repairing broken wire during a training gas attack.
https://i.imgur.com/p1YKvnC.jpg

Sailor Steve

05-30-19, 11:54 AM

Friday, May 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. S Orlando hands round a document regarding the situation in Carinthia. He suggests that Allied Commissioners should be sent to the scene of the fighting between Austria and the Yugoslavs with instructions to secure at once a cessation.

President Wilson suggests that the best plan would be for M Clemenceau, on behalf of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, to present a note to the Serbo-Slovene-Croat Delegation.

(It is agreed that Mr Philip Kerr should draft for consideration a note to the Serbo-Slovene-Croat Delegation warning them that the fighting must cease if they wish the boundaries to be settled, and that the result of the fighting will not prejudice the final decision as to the boundaries.)

The following instructions to the Drafting Committee, prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey in accordance with directions, was approved and initialed by the four Heads of State:

“With reference to the attached note C. F. 41, Minute 9, the Drafting Committee are instructed that any articles of the Treaty of Peace with Germany which are inconsistent with the text of articles 102 and 104 as notified to the Drafting Committee on May 24th., are to be brought into conformity with these articles.”

2. M Clemenceau says he has received an application from the Turkish Grand Vizier to come to Paris and enlighten the Peace Conference.

Mr Lloyd George supports the proposal. He thinks that it is unnecessary to treat the Turks in in the same manner as the Germans. He can see no harm in hearing the Turkish side of the case. The same will apply to the Bulgarians if they wish to come.

President Wilson says their first object will be to protest against what had been done in Smyrna.

M Clemenceau asks why they should not protest.

Mr Lloyd George says he would let them protest.

(It is agreed that the Turkish application should be granted and that Mr Philip Kerr should draft a reply for M. Clemenceau to send.)

3. Sir Maurice Hankey reads a note received from M Fromageot on behalf of the Drafting Committee, proposing in Article 228 of the German Treaty to omit the word “military” before the word “law”, so as to make the sentence read “such person shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law”.

S Orlando points out that if Belgium chooses to send her military culprits before a Civil Tribunal, it is a domestic matter which did not affect the other States.

(After a short discussion, the proposals of the Drafting Committee are approved, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

4. With reference to C. F. 37B, Minute 10,2 the question is raised as to whether the political articles affecting territory to be transferred to Italy will be ready for inclusion in the Treaty to be handed to the Austrian Delegates on Monday, June 2nd.

Count Aldrovandi reports that the Commissions to which some of the draft clauses had been referred are meeting that afternoon at 15:00.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to ascertain whether the Reports of the Commissions will be ready for consideration on the following day.)

(Note: Sir Maurice Hankey has made inquiries, and ascertained that the Report of the Financial Commission is ready. The Report of the Reparation Commission, with which was bound up the Economic questions, is not ready.)

5. There is a short conversation in regard to the German counter-proposals.

President Wilson say that he has sent the German document to his Experts, and asked them merely to summarize what counter-proposals had been made by the Germans. He proposes to consider these, and not their counter-arguments.

Mr Lloyd George says he has had a preliminary conversation with his colleagues on the British Empire Delegation, and has invited several members of the British Government to meet him in Paris on Sunday. There are certain statements of fact in regard to the eastern frontier, for example, the distribution of population in Poland, on which he would like to elicit the truth.

President Wilson refers to the statement that 750 years had passed since Silesia was Polish.

(After some further discussion, it is agreed to adjourn until Monday at the earliest any further consideration of the question by the Council, in order to give members an opportunity to study the question with their respective Delegations.)

6. The Council has under consideration the second German Note dated May 22nd, on the subject of International Labour Legislation and the reply suggested by Mr. Barnes’ Committee.

(After the reply has been read aloud, it is approved.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify the Secretary-General in order that it might be presented for M Clemenceau’s signature and forwarded to the German Delegation.

It is further agreed that the Note should be published after dispatch.)

7. The Council has before them the remarks of the Drafting Committee on the proposals of M. Kramarz on the Political Clauses for the Czechoslovak State.

The discussion is adjourned owing to the fact that the Articles of the Treaty to which M. Kramarz’ observations referred are not available.

8. With reference to C. F. 41, minute 8.3 Mr. Lloyd George asks leave to refer to the dispatches from Poland handed round by M Clemenceau on May 29th.

The point to which he wishes to call attention is the statement that General Haller had said he has no recollection of any promise made by him to anyone not to use his Army against the Ukrainians. This raises the question as to whether Marshal Foch had ever carried out his instructions to notify General Haller that he was not to do so. He recalled that Marshal Foch had, at one time, been exceedingly desirous of sending General Haller’s Army to Lemberg.

M Clemenceau undertakes to make full inquiry into the matter.

President Wilson reads a report from a United States Officer, a Lieutenant Foster, who had visited Sambor and Stanisslau, and reported that in the districts he had visited, the peasants, who were Ukrainians by nationality, had returned to the land and showed no antipathy to the Poles; the Poles had behaved with great tact and judgment, and had released all their prisoners; the Ukrainian Government, according to this report, had proved most unsatisfactory - had been unable to keep order and had made many requisitions mainly at the expense of the Polish population. The Ukrainian transport had been disorganized and the currency system hopeless. The Ukrainian troops had perpetrated many outrages on the Poles, and this Officer marveled at the restraint shown by the Polish troops. In his view, the Ukrainians were not capable of self-government, but he qualified his report by stating that he had only visited a limited part of the country, and this only applied to what he himself had seen.

9. With reference to C.F. 13, Minute I.4 S Orlando again raises the question of the action to be taken in cases where subjects of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire had committed breaches of the laws of war and had subsequently assumed some fresh nationality such as Czechoslovak or one of the other nationalities formed out of the old Austrian Empire. He said that according to his recollection, the previous decision had been to refer this to the Drafting Committee but that the Drafting Committee had received no instructions.

President Wilson says that the difficulty is that the Austrian Treaty cannot bind the Czechoslovak State.

S Orlando made the suggestion that the Czechoslovaks should undertake in the Treaty to bring to trial in their own Courts, persons accused of Breaches of the Laws of War.

This proposal is accepted.

(The Resolution was approved and initialed, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it immediately to the Secretary General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

Jimbuna

05-31-19, 06:01 AM

31st May 1919

Aftermath of War

British warships again defeat Bolsheviks near Kronstadt.

Allies present Note to Germany re: troops in Baltic Provinces.

Bolsheviks withdraw from Gulf of Riga.

A Scottish officer enjoys fly fishing on the Rhine in occupied Germany.
https://i.imgur.com/gjecTRy.jpg

Sailor Steve

05-31-19, 06:48 PM

Preliminary Peace Conference, Protocol No. 8, Plenary Session of May 31, 1919

The Session is opened at 15 o’clock (3 p.m.) under the presidency of M Clemenceau, President.

Present

For the United States of America:
The President of the United States.
Honorable Robert Lansing.
Honorable Henry White.
General Tasker H. Bliss.

For the British Empire:
Great Britain:
The Rt Hon David Lloyd George.
The Rt Hon A J Balfour.
The Rt Hon G N Barnes.
The Rt Hon Sir Joseph Ward.

Dominions and India:

Canada:
The Rt Hon Sir George Foster.
The Hon C J Doherty.

Australia:
The Rt Hon W M Hughes.
The Rt Hon Sir Joseph Cook.

New Zealand:
The Rt Hon. W F Massey.

For France:
M Clemenceau.
M Pichon.
M L L Klotz.
M André Tardieu.
M Jules Cambon.
Marshal Foch.

For Italy:
S. V E Orlando.
The Baron S Sonnino.
S S Crespi.
The Marquis G Imperiali.
S S Barzilai.

For Japan:
The Marquis Saionji.
The Baron Makino.
Viscount Chinda.
Mr K Matsui.
Mr H Ijuin.

For Belgium:
M Hymans.
M van den Heuvel.

For China:
Mr Lou Tseng-tsiang.
Mr Cheng-ting Thomas Wang.

For Cuba:
Sr Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante.

For Greece:
Mr Eleftherios Veniselos.
Mr Nicolas Politis.

For Nicaragua:
Sr Salvador Chamorro.

For Panama:
Sr Antonio Burgos.

For Poland:
Mr Roman Dmowski.
Mr Ignace Paderewski.

For Romania:
Mr Jean J C Bratiano.
Dr Vaida-Voevod.

For the Serb-Croat-Slovene State:
Mr N P Pachitch.
Mr Trumbitch.
Mr Vesnitch.

For Siam:
The Prince Charoon.
Phya Bibadh Kosha.

For the Czechoslovak Republic:
Mr Charles Kramar.
Mr Edouard Benes.

The Agenda Paper calls for the communication to the Allied and Associated Powers of the Conditions of Peace with Austria.

The President, after making a statement to the above effect, points out that the document which he is laying on the table of the Conference only lacks the political clauses relating to Italy, the Military and the Reparation Clauses, which are, moreover, in an advanced stage. He adds that the Secretariat-General has received a certain number of amendments, and calls on Mr Bratiano to speak.

Mr Bratiano (Romania) reads the following declarations:

A. The Romanian Delegation considers that the conclusion of Peace with Austria leaves no doubt whatever in regard to the union of Bukovina with Romania. In point of fact, Romania, having become by her Treaty of Alliance of the 17th August, 1916, a belligerent Power against Austria, saw Bukovina revert to her as a result of the dissolution of the Austrian Empire and in accordance with the wishes of its population. In this manner the mutilation of 1775 is remedied in respect of the whole of the territory torn from Moldavia.

Romania, by adhering to the Act of Union proclaimed by Bukovina, is taking in hand the reconstitution of that province, ensuring its safety and arresting on the frontier of the Dniester the spread of anarchy which threatens a large area of Europe. At the cost of military sacrifices which have not yet approached their end, Romania is watching over Bukovina and is also asserting her solidarity with the general interests of civilization.

B. In regard to Article 5, of Part 3, Section IV, of the Draft Treaty with Austria, concerning the treatment of minorities by Romania, the Romanian Delegation has the honor to make the following declaration:

The first Romanian Delegate, on the 27th May last, addressed the following letter to M Berthelot, Chairman of the Commission entrusted with the task of fixing the nature of the guarantees which should be provided for the protection of minorities included in the new States which are in process of formation in Europe, as well as those in other States which are about to receive accretions of territory:

“Sir,

In reply to the letter which you were so good as to address to me on the 23rd May last, I have the honor to inform you that Romania has assured to all her citizens, without distinction of race or religion, complete equality both of rights and of political and religious liberties. She regards as a Romanian citizen any individual born in Romania, but not enjoying any foreign nationality, as well as the inhabitants of the territories newly united to Romania, who were subjects of the States to which those territories hitherto belonged, with the exception of those who have expressed their desire to opt for a different allegiance.

Indeed, the Royal Government, in accordance with its principles and in agreement with the representatives of Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina, have likewise decided to ensure the rights and liberties of minorities throughout the whole extent of the new kingdom by a wide administrative decentralization such as will guarantee to populations of different racial origin their free development in the matter of language, education, and the exercise of their religion.

Generally speaking, Romania is ready to accept any arrangements which all the States belonging to the League of Nations would admit on their own territories in this connection.

In all other circumstances Romania would in no case be able to admit any interference by any foreign Governments in the application of her domestic laws.

In this letter Romania expresses her intention to give the widest recognition to the liberties of ethnical or confessional minorities. Her Delegates, taking their stand on these principles, voted, on the occasion of the constitution of the League of Nations, in favor of the guarantees suggested for the whole group of States which compose the League; outside these general principles, however, Romania would be unable to consent to stipulations of a nature to limit her rights as a sovereign State, and in this connection she considers the rights of States to be the same for all.

In the very interest which the founders of the League of Nations necessarily possess in avoiding any inconsistency as regards the great principles by which the League is animated, it is essential that the leading members of that institution should abstain from any attitude which would not be identic towards all States.

Foreign intervention, as a matter of fact, even if it granted no liberties beyond those which the Romanian State is determined to guarantee to all its citizens, might compromise the work of fraternization which the Romanian Government has taken as its aim.

On the one hand, certain minorities might consider themselves absolved from all gratitude towards the State, whereas it is precisely on the development of that sentiment that the State relies for cementing the brotherhood of the various races; on the other hand a tendency would arise towards the creation of two classes of citizens in the same kingdom: the one trusting in the care of the State for their interests, the other disposed to be hostile to the State and to seek protection outside its frontiers.

History is there to prove that the protection of minorities, regarded from this point of view, has done more to disintegrate States than to consolidate them. At the present moment the Conference of the Allies is bound to endeavor to establish, on the basis of fraternity between peoples, the countries whose development is destined to ensure peace in Central and Southern Europe. Moreover, these same Allies, when the draft of the League of Nations was under discussion, withdrew Article 21, of which the following is the tenor:

'The High Contracting Parties agree to state that no obstacle shall be placed in the way of the free exercise of every belief, religion, or opinion, the practice of which is not incompatible with public order and morality, and that, within their respective jurisdictions, no one shall be disturbed in his life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness by reason of his adhesion to such belief, religion, or opinion.'

Because it was thought that this Article infringed State sovereignty, Romania determined, in the interests of liberty and justice for all, as well as in that of her own internal development, to safeguard the rights of minorities; as an independent State she does not claim any exceptional treatment for herself, but she cannot, on the other hand, accept a special régime to which other sovereign States are not subjected.

For this reason she declares her readiness to insert in the draft Treaty, Article 5, Part 3, Section IV, the following text:

'Romania grants to all minorities of language, race, and religion residing within her new frontiers rights equal to those which belong to other Romanian citizens.'"

C. As regards the second paragraph of Article 5, Part 2, Section IV of the draft Treaty with Austria, Romania states that she is prepared to take every measure for the purpose of facilitating transit and developing trade with other nations.

She will accept all the measures of a general character adopted in this connection by the League of Nations and rendered applicable to all of the States composing the League, as well as those adopted by the various special Commissions of the Peace Conference to which the Romanian Delegates have given their adhesion.

D In agreeing to adhere to the stipulations set forth in the draft Treaty with Austria - subject to the reservations stated in the attached declarations - Romania has been animated by the desire of maintaining her solidarity with the Allies. However, while giving her adhesion, she finds herself compelled to state that it must not be inferred therefrom that she will acquiesce in all similar principles which may be embodied in the Treaties with other enemy States.

E. Proposals concerning the Financial Clauses:

1) In Article 2, last paragraph, substitute for the words “in the currency of the creditor State” the words “in crowns, gold.”

2) In Article 10, leave to each interested State the right of fixing the periods within which it will stamp or repay the currency notes, this being a matter of domestic concern. Each State, being acquainted with its own capacities, is in a better position to fix the periods of time for effecting these operations.

3) In regard to the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, the Romanian Delegation is of opinion that, in view of the small amount of the available assets of this Bank, if the securities deposited by the Austrian and Hungarian Governments as cover for the currency notes issued up till the 27th October, 1918, inclusive, are, as stipulated in Article 10, likewise cancelled, the cover remaining for those notes would be so reduced that the latter would scarcely have any value. Such a situation would bring about too heavy a charge from the Romanian point of view.

The Romanian Delegation therefore thinks it just to request that no such cancellation should take place.

4) The Romanian Delegation states afresh that it considers neither as just nor as in conformity with the principles of international law that the cedee States of territories of the former Austrian Empire, or those formed as a result of that Empire’s dismemberment, should be obliged to pay the value of the goods and properties which belonged to the Government of the former Austrian Empire and are situated on their respective territories.
The President explains that the Financial Clauses will be referred to the Drafting Committee for an immediate report. He then adds:

“As far as territory properly speaking is concerned, it must of course be understood that, whether regarded as the League of Nations or as separate Governments, we are unable to guarantee any portions of territory other than those which we have ourselves assigned, and that it is impossible for us to guarantee others.

I am very glad to know that, as regards the rights of minorities, Mr Bratiano’s opinion coincides precisely with our own. What we have to ascertain is whether in view of the past history of several peoples it may not be necessary to give, I will not say additional guarantees, but such guarantees of a more complete nature as may be admitted to be necessary. That is a question in regard to which we have got to take a decision, and I beg Mr Bratiano and anyone else who may have observations of a like character to offer, to rest assured that there is no intention of humiliating anyone or of encroaching on the sovereign rights of any nations whatsoever, but rather to remember that, in the matter of minorities, everyone’s history has not been quite the same. Some distinctions are necessary in this connection, so much so that we desire to humiliate no one when we suggest conferring a right of control, not on foreign governments, as Mr Bratiano states in his text, but on the League of Nations, whose control we all accept in our own territory in the circumstances to which Mr Bratiano has alluded.

In this matter, therefore, there is no question of humiliating anyone or of encroaching on anyone’s sovereignty.”

M Klotz (France) points out that the Financial Clauses and those concerned with Reparation, are altogether inter-dependent. As the Reparation Clauses have not been included in the text to be communicated to the Austrians on the following Monday, he proposes that a like decision shall be taken in respect of the Financial Clauses.

Mr Bratiano (Romania) points out that, according to the text distributed, the small States are to be controlled, not by the League of Nations, but by the Great Powers; the text reads: “Romania likewise adheres to the insertion in a Treaty with the principal Allied and Associated Powers of the measures which those Powers may consider necessary for the protection in Romania of the interests of the inhabitants, &c. …”

It is, therefore, the Great Powers which are to intervene in order to safeguard the rights of minorities within the Kingdom of Romania. That is the principle against which the modification proposed by Mr Bratiano is made, because Romania was an independent country before the war, and he cannot believe that her attitude during the war can have warranted in the slightest degree any derogation from that political independence.

The President admits that Mr Bratiano’s observation in regard to control being exercised by the Governments, in the place of the League of Nations, is in accordance with the text. He does not, however, think that it can be humiliating for Romania to receive friendly counsel given her by States which are named, the United States of America, Great Britain, Italy, and France. No one of these States desires to exercise any improper power in Romania. He adds that rectifications of historical traditions which have been perpetuated in certain countries have been requested for a long time past, even in other Treaties, but it has been impossible to secure them. In these circumstances the text under criticism is rather in the nature of an encouragement and support.

Mr Bratiano (Romania), in order to justify the statement which he has read out, expresses himself in the following terms:

“As I do not wish to waste the time of the Conference, I will refrain from any complete explanation of Romania’s policy in the past. I must, however, say that she does not deserve the situation which it is sought to impose on her to-day. In any case, we stand here - at least, we have always understood it in that way - before the Conference of the Allied and Associated Powers which have striven to establish the right to equality of great and small States, and to set up rules which may henceforth serve both as principles and precedents. Among those rules there are some in virtue of which it is sought to-day to establish classes of States which differ in the matter of sovereignty. On behalf of Romania I am unable to admit this principle. There is no question here of friendly counsel, but of formal engagements. The Romanian Government will always be willing to accept such advice, but counsels which are recorded in Treaties and in the form of precise engagements between one Government and another cease to have the character of advice.

History supplies us with precedents in this connection: the Russians, for instance, interfered in the policy of Turkey for the protection of Christians, but the result so far as Turkey is concerned has been her dissolution. Such an attitude naturally commanded our sympathy, but it could only be logical if its final aim was to secure the independence of these peoples.

Except with this object in view, it is not possible, in the interests either of States or of minorities, to accept a rule of this nature. As I had the honor to state in the short summary which I read to you just now, we desire, together with you, to set up a new world to take the place of the old one. This new world must be established in such manner as to enable States to find in the persons of their citizens devoted sons and a life of brotherly concord. If minorities are conscious of the fact that the liberties which they enjoy are guaranteed to them, not by the solicitude for their welfare of the State to which they belong, but by the protection of a foreign State, whatever it may be, the basis of that State will be undermined. At the very basis of the new state of things which it is sought to establish, the seed is being sown of unrest, which is in contradiction with the aims which this conference pursues.

Gentlemen, it is on behalf not only of the independence of the Romanian State, but also of the two great principles which this Conference represents, that I have given expression to these remarks; one of those principles is that of peace, order and fraternity among the peoples of the same State, while the other is that of the equality of all States, both great and small, in respect of their rights of domestic legislation. Those are the reasons for which I request you, on behalf of Romania, not to impose conditions on her which she could not accept.”

As Mr Bratiano has declared his acceptance of M Klotz’s proposal, the President states that his observations will be subjected to fresh examination by the heads of Governments, and thereupon calls on Mr Paderewski to speak.

Mr Paderewski (Poland) explains the point of view of the Polish Delegation as follows:

“Poland has submitted her remarks in writing as regards the financial questions; but as these questions are to be considered in connection with the Reparation Clauses, I will refrain from speaking on that subject.

On the other hand, I state, on behalf of the Polish Government, that Poland will grant to all minorities of race, language and religion, the same rights as she does to her other nationals. She will assure to those minorities all the liberties which have already been or may be granted to them by the great Nations and States of the West, and she will be ready to amplify those rights in the same degree as the League of Nations may consider desirable for the States which compose it.

I am convinced that these guarantees when once incorporated in the fundamental laws of Poland by her Constituent Diet, will be in absolute harmony with the noble and lofty spirit which animates the great labors of the Peace Conference.

That is all I have to say.”

In reply to a question by the President, Mr Paderewski states that his proposals as regards the property of nationals have already been made in writing, and that he has no further request to make.

Mr Kramar (Czechoslovakia) states that he is quite satisfied that the Financial Clauses should be dealt with in the same way as the Reparation Clauses; the question of the claim to State property belongs to the Financial Clauses, and he will therefore now confine himself to presenting his remarks in writing. Mr Kramar thereupon expresses a wish to say a few words in regard to a question concerned with the frontiers in the Czecho-Slovak State, and proceeds to do so in the following terms:

“In the Frontier Commissions we were not in a position to discuss the question, namely, that of the Station of Gmund, which was rebuilt a few years ago and moved further to the south. In view of this there might well be misunderstandings, unless the frontier be clearly defined.

I propose to substitute for the proposed text the words ‘by the extreme easterly point of the railway bridge.’ Such a modification would not be in any way out of accord with the ideas of the Frontier Commission, while it would avoid considerable inconvenience.”

As this question has not yet been submitted to a competent Commission, it is decided, after an exchange of remarks between the President, Mr Kramar and Mr Jules Cambon, that the two last named gentlemen shall come to an agreement for the Commission to draw up a report as soon as the Conference adjourns.

Mr. Kramar (Czechoslovakia) resumes his statement in the following terms:

“As regards minorities, I accept the proposed text, subject to some slight modifications. I request the deletion of two words which, in my opinion, are quite useless and might, on the other hand, cause us considerable inconvenience because people would consider our situation to be quite different from that which the President has indicated. We are ready to do everything possible for minorities in order to have peace at home, and we are perfectly ready to deal with this question together with the Great Powers. However, there are three words which I consider quite useless. It is stated:

'Czechoslovakia agrees to incorporate in the Treaty with the principal Allied and Associated Powers all measures which may be regarded as necessary for the protection in Czecho-Slovakia of the interests of the inhabitants who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion. …’

I ask for the deletion of the words ‘which may be regarded as necessary' because they are superfluous and even rather wounding to our feeling of independence. The result will be the same if they are omitted. It goes without saying that the Great Powers possess sufficient authority to ensure our acceptance of what we may be able to concede without fear for the sovereignty of our State; but there is no advantage in saying so in the Treaty.”

The President: If you will kindly underline the three words which you ask should be deleted and give me the text, I will bring it to the notice of the Assembly.

Mr Kramar (Czechoslovakia): I shall have a few amendments to bring forward to the clauses submitted to us, which are very difficult for foreigners to understand. I shall not, however, press these points, because the Drafting Committee will no doubt examine the question and our amendments with the courteous attention to which we are accustomed.

We wish, for instance, to give the Germans of Bohemia the right to opt for Austrian nationality, whereas, according to the text under consideration, that would not be altogether possible.

The other modifications which we propose are of a similar character to this one, and are designed to make the text clearer.

The President having inquired whether the Drafting Committee would be ready to make a very early report, M Fromageot states that the Committee has already sent a note on the subject to the Supreme Council.

The President points out that agreement has been reached in regard to the Financial Clauses, and calls on Mr Trumbitch to speak.

Mr. Trumbitch (Serb-Croat-Slovene State), expresses himself as follows:

“The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation has had the honor to deposit with the Bureau of the Conference proposals for the modification of certain clauses, especially in regard to the questions of minorities, of freedom of transit and commerce, of our northern frontier, and of the Financial and Economic Clauses.

I will not concern myself with the Financial and Economic Clauses, as that is not necessary, in view of the declarations which have already been made by M Klotz.

As regards the question of minorities I must make substantially much the same observations as Mr. Kramar. We should like to delete certain words from the official draft and say that ‘the Serb-Croat-Slovene State undertakes to determine in agreement with the principal Allied and Associated Powers, the necessary measures for protecting within the territories formerly belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and ceded by the present Treaty to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the interests of minorities.’ The difference between the two texts is clear.”

The President: Is that the Serbian and Czechoslovakian claim?

Mr Trumbitch (Serb-Croat-Slovene State): The Serbian claim is identical with that of the Czechoslovak State. I will hand you, M President, the text of our new proposal. Our request is that the principal Powers should come to an understanding with us for the insertion by common agreement of these provisions in a general Treaty.

The second question to which I should wish to call your attention is the limitation of the text as regards minorities to the territories formerly belonging to Austria-Hungary. We ask you not to extend that limitation to Serbia. The reason is clear: Serbia was an independent State; she had certain acquired rights; to-day it is not desirable to impose on former Serbian territories certain clauses which might interfere with the sovereign rights which she possessed as a State existing before the war.

I beg leave to offer you, Sir, the precise drafting which we should wish you to accept.

The second question relates to the northern frontier of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. We are under the impression that the text in regard to this frontier is not sufficiently clear or accurate. The first draft assigned the town of Radkersburg to the Yugo-Slav State; whereas in the final draft that is no longer the case. The text, therefore, lacks in clearness, as it is impossible to know whether Radkersburg will belong to the Yugo-Slav State or remain in Austria.

Carinthia was the subject of a question raised in the territorial Commission on the 21st May. In regard to Prekmurje, we have put forward a fresh draft, the substance of which is as follows.

In the Treaty of Peace with Austria we read in Part II, Frontier of Austria, Article 1, 2 and 3, that the frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia, so far as it is to be drawn between the eastern extremity of the Austro-Italian frontier (to be determined later on) and Hill 1054 at Stroina, will be fixed ultimately by the principal Allied and Associated Powers. From Stroina onward, the frontier will be either a line to be fixed on the ground, or the Drave below its confluence with the Lavandt and passing by Hill 1522, or (as is stated in the Summary on page 2) a line passing just to the east of Bleiburg and crossing the Drave just above its confluence with the Lavandt. In Part III, paragraph 5, Section 2, Article 4, we find the remark: “Klagenfurt is reserved.”

The Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State declares that these provisions do not take account either of its claims or of the minimum demands with which it acquainted the Territorial Commission. The point as regards Stroina and Bleiburg actually opens up a prospect which is in direct contradiction with the claims of the Delegation. Our Delegation is under the discouraging impression that it is sought to exclude the Serb-Croat-Slovene State from Carinthia; in fact, none of our numerous proposals have been taken into consideration. Now, even according to the Austrian statistics, about 100,000 Slovenes reside on the territories in question; there is nothing, therefore, to prevent an equitable solution.

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation notices with regret that the Allied and Associated Powers have not taken this request into account, even to the extent which the Germans themselves had, as is proved by the book “Staatsgrenze des Karntengebiets (1919)” (“State Frontiers of the Carinthia Territory”). The Delegation therefore considers itself compelled to call the urgent attention of the Great Powers to the untenable situation in which the Slovene people would be placed if the loss of Slovene Carinthia were added to its sacrifices in the Adriatic. The soul of the Slovene people would never recover from this blow, while a constant ferment of irredentism would hinder the peaceful development of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and would become a perpetual source of hostile feelings towards German Austria.

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation must therefore make a final appeal to the Conference in order to secure the definite assignment of the territory situated above the line fixed in Annex I and traced on the map Styria-Prekmurje.

In Part II, already mentioned, the Mur may be considered as a natural frontier up to its meeting with the frontier between Austria and Hungary, whereas, according to our Delegation, that formula would involve the exclusion from the Serb-Croat-Slovene kingdom of the region of Radkersburg.

Finally, we call the attention of the Great Powers to the fact that, in Section 4 of Part II of the Treaty with Hungary, the determination of the point from which the frontier between Austria-Hungary starts is inaccurate, because it leaves out of account the fact that Prekmurje is to form part of the Serb-Croat-Slovene kingdom. The same is the case in the Summary on page 3.

I have the honor to state that our Delegation urges this proposal, and I beg this high Assembly to give the matter its favorable consideration.

M Tardieu (France) offers the following explanation: As regards Radkersburg, it is an actual mistake in the text of the old proof which warrants Mr. Trumbitch’s remark. The line of the frontier has been rectified as he wishes.

As regards the rest of Prekmurje, there is no need to mention it in the Treaty with Austria, because, except the little corner of Radkersburg, Prekmurje is Hungarian territory. Provisions in regard to Prekmurje will be inserted in the Treaty with Hungary.

The President of the United States, speaking in English, makes the following speech:

“M President, I should be very sorry to see this meeting adjourn with permanent impressions such as it is possible may have been created by some of the remarks that our friends have made. I should be very sorry to have the impression lodged in your minds that the Great Powers desire to assume or play any arbitrary role in these great matters, or presume, because of any pride of authority, to exercise an undue influence in these matters, and therefore I want to call your attention to one aspect of these questions which has not been dwelt upon.

We are trying to make a peaceful settlement, that is to say, to eliminate those elements of disturbance, so far as possible, which may interfere with the peace of the world, and we are trying to make an equitable distribution of territories according to the race, the ethnographical character of the people inhabiting them.

And back of that lies this fundamentally important fact that, when the decisions are made, the Allied and Associated Powers guarantee to maintain them. It is perfectly evident, upon a moment’s reflection, that the chief burden of their maintenance will fall upon the Great Powers. The chief burden of the war fell upon the Greater Powers, and, if it had not been for their action, their military action, we would not be here to settle these questions. Therefore, we must not close our eyes to the fact that in the last analysis the military and naval strength of the Great Powers will be the final guarantee of the peace of the world.

In those circumstances is it unreasonable and unjust that, not as dictators but as friends, the Great Powers should say to their associates: ‘We cannot afford to guarantee territorial settlements which we do not believe to be right, and we cannot agree to leave elements of disturbance unremoved, which we believe will disturb the peace of the world?'

Take the rights of minorities. Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely to disturb the peace of the world than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to minorities. And therefore, if the Great Powers are to guarantee the peace of the world in any sense, is it unjust that they should be satisfied that the proper and necessary guarantees have been given?

I beg our friends from Romania and from Serbia to remember that while Romania and Serbia are ancient sovereignties the settlements of this Conference are greatly adding to their territories. You cannot in one part of our transactions treat Serbia alone and in all of the other parts treat the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as a different entity, for they are seeking the recognition of this Conference as a single entity, and if this Conference is going to recognize these various Powers as new sovereignties within definite territories, the chief guarantors are entitled to be satisfied that the territorial settlements are of a character to be permanent, and that the guarantees given are of a character to ensure the peace of the world.

It is not, therefore, the intervention of those who would interfere, but the action of those who would help. I beg that our friends will take that view of it, because I see no escape from that view of it.

How can a Power like the United States, for example - for I can speak for no other - after signing this Treaty, if it contains elements which they do not believe will be permanent, go three thousand miles away across the sea and report to its people that it has made a settlement of the peace of the world? It cannot do so. And yet there underlies all of these transactions the expectation on the part, for example, of Romania and of Czechoslovakia and of Serbia, that if any covenants of this settlement are not observed, the United States will send her armies and her navies to see that they are observed.

In those circumstances is it unreasonable that the United States should insist upon being satisfied that the settlements are correct? Mr Bratiano - and I speak of his suggestions with the utmost respect—suggested that we could not, so to say, invade the sovereignty of Romania, an ancient sovereignty, and make certain prescriptions with regard to the rights of minorities. But I beg him to observe that he is overlooking the fact that he is asking the sanction of the Allied and Associated Powers for great additions of territory which come to Romania by the common victory of arms, and that, therefore, we are entitled to say: ‘If we agree to these additions of territory we have the right to insist upon certain guarantees of peace.’

I beg my friend Mr Kramar, and my friend Mr Trumbitch, and my friend Mr Bratiano, to believe that if we should feel that it is best to leave the words which they have wished to omit in the Treaty, it is not because we want to insist upon unreasonable conditions, but that we want the Treaty to accord to us the right of judgment as to whether these are things which we can afford to guarantee.

Therefore the impressions with which we should disperse ought to be these, that we are all friends—of course, that goes without saying - but that we must all be associates in a common effort, and there can be no frank and earnest association in the common effort unless there is a common agreement as to what the rights and settlements are.

Now, if the agreement is a separate agreement among groups of us, that does not meet the object. If you should adopt the language suggested by the Czechoslovakian Delegation and the Serbian Delegation - the Yugoslav Delegation - that it should be left to negotiation between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and their several Delegates, that would mean that after this whole Conference is adjourned groups of them would determine what is to be the basis of the peace of the world. It seems to me that that would be a most dangerous idea to entertain, and therefore I beg that we may part with a sense, not of interference with each other, but of hearty and friendly co-operation upon the only possible basis of guarantee. Where the great force lies, there must be the sanction of peace. I sometimes wish, in hearing an argument like this, that I were the representative of a small Power, so that what I said might be robbed of any mistaken significance, but I think you will agree with me that the United States has never shown any temper of aggression anywhere, and it lies in the heart of the people of the United States, as I am sure it lies in the hearts of the peoples of the other Great Powers, to form a common partnership of right, and to do service to our associates and no kind of disservice.”

Mr. Bratiano (Romania) then makes the following speech:

“The eminent personality of President Wilson invests both his words and his advice with a specially authoritative character. I beg leave, in the name of the great principles which the President himself has proclaimed, to call his friendly attention to the apprehension lest the application in certain instances of principles, even with the best intentions, may bring about results precisely in contradiction with the end in view.

As I said, there must emerge from the labors of this Conference results which do not admit of discussion. The Conference has accomplished a great work of justice; it has set up, not only guarantees against the enemy, but also equality of rights for all States, great and small. If principles such as those which it is sought to embody to-day in the Treaty with Austria had been inserted in the Statutes of the League of Nations, we should not have raised any objection. President Wilson will certainly admit that the Romanian Delegation voted in favor of these principles being established once for all and as applicable to all. To act as it is proposed to act in the present Treaty means the establishment of varying degrees of sovereignty. Notwithstanding the feelings of friendship and profound admiration which I entertain for the Italian people, I am unable to conceive why, in identical circumstances, countries like Romania or Serbia should be treated differently from Italy.

On the other hand, as I have likewise had the honor to explain, we are seeking to establish a life of brotherhood between the peoples which are compelled by their geographical situation to form themselves into a single State. It would be a cardinal error to make these friendly relations dependent on a third party, whatever it be.

Further, we must not lose sight of the fact, even though men imbued with these principles are at the head of the Governments of the present Great Powers, it is quite possible that political evolutions will bring about the representation of those same States by other men, or that new interests may arise such as to make certain Governments deviate from their former attitude and involve them in actions of which the mainspring will not reside in these great principles, but rather in certain special interests.

It is undeniable that the Great Powers, by their sacrifices, have made certain the victory of the great cause common to us all. I may be permitted to add to the words pronounced by the President - words for which I thank him on behalf of all the small States - when he asserted that we can rely henceforward on the solicitude for our welfare of the great political factors, and that he wishes to guarantee the security of all of us; but I will add that the responsibility of each State in matters of independence and security nevertheless remains just as entire, whatever be its extent.

Thus, at the present moment, Romania is compelled to provide with her own troops for the defense, not only of her own frontiers, but also of a cause which is a matter of concern for the whole of Central Europe. Therefore, even though the Great Powers have a more important part to play, in proportion to their size, the responsibility and duties of independent States, whatever their size, remain undiminished.

I beg the Representatives of the Great Powers, and especially President Wilson, not to limit those responsibilities by a dangerous application of the principles which are dear to us all.

“It needs no effort to secure the recognition of the rights of minorities. There is no single State represented here which is not convinced of the necessity for respecting and developing those liberties; therefore, allow these States to develop themselves in the only atmosphere likely to render possible the consolidation of the general political state which we are here to establish to-day.

Such are the feelings, alike of respect and gratitude for the services which they have rendered, which animate me in earnestly praying the Great Powers to examine, with all the attention demanded by such important principles, the proposals and declarations made by the Romanian Government; it is necessary that these proposals should be accepted, for otherwise Romania would no longer preserve in its entirety the independence which she enjoyed in the past for the settlement of her domestic concerns.”

Mr Veniselos (Greece) offers a few remarks in the following terms:

“I beg leave to remark most respectfully that the clauses under ‘discussion do not necessarily form an essential part of the Treaty of Peace with Austria. I should wish, therefore, to suggest to you the desirability, after detaching those clauses, of communicating on Monday the remainder of the Conditions of Peace with Austria and referring those clauses to examination by the Heads of the Five Great Powers at a special meeting in conjunction with the Heads of the Powers with limited interests which are specially concerned. There would thus be nine or ten persons in all seated at one table, who would certainly find some means of allaying the legitimate uneasiness of the Powers with limited interests, while giving satisfaction to the Great Powers.

If you think it necessary to embody those clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Austria, we shall have sufficient time, up till the day before the signature of the Treaty - since these clauses do not concern Austria - to formulate them and insert them in the Treaty in order to obviate the drafting of a special Treaty for matters which concern the Powers with limited interests.”

The President: Mr Veniselos’ proposal will, of course, be examined together with those which have already been submitted.

The Agenda being disposed of, the Session is adjourned at 17 o’clock (5 p.m.).

The President,
G. Clemenceau.

Sailor Steve

05-31-19, 08:59 PM

Saturday, May 31, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon's Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 17:30

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. Attention is drawn to the Acts relating to

The proposed Romanian march on Budapest.

League of Nations. Drafting Correction to Article 24.

Omission of an Article on the Assling triangle from the draft Treaty of Peace with Austria.

Invitation to the Grand Vizier of Turkey to come to Paris.

Carinthia. Cessation of fighting between Austrians and Yugoslavs.

2. S Orlando draws attention to the following sentence in the Preamble of the draft Treaty of Peace with Austria:

“Whereas, by the free action of the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, this Monarchy has now ceased to exist and has been replaced in Austria by a Republican Government, and”

He said that the words underlined would be displeasing to Italian public opinion, as it would be taken as underrating the Italian Military effort.

(It is agreed to omit the words underlined, as well as the words “this Monarchy”, and that the clause should read as follows:

“Whereas, the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has now ceased to exist and has been replaced in Austria by a Republican Government, and”)

3. S Orlando also suggests that the clause in the Preamble following the above, in which it was stated that the Czechoslovak State and the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State have been recognised should be omitted. He says that Italy has not recognised these States. He adds that he has no knowledge of the instruction to the Drafting Committee, on which this Preamble is stated to have been based.

President Wilson suggests that the clause should begin as follows:

“Whereas the majority of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have already recognised etc”.

He points out that Poland is not included.

(The Drafting Committee are then sent for, and are introduced.)

During the discussion which follows, the Council are reminded that the presentation of the full powers of the Croats and Slovenes to the Germans had been regarded as tantamount to recognition.

S Orlando then withdraws his objection, and the paragraph is left unchanged.

4. (After some discussion, it is agreed that no alteration should be made in the provisions of the Draft Treaty of Peace with Austria in the clauses relating to Rights of Minorities, as proposed on the same afternoon at the Plenary Conference.)

(M Jules Cambon enters.)

5. (The attached Article of the Draft Treaty of Peace with Austria, relating to the frontiers between Austria and Czechoslovakia, which had been drawn up by the experts under M Jules Cambon, in consequence of remarks made by the Czechoslovak Delegation at the Plenary Conference the same afternoon, is approved and initialed by the four Heads of States).

Sir Maurice Hankey communicates the Article direct to the Drafting Committee.

(M Jules Cambon withdraws.)

(M Dutasta is introduced.)

6. M Clemenceau says he has received a letter from Herr Renner, the Head of the Austrian Delegation, who has asked to talk with him. Subject to the consent of his colleagues, he proposes to reply that it had been agreed that there should be no conversations, but that if Herr Renner liked to send a confidential note, he would undertake to show it only to the four Heads of States. Communications With the Austrian Delegation

(This is agreed to.)

(M Dutasta withdraws.)

7. With reference to C. F. 42, Minute 7,2 Sir Maurice Hankey states that he now has the Articles of the Treaty to which M. Kramarcz’s observations referred, and which had not been available on the previous day.

(In view of the discussion at the Plenary Conference that afternoon, it is decided not to discuss the question.)

(M Tardieu enters.)

8. Mr Lloyd George reads a telegram he had received from General Allenby, indicating that the situation in Syria would be extremely grave unless the Commission of the Peace Conference should come to Syria. He says that General Wilson has also received a private letter from General Allenby, dated May 17th, 1919, which fully confirms the message in the telegram. Hence, he feels that the moment has come to decide whether the Commission is to be sent out. Personally, he would prefer that the Commission should proceed at once. The United States Commissioners have already left for Syria. He himself, does not wish to send out British Commissioners unless the French also send Commissioners, but in this case, he must inform General Allenby. The situation is so serious that he cannot postpone action.

M Clemenceau says his position is as he had stated a few days before, namely, that he is willing to send French Commissioners as soon as the relief of British troops by French troops was begun. As long as Syria remains entirely in British military occupation, and Mr Lloyd George’s latest proposals hold the field it is useless to send French Commissioners. Nevertheless, he will undertake not to send any more French troops against the wishes of the British Government. He is sending some troops to Cilicia, although there is not much object in this from the French point of view, if Cilicia is to go to the United States. As soon as General Allenby lets him know that the replacement of British troops by French could commence, so that the people of Syria know that they were not exclusively under British force, he would send Commissioners.

Mr Lloyd George says he thinks it right before taking action, to let his colleagues know exactly what he proposed to do. He will not send Commissioners if the French do not. General Allenby shows clearly that if French troops go to Syria now, there will be very serious trouble. He himself is not in a position to judge of the matter, but General Allenby is a very reliable man, and is the British representative on the spot, and he cannot afford to neglect his advice. Mr Lloyd George then reads a copy of the telegram he proposes to send to General Allenby. At M Clemenceau’s request he agrees to alter one passage in order to make it clear that the French are not willing to send Commissioners until the relief of British troops by French troops has been arranged.

M Clemenceau says he will make no comment beyond asking for the above alteration.

Mr Lloyd George promises to send M Clemenceau a copy of General Allenby’s dispatch.

S Orlando says he will not send Commissioners until the British and French Governments send them.

9. S Orlando presents several proposed alterations in the Financial Clauses in the Draft Treaty of Peace with Austria which had been signed by the representatives of the four States on the Drafting Committee of the Financial Commission.

President Wilson is reluctant to initial these alterations without having some explanation as to their meaning.

(The question is reserved.)

Jimbuna

06-01-19, 09:30 AM

1st June 1919

German women at a British checkpoint in Düsseldorf-Reisholz, Germany enter a house where they’ll be searched for contraband.
https://i.imgur.com/L8oCVHQ.jpg

Sailors on the HMAS Australia, the flagship of the Royal Australian Navy, mutiny due to low morale.
https://i.imgur.com/mmW4SVw.jpg

The Allied triumvirate arrives at Versailles, 1 June 1919- (from left to right) Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France; Woodrow Wilson, President of the USA; and Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister.
https://i.imgur.com/N4teXdw.jpg

Berlin: The body of murdered socialist Rosa Luxemburg is discovered in a canal.
https://i.imgur.com/I9s5Q9T.jpg

Sailor Steve

06-01-19, 02:23 PM

Sunday, June 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

06-02-19, 07:20 AM

2nd June 1919

Aftermath of War

Britain: New Loan of £250 million proposed in House of Commons.

British Government recognises Yugo-Slavia as kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

Terms of Peace presented to Austrian delegates.

A family visits the American Military Cemetery No. 32 near Paris, France.
https://i.imgur.com/0vweMQu.jpg

After having abandoned his first wife Mileva Maric and two children, Albert Einstein remarries with Elsa Löwenthal, his double cousin, on June 2, 1919. Indeed, their two mothers, Pauline and Fanny, were sisters, while their two fathers were first cousins.
https://i.imgur.com/qh3fLwk.jpg

Ship Losses:

Rucumilla (Chilean Navy) The H-class submarine sank near the naval base at Talcahuano, Chile, when a valve was left open inadvertently during a training dive. All 25 men on board survived. She later was refloated, repaired, and returned to service.
Skoryi (Russian Navy White Movement) The gunboat was shelled and damaged by artillery and run aground on the Kama River, pulled off and towed away.
Statnyi (Russian Navy White Movement) The gunboat was shelled and sunk on the Kama River by artillery.

Sailor Steve

06-02-19, 12:50 PM

Peace Congress (Saint-Germain), Protocol No. 1, Plenary Session of June 2, 1919, 12:30.

The Presentation of the Conditions of Peace to the Plenipotentiaries of the Republic of Austria

The Plenipotentiaries of the Republic of Austria, their Credentials having been verified and found to be in good and due form, are invited to come to the Château of Saint-Germain-en-Laye on the 2nd June, 1919, at noon, there to have the Conditions of Peace communicated to them.

On the appointed day, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers, hereinafter enumerated, meet in the Congress Hall, and thereupon the Plenipotentiaries of the Republic of Austria are ushered in.

The Session is then opened at 12.30 p.m. under the presidency of M Georges Clemenceau, President.

Present
For the United States of America:
The President of the United States.
Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of State.
Honorable Henry White, formerly Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States at Rome and Paris.
General Tasker H Bliss, Military Representative of the United States on the Supreme War Council.

For the British Empire:
Great Britain:
The Rt Hon David Lloyd George, MP, First Lord of the Treasury and Prime Minister.
The Rt Hon A J Balfour, OM, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Rt Hon G N Barnes, MP, Minister without Portfolio.
The Rt Hon Sir Joseph Ward, KC, MG, Minister of Finance and Posts of New Zealand.

Dominions and India:

Canada:
The Rt Hon Sir George Foster, GC, MG, Minister of Trade and Commerce.
The Hon C J Doherty, Minister of Justice.

Australia:
The Rt Hon W M Hughes, Prime Minister.
The Rt Hon Sir Joseph Cook, GC MG, Minister for the Navy.

New Zealand
The Rt Hon W F Massey, Prime Minister.

India:
The Rt Hon E S Montagu, MP, Secretary of State for India.

For France:
M Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council, Minister of War.
M Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
M L L Klotz, Minister of Finance.
M André Tardieu, Commissioner-General for Franco-American Military Affairs.
Mr Jules Cambon, former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of France.
Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

For Italy:
S V E Orlando, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of the Interior.
The Baron S Sonnino, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
S Crespi, Minister of Food.
The Marquis G Imperiali, Senator of the Kingdom, Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Italy at London.
S S Barzilai, Deputy, formerly Minister.
General A Diaz, Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Army.

For Japan:
The Marquis Saionji, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.
The Baron Makino, formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs, Member of the Diplomatic Council.
Viscount Chinda, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at London.
Mr K Matsui, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Paris.
Mr H Ijuin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Rome.

For Belgium:
Mr Hymans, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of State.
Mr Van den Heuvel, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, Minister of State.
Mr Vandervelde, Minister of Justice, Minister of State.

For China:
Mr Lou Tseng-tsiang, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Mr Cheng-ting Thomas Wang, formerly Minister of Agriculture and Commerce.

For Cuba:
Sr Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante, Dean of the Faculty of Law in the University of Havana, President of the Cuban Society of International Law.

For Ecuador:
Sr Dorn y de Alsua, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Ecuador at Paris.

For Greece:
Mr Eleftherios Veniselos, President of the Council of Ministers.
Mr Nicolas Politis, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For Guatemala:
Sr Joaquín Mendéz, formerly Minister of State for Public Works and Public Instruction; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Guatemala at Washington, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on Special Mission at Paris.

For the Hedjaz:
Mr Rustem Haidar.
Mr Abdul Hadi Aouni.

For Liberia:
Mr H F Worley.

For Nicaragua:
Sr Salvador Chamorro, President of the Chamber of Deputies.

For Panama:
Sr Antonio Burgos, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Panama at Madrid.

For Poland:
Mr Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee.
Mr Ignace Paderewski, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For Portugal:
Dr Affonso Costa, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.
Mr Augusta Soares, formerly Minister Foreign Affairs.

For Romania:
Mr Jean J C Bratiano, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
General Constantin Coanda, Corps Commander, ADC to the King, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.

For the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom:
Mr N P Pachitch, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.
Mr Ante Trumbitch, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Mr Ivan Zolger, Professor of the Faculty of Law at the University of Zagreb.

For Siam:
The Prince Charoon, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Siam at Paris.
Phya Bibadh Kosha, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

For the Czechoslovak State:
Mr Charles Kramar, President of the Council of Ministers.
Mr Edouard Benes, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

For the Republic of Austria:
Mr Karl Renner, Chancellor of the Austrian Republic.
Mr Franz Klien, Representative of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Mr Franz Peter, Director of the Legal Section of the Department for Foreign Affairs.
Mr Johann Andre Eichoff, Political Director of the Department for Foreign Affairs.
Mr Richard Schuller, Economic Director of the Department for Foreign Affairs.

M Clemenceau (President) makes the following speech:

“Gentlemen,

“The Allied and Associated Powers have entrusted me with the duty of handing to you, the Plenipotentiaries of the Republic of Austria, the draft of the Treaty which has been the subject of our deliberations; not, indeed, the whole Treaty for I shall have to make some reservations in that connection, but at least its principal parts, which you will forthwith be able to consider.

It has been decided that the discussion shall take place in writing. You will be good enough to transmit to us, in writing, such remarks as you may have to make in regard to the text laid before you. The replies thereto will similarly be sent in writing.

You have a period of fifteen days within which to hand in your observations. It is, of course, understood that if, before that time, you are in a position to furnish documents, we shall receive them with pleasure and will immediately give our attention to any papers which you may be good enough to send us. You will understand, however, that your examination of the whole matter must take place within fifteen days time.

Those are the conditions of procedure, and these are the documents communicated to you. They comprise the following subjects:

Preamble.

League of Nations.

Frontiers of Austria.

Political Clauses.

Czecho-Slovak State,

Political Clauses relating to certain European States,

Protection of Minorities,

General Provisions.

Austrian Interests outside Europe.

Naval and Aerial Clauses.

Prisoners of War and Graves.

Penalties.

Economic Clauses.

Aerial Navigation.

Ports, Waterways and Railways.

Labor.

Miscellaneous Provisions.

The text of the clauses mentioned hereafter will be handed to you later on, and as soon as possible:

1) Political Clauses (Italy).

2) Financial Clauses.

3) Separation Clauses.

4) Military Clauses.

5) Clauses in regard to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom.

The Supreme Council, after examining the observations handed in within the period which I have mentioned, will send a written reply to the Austrian Delegation, fixing the period within which it should send in a final reply in regard to the Treaty as a whole.”

(The Text of the Conditions of Peace is then handed to Mr. Renner by the Secretary-General.)

(The President’s speech is translated into English, Italian and German.)

Mr. Renner (Republic of Austria) reads the following statement in French:

“The people of German Austria have awaited during a long and distressing period the advent of the day which should deliver it from uncertainty in regard to its future fate. We have been consumed with anxiety in expectation of the decisive hour; first of all because it would at last bring peace to our sorely-tried country, but also because it affords us an opportunity of explaining to this distinguished Assembly, whose authority runs throughout the whole world, who we are and what are the conditions in which we can hope to acquire the vitality necessary for an independent State.

The Danubian Monarchy, with which the Allied and Associated Powers were at war and with which they concluded the Armistice, has ceased to exist. The 12th November, 1918 may be regarded as the date of its disappearance. From that day onward there was no longer a monarch, nor any Great Power for him to rule; the disastrous dualism exists no longer; there is no Government, either Austrian or Hungarian, no army, no institution whatever recognized as issuing from a public power. There only remained eight nations, bereft of all public organization, which, at a day’s notice, have created their own Parliaments, Governments and armies, and thus formed States which reflect the peculiar genius of each one. Our young Republic has been constituted in the same way as all the other States; it is therefore, in no greater degree than they are, the successor of the former Monarchy. That fact is the direct origin of the fundamental contradiction which must be cleared up in the presence of this high Assembly.

On the one hand it is impossible to dispute, from the point of view of international law, the judicious statements recently made by the President of the Congress, according to which it would be contrary to every principle of international law to seek to assert that a mere alteration of political régime or change of governors would suffice to extinguish an obligation once assumed by a nation. It follows therefore that all the territories, as well as the populations of the former Monarchy, might be held responsible for the consequences of the war into which they were forced, one and all, by their former governors. Thus both we and the other States which have arisen on the territories of the former Monarchy are heavily burdened by our respective share of the inheritance of the fallen Empire—an inheritance of war, of exhaustion and of crushing financial obligations. Now, our young Republic has rid itself of all the ambition to dominate other nations which inevitably brought about the downfall of the former Monarchy. Our Republic has likewise rid itself of all the reactionary traditions which had made that ancient Empire a prison for these peoples. It is but the unfortunate victim of the terrible crime committed in 1914, a crime of the former governors, but not of the peoples.

On the other hand, the successor States have only been set up, from the point of view of international law, since the suspension of hostilities. The German-Austrian Republic itself has never declared war, nor made war on any one, nor found itself in the international position of a belligerent as against the Western Powers.

Now, it cannot be maintained, from any point of view, that our young Republic has ever been in a state of war with one or other of the new National States.

On the contrary, in our own city of Vienna, all the successor States have set up Commissions for the purpose of dividing among themselves, by common agreement, the heritage of the former Empire, and especially the rights and assets of that heritage. Their purpose there is by no means that of making peace among themselves, but rather of liquidating the former community, under the intervention and guarantee of the Great Powers, whose support we are here to request, and of regulating in a practical manner their future relations.

However, notwithstanding their situation, the successor States meet again here in Paris, with quite a different part to play. We hope to be able to enlighten the Peace Congress in regard to this confused situation. We can today foresee all the consequences which flow from this contradiction, and I reserve to myself the right of laying them before this High Assembly in writing. It is therefore as one of the portions of the Empire which has been vanquished and destroyed that we appear before you.

We are even perfectly willing to assume our respective share of the responsibility towards the Great Powers arising out of the situation which I have just described, and are well aware that our fate lies in your hands.

Nevertheless, we hope that the conscience of humanity will neither refuse us, nor restrict in our respect, the inalienable right of free self-determination proclaimed by the Allied and Associated Powers as an aim of their war against the Hapsburg and Hohenzollern Monarchies, a right which was, with our cordial and spontaneous consent, put into practice without delay in favor of our neighbors, while our own people trusting fully in the principles recognized by the Great Powers, has adopted it as the basis of its new Constitution.

We like to believe that reason and the practical spirit of the world can neither desire nor countenance our economic collapse and the destruction of the whole economic fabric of the Monarchy, the more so since the impediments placed on the outlets for the natural resources by which our country is supplied have condemned us during the last six months to a state of distress far more terrible than the actual sufferings of the war.

It is entirely due to the generous relief measures taken by the Allied and Associated Powers and conducted by their distinguished representative, Mr Hoover, that our people owes its salvation from a famine which would have literally decimated it. Now, throughout these disasters our people has, in spite of all, preserved its discipline, its spirit of endurance and its good sense in an admirable manner, and its revolution has not been stained by blood.

Encouraged by its confidence in the decisions of this Congress, it has abandoned all military action for the defense of its territories, two-fifths of which are still occupied by its neighbors. It has remained as the support of a peaceful and sensible social evolution in the middle of Europe. It will not deviate from this attitude provided that a just and democratic peace restores to us the indispensable means of economic existence.

We are aware, Gentlemen, that it is you, the victors, who will impose on us the Conditions of Peace, and we are determined loyally to examine any proposal which you make to us and any counsel which you may offer.

It will be our especial duty to explain to you thoroughly the true situation of our country, as well as to enlighten you in regard to the conditions of our existence. With very few exceptions you have hitherto only had the opportunity of hearing our neighbor’s accounts on this subject. We beg you to give us the same degree of attention. As the arbiters of the whole world you will likewise decide the fate of our small country. It is, too, fair that an arbiter should hear both sides. We ask you for a decision which will safeguard our future and our national, political and economic existence.

You may for your part be convinced that it is above all our desire, within uncontested frontiers and in the enjoyment of our liberty and our national civilization, to serve the cause of peace by collaborating, to the modest extent of our strength in the noble task of the League of Nations.”

(Mr Renner’s statement is translated into English and Italian.)

As no one else asks leave to speak, the President declares the Session adjourned at 13.10.

The President,
G Clemenceau.

The Secretary-General,
P Dutasta.

The Secretaries,
J C Grew,
M P A Hankey,
Paul Gauthier,
Aldrovandi,
Sadao Saburi.

Sailor Steve

06-02-19, 01:43 PM

Monday, June 2, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George’s Flat, 23 Rue Nitôt, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Three

1. President Wilson says that after the meeting with the Austrians in the morning, he had consulted his experts about the question of Klagenfurt. It appears that the whole difficulty had been raised by the Yugoslavs who want to hold the plebiscite by communes instead of for the whole district. This was what had been refused by the Council of Four in other cases. It was particularly unsuitable to the Klagenfurt Valley which constituted an economic unit. It was indeed a pocket surrounded by mountains and Klagenfurt was the only railway center in the Valley. Klagenfurt

Mr Lloyd George points out that there is a river running through the middle of the valley and a river is not a bad boundary between two countries. North of the river there is an overwhelming majority of Austrians; South of it an overwhelming majority of Slavs. If a plebiscite were taken for the whole, it might give a slight majority to the Yugoslavs who would then carry the whole Valley. He understands that the United States’ experts say that they are not Slavs but Wends and that these would very likely vote with the Austrians.

President Wilson says that the interests of the Wends are with the Austrians. He does not mind if the Valley went to Austria if it is given by votes of the Slavs. The United States’ experts who had traveled through the region had found that the people were, on the whole, desirous of remaining as a unit and part of Austria.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the views of the Yugoslavs should be heard.

M Clemenceau agrees and suggested Mr Vesnitch should be heard. It would only take a quarter of an hour.

2. Mr Lloyd George says he feels it is his duty to explain the present position of the British Delegation toward the German Treaty of Peace. It is an anxious one. So far as British public was concerned, it has made up its mind that it wants to get Peace and is not so much concerned about the precise terms. British public opinion will not support a Government that goes on with the war without very substantial reasons. Consequently, he thinks it advisable to invite as many members of the British Government as can be spared to come to Paris and confer with him. Altogether he has held four meetings. He had first consulted the British Empire Delegation alone. Then he had conferred informally with the members of the British Cabinet alone on Saturday evening and finally on Sunday he had held two joint meetings of the members of the British Government with members of the British Empire Delegation. He feels it useful to gather the views of men who were not immersed in the details of the Peace Treaty and whose perspective was consequently clear. He has asked each member separately for his opinion. They had proved to be unanimous on certain points. In particular, they had shown that they were not prepared to continue the war and march on Germany or join in the reimposition of the blockade unless certain defects in the Peace Treaty were put right. He regrets to say that Mr Barnes, who is the only labor representative in his Cabinet, had written to say that he could not sign the present Treaty of Peace. The South African Delegation were also refusing to sign the present Treaty and General Botha, who is a man of great moderation, insists on certain changes. Apart from these, however, the whole of those he had consulted had unanimously agreed that unless certain defects in the Treaty were put right they could not advise that the British Army should be allowed to march or that the Fleet should take part in the blockade. He would point out that those present had constituted a very fair representation of all Sections of the British Cabinet. There had been Conservatives and Unionists, Mr Barnes representing labor, representatives of the Dominions and a moderate liberal in Mr Fisher, whose views carry great weight. Before coming to the Meeting, they had read all the documents carefully. They were in touch with public opinion in England which, they said, wanted Peace and did not care so very much about the details of the terms. Several of his colleagues had expressed surprise that the German counter-proposal had gone so far in concessions to the Allies. Mr Chamberlain had been present and both he and Lord Egbert Cecil were strongly of opinion that changes were necessary in the Treaty. Both the Archbishops had written to him and expressed the same view. They might be taken as fairly representative of moderate opinion.

The points his colleagues had been most anxious to see changed were the following:

The Eastern Frontiers:

After reading the case put forward by the Germans, they felt they could not support an advance by the British Army unless this matter was put right. In this they had the support of the British experts.

Pointing to an ethnographic map of Western Poland and Upper Silesia, he explained that the following were the changes which the Experts advised.

In Upper Silesia they considered that there should be a plebiscite. The advantage of this was that if Upper Silesia elected to go to Poland no question of a war of revenge could arise. If Germany instead of annexing Alsace Lorraine had held a plebiscite in 1870, the present war would never have taken place. Neither could Prussia nurse a war of revenge in the future if Upper Silesia had declared itself for Poland by a plebiscite. His personal view was that Upper Silesia would vote in favour of Poland.

The next point arose in connection with Guhrau and Militsch. He was informed that this area had no historical connection with Poland and was inhabited by Germans in an immense majority. The frontier had been moved to the South in order to secure a strategical defensive line upon the river Bartsch. The strategic arguments however had not been deemed of a very convincing character.

Another district in which a rectification ought to be made was the Schneidemühl-Konitz region. In this district the frontier had been moved slightly to the west of the ethnographical frontier because of railway considerations and further a desire to avoid a serious strategic danger to Poland. The population in this area, however, was predominantly German.

Yet another point where change was desirable was a small district in the extreme north of Pomerania which was inhabited by Germans in a large majority and had been assigned to Poland partly because of railway considerations and partly in order to widen the corridor to the sea. This region, he was informed, was historically German and had no connection with Poland. Finally there was the question of Memel but this was a minor matter. His colleagues had also been a good deal concerned about the Saar. On this matter, however, he had taken up a strong line and had pointed out that at the end of 15 years, if the Saar wished to become Prussian it could do so and he thought his Colleagues would not press their objection here.

The next point, and every one of his Colleagues had made it, referred to compensation. All thought that more had been asked for than Germany could pay. They had pointed out that the scheme was indefinite and no figure had been fixed. He himself had two alternative suggestions on this subject which he would elaborate later, if desired, but he would rather have them examined by Experts before they were discussed in detail by the Council.

The next question raised had been that of the army of occupation. To this his Colleagues would not agree. They urged that when the German army was reduced to a strength of 100,000 men it was ridiculous to maintain an army of occupation of 200,000 men on the Rhine. They represented that it was only a method of quartering the French army on Germany and making Germany pay the cost. It had been pointed out that Germany would not constitute a danger to France for 30 years or even 50 years; certainly not in 15 years. There was something to be said for Marshal Foch’s view that the Rhine should become the frontier of France, although personally he could not agree to it, but there was nothing to be said for the 15 years’ occupation. British military opinion coincided with that of all his Colleagues in that respect. It would cost 100 millions a year if the burden were placed on the German Exchequer and the result of this would be that there would be nothing left for compensation. He then referred to the report by Lord Robert Cecil, M. Loucheur, Mr. Norman Davis and other experts, on a scheme of credit for Europe from which he drew the inference that for the first year or two, Germany would have as much as she could do to pay for her own maintenance. Hence it was reasonable to infer that for a time the army of occupation would cost every penny that Germany could spare. Further, it would be a constant cause of friction. Experience had shown that an army could not be quartered in a foreign country after a war without this result. His Colleagues therefore said they could not see their way to authorize the British Delegates to sign unless there was some modification of this part of the Treaty, nor would they allow the British army to be used for any advance to enforce the Treaty unless the modifications were made. They felt that they could not put this burden on Germany and at the same time deprive the Allies of every penny of compensation. The advice of the British military authorities was that two years was the utmost limit of time for the occupation.

Another point arose in connection with the League of Nations. His Colleagues thought that some indication ought to be given that if Germany showed a disposition to carry out the Peace terms, they should be allowed to enter the League of Nations as soon as possible. They did not urge that this should be done immediately, but that hope should be held out of their being allowed to come in within a year or two. His Colleagues had been unanimous on this point. They had advised that public opinion in Great Britain was a little shaken by the German comments on the Peace terms and found from Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter that the Germans were prepared to go a good way to meet the Allies.

A final point was that there were multitudes of small matters in the Treaty that gave the impression that Germany was being tied up in many different directions. These pin-pricks had been held by his Colleagues to produce a very serious cumulative effect.

To sum up, the main points on which his Colleagues pressed for a change referred to the Eastern front, Reparation, the army of occupation, the League of Nations and the pin-pricks. He had felt that he ought at once to communicate this information to his Colleagues on the Council.

President Wilson says that the objections raised to the Peace Treaty are of such importance that he would ask that instead of holding a Meeting on the following morning, he should be free so as to be able to consult the American group of Plenipotentiaries and Experts.

M Clemenceau says that he would like to do the same thing.

President Wilson says he would begin by asking the opinion of his Colleagues, without expressing any view in order not to bias them.

Mr Lloyd George says that his Colleagues had disliked the Saar Valley scheme, but he had defended it. He and Mr Balfour had taken a defensive attitude and his Colleagues had been the critics.

President Wilson says he thinks the Saar Valley scheme is sound, he asks Mr Lloyd George for the loan of his ethnographic map of Poland, a request which is granted.

M Clemenceau says he wishes to thank Mr Lloyd George for his frank statement of the position. It is an extremely grave situation. Indeed it could not be more grave. Just as Mr Lloyd George had considered current opinion in his own country, so he has to consider the current opinion here in France. In England the view seemed to prevail that the easiest way to finish the war is by making concessions. In France the contrary view is held that it is best to act firmly. The French people, unfortunately, know the Germans very intimately and they believe that the more concessions we make, the more the Germans will demand. What he fears is that by making concessions, a road will be taken which will lead to Peace through negotiations over an incalculable number not of weeks but of months. With these preliminary remarks, he would make a few observations on each of the questions raised.

In regard to Poland he does not say that there might not be desirable rectifications of the frontier. It is possible that some alterations might be made. He will observe, however, that sometimes it is not possible to follow purely ethnographical lines, as President Wilson had himself pointed out in the case of Klagenfürt. When we speak of establishing Poland, it must be remembered this was not done merely to redress one of the greatest wrongs in history. It was desired to create a barrier between Germany and Russia. He would emphasize this by referring to the statement attributed to Erzberger and reproduced in the Paris edition of the Chicago Tribune. He was alleged to have said that the principal aim of Germany would be to weaken Poland. If Poland were weak, she would be at the mercy of Germany. If she were strong she would provide a barrier between Germany and Russia. If Poland fell to Germany, the Allies would have lost the war. Germany would be stronger than ever and would be able to renew the advance of 1914, and as Erzberger had put it would “resume her march on Paris”. Without taking this statement too seriously, it should not be forgotten that if Germany were to colonize Russia, the war would be lost and not won.

In regard to the Saar he will make no comment as he understands that Mr Lloyd George’s Colleagues did not press that point.

In regard to compensation, France is convinced that Germany is not being asked to pay as much as she ought. (Mr Lloyd George says that this view had been expressed in England also.) As France had suffered most in the war, having been overrun by the enemy, so she demanded more from Germany. The general view in France was that he himself had not done enough. Moreover this was by no means what was said by those holding extreme opinions but by quite moderate men. M Ribot had made some such observation in his recent speech. He himself believed that the proposals made in the Treaty were reasonable but he had the whole opinion of France against him. Consequently, it would be impossible for him to recede still further. (Mr Lloyd George interjects that he does not wish to recede though he had alternative proposals to make.) If Mr Lloyd George could show him a better method he would be glad to examine it together. Public opinion in each country takes a different note. Mr Lloyd George had spoken of British public opinion. This of course said nothing about the Colonies or about the Naval proposals. Naturally it was satisfied in these respects. (Mr Lloyd George interjects that he had not spoken about the Colonies. If France is willing to give up Colonies so is Great Britain.)

The question of occupation was the most difficult and painful. He had been struggling from day to day with military men who had all sorts of proposals to make. One day when the controversy was finished he could show his Colleagues a remarkable collection of documents on the subject. Here in France he is accused of making too great concessions. The agreement in regard to reparations is one matter in which he is said to have yielded too readily. The burden of the cost of the Army of Occupation must be ascertained. He would be upset if the result should prove unfavorable to the just claims of Great Britain or any other ally. Another question was as to whether the Army of Occupation was necessary. He thought that this question had not been properly put by Mr. Lloyd George’s colleagues. He recognizes that Germany ias not an immediate menace to France. But Germany would sign the Treaty with every intention of not carrying it out. Evasions would be made first on one point and then on another. The whole Treaty would go by the board if there were not some guarantees such as were provided by the occupation. Consequently he could not agree to there being no troops on the Rhine.

His policy, as he had declared in the Chamber was to keep a perfect entente with Great Britain and the United States of America. He saw the inconveniences of this policy. He recognized the immense distance of water which separated the United States from France and he recognized the growth of the British Empire. Nevertheless it is his policy to stand to the Entente. For this he had been strongly attacked. If he were obliged to retire from office, his colleagues would find themselves met by a much stronger opposition. The best course to be taken was to discuss these matters and try and reduce their differences to a minimum. They should consider the facts and only facts. But if in the end there should remain some points on which there was an irreducible chasm between their views he did not see how they were to act, with the Germans waiting at Versailles.

Mr Lloyd George says he would like to offer a few remarks on what M Clemenceau had said. Preoccupations in England had been much the same as in France. The only trouble which he had had in England had been in regard to compensation. He had had no trouble about the Colonies. There had been a little difference about ships and there must be no surprise about this, when it was remembered how many ships had been lost by Great Britain. With regard to Colonies, however, he had read scarcely a speech or a newspaper article in the United Kingdom, though of course some of the Dominions had an interest in particular colonies. If Germany were to say, “We will sign if you will give us a mandate to our colonies”, he would be prepared to give up German East Africa on condition that France would give up the Cameroons. The main British concern, however, at present, was in regard to the occupation of the Rhine. His colleagues had felt that from the moment when a guarantee had been given to France that if they were attacked by the Germans, Great Britain would go to their support, there should have been no question of occupation.

M Clemenceau says he hopes Mr Lloyd George will not begin the whole matter again. The situation is very grave.

Mr Lloyd George says he does not in the least wish to minimize the gravity of the circumstances, but he has perfectly clear instructions as to the line he is to take. Those instructions are in his hand, and in writing. He feels he ought to speak quite frankly. His colleagues believe that it would be a real danger to the peace of Europe to have a great French Army on the Rhine. Occupation by a foreign Power is always dangerous, but is doubly so in the case of peoples who had hated one another for centuries. The result might be an incident which would necessitate Great Britain coming to the assistance of France. If M Clemenceau and his Cabinet come to the conclusion that they cannot meet the British Government on that point, he would have no alternative but to go home and put the whole matter before his Parliament. He had to admit that he ought to have contested this point before. He had never much liked it, and neither had Mr Balfour. But he had not quite realized the strength of the feeling of his colleagues about it. Although they had not put the matter quite so bluntly, the line they had taken up had been that France ought to have been given the alternative between the occupation of the Rhine and the guarantee of her territory. He himself quite agreed in this. We ought to have said to France “You are entitled to tell us whether you would prefer to occupy the Rhine or to have our guarantee.” He believed British opinion on this was unanimous. To show how he had misunderstood the strength of his colleagues’ views on this he mentions that before they came to Paris he had reckoned how he expected that they would be divided. Some of his colleagues, he had anticipated, would take a very strong view in one direction, and others, possibly, in another. As a matter of fact, they had all been agreed on this point. Mr Hughes, whom no-one could suspect of sympathies towards the Germans, had asked how he had ever agreed to this Treaty.

M Clemenceau says that he owes it to Mr Lloyd George to be as frank as he can on this point. It Is impossible for him to meet his views. Mr Lloyd George says that if they cannot reach an agreement he must go back to his parliament. He himself is in exactly the same case. He is quite willing to resign his position if he is an obstacle to peace, but it is not good either for him or for Mr Lloyd George to go to their Parliaments on such a matter. He will not conceal his difficulties. He has to struggle continuously against mighty forces in the Parliament and Press, etc. Nevertheless, he did not feel any recrimination against Mr Lloyd George.

Mr Lloyd George says that it was the same on his part. He has no reproaches of any sort or kind to make.

President Wilson asks if Mr Lloyd George could give the details of his proposals for reparation.

Mr Lloyd George says he stands by the main lines of the demands made in the Treaty. He will not cut out a single one of the categories of reparation, and so he has informed his colleagues. He thinks, however, that there is something in the contention that Germany should not be presented with an unknown liability. The difficulty is that they do not know what they have to pay. If the scheme is indefinite, it is equally so for France. If they suffer from this, why should France also suffer?

His first alternative suggestion is to take a contract from Germany to make restoration within a certain time or else to pay. Guarantees for proper execution of the contract would have to be provided. Outside restoration every item could, he believed, be fixed, for example, pensions, ships, etc. He would fix a definite sum for all these, and beyond it allow Germany to take a contract for restoration.

The second alternative is not to say to Germany “Sign the Treaty” but to give her three months within which she can make a definite offer of a figure. We would tell her that the offer in the Treaty was inadequate. The figure of five thousand million Pounds sterling was really only equivalent to two thousand million sterling when the dates of payment and the fact that no interest was to be provided were taken into account. If at the end of three months Germany cannot give a figure, then the Treaty would stand.

In conclusion, he wants to tell M Clemenceau that what he had said was not in any way intended as a kind of menace.

M Clemenceau says he recognizes this, and that he would much rather know the full truth.

(It is agreed that no meeting should be held on the following morning, so that the Heads of States might be free to consult their own Delegations, but that a meeting of the Council should be held at 16:00, when the following subjects would be considered in connection with the German remarks on the Peace Treaty:

Poland

Reparations

League of Nations.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify this to S Orlando.)

Jimbuna

06-03-19, 10:48 AM

3rd June 1919

Aftermath of War

Austrian Peace Terms published.

Mr. Asquith answers Lord French on the shells question.

British reinforcements reach Archangel.

Chinese students at Peking University protest against the Versailles Treaty while police keep a close eye.
https://i.imgur.com/0kPorkp.png

Anarchist Luigi Galleani and his followers send eight mail bombs to several politicians across the United States. None of the targets are killed, but one watchman and one of the bombers are killed.
https://i.imgur.com/fLNI35A.jpg

Sailor Steve

06-03-19, 03:37 PM

Tuesday, June 3, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon's Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 15:00

Meeting of Foreign Ministers

M Pichon says that the meeting has been called to resume the examination of the revision of the Treaties of 1839. At the end of the previous meeting the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs had declared that he would be in a position to throw further light on the intentions of his Government regarding this question. The best thing therefore, is to ask Mr Van Karnebeek to speak.

Mr Van Karnebeek says that the meeting will remember that he had asked his Belgian colleague at the end of the last meeting to communicate to him the requests of the Belgian Government. He had since become cognizant of the statements made by M Hymans in the two previous meetings, and he had been able to form an opinion of the ideas inspiring the proposals of the Belgian Government. He does not intend to enter into the details of the question or repeat what he had said on a previous occasion. From one point of view, however, he feels that he ought to reiterate the declaration already made regarding the question of the territorial status quo of Holland. As would be remembered he had declared that the Government of the Netherlands could not allow any modification of this status, and could engage in no negotiations regarding territorial modification. It follows that he is obliged to exclude from discussion some of the Belgian proposals tending, either upon grounds of defense or, for economic reasons, to withdraw certain territories from Dutch sovereignty in order to transfer them to Belgian sovereignty. He will not press this matter any further, but he thinks it necessary, in a few words, to recall the views of the Dutch Government on the question.

His Belgian colleague will allow him to call attention to point “C” relating to the management by Belgium of the Locks regulating the flow of water in Flanders. This matter is regulated according to the Treaty of 1843, but as the system is not fully satisfactory, a Commission had been instituted to deal with the question. The labors of this Commission had been interrupted in 1914 by the war. If Belgium has any further requests to make on this subject, he is glad to state that the Netherlands Government will willingly take cognizance of them, and examine them with the utmost goodwill.

The second question is that of the grievances of the Belgian fishermen at Bouchante. This problem, if it might be called a problem, results from the damming of the waters of Dragmund. The Dutch Government had begun the construction of a new Port and of a new canal, both of which would shortly be completed, and as a result, the fishermen would receive satisfaction and would be better off than before. If other difficulties arise, the Belgian Government need only communicate them to the Dutch Government, and the latter will immediately examine them with the wish to find a satisfactory solution.

Thirdly, his Belgian colleague had mentioned the canal from Antwerp to Moerdijk. The Meeting would know that there is a line of communication between Moerdijk and Antwerp, which is reputed to be better than in former days. The Belgian Delegation had now put forward the idea that another line of communication ought to be made. The Dutch Government has not as yet received the reasons which might militate in favour of this change, but he is prepared to renew the same declaration, and to assure the Belgian Government that any communications made by them to the Dutch Government would be studied by the latter very willingly with the object of finding a common settlement of the question.

There is also the question of the Dam of Baerle-duc. This is a very simple question, and is in process of settlement.

Finally, there is the question of communication between the Rhine, the Meuse and the Scheldt. He will again make the declaration made on a previous occasion, namely, that the Netherlands Government is disposed to enter into conversations with the Belgian Government regarding the latter’s desiderata. He would like to pause for a moment over the question of the Scheldt. It has been discussed on the previous occasion. His Belgian colleague had had certain grievances against the existing system. He, himself, had endeavored to show from his point of view that the application of the existing regulation should not give rise to any complaint on the part of the Belgian Government. He thinks it is fair to say that the system established by the Powers has not hampered the prosperity of Belgium. Nevertheless, in a spirit of conciliation he would ask M Hymans the following question:

“Could not Belgium and Holland come to an agreement on the question of extending the already existing system of cooperation from the matters to which it applied to other matters?”

This might be a means of satisfying Belgium. The system of cooperation he refers to applies to the management of buoys, piloting and preservation of channels, all of which were regulated by a mixed Commission. He thinks perhaps this system of cooperation might be extended to yet other interests even administratively in such a way as to afford Belgium the satisfaction she desired regarding guarantees of the navigability of the stream. He wishes to submit this idea to his Belgian colleague.

Such, in a few words, is the declaration he wishes to make regarding the desires formulated by the Belgian Government. M Hymans will not fail to observe that he is animated by the same spirit as at the first and second Meetings of the Council. He had previously said that he had not come to make matters more difficult, but to make them easier, and to see whether and to what extent Belgian desires could be met. He is glad to believe he has been able to open to his Belgian colleague an avenue of progress, and he thinks that there is now a basis for conversations between Belgium and Holland. If he recollects aright, during the last discussion he and his Belgian colleague had not been in agreement regarding the method to be followed in dealing with this question. He would like to add a few words on this subject. He had said on the previous day that the choice of the method should be governed by the consideration of bringing about the utmost mutual confidence between the two countries. It is clear that if Belgium and Holland wish to achieve new arrangements, these arrangements should be based on reciprocal good will. He need hardly remind M Hymans that the Netherlands are under no obligation in this respect, and that no change can be imposed on Holland. Nevertheless, the country wishes to reach agreement with Belgium in a spirit of cordiality which would itself contain guarantees for the future of both countries.

His impression is that Belgium, in this manner, would find a welcoming attitude, if she wishes to consult with the Dutch Government. He wishes to speak frankly. His impression is that the questions to be raised, will present themselves in a different form, if, first of all, the two Powers concerned are called upon to examine them in concert. Belgium desires certain changes. These changes, in a large measure, depended on the good will of Holland. He will ask his Belgian colleague to consider what conditions will incline Holland to be most yielding. Does he not think that it would be by adopting the method he recommends, namely, that Holland and Belgium should meet, face to face, and realize together the necessity for both to go forward harmoniously in the future?

He has a few more observations to make regarding the question of method. He would like to remind M Hymans of all the questions, which, since 1839, had been directly transacted between Holland and Belgium. There are a considerable number of Treaties to which he might allude. Some of these agreements relate to questions dealt with in the Treaty of 1839, others have a more extended scope. This shows that many of the Belgian desiderata could be transacted directly between the Government at Brussels and the Government of the Netherlands. He would indicate in a few words the principal Treaties in question.

Treaty of November 5th, 1842, supplementary to and explanatory of Treaty of April 19th, 1839.

Treaty of May 20th, 1843, laying down several regulations regarding navigation and fisheries.

Delimitation Treaty of August 8th, 1843.

Treaty of July 12th, 1845 regarding the creation of a lateral canal to the Meuse between the towns of Liege and Maastricht.

Treaty of May 12th, 1863, regarding the redemption of the toll on the Scheldt.

Treaty of May 12th, 1863, regulating the right of taking water from the Meuse.

Treaty of September 19th, 1863, relating to pilotage on the Scheldt.

Treaty of March 31st, 1866, providing for the establishment of a series of new lights on the Scheldt, and at its mouth, as well as further Treaties relating to pilotage, lighting and buoying of the Scheldt.

Treaty of January 11th, 1873, modifying Treaty of 12th May, 1863, above mentioned.

Treaty of January 13th, 1873, providing for the passage of a line of railway across Limburg.

Treaty of May 24th, 1872, regarding the damming of the Zwin.

Treaty of October 31st, 1879, regarding improvements in the Canal from Ghent to Terneuzen.

Treaty of April 7th, 1886, regulating the conditions of construction and upkeep of bridge on the Meuse at Maeseyk.

Treaty of June 29th, 1895, regarding improvements in Canal from Ghent to Terneuzen.

Treaty of March 8th, 1902, modifying Treaty regarding improvements in the Canal from Ghent to Terneuzen.

He has recalled these Treaties to show that the subjects with which the meeting was concerned, relating to Canals, means of communication and lights, had been settled in the past by direct agreements between Belgium and Holland, and not by international regulations. He wishes to draw the attention of the meeting to this, because if Holland and Belgium had, in a cordial spirit, found the solution to all these problems, he could not see why such questions as, the outflow of water from Flanders, as that of the grievances of the Belgian fishermen, of communication between Limburg and the Rhine, of the Canal from Moerdijk to the Meuse, why all these questions should be regarded as of an international character.

His impression is that all these Treaties should serve to indicate the method that should be followed, and that if the same method is adopted, it would lead to the discovery of the means whereby the Netherlands could satisfy Belgium on all these questions.

His Belgian colleague, however, had suggested that these subjects should be submitted to a Commission composed of representatives of the Allied Powers and of Belgium and Holland. On his side, he would like to insist on the idea elaborated above, namely, that the Belgian and Dutch Governments be asked to begin the examination of these questions directly. These two Governments might nominate a mixed Commission of Dutch and Belgian representatives, who would study the problems and make a report. If, after their examination, any points remain outstanding, he thinks that the new international organ lately created could take cognizance of the matter and find a suitable solution. He refers to the League of Nations. He presses strongly for another method than that suggested by M Hymans, because he had the impression that the question was of great importance. Holland had come to meet Belgium as Belgium had asked for certain changes. Holland said to Belgium, “Tell us what you wish, we are ready to concert with you and see what can be done.” In order to obtain success and a happy result, he thinks the procedure indicated by him should be followed, and he begs to urge his Belgian colleague to adopt it. Present conditions must not be lost sight of. It is not a question only of finding means to arrange certain difficulties between Holland and Belgium, but of harmonizing the whole relations of the two countries.

His Belgian colleague, the other day, recalled the trials through which Belgium had passed. As representative of the Netherlands, he wishes to say that his country had proved to the Belgians that it had not been indifferent to their trouble. At the beginning of the War, the Dutch had opened their frontiers and their doors to the Belgians. They had been happy to do so, and the Belgians had been their guests.

Subsequently to this, to speak frankly, as he thinks he should before a meeting which was to settle questions between Belgium and Holland, a certain ill-will has been shown in Belgium against the Dutch people, which has been more or less affected thereby. It seems to him therefore, that the most important work to be accomplished is to dissipate this feeling, which might estrange and had estranged the Belgian from the Dutch people. He would, therefore, repeat with emphasis that the best means of obtaining this result, was to put the representatives of the two peoples face to face, in order that they should seek means of agreement on these various questions.

M Hymans says that the statement made by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs has been most friendly and courteous in tone; but he cannot conceal that it had disappointed him very deeply. No doubt Mr Van Karnebeek had declared himself ready to give benevolent attention to certain grievances, which though important were in the whole problem insignificant. There is for instance the affair of the fishermen, and that of the locks for the Flanders streams. Mr Van Karnebeek had also suggested certain proposals relating to an extension of the system of co-operation. The formula is vague, and it is difficult without further study to see how far it would reach. He is not, therefore, able to express an opinion regarding this proposal, which in any case would have to be submitted to the examination of technical experts. His Dutch colleague has produced on him the impression that he has excluded from the revision of the Treaty all territorial and military questions. In effect he maintains the regime of the 1839 treaties, of which the Belgian Delegation requires the revision. Now the great Powers, after an impartial examination of the problem, have come to the conclusion that revision is necessary, and that it affected all of the clauses of the 1839 Treaty, inasmuch as the system brought about by that Treaty has diminished Belgium’s capacity for defense, and that it is necessary to amend the system in order to shelter Belgium and general peace from the risks of the future. This conclusion has in view the interest of Europe. This is a point he wishes to make clear. It is the system as a whole that is attacked, because it places Belgium in a state of dependence in regard to Holland, and hampers her capacity for defense. As he had previously observed, Holland was mistress of Belgium’s communications towards the sea and towards the East, and the defense of Belgium depends on decisions taken by the Dutch. M. Van Karnebeek has not said a word on this question. It does not appear to have struck him, but he must realize that this is the question which in the mind of Belgium takes precedence over all others. The state of Europe will be more or less unstable for a long time. Measures no doubt are being taken to ensure a prolonged peace. President Wilson had said that France’s frontiers were the frontiers of freedom. The Belgian frontier was a prolongation of this frontier. Belgium had been the field of battle of Europe for centuries. It is through Belgium that the coast was reaches, and it is through Belgium that France could be attacked. He recently had received an address from a Belgian town which said that it had been destroyed six times in the course of last century. It now requests that it be sheltered from a recurrence of such calamities. Belgium has taken military precautions, established a strongly trenched Camp round Antwerp and fortified the Meuse, believing that the town would not be taken or could at least resist for several months. This had been a mistake. As to the future, according to Belgian Military authorities, the line of the Scheldt cannot be defended unless the defense rests on the whole course of the stream. Further, the salient of Limburg must be blocked. This is a question of life or death for Belgium. Had Liege held out much longer, the Germans would have passed through Limburg. He is, therefore, right in saying that these two questions pass before all others, and that their solution is the solution of the whole problem. It is for this reason that in previous meetings he had formulated the following questions.

1) Can the line of the Meuse, which is the first defensive line of Belgium, be adequately held and defended according to the territorial status established by the Treaties of 1839 which, in particular, deliver to Holland the town of Maastricht (“Mosae trajectum”) through which, throughout the centuries German invasions have passed into Western Europe?

2) Can the line of the Scheldt, which is the principal defensive line of Belgium and is of great natural strength, be effectually held unless Belgium can establish her position on the whole length of the stream?

He asks that these questions be submitted for examination to the military experts. These questions concern Europe. This has been the view of the Supreme Council, seeing that in the text of its declaration, this had been explicitly recognised. If in the interest of Europe, it is also in the interest of Holland.

Mr Van Karnebeek has shown that there were close ties between the two nations. Like everyone, he had realized in the last war that the security of Holland depended on the security of Belgium. If Belgium had perished, Holland would have perished too. When, therefore, he speaks for the security of Belgium and for the security of Europe, he also speaks for the security of Holland. When he speaks of the interest of Europe, it follows he speaks of the interest of Holland also.

He has just observed that the Powers who examined the question of the revision of the Treaty of 1839, had considered that this revision should be made in the interest of general peace. He has laid stress on this as he has heard Mr Van Karnebeek say that Holland was under no obligation to take part in the revision. He thinks there is a moral obligation for Holland to take a share in promoting general European peace. This is an obligation to which all countries are liable, especially in relation to a neighbor.

The question is whether the problem he has drawn attention to should be settled directly between the two Powers, or according to his proposal submitted to a Commission, on which will be represented all the Powers who took part in this discussion. It seemed to him impossible to adopt a system of negotiations between the two only for it concerns a Treaty signed and guaranteed by several Powers, especially by France and England.

These Treaties determine questions which are of interest to the whole of Europe and the Council has considered that it is a question of European interest.

These Treaties are the collective work of Europe in 1839. Their revision must also be the collective work of the Powers and not only the work of Holland and Belgium. The latter course would not be logical and he asks what advantage there could be in depriving themselves of the assistance of competent men who had studied the question. How, further, can such a course assist in the establishment of closer relations between Holland and Belgium which were just as much desired by him as by Mr Van Karnebeek?

He is therefore anxious that this question should be looked into by representatives of all countries interested in the revision of the Treaties of 1839. He does not see anything that could in the slightest degree upset his Dutch Colleague or could arouse the susceptibilities of the Dutch Government. They would not be a Court of Judges who would decide the question, but representatives of the Powers who would give their opinion. Mr Van Karnebeek’s opinion, in which he agrees, is that the chief question is to re-establish a feeling of confidence between the two countries. It appears to him that nothing could do more to obtain such a result than a meeting in an Inter-Allied Commission. What could it matter that in such Commissions there are Representatives of other nations? It is just by the exchange of views between members that the Commission would clear the matter up.

Two questions concerning the security and defense of Belgium had been raised and it was on the opinion that was come to about these questions that the solution would depend. He himself does not put forward a solution because he does not wish to impose one and because the solution of the questions should depend on the answer which would be made to the two questions of security and national defense which he had suggested.

This is the point on which he wishes to close. He thinks that the field of revision can never be limited and he shares that belief with the Allied and Associated Powers, for on this point he does no more than follow the conclusions that the Supreme Council has adopted. The Council has said that the 3 Treaties of 1839 in all their Clauses forms an indivisible whole and that the Belgian-Dutch Treaty could not be separated from the other two. It has further said that these Treaties ought to be revised; it had decided moreover that the territorial and riverine clauses had been a cause of real prejudice to Belgium and had as a conclusion said that these Treaties should be revised.

He asks therefore that the problem should be investigated as a whole, that nothing should be excluded, nothing prejudged and that in good faith a solution should be sought which might ensure the safety of Belgium, and he considered that this investigation should be made by the Representatives of all the Powers.

He does not think that there is anything that could upset Holland or that could hinder her from negotiations with Belgium. That in his opinion is the most certain and most rapid method to be followed, and he earnestly begs his colleague that Holland should agree to such a course.

Mr Van Karnebeek asks leave to make a few remarks. He says that M Hymans had remarked that Holland does not feel bound to assist in the revision of the Treaties of 1839 which Belgium had asked for. This however is not quite the case.

M Hymans said that he had only replied to an expression that Mr Van Karnebeek had used. Mr Van Karnebeek had said that Holland had no obligation, and he had remarked that there is a moral obligation.

M Van Karnebeek said that he offered no criticism on this point; he had come to the Meeting full of the desire to find out how far an agreement with Belgium could be arrived at, but he felt that there was one thing that separated him and M Hymans. That was, the interpretation to be given to the expression “Revision of the Treaties of 1839”. M Hymans had spoken as if it was a question of entirely refashioning the separation between Holland and Belgium.

It is hardly necessary for him to point out that the Low Countries could never accept such a point of view. The Dutch Government could never entertain the idea of the disposal of the rights of Holland in order to make a new arrangement. At their first two meetings and even to-day he abstained from entering into details of history or into details of a juridical kind; but he wishes to recall a few facts so that there might be no mistakes as to the conception of the revision of these Treaties.

In 1839 Europe did not in any way whatever dispose of the rights or the goods of the Low Countries. By the Treaties of 1839 the work of 1814 and 1815 was undone; that work had been the union of the Austrian Low Countries to Holland. It was not a durable work and it needed to be undone, but there was never any intention in 1839, nor even in 1814 and 1815, to touch the secular rights of Holland. Anybody who had studied the protocols of 1830 and 1831 and of 1839 must be convinced that there could be no doubt about this point; but what M Hymans asked for was an entire reconstruction of the Treaties of 1839. In such a way he would refashion the separation between Belgium and Holland in an entirely different way to that done by the Treaties of 1839. M Hymans, however, must be aware that in 1839 they had adhered to the status quo of 1790, and that the idea of territorial modifications or of any disposal of the goods and rights of Holland was expressly rejected by the Conference of London. Could it be that any such action should be held of no value and that Holland might find herself in 1919 in a worse situation than that in which she was in 1830 or in 1839?

He had come to the Meeting, as he had already said, to assist in all necessary modifications in the Treaty of 1839. If it is necessary to modify these Treaties, Holland is ready to look into the question and she is ready to see what could be done in order to satisfy Belgium, but to ask that such arrangements should be made at Holland’s expense was quite another question. That was the point of view and the situation which as a member of the Netherlands Government he could never accept.

M Hymans in his speech had drawn attention to the importance of distinguishing between military and economic questions. He himself had thought that the proposal he had made was such as to be worthy of the attention of his Belgian colleague. The latter, however, had said that this proposal had seemed to him somewhat vague, and that he could express no opinion about it, but he had nevertheless expatiated on military questions. He had said that it was the military question which dominated the whole discussion. He himself wishes to remark that, as far as questions of national defense are concerned, there might well be differences of opinion and that there would no doubt be found some military authorities who would not share the views which M Hymans had expressed on the question of Limburg. He does not, however, insist upon that point.

The question, however, which concerns them, is what method is to be adopted for the revision of the Treaties of 1839. If Belgium wishes to enter into explanations with Holland on military questions that is a matter which might be entertained, but he wished to ask M Hymans, seeing that such questions concerned the defense of Holland, whether he could imagine or even expect, that Holland would submit her system of defense to an international Commission.

M Hymans says that he has only spoken of the question of Belgian defense.

Mr Van Karnebeek maintains that it would be very difficult to separate entirely the Belgian plans of defense from those of Holland, if the question is put in the form in which M Hymans put it. There cannot be any doubt that in such a case the Low Countries will be forced to expose their system of defense before the international Commission. If Belgium wishes to arrive at an explanation with Holland, there will be no difficulty, but it is quite impossible to submit such questions to an international Commission; that alone is an argument against the method suggested by M Hymans. His Belgian colleague had also said that the Treaties of 1839 were one collective Treaty, and that they concerned not only Belgium and Holland, but several Powers as well, and for that reason their revision cannot be entrusted to Belgium and Holland alone. That is an interpretation which might be discussed from the juridical point of view, but he refrains from doing so. He is content to ask why all these questions which from 1839 up to the present day have been the subject of exchanges of views and negotiations between Belgium and Holland, should not still be settled directly between the two Governments.

M Hymans said that such negotiations had been carried out under the regime whose revision they were now demanding.

Mr Van Karnebeek says that many questions which were brought forward today by the Belgian Government have already been the subject of an exchange of views before the war with the Dutch Government. For instance, that had been the case with the question of communications between the Meuse and the Rhine, which had been reserved in the Treaty of Peace. There had even been a declaration made on this subject which had certainly not been unfavorable to Belgium. No one had ever thought that this question should be decided only by an international Commission. The same had also been the case with the question of a lateral canal from Maastricht to the Meuse; no one could imagine that that was a question of an international character, and it was so also with many other demands of the Belgian Government which had already been the subject of negotiations between the Cabinets of Brussels and the Hague.

Now it is claimed that because it is a question of the revision of the Treaties of 1839 all these questions must have an international character. There seems to him no foundation for such an argument. The result would be to create such a situation that in the future every demand put forward by Belgium might become an international question. He sees no reason for such a point of view.

He would speak frankly. He does not wish anyone to gather the impression that Holland wishes to keep away the other Powers; that is not the case. The fact that he is there is sufficient to prove that they are not animated by such a feeling. It is very necessary that such a result should be arrived at, but in order that such a result should be arrived at it is necessary he speaks frankly, to avoid in his country any appearance of international influence. He thinks that if the procedure suggested by M Hymans is adopted, Holland would be very much on her guard and would not be as much disposed as she had been to meet the wishes of Belgium.

If, however, it is agreed that Belgium and Holland should settle the matter between them, there would be much less hesitation, if indeed there were any; that is the psychological point on which he feels bound to insist. It is important that the path they follow should lead to an improvement of Belgian-Dutch relations, and to the end which he had suggested.

He wishes to ask his Belgian colleague whether he thinks his country could obtain more by his own methods or by the one which he, the speaker, had suggested. His own proposal was a logical one. Holland is holding out her hand towards Belgium - would Belgium refuse that hand?, would his Belgian colleague take the responsibility of so doing? He hopes that is not the case. He hoped, indeed, M Hymans would put his hand into the one which he, as a member of the Dutch Government, offers. That is the way in which business could be done, and in which the two Governments could walk in perfect harmony. It is not for technical reasons that he does not share the opinion of his Belgian colleague, but for the serious reasons which he had expounded.

He wishes he could agree with M Hymans. He is convinced that the path which the latter had pointed out would not lead them in the direction in which they wished to go. He asks M Hymans once more to reflect, for he is aware of his conciliatory attitude. In the name of Holland he offers him his hand, a hand which must not be refused. His own was a logical proceeding. Had anyone ever seen questions which concerned the two States dealt with outside both States by an international commission?

Had M Hymans taken into consideration the unfortunate impression which had been produced in February last by the answer given by the Belgian Government to the request of the Dutch Government? It is known that Belgium had put before the Peace Conference certain questions which might be of interest to Holland and that the Dutch had asked the Belgian Government to enlighten them on the subject of these demands. The answer of the Brussels Cabinet had been that they would learn later on. The impression produced by this answer in Holland had been deplorable.

He now points out to his Belgian colleague the path which they could follow, and he hopes that they might arrive at an agreement and walk in harmony.

M Pichon says they had before them two contradictory proposals. On the one hand, the proposal of the Foreign Minister of the Low Countries for the setting up of direct negotiations between Belgium and the Low Countries on the subject of the revision of the Treaties of 1839, and on the other hand, the proposal of the Foreign Minister of Belgium, asking that the Allied and Associated Powers should entrust to an International Commission the study of the conditions under which such a revision should take place. He asks whether the representatives of the Powers who had declared that they considered the revision of the Treaties of 1839 necessary thought that these two proposals should be discussed? If such is the opinion of the Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers he asks Mr Van Karnebeek to allow them to examine these two contradictory proposals, as they had been put before them; they would then inform him of the steps which they think it right to take after they have carefully studied the two proposals.

Mr Lansing takes the same view.

Mr Balfour says that he has no objection.

Baron Sonnino accepts the proposal.

M Pichon says that they will then look into the question and give an expression of their opinion on the two proposals put before them.

(The Meeting adjourns at 17:00)

Paris, June 3rd, 1919.

Sailor Steve

06-03-19, 08:22 PM

Tuesday, June 3, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. President Wilson suggests that the Council should begin by discussing Upper Silesia. The aspect that takes him most by surprise is that in the general financial clauses of the Treaty of Peace, provision had been made which permitted the Allied and Associated Powers to expropriate the rights of German nationals in their own territory, and use the funds so obtained to indemnify their own nationals for losses in German territory. For example, in the United States all German businesses he understands have been sequestrated, and under the Treaty they will be used to make good to citizens of the United States for losses incurred in Germany. Germany is by the Treaty bound to make good their losses to German nationals. As he understands the matter there will be a certain balance in the value of German property which forms a contribution to reparation. Under these general terms, which are intended originally to apply to belligerents, Poland as an Allied and Associated Power will be in a position to expropriate mines privately owned by Germans and other property in Silesia, and to make the German Government pay the German proprietors.

M Clemenceau says he believes the mines in Silesia are the property of the Crown.

Mr Lloyd George says his impression is the same, but they are leased to private persons.

President Wilson says that in that case Germany will have to make good to the German proprietors the leasehold value. He had not been conscious that the new States were empowered to do this, particularly as it has been provided elsewhere in the Treaty for payment by Poland for public buildings. The question seems to him to present a very serious aspect with regard to many of the industries in Silesia.

Mr Lloyd George points out that it is specially serious in Silesia which, unlike Alsace-Lorraine, had not been Polish territory for 800 years.

President Wilson suggests that the mistakes in the Treaty about frontiers between Germany and Poland can easily be corrected. Furthermore he would be in favour of exacting from Poland an arrangement by which Germany would get her coal on the same terms from the mines transferred to Polish territory as Poland could. Provision should also be made for the property of German nationals to be paid for by the Polish Government under some fair process of assessment.

Mr Lloyd George asks why the Germans should lose their property at all. About one-third of the population of Upper Silesia is German, amounting in all to some 600,000; consequently it would not be right for the Poles to confiscate the property of these people. He asks if the clauses for the protection of minorities would not also protect the German minority. If the mines were the property of the German Government, their value ought to go to the Reparation Fund.

President Wilson then draws attention to the German statement as to the effect of the loss of Coal in Silesia. If the facts are considered they will be found to differ from the generalities in the German letter. The places in which the coal is actually consumed would no longer be in Germany, since they are in Posen. Consequently the German contention is untrue.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that the German case on the Silesian coal is no case at all.

President Wilson urges that provision ought to be made for allowing Germany to get the coal on the same terms as the Poles.

He then draws attention to the ethnographical map which Mr Lloyd George had lent him on the previous day. He said that he had conferred on this subject with Mr Lord, the American expert.

In the Schneidemühl-Konitz region he is advised that the country consists principally of heath and marsh, and that the population was very sparse. Mr Lord agrees, however, that the map should be redrawn so as to place the railway in German territory.

Mr Lloyd George says that the population concerned numbered some 80,000.

President Wilson suggests that if this matter is put right, and if there is a rectification of the frontier in Guhrau-Militsch region, based on ethnographical considerations, the main difficulty would be got rid of. The remainder of the boundaries are drawn almost entirely on ethnographical considerations.

M Clemenceau asks on which side the railway is now.

President Wilson says it is on the Polish side, and the proposal is to transfer it to the German side of the boundary, since it joins two German regions. It only runs just inside the proposed frontier line.

Mr Lloyd George then draws attention to an area in the extreme North of Poland, which is entirely German in population, and ought to form part of Pomerania. He points out that the line has been drawn so as to include it in Poland, mainly in order to widen the corridor.

President Wilson agrees that that might be rectified.

Mr Lloyd George says that the most important point is Upper Silesia. After long consideration he does not believe that a plebiscite could be carried out until the German officials, as well as the German troops, have been withdrawn. The officials, however, will not leave unless that were expressly provided for in the Treaty.

President Wilson says that Mr Lord has informed him that the people in Upper Silesia are entirely dominated by a small number of magnates and capitalists, probably not exceeding 20 all together. Among them was Prince Henry of Pless. Mr Lord actually knows the names of these magnates, who practically own the whole Region. The people of this district have been practically feudal servants of the magnates from time immemorial. The experts do not believe that a free plebiscite is possible in these conditions.

Mr Lloyd George says that the answer to this is that the people had actually shown their views by a vote.

President Wilson says they had voted German.

Mr Lloyd George said this was not the case. In 1907 they had returned a majority of Polish members. In 1912 the numbers of German and Polish members had been equal. That is to say in 1907 when the Germans were still complete masters, there had been only three German deputies to five Polish. Our experts believe that Upper Silesia would vote Polish. Nevertheless they strongly advise a plebiscite on the ground that it would get rid of a German grievance.

President Wilson points out that the property owners would be playing for high stakes, and would use every possible influence. Every possible objection would be made by the German Delegation.

Mr Lloyd George asks who are the capitalists on the German Delegation.

President Wilson says there are none, but they are arguing the case of the German capitalists.

Mr Lloyd George points out that Upper Silesia has not been Polish for 800 years. There is no resemblance between the case of Upper Silesia and Alsace-Lorraine. It is proposed to tear something from Germany that had been in the same combination as the other States of the German Empire for 800 years. In these circumstances he considers that the people must have some voice.

President Wilson says he does not dispute the right of the people to have a voice, but he doubts whether it could in practice be carried out freely.

Mr Lloyd George considers that it would be necessary to occupy Upper Silesia temporarily. If there were any attempt at intimidation, the Allies would have to interfere. Every man should have the right to vote as he pleases. He himself has some experience of attempts to intimidate in elections, particularly in agricultural districts, but it had been overcome in Great Britain. The population of Silesia, however, is not mainly agricultural and is not likely to be intimidated.

President Wilson points out that the greater part of the region is agricultural.

Mr Lloyd George replies that the bulk of the population, however, are in the towns and industrial areas. An industrial population very much resents interference by employers.

President Wilson says that Mr Lloyd George speaks of England. The same is not the case elsewhere. Even in the United States of America there is a great deal of domination at elections by employers in the great industrial districts. He himself has done much to overcome it and would be disappointed if he does not succeed in doing so in the end.

Mr Lloyd George then quotes the figures for the election which had taken place in 1912 in Upper Silesia, this being a less favorable election from the Polish point of view than 1907. In 1912, 97,000 Polish votes had been cast against 82,000 other votes, and these latter included Socialists, for whom a good many Poles would vote. The figures show that talk of intimidation had no basis in fact. Even when there had been every possibility of intimidation, the Poles had cast more votes, and the capitalists did not seem to exercise much influence.

President Wilson points out that in the case under consideration, the vote would be to join their fellow-countrymen. If they did vote for Poland, the whole status of their principal men would be changed, and not always for the good of the population.

Mr Lloyd George says that his understanding of self-determination is that of the people themselves, and not that of experts like Mr Lord. He is simply standing by President Wilson’s Fourteen Points and fighting them through. He cannot accept the view that any experts could judge better than the people themselves. Why should there be a plebiscite in Allenstein, Schleswig, Klagenfurt, but not in Upper Silesia?

President Wilson says that if there is a chance of a free vote, he is all in favor of it. But it would be necessary to exclude both the German officials and the army.

Mr Lloyd George says that that was exactly the argument S Orlando had used in the case of Klagenfurt.

President Wilson says he cannot allow Mr Lloyd George to suggest that he himself was not in favor of self-determination. All he wants to be sure of is that it is a genuine self-determination. He is assured by his representatives at Versailles that there would be armed resistance to the Polish occupation of Silesia.

Mr Lloyd George agrees, but says the same would not apply to a plebiscite.

President Wilson asks whether Mr Lloyd George has considered the time and the arrangements.

Mr Lloyd George says they would be the same as for Allenstein. In order to prevent intimidation in Allenstein, he reminds his colleagues that half a dozen conditions had been drawn up. Eventually it had been decided not to embody them in the Peace Treaty, but to leave it to the League of Nations Commission to lay down the conditions.

President Wilson says he assumed that the Germans would be bound by the Treaty to accept the conditions laid down by the Commission.

Mr Lloyd George says he is inclined to introduce a provision for occupation by United States troops.

President Wilson asks how Mr Lloyd George would escape the argument that the Germans would use that the Allied troops were simply being used to bring about the result their Governments desired.

Mr Lloyd George says the Germans would have to trust the Allies. His plan would be to remove both German and Polish troops and put in sufficient Allied troops to police the country.

President Wilson says that in the case of Allenstein, the idea had not been to send in the Allied troops, but to keep them in the vicinity. He feels there is a good deal of danger in Mr Lloyd George’s plan. The main object is to get a fair plebiscite.

Mr Lloyd George says that the impression he derived from many quarters - Berlin, Cologne, and what he heard from Versailles, is that Silesia is the point to which the Germans attached most importance. He himself wants to avoid the necessity of occupying Berlin. He is afraid of a repetition of the Moscow campaign, namely, an easy march and, on arrival, to find no-one with whom to treat.

President Wilson says that he is less concerned with the question of whether Germany will or will not sign than with ensuring that the arrangements in the Treaty of Peace are sound and just. He is not moved by the argument that the Germans will not sign unless it can be shown by them that the Allied and Associated Powers had not adhered to the principles on which they had agreed to make Peace.

Mr Lloyd George says that his view of the Peace Treaty is that it is the best we can do on an ex-parte hearing, for it must be admitted that the draft Treaty is entirely ex-parte. He thinks that now that the Germans have made their observations, the British Delegation is entitled to see how far they had made out a case, and how far it ought to be met. President Wilson himself admits that the Germans had made a case in regard to some districts. In regard to Silesia, the Germans said that for 800 years it had been associated with the political organisation of which the other States of Germany formed part. Under these circumstances, the British Delegation merely urged that the people should be allowed to decide it for themselves. They are ready that every possible precaution should be taken to avoid any interference by soldiers or officials. If, after this had been done, the Germans refuse to sign, then the British will be ready to march with their Allies as loyally as before, and to act as solidly with them as at any time in the war He is not in the least influenced by the arguments of pacifists, but by those of men who had supported him staunchly throughout the war and would still support him, provided they were satisfied that the Peace is a just one.

President Wilson suggests that perhaps he and Mr Lloyd George are not very far apart. His position is substantially the same as that of Mr Lloyd George. It would not be sound to yield merely because the Germans would not sign, and he is ready to make concessions where they could be shown to be in the interest of fairness. For example, in the matter of reparation, he is prepared to say not that it was not just that Germany should not make full reparation, but that if they could show that the present scheme could not be worked or would not operate fairly, it ought to be reconsidered.

Mr Lloyd George says that he is half way between the two positions postulated by President Wilson. He is ready to make any concession that is fair, particularly if it would give the Germans an inducement to sign. For example, even though a plebiscite would make no difference in the ultimate destination of Silesia, nevertheless, if it would enable the Germans to sign the Treaty, he would be in favour of it.

President Wilson says he has no objection to doing anything which would help the Germans to sign provided he was doing right.

Mr Lloyd George says he thinks there ought to be a plebiscite taken where any doubt arises. There dos seem to be a certain element of doubt in Upper Silesia.

President Wilson suggests that the best plan would be to appoint Commissioners to draw up the safeguards, and supervise the operation of the plebiscite.

M Clemenceau says he Is afraid that in order to avoid one difficulty we should only get into a greater one. He recognizes that theoretically a plebiscite is the only method that fits into the doctrine of the rights of people. The experience of the past, however, does not support the view that the free will of the people could be expressed under Germany. This might be the case where a plebiscite was theoretically suitable, but he takes the liberty to affirm that if British, French or United States troops are employed, the Germans will simply allege that pressure had been exercised to avoid a free vote. They would say that the vote had been dictated by the Allies. Then, in Peace, you would have most of the difficulties you had in war, and in some respects they would be graver than today. Mr Lloyd George says he does not want to have to march to Berlin. Neither does he. Neither had he wanted hundreds of thousands - indeed, millions - to be killed in the present war. But he had had to put up with that, and might have to put up with the other. It is difficult to say what are the views of the Polish population of Silesia. He believes the Poles are in the majority, and Mr Lloyd George says that this is incontestable. He does not know how they would vote: but, if Allied soldiers were present, the Germans would protest just as much as they would against the transfer of Silesia to Poland without a plebiscite. Hence, he thinks it would be better to stick to the Treaty of Peace as President Wilson had at first proposed. He is always ready to yield when he is convinced that a proposal was a fair one, in which case he instanced the Saar. Today we wish to know the ideas of the Poles. If an International Commission were employed to carry out the plebiscite, order would have to be assured, and for this troops would be necessary. When it is said that the German troops will be turned out, he - knowing the Germans as he does - feels absolutely certain that there would be fighting; there would be quarrels if there were not actual battles. Hence, he would take the liberty to suggest that it would be better to leave matters as they were.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that if there would be resistance to a plebiscite, there would even the more be resistance to transfer to Poland as proposed in the Treaty.

President Wilson then reads No. 13 of his Fourteen Points:

“An independent Polish State should be erected, which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.”

All that has to be established under this is that the population of Poland is indisputably Polish.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is exactly the challenge that the Germans made. They said that the population was not Polish in sentiment. Surely the clause just read did not mean that if the Poles preferred to remain under Germany, they would have to become Polish because they were of Polish race.

President Wilson says that we know the ethnographical facts, and there is no need to add a plebiscite, which was not imposed by the Fourteen Points.

Mr Lloyd George appeals to the principle of self-determination. Under the doctrine proposed by President Wilson, Alsace ought not to go to France, since its population was of German origin.

President Wilson points out that Alsace-Lorraine was expressly provided for in the Fourteen Points. In the cases of both Alsace-Lorraine and of Poland, there are specific Articles in the Fourteen Points to meet the special conditions, and the settlement is based on those rather than on general principles.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that before the Polish Commission met, the case of the transfer of Silesia to Poland had not been in people’s minds.

President Wilson says that it has been generally in his own mind. In Washington, he had seen Mr Paderewski and Mr Dmowski, and had asked for their views about Poland. As a preliminary, he had asked for an understanding that he and they meant the same thing by Poland. They had sent him maps and papers demanding very much more than Poland was now being given, but, when he spoke of territory that was unmistakably Polish, he included generally Upper Silesia, although it might not have been very prominently in his thoughts.

Mr Lloyd George says that he had thought mainly of the historical claim, and had not thought much of Upper Silesia.

President Wilson makes the proposal that an agreement should be exacted from Germany to accept a plebiscite under safeguards to be laid down by an International Commission. If the Germans would not accept this, then the offer would be withdrawn, and the Allied and Associated Powers would be free to take any decision they pleased. This would avoid M Clemenceau’s difficulty.

Mr Lloyd George says he does not think that the Germans would object if United States troops were used to occupy territory during the plebiscite, and he would like to add this.

President Wilson suggests that his proposal should be accepted, together with the small rectifications of the frontiers which had been suggested, that is to say, the alteration of the frontier so as to include the Guhrau-Militsch region in Germany; to bring the railway in the Schneidemühl-Konitz region to the German side of the frontier; and to transfer to Pomerania the German-inhabited region which had been allocated under the Treaty to Poland. Further, the Germans should be bound to accept a plebiscite in Upper Silesia, and to accept the conditions to be laid down by an Inter-Allied Commission.

Mr Lloyd George suggests to add “including the withdrawal of German troops and policing by Americans”.

M Clemenceau asked how many troops Mr Lloyd George contemplates.

Mr Lloyd George suggests about a division.

President Wilson says he would also suggest to include such safeguards of the property of German nationals in their area as was rendered necessary by the provisions of the Treaty.

Mr Lloyd George asks for the inclusion of a guarantee that Germany should be able to purchase coal in any region that might be transferred on the same terms as Poland.

President Wilson says that with these provisions he does not think that the Germans would have any case for objecting.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is requested to draft a reference to an Expert Committee on the above lines.)

2. President Wilson says that his position is that he sees no injustice in imposing an obligation for complete reparation on Germany. But he thinks it is agreed that it is past hoping for that Germany could, in any time, make complete reparation. Ought we not therefore to instruct our advisers to re-study the method? The idea in the Treaty had been to leave the bill of the total amount undecided for two years, and to set up the Reparations Commission, first, to decide on the amount, and then, to supervise the process and means by which Germany would make good. Germany’s objection was that this constituted an undefined obligation, and that the whole industrial life of Germany would be at the disposal of the Commission, which could prescribe this or that method of payment. In short, it would put the whole economic life of Germany at the disposal of a Commission formed from outside nations.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that the Germans had overstated the case.

President Wilson agrees. One of his experts had said that, if only the matter could be explained to the Germans as to exactly what was intended, he thought they would not feel the same objections. He, himself, had replied that the present scheme would take 30 years to carry out. Consequently, what guarantee was there that the members of the Reparations Commission would understand the scheme in the same way as those who had drawn it up? Is it not possible, he asked, to make clearer what was intended?

Mr Lloyd George thinks that, in most points, it is perfectly clear.

President Wilson points out that, if the German proposal for a definite sum could be accepted, half the objections would disappear.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is not really the case. There would still be the installments to be considered, and the guarantees for payment and the controls. The only really important point in the German case is that until the whole liability was ascertained, Germany’s credit is gone, and she could not raise money for her current needs.

President Wilson agrees that this is the case for two years. His experts were, from the first, in favour of a definite sum being fixed.

Mr Lloyd George points out that every possible way of arriving at a sum had been attempted, but it had not been found possible.

President Wilson says he is struck by the fact that Germany had fixed on the same sum as had most frequently been mentioned in these discussions, namely, five thousand million pounds sterling. It is true that the Germans did not mean the same as the Allies by this. The Germans meant the five thousand millions as a total, whereas the Allies had contemplated the same sum with interest. If we were to say that we would accept five thousand millions sterling if treated as a capital sum with interest to be paid after the first year or two, during which by common consent, Germany could not pay much, would it not form a good basis? Capitalized, this would mean a very large sum.

M Clemenceau says that M Loucheur is opposed to this.

Mr Lloyd George asks if the following two alternative methods of dealing with Reparation, communicated by him to President Wilson and M Clemenceau, had yet been considered by their experts:

1) The Germans to undertake as a contract the whole task of Reparation, and that a sum should be fixed in the Treaty of Peace for all other items in the category of damage.

2) In the alternative, the Germans to sign the Reparation Clauses as they stand, but that three months should be given them to endeavor to effect an arrangement for the fixing of a definite sum in cash as a commutation for all the claims. In the event of the Germans making no satisfactory offer, the present Reparation clauses would stand.

M Clemenceau said that M Loucheur had promised him an answer this evening. He says that the period of three months in the second alternative was very short.

Mr Lloyd George says that it might be extended up to four months. He, himself, prefers the first alternative. It strikes him as odd that Article 234 of the Treaty of Peace seemed to have escaped the Germans. This article provides for the right of appeal. He thought it might be desirable to draw the attention of the Germans to it.

President Wilson points out that the Germans had deliberately avoided mention of everything favorable to them.

M Clemenceau says he cannot agree to settle this question today, as he had not yet seen his experts.

(It is agreed that one representative each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy, should be appointed to examine the proposals made by Mr Lloyd George, and referred to above. President Wilson nominates Mr Baruch for the United States of America. M Clemenceau nominated M Loucheur for France. S Orlando nominated S Crespi for Italy. Mr Lloyd George says that, for the moment, he would act for the British Empire himself.)

3. President Wilson says that the German acceptance of the military terms is conditional on their admission to the League of Nations.

Mr Lloyd George says that, on the question of the military terms, his military advisers say that Germany must be given an interval before being called on to reduce her army to 100,000 men. This was necessary, owing to the disturbances in Germany.

M Clemenceau says that, if this is granted, Germany will never bring her forces down to 100,000.

President Wilson says this is exactly his fear. Moreover, he does not know exactly where the disorder is in Germany, which necessitates the employment of troops. At present their army is used for occupying the Polish frontier and Lithuania.

Mr Lloyd George says that republics have been proclaimed here and there.

President Wilson says that Mr Hoover's food experts who, of course, had no political instructions, reported to Mr. Hoover that the question of the entry of Germany into the League of Nations was one of the points most prominently in the German minds. They put Upper Silesia first, and the League of Nations second. It is probably a matter of national pride, which is readily understandable. It was a question of whether they are to be pariahs, or to be admitted into the League of Nations. He thinks it is the common intention of the Allied and Associated Powers to admit them as soon as they are convinced that the change in the system of Government is sincere. At present, however, it is difficult to foretell what the future of Germany will be. He asks that a general assurance should be given to Germany.

M Clemenceau says Germany only wants admission to the League of Nations to give trouble there. He, himself, had agreed to the proposal to admit them to the Labour Organisation if the Washington Conference so decided. He has no objection in principle. But peace must first be established as a living thing in Europe and Germany must show herself to be free from the old system of Government.

President Wilson says that had been exactly the view of the Commission on the League of Nations. Would it, he asked, be sufficient to reply to the Germans that they would be admitted to the League of Nations as soon as a stable Government is established?

M Clemenceau suggests that it should be left to the League of Nations itself to decide.

President Wilson suggests that the answer should be that the Allied and Associated Powers have no intention to exclude Germany from the League of Nations, but think they have sufficient reasons for awaiting a proof of the sincerity of the change of the system of the Government in Germany. He agrees with Mr Lloyd George that Germany could be better controlled as a member of the League than outside it.

M Clemenceau agrees, but says she should not be admitted until she had shown her good faith.

President Wilson points out that the most troublesome elements in Europe - Germany and Russia - are, at present, being left outside the League of Nations.

(It is agreed that the reply to the German Delegation should be in the sense that the Allied and Associated Powers have no intention to exclude Germany permanently from the League of Nations, but that her inclusion must be postponed until the sincerity of the change in the system of Government in Germany had been proved by experience.)

4. Mr Lloyd George says that he has received information that Kolchak had received a bad reverse.

M Clemenceau says that Kolchak had made a speech that went far to meet the demands of the Council. He had given instructions for a despatch to be circulated to his colleagues to the effect that Kolchak’s reply would be received in a few days. He heard that Mr Sazonoff was strongly opposed to the memorandum that had been telegraphed to Kolchak.

Mr Lloyd George says he had heard of this, and as he understands it Mr Sazonoff is likely to advise Kolchak not to send a favorable reply he has asked Mr Churchill to telegraph to General Knox to urge Kolchak not to listen to Sazonoff.

5. President Wilson reads a telegram from the French Minister at Warsaw, dated May 31st, from General Pilsudski.

(It is agreed that this is thoroughly satisfactory.)

6. Mr Lloyd George says that the German documents have made a certain impression in the Allied countries, and it is necessary to consider the question of a general reply. He thinks it is very important to put the general case and to controvert certain points. It is desirable that a reasoned statement should be prepared. He has already instructed Mr Kerr to set to work on the subject.

President Wilson says it is very important to controvert the argument that the bases had been ignored. In fact, they had not been ignored, but if it could be shown that they had, he, for one, would be ready to make the necessary changes. The real case was that justice had shown itself overwhelmingly against Germany. This ought to be clearly shown in the reply. He was opposed to any further answers being sent to the various German letters. They should now be concentrated in the final reply to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau.

M Clemenceau says that in the last lines of the letter the Germans should be given a final period within which to say whether they would sign or not.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the period should not be longer than 7 days, at the end of which the Armistice would come to an end.

President Wilson says he is not at all convinced that if the concessions now proposed are made, the Germans would sign.

M Clemenceau was convinced that they would not.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that if Brockdorff-Rantzau would not sign, he would probably be replaced by someone else, whose signature might be of little account.

7. In view of the above discussion:

(It is agreed that the draft replies that have been prepared to the German Note of 22nd May, on the subject of Note of German property abroad, to the German Note of 17th May on the subject of Religious Missions, and to the German Note of 24th May, on the subject of Responsibilities and Reparations, should not be dispatched, but rather that so much of them as was necessary should be incorporated in the global rejoinder to the German Notes on the Treaty of Peace.)

8. (The proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers that the Note of the French Government to the Swiss Minister in Paris, dated 18th May, should be inserted in the Treaties of Peace with Germany and with Austria, is approved.)

A copy of the note in French was initialed by the Four Heads of States.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

9. The Council has before them letters from the Romanian and Serbian Delegations, dated 2nd and 1st June respectively, maintaining the reserves they had made in their declarations made at the Plenary Session on the 31st May, to the Treaty with Austria.

(On the proposal of M Clemenceau, it is agreed that Sir Maurice Hankey should draft a letter for consideration, asking the Romanian and Serbian Delegations what was the signification of these letters. Is the intention not to sign the Treaty, or is it proposed to sign and then not to carry it out?)

10. The Council has before them the following reports by the Drafting Committee:

Report on the proposition of Mr Kramarcz.

Opinion as to certain modifications demanded by the Polish Delegation (Polish Note of May 30th, 1919).

Financial Clauses; opinion on certain modifications demanded by the Czechoslovak Delegation. (Note of 30th May, 1919).

(After a short discussion, it is agreed that the above reports should be referred in the first instance to the Territorial Coordinating Committee of the Peace Conference, of which M Tardieu is President, the said committee to be empowered to invite the co-operation of such experts as it may from time to time require.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General for the necessary action.)

11. (It is agreed that the draft Reparation Clauses prepared by the Commission should be considered on the following day).

Jimbuna

06-04-19, 12:55 PM

4th June 1919

British MPs concerned about debt Britain owed the US #onthisday 1919. Government confirmed UK owed $4.26 billion ($62 billion in 2019) to the US Government as well as other debts due in America.

A Frenchwoman filling bags with coffee beans for the U.S. occupation troops in Germany.
https://i.imgur.com/BhSlh5i.png

The U.S. Senate, following the House of Representatives, approves the 19th Amendment to give women the right to vote. The amendment now goes to the states for ratification.
https://i.imgur.com/DqaKBEx.jpg

Sailor Steve

06-04-19, 07:00 PM

Wednesday, June 4, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four with experts on Reparation

The Council has before them the draft Reparation Clauses for inclusion in the Treaty with Austria.

1. Mr. Lamont (USA) reminds the Council that they had approved the draft Reparation Clauses which had previously been before them subject to certain changes which had now been made according to the instructions then given. Further, the Commission had reconsidered the financial provisions of these Clauses and, having regard to the weakness of Austria’s economic position, it had been decided not to specify any definite amount of bonds to be issued by Austria in connection with Reparation payments and to insert special instructions to the Commission to take Austria’s economic situation into careful consideration.

2. Mr Dulles puts forward claims made by Czechoslovakia for the restitution of Objects of Art. It is agreed that the claims in their present form are too general: they can only be inserted in the treaty provided they refer to specific objects.

Lord Sumner is instructed to deal with the matter on behalf of the Commission.

President Wilson says that some of the claims seem to him to go rather far back in the matter of date: and added that his experience has led him to oppose the break-up of learned and artistic collections.

Lord Sumner points out that all these claims have to be proved before a juridical Commission, who will deal with the question whether lapse of time is a bar to a claim. He agrees with the objections to breaking up collections, but only a few specific objects had been mentioned in which national feeling was understood to be deeply engaged.

3. President Wilson suggests that the words “during the war” should be inserted after the word “sequestrated” in Art. VIII.

(This is agreed).

4. Mr Lloyd George says that he regrets that it should be found necessary to call upon Austria to surrender the cattle specified in Annex IV of the proposed Clauses: he understands that the position of the country with regard to food supplies is very serious. It must be noted that these proposed deliveries are in addition to the restitution of cattle removed from Allied countries and which would be identified. Such a measure seems harsh even in the case of Germany. He thinks, at any rate, that the percentage which these figures represented to the number of cattle now in the country ought to be ascertained.

M Tardieu says that the figures in the Annex had been approved by Dr Taylor, one of Mr Hoover’s colleagues.

Mr Lamont says that the condition of Vienna is certainly bad: but the cattle would be taken from the districts adjoining Italy, and, owing to transport difficulties would in no case have been sent to Vienna.

Mr McCormick says that the figures represent a very small proportion of the cattle in Austria. The demand for the surrender of cattle had been inserted at the desire mainly of Italy and Serbia who had suffered very seriously in this respect.

S Orlando says that the Austrians had carried off nearly 400,000 head of cattle from Italy.

(Mr Lloyd George then withdraws his objection to the provision in Annex IV for the surrender of cattle).

5. S Crespi draws attention to a provision proposed for insertion in the Financial Clauses allowing the requisition without payment by the new States of buildings of historical value in the ceded territories. He puts forward some general claims of a similar kind on behalf of Italy in Trentino and Trieste and more especially referred to the Palazzo Venezia in Rome. The text proposed is as follows (Article 12, paragraph 1, of Financial Clauses):

“States to which Austrian territory is ceded and States arising from the dismemberment of Austria shall acquire all property and possessions situated within their territories belonging to the old or new Austrian Governments, and the value of such property and possessions acquired by States other than new Austria shall be fixed by the Reparation Commission for the credit of the new Austria on account of the sums due for reparation. Nevertheless, any building or other property so situated whose principal value lies in its historic interest and associations and which formerly belonged to the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Kingdom of Poland, the Kingdom of Serbia, or the Venetian Republic and the episcopal princedoms of Trient and Bressanone, shall, subject to the approval of the Reparation Commission, be transferred to the Government entitled thereto without payment. These States shall have no claim to any property of the Governments of the old or new Austria situated outside their own respective territories.”

Lord Sumner supports the Italian claim to the Palazzo Venezia: it is not the Austrian Embassy but had been used for the representation of the Venetian Republic in Rome and had thus passed into the possession of Austria at the end of the eighteenth century. It has since been used for the representation of Austria at the Vatican, for which other arrangements had now been made by the Italian Government.

Mr Lloyd George agrees to the Italian claims as regards this building but considered that the claims as embodied in the proposed clause were too wide.

S Crespi points out that the clause in this form had been put forward by the Poles and Czechoslovaks.

President Wilson suggests some modification, and the substitution of “may … be transferred” for “shall … be transferred” is finally adopted.

6. M Sergent calls attention to the fact that in the Treaty with Germany a provision had been inserted in the Territorial Clauses sanctioning the acquisition by Poland, without payment, of the forests formerly belonging to the State in the territory ceded by Germany to Poland. The Polish delegation had asked for the insertion of a similar clause in the Treaty with Austria. He thought there was no objection and would propose to insert this provision among the Financial Clauses. It should be understood that the concession applied to Poland only.

President Wilson says he does not see how claims from other States can be avoided.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the clause was inserted in the Treaty with Germany as some compensation to the Poles for the devastation of their forests by the Germans.

M Clemenceau thinks that if these forests had really belonged to the Polish State they can hardly be made to pay for them.

Mr Lloyd George says that Poland is getting a great deal out of the war: the value of these forests, which is considerable, might represent a suitable means of contribution towards the cost of the war. Poland is also getting valuable coal mines. He suggests that the question of releasing Poland from payment for these forests should be put back until they know what contribution the Polish Government is prepared to make toward the cost of war.

7. Mr Lamont is then asked to state how the situation stands with regard to the payment of contributions by the new States towards the cost of the war. He pointed out that the provisions for the payment reparation by the States arising New states out of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire has now been omitted from the proposed Reparation Clauses. They had drawn up instead a formula of undertaking to make contribution towards the cost of the war: this had been accepted by the Czechoslovaks and he hopes within 24 hours to get the consent of the other three states concerned, viz: Romania, Poland and Yugoslavia. The undertaking provides for the payment to the Allies of an amount equal to 25 per cent of the par value of the war bonds, found in each case in the territory in question; the amount payable being in no case less than 15 per cent of the value of the bonds which might reasonably be supposed to have been subscribed for in that territory. The total amount thus obtainable from all the four States would be from six to ten milliards of kroner.

Mr Lloyd George says that he thinks payment for the State forests ought to be additional to this sum. He desires to make two comments on these proposals. He does not see why a minimum of 15 per cent of war bonds should be allowed for: he thinks the figure should be 25 percent in both cases. It would be very difficult to ascertain how much had been subscribed in any given territory - probably they would have to resort to a rough allocation according to the estimated wealth of the territory. Further, he desires to recall to the minds of the Council a former proposal of S Orlando to the effect that, in the case of States like Serbia and Romania who have claims against Germany and are receiving accessions of territory, the amount of reparation which this new territory would have had to pay had it remained part of Austria should be set off against the claims made against the Enemy States by the State benefiting by the accession of territory. This scheme would relieve the Allies from the necessity of collecting contributions from the Yugoslav and Romanian Governments which would probably prove a difficult proceeding. He is disposed to suggest that claims and obligations should be regarded as cancelling out - more especially in the case of Romania. Serbia, indeed, might have a balance of claim and, upon the suggestion of Mr Davis, he agrees that some preliminary assistance might be given to Serbia on account of her claims in order to enable her to deal with her forged notes and that possibly a prior claim on the payments by Bulgaria should be accorded to her. Claims by Serbia and Romania against Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria for restitution and reparation in respect of livestock might also stand. Poland and Czechoslovakia having no claims against the enemy should be dealt with on the lines described by Mr Lamont.

Instructions are accordingly given to the Reparation Commission to negotiate with the respective States in question in accordance with these suggestions.

(It is agreed that, subject to a satisfactory agreement regarding contributions being concluded with the four States already referred to, and to the insertion of the modifications agreed upon at the present meeting, the Reparation Clauses should be incorporated in the Treaty with Austria).

(The meeting terminates at 12:50).

Sailor Steve

06-05-19, 01:40 AM

Wednesday, June 4, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:00

Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

1. M Pichon said that M Tardieu had prepared a proposal, which he wished to lay before the Council, regarding the procedure to be followed for the revision of the Treaties of 1839.

M Tardieu says that the Council has to deal with two questions, one of method, and one of substance. The question of method was whether negotiations should be carried on directly between the Dutch and the Belgians, or in an international Commission, on which the Great Powers and those two countries should be represented. The question of substance is how far the revision of the Treaties should extend. He thinks he is in a position to give the views of the Commission on Belgian Affairs.

As regards the first question, it seems difficult for the Powers which have declared revision necessary, especially for such of them as are signatories to the Treaty, not to take part in the discussion. On this point, therefore, the contention of the Belgians should be accepted.

As to the second point, it seems that, as the Conference had decided that no territorial compensation to Holland at the expense of Germany could be enforced, all territorial questions arising out of the revision of the Treaties must be excluded. A further argument was that no Commission had considered the question of territorial readjustments in Flanders or Limburg. The solution he proposes, therefore, is one that could be adopted speedily and which offers the advantage of a middle course between the Belgian and Dutch points of view. In regard to territory, Belgium would be refused her demand, but in regard to the method of conducting negotiations, her requests would be satisfied.

Mr Balfour says that he is inclined to agree with the policy proposed by M Tardieu. He feels sure that it is useless to try and negotiate territorial changes in view of the categorical refusal of Holland. Anyone in the position of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs would have adopted the same attitude. The Powers cannot compel, nor can they induce Holland to give up any territory. He also agrees with M Tardieu in his general view regarding procedure. It is difficult for any of the Great Powers who are signatory to the Treaties of 1839 to disinterest themselves from the negotiations. He is not sure, however, that it would not be better for the Great Powers to remain in the background while Belgium and Holland conduct the negotiations as far as possible, directly. This, he thinks, is not necessarily in contradiction with what M Tardieu had proposed. Mr Hymans wishes all the Delegations concerned to discuss questions of railways, canals, the Scheldt etc. as it were, in Plenary Conference. These questions are no doubt important, but hardly justify such a procedure. It would be better, he thinks, that Belgium and Holland should try to obtain agreement, and come to the Conference should they fail to obtain it. The Great Powers would, of course, be party in any case to the final settlement. The smaller the number of people discussing such questions as related to waterways, the better, and the solution would be all the speedier. Moreover, if Belgium and Holland really wished to come to an agreement, they would be better alone. He does not know whether this would suit Mr Hymans, but Mr Van Karnebeek has shown a conciliatory spirit towards the Belgian demands, and this suggestion might lead to a friendly arrangement. He says this in the interest of Belgium. He wishes Belgium to obtain all the privileges she asked for, and he thinks she would get them more readily by a friendly talk with Holland than by what might appear to the Dutch as coercion by the Great Powers.

M Tardieu says that he concurs with what Mr Balfour had said. It is obviously desirable to obtain a friendly arrangement between the Dutch and the Belgians, but according to the plan suggested, the Great Powers would be placed in the position of arbiter. An arbiter is generally a person foreign to the dispute. The fact cannot be neglected, however, that several of the Great Powers are signatories of the Treaties under revision. He would therefore propose a solution very similar to Mr Balfour’s, namely, that the Great Powers, together with Belgium and Holland, should constitute a Commission. This Commission would immediately ask the Dutch and Belgian Members to form a sub-Commission, in order to clear the ground. This sub-Commission would be able, it was hoped, to find solutions for all the more domestic problems concerning the two countries. There are some subjects, however, notably the military problem Mr Hymans had alluded to, the fortification of the Scheldt, the Port of Flushing, and similar questions, in which the Great Powers were interested. Their advice might be of use in finding a solution to these questions.

Mr Balfour say that he accepts this proposal.

Mr Lansing says that he is not able to say that he would accept it. Whatever the origin of the divisions of territory and reciprocal rights arranged in 1839, the matter has now become essentially one concerning Belgium and Holland. The military question, in his view, is of small importance. The principal question is economic and the Great Powers are not properly interested in this question. He therefore proposes that a joint Dutch and Belgian Committee be appointed to consider the whole problem. In case of disagreement, or in case of undue delay, the Great Powers, or the League of Nations, or Holland and Belgium, might appoint a single individual to arbitrate.

Baron Sonnino says that this can only be given in the form of a recommendation. Of the two proposals, he thinks perhaps Mr Lansing’s is the more conciliatory.

Mr Balfour asks whether, in Baron Sonnino’s opinion, Belgium would prefer it.

M Pichon says that he thinks Holland might, but that Belgium would not.

Baron Sonnino says that both sides cannot be satisfied.

Mr Lansing says it must be borne in mind that one party stands to gain something, and the other can only expect to lose.

Baron Sonnino says that if the stipulation that territorial questions were excluded was clearly made, Holland might be satisfied.

M Pichon expresses the view that Holland would be satisfied with this. In his opinion, in view of the decision previously adopted, it was impossible for the Great Powers to avoid intervening in the discussion. By the 1839 arrangement Belgium had been made neutral, her sovereignty had been limited, but her security had been guaranteed. It has now been decided that her sovereignty must be restored, and the limitations removed; if so, her security must be established on a new basis. The Powers which established the previous regime could not evade the duty of participating in the creation of the new. The Dutch say, however, and they seem genuinely disposed to display good-will, that the desired result could be better obtained by discussion between Holland and Belgium than by a debate before an areopagus of the big Powers. He thinks, therefore, that Mr Balfour’s proposal meets the case. The terms of reference to the Commission should be clearly defined, territorial questions should be strictly excluded, the question of the new regime to be substituted for the old should be examined, and the remaining questions should be referred to the Belgians and Dutch to solve by common agreement. Should they fail to do so, Mr Lansing’s proposal might be resorted to.

Mr Lansing says that he is not in favour of a Commission of the Great Powers. In the first place, the United States of America had not been party to the Treaties of 1839. The Council is no doubt within its rights in passing a resolution in favour of revision. Any body of citizens might do that. It does not follow that the authors of the resolution should make the revision. Matters all over the world are better settled without foreign interference. If the 1839 Treaties is annulled, Belgium will be relieved of limitations to her sovereignty. Instead of paying for this advantage, she asks that more might be given to her at Dutch expense. An International Commission to deal with this matter is unlikely to produce an acceptable solution, and more likely to aggravate bad feeling. He therefore adheres to his view, that the two countries concerned should try and find a solution by themselves, and if they fail, submit the dispute to an arbitrator.

M Pichon points out that Clause D of the conclusions suggested by the Commission and adopted by the Council, stipulates “that the Great Powers at the Peace Conference whose interests are general should take part therein.”

Mr Lansing points out that, at that time, the Council had in mind the delivery to Holland of certain territories to be taken from Germany.

M Laroche asks if he might be allowed to state the view of the Commission. In 1839, a perpetual limitation of Belgian sovereignty had been instituted. This had been done by the Powers. If this were abrogated, the situation preceding that settlement is restored. It follows that the same Powers should provide the alternative. Had the Powers not taken part in the Treaties of 1839, the settlement would certainly have been very different. It was the duty of the Powers to settle the fate of Belgium now, otherwise, Belgium would be at a disadvantage in relation to Holland. She remains hampered by the limitations imposed in 1839, whereas Holland is free from these impediments.

M Pichon quotes from the Annex to the Report of the Commission the following passage:

“In any case the revision of the three treaties is called for.

Several of the signatory Powers have in fact given definite expression to their views as to the situation set forth above.

(a) Belgium as early as 26 July, 1917, made the following declaration: ‘The international statute established 1831–39 in order to guarantee the security of Belgium has become void by reason of the violation of the joint treaty by two of its signatories. It must be revised.’ She has since renewed this demand before the Peace Conference.

(b) France and Great Britain, signatories and guarantors, have adhered to the Belgian demand for revision.

(c) The United States, not a signatory, has declared that Belgium must be ‘restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations.’

It is a logical consequence of this unanimity and of the considerations set forth above, that the three treaties should be revised, the revision being undertaken in agreement with Holland, not only by Belgium, but by the Great Powers which are signatories and guarantors thereof.

This revision is fully justified in law and cannot be refused.”

He says that he makes this quotation not in order to place Mr Lansing in the position of contradicting the declared policy of the United States, but merely in order to make the question as clear as possible. He wishes to reconcile Belgium and Holland, but he also wishes the interests of the Great Powers not to be overlooked. These interests are limited to the question of neutrality and sovereignty, the rest could be left to the Belgians and the Dutch to settle among themselves.

Mr Lansing says that there are two questions, one is the limitation of the sovereignty of Belgium, and the other the limitation of the sovereignty of Holland. He is entirely in favour of relieving Belgium from all limitations to her sovereignty. In regard to anything which might impose limitations on Dutch sovereignty, he favors direct negotiations between Belgium and Holland.

Baron Sonnino says he thinks there is general agreement. The question is to find a formula. He suggests that the Powers should nominate a Commission to examine from the general point of view the consequences of the revision of the 1839 Treaties, with the object of relieving Belgium of all limitations to her sovereignty, without reference to any territorial readjustments, and only in so far as the questions in dispute cannot be settled between the two countries directly concerned. He points out that the question of the Congo, which is also neutralized, would be likely to arise. This question concerns all the Powers, and could not be dealt with only between Belgium and Holland.

Mr Lansing says that he is in favour of a Commission to examine the limitations or restrictions imposed on Belgian Sovereignty and the best means of removing them. In regard to any similar burdens to be imposed on Holland, he thinks Belgium and Holland should settle the matter together.

Baron Sonnino points out that the neutrality of any country affects the sovereignty of all others. Not only Holland is concerned. For instance, Germany in 1914 had not the sovereign right of attacking Belgium; she had done so and that was why the rest of Europe had fallen on her. The consequences of the neutrality of any country is therefore general.

Mr Lansing says that his reservation relates to limitations that might be placed on Dutch sovereignty, for instance the servitude Belgium wishes to impose on the Dutch part of the Scheldt.

M Tardieu says that if this view is taken he cannot see what Belgium could possibly gain. Whether neutrality is considered an advantage or a burden, it is to be abolished. No territorial re-arrangement is to be made. All that can be done is to give Belgium waterway facilities, notably in the course of the Scheldt. He pointed out that the Peace Conference had imposed an international régime on many rivers, for instance the Rhine which passes through neutral countries. He does not think Dutch sovereignty would be damaged by a similar arrangement in regard to the Scheldt. President Wilson in replying to M Bratiano in the last Plenary Conference, had said that as the Great Powers were accepting the responsibility of safeguarding the Peace of the world, they have a right to establish such conditions as they feel they would be justified in maintaining.

Mr Lansing says that he is unable to perceive the cogency of the argument. Belgium is being relieved of a burden, and alleges that she must be therefor compensated.

Mr Tardieu says that Belgium must be in a position to defend herself.

Mr Balfour said that there was surely a substantial difference between interference with Dutch Sovereignty and saying that the Scheldt is really an international river. In 1839, Holland had been given control of the stream. As a result, Belgium is unable to ask her Allies to come to her help. Now that Belgium is to be made sovereign, she must be in a position to summon her friends to assist in her defense. In this war, neither the French nor the British Navy had been able to go up the Scheldt in order to help Belgium. Holland has a right to say to the British and French Governments that as she is maintaining her neutrality vis-à-vis Germany, Belgium’s Allies would not be allowed to help in the defense of Antwerp. It is surely not an attack on Dutch sovereignty to ask that Belgium be enabled to summon her Allies to her assistance.

Mr Lansing observes that had Great Britain been the enemy of Belgium, the arrangement would have worked the other way.

Mr Balfour says he wishes to point out that the British Admiralty as such does not desire any change in the status of the Scheldt, it is the Belgians who desire it, not the British. The Belgians desire henceforth to throw in their lot with the French, British and Americans and to resist with them all danger coming from the East. They now say “we cannot call our friends to help us.”

Mr Lansing asks whether Mr Balfour would advocate that the Rhine be so internationalized as to allow Germany to call in her friends if attacked.

M Tardieu says that he would like to add a few minor arguments to those of Mr Balfour. Mr Balfour had spoken of the danger to Belgium in time of war. He wishes to speak of the difficulties of Belgium in time of Peace. The régime established in 1839 had as a result that Belgium was deprived of the most natural rights in the stream which is her outlet to the sea. This stream is as extensive as an arm of the sea and the only Port on it is the Commercial Capital of Belgium. All the Great Powers can do is to say that they are agreed that an alteration of the system is desirable. No other pressure could be put on Holland. He thinks it is exaggerated to say that any change in the régime is an attack on Dutch sovereignty. Should the Conference which is trying to rebuild the world in the interests of Peace and Justice shirk a matter of this sort for such a reason?

Mr Balfour agrees that the Conference is trying to rebuild the world. One of the methods was to open all natural international waterways to the world. No better example of such a waterway exists than the Scheldt. The Powers should be able to go to Holland and say “Will you not allow this great international stream to be governed internationally like the Rhine and the Danube?” This was not a territorial question, nor one of local transportation. It should be treated apart from such questions and submitted, like the case of other big streams in other parts of the world, to a special Commission.

Mr Lansing says that he is surprised in Mr Balfour’s argument. In the case of the St Lawrence, would Canada or the United States agree to the control of this river by an international Commission? Yet to reach certain American cities, American vessels have to pass through the Canadian reaches of the river. He could understand rule by an international Commission whenever a river passes through many States especially States which had been engaged in hostilities, but when the river in question only concerns two friendly countries, he can see no reason why they should not settle the problem together, only calling in a third party in case of disagreement. Belgium and Holland had made a whole series of treaties together, regarding the Scheldt. They had been mentioned by Mr van Karnebeek on the previous day. It is a general rule that the nation situated upstream should also desire sovereignty over the whole course. This is human nature, and inevitably leads to the imposition of servitude on the country downstream. Why should the Powers take on their shoulders Holland’s burden? It is certain that an international Commission would never satisfy the parties.

M Tardieu says that he thinks his proposal answers the case. The Commission he proposes would not deal with territorial questions, but only with the revision of the general political status. This should be done under the auspices of the Powers. All strictly local relations would be settled between Belgium and Holland.

Mr Lansing says he would agree, provided it is clearly understood that territorial sovereignty included servitude such as that imposed in favour of transit on rivers.

M Tardieu says that the operation as a whole would not consist in imposing new servitude on Holland, but primarily in liberating Belgium from servitude. To take a concrete instance, would Mr. Lansing regard it as a limitation of Dutch sovereignty if, instead of the system by which Belgium had to ask Holland to perform all works necessary for navigation, each country were empowered to do the needful on a basis of equality?

Baron Sonnino says that it is undesirable to define too closely what the Powers can or cannot do. Holland is ready to do much to avoid interference by the Powers. It would be a pity to give her a pretext for resisting.

M Pichon restates the proposal that a Commission should study the revision of the 1839 treaties with the object of establishing Belgian sovereignty, leaving aside all territorial questions. Holland and Belgium should be invited to solve all the subsidiary problems they could solve together. The Powers would not intervene if any agreement were reached.

Mr Lansing suggests that the investigation be made only by the Powers signatory to the Treaties of 1839. The Commission could then report to the Council.

Mr Balfour says that in his view President Wilson would not wish America to be left out of the investigation. He would like to make an informal suggestion. If this were a private transaction, he thinks it would be best if M Pichon asked Mr van Karnebeek to come to see him informally, and ask him to state exactly what Holland’s position was;

(a) regarding territorial matters;

(b) regarding local questions;

(c) regarding the Scheldt.

M Pichon might tell him that the matter had been discussed in the Council and no resolution had been made. He might ask him whether, if all territorial matters were excluded, a good arrangement regarding the Scheldt could not be secured. It might be indicated to Mr Van Karnebeek that if such a settlement were not arrived at, there was always a chance that the River might be declared international. It is often easier to get useful results in this way than by a more formal method. Holland might be more yielding than if face to face with a formal document.

Mr Lansing says that he agrees and the result of this conversation might furnish a guide for a resolution later on.

Baron Sonnino thinks that the Dutch might be more frank with the Belgians, especially as they seem very anxious about their public opinion.

Mr Balfour adds that it might be better to leave M Pichon a completely free hand and avoid stating at the outset that the Powers have no thought of taking territory from Holland. In fact, they have no such intention and cannot carry it out if they had, but it might be inexpedient to say so categorically.

M Pichon replies that he has already had a talk with Mr Van Karnebeek, who had told him that Holland could not take part in any negotiations touching her sovereignty, or her territory. He could not even submit to his Government any question of this sort, as this would cause an explosion of public feeling. As to bringing about better relations between Holland and Belgium, he expects good results from direct negotiation. He thinks that a solution could be found to all the questions relating to Canals, to connection between the Meuse and the Rhine, to the Scheldt, in fact, to all the questions pending between the two countries. He feels sure that he will be able to satisfy the Belgian Government. That was the ground on which he stands and he will not change it. It was for this reason that M Pichon thinks the proposal for a Commission is a good one. It gives satisfaction to the Dutch Government and might result in satisfaction to Belgium.

Mr Lansing said that he would agree still with the proviso that ‘territory’ included rivers just as it included three miles of sea from the coast of any country.

Baron Sonnino says that the main object is to allow the two countries to decide all they can with every appearance of freedom. Too close a definition of functions is therefore undesirable.

Mr Balfour points out that 63 kilometres of the navigable course of the Scheldt were in French territory, and the French fluvial ports of Condé and Valenciennes were situated on this course. The Scheldt is therefore an international river.

(After some further discussion, the following formula is adopted:

“Having recognised the necessity of revising the Treaties of 1839, the Powers entrust to a Commission comprising a representative of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium and Holland, the task of studying the measures which must result from this revision and of submitting to them proposals implying neither transfer of territorial sovereignty nor creation of international servitude.

The Commission will ask Belgium and Holland to present agreed suggestions regarding navigable streams in the spirit of the general principles adopted by the Peace Conference.”)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

06-05-19, 03:10 AM

Wednesday, June 4, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

(Mr Vesnitch was introduced.)

1. President Wilson says that the Council is anxious to hear the views of M Vesnitch as representing the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the subject of Klagenfurt.

Mr Vesnitch says that in the first place he wishes to express his gratitude to the Council for listening to the request of his Delegation for a further examination of the question of Klagenfurt. This question seems to have been insufficiently considered from every point of view. He insists on the importance of the problem which goes far beyond the mere delimitation of frontiers between the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State and the Republic of Austria. In order to understand the importance of the question, it is necessary to recall the circumstances in which the war had begun. The war had been made by Germany for the purpose of giving effect to a long prepared policy. The German program had been to descend towards the South-East of Europe to the Aegean on the one side and the Adriatic on the other. He is not saying this merely to find an argument for the present case for it was a well recognised fact. As an instance of this he refers to one of the Professors of the University of Prague, M. Niederland, who had foreseen in 1911 what could happen and had had the courage to develop the facts. In the struggle of Germanism to achieve those objects, the Slovene element had been put in special danger. In the past, the Slovenes had been gradually forced by the Germans to retire step by step from Salzburg towards the South-East. To prove this, it was necessary only to open a map and see how the names showed the former presence of the Slovenes. For example, Graz, the capital of Styria, had formerly been called Gradetz. The German push to the South-East had been especially strong since the creation of the German Empire when under Bismarck the Pan-German policy first took definite shape. This mixture of races which now prevails is the result of a systematic endeavor on the part of Germany to strengthen the German elements in the population. Priests had been sent down from Württemberg and from Bavaria with a definite Mission from the powerful German Schulverein and they had worked with the greatest energy and their policy had been highly Chauvinistic. The influence of the Church had not been considered sufficient and the German propaganda had been developed by means of schools and economic influences always used against the Slovene population. They had applied here the same system as in Poland. The political system had taken its direction from Berlin rather than from Vienna. Those Slovene populations being under German-Austrian domination and unsuspecting of the great movement towards nationality that was to come with the help of France, Great Britain and the United States of America, had been obliged to fall back and yield. Consequently, he had heard to-day that there were Slovenes who wished to remain connected with Austria. He hopes that this fact will not impress the Council too much. The same thing had often happened before and in support of this he appealed to the witness of the Italian writer, Antonio Fogazzaro, who, in a work entitled “Piccolo Mundo Antico” recalled that even in Lombardy after prolonged Austrian occupation, there had been Italians who were more or less partisan of Austria and favored remaining under Austrian rule. This was due to the pressure of Government, Police, administration etc., and it was not every man who had the courage to be a great citizen. What had happened in Italy had happened elsewhere and this consideration should not influence the judgment of the Council beyond a certain point.

He did not wish to conceal that the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State had the ambition to embrace within its territory the larger part of the Slovene territory. But after close study and especially after discussions with the members of the Peace Conference, they had realized the difficulties and had moderated their program only asking to have included on the one hand what was incontestably Slovene and on the other what was indispensable to their people.

He wishes to insist on two classes of motives which actuated them, one the Yugoslav motive, and the other a general motive.

In regard to the Yugoslav reason, the Slovenes are a race that had suffered most under the hard Germanic domination, but nevertheless the people had suffered together and had been left with the hope of eventual freedom. By the force of circumstances this small people, who had suffered so much, were to be divided into four groups by the present Treaty. One party would remain in the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. Another party would remain with Austria. The third would remain Magyar, and a large group of some 300,000 to 450,000 come under Italy. He quite understands that the Council may have been obliged to separate the race and to put some of them under Allied countries. This he could understand, but what his delegation could not understand was the strictness of the conference in dealing with the disposition of the Slovene populations to enemy countries. His delegation had asked for a plebiscite in regard to the populations to go under Romanian and Italian rule. The proposal had not been accepted. Now when it is a question of a Slovene population going under enemy rule, the proposal for a plebiscite is imposed, He fears that this will create an impression among his people contrary to what the Council would desire; a painful and not at all beneficial impression.

In regard to the reasons of general policy, which, in his own opinion are the more important, he asks that no illusions should be entertained. It is his duty, if the Council will allow him to say so, to call attention to the danger which is being run. The Powers are under the impression that they are creating in Austria a small State, and that it is to their interest to deal mildly with it. The Austrian State is German, and never would be anything else. In the future, Austria would have a much greater tendency than in the past to unite with Germany. In spite of the smooth words spoken by Dr. Renner at St. Germain, he had insisted that his people must also be allowed the right of self-determination.

What is even more important is that in the German reply to the draft Treaty of Peace Count Brockdorff-Rantzau had insisted that Austria should have the right to self-determination. That is to say Count Brockdorff-Rantzau regarded it as a German question. The situation today enables the Powers to compel Germany to accept what the needs of the moment required. But the nature of the peoples of Europe was much stronger than seems to be thought. At the same time it has been decided that the peoples are to have the right to declare for themselves. Consequently, the time will come when Austria will declare her union with Germany and in doing so will consider that it is doing its duty. He does not believe that it will be possible to make war to prevent this from happening. Governments are not masters of public opinion and it is impossible to judge now whether public opinion will permit a war for this reason. Austria then will, in time, unite with Germany, and the German policy of pushing towards the sea will again recommence with the benefit of the bitter experience of the past. He does not know why that policy should be helped on directly by substituting German Rule for Yugoslav Rule in the area under consideration, and indirectly, by giving the Yugoslav people a lesson in pessimism and cynicism, a sense of failure in the past and of futility in the future. He therefore implores the Council to think these matters over seriously and to draw from the facts he had presented the right conclusion. He would add that it is not for him, as the representative of a small country, to offer advice to the representatives of such much greater nations, but he would wish to draw attention to one undoubted fact. That is that Austria will inevitably become the spoiled child of the German race, which will embrace it with the greatest tenderness. Germany will give to Austria all the assistance necessary for her to play in the future the same role as in the past. Austria, though small, will, with German support, again become the instrument of German policy in South-East Europe, and will carry out its mission with greater energy than ever. He begs therefore that Austria should not be reinforced with elements which she is not entitled to demand, but rather that those elements should be utilized to form part of the barrier against the German push to the South-East.

Finally, the last line for which his delegation had pressed in the Klagenfurt area included from a statistical point of view a proportion of 60,000 Slovenes to 24,000 Germans. These figures were based on the official statistics of the Austrian Government, which were not favorable to non-German peoples. In the part which his country had agreed to abandon there are 21,000 more Slovenes who would be included in Austria. Consequently, Yugoslavia would, under this proposal, take in 24,000 Germans, and abandon 21,000 Slovenes, showing a balance of only 3,000 in favour of Yugoslavia. This calculation is based on Government statistics, but if Ecclesiastical statistics are taken, the result is very different. According to these there would be 80,441 Slovenes and 4,854 Germans showing a very much more favorable and overwhelming majority to the Yugoslavs. An ethnographical map, published in Vienna by German cartographers, attributes the territory which his delegation demands to the Slovenes. Handler, a German propagandist authority, also attributes this region to Slovenes. His delegation cannot understand why their friends and Allies, whose cause is the same as their own, refuses what their enemies recognised. He would add that he understands that in certain regions economic factors have to be taken into consideration, and his delegation is quite prepared to examine carefully what commercial arrangements should be made to allow adjacent regions on different sides of the border to continue their common economic life. He prays, therefore, in the name of his delegation that the Council would accord the line they ask for, and in demanding it he can declare with his whole conscience that nothing is being done against any one of the great principles proclaimed, or against any aim of the Allies during the whole war. His conclusion, therefore, is that his delegation prays that the reduced line should be granted without the formality of the plebiscite, because, generally speaking, they desire the peaceful life of the country to begin as soon as possible. The new procedure would only maintain the present effervescence and cause delay in the consolidation of the new State. Practically it would give no other result than now asked for.

Mr Lloyd George asks exactly what Mr Vesnitch wishes.

Mr Vesnitch explains that the line they propose follows the line of the lakes. These make a very good frontier, and he thinks their demand is reinforced by the fact that the technical commission had agreed on this line.

President Wilson says that at one time or another they had agreed on a good many things.

Mr Vesnitch does not contest this.

Mr Lloyd George asks if the population south of the lakes is Slovene in character.

Mr Vesnitch says it is overwhelmingly so.

President Wilson says that according to his information geographically the Klagenfurt basin is united. The life in it is not highly developed. It is not an industrial district, nor is it very highly developed agriculturally. He understands that it imports its wheat. In the town of Klagenfurt he is told that there was no wholesale shop and only retail merchants and markets.

Mr Vesnitch says the population is probably from 18 to 20 thousand.

President Wilson says it is only lately that he had comprehended that a plebiscite for the whole basin would probably not result in a decision for Yugoslavia.

Mr Vesnitch says he is not of that opinion although he understands there are some Germanophiles. The plebiscite depends a good deal on the form, date, etc.

President Wilson then turns to a map of the Klagenfurt basin showing two districts, one marked “A”, in the Southern part of it, which is claimed by Yugoslavia, and another marked “B”, which Yugoslavia is willing to abandon. He makes the suggestion that at some early date, say six months after the signature of peace, the inhabitants of “A” should vote by plebiscite as to whether they would be united to Yugoslavia or Austria. If they vote for Austria, the whole district, including “A” and “B” will be settled. If, however, they voted for Yugoslavia, he proposes that subsequently the zone marked “B” should also vote as to whether it would go to Yugoslavia or to Austria, in the latter case dividing the Klagenfurt basin in two. The testimony as to the desire of the people to hold together is conflicting. It seems fair to the Serbo-Croat State that the people in zone “A” who are Slovene by race should be offered to vote first, and that if they vote for the Serbo-Croats, then the people of zone “B” should have the chance of remaining with the rest of the Klagenfurt basin.

Mr Vesnitch says that he is perplexed by this proposal. He thinks he has given all the reasons which ought to be taken into consideration for uniting this territory to the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, and that the council will not have any real necessity to expose them to these new votes. He would like the Council to attribute this compact Slovene population without the necessity of consulting the people. He does not contest that the population in this area is mixed, but even the enemies of this people concede that the Slovene race is in the majority. The Council will not believe his delegation, nor even their enemies.

President Wilson admits that there is a large majority of Slovenes. The same problem, however, had presented itself in Upper Silesia and there, in order to give, so to speak, ceremonial cleanliness to the Treaty with Germany, they were asking that the district should be submitted to a plebiscite.

Mr Lloyd George asks where the injustice of a plebiscite would lie.

Mr Vesnitch said it would be unjust and impracticable. These places had formed the battlefields of the strongest racial antagonism. 70 millions of Germans had weighed on 1,400,000 Slovenes. In German politics Poland is quite a secondary consideration, and German policy always pressed towards Asia Minor and the Adriatic. Consequently, in this region, there had been an endless struggle.

Mr Lloyd George says he does not see the point of this. He understands that in the Northern (B) area a good many people were against the plebiscite. But he cannot see why the population of Slovene origin should not be asked whether it would prefer to remain German or to be united with people of its own race.

Mr Vesnitch says that for the last fifty years German propaganda had worked on the population in such a way that these peoples are always under the impressions created by it. They are like birds which are too tame to fly. For fifty years it had been preached to them that the Serbians and the Croats were the worst people on our planet, that under them there can be no security and no rule. It had been just the same in Lombardy fifty years ago. He does not say that the plebiscite would go the wrong way, but in these circumstances there is that risk.

President Wilson says his information is that in all probability the Southern area (A) would vote in favour of uniting with the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, but Mr Vesnitch seems to have doubts.

Mr Vesnitch says he has no doubts because he, personally, does not know the district. But the inimical action of the Germans is so strong that it is continued even at the present time. If it should be decided to take the plebiscite by communes perhaps it would be more acceptable to his Delegation.

President Wilson points out the difficulty that plebiscite by communes might give disconnected results.

Mr Vesnitch said the consequences of this would have to be risked.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the difficulty of plebiscite by communes is that the population of the towns so often differs from the country.

M Vesnitch says that the Germans always work by establishing strongholds and these are usually in the towns. If the Slovenes can only be freed from German influence or, for the matter of that, Slovene influence too, for a couple of years he was quite certain how they would vote. Once they could come under fresh influence there would be no doubt.

President Wilson recalls that the experts had first advised that the plebiscite should be held three years after the signature of peace. They had then been told that Mr Vesnitch and his associates feared the German propaganda during this period; consequently, the plebiscite had been put earlier to escape this danger. By shortening the period an attempt had been made to produce a situation in which the vote would be taken before the danger of propaganda manifested itself. If the Serbian Delegation preferred it perhaps a Commission could be set up to govern the district for three years and then take the plebiscite. All sorts of recommendations had been made and the last one had been for the immediate plebiscite in regard to the Southern area marked A on the map and for a later plebiscite in the area marked B, which would only take place if area A had declared for the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State. He asks Mr Vesnitch to consider whether he would prefer the plebiscite to take place within six months or in some longer period which might be one, two or three years.

Mr Lloyd George says that in the meanwhile, the administration would be by a local government under the League of Nations.

Mr Vesnitch says he would like to consult his Delegation before giving an answer. He had hoped that the proposal of his Delegation, which left an important part of the area to Austria, was of such a nature that it would not be considered necessary to adopt any system of plebiscite. In his humble opinion it was hardly realized how many of these matters the Powers would have on their shoulders.

M Clemenceau said it was not their fault. It is due to the enormous scope of the operation of settling the peace of the world.

President Wilson explains how important it is not to adopt one course in one plan and another course in another plan. These difficulties of mixed populations arise wherever an ancient sovereignty had been extended over an alien people. The only way to close the mouths of the critics is to say “Let the people themselves judge”.

(The Council agreea that:

1) The group of experts who have been considering the Klagenfurt problem should formulate a detailed plan on the basis that the population of the Southern part of area marked A on President Wilson’s map should declare by plebiscite whether they wished to be attached to Yugoslavia or to Austria. In the interval between the signature of peace and the date of the plebiscite, the region is to be administered by a local government under the League of Nations. The date of the plebiscite is to be fixed after hearing the views of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation.

2) That Mr Vesnitch should consult his Delegation as to whether it would prefer the plebiscite to be held within six months after the signature of peace or after some longer period.

Mr. Leeper, who is in attendance, is called into the room and personal instructions are given to him to get into touch with the other experts on the subject.)

Sailor Steve

06-05-19, 03:40 AM

Wednesday, June 4, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 17:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. On the motion of Mr Lloyd George, a Resolution regarding the steps to be taken for preparing a reply to the German counter proposals is agreed to.

2. With reference to C. F. 44, Minute 1,2 a draft reference to an Expert Committee, submitted by Sir Maurice Hankey, in accordance with instructions, is approved.

3. M Clemenceau reports that the Polish Delegation has asked to be heard on the question of the Eastern frontiers of Germany.

(It is agreed that Mr Paderewski should be invited to attend the Council at 11:30 on the following morning.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to send him an invitation, and to enclose for his confidential information a copy of the terms of reference to the Committee).

4. With reference to C. F. 44 Minute 9,3 Sir Maurice Hankey hands to M Clemenceau a draft in English of letters in reply to the letters from the Romanian and Serbian Delegations, maintaining the reserves they had made in their declarations at the Plenary Session on May 31st.

M Clemenceau undertakes to have these translated into French and to dispatch them.

5. M Clemenceau says that it would be very difficult to fix the figure for the States of Eastern Europe other than the enemy States.

Mr Lloyd George says he has no doubt what the size of their forces will be if no action is taken.

President Wilson says that he fully shares the fears of Mr Lloyd George. At present these peoples appear to be out for fighting and for what they can get. His suggestion is that a period should be fixed within which it might be anticipated that the ferment in Eastern Europe would subside, at the end of which the armies should be reduced to the figures now settled. For example, it might be provided in the Treaty of Peace that after January 1st, 1921 the various States should agree to accept such and such limitation of forces, unless in the judgment of the Council of the League of Nations some extension is desirable.

M Clemenceau thinks that it would be better not to fix the number at present. He thought this would irritate them very much. It would be better to say that by the 1st January, 1921, the League of Nations will fix the figure.

President Wilson considers that they would resent more having to agree to an unstated figure than to one which was laid down now.

M Clemenceau says that, with all precautions, he had spoken to the representatives of some of these States, and his remarks had been very unfavorably received.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the representatives of these States should be invited to meet the Council.

President Wilson agrees, and suggests that the larger figures of the Military Experts might then be proposed to them.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that at this meeting President Wilson should make to them the suggestions he had just offered.

President Wilson urges that only one representative of each State should be invited.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that they should be accompanied by their Military Experts.

President Wilson deprecates this, as the principal Powers will then have to bring their Experts and the numbers will become unwieldy.

M Clemenceau points out the difficulty in which Greece would be, owing to the situation in Turkey.

Mr Lloyd George says he hopes that whatever else might be imposed on Turkey, there would be a very drastic limitation of armaments.

M Clemenceau says he is in favour of accepting the figures proposed by the Military Representatives, before seeing the representatives of the various States. They would then be told that the Council’s desire is that they should not be in a position to fight either against each other or to unite against Austria.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the danger of German intrigue might be added.

President Wilson points out that these States form the material which Germany had worked on and used against the world. The principal Powers are entitled to see that there was no risk of a repetition of this. One argument which the principal Powers might find embarrassing is if they are asked whether they intend to impose a limitation of armaments on themselves. The reply would be, “Yes, the Council of the League of Nations is to present a plan”. To this the representatives of the Small States would reply “Are you bound to accept it” and the principal Powers would have to reply “No”.

M Clemenceau points out the much greater responsibilities of the principal Powers.

President Wilson strongly urges that in the first instance only one Statesman and no Military Adviser from each country should attend the meeting. Afterwards, they can discuss the question with their own Military Advisers, and the Military Experts of the principal Powers can discuss the question with the Military Experts of the Smaller States. He suggests that the figure for Austria might be settled at once and he proposed to adopt the figure of 40,000, proposed by the Military Representatives at Versailles.

M Clemenceau urges that this is a large figure in comparison with Germany.

President Wilson points out that the basis of the calculation had been 4 effectives per 1,000 of the population, a slight increase being allowed on account of Austria and Hungary, owing to the large populations of the capitals.

M Clemenceau said that Germany would use the argument to demand an increase in her strength.

Mr Lloyd George suggests a figure of 30,000.

(This is accepted.)

President Wilson suggests that the Military Experts should be instructed to draw up the Military Clauses for inclusion in the Austrian Treaty on this basis. He urges that there is no necessity in the case of Austria for the large amount of detail that was needed in the case of the German Treaty.

M Clemenceau agrees.

S Orlando agrees.

Mr Lloyd George agrees, but urges that Austria should not be allowed to manufacture guns. Conditions must be provided to prevent Austria from becoming a supply center to German Military activities.

President Wilson agrees, and says it is rather in such matters as the number of divisions of infantry and cavalry, etc., to which he referred.

The following decisions were taken:

1) The Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles should redraft the articles of the Military Terms to be included in the Treaty with Austria on the following bases:

(a) The strength of the Austrian effectives to be fixed at 30,000 (corresponding to the figure of 100,000 laid down for Germany):

(b) The articles to be drawn in more general terms than in the case of Germany and not to specify details such as organisation; precise number of infantry and cavalry divisions; the exact number of educational establishments, etc. etc. as laid down in the Treaty with Germany:

(c) Austria not to be permitted to manufacture guns, and provisions to be included for preventing Austria from becoming a manufacturing center for the supply of war material to Germany or other States.

2) The following representatives of States in Eastern Europe to be invited to meet the Council on the following afternoon at 4 p.m.:

Mr Paderewski for Poland
Dr Benes for Czecho-Slovakia
Mr Vesnitch for the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom
M Bratiano for Romania
Mr Venizelos for Greece.

The above statesmen to be informed:

(a) That the Council had decided to invite them to accept the following military establishments:

Austria 30,000
Hungary
Bulgaria 20,000
Czechoslovakia 50,000
Yugoslavia (including Serbia and Montenegro) 40,000
Romania 60,000
Poland 80,000
Greece 20,000

(b) That it was not proposed that their forces should be reduced to these establishments before January 1st, 1921 (by which time it was hoped that the ferment in Eastern Europe would have subsided) and that this was subject to the right of the Council of the League of Nations to postpone the date of reduction in any particular case if it considered the circumstances justified such postponement.

(c) That the reasons for these proposals were to limit the risk of an outbreak of war, whether between these States themselves, or by means of combinations of these States against other States, and to obviate the risk of any repetition of the German intrigues in Eastern Europe, which, in the past, had been such a fruitful cause of war.

(d) That the representatives would then be asked to confer with their Military Advisers, who might, if they wished, consult the Military Advisers of the Allied and Associated Powers.

6. The Council has before them a Note from the Drafting Committee urging that a new section similar to those relating to Czechoslovakia and the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State should be inserted for Romania, in consequence of the cession by Austria to Romania of the greater part of the Bukovina.

(The proposal is approved and initialed in manuscript by the Four Heads of States and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

7. Mr Lloyd George asks that action might be taken in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers by Marshal Foch to demand an apology from the Germans for the arrest of Naval Officers in Libau and at the same time he suggests that a demand should be made for the removal of the guns emplaced by the Germans in the harbor of Reval.

He reads a telegram which it is proposed that Marshal Foch should send to the Germans.

The telegram is approved, and M Clemenceau undertakes to instruct Marshal Foch to dispatch it.

8. During the above discussion M Clemenceau reads a letter from Marshal Foch advising that if pressure has to be put on the Germans to desist from action in the Baltic provinces of the former Russian Empire the best way would be by refusing to repatriate Germans from Salonika or else by tightening the blockade. He suggests that instructions should be given to the proper organisations to study these questions.

President Wilson raises the question as to whether the Armistice provides for the retirement of the Germans from the Baltic Provinces.

Sir Maurice Hankey then reads Article 12 of the Armistice of November, 1918:

“… and all the German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable having regard to the internal situation of these territories”.

President Wilson asks whether any demand has been made to the Germans to withdraw.

M Clemenceau undertakes to make inquiries on this point.

Jimbuna

06-05-19, 10:17 AM

5th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Britain: 104,743 officers and 2,725,403 other ranks demobilised to date.

30-year-old Adolf Hitler begins a course on politics at Munich University. Subjects include "German History Since the Reformation", "The Political History of the War", "Socialism in Theory and Practice" and "our Economic Situation and Peace Conditions"

Wounded American soldiers race each other outside a military hospital at Nantasket, Massachusetts.
https://i.imgur.com/deztbIL.jpg

Two tanks on Hohenzollern Bridge taking part in a procession and inspection officiated by the VI Corps Commander, General James Aylmer Haldane, outside Cologne Cathedral.
https://i.imgur.com/yWsyMrK.jpg

President of Paraguay, Manuel Franco, dies of a heart attack while in office.
https://i.imgur.com/2pwtGnH.jpg

Sailor Steve

06-05-19, 12:02 PM

Thursday, June 5, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. M Clemenceau reports that information has been received that the Magyars have attacked the Czechs, and that a very serious situation has been created. He proposes to follow the precedent of the fighting between the Magyars and the Romanians, and to refer the question to the Military representatives at Versailles.

(It is agreed that the Military representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles should be asked to advise as to the action to be taken to meet the situation created by the fighting between the Magyars and the Czechoslovak forces.)

2. S Orlando suggests that the question of the fighting in Carinthia should also be sent to Versailles.

President Wilson says that he has received a letter from S Orlando, suggesting that he should send an officer to Carinthia and he has replied that he would do so.

Mr Lloyd George says that in reply to a similar letter he had ordered a British General in that locality to proceed to Carinthia.

(It is agreed that the question should not be referred to the Military representatives at Versailles).

3. Sir Maurice Hankey reports that the Head of the British Military Section is pressing for the appointment of the Inter-Allied Military Supervisory Commission which would be set up under the Articles of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

(The question was postponed.)

4. (A stenographic report of Mr Paderewski’s evidence is contained in the records of the following meeting, but the following decision can be more conveniently recorded here.)

(In consequence of the representations by Mr Paderewski it is agreed to ask for a report from the Committee set up on the previous day (Dr Lord, Mr Headlam-Morley, General Le Rond, and Marquis della Torretta) as to whether the district of the coast frontier line in the region of Schildberg-Kempen-Kreutzburg should not with advantage be included in Poland).

Sailor Steve

06-05-19, 01:25 PM

Thursday, June 5, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:15

Meeting of the Council of Four with Ignacy Paderewski, Premier of Poland

President Wilson: We are trying to go over the various counter-proposals and objections made in the German reply to the treaty, and we learn from various sources that one of the parts of the treaty which troubles German opinion most is the Upper Silesia part and in general the Eastern Border, the border between Germany and Poland; and we therefore had that memorandum made by Sir Maurice Hankey sent you as an outline of what ought to be restudied, and we were very anxious to have your views upon the matter before going any further.

The main point, I take it, is not so much the slight redrawing of the boundary so as to leave as many Germans outside of Poland as possible, but the question of Upper Silesia. My own judgment is that, notwithstanding the fact that they admit that it has an overwhelming Polish population, the very great mineral riches of Silesia are of great concern to them. We have been considering a plebiscite under international supervision and under such rules as an international commission should set up, to get the German troops out and any German officials who might be interfering with it, and it was on that general series of subjects that we were anxious to have your views.

Mr. Paderewski: I beg to express first of all my sincere and deep appreciation of your thoughtful and gracious action in having me come here to be informed about your intentions. Of course, the destiny of my country is entirely in your mighty hands and you could have very well disposed of it without notifying me about these intentions. I beg to thank you most warmly and most sincerely indeed.

As to the plan as it has been presented to me, I have made some remarks. The general plan has been made in a very wise and just manner. There are, however, a few exceptions. In some districts the plan leaves a certain majority of German population in Polish hands, but in some others, and they are more numerous indeed, it leaves a great majority of Polish population in the German hands. So, if any correction is to be made, justice requires that the Polish majority should go to Poland, as well as the German majority shall go to Germany.

The President asks Mr Paderewski to begin with Silesia, as the ethnographic map which they were awaiting has not yet arrived.

Mr Paderewski: In Silesia there are two districts with a decidedly Polish majority, namely Gross Wartenberg and Namslau. On the other side there is a district wherein the majority is German, and that is the district of Loebschütz. The upper Silesian territory is divided into two sections, one of which, the eastern, is mining - industrial, and the other, the western pact, is agricultural. The western part of the Silesian territory is under the influence of the Catholic clergy. That Catholic clergy has been brought up in a very strong German spirit by the Archbishop of Breslau, and the influence of that clergy is most dangerous for us, because those people rule absolutely our people, and in the case of a plebiscite, they would, even in spite of our majorities, amount in many districts to ninety per cent arid more - they would decidedly follow the orders of that German clergy. From that point of view a plebiscite is absolutely impossible. In the eastern district the people, of course, are free from that influence; they are more conscious of their nationality and of their political aspirations, and they would, of course, declare themselves for Poland.

M Clemenceau: In what district is it that the Catholic clergy is so strong?

Mr Paderewski: In the western part of Silesia. In the eastern part the labor population - the workers, the miners - with them it is different. We are not afraid of that. The vote would be decidedly in our favor, but there would be some inconvenience in having that district alone assigned to us, because it would put the whole mining industry, the whole of those industrial plants, on the frontier. Consequently, they would be quite accessible to any invasion, accessible to the destruction of any gunshot. It is positively on the border. We could not really, if we were asked, agree to a plebiscite.

Mr Lloyd George: Where is the majority of the population? Is it in the west or the east?

Mr Paderewski: Almost equally divided. You may judge from this map. (Illustrating.)

Mr Lloyd George: Can you give me any idea what the population would be in the industrial and mining area, and what it is in the agricultural area?

Mr Paderewski: In the mining and industrial area, there would be about 900,000 of Poles and about 400,000 of Germans.

Mr Lloyd George: That would be 1,300,000. What is the population in the agricultural area?

Mr Paderewski: About 540,000. I could not tell you precisely these figures, but the population is twice as large in the industrial area. The whole population of Upper Silesia is 2,200,000, of which there are 1,500,000 Poles, and about 700,000 Germans.

Now as to the economic conditions as proposed in that little note, I think there would be no difficulty. We understand perfectly well. We have to exchange certain commodities of life and to oblige each other in every civilized and humane way. We do not object to those concessions.

Mr Lloyd George: If you have finished with Silesia, before the map comes, you might say something about Memel.

Mr Paderewski: Memel concerns Lithuania, and it is very dear to us. We have some trouble with Lithuania now, as we have had with every population which was formerly belonging to the Polish Republic, but we know to whom we owe these troubles - to the Germans - and we naturally understand it. Memel is on the Lithuanian territory, of course. It used to be called Klajpeda. It is a very important harbor, a harbor which is essential for Lithuanian life, and practically it would be the only real and strong harbor for a large population which is living principally on the export of timber. So it is of vital necessity for that country. I don’t think that Germany is in need of harbors. She has plenty of them. We don’t know yet what kind of status Eastern Prussia will have, whether it will form an integral part of the Prussian Monarchy or a part of the German Republic, or a republic in itself. It would really make things much clearer to the whole world if it had been stated in the preliminary conditions of peace.

Mr Lloyd George: I thought that we had made it quite clear that Eastern Prussia is to be an integral part of the German Republic.

The President: I don’t know that that is stated in the treaty, but that certainly was our purpose.

Mr Lloyd George: By the necessary operation of the treaty.

The President: In other words, it does not alter its status.

Mr Lloyd George: Is Memel a German town?

Mr Paderewski: The majority of these towns are German, but the rural district is mostly Lithuanian. There is another city on the River Niemen, Tilsit, which is also a Lithuanian city, though with the majority of the population of German origin - of German language anyhow, because a great many people in that country have been Germanized, and consequently their nationality is rather superficial.

Mr Lloyd George: Has the population outside been Germanized at all?

Mr Paderewski: Very little.

Mr Lloyd George: They are Lithuanians, then?

Mr Paderewski: Yes. The Lithuanians in Eastern Prussia are very conscious of their nationality, and they have even developed in the last few years a considerable literature. It is a very small population - about 2,200,000 in the whole.

Mr Lloyd George: It is really like setting up Wales as a separate republic - exactly the same population, 2,000,000.

Mr Paderewski: Mr. President and Gentlemen, I call your attention to the fact that the changes which you intend to introduce into the treaty might endanger the whole situation, not of my country alone, but of Eastern Europe. For the last few months Poland has been a stronghold of peace and order in the East. We have had no sign of revolution, no sign of Bolshevism, and if there is fighting, it is unfortunately fighting on the borders. It is not due to our people. It is due to the necessity of defending ourselves. We have not attacked anyone, and I am ready to prove the truth of my statement by facts and at any moment.

Mr Lloyd George: There was a telegram this morning which I read that you are still advancing in the Ukrainian part of Galicia.

Mr Paderewski: There is some misunderstanding concerning Ukraine and Galicia. There are two Ukraines and there is only one Galicia. The people in Galicia pretend to be Ukrainians on account of the similarity of their language with the real Ukrainian people. These people are not Ukrainians. They are under the influence of Germany. There is an accusation of the Poles persecuting the Ruthenians in Galicia. There is an influence there of Germany, there is an influence of Austria, and altogether the people are not in harmony with the real Ukrainia. Galicia represents a territory, a small territory comparatively speaking, with the population of 3,300,000 Ruthenians and 4,700,000 Poles. On the other side, there is the real Ukrainia, which represents eight provinces, each of them being much larger than Galicia itself; and there are two distinct governments. There is the former government of Stanislau, and the government of Ukrainia directorate formerly of Kiev and Odessa, and at last of Rovno, which is under the leadership of Petliura.

We have been asked to stop that fighting, or, to put it more clearly and precisely, I have been asked by General Bliss in behalf of you, Mr President, to agree to an armistice, which I did in principle. The Commission was appointed and some deliberations have taken place. Then I was told by you, Mr President, that I should avoid or prevent Haller’s army from taking any part in the fighting in Ukrainia, to which I also agreed and I notified the Government of Poland. I beg to call your attention to the fact that during the time the negotiations were going on for an armistice here in Paris, the bombardment of the unfortified city of Lemberg was still in progress, and that many people were being killed by these so-called Ukrainian Armies in Galicia. Upon my arrival in Warsaw, I went immediately to the chief of the state and told him about your wishes. Haller’s army was still in the neighborhood of Galicia, not in Galicia itself, but on the Volhynian front, and the offensive,—not the offensive, but rather the defensive advance, to put it properly, was ordered by General Iwaszkiewicz. When I was talking to the Chief of the State we received the telegram of General Pawlenko, the Commander of the Ukrainian forces, notifying us that the Ukrainian army would stop all the hostilities in view of the negotiations then taking place in Paris, and that they hoped on our side we should cease also every hostility. We gave orders to General Iwaszkiewicz to stop every preparation for that advance on the 11th of May. I must not forget that the situation of the country was really very dangerous. The excitement and the discontent of the people when they learned that the offensive was called off, and every movement against the Ukrainians was postponed, reached such a pitch that we were really on the verge of revolution. I called together all the leaders of the party and I offered them my resignation, which they, however, did not accept. Hundreds of meetings took place in the country protesting against that action and we were really in a very dangerous position. Fortunately, or unfortunately, however it may be called, on the 12th of May the Ukrainians, in spite of these telegrams sent to us, wanted to improve their position anyhow and they attacked us on two places which were quite new in their military action, but they attacked us also north of Lemberg. However decisive were our efforts, we could not keep back those boys of twenty years of age. They went on. They simply marched like a storm. They made thirty-five, forty kilometers a day without any opposition, and they took back that territory, and if you are interested in the fact that there should be no bloodshed in the country, I am able to tell you that the whole offensive in Galicia has not cost us a hundred people in killed and wounded. There were no battles. In many places, the population, stimulated by the news of Polish troops advancing, took the matter in hand themselves. The Polish population is very numerous there, about a third of the inhabitants being Poles - about thirty-seven percent.

Mr Lloyd George: Does Poland claim the whole of Galicia?

Mr Paderewski: Historically, yes.

Mr Lloyd George: Do they claim that the whole of Galicia should be annexed to them?

Mr Paderewski: We have given autonomy to this country. We claim the whole of Galicia. We claim it for the simple reason that it is absolutely impossible to define ethnographically this country, because, curiously enough, and we should rather be proud of the fact, in the center of Galicia there is more of a Ukrainian population than on the border. The farthest districts of Galicia are more Polish than the immediate surroundings of Lemberg. There isn’t a neighborhood of Lemberg which contains eighty percent.

The President: Pomerania is German, isn’t it?

Mr Paderewski: It has been Polish, but it is more German now. It has been Germanized.

The President: If Upper Silesia voted as a unit, do you think the influence of these portions (illustrating on map) would outvote that part?

Mr Paderewski: I am afraid it would.

I suppose that as the system of voting has been already adopted in Prussian Mazuria and in this part of Eastern Prussia, it should also be applied to Upper Silesia, by communes.

The President: Then your expectation would be that the agricultural communes would go to Germany?

Mr Paderewski: Yes.

The President: Then your frontier would probably be the Oder?

Mr Paderewski: Yes.

Mr Lloyd George: If you took the opinion of Silesia as a whole, it would be German?

Mr Paderewski: Yes, as a whole it would be German.

If there is any essential change in that which has been already granted to Poland, I should immediately resign, because I could not return to my country if there is any such change as a plebiscite here, or any essential change in the disposition of the territory which has been already made public as granted to my country. If there are such changes, I couldn’t have anything more to do with politics, because it would be absolutely impossible to rule my country. You know that revolutions begin when people lose faith in their leadership. These people have belief in me now, because they were told by me, and most emphatically, that these things promised to them would be given to them. Well now, if something is taken away from them, they will lose all faith in my leadership. They will lose faith in your leadership of humanity; and there will be revolution in my country.

Mr Lloyd George: No promises were made. We made certain proposals to the Germans. Nobody ever suggested that those were an ultimatum, and that the Germans must accept them, every line without alteration. We are actually considering now certain questions which affect my country and France. If we thought that this was an absolute ultimatum, there would be no use discussing it.

Here is Poland that five years ago was torn to pieces, under the heel of three great powers, with no human prospect of recovering its liberty; certainly without the slightest chance of recovering it by its own exertions. Why, during the four or five years of the war the Poles were actually fighting against their own freedom in so far as they were fighting at all. We were capturing Poles on the Western front, and capturing them on the Italian front. That was the condition of things. Now, you have got at the very least, even if you took every one of these disputed parts away, you have got twenty millions of Poles free, you have got an absolutely united Poland. It is a thing which no Pole could have conceived as possible five years ago; and in addition to that, they are claiming even populations which are not their own. They are claiming three millions and a half of Galicians, and the only claim put forward is that in a readjustment you should not absorb into Poland populations which are not Polish and which do not wish to become Polish. That is the only point that is put. The Poles had not the slightest hope of getting freedom, and have only got their freedom because there are a million and a half of Frenchmen dead, very nearly a million British, half a million Italians, and I forget how many Americans. That has given them their freedom, and they say they will lose faith in the leadership which has given them that, at the expense of millions of men of other races who have died for their freedom. If that is what Poles are like, then I must say it is a very different Poland to any Poland I ever heard of. She has won her freedom, not by her own exertions, but by the blood of others; and not only has she no gratitude, but she says she loses faith in the people who have won her freedom.

Mr Paderewski: I am very sorry I gave you that impression. Perhaps I did not express myself precisely enough. If I say that I would not be able to lead these people any more because they may lose faith in my leadership, I don’t mean to imply that they are losing faith in your leadership.

Mr Lloyd George: I was only referring to what you said. We won freedom for nations that had not the slightest hope of it - Czechoslovakia, Poland, and others - Nations that have won their freedom at the expense of the blood of Italians and Frenchmen and Englishmen and Americans. And we have the greatest trouble in the world to keep them from annexing other nations and imposing upon other nations the very tyranny which they have themselves endured for centuries. You know, I belong to a small nation, and therefore I have great sympathy with all oppressed nationalities, and it fills me with despair the way in which I have seen small nations, before they have hardly leaped into the light of freedom, beginning to oppress other races than their own. They are more imperialists, believe me, than either England and France, than certainly the United States. It fills me with despair as a man who has fought all his life for little nations.

Mr Paderewski: I beg to protest emphatically against the accusation that we are imperialists. I am a representative of a nation which has fought for liberty for others; where other nations were oppressed, Poland was always there to fight for liberty,—wherever liberty was fought for. As a proof, I may perhaps read to you the resolutions adopted by the Diet, which absolutely denies the accusation of imperialism. We are not imperialists and we do not want to annex any country or any people. We have never imposed upon any nation or foreign language. We never persecuted any religion. We never imposed upon the people different customs, and the proof of it is this, that after six hundred years of common life with primitive people, like the Lithuanians, like the Ruthenians, even like the Ukrainians, these people are still existing and even with our assistance, with our practical help, are regaining their individual character. These accusations are entirely based upon rumors which are spread by our enemies in the newspapers.

Mr Lloyd George: Newspapers attack me just the same.

Mr Paderewski: If we are fighting in Galicia, it is because we must defend ourselves. Yesterday, I received a letter from one of the noblest men in my country, though he is a Catholic archbishop. There are some Catholic people who are very honest and very good. I ask your permission to read it.

(Mr Paderewski reads the telegram, which requests him to protest to the Peace Conference against the outrages committed by the Ukrainian armies, the killing of defenseless priests, etc.)

Mr Paderewski: You wanted us to make an armistice with the Ukrainians in Galicia, and we thought that your information was not correct, that you had been misled by some reports; that the Ukrainians of Galicia were not the people to address for an armistice. Instead of addressing ourselves to a fraction of a nation, which represents only 3,300,000, we thought it would be better and more proper to talk to the people who represent 27,000,000. I think that we were right and this is the proof of it. This is a document which shows that we are not such imperialistic people. It reads as follows:

Mr Lloyd George: I ought to say that you and I have been very good friends, Mr Paderewski. I don’t want to have any dispute with you. What I mean by imperialism is the annexation of peoples of a different race against their will, or even a people of the same race against their will. I consider the annexation of Alsace, though the race was German, as culpable as the annexation of Lorraine, where the people were French. It is the annexation of people against their will, whether it is by a big race or a small race.

Mr Paderewski: Mr. Lloyd George, you admit that the representatives of a nation should be believed, if they speak as representatives, as of a constituent assembly of a country.

Mr Lloyd George: If they represent that particular population, certainly.

Mr Paderewski: The resolutions which have been unanimously adopted by our constituent assembly ought to be a proof of what our intentions are and what our character is, don’t you think so?

Mr Lloyd George: You mean that the intentions of the Poles are not imperialistic. I am just hoping that they will not be, and that they do not mean to annex foreign populations. That is all I want.

Mr Paderewski: They don’t; but you must find it natural that we try to protect people of our own speech and our own blood if they are attacked, if they are murdered, if they are slaughtered, in Ukrainia and by these people under the Bolshevist regime.

Mr Lloyd George: They are making the same accusations against your troops. I only saw a Ukrainian once. The only Ukrainian I have ever seen in the flesh was upstairs. I haven’t seen another. It is the last Ukrainian I have seen, and I am not sure that I want to see any more. That is all I know about it.

Mr Paderewski: On the day I left Warsaw a boy came to see me, a boy about thirteen to fourteen years old, with four fingers missing on this hand. He was in uniform, shot twice through the leg, once through the lungs, and with a deep wound in his skull. He was one of the defenders of Lemberg. Do you think that children of thirteen are fighting for annexation, for imperialists? I saw girls in the same position, also wounded through the chest, through the lungs, through the legs, also with fingers missing; they were all defending Lemberg. Do they fight for territory, or for oil, or for annexation, or for imperialism?

Mr Lloyd George: Lemberg, I understand, is a Polish city. They were undoubtedly fighting for a Polish city.

Mr Paderewski: There is one district near Lemberg which has an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians, but on the other side there are five big districts, at the extreme point of Galicia, which are overwhelmingly Polish. That is the reason why we consider it is so very difficult to decide that question.

I would like to read you the resolutions which will give you an idea about the character of my country:

“The Polish Republic aspires to be a factor of international peace, founded on the right of all nations to independence and self-determination.

Poland supports the idea of a League of free and equal nations, with the view of avoiding wars and of realizing lasting peace between nations.

The Polish Republic tends to the union of all Polish territories, and guarantees to all national minorities equal rights as well as national and cultural autonomy, on territories with mixed population. The Diet states that the principles expressed and supported with great moral courage by Mr. Wilson, President of the United States, have found a loud echo and appreciation in this country.

In accordance with these principles, the Republic aims at creating a peace with all states and nations, which will safeguard all important national and economical interests of the Polish nation.

It is the tendency of the Polish Republic to liberate the territories of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania from foreign oppression, and to render possible to the nations inhabiting these territories the exercise of the right of self-determination concerning their future, as well as their relation to the Polish State. The Republic tends to a junction with the nationalities of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania on the basis of mutual political, economical and cultural interests. The legal and political basis of this junction shall correspond to the right of all nations to determine their own future. The principle of self-determination must, accordingly, also be applied to that part of Lithuania and White-Ruthenia in their historical limits, in which the Polish population forms a majority and which aspires to a union with Poland.

The Diet declares that the Polish Republic does not intend to incorporate to the Polish State the territories of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania solely on the basis of a decision of the Polish Constitutional Assembly.

The Diet recognizes the application of the principle of self-determination to the nations of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania as stated in the report of the Commission for Foreign Affairs, voted by the Diet on April 4th, 1919, as well as stated in the proclamation of the Commander in Chief issued in Vilna on April 22, 1919, without precising, for the time being, the way in which this principle shall be applied.”

Mr Clemenceau: About the plebiscite: Let us suppose that we wouldn’t ask for a plebiscite immediately and that in the meantime the country would be occupied by troops of the Entente, suppose Americans, we should say, dont you think that then in that country there would be a great chance to have a fair vote?

Mr Paderewski: There will be a fair vote in that industrial part of Upper Silesia, but there will be no fairness in the western part, because the officials and the land owners, and the clergy especially, would take the matter in hand. And, besides, there is a tremendous element of provocation in that country already. They are trying to create a revolutionary movement in order to have an excuse for suppressing it. The Germans are shooting every day some guns.

Mr Lloyd George: That is an excuse for clearing them out.

Mr Paderewski: On the tenth of May there was a sitting in Berlin, at which were present the representatives of Saxony, of Bavaria, of Württemberg, of Baden, and all the ministers, of course - Mr Scheidemann - and a Colonel Hiser was the representative of the General Staff; and Mr Scheidemann said that their economical position was absolutely desperate, but their political situation had greatly improved on account of their secret treaty concluded with Trotsky. He said that Trotsky promised him all the assistance needed provided he would send immediately three thousand instructors - officers and sergeants - to Russia, which he did; whereupon Colonel Hiser confirmed that report, adding that the spirit of the troops at this very moment was just as good as in 1914 and that they expected to receive through their mobilization at least one million good troops. As to the others, they gave up the hope of making anything out of them, because they are too demoralized, but one million more men can be got at any moment. As to the munitions, they have been manufacturing them here (chiefly in these districts) in Upper Silesia, and the Chief factor is, of course, poisonous gases. We have had already, a few days ago, some experience with it, because they sent a few shots of poisonous gas into the villages and killed a great many people. The day before yesterday there was an attack made here (illustrating) on a village. Several peasants were killed and several houses destroyed. Of course, it is not yet real war, but there are symptoms, and at any moment war may be a reality. And we have no munitions. We have no equipment.

(End of meeting)

Sailor Steve

06-05-19, 03:32 PM

Thursday, June 5, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:15

Meeting of the Council of Four with the Representatives of:

Czechoslovakia
Dr Benes

Greece
Mr Venizelos

Poland
Mr Paderewski

Romania
Mr Bratiano
Mr Misu

Serbia
Mr Vesnitch

1. President Wilson says that when the Council came to the problem of fixing the military establishments for Austria, it had realized the difficulty of discussing the question with the Austrians unless, at the same time, the military establishments to be maintained by the group of States surrounding Austria are considered. Greece, obviously, is included in the group, and it has now become apparent that an attempt must be made to solve the question. The first step is to invite the Council of Military Advisers of the Supreme War Council to make suggestions. They have taken for their basis such matters as population, frontiers and the distribution of the population: they have further adopted the principle that States containing one or more very great cities should be allowed larger forces than States where the population was less concentrated, in order to provide against disorder. The first figures proposed by the Military Representatives contemplate 40,000 for Austria. This seems to the Council disproportionately large for a nation of 8,000,000 or 9,000,000, when Germany, with a population of 60,000,000, is only to have a force of 100,000 men. The Military Representatives have also made proposals as regards the forces of Hungary and Bulgaria, who cannot be represented, of course, today, and the remainder of the Group. He and his colleagues had seen at once that no attempt could be made to solve the difficulty without first consulting and getting the views of the representatives of the States concerned. They have it in mind that it is one thing to fix the details of a permanent peace settlement and another thing to carry it out. They think, however, that it might be possible to reach a definite limitation of armaments on a definite date, for example, January 1st, 1921, unless the Council of the League of Nations should think the grounds sufficient to postpone it. This is only one of several suggestions. The figures of the Military Representatives had been based on a calculation of 4 effectives per 1,000 of the population, although, in Austria and Hungary which contain immense cities like Vienna and Budapest, a slightly larger proportion had been allowed.

Mr Vesnitch says that the program is, for his country, of the highest importance. For the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, he must confess the proposals came quite as a surprise. His Delegation feels bound to put the question of how matters of such importance for Allied States who had fought side by side with the larger Powers could be decided as part of the settlement with the enemy. This gives him serious preoccupation. A second and equally important point is the tendency to diminish and even to annihilate the sovereignty of the smaller States. In entering the war, one of the things for which his country had fought was to obtain for the small States the same freedom, the same right of organization and the same juridical equality as has been recognised as just ever since international law had existed. His Delegation is seriously afraid - and he is speaking in the name of the whole people - that if at this moment before the League of Nations had taken its standing, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State is obliged to accept such an acknowledgment as is now proposed, it would surely be condemned by the people. It would be impossible to obtain powers of ratification for the Treaty. He finds himself confronted with a difficulty which might perhaps be avoided if it were not connected with the limitation of armaments of Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. Up to now, the limitation of armaments had been laid down for Germany and for no other country, great or small. If the proposals envisaged in President Wilson’s remarks are brought forward now, the Allied States of central Europe would find themselves in a less good position than even Neutrals who had remained out of the war. Consequently, without insisting further on the subject, he, in the name of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, must make all reserves even on the principle. Should the Great Powers, however, be decided, (and he hopes they are not), to press this matter, then he must reserve the right of discussing the proportion of the military forces of his own country. His Government regarded it as the gravest necessity to protect the external as well as the internal peace of the State.

Mr Venizelos says that the limitation of armaments is one of the great common hopes which animate all, and he hopes that it will become a reality. He will be very disappointed if, after all the sacrifices which have been made, the same Armies are maintained as before the war. He must acknowledge however, that Mr Vesnitch’s remarks have made a considerable impression upon him. If it is contemplated now to have the forces of the States with special interests fixed to a certain standard after some particular date, for example, January 1st 1921, it would seem better to await the functioning of the League of Nations. So far as Greece is concerned, he would declare now that she would pay the most earnest attention to the recommendations of the Council of the League of Nations. In this order of ideas, he supports the general views of M. Vesnitch and suggested that the question should be remitted to the Council of the League of Nations.

Mr Bratiano begins by thanking the Council for examining the question in this manner, so that he was able to state the views and interests of his own country in the most frank but in the most amicable fashion. He desires to affirm the sympathy he feels for the manner in which Mr Vesnitch and Mr Venizelos have presented the case. As a question of principle, it is agreed that there should be a limitation of armaments, and, in bringing this about, the League of Nations would have a great role to play. Allusion has been made to the limitation of armaments of States with special interests. This is a term that has been found useful in the present Conference, and certainly these States might be said to have a more limited influence than the great States. Nevertheless, their influence is more extended and more complicated than would appear from merely looking at the map. He is only speaking for Romania’s interests, but the limitation of armaments in Romania cannot be considered only in relation to the armaments of Austria, who have not even a common boundary with her territory. Has the Military Representatives at Versailles considered the special situation of each country? It is not merely a matter of the number of towns in a country. Other considerations must not be forgotten - the neighbors and the nature of the frontiers. If frontiers are open, the defensive forces must be larger. The frontiers of Romania, however, are still unsettled, so that the military establishments cannot yet be fixed. On the other hand, Romania is actually in a state of war formally declared on her by the Bolshevists both of Russia and Hungary. It is a good thing to disarm the police, but the thieves must be disarmed first. Who would charge himself with this duty? On the Eastern frontier, Romania does not know whether she would have as neighbor the Ukraine or a great United Russia. How then can the question be solved at the present time? It cannot be decided in relation to Austrian armaments, since Austria is not a neighbor, but must be settled in connection with Russian armaments. The effectives could not be considered until an answer can be given as to what would be the status of Russia, the strength of her forces and her relation to the League of Nations. That is why, though sympathetic to the principle of the limitation of armaments, he thinks the question cannot be settled now. Consequently, he rallies to the views of Mr Vesnitch and Mr Venizelos.

Dr Benes thanks the Council for the opportunity of expressing his views. He wishes to explain the special position of his Government in regard to this question. There are several points on which Czechoslovakia has a peculiar point of view. His Government has already taken decisions which correspond to the idea of the limitation of armaments. Their general intention and policy is to work out a constitutional system similar to that in operation in Switzerland. This applies also to military matters. Their geographical situation is similar to that of Switzerland and the system is suitable, specially when the fact of their considerable German population is taken into account, and the people of Czechoslovakia would be satisfied with it. Hence, the policy of his Government fundamentally corresponds to the principle of the limitation of armaments. He then explains why he inclines to the same view as the Heads of Central European States who had already spoken. First, there is the general situation of Central Europe, which compels all the countries situated therein to take special measures. Austria is gone, but, in deciding on the limitation of armaments, it is impossible to overlook Russia, and the Neutral States, or, for that matter, the Western Powers. In Bohemia, the question will be asked “What is to be the future of Germany and Russia?" The question is unanswerable. In these conditions, it is difficult to take measures which would aggravate and alarm public opinion.

Measures must not be taken which the inhabitants of Bohemia would consider to place them in a less favorable position than Holland and Switzerland. It would increase the anxiety of the people. Hence he believes it dangerous to consider the question from the local point of view, that is to say, the point of view of Central Europe. Limitation of armaments must be considered as a world question. A situation might arise which might be more difficult and uncertain for all the Nations even than the present. A second point is that if it were laid down that Czechoslovakia were to have an Army of such and such a size the Government would be placed in a difficult situation because in the Czechoslovakian State while there is a strong tendency towards disarmament, at the same time the people are in complete uncertainty as to the future of Germany and Russia, and they are actually being attacked by the Magyars. Hence, to commence now would bring dangerous consequences with it.

To sum up he considers that to put the limitation of armaments in force at present would be very dangerous, and that the question should be discussed on a general basis as a world question by the League of Nations. He would deprecate any immediate decision.

Mr Paderewski says that contrary to opinions that have been expressed in some quarters, Poland has no idea of defying the authority of the Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. In this and in all other matters Poland relies on their wisdom and equity and awaits their final decision with perfect confidence. Technically, the Polish Army is no longer under the control of the Polish Government. It has been placed under Marshal Foch who ought to be consulted on the question. As representing the Government of the Polish State, he could declare that his Government will support most cordially every measure for the limitation of armaments. They consider as a benefit for the country and people everything which tends to relieve them from the burden which they have so long borne. While associating himself with the distinguished speakers who had preceded him, he would wish to call attention to the peculiar position of Poland. The situation is even more critical than that of Romania which Mr Bratiano had described. Poland is menaced greatly by Germany, not only on the west and on the north-west, but in the country itself. From 300,000 to 350,000 German soldiers were concentrated round Poland in Upper Silesia, Posnania, East Prussia and Lithuania. The monster had been wounded but not killed, and is still very much alive. There is no actual war, but skirmishes take place every day, and these, together with reports of bombardments, slaughter of peasants, gassing of villagers, and persons being killed contributed to a continual excitement. On the other side Poland is not menaced but forced by circumstances to be at war with Bolshevik Russia and Ukrainia. On the western side of Germany the German forces are not yet entirely controlled by the Allied and Associated Powers, and on the eastern frontiers of Poland the Peace Conference exercises no authority whatsoever. Hence, he is obliged to ask that the principal Powers in case of disarmament would undertake to protect Poland against Russia and Germany.

President Wilson says he has been much impressed by the spirit of the views expressed and by their definiteness. There has been brought to the surface not merely local, but general difficulties. It is these considerations which have induced him and his colleagues to make the suggestion that the day of the limitation of armaments should be postponed for the present, and that the possibility of further postponement should be provided for. All recognize the danger of present circumstances to the States of Central Europe. He felt that after hearing these views he would have to think the whole matter over again.

Mr Lloyd George agrees with what had fallen from President Wilson. He is greatly impressed by what has been said by the representatives of the Central European States. He had already had the advantage of discussing the matter with Dr Benes, who has convinced him that as Mr Paderewski had pointed out limitation of armament was out of the question until the present dangers have passed. But as President Wilson had said there had been no idea in the mind of him and his colleagues to reduce the defense against these dangers. The problem which faces them is the amount of armaments to be allowed to Austria and Hungary. It has been decided to render them impotent. They are carving out practically new countries. He would remark to Mr Vesnitch that the conditions are not similar to those of Holland. Serbia is trebling the size of her kingdom. The problem is as to the conditions which were to be insisted on in a delimitation of a territory which will add enormously to the size of Serbia and Romania. The problem is the same as had faced the negotiators of the Treaty of Berlin, that is to say, new States will be created, and conditions have to be laid down to secure the peace of the world. That is why it is thought necessary in carving out new states from old Empires not to leave them at the mercy of neighbors with unlimited armies. There is no idea at all of interfering with defensive necessities, but merely whether in imposing on the enemy the delimitation of armaments, the principle should not be extended to the neighboring States. The argument presented by the statesmen present is very powerful and clever, but he and his colleagues have no idea of any interference with sovereignty. They are engaged in rearranging Central Europe and the Turkish Empire and they do not wish to create new forces of danger. Moreover they will not impose conditions they were unwilling to accept themselves. After peace is signed there will be a great reduction in the military forces of the British Empire. The Romanian army will almost certainly be larger than the British, and probably the same could be said of the Polish.

Mr Paderewski points out that Great Britain does not have to “fight the water” on its frontiers.

M Clemenceau says he does not speak to contradict anyone, but agrees in all that has been said. The Central European situation justifies all the statements made. He thinks that all are agreed in principle. No one had asked him to reduce the French army, but he can assure those present that this is one of the first questions that will have to be considered after peace is made. Even if France wishes to maintain her army, economic considerations and the need to concentrate all efforts in the economic field will impose it on her. One thing that strikes him in the observations of Mr Vesnitch - he had stated it with moderation and with tact - is that the principal Powers in their hour of victory ought not to discuss the limitation of the armaments of their Allies in relation to the limitation of Austria’s armaments. This is not certainly the principle which had inspired them. They are imposing terms on Austria, but discussing with their friends and Allies what reduction they can agree to among themselves. In order to insure permanent peace nothing is more important than to maintain the accord of the victorious Powers, and he hopes that his friends of Central Europe would recognize this. He himself will always remain faithful to this idea. If the Council were to start from the idea of the limitation of armaments of Austria, and keep in view the idea of a reduction of armaments, he thinks that this is almost all that can be done at the moment. It is impossible to overlook what Mr Bratiano and Mr Paderewski had urged with regard to the dangers of their countries. The Czechoslovaks are in the same case, and are now being attacked by the Hungarians. Some time ago the Allies had discussed whether they could not settle matters finally with Hungary, and the Commander-in-Chief of the French army in the East had been consulted. He had produced a scheme, the extent of which had rather alarmed the Council. Then they had heard that the Romanians were advancing, but Mr Bratiano when questioned had said this information was not correct. Today the situation is changed, the Czechs are being attacked by the Magyars. It might be necessary to take some action and the military representatives at Versailles might probably very soon propose some combined operation. Mr Paderewski had stated a formidable figure for the German forces on the Polish frontier, but unfortunately this corresponded with French information, except that the French gave the forces as 300,000 and not 350,000. What was the reason of this concentration? Crushed in the West, Germany is seeking expansion in the East, first military and then economic. If Germany gets control of Russia the war will have been lost. The Germans in Silesia are not there for a parade. Will the Germans sign the Treaty? Even if they do he is not sure that they would evacuate this territory. With 350,000 soldiers on the Polish frontier he is convinced, like all present, that the moment for limitation of armaments has not come. He himself has always been an enemy of war, although he has been dragged into it a great deal, but he would today take a solemn engagement before all that it will not be France who will provoke a future war. The sentiments of Great Britain and the United States in this matter are well known. They are entirely pacific. Nevertheless it is essential not to create a situation, of which some great Power in a spirit of aggression would take advantage. Supposing all are not in agreement on this question. It is mathematically certain that the war would cease before the limitation of armaments could begin, and he is by no means sure that peace itself would begin with the signature of the Treaty. He thinks, therefore, the best plan would be to decide to take a mutual obligation by the great and little Powers to settle these questions when the right time comes. He is a partisan to fixing a date, but he does not think it is possible to fix it at present. We do not know what would happen to Germany nor to Hungary. It is certain that when the time comes the League of Nations will play a great role in the question of disarmament; hence he thinks that either the League of Nations or, if preferred, the Great Powers, should ultimately hold a conference to fix the military establishments. He has full confidence in the League of Nations which has a great task before it, but the war is not yet at an end. Poles, Czechs, Magyars, are all fighting. When all this fighting is over, and people have resumed their normal occupations and life had quieted down, then it would be a splendid example to the world to hold a conference to consider the question of international disarmament.

S Orlando says he really has nothing to add to what his colleagues had said, and he only speaks at all in case his silence should be misunderstood. All are in agreement, and no one has any idea of limiting in any humiliating way the sovereignty of nations which have combined to bring about this great victory. He cannot but recognize the gravity of the situation. In saying this he has in mind the suggestion that has been made that even January 1921 is too early a date to commence limitation of armaments. In certain cases, however, it might be possible to postpone disarmament. For the moment disarmament is rather a technical than a political question. If the proportion of four effectives to one thousand of the population is taken as a basis it will be found that before the war the peace establishment of the Italian army had closely corresponded to it. He thinks the discussion has been a very valuable one, although skeptical people say a discussion teaches nothing. He himself has been much impressed by what he has heard. For the moment he will limit himself to what Mr Bratiano had said, namely, that the question of the limitation of armaments cannot be settled when frontiers have not been delimited. According to the nature of the frontier the military forces would be greater or smaller. He is in full accord with all that his colleagues had said, and he thanks his colleagues representing the States of Central Europe for their very valuable contribution to the discussion.

Jimbuna

06-06-19, 06:18 AM

6th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Finland declares war on Bolshevist Russia.

Russian prisoners of war in Guben, Germany wait in line to receive hot water.
https://i.imgur.com/bumsLNj.jpg

Nicole Girard-Mangin, the first female doctor to serve in the French Army, has passed away. She served at Verdun, where she was also wounded.
https://i.imgur.com/hIf2K6t.jpg

Sailor Steve

06-06-19, 01:25 PM

Friday, June 6, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Three

1. M Clemenceau says he has arranged to send General Haller to Carinthia. He asks what his mission will be.

President Wilson says merely to be present when the Armistice was patched up between the Austrians and the Yugoslavs.

2. M Clemenceau hands to Sir Maurice Hankey the first part of a reply from Admiral Kolchak, to be translated and circulated.

3. President Wilson says he has received a letter from S Orlando, in the sense that, in the course of his conversation with the President, S Orlando has assumed that M Tardieu’s proposal does not exclude Italy from advising what frontiers it considered to be advisable and fair for the new State of Fiume to have. This, of course, is an impossible proposal. He himself had understood S Orlando to say that he assumes that the map does not show the final drawing of the frontier in detail and had thought he only referred to the establishment of the details of the boundaries by the Boundary Commission, or some body of that kind. He had never thought he had alluded to serious changes in the boundaries. This shows the inconvenience of having to work through an interpreter. Earlier in the discussions when his colleagues of the American Delegation had met the Yugoslavs to put the Tardieu proposal to them, S Orlando had come and said that it would ease the situation if Fiume were made an independent city. President Wilson had replied that in that case there was no object in having a Free State. S Orlando’s only argument had been that it would make it easier with public opinion in Italy. He only mentioned this to show that at present there is apparently nothing fixed in S Orlando’s mind, which is quite fluid on the subject.

President Wilson then produces a map showing the Yugoslav counter-proposals to the Tardieu scheme.

He says that this proposal by the Yugoslavs is in line with the other settlements made in the Treaty of Peace, whereas the Italian proposals are not. S Orlando, he continues, in the course of subsequent conversation, insisted that the junction of Assling must go to Italy. He then produces an Italian ethnographical map prepared by the Italian expert Marinelli before the war. According to this map the Southern portion of Cherso and one spot on the island of Veglia were Italian. The island of Lussin was entirely Italian. This was a non-partisan map, prepared before the present war. He personally was of opinion that the Yugoslav proposal seems fair. He had been much impressed on the previous day of a Slovene Delegation that had come to see him on the subject of Klagenfurt. They had pointed out that in former days, in spite of the oppression of Austrian rule, nevertheless the Slovene population had succeeded in maintaining itself as a unit. Now it is to be divided relatively into small pieces. Those Slovenes who lived on the western side of the Italian Alps were coming under Italian rule. This they had realized is unavoidable. Then an additional number in the Tarvis region were placed under Italian rule. Further to the north a pocket of Slovenes was placed under Austrian rule. And now they say it was to be debated as to whether Klagenfurt is to be under Austrian rule. He had explained what was proposed about Klagenfurt, and thought they were satisfied on that point. Nevertheless, he had been touched by their humility. Their attitude made him feel that the liberation of the Yugoslavs must be a real liberation. What Italy really cares for is not the islands but only Fiume.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that the Adriatic coast is of real military importance to Italy. During the war they had only been able to run the railway along the eastern coast of Italy for military purposes, and with the risks that soldiers always had to run. Civilian traffic had practically been brought to a standstill, because the Austrian Navy, though inferior to the Italian, was able to send fast vessels across to make raids on the coast.

President Wilson says the Italians are not afraid of the Yugoslav fleet. What they are afraid of is that Yugoslavia might form an alliance with a Naval Power. The only possible Naval Powers are France and Great Britain.

Mr Lloyd George says there is one Power which is constantly overlooked in this Conference, namely Russia. At the moment it has gone to pieces but in five years who can tell what it will be.

President Wilson suggests that Russia will be bottled up, owing to the fact that some other Power would hold the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

Mr Lloyd George says that France is most afraid of the Teuton, but his view is that the Teuton was largely done for. The nation he fears is the Slav, which is an incalculable factor, capable of following the instructions of a dictator or becoming Bolshevik. If some powerful, capable, ambitious man arises in Russia the Slav race might become a great danger. Moreover, there is a very close feeling between Russia and the Southern Slavs. Serbia has always been treated as a younger brother by Russia. If he were Italian he would feel much happier if the islands in the Adriatic were not Slav. He thinks this is a factor that ought to be taken into account.

President Wilson agrees that all arguments ought to be taken into account. The Slavs, however, have nowhere shown the organisation that made the Teuton so dangerous. The German has been the best trained instrument that the world had ever seen for carrying out German policy. Behind it all was a full generation of thorough education. Russia could not get that for years and years. He himself had been trained with people who had had their training in Germany. They had revisited Germany and had been horrified. They had found that the old intellectual freedom of the German University was gone. There had been a systematic direction of the whole education of the country, down to the primary schools always inculcating and promoting the policy which was aimed at. They had even gone to the length of teaching false facts in the schools. If Russia were ever to get an educational system comparable to that of Germany and should impregnate the whole country as Germany had done with Slav ambitions, she might become very dangerous. At present, however, Russia is entirely illiterate.

Mr Lloyd George points out that Napoleon, with an illiterate population, had marched to every capital in Europe.

President Wilson says also that a great industrial development is necessary for the creation of a native-built fleet. We know that Russia cannot place orders for any great naval development in Western countries. The United States had had a great development of mercantile ship-building during the war, and is full up with orders for years to come. Russia is not developed as a shipbuilding country, and the development cannot take place within a generation. The central fact is that the population of mujiks is so ignorant that communications to it could only be made by word of mouth. The United States had sent out YMCA men as propagandists, the only effective means of propaganda being pictures and conversations through interpreters. He thought it would be necessary to watch the development of the Russian people very carefully. But it would be a mistake to assume this possible development as the basis of the present treaty, and this would only cause exasperation with the Slavs.

Mr Lloyd George says he is satisfied that the transfer of the islands contemplated in the Treaty of London to Italy would not involve the transfer of any large population. The only danger to Italy is that these islands and ports might become nests for submarines. Russia is not in the League of Nations, and there is no control over her. He recalls that twice within modern times Great Britain had been in danger of war with Russia, first in Lord Beaconsfield’s time - but, of course, he was very Turcophile - and later when Gladstone was Prime Minister. In spite of the fact that Mr Gladstone was very pro-Russian, the Penjdeh incident had almost brought on war, and Mr Gladstone had had to go to the House of Commons for a vote of credit. This showed the danger of Russia when in the hands of dangerous bureaucrats. Now new great Slav States were being created, and Russia might eventually dominate 160 millions of people. If Kolchak got to Moscow this year, the situation might even begin to develop. The Teutons had at best 70,000,000. He hoped that the danger which M Clemenceau had mentioned on the previous day would not be under-estimated, namely that the organizing ability of the Teutons would be brought to re-organize Russia. Nothing in the Treaty could stop this. In Germany there are hundreds of thousands of men trained for war and nothing else, for whom in the collapse of German industry it would be difficult to find anything to do. These people would seek employment in Russia and with the Teutonic gift of organisation behind her Russia might become very formidable. This is why Italy has reason to apprehend the proximity of great Slav States. Bigger things than these Islands are being given away.

President Wilson says not for strategic reasons. Even in the case of the Alps the reason is not strategic. A great barrier like the Alps forces a certain economic unity. He recalls that the Council had spent hours in arguments in favour of giving the Rhine as a frontier of France, and from the strategic point of view the various arguments of Marshal Foch were unanswerable, but at one time he recalled that M Clemenceau had wanted to create a buffer state for strategic reasons between Germany and France. But when he came to view the whole situation after talking it over with his colleagues M Clemenceau had agreed that this would not be consistent with the principles on which peace was being made. When in this much more important case to France, strategic principles had been cast aside, how could the principles be applied in a different way now?

Mr Lloyd George says that it only involves a very small transfer of population. In reply to M Clemenceau he says he is in favour of the Tardieu proposal. This gets over a difficulty in which France and Great Britain are as regards the Treaty of London.

President Wilson says that the moment S Orlando refused to give Fiume to the Yugoslavs they were free of the Treaty of London. He says that the Yugoslavs urged that if strategical considerations applied for Italy, they applied equally for Yugoslavia.

Mr Lloyd George points out that they do not apply to the same extent. In the present war a possibility has been carefully studied of entering Austria from the Adriatic, but it had not been found possible to do so; even from Ragusa where there was some sort of a railway. The country is too steep and difficult.

President Wilson points out that if the Italians are given the Island of Cherso, the Yugoslavs contend that it would bottle up Fiume. The Italian commercial interests of Trieste are determined to stifle Fiume and that is the basis of the argument for the Assling Junction.

Mr Lloyd George urges the importance of a settlement, as S Orlando has to go back to Italy next week. If some settlement cannot be reached it is doubtful if he can remain in office.

M Clemenceau asks if any figures are available as to the population of the Islands.

President Wilson produces a map which gives the population of Cherso as, Italian 2,200; Yugoslav 5,816. As regards Sebenico the town contained 858 Italians and 9,031 Yugoslavs, while the judicial district contained 873 Italians and 36,177 Yugoslavs.

M Clemenceau says he is willing to give Zara to the Italians, but he would object to Sebenico. He thinks if this plan is adopted both sides would be satisfied. Sebenico should, of course, go to the Slavs.

President Wilson suggests that Sebenico should be Slav and that Zara should be a free city represented in its foreign relations by Italy. The Italians spoke vaguely of a hinterland for Zara.

Mr Lloyd George says he will not give any hinterland.

M Clemenceau says he will not either.

President Wilson urges the importance of insisting on free and undiscriminating access by railway to the port of Fiume on the same terms for all the countries concerned. He is afraid attempts might be made to colonize the state of Fiume with other nations.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Yugoslav population said that this would be impossible.

President Wilson says that the Italians are insisting on what is called the corpus separatum for the town of Fiume. As far as he could learn the Italian majority in Fiume was not an influential majority. The Italians consist of small shopkeepers, and the rank and file of the population, whilst the big interests, including the bank and shipping interests were Yugoslav. Mr Trumbitch had given him information to this effect, which is confirmed from independent sources.

Mr Lloyd George urges that it is important not to cripple the development of the new state. If the result of the creation of the new state is a great increase in business, the Italians might refuse to carry out the necessary technical works, such as the provision of wharves and cranes.

President Wilson says the most important thing is to lengthen the existing mole. It already runs out into 100 feet of water, and consequently it is a big work to extend it.

Mr Lloyd George says this shows Fiume is a bad port. Buccari seems more promising, and he thinks the Yugoslavs could probably make a port there.

President Wilson says the difficulty there is that the mountains are so steep that the terminus of the railway would actually have to be hewn out of the rock. It is a choice between the construction of the very difficult breakwaters of Fiume and elaborate tunnels and railway works at Buccari.

(President Wilson undertakes to draft in general terms proposals based on the discussion of that morning which he would communicate to Experts to formulate in more precise terms. His proposals would include the creation of a free state in Fiume commencing in the north from the point where the line of the Treaty of London joined the American line, and extending the Tardieu line so as to include the islands of Cherso as well as Veglia.)

4. Mr Lloyd George reads a telegram from the British High Commissioner at Constantinople. This telegram points out that the French High Commissioner when communicating, as instructed by M Clemenceau, on behalf of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, their acceptance of the Grand Vizier’s proposal to come to Paris, conveys the impression that this is done as a result of his own representations and those of the French Government. And further, that it has been followed up by a special message from the President of the Republic to the Crown Prince of Turkey forwarded by M Pichon conveying the same impression.

M Clemenceau recalls his own share in the transaction. He was first told that the Turks wished to come to Paris. He had given instructions that the French High Commissioner was to be instructed not to discourage them. Then he brought the Dispatch to the Council and Mr Lloyd George had drafted an answer which had been agreed to.

M Pichon had sounded him as to whether he should take the attitude that the French were in favour of it. He had told M Pichon that no special advantage was to be taken of this by France. He asked Sir Maurice Hankey to give him a paraphrase of the telegram, and he undertook to inquire into the matter.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

06-06-19, 04:14 PM

Friday, June 6, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. (Mr Norman Davis is present during this discussion.)

The Council has before them a draft of the Political Clauses for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria.

Mr Norman Davis explains that originally there had been thirty-five Articles in the first Draft. These had been referred to an Economic group consisting of members of the Economic Commission and the Reparation Commission. They had found that the first eleven clauses were entirely political in character, and had concerned themselves with the last twenty-four which, as a result of their discussions, had been reduced to thirteen.

President Wilson says that he was informed by the American experts that the subject of this clause had already been considered by the Reparation Commission and rejected. It has now reappeared in the present draft. The effect would be to leave Austria-Hungary without sufficient rolling stock to carry on.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is either a reparation demand or armistice demand and ought not to appear in this section of the Treaty.

S Orlando explains that restitution of this kind had been provided for in the case of France and Belgium in the terms of the armistice. The Austrian armistice had been drafted before the German armistice and this point had been overlooked. All that Italy asks is that she should now be put in the same position as regards railway material as France and Belgium had been put by the armistice.

President Wilson points out that by the terms of the German armistice definite quantities of rolling stock had been demanded. This demand was without any limit.

Mr Lloyd George points out that all the wagons would be taken away from one nation of only 9 millions of people whereas the other States which had constituted the Austro-Hungarian Empire are equally concerned. He agrees that Italy ought to have restitution for the actual rolling stock taken.

Mr Davis agrees that they should get restitution of the articles actually taken away from them. In this clause, however, they demanded the equivalent though the actual articles could not be identified. This is the same question that had been fought out before the Reparations Committee and the same demand had been made by France, Belgium and Romania. It had been found necessary, however, to limit them to reclaiming the actual articles taken away, which could be identified and not to allow the equivalent to be taken.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that if the actual rolling stock could be traced, it should be returned, but this claim on the small Austrian Republic to return all the wagons taken by the Austro-Hungarian Empire is too much. He suggests to S Orlando that the last half of Article 20 commencing with the words “A défaut” should be omitted. If after consulting with his experts, he wishes to alter this decision he could raise the question again at the Council.

S Orlando accepts this proposal.

Sir Maurice Hankey points out that this Article, which had been reserved for agreement between the British and Italian Delegates, has now been completed and is given in English at the end of the appendix. The revised Article had only reached him after the remainder had been reproduced and he had instructed that it should be added at the end.

There is some discussion as to what action should be taken as regards the Political Clauses.

Sir Maurice Hankey recalls that it had been desired to deal very rapidly with these Clauses and consequently instead of referring them to a special Commission each member of the Council had undertaken to consult his own expert so as he could deal with it himself. Afterwards, however, it had been found necessary to refer the later Clauses to technical Commissions and thus it came about that there had been no comprehensive consideration of the first eleven Clauses.

(It is decided to refer the question to a special Commission.)

The conclusions of this discussion are as follows:

1) Clauses 12–24 are approved, subject to the following alteration in Article 20:

2) The last half of Article 20 beginning with the words “A défaut” to be omitted, subject to the right of S Orlando to raise the question again if, after consultation with his experts, he finds it necessary. Article 20 would therefore read as follows: "L’Autriche restituera à l’Italie, dans un délai de trois mois tous les wagons appartenant aux [Page 221]chemins de fer italiens qui, avant le début de la guerre, étaient passés en Autriche et qui ne sont pas rentrés en Italie."

("Austria will restore in Italy, within three months all wagons belonging to Italian railways which, before the beginning of war, had passed in Austria and that did not come back to Italy.")

3. The first eleven Clauses are referred to the following Committee:

For the United States of America: Mr Lansing, or a representative nominated by him.

For The British Empire: Mr Balfour, or a representative nominated by him.

For France: M Pichon, or a representative nominated by him.

For Italy: Baron Sonnino, or a representative nominated by him.

2. President Wilson reads an extract from a letter he had received from the United States member of the Polish Commission stating that the Commission had made no progress with regard to the German Treaty because the British Member had declined to discuss the question.

Sir Maurice Hankey says he has reason to believe that the reason of this is that the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had set up a Special Committee to work out certain modifications in the German Treaty and the British representative, having knowledge of this, had thought it would be inconvenient if two bodies were at work on the same subject.

President Wilson agrees that this is a right attitude.

(It is agreed that the Polish Commission should for the present reserve taking action with regard to the German Treaty, leaving the matter in the hands of the Special Committee.)

(Mr Norman Davis then withdraws.)

3. President Wilson reads a report by the Committee on New States, raising the question of whether appeals to the League of Nations in the matter of minorities should be allowable by any member of the League of Nations, or only by a member of the Council of the League.

He says that the importance of the question will be appreciated by remembering how sensitive Mr Bratiano, Mr Pasitch, and other representatives of the States with special interests have shown themselves to the idea of anything being imposed by the larger Powers. If the right of appeal to the League of Nations is confined to members of the Council, he thinks that it would rather increase and perpetuate this feeling. It would mean that only the representatives of the Great Powers and the representatives of the few other States, who, for the time being are members of the Council, would have the right to call attention to these matters. This would place these nations in a supervising position, and would tend to increase the sensitiveness of the other States. Consequently, he thinks that any member of the League of Nations should have this right. The Jews in the United States of America, Great Britain, France or Italy, are treated just the same as anyone else. The Jews who were likely to disturb the peace of Europe did not reside in these States, but in Eastern Europe. Supposing Poland does not keep her covenants in regard to the Jews, a Romanian representative would have the right to call attention to it, and vice versa. By this means, equality would be established between the different States.

Mr Lloyd George says that his own judgment has been much influenced by the method which is most acceptable to the States themselves.

M Clemenceau is rather opposed to consulting them as they are so sensitive. At this very moment, they have in their possession a letter from him, asking what they mean by their statement that they would make reserves in regard to the Treaty with Austria, and he does not think they would give a very favorable reply. He has learned that Mr Bratiano intends to resign, and is leaving tonight for Romania.

President Wilson recalls that there is a Clause in the Covenant of the League of Nations which gives the right to every State a member of the League, to call attention to matters affecting the peace of the world. The matter now under consideration is just such a question.

Mr Lloyd George says it is difficult to know how another country will regard the question. If he were a Romanian or Pole, he would prefer to have attention called to such a matter by one of the Great Powers rather than by Nicaragua or Greece. Romania would probably strongly object to attention being called to such a matter by, say Mr Venizelos or Mr Politis. He thinks it would hurt her pride less.

It is agreed that the representatives of the States concerned should be consulted as follows:

President Wilson to see Dr Benes.
Mr Lloyd George to see Mr Paderewski.
M Clemenceau to see Mr Vesnitch.
S Orlando to see Mr Bratiano.
(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to circulate copies of the Report the same evening.)

4. Mr Lloyd George hands M Clemenceau a paraphrase of the telegram received from the British High Commissioner at Constantinople, as he had promised at the morning meeting.

5. President Wilson reads a portion of the reply from Admiral Kolchak, which had been received, and there was a short discussion thereon.

(As the reply is as yet incomplete, it will be included in the Minutes of a later meeting.)

6. Sir Maurice Hankey calls attention to the Secret and Confidential Report of the Committee of the Supreme Economic Council that had been appointed to consider the question of drawing up a Scheme of Credit for Europe. He says that Lord Robert Cecil is anxious to return to London, and is pressing to have this Report considered without further delay.

(In view of the urgency of pushing on with the reply to the German Treaty, and with the Austrian Treaty, it is decided to postpone this matter for the moment.)

(It is agreed to discuss Reparation in the German Treaty on the following day.)

Jimbuna

06-07-19, 09:47 AM

7th June 1919

German admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, one of the proponents of unrestricted submarine warfare against the Allies during the war, has passed away.
https://i.imgur.com/HR8lpjc.jpg

Group of U.S. soldiers who became naturalized citizens during their service.
https://i.imgur.com/kpsnvOj.jpg

Alvin York (Dec 13, 1887 – Sept 2, 1964), also known as Sergeant York, one of the most decorated United States Army soldiers of World War I, marries Gracie Williams (Feb 7, 1900 – Sept 27, 1984). The couple were married by Tennessee Governor Albert H. Roberts in Pall Mall, Tennessee.
https://i.imgur.com/EGnlnVP.jpg

Sailor Steve

06-07-19, 11:58 AM

Saturday, June 7, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. M Clemenceau reports that M Loucheur is not yet ready to report to the Council on the subject of Reparation in the German Treaty. He hopes, however, to be in a position to report by 16:00 that afternoon, if not by 12:30 that very morning. Later in the meeting, however, a message was received from M Klotz at the Ministry of Finance stating that M Loucheur would be unable to report to the Council that day.

2. M Clemenceau says he has now seen M Pichon in regard to the telegram received by Mr Lloyd George from the British High Commissioner at Constantinople. It appears that President Poincare’s telegram to the Crown Prince was an answer to a telegram sent from the Crown Prince some four days before the proposal was discussed that the Grand Vizier should come to Paris.

Mr Lloyd George says that a somewhat similar telegram had been sent to him. He did not reply, but had mentioned the fact to the Council. He submits that it is highly improper to send a telegram to a member of the royal family of a nation with which we are at war. What would the French Government say if King George were to send a telegram to a member of a German royal family? Moreover, this is encouraging the old Turkish game of playing one Power off against another. They would tell first one Power and then another that they felt warm friendship for them and would re-call old relations, but their object was simply to make dissension, and to reply without consulting an ally was merely to help their game.

S Orlando says that a similar telegram had been sent to the King of Italy, and, in reply, the Italian High Commissioner had merely been told to associate himself with any action taken by his colleagues.

M Clemenceau admits that the action taken was improper.

3. President Wilson reports the receipt of a telegram from the American Representative at Omsk, dated 31st May,2 enclosing a copy of a very satisfactory proclamation which Admiral Kolchak is about to issue. The telegram reports that the question of recognition kept the people in Siberia in a state of expectancy, and, he hopes that, if Kolchak is not recognised, the United States would not get the blame. The gist of the proclamation is somewhat as follows. The efforts of Kolchak’s army are steadily drawing to an end. He proclaims ceaseless war not with the Russian people but with the Bolshevists. Those people who had been forced to serve the Bolshevists had committed no crime and had nothing to fear, and a full pardon and amnesty would be granted them. Kolchak had only accepted office in order to restore order and liberty in Russia. As his army advances, he will enforce law and restore local governments. His office is a heavy burden to him and he will not support it for a day longer than the interests of the country demand. After crushing the Bolshevists, he will first carry out a general election for the Constituent Assembly and a commission of his Government is now working out a law. This general election will be carried out on the basis of universal suffrage. After the establishment of a representative Government, he will hand over all his powers to it. For the moment, he had signed a law giving the produce of the fields to the peasants, leaving to the large landowners only a just share. Russia could only be strong when the peasants owned the land. Similarly, workmen must be secured the same safeguards as in the countries of Western Europe and a commission of his Government is preparing data in regard to this. The day of victory is approaching. President Wilson considers this a very good proclamation.

Mr Lloyd George says that it is very important, as soon as Kolchak’s reply is received, to publish the original telegram of the Allies and the reply.

M Clemenceau says that the whole of the telegram from Kolchak will be available by the evening.

4. M Clemenceau reports that he has seen Mr Vesnitch. The Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes complained that the Committee on New States had never heard them. He would reserve further report until his colleagues had seen those whom they had undertaken to interview.

President Wilson expresses the view that the Committee on New States has not really had sufficient authority to interview the representatives of the small States.

S Orlando said that he had seen Mr Bratiano, who is in a state of great exasperation. He would not discuss the question he put to him because he objected so much to the whole system. He says he is going to resign but does not intimate when his resignation will take place. He says that no Romanian Government would accept these proposals.

5. M Mantoux reads a translation of M Vesnitch’s reply to the questions put to him on June 4th on the subject of Klagenfurt.

President Wilson points out that the difference between the second proposal of the Delegation of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the proposal of the Council is that the former proposed that the plebiscite should be conducted under the auspices of the Yugoslav Government.

Mr Lloyd George reads an extract from the conclusions of the previous meeting and points out that Mr Vesnitch has not answered the question put to him.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to write a letter to Mr Vesnitch, taking note of his proposals, but asking him if he would be so good as to answer the question which had been put to him.)

6. S Orlando communicates the information indicating that so far from ceasing fighting, the Yugoslav troops had pressed on from June 2nd to the 5th, and that two Yugoslav officers have actually entered Klagenfurt.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to draft a further telegram to the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, asking for explanations and insisting on the carrying out of the previous demands.)

7. President Wilson informs S Orlando that each of the three Governments has designated an officer to proceed to the region of Klagenfurt, in order to watch the Armistice negotiations.

8. S Orlando reports that he is leaving the same evening for Rome and will be absent for some days. It would be of the utmost assistance to him if the question of the Italian claims could be settled immediately.

9. The Council had before them a letter from M Tardieu, the President of the Coordinating Committee addressed to the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference and dated 5th June, 1919, covering a report by the Drafting Committee on proposals by Mr Kramarcz.

(The report of the Coordinating Committee is approved, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify the Secretary-General in order that action may be taken to give effect to it.)

10. Mr Lloyd George reads the following minute that he had received from Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith:

“We have now reached a stage when it is desirable if possible to have clear directions from the Council of Four, whether it is or is not desired that the Commission on International Transit, Waterways, Railways & Ports should after completing the Articles for the various Peace Treaties endeavor to settle General Conventions with regard to the various matters within the scope of the Commission applicable to the Allied and Associated States generally. It will be remembered that such Conventions are foreshadowed in the Treaties which bind the Enemy States in advance to adhere to them. They are also foreshadowed in the Articles proposed to be inserted in the Convention for the New States. The International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways: The Question of Drawing: Up an International Convention

The alternative courses are to endeavor to settle these Conventions now, or to postpone such an attempt to a future Conference under the League of Nations.

The British Empire Delegation took the view that it would be well to make the attempt now, when everybody is here, the work three parts done and the whole matter fresh in our minds. We may never get so good an opportunity again and if we separate without coming to an agreement we may never come to one at all.

This is still our view, but on the other hand it may be argued that neutrals are not here, that everyone is anxious to get away, and (above all) that America is not at present willing to commit herself to general agreements binding on her. President Wilson holds the key of the situation, and it seems very desirable that it should be raised and settled. Could this be arranged for?”

President Wilson asks whether the Treaty of Peace with Germany provided for the acceptance by Germany of a General Convention.

Sir Maurice Hankey points out that this was provided for in Article 379 of the draft Treaty of Peace with Germany, which is as follows:

“Without prejudice to the general obligations imposed on her by the present Treaty for the benefit of the Allied and Associated Powers, Germany undertakes to adhere to any General Conventions regarding an international regime of transit, waterways, ports and railways which may be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with the approval of the League of Nations within five years of the coming into force of the present Treaty.”

President Wilson undertakes to consult Mr Henry White on the subject.

11. President Wilson says that he is in favour of conversations between the economic group of experts of the Allied and Associated Powers and German experts, in order that the meaning of the more technical parts of the Treaty might be explained to them. Verbal Discussions With the Germans

M Clemenceau says the object of the Germans in asking for conversations is to divide the Allies. They will say that M Loucheur said one thing, Lord Cunliffe another, and Mr Keynes a third.

Mr Lloyd George said that he would rather that a single representative sees them alone.

M Clemenceau says he would not like any Frenchman to undertake this duty.

President Wilson suggests that the group should have definite instructions as to the interpretation they were to give to the clauses and should not be allowed to give different explanations.

M Clemenceau urges that the matter should be postponed until it is known what points require further elucidation.

Mr Lloyd George mentions a request that the Swedish Financier, Mr Wallenburg, had made to Lord Robert Cecil that he should be allowed to see the Germans without any authority from anyone, merely to try and ascertain what was the minimum they would accept.

(The subject is adjourned.)

Sailor Steve

06-07-19, 06:20 PM

Saturday, June 7, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

Note: M Orlando does not arrive until 16:30. Before his arrival, his three colleagues read and finally approve the proposal handed to M Orlando later in the Meeting in regard to the Italian Claims in the Adriatic.

After the Memorandum has been agreed, there are short preliminary discussions on matters interesting the four States, and which are briefly recorded below.

1. Mr Lloyd George says he has just seen the American Experts, who are anxious to fix on a figure for Germany to pay.

M Loucheur considers this difficult, and is inclined to agree with him.

President Wilson says that it might be difficult, but it will undoubtedly be best if it could be done.

Mr Lloyd George says the figure will be so high that Germany will not be able to accept it.

President Wilson says the object of the figure is to get the Germans to agree.

Mr Lloyd George says he prefers the plan to which he and M Loucheur are nearly agreeing on, by which Germany will be given three or four months in which to name a figure, and by which she will be allowed to pay a part of her reparation in material and labor. He thinks this will be better for the Germans also, and that they would prefer it.

M Clemenceau says he takes the same view.

2. The Council has before them the Report of the Military Representatives at Versailles.

M Clemenceau says that this report will require study by the respective Military Advisers of the members of the Council. He thinks that some immediate action can be taken pending this study. He recalls that the Romanians have three times crossed the Armistice line that has been drawn, but they had been stopped from advancing. The Magyars had got to know that the Romanians were being held back, and had concentrated their forces and fallen on the Czechoslovaks, with very serious results. Pending the study of the Versailles Report, he proposes that a dispatch should be sent to the effect that this attack on the Czechs had been made at the very moment when the Hungarians were asked to come to Paris to make peace. If they will stop, we will make peace with them. If they will not, we will take active measures against them.

(It is agreed that General Albi, who is in attendance in the next room, should prepare a draft.

At a later stage of the Meeting, General Albi’s draft is presented and approved, subject to one slight modification, namely, the substitution of some such words as “extreme measures” instead of “force” This is inserted at President Wilson’s suggestion, as he does not like to threaten force when no available force is on the spot.

M Clemenceau undertakes to send the dispatch on behalf of the Council.)

3. The Council approves the dispatch prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey under instructions given at the morning’s Meeting, in regard to the fighting in Carinthia.

(M Clemenceau signs the despatch, and hands it to M Mantoux, to give to the Secretary-General for immediate dispatch.)

4. M Lloyd George says that he has seen Mr Venizelos and Mr Paderewski. Mr Venizelos was quite definite that he would prefer references to the League of Nations to be permissible only to members of the Council of the League. Both Mr Venizelos and Mr Paderewski had made the point that the Treaty ought not to enable minorities to insist on the use of their own language. Mr Paderewski had said that the Yiddish language used in Poland was not Hebrew, but only a corrupt form of German. To make it an official language would be almost to make German a second official language in Poland.

President Wilson points out that this is not the question on which their opinion had been asked.

Mr Lloyd George says that, nevertheless, both of them had raised it.

M Paderewski had promised a written answer, and, when he had received it, he would report again.

(S Orlando and Count Aldrovandi enter during the following discussion.)

5. The Council has before them a report dated June 6th from the Commission on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs, which had met to consider the Klagenfurt question.

President Wilson reads the report.

M Orlando says that, given the present situation, which was accepted, the plebiscite appeared to him useless. The Commission recognizes that in Sector B the majority of the population is Austrian, in Sector A the majority is Yugoslav. The result of the plebiscite in these areas is therefore a foregone conclusion, and it seems useless to carry it out. The only basis for a plebiscite would be one for the whole area, with a view to obtaining unity for the whole district. He suggests, therefore, that it would be better to take a decision at once that area A, on President Wilson’s map, (i.e., the southern part of the area) should be Yugoslav; and area B (namely, the northern part) should be Austrian. He points out that there is a small section of the area which is traversed by the Assling-Villach railway. He must make reserves in regard to this. The reason for this is that he had already asked for the question of disposition of Assling to be reserved, and claimed it for Italy. If the railway north of it runs through the territory assigned to the Yugoslavs, there would be no object in his reserves in regard to Assling.

President Wilson says he must say frankly to S Orlando that he has gone out of his way in order to assign the junction of Tarvis to Italy on the understanding that Villach should be Austrian and Assling should be assigned to the Yugoslavs. The object of this is to take the line Tarvis-Trieste right out of Yugoslav territory. He cannot assent, however, that both the lines together with all three junctions should go to Italy.

Mr Lloyd George says he is by no means certain that S Orlando is right in saying that area A would vote Yugoslav. He had gathered from Mr Vesnitch’s evidence that he also is very doubtful. Mr Vesnitch’s insistence that the area should be allocated to the Yugoslavs without a plebiscite confirms this view. He thinks Mr Vesnitch’s evidence rather tended to support the views expressed by President Wilson’s Experts.

S Orlando says that in this case it would be necessary to organize the plebiscite with all guarantees, and he does not like the proposals of the Yugoslav-Romanian Commission.

Count Aldrovandi points out that proposal 3 of the Commission is not in accordance with their instructions.

Mr Lloyd George agrees. He asks why the administration could not be by five Commissioners using the local authorities.

President Wilson says the assumption is that the local authorities are Austrian. However, any undesirable officials could be excluded during the plebiscite, and his suggestion would be that the Commission should be directed to conform with its previous instructions.

S Orlando agreed.

(After a short discussion, Sir Maurice Hankey is directed to reply to the Commission in the following sense:

1) The reply to the question in the second paragraph of the Commission’s Report is that the régime of local Government should apply to zone B, as well as to zone A.

2) The Council agrees that the actual procedure at the plebiscite will be very different, according as the date for it is fixed at six months after the signature of the Peace, or three years after, or more. The Council has received a communication from Mr Vesnitch, but, instead of giving a reply on this point, it only contains a counter proposal. Mr Vesnitch has been asked to give a definite reply to the question that was put to him.

The Council agrees with the Commission that, in the first case, it will be advisable to make arrangements like those proposed for Allenstein and Sleswig, and, in the second, like those adopted in the case of the Saar Basin.

3) As regards the remainder of the memorandum, the Council has read and taken note of the observations of the Commission, but adheres to the original instructions to Mr Leeper as the basis of the Commission’s work.)

(Admiral Hope is introduced.)

6. Admiral Hope reads extracts from a Memorandum prepared by Sir Esme Howard, General Thwaites and himself, and from a Report by General Gough at Helsingfors with regard to the situation in the Baltic Provinces. These Reports reveal a very complicated state of affairs. The Germans are advancing North and North-East from Riga, thereby preventing the Estonians from advancing on Petrograd. They appear to be taking this action in collusion with a Russian Anti-Bolshevist force under Prince Lievin, with whom they have established liaison by aircraft. From the available information it is evident that the Germans intend:

1) In conjunction with the German Baits in Latvia to advance into Estonia, and with the co-operation of the German Bait element in the latter country to crush the Estonian national movement.

2) To make common cause with the North-Russian corps, (whose sympathies are entirely pro-German) in an advance on Petrograd, where they presumably proposed to install a Government of their own choosing.

Admiral Hope urges that the Germans should at once be ordered:

(a) To stop all further advance Northwards in the direction of Estonia.

(b) To make preparations for the evacuation of Letland under the orders of the Allied High Command as laid down in Article 12 of the Armistice Commission.

(After some discussion it is agreed that the question should be referred to for report to the Military representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, with whom should be associated for the purpose of this inquiry the United States of America, French and Italian navies.)

(Admiral Hope withdraws.)

7. President Wilson, on behalf of M Clemenceau, Mr Lloyd George and himself, hands S Orlando the Memorandum containing proposals agreed to by himself and his colleagues in regard to the Italian claims in the Adriatic. He explains that the Memorandum is only a sketch containing principles, and the scheme has not yet been formulated in detail by experts. The only parts of the project worked out in detail are the boundaries of the proposed free state. It is hardly necessary for him to remind S Orlando of the scruples he has in arriving at any half-way agreement. He had thought and still thinks that it would be an assumption of unwarranted authority on his part to concur in any suggestion for the transfer of people against their will from one sovereignty to another. At every turn, however, he finds himself faced with the difficulty in which his British and French colleagues are involved, but in which the United States of America is not involved in agreeing. Rather than reach an absolute impasse and after conferring repeatedly with his colleagues, he has in association with them formulated this suggestion. Without discussing or expounding it he will place it in S Orlando’s hands as the joint suggestion of the three Governments. He cannot help adding that reasonable people in the United States of America will probably think he is not justified in assenting to the scheme until he has had an opportunity to explain to them the whole circumstances. He made this explanation only to indicate to S Orlando the impossibility for his Government to go further. He begs S Orlando to put that aspect of the matter before his colleagues in considering this proposal. As a matter of detail he says he has changed one or two words as compared with a copy sent to his experts owing to the difference in the nomenclature on the map. He will also mention that there is a reference in the memorandum to the line of the Treaty of London. The line adopted is what experts call the Italian version of the line of the Treaty of London. He recalls that the streams in this part of the country run under ground for a certain distance, and the British had drawn the line at the point where the streams disappear below ground, whereas the Italians had drawn it where they came out again.

S Orlando says it is impossible to study the scheme here and now. He thanks President Wilson for all the trouble he has taken in the matter. In loyalty he feels bound to declare that the Tardieu scheme has been studied with an open mind, and when accepting it the Italian Delegation had felt they were making an extraordinary sacrifice. In doing so they went beyond what was their minimum. They only accepted it in a spirit of resignation. He himself was not an extremist and always sought compromise. After waging this war, however, he feels very distressed that the doors of Italy were not closed. He has something in him of the Franciscan spirit, but it is extremely bitter for him to have accepted the Tardieu scheme. On Fiume Italy had received no satisfaction. This is an Italian town that was treated in the same way as some barbarous half-civilized people, or as an enemy town. Here is a people of the highest and most ancient civilization, who had emerged from a victorious war, and yet they were subjected to the same system as some Pacific Island or the Saar Valley. This was a terrible sacrifice, but nevertheless he had accepted it. It was the extremity of the effort which he could make in sacrifice, and he must assure the President and his colleagues that if, as he feared, the new proposal was less favorable than the Tardieu proposal, it would be impossible for him to accept it.

President Wilson says he hoped S Orlando would not say this, because there are impossibilities on his side also.

Mr Lloyd George asks what S Orlando meant by not closing the gate?

M Orlando says he refers to the Alps and the Istrian Peninsula.

President Wilson points out that the crest of the ridge was given to Italy.

S Orlando points out that the proper crest of the Alps is to the eastwards of this ridge.

Mr Lloyd George objected to the suggestion that the people of Danzig were semi-barbarous. They are one of the most civilized and cultured people in the world.

S Orlando says he only refers to them as an enemy people.

He undertakes to consider the proposal.

8. President Wilson reads a proposed reply to Germany’s demand for admission to the League of Nations which he had received from Colonel House, Lord Robert Cecil, M Leon Bourgeois and their associates.

Mr Lloyd George says he cannot agree to the admission of the Germans to the League of Nations within a few months.

President Wilson agrees and suggests to substitute within a “short time.”

M Clemenceau expresses the gravest doubt as to the wisdom of some of the proposals.

(After a short discussion it is agreed that the document requires very careful study, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to get it copied and circulated to the Council the same evening.)

9. The Council has before them a report from the Financial Commission on various points raised by the Polish, Romanian, Serbian and Czechoslovakian Commissions.

These reports had been remitted to the Financial Commission by the Coordinating Commission whose report had been approved on the same morning.

(The report of the Financial Commission is approved and initialed by the four Heads of the State. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

Jimbuna

06-08-19, 07:05 AM

8th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Denikin's army advances successfully in S. Russia.

An armed oil tanker “Emil Nobel” in Baku harbour, Azerbaijan. British troops are in the city to secure oilfields in the region.
https://i.imgur.com/vXRGLVE.jpg

In Malta, demonstrations occur against the British to protest new taxes and to ask for more autonomy for the island. British troops fire on the crowd, resulting in four deaths. Funeral for the victims.
https://i.imgur.com/oOQiTrF.png

Sailor Steve

06-08-19, 12:20 PM

Sunday, June 8, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

06-09-19, 09:24 AM

9th June 1919

Canadian troops of the 85th Battalion, Nova Scotia Highlanders are welcomed home after returning from the war.
https://i.imgur.com/Kb9xlrx.jpg

Men of the 11th Cavalry performing stunts at Arlington, Virginia.
https://i.imgur.com/wvSx8Vu.jpg

First Flag Day at Capitol June 9, 1919, flag was largest in world at 90'x165'
https://i.imgur.com/5VPBvy8.jpg

Ship Losses:

HMS L55 (Royal Navy) British campaign in the Baltic: The L-class submarine was sunk by the Bolshevik Orfey-class minelayer-destroyers Gavril and Azard in the Gulf of Finland off Kronstadt. The Soviet Union refloated her in 1928, repaired her, and placed her in service as L55, later renamed Bezbozhnik ( Soviet Navy).

Sailor Steve

06-09-19, 12:08 PM

Monday, June 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

M Clemenceau announces that a reply has been received from Budapest, acknowledging receipt of the telegram which had been dispatched on 7th June, 1919, in regard to the Hungarians’ attack against the Czechoslovaks.

President Wilson says that the military representatives had been summoned by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in order to discuss the question of the military measures to be taken with regard to Hungary, in accordance with the proposals contained in a joint note No. 43, submitted by the Military Representatives, Versailles.

He had heard contrary statements in regard to the Hungarian advance into Czechoslovakia. He would, therefore, like to hear from one of the Military Experts what are the actual facts of the case and he will ask General Wilson to give a short summary of the present military situation.

General Wilson states that the first move forward had been made by the Czechoslovaks who had overstepped the boundary. This act had raised a strong national spirit in Hungary, with the result that the Hungarians had attacked the Czechoslovaks, and the chances now were that the Hungarians would beat the Czechoslovaks.

President Wilson inquires whether the Hungarians are making a very vigorous attack against the Czechoslovaks.

General Wilson replies that the information available is not sufficient to enable him to give a definite reply to that question.

Mr Lloyd George say that he has received very important information supplied by a British subject who had just returned from Budapest. This witness had stated that the whole blame lay with the Romanians. At the time of the Armistice the General Commanding in Chief the Armies of the East, General Franchet d’Esperey, had fixed a boundary line between Romania and Hungary. That boundary line had been crossed by the Romanians in defiance of General Franchet d’Esperey’s orders, who had then proceeded to fix a second boundary line considerably in advance of the first. Now, the second boundary line had also been crossed by the Romanians. At that time, Bela Kun was done for, and the people outside the capital were determined to get rid of him. But the moment the Romanians began their last advance into Hungary, many of the aristocratic officers of the old Hungarian Army had rushed to Bela Kun to be enrolled to fight against the Romanians to stem the invasion, with the result that at the present moment a strong national movement for the defense of the country had been started in Hungary. At the same time, the Czechoslovaks had also advanced with the object of occupying the only coal-bearing area remaining within the boundaries of the new State of Hungary. The result had been a national Hungarian rising against the Czechoslovaks.

It will be seen, therefore, that the fault lie entirely with the Romanians who were the first to invade the new State of Hungary; and the attack of the Romanians had been followed by the advance of the Czechoslovaks in the direction of the coal basin of Pecs.

The statement made by his informant, who had come straight from Budapest, fully bears out what General Bliss had stated in the Memorandum attached to the joint note submitted by the Military Representatives, Versailles.

M Clemenceau points out that no reply has yet been given by the Military Representatives to President Wilson’s question in regard to the military situation in those regions.

Mr Lloyd George says that he has received the following two telegrams which would answer M Clemenceau’s question:

The first telegram is dated Prague 5th June, 1919, and had been received in Paris on 8th June. It states that General Pellé had, at President Masaryk’s request, been appointed Commander in Chief of the Czechoslovak army and that martial law had been proclaimed at Pressburg.

The second telegram, dated Prague 7th June, 1919, states that Wobsi (?) has been captured by the Magyars and that the situation is extremely grave. The Czechoslovak troops are quite dispirited and a great shortage of munitions exists. Pressburg is threatened, where the only powder factory of Czechoslovakia is situated.

Mr Lloyd George, continuing, says that his informant had also stated that the Slovaks had become Bolshevik and that the whole of Czechoslovakia has almost become Bolshevik.

(General Cavallero points out on a map the boundaries of Hungary, the Hungarian territory occupied by the Romanians and the territory at present occupied by the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia.)

General Belin explained that in their advance into Czechoslovakia the Hungarians had driven a wedge between the left wing of the Czechoslovak army and the right wing of the Romanian army, so that continuity between the two armies had been broken. As a result, a road had been laid open for a possible advance of the Hungarians on Pressburg, the most important Czechoslovak center.

Mr Lloyd George asks for information in regard to the invasion of Hungary by the Romanians.

General Belin replies that the Romanians have stopped their advance on the line of demarcation which had been laid down by General Franchet d’Esperey after the Armistice line had been passed.

Mr.\ Lloyd George emphasized the fact that the Romanians had advanced well into Hungary beyond the first Armistice line.

President Wilson agrees that the Romanians had, in consequence, occupied a not insignificant part of Hungarian territory.

Mr Lloyd George, continuing, says that in addition the Czechs have also invaded Hungary and are advancing on the coal mines of Pecs. In his opinion, it is evident that the Romanians and the Czechoslovaks are wholly to blame for what had occurred and in considering this matter, it is the duty of the Council to be fair, even to their enemies.

President Wilson agrees. He adds that under the circumstances it is sometimes very difficult to be fair to their friends. He suggests that the military advisers should withdraw and that the question should be further considered by the Council of Four in private.

Mr Lloyd George inquired whether the Council is in possession of all the requisite information in regard to the supply of munitions and other war material to Romania and Czechoslovakia.

General Cavallero reports that General Segre, the chief of the Armistice Commission at Vienna, has been asked to dispatch to the Czechoslovak army war material to be taken from the stocks and supplies of the old Austro-Hungarian army. General Segre had willingly agreed to this proposal and the military representatives in the Joint Note they submitted to the Supreme War Council, had recommended that the Italian Armistice Commission at Vienna should be charged with the carrying out of the work in question.

Mr Lloyd George inquires what supplies are now being given by the Allied and Associated Governments to the Romanian armies. He points out that Romania has defied the Allied Commander in Chief, General Franchet d’Esperey, and twice the Romanians have refused to obey his orders. This clearly proves that the Paris writ is not running. Orders are sent by the Supreme Council to the Romanians, who merely snap their fingers at them. Consequently, in his opinion, it will be necessary to stop the dispatch of all further supplies until a complete understanding is reached. He understands that a great deal of material is supplied by Great Britain and that will now be stopped, and he suggests that France should do the same. The whole of the trouble in Central Europe arises from the fact that their friends refused to obey the orders issued by the Supreme Council. He thinks it will be necessary to take strong measures with their friends. In this case, all the trouble has arisen because Romania had advanced in defiance of the orders given. Consequently, all supplies to Romania should be stopped until a complete understanding has been reached as to what ought to be done.

President Wilson expresses the view that the Romanians should be made to retire to the original Armistice line. He inquires whether they have advanced since General Smuts’ visit.

Mr Lloyd George replies in the affirmative.

M Clemenceau says that the Romanians have stopped their advance, as a result of the last instructions issued by the Supreme Council.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it would be more correct to say that they have been stopped by the Hungarian forces.

M Clemenceau points out that their military experts, in Joint Note No. 43, have recommended that the Romanians should advance.

General Sackville-West explained that this recommendation is merely based on the terms of reference to the Military Representatives which are as follows:

“The Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers has charged the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles to examine the military action to be taken by the Allied armies to put an end to Hungarian attacks against Czechoslovakia.”

General Cavallero asks permission to read the following telegram, giving the information received by the Italian General Headquarters:

“As a result of the advance of the Romanian Army, which, on the 25th. April, was about to reach … and to proceed in a northwesterly direction towards the Theiss, the Czechoslovak Minister of Defense on 27th April ordered the Czechoslovak troops to cross the present line of demarcation in order to occupy the whole of the territory which had been evacuated by the Hungarian troops in front of the Czechs. The Hungarian troops had been withdrawn from this territory in order to resist the further advance of the Romanians. The Czechoslovak advance was made by General Hennocque’s troops.”

M Clemenceau inquires why the Hungarians have evacuated the territory facing the Czechoslovaks.

General Cavallero replies that the Hungarians have been compelled to withdraw their troops in order to stop the Romanian advance. The Czechoslovaks in their advance have threatened the whole of the region lying to the south of the mineral bearing mountains, where the only remaining coal mines in the new State of Hungary are to be found.

M Clemenceau inquires whether Mr Bratiano, Dr Benes and Dr Kramarcz should not be summoned before any decision is taken.

President Wilson thinks that this will not be necessary. He, personally, thinks it would be dangerous to play with ammunition dumps.

Mr Lloyd George agrees. In his opinion, it is imperative that measures should be taken to enforce the orders issued by the Supreme Council. In the past, the small Balkan States had defied every order issued from Paris and, having got themselves into trouble, invariably appealed to Paris to extricate them from their difficulties. He agrees with President Wilson that the question should be settled by the Council of Four without consulting the small Powers concerned.

(It is agreed that the question should be further discussed by the Council of Four.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

06-09-19, 03:30 PM

Monday, June 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:45

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. Mr Lloyd George says that he has received a report from Mr. Headlam-Morley to the effect that the Committee which was working out the details of the plebiscite for Upper Silesia has arrived at an impasse on the question of the time within which the plebiscite should be taken after the signature of peace. Consequently, he had asked that this Committee might attend to receive further instructions. Since then, however, he had seen Mr. Headlam-Morley and had suggested to him that the Committee should work out the conditions of the plebiscite, leaving the period within which it should be held blank to be filled in by the Council. Eastern Frontier of Germany.

President Wilson says that the conditions of the plebiscite will, to some extent, depend upon the time.

Mr Lloyd George says that he had suggested that the Committee should work it out on alternative hypotheses. He had told Mr Headlam-Morley that it was not the business of the Committee to discuss policy but merely to work out the details, leaving the policy to the Council. In reply to President Wilson, he says that there are certain other difficulties, for example, some members of the Committee wish the clergy to be removed from the area during the time preceding the plebiscite, which is obviously impossible. He is inclined to leave all these details to the Commission to be set up by the League of Nations for the purpose of conducting the plebiscite.

(The above views are accepted, and, at the request of the Council, President Wilson retires to the next room to meet the Committee and give them verbally the Council’s instructions.)

2. S Orlando says he has information that Klagenfurt has now been occupied by the Yugoslavs.

3. Sir Maurice Hankey reports that M Clemenceau had that morning handed him a fresh proposal on the part of the Delegation of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, in regard to the Klagenfurt question. He had at once sent it to be translated.

4. Mr Lloyd George reports that he has received a letter from the Estonian Delegation, asking that action might be taken to bring to an end the German activities which were affecting their operations against Petrograd.

(It is agreed that the letter should be communicated to the Military Representatives at Versailles, for their consideration. Sir Maurice Hankey undertakes to hand it to Major Caccia, the British Secretary.)

5. M Clemenceau says that it is a good thing that the telegram had been sent to the Hungarian Government insisting on their desisting from attacks on the Czechoslovaks. He now has information that the invitation to the Hungarian Government to send delegates to Paris to make peace has at last been received and he expects to have a definite reply on the following day.

President Wilson suggests that the representatives of the Czechoslovak and Romanian Governments in Paris should be sent for by the Council, who, without asking their advice, should say: “If you do not observe the conditions on which a final settlement is alone possible and which we have communicated to you” - which, in the case of the Romanians would be the armistice line - ”we will withdraw every sort of support.”

Mr Lloyd George suggests that there ought to be someone on the spot. It might be General Franchet d’Esperey, or possibly some other person might be found to summon all parties and make them agree on the lines on which fighting should cease. He has very little doubt that the Hungarians will withdraw from Czechoslovakia if the Romanians could be made to withdraw from Hungary.

President Wilson asks if a position has not been reached where the Romanians ought to be allowed to take no further part in the settlement. If they are allowed to advance, they will never evacuate the territory they have occupied.

Mr Lloyd George hopes that this is no reflection on the Military Representatives. They had only been asked to report on the situation from a military point of view, and General Sackville-West had told him he had not felt at liberty to discuss the political consequences of their advice.

President Wilson says that no such reflections were intended. General Bliss says the military advice was good, but draws attention to the political risks.

M Clemenceau says the political risks have already been taken when the telegram was sent to the Hungarian Government.

Mr Lloyd George says that, by the following day, M Clemenceau and he himself could ascertain how much war material was being sent to Romania. General Sir Henry Wilson had informed him that a good deal of material was on its way and he had asked him to stop its delivery. He suggested that a report should also be obtained from the Supreme Economic Council.

(It is agreed:

1) That Mr Lloyd George should ascertain the amount of British war material on its way to Romania which could be stopped.

2) That M Clemenceau should obtain the same information as regards French war material. (He instructs M Mantoux to initiate the necessary inquiries.)

3) That Sir Maurice Hankey should obtain the same information from the Supreme Economic Council.)

6. President Wilson reads a letter he has received from the Commission on Reparation, explaining the differences of opinion that had arisen.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to circulate this document immediately.)

Mr Lloyd George says that there is a good deal to be said, in his opinion, for putting Germany in a position to restart her industries again. Unless she is given raw material and the necessary credits, it would be impossible for her to pay reparation. But, on the question of fixing the amount, he is not in agreement with the United States experts. He has turned the matter over in his mind again and again, in order to try and meet their views. The conclusion he has come to is that if figures are given now they will frighten rather than re-assure the Germans. Any figure that would not frighten them would be below the figure with which he and M Clemenceau could face their peoples in the present state of public opinion. He does not know how Italy feels toward it but he has no doubt about Great Britain. Mr Bonar Law had been in Paris during the last day or two and was better in touch with British public opinion than he was himself. Mr Bonar Law was also inclined to take the same view as the United States delegates, but the moment any possible figure was mentioned he began to shrink from it. The statement of a figure at the present time would also raise inconvenient questions between the Allies. France could not accept any figure at the present time which did not provide a very large sum for restoration. His own opinion is that the present French estimate is a good deal higher than the actual cost would be. He thinks that France could take the risk of a lower figure, but of course they had not yet been able to make any detailed survey. In three or four months a preliminary survey would have been made, and it would be easier for France to state a figure. Another point is that he does not see how any member of the Council could apply his mind to the considerations involved in fixing a figure. They are faced with an infinity of subjects; for example, within the last day or two they had been considering the making of an armistice between the Hungarians and Czechs and between the Yugoslavs and Austrians in the Klagenfurt region and Polish questions. The topics are innumerable. To ask them now to fix a figure is like asking a man in the maelstrom of Niagara to fix the price of a horse. It is impossible, in these circumstances, for him to work out a figure which was fair to the British, French and Germans. He cannot honestly say that it is possible for him to give his mind properly to this at the present moment and he requires more time. Only this morning he had received information to the effect that the Germans are saying just the same thing. They really do not know what they can pay and would prefer to have more time to consider it. He would have thought that the proposal to allow three or, as Mr Loucheur urged, four months for the Germans to make an offer of a figure would be preferable. This would enable an examination to be made of the conditions and a survey to be carried out and for the estimates and methods to be worked out in detail. He hoped, therefore, that four months would be allowed in which the experts of all the Governments concerned, including the Germans, would be able to meet. The matter cannot be settled in an hour or two’s talk with German experts at Versailles, but if time were allowed it should be possible. M Loucheur, who is a particularly able business man, said frankly that he did not know what would be a fair sum. He was, however, with the United States experts in their desire to give a guarantee to Germany that she should get raw materials.

President Wilson says his position is that he is perfectly willing to stand by the Treaty provided that it were explained to the Germans, but he had understood that the British and French Governments were desirous of making some concessions as a possible inducement to the Germans to sign. If we must make concessions then he is in favour of perfectly definite concessions. He is not very interested in the details because personally he is prepared to sign the Treaty provided it is understood by the Germans. If, however, concessions are to be made the difficulties must not be allowed to stand in the way. He admits the full force of what Mr Lloyd George had said, namely that no-one knew enough to enable the bill to be drawn up, or the capacity of Germany to pay, to be estimated. Consequently, he is prepared to admit that any sum fixed now would be quite arbitrary and we should not know whether it covers the claims or whether it is within Germany’s capacity to pay. He understands, however, that Germany is supposed to want a fixed sum. From his point of view the sole consideration is as to whether it would provide a serviceable concession or not. He was warned, however, by his Economic experts that if Peace is not signed very soon most serious results would follow throughout the world, involving not only the enemy but all States. Commerce cannot resume until the present Treaty is signed and settled. After that it is necessary to steady finance and the only way to do this is by establishing some scheme of credit. He wishes to say most solemnly that if enough liquid assets ire not left to Germany together with a gold basis, Germany will not be able to start her trade again, or to make reparations. His own country is ready to provide large sums for the purpose of reestablishing credit but Congress will not vote a dollar under existing circumstances and he cannot ask the United States bankers to give credit if Germany has no assets. Bankers have not got the taxpayers behind them as Congress has and consequently they must know what Germany’s assets were. The United States War Finance Corporation is prohibited by law from granting credit unless it is covered by assets. Hence, if commerce is to begin again, steps must be taken to reestablish credit and unless some credit can be supplied for Germany’s use, the Allies will have to do without reparation.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the question between establishing an immediate fixed sum for Germany to pay, and allowing four months within which the sum was to be fixed, could be discussed between experts on both sides. For example, before long Germany will want raw cotton, but until the Treaty is signed it is impossible to discuss the conditions with her.

President Wilson says that he has not the material wherewith to justify any particular sum.

Mr Lloyd George says that neither has he.

President Wilson says that the only argument in favour of fixing a sum is to provide a basis for credit. Supposing, for example, the sum is fixed at twenty-five billion dollars, the financial world could then form a judgment. If it is thought that Germany could pay this sum, many would be willing to lend to her on the strength of the bonds to be issued under the reparation scheme in the Treaty. Otherwise, money would not be lent. To find some way of making the bond issue the basis for credit is the whole question.

M Clemenceau says he agrees in this last statement.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it is impossible to fix a sum before Peace is signed.

President Wilson then reads a suggested reply on the subject of reparation which had been prepared by the United States Delegation. He undertakes to have it reproduced at once and to circulate it to the Council.

Mr Lloyd George says he likes “the crust and the seasoning but not the meat”. He does not think it is necessary to go as far as is proposed. According to his information this is not necessary. He would like President Wilson to see the man who had given him this information.

President Wilson says that the difficulty is that the information is so conflicting.

Mr Lloyd George says it is necessary to act on some information.

President Wilson says he does not agree in this. At the meeting of the United States Delegation it had been proposed that all the Commissions should be instructed to consider the concessions that could be made to Germany. He had replied that our objects should be to show the reasonableness of the Treaty and to make it workable. That is what he has in view in the present discussion.

Mr Lloyd George says that, as a former lawyer, before a litigation he would always try and find out what concession it was necessary to make in order to secure an agreement. This is his present attitude, and according to his information it is not necessary to make so large a concession as is proposed in the letter of the United States Delegation.

President Wilson agrees that for the moment it would be desirable to leave out fixing the sum to be paid.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that this is important. But he thinks it was unnecessary to make the concessions in regard to shipping. He is prepared to meet the Germans in regard to the gold assets.

(The question is adjourned until the following day.)

7. S Orlando says that his reply is ready and he can discuss the matter at once.

President Wilson suggests that S Orlando should forward his reply in writing in order that the Council might consider it.

S Orlando agrees to do this.

8. M Clemenceau said that a repetition of the telegram containing Admiral Kolchak’s reply haw been asked for.

(It is agreed that nothing should be published until the repetition had been received, as there are various important points still obscure, particularly the passage in which reference was made to the regime in force in Russia in February 1917. It is not clear as to whether the possibility of a return to this regime is or is not contemplated.)

Jimbuna

06-10-19, 11:46 AM

10th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Austrian delegates protest against Peace Terms.

Agitation in China against Shantung decision of Peace Conference.

Senator Knox's resolution (asking separation of League of Nations Covenant from Peace Treaty).

Graduation ceremony at West Point with Lieutenant General Robert Lee Bullard giving an address.
https://i.imgur.com/yGQlYng.jpg

Mieczysław Garsztka, a Polish flying ace with 6 victories in the German air force during the Great War, dies in a plane crash while fighting in the Polish-Ukrainian War.
https://i.imgur.com/WtIIjbZ.jpg

Sailor Steve

06-10-19, 12:46 PM

Tuesday, June 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

1. M Clemenceau says he has circulated the Hungarian reply to the invitation to come to Paris. He suggests that the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Romania should be asked to attend the afternoon meeting.

(This is agreed to. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to summon M Kramarcz, M Benes, Mr Bratiano and Mr Misu)

2. M Clemenceau says he thinks S Orlando’s reply to the latest proposals made to him on the subject of the Italian claims ought to be discussed without delay.

Mr Lloyd George says that at present he can make no contribution to the subject.

President Wilson says that is his position.

M Clemenceau said that he has a proposition to make, but thinks he had first better discuss it with Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson.

(M Clemenceau takes Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson aside and communicates his proposal to them.)

3. The Council has before them a Project for Reply to German Counter-proposals dealing with Reparation.

Mr Lloyd George points to the harm done by the Press, whose indiscretions, all of which went to Berlin, gave an entirely false impression in regard to the discussions of the Council. The newspapers gave the impression that the terms of the Treaty of Peace were being torn to pieces. As a matter of fact, only four alterations have so far been proposed.

He says that his own proposals are now ready. He then reads the following extract from a memorandum prepared by Lord Sumner:

“Immediately after the Treaty is signed, Germany may present forthwith and the Allied and Associated Powers will receive and examine such evidence, estimates, and arguments in writing, as she may think fit to present. Such documents need not be final, but may be presented subject to corrections and additions.

At any time within four months of the signature of the Treaty, Germany shall be at liberty to submit, and the Allied and Associated Powers will receive and consider, such proposals as Germany may choose to make. In particular, proposals will be acceptable on the following subjects and for the following purposes. Germany may offer a lump sum in settlement of her whole liability, or in settlement of her liability under particular categories. Germany may offer to undertake to repair and reconstruct part or the whole of any damaged district, or certain classes of damage in each country or in all the countries which have suffered. Germany may offer labor, materials or technical assistance for use in such work, even though she does not undertake to do the work herself. Without making further specifications, it may be said in a word that Germany is at liberty to make any suggestion or offer of a practical and reasonable character for the purposes of simplifying the assessment of the damage, eliminating any question or questions from the scope of the detailed inquiry, promoting the performance of the work and accelerating the definition of the ultimate amount to be paid. One condition and one condition only is imposed upon the tender of these proposals. They must be unambiguous, they must be precise and clear, and they must be made in earnest. The Allied and Associated Powers have to remark that in the observations submitted the German Delegation has made no definite offer at all but only vague expressions of willingness to do something undefined, and that the one suggestion, namely, as to the payment of £5,000,000,000, which appears to be expressed in concrete terms, is so hedged about with conditions and qualifications as to appear to be intended to provoke controversy and not to promote peace.

Within two months thereafter the Allied and Associated Powers will, so far as may be possible, return their answer to the above proposals. It is impossible to declare in advance that they will be accepted, and if accepted, they will be subject to proper conditions, which can be discussed and arranged. The Allied and Associated Powers, however, declare that such proposals will be seriously and fairly considered; no one could be better pleased than they, no one could profit more than they, if, in the result, a fair, a speedy and a practical settlement were arrived at. The questions are bare questions of fact, namely, the amount of the liabilities, and they are susceptible of being treated in this way. Beyond this, the Powers cannot be asked to go.

Even if no settlement were arrived at, it must be evident that the early production of the German evidence would greatly abbreviate the inquiry, and accelerate the decisions. The information at present at hand comes from one side only. A great part of the damage done has been done by German hands in faithful execution of German plans. The German Authorities have had long occupation of a large part of the damaged areas and have been over the ground, forwards and backwards, within the last twelve or fifteen months. Their information must be extensive and exact. The Allied and Associated Powers have as yet had no access to this mass of material. The mere comparison of the evidence forthcoming on the one side and the other must greatly narrow the field of dispute and may eliminate dispute altogether. It is obvious that, if the class of damages done in the devastated areas can be dealt with in this fashion, the liability under the other categories can be quickly established, for it depends on statistics and particulars of a far simpler character. By giving a satisfactory covenant to execute the work of rebuilding themselves, the Germans could at once dispose of the only difficult or long subject of inquiry.”

M Clemenceau says that as a matter of principle, he accepts this proposal.

Mr Lloyd George says he will accept any arguments, but he thinks these had been admirably stated in the document prepared by the United States Delegation.

President Wilson says that the extracts from Lord Sumner’s paper that Mr Lloyd George had read only provide a substitute for the portion of the United States paper proposing a fixed sum. Is the remainder of the United States answer acceptable, he asks?

Mr Lloyd George says that he prefers the first four pages of the United States draft.

President Wilson then reads his draft slowly, in order that it might be considered in detail. On the first page, the following alterations are agreed to:

Line 1. Instead of “consistent to” put “consistent with”.

At the end of the first paragraph, on Mr Lloyd George’s suggestion, it is agreed to insert the actual words from Mr. Lansing’s Note of November 5th, 1918, defining the intention of the word “Reparation”.

2nd Paragraph. Line 4, instead of “more difficult” put “the more difficult”.

The last sentence of the second paragraph is rearranged to read as follows:

“For the purpose of clarification, however, and in order that there may be no possible ground for misunderstanding, the Allied and Associated Governments submit the following observations”.

3rd Paragraph. For “the Reparation Commission” put “a Reparation Commission.” In the following line, for “the Reparation Commission,” put “this Reparation Commission.”

Page 2. On Mr Lloyd George’s suggestion, it is agreed that as far as possible, where particular Articles of the Peace Treaty were referred to, words explanatory of the contents of the Article should be introduced.

1st Paragraph on Page 2. For the words “after May 1st, 1921”, put “when once the amount of the liability of Germany is fixed.”

After the first paragraph of page 2, it is agreed to insert the following extract from Lord Sumner’s memorandum:

“The observations of the German Delegation present a view of this Commission so distorted and so inexact, that it is impossible to believe that the clauses of the Treaty have been calmly or carefully examined. It is not an engine of oppression or a device for interfering with German Sovereignty. It has no forces, which it commands; it has no executive powers within the territory of Germany; it cannot, as suggested, direct or control the educational or other systems of the country. Its business is to fix what is to be paid; to satisfy itself that Germany can pay; and to report to the Powers, whose Delegation it is, in case Germany makes default. If Germany raises the money required in her own way, the Commission cannot order that it shall be raised in some other way, if Germany offers payment in kind, the Commission may accept such payment, but, except as specified in the Treaty itself, the Commission cannot require such a payment. The observations appear to miss the point that the Commission is directed to study the German system of taxation equally for the protection of the German people as for the protection of their own. Such study is not inquisitorial, for the German system of taxation is not an object of curiosity to other Powers, nor is a knowledge of it an end in itself. If any plea of poverty, which the German Government may advance, is to be properly considered, such a study is necessary. The Commission must test whether a sincere application is being given to the principle, accepted in the observations, “that the German taxation system should impose in general on the taxpayer at least as great a burden as those prevailing in the most heavily burdened of the States represented on the Reparation Commission.” If the German resources are to be properly weighed, the first subject of inquiry, and perhaps the first ground for relief, will be the German fiscal burden.”

2nd Paragraph on Page 2. Delete the first two lines, and insert the subject matter of the remainder of the paragraph in the above, extract from Lord Sumner’s document.

Page 3. At the end of the first paragraph,5 insert the extract from Lord Sumner’s memorandum read by Mr Lloyd George at the beginning of the discussion, and already quoted above.

At Mr Lloyd George’s suggestion, certain additions are made to the above extracts, and are accepted.

(These are drafting additions, and will be found in the second draft of the memorandum to be reproduced in the Appendix of a later meeting.)

Page 3. Omit the whole, after the first paragraph.

Page 4. Omit paragraph 1.7

Page 4. Paragraph 2. There is a somewhat prolonged discussion in regard to the proposal that specific instructions should be prepared, directing the Commission to permit the retention by Germany for two years of ships designated by the Commission, representing 30% of the tonnage of the total amount of ships.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the United States of America, Brazil and Portugal, had all received ships considerably in excess of their losses in the war. France had lost in the war, perhaps a million tons of shipping, and would only receive about 40,000 tons with a proportion of the remainder. Great Britain had lost nearly 8 million tons, and would not receive more than one to one and a half million tons. Consequently, Great Britain would lose, net, to the extent of 6½ million tons, a great proportion of which had been lost not in carrying her own material, but supplies of all kinds for France and Italy, and some in carrying for America. The voyages to France and Italy had been particularly dangerous. He is not fighting for British trade, but what he wishes to insist on was that if 30% of Germany’s shipping must be allowed to her, the arrangement must be made on the dead level, and every nation must contribute its share. If this is the case, he is ready to discuss an allocation of 10%, 20% or even 30%. The British people, however, will not understand, if all the loss falls on France and Great Britain. He points out that the United States had acquired a net gain of three or four hundred thousand tons of shipping, (and this is some of the best shipping that Germany had possessed), owing to the fact that this shipping had taken refuge in its ports for fear of capture by the British Navy. If the German shipping had not taken refuge in the ports of the United States, Brazil and Portugal, Great Britain and France would have captured the greater part of it.

President Wilson points out that this shipping is the only reparation that the United States will receive after all their efforts in the war.

Mr Lloyd George says that for the next few years, tonnage is worth a great deal more than money. Those who were able first to establish themselves in overseas trades, would gain enormous advantages.

President Wilson points out that unless Germany receives a certain amount of raw material and retained a certain amount of liquid assets, there will be no reparation to be received.

Mr Lloyd George entirely agrees. As long as the arrangement is made on the dead level, he does not object. Nevertheless, it would have been easier for him to justify to the British Parliament a claim by the United States for pensions than for these ships. He hopes that no arrangement will be concluded at the expense of France and Great Britain. He has always put France first in speaking of the matter in Great Britain, and he tales the same line now.

M Clemenceau says that he is quite prepared to assist Germany as an arrangement between the Allies, but not to give it the appearance of a concession wrung from the Allied and Associated Powers by the enemy. France has very few ships, quite insufficient for her needs, and it is impossible for him to agree to give up ships to Germany. He realizes, however, that it would be to France’s interest to give Germany some facilities.

Mr Lloyd George says he is willing to consider the German needs fairly, and when the time comes, he thought it will be a business proposition to our own people. Having in view, however, the great shortage of shipping, which is entirely due to the abominable system of piracy by Germany, the sinking of ships and leaving their crews far out at sea in open boats, etc., he cannot agree to this proposal unless it is carried out on the dead level for all nations.

M Clemenceau says that the question is as to whether a sum is to be fixed to be paid, or whether Mr Lloyd George’s proposal should be adopted. He, himself, prefers Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal. The United States proposal would have the effect of changing the whole system of reparation which was only reached after very long discussions and immense difficulties. The various proposals in the United States paper would have the effect of an abandonment of the whole system of Reparations, which had been so laboriously worked out. We have stated that we should make Germany pay for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany, by land, by sea, and by the air. Supposing they accepted a fixed figure, would these damages be repaid? We do not know. As Mr Lloyd George had said in the course of the discussion, it is France who had suffered most. Though her losses on land had been very great, they had also been heavy at sea. He must say frankly that he does not believe in abandoning the scheme that had been drawn up. He probably knows the Germans better than any of his colleagues. He has known them very well since 1871. We have brought the proposals made to Germany before the whole world. To abandon them merely because the Germans have objections is a thing he cannot assent to. It had been proposed to make the Treaty more acceptable to Germany by letting her have ships and gold, by abolishing conscription, by financial advantages, and by admission to the League of Nations. To do this would be to turn the whole world upside down. It would be not the conquerors but the conquered who came out best. For days and days he had followed the discussions, with the intention of agreeing with the majority. He cannot, however, agree to something that would turn the world upside down. He is prepared to accept Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal. He is convinced that this or that concession would not make the Germans sign. There is much to be said against the Germans, but they are a people with great qualities even if they have great faults, and at present, they are very anxious to put their country on its legs again. Of course, if Alsace-Lorraine, the Saar, Poland etc. are abandoned, we could have peace tomorrow. When Great Britain had abandoned her policy of splendid isolation and thrown herself into the struggle, she had taken all risks. She must continue to do so to the end. After expending so many men and so much money, and making such prodigious efforts, it is necessary to have peace. The same applies to the United States of America. Peace has become the most essential thing for the whole world. If the Germans are confronted with a strong peace, supported by a firm attitude, then peace will be assured, but otherwise we should lose the confidence of our own people, while the Germans will be strengthened and we should not get peace. He knows the Germans well, and if a concession is made, they always ask for more. If they are promised admission to the League of Nations, they will only demand ships, and if they are promised ships, they will demand gold. Moreover, when we made these offers to Germany, we pledged ourselves. Germany, however, took no pledges. If Germany had said, “If you will give up this or that, we will accept”, the matter might be worthy of consideration, but Germany had done nothing of the kind. He is willing to accept modifications, but he was not willing to compromise the peace and the victory, which is not British, nor French, nor Italian, nor American, but a peace secured by all.

President Wilson says that the United States has never proposed any concessions to Germany. They have only made certain proposals in a spirit of cooperation. If these are not acceptable to his colleagues, there is no difficulty in withdrawing them. The United States Delegation, however, has taken up a consistent line from the first in this matter.

Mr Lloyd George says that he is in complete agreement with the spirit of the United States document, which, in his opinion, had got hold of the right idea. We do not desire to crush Germany, nor to make it impossible for her to resume her industrial life. He thinks that some general proposal should be made to the effect that an opportunity will be offered to Germany to obtain raw material, shipping facilities, etc., and during the meeting, he had invited Lord Sumner to draft such a proposal. His view is that what they require is not a detailed proposal, but some general assurance.

M Clemenceau said it is to our own interest to give that.

Mr Lloyd George admitted that his proposal is open to comment, as being vague, but he does not think the Germans will make this point.

President Wilson says that the only difference between them is that the United States Delegation’s proposals are more specific.

Mr Lloyd George says that the difficulty of specific promises is that it would be very difficult to draw up a complete list. If shipping and credit facilities and certain raw materials are mentioned, the Germans will think that anything omitted from the list had been left out deliberately. Germany needs so many things, for example, cotton, rubber, wool, tungsten, and all kinds of raw materials, most of which were controlled by the Allied and Associated Powers. His view, therefore, is that it would be better merely to make a general statement. He then reads the following draft prepared by Lord Sumner:

“The Powers will, however, make a declaration on another point as follows:

The resumption of German industry involves access for German manufacturers to the necessary raw materials and provision for their transport to German factories from overseas.

The resumption of German industry is an interest of the Allied and Associated Powers, as well as an interest of Germany. They recognize this fact and therefore declare that they will not withdraw from Germany the commercial intercourse and assistance, without which this resumption cannot take place, but that subject to conditions, and within limits which cannot be laid down in advance, they are prepared to afford to Germany facilities in these directions for the common good.”

This is accepted with the substitution of the word “withhold” for “withdraw.”

(It is agreed that paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 (that is to say the whole of page 4 and whole of page 5 except the last paragraph) should be omitted).

4. There is some discussion as to the advisability of including in the memorandum a passage dealing with the cost of the Army of Occupation.

Mr Lloyd George favors the proposal on the ground that the Germans are very apprehensive lest a very large sum should have to be paid for this charge. A bill for 50 million pounds per annum for example, would be very heavy on a country which is already burdened with Reparation.

M Clemenceau is opposed to the proposal on the ground that the question does not really affect Germany. In any case she has to pay everything that she can, and it was immaterial to her whether it is expended on the cost of the Army of Occupation or paid out as Reparation. He makes it clear, however, that he is not in favor of a large charge for the cost of the Army of Occupation. He wishes the Army to be as small as possible, in order that more assets might be available for Reparation.

Sailor Steve

06-10-19, 08:27 PM

Tuesday, June 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:15

Meeting of the Council of Four with Representatives from Czechoslovakia and Romania

(M Clemenceau arrives half an hour after the beginning of the Meeting, having been detained in the Chamber.)

1. President Wilson says that the Council has been much concerned with the military operations continuing in and about Hungary. The part of it which has attracted the principal attention is the movement of the Magyars against Czechoslovakia. The information of the Council, which might possibly not be wholly correct, is to the effect that this is due to the movement of the Czechoslovaks, threatening the principal coal mines of Hungary. Behind them there are understood to be other causes that have contributed largely to the situation. Some time past General Franchet d’Esperey had drawn a line beyond which the Romanian forces were not to pass. Nevertheless the Romanian forces had passed the line. Then a second line had been drawn, and again they had passed beyond it, thus declining to obey the orders of the Allied Commander-in-Chief under whom their army had been placed. It was this second advance which had caused the downfall of Karolyi who, more than any other Hungarian, was supposed to be friendly to the Entente. The fall of Karolyi had been followed by the establishment of the Bela Kun Government, which was understood to be not acceptable to the more substantial classes of the population of Hungary. However, the information of the Council was that when it was believed the Czechoslovaks were advancing, even the better classes rallied to the support of Bela Kun. Thus it came about that the Romanian forces had brought the Bela Kun Government into existence, and the Czechoslovak forces had prolonged its existence. The interest of the Council was to stop this fighting, not only in the general cause of peace, but more particularly in order to bring about a settlement. The Council’s wish was to draw a boundary line, thus making a good beginning, after which it would be hoped to keep things steady by means of the common authority of the nations. The Council were deeply concerned to remove the causes of the present trouble, and to produce a situation when there would be no more difficulties in the East, and Peace could be maintained and a settlement made in Paris.

Mr Bratiano said he thought that the Council had not been very well informed as to the role of the Romanian Army, and the provocation that had been given by the Hungarians. The true situation was as follows. When the Armistice was proclaimed General Franchet d’Esperey, whom he had seen several times, had told him that he knew almost nothing of the military and political situation of the Romanian Army, and of the relations between the Army and the State. General Franchet d’Esperey had drawn an Armistice Line quite arbitrarily, which left in the hands of the Hungarians the greater part of the most Romanian population in Hungary. Behind the Romanian front order had been immediately established, and foreign populations, like the German speaking people known as Saxons, for example, had not only shown passivity, but had made movements for union with Romania. Then it was that Karolyi’s Government started in Hungary the Bolshevist propaganda. He had in his possession proclamations making an appeal for Bolshevik movements in Transylvania, and behind the Romanian front. It was then that he had asked for a new line, and this had been agreed to and drawn in conjunction with the French High Command. The Romanian Army then advanced and occupied the line drawn up at Versailles. After this there had been a struggle, and in the course of the fighting the Romanian Army had advanced to the only decent military line of defense, viz"|: the line of the River Theiss. He had definite proof that the Bolshevik propaganda just referred to had been paid for by Karolyi’s Government, and he had in his possession documents prepared by the Government and printed in Pest. Then it was after securing proof of this Bolshevist propaganda by Karolyi’s Government that he had proposed, in line, as he thought, with the general policy of the Entente, to advance on Budapest. He was, however, told not to advance, and the Army had been stopped on the Theiss. A short time ago M Pichon had told him that the Council were apprehensive lest the Romanian Army should advance on Budapest. He had replied that if the Allies preferred to leave the Bolshevist movement to ferment freely in Budapest, and perhaps to perish in the process, he had nothing to say, and the Romanian troops remained where they were. The Bolshevist movement in Hungary had been organised just as much by Karolyi as by Bela Kun. He also thought that the Council had received incorrect information as to the attitude of the Hungarian population. The Army had occupied some territory that was purely Hungarian, including the district of Debreczen. The Mayor and Bishop of that place had come forward to thank the Romanian Commanding Officer for the good order that had been kept. Also, when the King of Romania visited these districts, he received many deputations from Hungarian bodies thanking him for the protection that had been given and the good order kept. He would permit himself to insist that the Hungarians had been left in such uncertainty as to their position that they had somehow received the impression that instead of being a conquered people, they were Allies. Once they realized that they were a conquered race, peace would follow. They were not in a position to resist and if strong language were used they could do nothing but submit. Any other course would only result in much greater difficulties. He would add that quite recently the non-Bolshevik elements of Hungary had sent emissaries to Romania, inviting them to advance on Budapest, but they had refused these invitations.

Mr Lloyd George says he understands that the Commissions set up by the Peace Conference had given their advice as to the boundaries between Hungary and Romania.

Dr Benes says that is the case between Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Mr Bratiano said that the only line that had ever been communicated to him was the Versailles Armistice Line.

Dr Benes says that the Commissions had given their recommendations as to the final frontier line between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but after that the matter had gone before the Central Territorial Commission and finally to the Foreign Ministers.

Mr Lloyd George asked if Mr Bratiano had never received any intimation as to his frontiers.

Mr Misu (Romania) says he had heard nothing officially. Many people talked, but the matter was supposed to be secret.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether they had made any demand to the Secretary-General.

Dr Benes says that the Czechoslovaks had done so, but that the line was supposed to be secret.

Mr Bratiano says he had only read it in the newspapers.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether Romania has claimed Debreczen.

Mr Bratiano says he has not. The Romanian Army was on the Theiss for military reasons.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the Army on the Theiss is half-way between the proposed eventual frontier and Budapest. This is the way to make Bolshevism.

Mr Bratiano says that Mr Lloyd George misunderstands the matter. The Romanians had been attacked on the Versailles line and they had advanced to the Theiss solely for military reasons. He explains the whole of these incidents on a map. The evidence in regard to the Bolshevist activities of the Karolyi Government was very definite. Radkowski, who was now Commandant of Kieff, had been at the head of these activities.

Mr Lloyd George says it will take a great deal to convince him that Karolyi had encouraged the Bolshevik movement.

Mr Bratiano regrets that he cannot convince Mr Lloyd George. This is a matter on which probably his information was better than that of Mr Lloyd George.

The movement had been begun before the time of Karolyi by the Germans. There had been a regular Bolshevik organisation established in Mackensen’s time. The whole machinery of the movement was quite familiar to the Romanians. Part of the plan had been to connect the Bolsheviks of Hungary with the Bolsheviks of Russia, across Romania as part of the German war machine. Of this he had substantial proofs.

President Wilson says he has no doubt intrigues of this kind had been started by Germany. Unquestionably Germany had tried to make the situation in Eastern Europe impossible for the Allies. It is, however, one thing to stir up trouble by means of propaganda and another to do it by aggression. The Allies must see that they do not contribute to it by giving anyone just ground to dread them. As an example, he mentions that in the United States there is an organisation known as the Industrial Workers of the World which was largely an anarchistic organisation of laborers but one that was opposed to agreements with anyone. When opportunity offered they took action by means of sabotage. The policy of the United States Government had been to check this by ensuring, as far as possible, that no grievances should exist among the army of working people. He would not say that there were no grievances but where these grievances had been removed the activities of the Industrial Workers of the World had been checked. The right thing, therefore, must be done. Whatever the reasons might be, it was certain that under the terms of the armistice the Romanian troops had no right on the Theiss. So long as they remained there they were helping to create Bolshevism in Hungary even more than propaganda would. This situation was one of provocation to Hungary. He was surprised at what had been told him as to the Romanian and Czechoslovak Delegations knowing nothing of the proposed boundaries for them. They certainly ought to be informed, and he could only presume that the reason was that only the initial processes had been passed through. The first question was to settle boundaries and have some understanding in regard to them which could be observed. When the boundaries were settled, he thought the Bolshevist support would be weakened. As a result of this afternoon’s meeting, he hoped that they would come to an understanding as to what was right in respect to the positions the armies should occupy and as to the action that the armies should take. With all respect, he would say that the Romanian troops had no right in Hungary, and if he himself had the misfortune to be Hungarian he would be up in arms against them, and so would anyone.

Mr Lloyd George adds that when the Czechoslovaks crossed the frontier. Bela Kun, who was then tottering had rallied to him officers of the old army and the anti-Bolshevik forces.

Dr Kramarcz said he was much surprised when he heard that the Czechoslovaks were accused of provoking the fighting. There had been great discussions in his country as to whether an advance should be made into Hungary or not. Some people said it was necessary to adopt an aggressive attitude in order to effect a junction with the Romanian army and crush Bolshevism. There had, however, been strong opposition from the democratic elements and the socialists, and the offensive had been stopped. He has no idea whether Czechoslovak armies have crossed the line of demarcation. He has no knowledge of any aggressive movement. He knows nothing as to whether any advance had been made. The cause of the fights is the Bolshevik movement against them. He knows that General Piccione, on resigning his command, had undertaken to ask the Italian Government to send arms and ammunition for the Czechoslovak forces. When he heard that the Czechoslovaks were accused of being the cause of this fighting he directed his mind to the Magyar side. There they had an army as well organised as one of the great armies. It contained hundreds of thousands of men and a very good armament, including what Mackensen had left behind. It contained German elements and also, he believed, a few Russian Bolshevik elements. It had not been raised on the spur of the moment. He had no detailed information in his possession, but he certainly had no knowledge of any offensive. In regard to the Bolshevist propensities of Karolyi, he entirely supported what Mr Bratiano had said. They actually knew the name of the man who had exercised control over it. If the conquest of Hungary had been intended, the Czechoslovak army must have been prepared. This, however, was not the case and they had adopted a purely defensive attitude. They had been greatly tempted to advance. The bourgeoisie in Hungary had clamored for them to advance and crush Bolshevism. The Czechoslovaks, however, had been bound to recognize things as they were, and had desisted from any advance. The Hungarians had amassed a great army and had the ammunition of the Austrian Army and of Mackensen to support them. They had attacked the Czechoslovaks, who were, and still are, much weakened. The Czechoslovaks, therefore, expected the Allied and Associated Powers to order the Hungarian army to stop, and if they did not do so, to send them help. In his country, there was great enthusiasm for the defense. Even the socialists were marching like the greatest patriots. If they only had arms there were plenty of men at their disposal. They had no desire to cross the line of demarcation. He is not sure that the danger would not increase, but he had read in the papers that Vienna was also threatened by Bolshevism. On the Western front Czechoslovakia was threatened from Bavaria by 40,000 men. Consequently they are in a very difficult situation, and their communications with their Allies are very seriously threatened. He asks, therefore, that the Allies would assist with arms and ammunition. He would give a pledge never to use the arms for any offensive purpose, but only for defense against the Bolshevik advance. He thinks a compromise with the Magyars is unbearable in view of the atrocities they had perpetrated in Czechoslovakia.

President Wilson says he ought to mention that word had been sent to Hungary two days ago to stop all offensive action. A satisfactory reply had been received, and they had undertaken to stop if not attacked themselves.

Dr Benes asks to add a few words to what Dr Kramarcz had said. He can give a historical account of the line of demarcation between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and show that Czechoslovakia had always been loyal and always on the defensive. The line of demarcation had been drawn last November after the armistice. It had been so drawn, however, as to leave no line of communications with the East of Slovakia which was separated from the rest of the country by mountains. Consequently, they had asked for an alteration of the line to enable them to have direct communication. This is a very modest demand, because their territorial claims go far South of it. Then the Territorial Commission recommended a frontier South of the first line of demarcation, and when they knew that the final frontier would be drawn further to the South, they had asked for the original line of demarcation to be moved, and had made an application to the Conference and to Marshal Foch and the High Command for its amelioration. After three or four appeals Marshal Foch had agreed to the change. The final frontier extended South of the new line of demarcation.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether the new line of demarcation had ever been communicated to the Hungarian Government.

Dr Benes says he does not know, but it had been communicated to the Czechoslovaks. The application for the new line had been supported by Mr Hoover, who required it for his relief work. The new line had been drawn about four weeks ago, and on this line the Czechoslovak forces had remained. Then the Government had begun its preparations for financial reforms and for elections and had distributed its forces on the frontiers towards Germany, partly because they knew that Poland was threatened by the Germans, and partly because Marshal Foch had wished them to be ready either to enter Bavaria, or at any rate to meet a possible attack from that quarter. The result had been a distribution of the forces which had enabled the Magyars to see that Czechoslovakia had no forces on her frontier. Throughout they had remained loyal.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether their forces had not advanced towards the coal mines?

Dr Benes says that some four weeks ago, when the new line was drawn, he believed the Czechoslovak troops had transgressed and advanced towards the coal district. Immediately afterwards M Pichon had spoken to him, and he had told M. Mazaryk, who had at once ordered a retirement, which had been carried out.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that when the Czechoslovak troops advanced towards the coal district they had been attacked by the Magyars and fell back.

Dr Benes said he has no information about this.

Mr Lloyd George says that this was the Council’s information. When the Czechoslovaks had crossed the frontier and directed themselves towards the only coal district in Hungary, the Magyars had turned upon them and had driven them out.

Dr Benes says he supposed some mistake had been made. The extension of the Line of Demarcation had not been in the direction of the coal mines. The Magyar attack had been further to the Eastward, with the object of dividing Slovakia into two. He explains the situation on a map.

Mr Lloyd George points out that Kassa, towards which Dr Benes says the first attack had been made by the Magyars, is behind the Romanian lines.

Mr Bratiano begs the Council to remember that Romania is in a state of war with Hungary. Her army has occupied certain territory for purely military purposes. He hopes that the territory so occupied would not be mixed up with the territory claimed. The only reason for its occupation had been for security. Its occupation does not indicate any more desire on Romania’s part to retain the territory than the occupation of territory in Germany by the Armies of the Allied and Associated Powers indicated an intention to hold that territory. If the Romanian army had to withdraw from this territory it would put it in a very insecure position.

M Clemenceau says he has received a despatch from General Pellé who commanded the Czechoslovak Army, declaring that the Czechoslovaks were overwhelmed, and had no guns and no gunners. Hence, he is in a state of great embarrassment. The Romanians had twice crossed the lines drawn by General Franchet d’Esperey, and this had produced the present difficulties. How long did the Romanians propose to occupy these lines?

Mr Bratiano says they will quit them immediately on the signature of peace.

M Clemenceau says the object of the Council is to stop fighting. Would the Romanians stop if the Hungarians do?

Mr Bratiano says the Romanian Army had stopped already.

(At this point President Wilson, Mr Lloyd George, M Clemenceau and S Orlando withdraw to an adjoining room for a consultation.)

On their return, President Wilson explains that he and his colleagues had wished to confer for a few minutes in order to consider what ought to be done. They had come to the conclusion that an Armistice line and merely temporary arrangements were thoroughly unsatisfactory. Consequently, they had decided to invite the Council of Foreign Ministers to confer with the Czechoslovak and Romanian delegations on the following morning on the subject of the permanent boundaries between Hungary and Czechoslovakia and Hungary and Romania. When these permanent boundaries are fixed, which would be done at once, it is proposed to communicate them to the Hungarian Government, from whom they had received a radio-telegram favorable to the cessation of fighting and to peace negotiations. The Hungarian Government would be told that any movement across this line would mean a cessation of the peace negotiations. The suggestion was that the Romanian and Czechoslovak Governments should also agree to respect these boundaries, and call their armies behind them. The observance of this would determine the attitude of the Allied and Associated Powers in the matter of further assistance.

Dr Benes says that this is exactly what he had asked for in a letter he had addressed to M Clemenceau a few days ago.

Mr Bratiano says he has no observations to make.

M Clemenceau says that as soon as the Foreign Ministers have agreed on the boundaries, the reply would be sent to Budapest.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to arrange with the Secretary-General for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the following morning as early as possible, to which Dr Kramarcz, Dr Benes, Mr Bratiano and Mr Misu should be invited.)

2. M Clemenceau apologizes for not being able to give his opinion on the draft reply to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau on the subject of Reparation which had been circulated by Sir Maurice Hankey.

At the moment of his conference with M Loucheur on the subject he had been summoned to the French Chamber, but he undertakes to give his views on the following day; but on the first reading he likes it.

S Orlando said that S Crespi approved it.

(It is agreed that the draft should not be remitted to experts, but that each member of the Council should discuss the matter with his own experts.)

Jimbuna

06-11-19, 01:00 PM

11th June 1919

Welcome home parade for returning U.S. soldiers at Terre Haute, Indiana.
https://i.imgur.com/ii7lEXM.png

Crowds at Trafalgar Square during a promotion of the Victory Loan Campaign, which will fund government expenses in the postwar.
https://i.imgur.com/Or26BzU.png

Sailor Steve

06-11-19, 08:59 PM

Wednesday, June 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of Foreign Ministers

Sailor Steve

06-11-19, 09:01 PM

Wednesday, June 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

Sailor Steve

06-11-19, 09:03 PM

Wednesday, June 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

Sailor Steve

06-11-19, 09:04 PM

Wednesday, June 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 17:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

Sailor Steve

06-11-19, 09:05 PM

Wednesday, June 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 17:45

Meeting of the Council of Four

Jimbuna

06-12-19, 06:02 AM

12th June 1919

Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and his family at Washington D.C.
https://i.imgur.com/NCjdYPj.png

Not to be outdone by American rival Ruth Law, French aviator Raymonde de Laroche regained her top standing by breaking the women's altitude record again, flying to a height of 5,150 m (16,900 ft).
https://i.imgur.com/N6T73V4.jpg

Sailor Steve

06-12-19, 07:21 PM

Thursday, June 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of Foreign Ministers

M Pichon says that in a letter dated 11th June, 1919, the Supreme Council had referred certain definite questions to the Foreign Ministers, having reference to the meeting held yesterday. The first question is drawn up in the following terms:

“First, they think that some inquiry should be made as to why the frontiers between Romania and Hungary, which were approved at a Meeting of the Council of Ten on May 12th, were never communicated to the representatives of Romania, or presumably the other States concerned.”

M Pichon, continuing, says the answer to that question would be that the precedent applicable to all similar cases had been followed in regard to Romania. For instance, the boundaries of Austria had been communicated to the parties concerned only on the day preceding the presentation of the Peace Treaty to Austria. The Council of Foreign Ministers had, therefore, been justified in supposing that the same procedure would, under normal conditions, have been followed in the case of Hungary.

Mr Lansing thinks that the Foreign Ministers should go further and point out that even in the case of Germany, the frontiers fixed had not been communicated in advance to any of the parties concerned, except Belgium. Furthermore, the communication to the Belgian Government had been made by the Council of Four and not by the Foreign Ministers. It would appear, therefore, that the practice had become well established that the frontiers approved by the Supreme Council should not be communicated in advance to the parties concerned, except under instructions from the Council of Four.

M Tardieu asks the Council to consider what procedure would have been followed, in the ordinary course of events, in regard to the communication of the boundaries of Hungary, had not the present military operations occurred, which had made it desirable as an exceptional measure for some definite boundaries to be fixed. It is evident that the Hungarian Delegation would have been summoned to Paris, and the day before their arrival, the territorial clauses of the Treaty would have been communicated to the plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers at a Plenary secret meeting. Consequently, the question of principle had not in any way been altered, and it was only for special reasons that the Foreign Ministers had been instructed on this occasion to communicate the boundaries of Hungary with Czechoslovakia and Romania to the Czechoslovak and Romanian Delegates.

(At this stage, Lord Hardinge enters, and M Pichon gives a summary of the statements recorded above.)

Baron Sonnino says that in the reply to the Supreme Council, a rider should be added to the effect that in future, as soon as definite decisions were reached in regard to frontiers, these should forthwith be communicated to the parties concerned.

Lord Hardinge doubts whether it would always be advisable forthwith to communicate the decisions taken in regard to frontiers - for instance, in certain cases only one part of the frontiers might have been fixed while other parts still remained undetermined. He had in mind the case of Romania, where the boundaries of Bessarabia and Dobruja still remain unsettled. The same remark would probably also apply to Greece, when those frontiers come under discussion.

Mr Lansing accepts Baron Sonnino’s recommendation that agreed frontiers should be communicated to the parties concerned with as little delay as possible. He thinks, however, that the Council of Four should be responsible for determining the opportune moment for communicating the same to the interested parties, thus avoiding the danger of producing complications such as Lord Hardinge had contemplated.

Lord Hardinge expresses the view that Mr Lansing’s suggestions would cover the cases quoted by him.

(It is agreed to inform the Supreme Council that the established practice, heretofore approved by that Council, has been followed in the case of Romania and Czechoslovakia, namely, that the boundaries of States should not, as a rule, be communicated in advance to the parties concerned, except under special instructions from the Supreme Council.

The Foreign Ministers also express the opinion that, in future, the boundaries of States should be communicated to the parties concerned as soon as possible after a decision had been reached, on instructions to be issued by the Supreme Council.)

M Pichon said that the second question read as follows:

(b) Frontiers with Romania: Views of Mr Bratiano “The Council would also like to be informed as to whether Mr Bratiano gave any indication as to whether the proposed frontiers were acceptable or not, and whether of he offered any criticism on the subject.”

M Pichon, continuing, says that Mr Bratiano had raised certain objections. In the first place, he had definitely stated his inability to accept two portions of the proposed boundary line, namely, the portion between Csap and Nagykaroli and the portion between Nagyvarad and Szeged.

M Tardieu says that Mr Bratiano had asked that the two bits of railway line in question should be included in Romania. In addition to that, however, he had also invoked strategic reasons in support of his contention that the whole of the boundary line between Nagykaroli and Nagyvarad and onward would be unacceptable, as it runs within two or three kilometres of an important railway line, As a result, he understands Mr Bratiano to dispute the whole of the boundary line. Mr Bratiano, on behalf of the Romanian Government, had not definitely rejected the boundaries proposed, but he had asked to refer the whole question to Bucharest for examination and report.

Mr Lansing accepts the statement made by M Tardieu. He thinks, however, that the Foreign Ministers should, in addition, express an opinion to the effect that the boundaries proposed should be accepted without alteration.

(It is agreed to inform the Supreme Council, in regard to the boundaries of Hungary with Romania, that Mr Bratiano had expressed his inability to accept the frontiers proposed, or to discuss the same without first consulting his Government, for which purpose a period of 10 to 12 days would be required.

Further, the Foreign Ministers expressed the opinion that the boundaries, as approved by the Foreign Ministers and the Supreme Council, should be adhered to without alteration.)

(c) M Pichon says that the third question referred to the Foreign Ministers by the Council of Four had reference to the alterations in the frontiers of Hungary with Czechoslovakia, namely:

“The Council would be glad to receive, as early as possible, the recommendations of the Council of Foreign Ministers as to the alterations in the frontier asked for by the Czechoslovak Delegation.”

M Cambon said that the Czechoslovaks had, in principle accepted the proposed boundaries of Hungary with Czechoslovakia. Dr. Kramarcz had, however, asked for two slight modifications to be made.

The first modification related to a small strip of territory situated on the southern bank of the Danube, over against Pressburg. The area in question, known as Edor, constituted a suburb of Pressburg and the Magyars had been firing from there across the Danube into Pressburg. The Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs were, however, unanimously agreed that the Danube formed an excellent boundary and that no reasons existed for any alterations to be made to the boundary proposed.

(It is agreed that no alterations should be made in the proposed boundaries of Czechoslovakia in the region of Pressburg.)

M Cambon, continuing, says that the second request made by the Czechoslovakia Delegation related to the railway line running between Kalonda and Komoron, which, in accordance with the decision reached by the Commission, will remain in the hands of the Hungarians including the railway junction at Ipolysk. Should the demands of the Czechoslovak Delegates be accorded, a large number of Magyars will have to be included in Czechoslovakia. On the other hand the railway line running from Ipolysk to Korpona serves an important stretch of Czechoslovak territory which is practically inaccessible except from the South, and the fact that the Junction of this railway line (Ipolysk) has been allotted to Hungary will undoubtedly cause very grave inconveniences to the Czechoslovaks.

Under these conditions he would, as President of the Commission, strongly recommend that the proposed boundary line in the immediate vicinity of Ipolysk be slightly altered in order to place the railway junction inside the boundaries of Czechoslovakia.

Baron Sonnino understands that the boundary line accepted by the Commission has been the result of a compromise.

M Cambon agrees. He says that for that very reason the Commission had recommended that the boundary between Kalonda and Csad as a whole should not be altered. He had merely suggested that a very slight modification should be made at the Railway junction, such a modification being really essential in order to obtain full use of the Korpona railway line which merely served Czechoslovak territory. No material alteration in the agreed boundary line was intended.

Baron Sonnino understands M Cambon’s proposals to be that a small corner of territory round the railway junction of Ipolysk should be transferred to Czechoslovakia. In this connection he invites attention to the following recommendation of the Committee on Czechoslovak affairs:

“The railway which follows the valley of the Ipoly between Losoncz and Csata, as well as the junctions of this line with the lines situated to the north and south, shall be administered under the ultimate supervision of the Allied and Associated Governments in such a manner as to assure to the neighboring interested States the free use of these lines during the period required for the construction in Czechoslovak territory of the sections linking up a continuous line of railway on the right bank of the Ipoly.

The conditions of this supervision and the period during which the free use of the line shall be guaranteed equally to the nations interested shall be determined by the Allied and Associated Governments.”

He wishes to inquire whether that recommendation still holds good?

M Cambon replies that the stipulation in question will still remain.

(It is agreed that the boundaries of Czechoslovakia in the vicinity of the railway junction of Ipolysk should be so altered as to include the railway junction itself in Czechoslovak territory.

The Committee on Czechoslovak questions were asked to meet without delay and to submit definite proposals to this effect.)

(d) M Pichon says that the last of the four questions referred to the Foreign Ministers by the Supreme Council reads as follows:

“Finally, they would also like to receive the recommendations of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the proposals of General Pellé. The Council of Foreign Ministers are, of course, at liberty to obtain any Military or other expert advice they desire.”

At the meeting held yesterday, the Council of Foreign Ministers had expressed the view that it would be undesirable from a political standpoint, to fix a military line of demarcation divergent from the frontier laid down by the Supreme Council, and accepted by the Czechoslovak Delegation. At the same time the Foreign Ministers had admitted that military reasons might exist which would necessitate the delimitation of a temporary line as suggested by General Pellé. He, personally, does not think that it will be necessary to take military advice, especially as the matter under reference appears to be extremely urgent. He thinks the Foreign Ministers could forthwith agree to the opinion expressed yesterday, namely, that the Hungarians should be asked to withdraw their troops forthwith to the permanent boundary line.

Mr Lansing inquired whether the Hungarians had crossed the permanent boundary line.

M Pichon replies that the Hungarian forces are now a long way, about 40 miles, north of the permanent boundary line, and their advance continues. He adds that General Pellé’s line will be situated further in Hungarian territory than the proposed permanent line.

M Tardieu adds that the line proposed by General Pellé possesses the further inconvenience that it coincides with the boundary originally claimed by the Czechoslovaks. He thinks that fact makes it imperative to avoid accepting General Pellé’s proposal.

Baron Sonnino agrees. He understands that the boundary to be laid down will apply to both parties concerned. That is to say, the Hungarian forces will be ordered to retire to the permanent boundary line, and the Czechoslovaks will be similarly prevented from crossing that line.

(It is agreed to recommend that the permanent boundaries of Hungary with Czechoslovakia, as approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Supreme Council, should forthwith be laid down, and that the Hungarian forces should be required forthwith to withdraw their troops within their own territory, as thus defined.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

06-12-19, 08:18 PM

Thursday, June 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four, plus Japan

1. Instructions to the Drafting Committee concerning the Eastern Frontiers of Germany are approved and initialed by the four Heads of States.

It is also agreed that the plebiscite should be held under the auspices of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and not under the League of Nations.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify this decision to the Secretary-General for the Drafting Committee.)

2. It is agreed to discuss the question of the Military Situation on Hungary in the afternoon, when a further report will be available from the Foreign Ministers.

3. The Council has before them a draft, prepared by Mr Philip Kerr and submitted by Mr Lloyd George, of a reply to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letter covering the German counter proposals.

In the course of the discussion a number of alterations are made in the draft. The great majority of these are purely drafting and verbal alterations. The following alone raises questions of principle:

The Saar Valley:
M Clemenceau produced a fresh draft, as he wishes to avoid raising again the question of the boundaries of 1814. This has already been the cause of some agitation in France and he does not wish to include anything which will raise it again.

(M Clemenceau’s draft is accepted.)

Memel:
Mr Lloyd George points out that this paragraph had been left blank, because the point had not yet been decided and he had not been able to give Mr Kerr any instructions.

Baltic Provinces:
An addition proposed by Mr Kerr, calling attention to the high handed German action in the Baltic Provinces, is not accepted as it is not considered relevant.

Reparation:
Under this heading, it is pointed out that the draft as originally worded contains an admission that the Allied and Associated Powers were not claiming the utmost to which they were entitled.

Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau both think that this will raise political difficulties in their respective countries.

President Wilson points out, however, that the object of the letter was rather to show the Germans the intentions of the Allied and Associated Powers than for home consumption.

(It is agreed to substitute some such phrase as the following:

“They confined the payments payable by Germany to certain specific categories clearly justified by the terms of the Armistice.”)

Another sentence added under the heading, Reparation, was the following:

“and to make proposals thereafter within four months of the signing of the Treaty for a settlement of the claims under each of the categories.”

League of Nations:
(The following draft, based on a proposal made to Mr Lloyd George by Mr Bonar Law, was approved as an addition:

“The German revolution was postponed until the last moments of the war, and there is as yet no guarantee that it represents a permanent and fundamental change.”)

President Wilson only consents to the use of the word “fundamental” under pressure, as he considers that, strictly speaking, it does not convey what it was meant to say. He prefers some such term as “more than formal.” Under strong pressure from Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau, however, he gives his assent.

Last page of the Memorandum:
(It is agreed that the period allowed to the Germans within which to give their final answer should be five instead of seven days.

M Clemenceau explains that five days was all that the Germans desired.)

4. Baron Makino says he is willing to have the dispatch of the Allied and Associated Powers published, together with Admiral Kolchak’s reply. He suggests, however, that some indication should be given to the press that Admiral Kolchak’s reply is considered satisfactory.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that a reply in this sense should be sent to Admiral Kolchak, which could be published.

(Mr Philip Kerr is instructed to draft a reply, but no final decision is taken as to publication.)

5. There is a short discussion in regard to a second document, prepared by Mr Philip Kerr and presented by Mr Lloyd George, dealing with the Responsibility of Germany for the War and the Legal Basis of the Peace Negotiations. This document, like Mr Kerr’s previous document, had been circulated by Mr Lloyd George on the previous day.

M Clemenceau says he would like to reserve this paper for the present. The Germans had issued a White Book, in which they accused the French of having violated the frontier very many times. He thinks that this document should rebut the statements in the White Book. He likes the document well enough as a magazine article, but does not consider it so vigorous as the other. He thinks the tendency would be for it to weaken the first document.

President Wilson says that he is well satisfied with the document so far as it goes. He feels a little, however, that it might be unwise to go into the historical argument without making it more complete. The document had conveyed a slight feeling of inadequacy. It would not prove satisfactory to the future historian. If, however, it were only intended to reassure our own people that the Germans were not believed, this moderate statement is, perhaps, sufficient. He does not feel quite happy, however, about an argument that is incomplete.

M Clemenceau says it cannot be made complete unless it is expanded into a large volume. In France, at any rate, there is no necessity for such a document, as the facts are perfectly well understood.

Mr Lloyd George says that the same is true in Great Britain, but he does not like to leave the German note without some reply.

President Wilson suggests that, since all that is required is to let the Germans know that we deny their allegations, the document might be considered adequate. Moreover, perhaps something is to be said for it on the ground of its quietness. As a general traverse of the German argument, it is sufficient. He proposes that it should be accepted, subject to the possibility of change before being sent in.

Mr Lloyd George supports this view. If the Germans decline to sign and an advance by the Army was necessary, it might be necessary to stir up public opinion again to a certain extent.

M Clemenceau asks for it to be reserved for the present, while he obtains a translation of the German White Book. He asks Sir Maurice Hankey to put himself in communication with the Secretary-General on this matter.

6. The Council has before them the reply to the German proposals on the subject of the League of Nations proposed by Colonel House, Lord Robert Cecil, M Leon Bourgeois and their associates.

President Wilson reads this document.

(It is agreed to substitute for the first paragraph a fresh paragraph proposed by President Wilson, adding at the end the following sentence:

“Provided these necessary conditions are assured, they see no reason why Germany should not become a member of the League in the early future.”

The second and third paragraphs are approved without alteration.

The last paragraph is approved, except the last 5 lines, for which is substituted the following:

“It goes without saying that the realization of this program will depend in large part on the satisfactory carrying out by Germany of its own engagements.”

(The Document as appended is approved.)

7. The Committee has before them the Report of the Commission on the Left Bank of the Rhine. As, however, the English copy of the Report did not reach Mr Lloyd George before the meeting, the Report is not discussed in detail.

Mr Lloyd George says he would like to raise the whole question both as to the period of occupation and the numbers of troops. The question of the régime to be adopted would follow from this. If the occupation is for a prolonged period the conditions should be gentle. If for a short period, the conditions by Germany on France in 1871 would be very suitable. He would like to ask the Military Authorities the question as to whether they would prefer a short period with stringent conditions or a long period with weak conditions.

M Clemenceau is unwilling to consult the military. He hopes that his colleagues will not ask him to make any change in the existing agreement.

President Wilson asks if M Clemenceau would be willing to give an undertaking to reconsider the question within a short period.

M Clemenceau says that among the Allies he is willing to say that he would be prepared to reconsider it after the lapse of a certain time, provided the Germans gave satisfactory guarantees and assurances that they will carry out the Treaty. He is, however, not willing to say this to Germany.

Mr Lloyd George says he would like to consider this proposal. His difficulty is to get the occupation clauses accepted by Parliament. They would say ”Why do you want both occupation and guarantee”. He is in a real difficulty here. To show how strong the feelings of his colleagues are he reads a memorandum by Mr Barnes on the subject which he subsequently hands to M Clemenceau. He instructs Sir Maurice Hankey to check the statement which Mr Barnes had attributed to Marshal Foch. He asks whether M Clemenceau would allow him to make a statement to Parliament about the understanding between the Allies. This, of course, would be after the signature of Peace but would indicate to the Germans the intention.

M Clemenceau, after leaving the room to consult M Loucheur, said that he and M Loucheur have come to the conclusion that it is a question of drafting. Both he and M Loucheur are of one mind that it would be impossible to concede to the Germans a reduction in the period of occupation. He is prepared, however, to do his best in the delicate matter of drafting a statement which could be used by Mr Lloyd George in Parliament.

Mr Lloyd George says that a prolonged occupation is not really necessary for the protection of France. It was insisted on mainly for political reasons. If the occupation is to be for a prolonged period it should be made as harmless as possible. He wishes to utter a warning (and he intends to make a formal protest on the subject) that a prolonged occupation would be a great peril to France and a prolonged peril to the Peace of Europe.

M Clemenceau says he cannot accept that point of view. It is necessary that the German people should see a Foreign Army on German soil as a guarantee for the payment of the indemnity. He himself can remember the German occupation in 1871 and what a relief it had been when the Germans left. They had not moved a man until the last penny was paid. An occupation is necessary as a reminder to the Germans that they owe money which they should pay.

In regard to the French army, he feels sure that it will obey all orders while in the occupied territories and the French Government does not mean to interfere in any way with the people. While he cannot accept and must altogether repudiate Mr Lloyd George’s point of view, he is prepared to agree on his conclusions. He will go so far as to say that if the proposals of the Commission are approved by his Colleagues, he will accept them, though he himself, however, thinks personally that a shorter formula might be devised. He is ready to examine the question with his Colleagues.

(The discussion on this subject is adjourned.)

8. President Wilson reads the draft reply to the German Note prepared by the appropriate Commission on the subject of the territory of the Saar Basin. The Note is approved, subject to the following alterations:

6th paragraph, 10th line: for “law” put “order”.

Delete the following words:

“By no means followed that it is an Arbitrary Government nor (as the German Note suggests) that it is the French Government which will be in power. The Commission …”

The sentence would then read as follows:

“It is true that the Governmental Commission to which belongs the Supreme Authority will not be directly responsible to a Parliamentary Assembly, but it will be responsible to the League of Nations and not to the French Government. The arrangement made will afford ample safeguards against any abuse of the Power entrusted to it; the Commission will besides etc.”

Add at the end of the Note, the following sentence:

“The German Note constantly overlooks the fact that the whole arrangement is temporary, and that at the end of 15 years the inhabitants will have a full and free right to choose the sovereignty under which they are to live.”

(The Note as amended is approved.)

Sailor Steve

06-12-19, 09:24 PM

Thursday, June 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four, plus Japan

1. The Telegram prepared by Mr Philip Kerr to Admiral Kolchak is approved and signed.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it immediately to the Secretary-General to be telegraphed, on behalf of the Conference, to Admiral Kolchak.

It was further agreed:

That the whole of the telegrams interchanged between the Allied and Associated Powers and Admiral Kolchak should be published in the newspapers the following day.

Baron Makino while assenting with his Colleagues to the above telegram says he would liked to have gone further and to have recognised Admiral Kolchak. Nevertheless it was a step in the right direction.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Allied and Associated Governments cannot yet recognize Admiral Kolchak for the whole of Russia.

2. Mr Lloyd George says that Sir George Riddell has reported to him that the newspapers in London now have copies of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. They have not published it and he thinks they will not publish it without permission although there is no censorship. Sir George Riddell urges, however, that permission should now be given.

M Clemenceau says that at one time he had favored publication. It is, however, too late now and to publish it would be ridiculous.

President Wilson agrees that there is no use in publishing the Treaty now. The only treaty that can be published is not the one that is going to be signed. He has cabled to the United States that he is not willing to communicate to the Legislature what is only part of the Treaty. He thinks it would be ridiculous to release the document handed to the Germans as though it were the Treaty.

On the proposal of Mr Lloyd George it is agreed that when the reply to the Germans is released for publication the German proposals should also be published, and, at the same time or as soon as is physically possible thereafter the Treaty of Peace in its final form should be published.

(Mr Lloyd George instructs Sir Maurice Hankey to write officially to Sir George Riddell in this sense.)

3. Sir Maurice Hankey reports that he has received a letter from M Tardieu, proposing, as he himself has already done, the formation of a Committee to edit the reply to the German Note.

(It is agreed that the following Committee should be appointed, for the purpose of editing the reply to the German Note:

M Tardieu for France, and as President.
Mr Hudson for the United States of America.
Mr Philip Kerr for the British Empire.
Count Vannutelli-Rey for Italy.
Mr Nagaoka for Japan.

Sir Maurice Hankey is directed to request the Secretary-General to arrange for this Committee to meet with the least possible delay, and communicate to it the various portions of the reply as they were approved.)

4. Sir Maurice Hankey reports that he has ascertained that the English version of the reply in regard to the Saar Valley, which had been approved at the morning meeting, was a translation from the French, the French version itself being a translation from an original English draft. In these circumstances, he had felt justified in incorporating the decisions of the Council in the original English version. As a matter of fact, several of the alterations had thereby been found to be unnecessary.

(Sir Maurice Hankey’s action is approved.)

5. The draft reply to the German Note on the subject of Alsace-Lorraine, prepared by the appropriate Commission Lorraines and dated June 8th, is read and approved without alteration.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for communication to the Editing Committee.)

6. Sir Maurice Hankey says that he thought it had not been realized at the morning meeting that Mr Philip Kerr’s memoranda on the subjects of Responsibility of Germany for the War and the Legal Basis of the Peace Negotiations would not appear as a special pendant to the covering letter, but would merely take their place among the Negotiations other memoranda in the reply to the Germans. He had, as instructed, made inquiries from the Secretary-General about the German White Book, and had ascertained that this contained no documents that had not already been translated and circulated. The first document in the White Book was a reproduction of the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities, which had been published in an American newspaper.

The second document was the long German reply which had already been circulated. He was not quite clear what the decision at the morning meeting had been in regard to Mr Philip Kerr’s draft.

(It is agreed that the two memoranda referred to should be approved for incorporation in the reply.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate them to the Secretary-General for the information of the Editing Committee.)

7. The Council has before them a memorandum signed by M Jules Cambon on behalf of the Czechoslovak Commission of the Conference, recommending certain alterations in the Peace with Treaty of Peace with Germany, affecting the Kreis Provision of Ratibor and the Kreis of Leobschütz.

After President Wilson had read the document, it was appreciated that an expert explanation was required. M Jules Cambon not being available, Sir Eyre Crowe, Dr Lord, and M Laroche are sent for and introduced.

Sir Eyre Crowe explains that the district of Leobschütz was to have been attributed to Poland, but is now affected by the plebiscite in Upper Silesia. The northern part of Leobschütz is German, and the southern part is Czech. If Upper Silesia was attributed to Germany as a result of the plebiscite, the German portion of Leobschütz should go with it, otherwise, it should remain with Czechoslovakia.

(After some further detailed explanations by the experts on the map, it is agreed to approve the recommendations of the Czechoslovak Commission and the Article proposed was signed as an instruction to the Drafting Committee.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

(Sir Eyre Crowe, Dr Lord and M Laroche withdraw.)

8. The Council has before them the further report of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the questions referred to them on the previous day.

1) The proposal to maintain the frontier between Hungary and Romania adopted on May 12th, is accepted.

2) The recommendation against establishing the Czechoslovak State on the southern bank of the Danube opposite Pressburg is also accepted.

3) The recommendations of the Council of Foreign Ministers in regard to an alteration of the frontier, so as to include in Czechoslovak territory the junction of the Korpona railway with the Komarom–Losoncz railway line, and the insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary of a provision to ensure to the Czechoslovak State the right of passage for its trains over the sections of railway included in Hungarian territory of the Komarom–Csata–Losoncz railway, are also approved.

President Wilson proposes that the boundaries as adopted in the preceding decision should now be communicated to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania, and that their observance should be insisted on.

M Clemenceau suggests that it might be better to adopt the Romanian boundary provisionally only.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Allies ought also to hear what Hungary has to say.

M Clemenceau says that Romania will present great objections.

President Wilson points out that the Romanian Delegates had presented their case at very great length.

Mr Lloyd George adds that Romania is more than doubling her territory.

M Clemenceau suggests that representatives ought to be sent, not to Vienna as proposed by Bela Kun, but to Budapest, to arrange an armistice.

President Wilson suggests it would be better to send a telegram to Budapest, Bucharest and Prague.

Mr Lloyd George doubts whether this course will be successful. His view is that the Hungarians had attacked the Czechoslovaks mainly owing to the Romanian advance, with a view to dividing the Romanian and Czechoslovakian forces.

President Wilson says that this is quite unjustifiable.

M Clemenceau doubts if the Romanians can be induced to retire behind the boundary line.

Mr Lloyd George says that if they refuse, Romania will have to be informed that she is outside the protection of the Allied and Associated Powers.

President Wilson says she will also be outside the recognition of the Allied and Associated Powers. Romania cannot expect the Allied and Associated Powers to fight for a boundary which they did not believe to be right.

M Clemenceau suggests that a document should be prepared to be sent to Mr Bratiano, Mr Kramarcz and Bela Kun.

President Wilson says that each paper will have to be carefully prepared and accompanied by a map of the boundaries.

Mr Lloyd George says it will be necessary to insist on the instructions being obeyed.

(It was agreed:

1) That a separate communication should be sent to each of the following:
Bela Kun for Hungary,
Mr Kramarcz for Czechoslovakia,
Mr Bratiano for Romania,

notifying them of the permanent territorial frontiers adopted by the Conference; insisting on the immediate cessation of hostilities; on the withdrawal of all military forces behind the frontier lines; and on an undertaking for the future observance of these frontiers, as a preliminary to the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace with Hungary.

2) That Mr Balfour should be invited to draft these documents for approval by the Council.

3) That maps should be prepared by experts to accompany the above communications.)

9. Arising out of the previous discussion, President Wilson suggests that a line should also be established between Poland and the Ukraine.

Mr Lloyd George thinks the same course should be adopted as in the case of Upper Silesia. Mr Paderewski had told him that the Ukrainians are anxious to enter Poland. The situation there, according to Mr Paderewski, is almost the same as in Upper Silesia. There is an area where there is one Pole to two Ruthenians, the upper grades of the population being Poles, but the Ukrainian population is also said to be in favour of junction with Poland. The best plan therefore, would be to hold a plebiscite.

President Wilson suggests that experts should be got together to draw a plebiscite area.

(On the suggestion of President Wilson, it is agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be invited to examine this question with experts, and after hearing representatives both of Poland and of the Ukraine on the subject, should advise the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers

(a) as to whether they recommended a plebiscite.
(b) as to the area of the plebiscite.)

10. The Council has under consideration a draft reply to the German note prepared by the appropriate Commission on the subject Political of the Political clauses relating to countries outside Europe.

(After President Wilson has read the draft aloud it is approved subject to some quite minor alterations.

11. Mr Lloyd George says that one question has to be faced related to the property of Religious Missions in the German Colonies. The representative of the Vatican had called to see him and had seen Mr Philip Kerr and claimed that all Roman Catholic property is the property of the Vatican. Great Britain has always challenged this claim from the earliest times.

M Clemenceau says that these Missions are not really the property of the Vatican. He is prepared to give a guarantee that Roman Catholic property should be handed over to Roman Catholics of some other nationality, or even to the Vatican, but he is not prepared to say that it is property with which the Vatican could dispose of as it likes.

S Orlando says he had no relations with the Vatican.

President Wilson says that he has received a letter on the subject and the point made is that the Vatican desires a specific promise that missionary property should be transferred to some Church of the same connection.

Mr Lloyd George points out that this is not claimed by Germany and that all that is required is some assurance to the Vatican.

President Wilson suggests that the assurance given might be that the matter should be provided for in the mandates for the German Colonies.

Mr Lloyd George undertakes to instruct Mr Philip Kerr to prepare a draft declaration on the subject.

12. The Council has before them a draft reply to the German Note prepared by the appropriate Commission on the subject of Military Clauses.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that Paragraph I ought to be strengthened as it is a matter of great importance before coming to the concessions to indicate the great trouble that had been caused in the world by the development of the German military machine.

(This is accepted and two paragraphs drafted by Mr Philip Kerr are adopted later in the Meeting.)

(It is agreed to delete Paragraph 2 and the following words at the beginning of Paragraph 3: “With due regard to these points therefore”.)

Paragraph 4: M Clemenceau objects to the number of 300,000 men which Germany is to be allowed to have after three months. He points out that Marshal Foch had originally proposed an Army of 200,000 men for Germany. The Germans already have more than 300,000 men on the eastern front alone. He does not think that these are intended for fighting, but rather for passive resistance and to make difficulties in Upper Silesia. He proposes to reduce the number to 200,000.

(It is agreed that the number at the end of three months should be 200,000.)

Paragraph 5: The last six lines are deleted on the ground that this is not a convenient place at which to introduce a reference to the League of Nations.

(The draft articles for the Treaty of Peace with Germany are initialed by the Five Heads of States.

Sir Maurice Hankey is directed to communicate them to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.

Sir Maurice Hankey is directed to forward it to the Secretary-General of the Editing Committee.)

13. The Council has before them a joint note by the Allied and Associated Admirals containing the draft of a reply as regards the Naval clauses.

(After the Note has been read, it is approved.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for the information of the Editing Committee.)

14. The Council has before them the draft of a reply to the German Note on the subject of Prisoners of War prepared by the appropriate Commission.

(It is agreed that this Note is unduly long and should be shortened.)

(M Mantoux is instructed to communicate with M Cahens accordingly.)

15. S Orlando says that he has received the resignation of two Italian Ministers. He also has information that socialists are preparing some trouble.

M Clemenceau says this was the case in France also.

Mr Lloyd George says that he has seen someone who had seen Mr Ramsay MacDonald. The latter had reported that socialist trouble was brewing in Italy and had said that he himself had discouraged it.

S Orlando says he is less preoccupied with the internal situation than with the crisis in his Government. There is some trouble due to high prices and that in a recent riot in Spezia one person had been killed and two wounded.

Mr Lloyd George says that he was advised there will be no limit to the high prices unless the Inter-Allied Purchasing Commissions were maintained. Otherwise, there will be competition not only between one Ally and another, but the Germans who are half starving would enter the market and send prices still higher.

S Orlando agreed. He views with dismay the prospect of the abolition of the wheat executive.

President Wilson says that this question will have to be considered as part of the general economic question.

S Orlando says he must now leave as he might have to go to Italy in the evening.

16. The Council has before them a draft reply to the German Note on the question of responsibilities prepared by the appropriate Commission.

After the document is read, M Clemenceau expresses the view that it is a weak document.

Mr Lloyd George thinks a much stronger document is required.

Baron Makino points out that the points had been correctly made. This view is generally accepted.

Mr Lloyd George invites Mr Philip Kerr to redraft the reply.

17. President Wilson reads the Report of the Military Representatives at Versailles on the situation in the Baltic, after which M Mantoux reads the Report of the Baltic Commission.

Mr Lloyd George expresses the view that the Germans ought to be cleared out of the Baltic.

President Wilson agrees in principle but does not see how they were to be got out.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Armistice gives power to order their withdrawal. If this right is not exercised, the Germans will establish themselves there. We have information that they are colonizing Courland and he has even read a telegram that settlers are coming there from the Saar Valley.

Mr Lloyd George undertakes to discuss the question that evening with General Sackville-West, the British Military Representative, in order to ascertain whether it is necessary to see the experts on the following day.

Jimbuna

06-13-19, 04:34 AM

13th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Britain: Terms of New Victory Loan issued.

Cher Ami, the US Army homing pigeon who provided critical information to save the 77th Infantry from defeat during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive at the close of WWI, succumbed to injuries while at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. She remains one of the world’s most decorated war pigeons.
https://i.imgur.com/JqePGpX.jpg

Sailor Steve

06-13-19, 01:00 PM

Friday, June 13, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four, plus Japan

1. Referring to the reply to the German Note on the subject of the League of Nations approved on the previous day, M Clemenceau says he thinks a mistake had been made in stating that the Allied and Associated Powers saw no reason why Germany should not become a member of the League “in the early future”.

Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson confirm the Secretary’s record that this has been approved, and insist that there is no object in inserting the sentence without these words. After rereading the whole passage, M Clemenceau withdraws his objections.

2. (It is agreed to receive the Turkish Delegation in a formal manner in one of the large rooms at the Quai d’Orsay, on Tuesday, June 17th, at 11:00.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to ask the Secretary General to prepare a letter to the Turkish Delegation for M Clemenceau’s signature and for dispatch, notifying them of this decision and asking them to be prepared to make a statement on that occasion of anything which they had to say.)

3. The Council has before them a Note from the Superior Blockade Council, dated June 11th, 1919.

Mr Lloyd George advocates a renewal of the blockade in the event of the Germans refusing to sign, as if this were known in Germany beforehand it would have a great effect.

President Wilson says he is opposed to the imposition of a blockade. A military occupation is justified, but he does not believe in starving women and children. It is the last resort and should not be taken at first.

M Clemenceau considered that the sea blockade would not be very effective so long as the land frontiers with neutral States were open.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the neutrals had at present no supplies to spare, consequently everything depended upon an effective sea blockade.

M Clemenceau says in that case he is in favour of it in the interests of humanity, to prevent a prolongation of the interval between breaking off negotiations, and signing the Peace. If the German people know that the blockade is being prepared it will stop the whole business.

Mr Lloyd George says he is apprehensive of difficulties that will arise from the military occupation.

President Wilson points out that in any case the Allies control practically all the food supplies of the world, and will not sell them to Germany if they will not sign. In any case therefore privation will begin at once. The imposition of the blockade will shock the sense of mankind. A military occupation is the regular and habitual way of dealing with a situation of this kind. Germany has disregarded all methods of humanity, but this does not justify the Allies in doing so. He does not anticipate any actual fighting.

Mr Lloyd George says that every military man will confirm that but for the contributory action of the Blockade the war might still be continuing. The German Army was still in occupation of Allied territory when it had capitulated. The reason was that the effect of the blockade on the German people was so great that they could not stand it any longer.

President Wilson says that if actual hostilities begin again the blockade might be justified, but Marshal Foch has assured the Council that there is not likely to be any military resistance.

Mr Lloyd George does not anticipate organised military resistance but he thinks there might be a great deal of unorganized resistance.

M Clemenceau points out that the Germans are a submissive people. They are not like the English or French, who in such a case would make great trouble.

President Wilson says that starvation would only bring about Bolshevism and chaos.

Mr Lloyd George says that the mere noise of preparing a blockade would do more to make the Germans sign than the military occupation. There were important elements in the population such as the rich industries and the wealthier classes of Berlin who would probably welcome an occupation as a means of insuring order. The mere threat of a blockade, however, would terrify the whole population.

President Wilson doe not want to threaten without carrying out the threat.

Mr Lloyd George says that while he fully appreciates the President’s motives and regards the blockade as a horrible thing, yet he thinks it necessary to shorten the agony. He feels sure that in the end we should be driven to the blockade.

M Clemenceau said that if the blockade were not adopted it would cause the deaths of many Allied soldiers.

President Wilson says he must refuse to cooperate in the blockade until military cooperation has been tried. His instinct on this matter is overwhelming. He notes that the Blockade Council has already brought the various parts of the blockade to the most advanced state of readiness. He wishes to know what more they require.

Sir Maurice Hankey says that the British Member of the Blockade Council had informed him that there are certain steps involving expenditure which the Blockade Council does not feel justified in insisting on without a decision of this Council. For example, the bottoms of a number of Destroyers have to be cleaned and crews had to be kept in a state of mobilization. The Destroyers are required for the blockade of the Baltic which is a new service which it had never been possible to undertake during the war.

Mr Lloyd George suggests the desirability of some Destroyers appearing in the Baltic in order to give the Germans the impression that preparations are being made. He wants the Germans to sign without the necessity of the Allies striking a blow.

(It is agreed that the Blockade Council should make every preparation for the reimposition of the blockade, but that its actual enforcement should not be undertaken, even in the event of a refusal by the Germans to sign the Treaty of Peace, without a decision from the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. No actual threat should be made public that the blockade is to be reimposed, but short of this steps should be taken to give the public impression that preparations are in hand. If practicable these steps should include the despatch of Destroyers to show this in the Baltic.)

4. Mr Lloyd George reads the following note from Admiral Hope:

“Referring to the Naval action to be taken in the event of the Germans refusing to sign the Peace Treaty, the Admiralty are anxious to know, as soon as possible, in order that the necessary preparations may be made, whether the Supreme Council approves in principle the following measures suggested by the Admirals in their joint Report of 10th.

(a) Officers and men of the ships interned at Scapa to be made prisoners of war.

(b) The interned ships at Scapa to be seized.

(c) All fishing by German vessels to be prohibited.

(d) All German vessels found at sea, either with or without permits, to be seized.

It would also greatly assist the Admiralty if the Council’s decision as to the blockade could be made known so that any necessary Naval dispositions could be arranged in good time.”

(It is agreed that the British Admiralty should make the necessary preparations for carrying out (a), (b), (c), and (d), above.)

5. The Council has before them a report by the Military Representatives at Versailles with whom are associated Naval Representatives.

Mr Lloyd George says that he has discussed the question with General Sackville-West and he finds his view to be that the evacuation by the Germans should be a comprehensive one. If the attempt is made to specify in detail the actual places to be evacuated, misunderstandings are liable to occur owing to the fact that many places had the same name, and some places have several names which would facilitate evasion by the Germans. His opinion was that the Germans ought to be ordered to clear out of the Baltic Provinces altogether under Article 12 of the Armistice terms. It would be very dangerous if the present German Ministry went out of Office and Haase came in, as then there would be a German force in the Baltic Provinces under the direction of a Bolshevik Government.

President Wilson and M Clemenceau agree with Mr Lloyd George.

There is some discussion as to the proposal of the Military Representatives that sums of money should be made available for the Baltic Provinces, but it is generally agreed that this is unnecessary for equipment, arms, ammunition, clothing and supplies were given.

After a short discussion, it is agreed that the following action should be taken:

1. Marshal Foch should order the Germans

(a) To stop all advance northwards towards Estonia.

(b) To evacuate Libau and Windau at once, and to complete the evacuation of all territory which, before the war, formed part of Russia, with the least possible delay, in accordance with Article 12 of the Armistice Terms.

2. That the local national forces in the Baltic Provinces should be supported with equipment, arms, ammunition, clothing, and supplies generally.

3. That the Military Representatives at Versailles should advise as to what supplies should be sent and by whom.

M Clemenceau undertakes to give the necessary instructions to Marshal Foch.

6. The alteration to the Czechoslovak frontier contained in the report of the Council of Foreign Ministers dated June and approved on the previous afternoon, is initialed by the five Heads of States.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Drafting Committee for their information.

Sailor Steve

06-13-19, 06:34 PM

Friday, June 13, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 12:00

Meeting of the Council of Four, plus Japan

The following experts on the subject of the Rhine Provinces were also present:

M Loucheur for France.
Mr Wise and Mr Waterlow for Great Britain.

1. The Council had before them a Report dated June 9th, of the Commission appointed by them on May 29th to rewrite the draft convention relating to the occupation of the Rhine Provinces, on the skeleton plan suggested in the letter from Mr Noyes, the American delegate on the inter-allied Rhineland Commission, to President Wilson, dated May 27th, 1919.

This report and its first two annexes, the draft convention and the memorandum, are considered.

President Wilson reads out the English texts of these documents, which, after discussion, are adopted along with amendments.

The omission of the words “and the execution of the Treaty” from Article III (a) of the draft convention is, on the proposal of President Wilson, decided on the ground that to supervise the execution of the Treaty of Peace is outside the scope which it is desirable to give to the functions of the Rhineland High Commission.

In regard to Article IV of the draft convention, Monsieur Clemenceau explains that Marshal Foch has put forward certain objections to the principle on which it was proposed to base the administration of the occupied territory, but it is pointed out that the question of principle would arise in connection with the memorandum. When Article V of the memorandum is reached, Monsieur Loucheur (French Minister of Industrial Reconstitution), who is in attendance, explains that what Marshal Foch chiefly has in mind is the danger of setting up two separate authorities, viz., the Allied High Command and the Inter-allied Rhineland High Commission, to deal with the German authorities. The Marshal fears that any attempt to work such a system will lead to confusion, and he considers that the proper course is to vest all necessary powers for dealing with the German authorities in one single Inter-Allied authority, who might be assisted by an advisory council in respect of economic and civil matters. While taking note of this point of view, the Council decides to maintain the principle of making an Inter-Allied civil authority the supreme representative of the associated Governments concerned in the administration of the occupied territory.

The following are the amendments adopted in the draft convention:

(This is followed by a long list of minor wording changes for all Articles I through XIII.)

A new article to be added at the end of the memorandum as follows:

“VII. In issuing decrees and proclamations or otherwise interfering with civil administration under a state of siege, the Commander-in-Chief shall continue to act in consultation with, and only with the approval of, the High Commission. This shall, of course, not apply to action of a purely military nature.”

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

06-13-19, 07:01 PM

Friday, June 13, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four, plus Japan

1. Mr Lloyd George says he has received a letter from Sir George Riddell, suggesting that the newspapers would not be able to handle on one day both the German proposals in respect to the the Peace Treaty and the Allied reply.

(After a short discussion, it is agreed:

1) To publish the German proposals in the morning newspapers of Monday, June 16th.

2) To publish the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers in the morning newspapers of Tuesday. June 17th.)

Sir Maurice Hankey reports that a summary is in course of preparation by general arrangement between the British and American Delegations, and which can be put at the disposal of any other Delegation.

2. The Five Heads of States approve and initial the reply to the note of the Superior Blockade Council, dated June 11th, 1919.

"Decision of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at a Meeting Held on June 13th, 1919.

The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have considered the Note of the Superior Blockade Council, dated June 11th, 1919.

They have decided that the Blockade Council should make every preparation for the re-imposition of the Blockade but that its actual enforcement should not be undertaken, even in the event of the refusal by the Germans to sign the Treaty of Peace, without a decision from the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. No actual threat should be made public that the Blockade is to be reimposed but, short of this, steps should be taken to give the public impression that preparations are in hand. If practicable, these steps should include the despatch of destroyers to show themselves in the Baltic.

W. W.
G. C.
D. L. G.
S. S.
N. M.

June 13, 1919."

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate it to the Blockade Council. Blockade in the Event of a Refusal by the Germans To Sign the Peace Treaty.)

3. The following documents were initialed by the Four Heads of States:

1) The draft Convention relating to the Military occupation of the Territories of the Rhine.

2) A memorandum defining the relations between the Allied Military Authorities and the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward them to the Secretary-General for communication to the Drafting Committee, who should use them as material for the drafting of the final Convention and Agreement.)

4. Mr Lloyd George circulates a draft reply prepared by Mr Philip Kerr, to the German note on the question of “Responsibilities” to take the place of the note considered on the previous day. The note is approved subject to the following alterations:Penalties for Individuals.

Page 2, line 3. Omit the words “in any way.”

Page 2, line 9. Omit the following sentence:

“There can be no question of admitting the right of jurisdiction of the representatives of countries which have taken no part in the War.”

(Sir Maurice Hankey is directed to forward the Report to the Secretary-General for communication to the Editing Committee.)

5. The Council has before them a Report from the Commission on International regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways.

President Wilson reads the Report aloud.

(The Report is approved subject to the following alterations:

Page 2. Delete the first paragraph. Also delete the word “Supreme” before “Council of the League of Nations” in the middle of the second paragraph.

6. The Council then considers the amendments to the Treaty of Peace proposed by the Commission, annexed to their Report.

Article 89. President Wilson feels some doubt as to whether this Article should be approved, unless he is convinced that Poland will receive exactly the same advantages under the Treaty as Germany is to receive under the substituted Article. It would appear to him that under this Article Germany will get rights the moment it becomes operative, while Poland will have to wait for the conclusion of the Convention.

Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith and Colonel Henniker are invited to attend, and reassure President Wilson on this point. They explain that in other portions of the document exactly the same treatment is accorded to Poland by Germany.

(The amended Article 89 is then accepted.)

Article 98. The amendments are accepted.

Article 325. President Wilson reads a letter from the United States Delegation urging that the whole Article should be deleted.

Mr Lloyd George concurs in the view of the American Delegation. He considers the Article, either in its old shape or in its new shape, as unfair and unworkable.

Baron Sonnino points out that the object of the Article is to prevent something akin to dumping, but he admits it would be difficult to enforce. He does not press strongly against its rejection.

(It is agreed to delete the Article.)

The amendments to Articles 341, 349 and 353 are approved.

Article 373. President Wilson points out that both the British and American Delegations wish to delete the whole Article.

(It is agreed to delete Article 373.)

Article 386 is accepted.

Subject to the above alterations, the annex to the Report is approved and initialed by the Five Heads of States.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward an initialed copy of the annex of the Report to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

7. The Council has under consideration the Report of the President of the Labour Committee commenting on the German reply to the Note.

The Proposals under heading 2, namely: the admission of Germany to the League of Nations.

Heading 3. The offer made by Germany to supply German labor for the restoration of the devastated regions.

Heading 4. Rights and privileges of Allied workpeople admitted to enemy territory and vice versa are not accepted.

Heading 5. Containing the proposed addition to Article 312 to the Treaty with Germany, and the corresponding Article in the Treaty with Austria, is approved and initialed by the Five Heads of States.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.

8. The Council has before them the Report of the Committee on the Eastern Frontiers of Germany on the answer to be given to the German reply.

The report is read and generally approved, subject to the following amendments:

1) It is considered that the first paragraph of (A) should be strengthened by a reference to the treatment of Poland as having been one of the most notorious historical crimes.

2) A strengthening of the last sentence of the first paragraph under the heading “East Prussia” on page 2, by developing the reference to the fact of the slightness of the railway traffic between East Prussia and Germany and the habitual use of the sea.

3) The addition of a paragraph in regard to Upper Silesia.
(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to invite the Committee to alter the report accordingly.)

9. President Wilson draws attention to the second paragraph under the heading “(B) Possible Concessions” on page 3 of the above report: Enemy Proprietors in Transferred Territory

“Further, two Delegations are of opinion that Financial Clause F in regard to German proprietors in Upper Silesia ought to apply equally to German proprietors in the territory transferred from the sovereignty of Germany to that of Poland.”

Recalling that it has already been decided to apply this to the rest of Poland, he says he thinks this should be of application also to the corresponding clauses in the Austrian Treaty.

Baron Sonnino says that he is in general agreement, but he would not like to take a decision on the point without considering each case in detail.

10. The Council has before them a report by the Prisoners of War Committee, divided into the following parts:

1) Proposed alterations to Articles relating to Prisoners of War and Graves.

(It is generally agreed that, as these are stated to relate only to form, it is too late to incorporate them in the German Treaty.)

2) A draft reply to the German counter-proposals.

(The draft does not commend itself to the Council, and it is agreed that the Editing Committee should be instructed merely to make a reference to the note already sent to the German Delegation on the subject of Prisoners of War.)

3) An Annex to the report, containing the revised text of Articles 217, 221 and 225 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

(It is agreed that the changes proposed are of such minor importance as not to require action.)

11. (It is agreed that the reply to the German note on the subject of Memel should be referred to the Committee on the Eastern Frontiers of Germany.)

(Mr. Balfour was introduced.)

12. Mr Balfour reads the attached telegrams (Appendix V, A to F) which he has prepared at the request of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. He explains that they consist of the following:

1) A general telegram to be addressed to the Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Romanian Governments.

2) Three additions attached to the general telegram and addressed respectively to each of the above governments.

3) A separate telegram containing the frontiers between Hungary and Czechoslovakia and Hungary and Romania, respectively.

(Mr Balfour’s drafts are approved, and the Council thanks him for preparing them.)

(M Clemenceau signs each of the telegrams and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate them to the Secretary-General for immediate transmission, and for communication to the Romanian and Czechoslovak Delegations in Paris.)

(The meeting is then adjourned.)

Jimbuna

06-14-19, 05:52 AM

14th June 1919

Small group of civilians in Bailleul, France gather around a hut erected in the main square to receive their rations.
https://i.imgur.com/3OwEPa7.png

Brigadier General Wilds P. Richardson inspecting American troops participating in the Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War at Archangelsk, Russia.
https://i.imgur.com/3yOB7yK.png

Alcock and Brown takeoff from St. John's, Newfoundland.
https://i.imgur.com/0ZQC1a2.jpg

United States Navy pilot Charles Hammann dies in an aircraft crash at Langley Field, Virginia. He will receive the Medal of Honor posthumously in 1920 for a heroic World War I action on August 21, 1918, retroactively becoming the first U.S. aviator ever to receive the award.
https://i.imgur.com/t7REHbX.jpg

The SSZ airship aboard HMS Furious.
https://i.imgur.com/sNV9oTT.jpg

Sailor Steve

06-14-19, 07:35 PM

Saturday, June 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

1. M Clemenceau produces a Report by the Military Representatives at Versailles on the situation in Bulgaria.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to raise the question on Monday, and to circulate the Report before then.)

2. President Wilson reads a re-draft of Article 438 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, which has been agreed to by a representative of the Vatican, who had seen a representative of the American Delegation.

Mr Lloyd George objects to one portion of the draft, in which it is suggested that the names of the trustees for missionary property in former German colonies should be submitted to the Vatican. He says that the British Government has always refused any claims of this character on the part of the Vatican.

(The alteration to Article 438 in Appendix I is approved.)

3. In view of the short time available before communicating the reply to the German Note to the German Delegation, it is agreed that no Plenary Conference should be held, but that, instead, the representatives of the States principally affected by the changes proposed, should be invited to meet the Council that afternoon.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to summon at 15:30 the representatives of Belgium, Poland and the Czechoslovak State.)

4. The Council has before them re-drafts of certain passages in the Report of the Committee on the Eastern Frontiers of Germany on the answer to be Frontier of given to the German reply, prepared in accordance with the decisions taken on the previous day.

(Subject to certain verbal modifications, these are approved. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to report to the Secretary General for the information of the Editing Committee.)

(Note. Sir Maurice Hankey hands M Tardieu a corrected copy.)

5. M Tardieu reports that there are a number of outstanding points arising out of the German comments, to which, as yet, the Editing Committee believes no reply has been prepared. These include Luxemburg, Austria, Russia and Guarantees of Execution.

Sir Maurice Hankey adds to this list Reparation in Kind and Dye-stuffs.

M Tardieu then mentions several questions which are to be dealt with by the Council on the same afternoon.

(It is agreed that the Editing Committee should have authority to insert a paragraph in the reply, to the effect that there are certain points of detail raised in the German Note, to which it is not considered necessary to make a detailed reply, but that the points have been considered and the Allied and Associated Powers are unable to accept the arguments or to alter the Treaty.)

6. M Tardieu says that the Editing Committee has discovered a certain number of contradictions between the general covering letter to the Germans and the special replies.

(It is agreed that the Editing Committee should have authority to make the necessary changes either in the covering letter or in the special replies, to ensure uniformity.)

7. M Tardieu says that the Editing Committee has discovered that the English and French texts of the German Note, as published by the German Government, have been varied from the German text, in order to create a false impression among the British or French publics. He asks permission to mention this fact at the end of the Note on Responsibilities.

(This proposal is approved.)

8. M Clemenceau asks whether Mr Philip Kerr’s draft on the subject of Responsibilities has been approved.

President Wilson says the arrangement has been that it should be approved unless M Clemenceau wishes to change it.

M Clemenceau says that he doe not like the Note, but he does not press his objection.

(M Tardieu withdraws.)

9. The Council has before them a memorandum prepared by the Economic Commission regarding the Economic remarks of the German Delegation on the Economic Clauses of the Conditions of Peace.

President Wilson reads aloud the memorandum together with the supplementary Note.

(The Report is approved, subject to the following small changes.

Page 6, under the heading “German Appendix on Special Legal Questions.” Line 4. Before the word “activities” insert “political”

Page 7. 3rd Paragraph.3 For the word “likewise” insert “what she has forced her opponents to do.”

Page 13. Line 2.4 Instead of “English, French or Italian” put “English, French, Italian or Japanese.”

Page 13. Article 306. Paragraph 3.5 Delete the following words: “as we do not feel able to place any reliance on the character or fairness of the corresponding German measures. On the other hand,”

As a certain number of alterations in the Treaty of Peace with Germany are provided for by this Report and as these were summarized at the end, the Supplementary Note is initialed by the representatives of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers as an indication to the Drafting Committee that the necessary alterations were to be made in the Treaty.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify the Secretary-General of these decisions, for the information of the Drafting Committee and the Editing Committee.)

10. The Council has before them a reply to the German Counter-proposals in so far as these affect questions of Air craft and aerial navigation, prepared by the Aerial Commission.

(The reply does not commend itself to the Council, and it is decided that this subject should be included among the questions to which no detailed reply is to be sent, and which will be covered by a general paragraph in the Reply, stating that the German proposals have been considered; that their arguments are not accepted; and that no modification can be made in the Treaty.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify the Secretary General, for the information of the Editing Committee.)

Sailor Steve

06-14-19, 07:50 PM

Saturday, June 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Five with the Representatives from Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

1. President Wilson says that this Meeting has been arranged in order to enable a discussion to take place between the members of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Representatives of certain States, not represented on that Council, in regard to the changes contemplated in the Treaty of Peace with Germany which especially affect them. There is one point more especially affecting Belgium and Czechoslovakia and he proposes to explain the contemplated change in the first instance. Article 373 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany would have compelled Germany to allow railways to be constructed in her territory by the Allied and Associated Powers. The Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways had proposed a fresh draft which would have enabled Belgium and the Czechoslovak State to construct certain specified lines. The Council had come to the conclusion, however, that this was not a just provision for among other things the proposed Clause provided for the possibility of some of the expense falling on Germany. This would have meant a burden heavier on Germany than was provided in the original Clause and it had been a fixed principle not to impose any greater burden on Germany than had been contained in the original Treaty.

Dr Kramarcz (Czechoslovakia) says that he had been a Member of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways, and is familiar with this question. The subject had originated with a desire on Italy’s part to obtain certain junctions with the Tauern Railway. Belgium had then expressed a desire for improving the communications between Antwerp and Mannheim. The proposals now made are really much less than those contained in the original Treaty. Germany had protested against the original clause and was right in doing so, for it would have given an undefined right of railway construction by foreign powers in Germany, so that they could have constructed railways anywhere. Such a general provision is indefensible. The object of the new text had been to meet the German criticisms by defining and limiting what is required of Germany. The objects were, first, to show Germany that the Allied and Associated Powers had no desire to construct railways in Germany wherever they pleased; and secondly, to ask for certain definite improvements on specified lines. These proposals amounted to very little. The first proposal was for improvements for connecting Antwerp with the Rhine provinces. The second proposal provided for certain railways of considerable importance to Czechoslovakia, but, at the same time, he thinks that the new Article will satisfy the Germans. The United States Delegates have taken a strong line against the proposal, but the British Delegates had only made slight objections. If Belgium and Czechoslovakia are left to negotiate these railway constructions with Germany, they will be in an inferior situation. They want the support of their Allies in pressing for this construction, and they therefore ask for the maintenance of the Article.

M Hymans (Belgium) thanks Dr Kramarcz for his explanation in regard to Belgium as well as his own country. Dr Kramarcz has been a Member of the Commission and he himself has not, and is not familiar with the question. He has had no opportunity to confer with the Belgian Delegate on the Commission, but he is a very competent person and he knows that the lines he has asked for are only what is reasonable. He understands that the Germans object to the very general provisions in the original draft Treaty. The new text provides for the construction only of a few lines, none of them very extensive. This should be a great relief to the Germans and from their point of view, an improvement on the old Treaty. Hence, he agrees with Dr Kramarcz in pressing strongly for the retention of the amendment.

Mr Lloyd George asks Dr Benes (Belgium) and J Hymans whether the proposed railways are of sufficient importance for it to be worth while for the Czechoslovak and Belgian Governments respectively to construct the railways in Germany at their own expense.

Dr Benes explains that in regard to the connection between the stations of Schlauney and Nachod it would be worth while, as this railway is important for the conveyance of coal from Upper Silesia.

M Hymans is unable to answer the question, but undertakes to send an expert.

After some further explanations have been given by Dr Kramarcz and Dr Benes on a map, the Belgian and Czechoslovak Delegates withdraw.

(After consultation with the British expert, Colonel Henniker, the Council decides that instead of deleting Article 373 in accordance with the decision taken on the previous day, a new Article 373 should be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Germany, providing that within a period of five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Czechoslovak State may require the construction at the expense of the Czechoslovak State of a connection between the stations of Schlauney and Nachod.

An instruction to the Drafting Committee in this sense is initialed by the representatives of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers.)

(Note: The Belgian technical representative did not arrive.)

Sailor Steve

06-14-19, 10:05 PM

Saturday, June 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:45

Meeting of the Council of Five with the Representatives from Poland.

1. President Wilson explains that the Council has three points which they wish to discuss with the representatives of Poland. The first relates to the re-adjustment of the frontier, with which Mr Paderewski is familiar. The Council wishes to leave the Germans with no excuse for a grievance on ethnological grounds. The second relates to Upper Silesia and the proposal for a plebiscite. The third point, with which he will deal first, is a financial one. A general clause in the Treaty provides that by way of reparation countries like France and Great Britain can appropriate property or assets of German nationals in their countries and use them to make good the loss of French or British nationals in Germany. The German Government has to reimburse their nationals in their own country. The Council feels that a different principle ought to apply in territory taken from Germany. In the Austrian Treaty for example they propose to apply a different principle in the case of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Considering the application of this to the case of Poland, he says that German property in Upper Silesia and in the part of Poland that had formerly been German can be liquidated by the Polish Government but under the proposed procedure the proceeds will have to be paid to the German owner. If he has any complaints to make he will refer them to a mixed tribunal. The proposal had first been made in the case of Upper Silesia but it had been decided to apply it to the whole of the territory transferred from Germany to Poland.

Mr Dmowski asks if it is clear that this principle only applies to Polish territory taken from Germany and not to the remainder of Poland.

President Wilson explains that the Council had begun by applying it only to Upper Silesia and then they had decided to apply it to the other territory taken from Germany.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Economic Commission had recommended the adoption of this principle everywhere without discrimination.

Mr Paderewski says that the Polish Government does not entertain the idea of any expropriation without payment.

President Wilson says the Council feels assured of this but nevertheless has not felt at liberty to make the change without the approval of the Polish Government.

2. President Wilson says that as regards the frontiers, the desire of the Council has been not to give any excuse to the Germans for incidents disturbing the peace. The Germans do not deny the preponderance of Poles in Upper Silesia. What they do deny is the desire of the population to become Polish. Provision is now in contemplation for a plebiscite by communes. He feels confident that the result will be that the industrial regions will elect to become Polish. In order to get rid of certain adverse influences the plebiscite is to be delayed and during this period an occupation by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers is under consideration.

Mr Paderewski says that he cannot conceal the fact that this decision is a very serious blow to Poland. First, it will affect the people of Poland sentimentally. They believe President Wilson’s principles like the Gospel. The second reason is that it will cause bitter disappointment. If the plebiscite does not bring the result he hoped for it will be their poor neighbors of Polish race who will be the first to suffer. For centuries they have been treated like slaves. They have been driven out of their country and sent to Westphalia and compelled to forced labor in Berlin and elsewhere. They had hoped in future to live decent lives on their ancestral soil. If the plebiscite did not come up to expectations it will cause terrible disappointment. Thirdly, the country, owing to the plebiscite, will be in a chaotic condition and he hopes, therefore, that it will be taken within three or six months of the Peace in order to quieten things down. It will increase the excitement in Poland. The plebiscite is not like an election, since it is to decide the destiny of the country perhaps for centuries. The people will become demoralized. All sorts of impossible and unreasonable promises will be made. This is why the people of Poland do not accept the idea. The Polish Delegation can only accept the decision with profound respect but with deep sorrow.

President Wilson says that Mr Paderewski has taken up a very fine position which considerably shakes him.

Mr Lloyd George says that he also was much moved by the case put by Mr Paderewski for whom he had the very greatest personal respect. It was only after the deepest consideration that he had come to the conclusion that a plebiscite was desirable. According to his information, Mr Paderewski need not fear the result in the mining districts which were more independent than rural districts.

President Wilson says that an American observer who had just returned from Upper Silesia reported that there was a general desire for attachment to Poland.

Mr Dmowski says that he is fairly confident of the result, especially in the mining districts. Fifty years ago these people had only been Poles by language. Since then with the spread of education had begun the development of national conscience. In the western districts if the plebiscite should now give the wrong results this development would nevertheless continue and within twenty years there would be a great desire for union with Poland.

President Wilson points out that the League of Nations had made provision for such conditions. It is recognised that the present Conference cannot provide for all time and this is why this provision has been made under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Mr Lloyd George says that in the House of Commons he had made a great point of this and had emphasized the impossibility of laying down conditions for all time.

Mr Dmowski asked whether provision was made for the evacuation of Upper Silesia by the Germans during the interval before the plebiscite. When they are withdrawn what administration will be enforced?

President Wilson says that the Commission to be set up will arrange this.

Mr Dmowski insists on the importance that the Commission should employ equally Germans and Poles.

President Wilson says that the scheme provides fully for this.

Mr Dmowski says that though he knows the decision was already taken he must, for the salvation of his soul, point out certain changes in the frontier, which, in his opinion, ought to have been made so as to include the districts of Bomst and Meserytz in Poland. In reply to a question he said he had put this point to the Commission.

(Mr Paderewski and Mr Dmowski then withdraw.)

(Later in the Meeting, it is agreed that the plebiscite instead of being held within one to two years after the establishment of the Commission in the district, should be held “not sooner than six months or later than eighteen months after the establishment of the Commission in the district”.

A copy of the Articles relative to the carrying out of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia, containing this amendment, is initialed by the representatives of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers and handed to Mr Fromageot and Mr Hurst, who are present in connection with another question.)

Sailor Steve

06-14-19, 10:55 PM

Saturday, June 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 18:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

1. The Council has before them a memorandum on the observations presented by the German Delegation relative to Part 9 of the Treaty, (Financial Clauses) prepared by the Financial Com-Financial mission.

(This Memorandum had been read by Members between the morning and afternoon meetings and is approved without amendment.)

A copy of the Memorandum is initialed by the representatives of the five States, since it provides for certain alterations in the Treaty of Peace.

The initialed copy for the Drafting Committee is handed to Mr Hurst, who, with M Fromageot, attends the Council later in the meeting in connection with another question.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate a copy of the Memorandum to the Secretary-General, for the information of the Editing Committee.)

M Fromageot and Mr Hurst, of the Drafting Committee, are present during the following discussion.

2. The Council has before them the draft reply of the Commission on Belgian and Danish affairs to remarks of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace.

The reply with regard to Belgium is approved subject to a verbal alteration in line 5 of the English version, the word “offset” being substituted for “effect”.

In regard to Schleswig, the Council decides in principle to drop the idea of the plebiscite in the most southerly of the three zones. This decision is taken in view of the objections of the Danish Government.

M Fromageot and Mr Hurst are instructed without waiting for any initialed authority to proceed with the necessary alterations in the Treaty of Peace with Germany to give effect to this decision.

The Council feels, however, that in view of M Tardieu’s exceptional knowledge in this subject, the matter should be brought to his personal notice in case he might have any special objections to offer, in which case he should arrange with the Drafting Committee not to make those alterations without further questions.

M Tardieu’s attention is also to be drawn to the fact that, if the plebiscite were dropped, the memorandum on Schleswig would require alteration accordingly.

The whole of the memorandum from the Heading “Article 34” onward is struck out by the Council. A question raised in the note of the Financial Commission attached to the report of the Commission on Belgian and Danish Affairs gives rise to a discussion which leads to no change in the Treaty of Peace or in the reply to the Germans.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate these decisions to the Secretary-General for the information of the Editing Committee.)

3. After the reading of the memorandum from the President of the Financial Commission dated 11th June, 1919, attached to the report on Belgian and Schleswig Affairs,

Mr Lloyd George says that this raises a very important question, namely, as to what was the position in regard to Reparation of territories which were German at the beginning of the war. For example, are Danzig and Upper Silesia, both very wealthy states, to bear no part of the burden of the reparation?

M Clemenceau says that they ought to pay.

Mr Hurst says that in regard to Danzig, nothing is provided as to a contribution for reparation.

President Wilson says that whatever views anyone might hold about Poland, the Polish people have been compelled to fight for the Central Powers. They had had no choice. Their territory had been devastated by Russia as well as by Germany. They had suffered as hard a fate as any nation in the war. As all had from the first agreed that Poland was one of the nations to be redeemed by the war, the question arose as to whether any share of German reparation ought to be subtracted from her. The question which Mr Lloyd George raised, he says, had been discussed again and again and had been given up because no decision could be reached. He recalled the discussions on the subject in connection with Austria and the proposals for a book-keeping arrangement.

Mr Lloyd George reminds his colleagues that in the Austrian Treaty, an arrangement had been reached which he understood was going to be incorporated in the Treaty after discussion with the States formerly constituting Austria.

President Wilson urges that to take up this question involving a long delay is risky in view of the urgency of obtaining peace in the following week.

Mr Lloyd George says at least it is important to ascertain how the matter stands.

President Wilson says it had been a fixed principle that nothing must be added to the burden imposed on Germany by the Draft Treaty handed to the German Delegates.

Mr Lloyd George points out that to make Danzig and Upper Silesia take a share of Reparation would not be increasing, but lightening the burden on Germany, since these territories would not be German.

Baron Sonnino suggests that as Danzig is to be separated from Germany against its will, some consideration ought to be allowed to it.

M Clemenceau says the amount involved is small.

Mr Lloyd George says that there are 1,000,000 people in the Danzig area, while Upper Silesia provides one-third of the coal of Germany. The sum involved, therefore, is by no means small. He would like to make some provision in the parts of the Treaty relating to Upper Silesia providing that if any part of Upper Silesia goes to Poland there should be a joint consideration between Germany, Poland and the Commission as to how much of the burden of reparation was to be borne.

Baron Sonnino says that this would furnish a tremendous argument against a vote in favour of going to Poland.

President Wilson says he regrets the matter had been overlooked, but he thinks it is now too late.

M Clemenceau suggests that some agreement should be made with the Poles.

Mr Lloyd George says it could only be a free-will offering on the part of the Poles.

President Wilson thinks that in view of the political considerations involved this is the only fair method.

Mr Lloyd George says that by not adopting his proposal, the Council would not be letting off the Poles, but only the rich Germans inhabiting Silesia would be released from their appropriate share of reparation. It is not just to say to Silesia that if she votes out of Germany she will escape a payment of perhaps 500 million pounds. This is loading the dice against Germany.

President Wilson protests strongly against the use of this term. He points out that he is not obliged under the Armistice to agree to a plebiscite in Upper Silesia at all, as No. 13 of the Fourteen Points is perfectly clear on the subject. He had only conceded the plebiscite to meet Mr Lloyd George’s principles. So far as Germany is concerned, having accepted the Fourteen Points, she had no case to claim a plebiscite. He does not say that Mr Lloyd George has no case to claim this, but only that Germany had not. As the population had been ground down under the land-owners, it would not be loading the dice to make it exempt from sharing Germany’s burden of reparation.

Baron Sonnino points out that the effect of no share of reparation being taken by Upper Silesia would be to offer the rich proprietors of the land and of the mines a strong inducement to use their influence to the utmost to vote against Germany.

Mr Lloyd George says he must make a strong protest against the release of Upper Silesia from taking any share of reparation. He does not feel that he could withdraw the suggestion that it was loading the dice, although of course, this has no personal application.

President Wilson says that nevertheless he must strongly demur to the use of this term.

M Clemenceau said that as a matter of principle Mr Lloyd George is right, but he thinks to adopt his plan in practice would probably not be politic.

Mr Lloyd George says that this might cost scores of millions of pounds to the British Empire, and hundreds of millions to France, and he feels bound to make the strongest protest.

(The discussion is adjourned.)

4. The Council has before them a note by Mr Hurst on the question of Danzig, which they discuss with Mr Hurst and M Fromageot.

As the result of this discussion it is decided that the sentence as to the protection of the League of Nations in Paragraph 102 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, which has been suppressed in consequence of a decision taken by the Council on May 24th, should be reinstated.

M Fromageot and Mr Hurst are authorized to make this alteration without further authority. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate the decision to the Secretary-General.

5. Mr Hurst says that he and M Fromageot have been deputized by a joint meeting of the Drafting Committee and the Editing Committee to obtain a decision of the Council as to whether the five days to be allowed for the German Delegation to decide whether or not they would sign the Treaty of Peace included the three days’ notice which had to be given for the denunciation of the Armistice. A further question arises as to whether the notification of the denunciation of the Armistice should be made in a separate note or at the end of the letter covering detailed replies to the German note.

It is agreed:

1) That the five days allowed for the German Delegation within which to make a declaration as to whether they were prepared to sign should include the three days required for the denunciation of the Armistice.

2) That a separate communication on this subject should be sent to the German Delegation.

3) That the letter covering the detailed replies to the German Delegation should also end with a statement to the same effect.

6. On the suggestion of M Fromageot and Mr Hurst, it is agreed that the Drafting Committee should prepare for the use of the Germans a clean copy of the Treaty of Peace, showing in red ink the alterations provided for in the reply to the to the Germans.

Note: Owing to the numerous alterations in the Military Section and the Polish Section, however, reprints of those two sections will be presented.

Jimbuna

06-15-19, 07:20 AM

15th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Counter proposals by German Government published.

British aviators John Alcock and Arthur Brown completes the first non-stop transatlantic flight from Newfoundland to Ireland.
https://i.imgur.com/AVjvtj4.jpg

John Alcock and Arthur Brown enjoying breakfast after their non-stop flight across the Atlantic.
https://i.imgur.com/409cla8.jpg

American Federation of Labor demonstrates in Washington D.C. against prohibition of alcohol on grounds that drinking is a workers’ right.
https://i.imgur.com/mQMxxZI.jpg

The German Mephisto A7V Tank unloads off the SS Armagh at Brisbane.
https://i.imgur.com/p6prO7Z.png

Ship Losses:

Flottbeck (Imperial German Navy) The Ditmar Koel-class Vorpostenboot was sunk by mines 35 miles north west of Norderney.
Vesterby (Sweden) The cargo ship, en route from Antwerp to Kolding, sank after striking a mine in Danish waters. The crew was saved.

Sailor Steve

06-15-19, 11:09 AM

Sunday, June 15, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

06-16-19, 06:13 AM

16th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Allies reply to German counter proposals presented and published.

Troops under Pancho Villa attack Mexican government soldiers at Ciudad Juárez but are defeated by the combined forces of the Mexican government and U.S. troops crossing over from El Paso. U.S. armored cars at El Paso.
https://i.imgur.com/j2s4UBw.png

Helen Keller met with Charlie Chaplin during the filming of “Sunnyside.”
https://i.imgur.com/IrCAg8K.jpg

Ship Losses:

HMS Kinross (Royal Navy) The Aberdare-class minesweeper struck a mine and sank in the Aegean Sea.

Sailor Steve

06-16-19, 07:07 PM

Monday, June 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

(M Clemenceau and M Mantoux are not present during the discussion of the first few items.)

1. The Council has before them a memorandum by the Economic Commission, headed Periods of Time, recommending certain alterations in the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

(After the memorandum has been read, it is agreed that these alterations should not be approved.)

2. The Council has before them a suggested modification in Article 276c of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

(After the proposed alteration has been read, it is agreed that it is not necessary to make the alteration.)

3. The Council has before them proposals of the Special Aeronautical Committee in regard to the exportation and subsequent repurchase of aeronautical material in Germany. At the end of this memorandum it was proposed that the measures, if adopted, should be extended to all enemy States and to all war material.

(After the memorandum has been read, it is agreed that the proposals should not be adopted.)

4. The Council has before them Report No 5 by the Committee on New States, recommending an additional Article for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with committee on Germany after Article 93, or after Article 155.

Mr Lloyd George says that the only effect of this would be to make the Germans suspicious.

(After the proposed addition has been read, it is agreed that the proposals of the Committee on Minorities should not be adopted.)

5. Sir Maurice Hankey reports that on the previous day, a verbal alteration of the revised Article 438 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, on the subject of Religious Missions, which had been approved by the Council on Saturday, June 14th,1 had been initialed by President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George, and had provisionally been acted on by the Drafting Committee. They had felt justified in doing this, as the British and United States Governments were more concerned than other Governments in the alteration. He now asks for the initials of the representatives of the other states.

The alteration in question consists of the substitution for the following words, “composed of persons belonging to the same or corresponding religious denomination as the Mission whose property is involved” by the following, “composed of persons holding the faith of the Mission whose property is involved.”

Mr Lloyd George says that the reason for the change is that there is no religious denomination in the British Empire precisely corresponding to the German Lutheran denomination. The word faith had been substituted for denomination, as it would enable other denominations closely akin to the Lutherans, such as the Presbyterians, to take over the Lutheran Missions.

Baron Sonnino does not much like the word faith, the use of which, he says, would bring about difficulties with the Vatican.

(After a discussion, in the course of which the proposed declaration to the Vatican is brought up, Baron Sonnino withdrew his objections, and the revised Article 438 is initialed by M Clemenceau, Baron Sonnino and Baron Makino.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward the initialed copy to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.

6. Mr Lloyd George hands in the draft of a Declaration which it is proposed to make to the Vatican in regard to German Missions.

The draft is read, and in the course of the discussion, the following alterations were made:

Paragraph 2) Last line. At the suggestion of Baron Makino, the words “in Africa and Asia Minor” were omitted.

Baron Makino points out that there might be Missions in the Pacific Islands also.

Paragraph 3) Baron Sonnino suggests that the following words in lines 10 to 13 might cause considerable difficulties: “the property of Missions under the Holy See will be placed at the disposal of persons of the Roman Catholic faith authorized thereto by the Holy See.”

The Council approves of the following substitute:

“The property of Missions under the Holy See will be placed at the disposal of properly authorized persons of the Roman Catholic faith”, the following words being omitted: “authorized thereto by the Holy See.”

President Wilson says that he cannot accept the following additional paragraph, which had been proposed in case it were desired to apply the declaration to territory other than mandated territory:

“These principles laid down by International agreement for territories administered under mandate will also be observed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in all territories belonging to them.”

(It is agreed to omit this paragraph.)

Baron Makino asks, however, that the final decision might be reserved until the afternoon.

7. The Council has before them a draft paragraph for inclusion in the reply by the Allies to the German Counter-proposals on the subject of Memel.

(This reply is approved subject to the following addition after the word “sovereignty.”

“particularly in view of the fact that Memel is the only sea outlet for Lithuania.”

A copy of the paragraph, as finally approved, is handed to M Tardieu for the Editing Committee.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General.)

8. M Clemenceau says M Loucheur had pressed for a small verbal alteration on page 6 of the reply to the German Counter-proposals on the subject Reparation: of Reparation.

(After a short discussion, it is agreed that the following sentence should be deleted: “Suitable facilities for inspecting the damage done will be afforded to Germany’s Agents at reasonable times” and that the following sentence should be substituted:“The necessary facilities for making reliable estimates of the damage done by her will be afforded to Germany.”

The change was communicated by Sir Maurice Hankey to M Loucheur and M Tardieu, who were in the adjoining Room.)

9. Baron Sonnino hands in a letter, dated June 14th, 1919, addressed by S Orlando to M Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, on the subject of the peculiar difficulties which would face Italy should the signature of the Conditions of Peace with Germany take place before the settlement of the future Italian boundaries. This, as explained in detail in the letter, arises from the fact that the signature of the Peace Treaty with Germany implies also the signature of the Covenant of the League of Nations, one of the clauses of which, contemplates reciprocal guarantees for the territories of the signing powers.

S Orlando had telegraphed, Baron Sonnino continued, to ask that Italy’s reserve should be recorded, namely:

“That the Italian Delegation is of opinion that the Clauses of the League of Nations, just because they refer to a territorial asset already established, do not apply to any of those arrangements and to those questions connected with them, which form the object of the Peace and which have not been settled yet.”

S Orlando had always hoped, when giving his previous warnings on the subject, that the question of the Italian claims might be regulated before the signature of the German Treaty, and thus it is imperative to make these reservations now.

President Wilson suggests that these reservations are entirely unnecessary, since none of these mooted questions arise out of the Peace with Germany. The Austrian Treaty, he points out, also contains the Covenant of the League of Nations, and lays down that Austria agrees to recognize some of the States within boundaries to be decided by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Consequently, the League of Nations Covenant cannot apply to an unclosed question.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that Baron Sonnino should write a letter to the Council.

Baron Sonnino says that it will be sufficient for the moment if his reservation is taken note of on the procès-verbal.

(It is agreed to take formal note of the reservation contained in S Orlando’s letter of June 14th, 1919.)

10. The text of an agreement between the United States of America, France and Great Britain, in regard to the Rhine Provinces, was approved by M Clemenceau, Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson.

Mr Lloyd George points out that some similar arrangement will have to be made with Belgium. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to prepare a copy for signature.

11. Sir Maurice Hankey says he has received a telephone message from the Drafting Committee stating that the Rhine Convention is now practically ready to be handed to the Germans. The material given the Drafting Committee had not specified who were to be the High Contracting Parties. As the Italian representative on the Drafting Committee had stated that Italy would like to be a High Contracting Party, notwithstanding that she was not represented on the High Commission, the Drafting Committee had included Italy as well as Belgium with the British, French and United States as High Contracting Parties.

Baron Sonnino says that the only object of making Italy a High Contracting Party is to enable her to send a Military Attaché to the High Commission in order to keep her informed of what was going on.

At the Commission which considered this subject Lord Robert Cecil had said that Italy could always send a liaison officer.

M Clemenceau doubts if there is much value to Italy in a liaison officer who would only [apparent omission] between operative bodies.

Baron Sonnino says that if there is to be no Italian liaison officer, it is no use Italy being a High Contracting Party.

(It is agreed:

1) That Italy should not be a High Contracting Party.

(This is immediately notified to the Drafting Committee by Sir Maurice Hankey.)

2) That the Convention should be handed to the German Delegation at the same time as the reply to the German Counter-proposals.)

12. President Wilson says he is to be away at Brussels from the evening of Tuesday, June 17th, until the morning of Friday, June 20th.

Mr Lloyd George says he too contemplates a short absence.

(The Council then adjourns upstairs for the discussion of certain military questions with the Military Representatives at Versailles, those proceedings being recorded as a separate meeting.)

ALLIED REPLY TO GERMAN COUNTER-PROPOSAL

(Finally approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on afternoon of June 11th, 1919, with a small amendment, approved on the morning of June 16th.)

The Allied and Associated Governments, consistently with their policy already expressed, decline to enter into a discussion of the principles underlying the Reparation Clauses of the Conditions of Peace, which have been prepared with scrupulous regard for the correspondence leading up to the Armistice of November 11th, 1918, the final memorandum of which dated 5th November, 1918, contains the following words:

“Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of the 8th January, 1918, the President declared that the invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, and the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.”

To the extent that your reply deals with practical phases of the execution of the principles enunciated in the Conditions of Peace, you appear to proceed on the basis of a complete misapprehension, which is the more difficult to understand as the inferences you draw and the statements which you make are wholly at variance with both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty Clauses. For purposes of clarification, however, and in order that there may be no possible ground for misunderstanding, the Allied and Associated Governments submit the following observations:

The vast extent and manifold character of the damage caused to the Allied and Associated Governments in consequence of the war has created a reparation problem of extraordinary magnitude and complexity, only to be solved by a continuing body, limited in personnel and invested with broad powers to deal with the problem in relation to the general economic situation. The Allied and Associated Powers, recognizing this situation, themselves delegate power and authority to a Reparation Commission. This Reparation Commission is, however, instructed by the Treaty itself so to exercise and interpret its powers as to ensure in the interest of all, as early and complete a discharge by Germany of her reparation obligations as is consistent with the true maintenance of the social, economic and financial structure of a Germany earnestly striving to exercise her full power to repair the loss and damage she has caused.

The provisions of Article 241, by which the German Government is to invest itself with such powers as may be needed to carry out its obligations, are not to be misconstrued as giving the Commission power to dictate the domestic legislation of Germany. Nor does Paragraph 12 (b), of Annex II, give the Commission power to prescribe or enforce taxes or to dictate the character of the German budget, but it is to examine the latter for two specified purposes. This is necessary in order that it may intelligently and constructively exercise the discretion accorded to it in Germany’s interest particularly by Article 234, with regard to extending the date and modifying the form of payments. The provisions of Article 240 with regard to the supply of information are similar in character and purpose and there should be little occasion for the exercise of these powers when once the amount of the liability of Germany is fixed, if Germany is in a position to, and does, comply with the schedule of payments which then will have been notified to her and with the specific provisions of the several Annexes relative to reparation in kind. It is further to be observed that the power of modification accorded by the said Article 234 is expressly designed to permit of a modification in Germany’s interest of a schedule of payments which events may demonstrate to be beyond Germany’s reasonable capacity. The Allied and Associated Powers vigorously reject the suggestion that the Commission, in exercising the power conferred by Article 240 and by Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Annex IV, might require the divulgence of trade secrets and similar confidential data.

The observations of the German Delegation present a view of the Commission so distorted and so inexact, that it is difficult to believe that the clauses of the Treaty have been calmly or carefully examined. It is not an engine of oppression or a device for interfering with German Sovereignty. It has no forces, which it commands; it has no executive powers within the territory of Germany; it cannot, as is suggested, direct or control the educational or other systems of the country. Its business is to fix what is to be paid; to satisfy itself that Germany can pay; and to report to the Powers, whose Delegation it is, in case Germany makes default. If Germany raises the money required in her own way, the Commission cannot order that it shall be raised in some other way; if Germany offers payment in kind, the Commission may accept such payment, but, except as specified in the Treaty itself, the Commission cannot require such a payment. The German observations appear to miss the point that the Commission is directed to study the German system of taxation for the protection of the German people no less than for the protection of their own. Such study is not inquisitorial, for the German system of taxation is not an object of curiosity to other Powers, nor is a knowledge of it an end in itself. If any plea of inability which the German Government may advance, is to be properly considered, such a study is necessary. The Commission must test whether a sincere application is being given to the principle, accepted in the observations “that the German taxation system should impose in general on the taxpayer at least as great a burden as that prevailing in the most heavily burdened of the States represented on the Reparation Commission”. If the German resources are to be properly weighed, the first subject of inquiry, and perhaps the first ground for relief, will be the German fiscal burden.

It is understood that the action necessary to give effect to the provisions of Annex IV, relative to reparation in kind, will be taken by Germany on its own initiative, after receipt of notification from the Reparation Commission.

The provisions of the Treaty are in no wise incompatible with the creation by Germany of a Commission which will represent Germany in dealings with the Reparation Commission and which will constitute an instrumentality for such co-operation as may be necessary. The Treaty specifically and repeatedly provides opportunities for the German Government to present facts and arguments with respect to claims and modes of payments, within the limits of the principles and express provisions of the Treaty. This may be done through a commission and no reason is perceived why such a commission could not work in harmony with the Reparation Commission. Certainly this is greatly to be desired. The Allied and Associated Powers are therefore ready to agree to such a procedure as the following:

Immediately after the Treaty is signed, Germany may present and the Allied and Associated Powers will receive and examine such evidence, estimates and arguments, as she may think fit to present. Such documents need not be final but may be presented subject to corrections and additions.

At any time within four months of the signature of the Treaty, Germany shall be at liberty to submit, and the Allied and Associated Powers will receive and consider, such proposals as Germany may choose to make. In particular, proposals will be acceptable on the following subjects and for the following purposes: Germany may offer a lump sum in settlement of her whole liability, or in settlement of her liability under any of the particular categories which have been decided upon and laid down. Germany may offer to undertake to repair and reconstruct part of the whole of any damaged district, or certain classes of damage in each country or in all the countries which have suffered. Germany may offer labor, materials or technical service for use in such work, even though she does not undertake to do the work herself. She may suggest any practicable plan, category by category, or for the reparations as a whole, which will tend to shorten the period of inquiry and bring about a prompt and effectual conclusion. Without making further specifications, it may be said in a word that Germany is at liberty to make any suggestion or offer of a practical and reasonable character for the purposes of simplifying the assessment of the damage, eliminating any question or questions from the scope of the detailed inquiry, promoting the performance of the work and accelerating the definition of the ultimate amount to be paid. The necessary facilities for making reliable estimates of the damage done by her will be afforded to Germany. Three conditions and three only are imposed upon the tender of these proposals. Firstly, the German authorities will be expected before making such proposals to confer with the representatives of the Powers directly concerned. Secondly, such offers must be unambiguous, and must be precise and clear. Thirdly, they must accept the categories and the reparation clauses as matters settled beyond discussion. The Allied and Associated Powers will not entertain arguments or appeals directed to any alteration. The Allied and Associated Powers have to remark that in the Observations submitted the German Delegation has made no definite offer at all but only vague expressions of willingness to do something undefined. A sum of £5,000,000,000 is indeed mentioned, and this is calculated to give the impression of an extensive offer, which upon examination it proves not to be. No interest is to be paid at all. It is evident that till 1927 there is no substantial payment but only the surrender of military material and the devolution upon other Powers of large portions of Germany’s own debt. Thereafter a series of undefined installments is to be agreed, which are not to be completed for nearly half a century. The present value of this distant prospect is small, but it is all that Germany tenders to the victims of her aggression in satisfaction of their past sufferings and their permanent burdens.

Within two months thereafter the Allied and Associated Powers will so far as may be possible, return their answer to any proposals that may be made. It is impossible to declare in advance that they will be accepted, and if accepted, they may be subject to conditions, which can be discussed and arranged. The Allied and Associated Powers, however, declare that such proposals will be seriously and fairly considered; no one could be better pleased than they, if, in the result, a fair, speedy, and a practical settlement were arrived at. The questions are bare questions of fact, namely, the amount of the liabilities, and they are susceptible of being treated in this way. Beyond this, the Powers cannot be asked to go.

The Powers will, however, make a declaration on another point, as follows: The resumption of German industry involves access by the German people to food supplies and by the German manufacturers to the necessary raw materials and provision for their transport to Germany from overseas. The resumption of German industry is an interest of the Allied and Associated Powers as well as an interest of Germany. They are fully alive to this fact and therefore declare that they will not withhold from Germany commercial facilities without which this resumption cannot take place, but that, subject to conditions and within limits, which cannot be laid down in advance, and, subject also to the necessity for having due regard to the special economic situation created for Allied and Associated countries by German aggression and the war, they are prepared to afford to Germany facilities in these directions for the common good.

Even if no settlement were arrived at, it must be evident that the early production of the German evidence would greatly abbreviate the inquiry, and accelerate the decisions. The information at present at hand comes from one side only. The German Authorities have had long occupation of a large part of the damaged areas and have been over the ground, forwards and backwards, within the last twelve or fifteen months. Their information must be extensive and exact. The Allied and Associated Powers have as yet had no access to this mass of material. The mere comparison of the evidence forthcoming on the one side and the other must greatly narrow the field of dispute and may eliminate dispute altogether. It is obvious that, if the class of damages done in the devastated areas can be dealt with in this fashion, the liability under the other categories can be quickly established, for it depends on the statistics and particulars of a far simpler character. By giving a satisfactory covenant to execute the work of rebuilding themselves, the Germans could at once dispose of the only difficult or long subject of inquiry.

Meanwhile, the draft Treaty must be accepted as definitive and must be signed. The Allied and Associated Powers cannot any longer delay to assure their security. Germany cannot afford to deny to her populations the peace which is offered to them. The Reparations Commission must be constituted and must commence its task. The only question open will be how best to execute the provisions of the Treaty.

The foregoing should suffice to demonstrate the reasonableness of the conditions under which Germany is to discharge her reparation obligations, and how utterly unfounded are the criticisms of the German reply. These are, indeed, explicable only on the theory that the German plenipotentiaries have read into the Conditions of Peace, in clear defiance of their express terms, an intent which it would be not unnatural to see evidenced by victorious nations which have been the victims of cruelty and devastation on a vast and premeditated scale. The burdens of Germany undeniably are heavy, but they are imposed under conditions of justice by peoples whose social well-being and economic prosperity have been gravely impaired by wrongs which it is beyond the utmost power of Germany to repair.

Paris, 11 June, 1919. (Published 16 June.)

Sailor Steve

06-16-19, 07:14 PM

Monday, June 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 12:30

Meeting of the Council of Five

1. (The Council agrees to accept the Military Clauses as amended by the Military Representatives.)

(The Council agrees to accept the Clauses relating to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control.)

(The Council agrees to accept the Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses (General Clauses) as amended at the meeting held on May 15th, 1919.)

2. (The Council accepts Joint Note No. 44 to the Supreme War Council by its Military Representatives, on the subject of the Military Measures to be taken in Bulgaria.)

Sailor Steve

06-16-19, 08:17 PM

Monday, June 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

1. President Wilson says that Marshal Foch has been invited to attend the Council in order to explain his plans in the event of a refusal by the Germans to sign the Treaty of Peace. The Governments have the responsibility for general affairs, but Marshal Foch has the responsibility for military affairs. If the general affairs are to be conducted correctly the Governments must know what the military plans were.

Marshal Foch says that the military action to be undertaken must have a definite aim. He asks the Governments to say what the object is that he is to provide for. There was no serious enemy force in front of the Allied Army on the Western front, but there was an enemy Government. What result do the Allied and Associated Governments require of military action? They might desire that if the German Government resists, it should be upset and replaced by a Government that would sign. If so, he will examine what the military means are for effecting it. On the contrary, they might desire more immediate and limited objects, such as the occupation of the most productive provinces of Germany, such as the Basin of the Ruhr (in Westphalia). Or again, they might desire chiefly an economic and political result. The military operation must conform to the Government’s desires. When he is given his aim, he will say what military means are available for attaining it.

M Clemenceau says he thinks the Council are already in agreement as to the principles of action. They do not seek an economic result nor a military conquest. What they seek is a political result, namely, that the Treaty of Peace should be signed as soon as possible. Germany is now prostrated, and is in such a state of weakness that as Marshal Foch had said, he has no effective military force in front of him. There are two possible methods, the soft method and the strong method for dealing with Germany. He himself is in favour of the strong method. We ought to take resolute, rough and prompt action to solve the difficulty. If we seem to hesitate, or if we merely occupy certain limited territory, his opinion is that it will give the impression to the Germans that we are weaker than before, and that our demobilization had proceeded too far. Hence, he is in favour of strong measures, and the Council ought to put it to Marshal Foch to say what they should do. For his part, he can think of nothing but a march on Berlin. This will have an immediate result on German public opinion. If this were done, it is not improbable that the present Government would fall and we should have a Government to deal with which will sign. If we do not do this, the Germans will think us weakened and only able to take milder action. He would not like to give this impression. Hence, if the Germans refuse to sign, strong military action must be taken.

President Wilson agrees.

Mr Lloyd George says he was in complete accord.

Baron Sonnino says there is no doubt of it.

Marshal Foch says that the decision is for strong action, and it is not for him to dispute it. The result he has to keep in view is to compel the Germans to sign the Treaty of Peace. To do that, it is necessary to seek out the German Government, if necessary, to destroy it, and to find another Government that is ready to sign. That is the object before him. It is now necessary for him to state the position as regards the means available to achieve this end. Today is the 16th June, 1919. Since the 11th November 1918, demobilization had proceeded far. Now he can dispose of 39 divisions for an offensive operation, namely 18 French, 10 British, 5 American and 6 Belgian. On the 11th November, 1918 he had disposed of 198 divisions. Consequently, the same effort cannot be expected now as if the war had been prolonged then. What is in front of him? The German Army on the Western front is not at all formidable. There was no serious organized military resistance sufficient to stop the advance of his 39 divisions. But Germany has a large population, amounting at present to some 65 millions. These 65 millions, in their male part, consisted largely of trained soldiers who had been demobilized, but are fully experienced in war, and capable of military action in any extemporized organization. Hence, in their advance, the Allied Army will have difficulties of a special nature to guard against. As it advances, it will have to leave garrisons of occupation to keep the population quiet. The territory to be occupied is very vast and there was 65 millions of people to be controlled. The situation is all the more formidable owing to the fact that Germany had a single Government constituting a sole central authority. It might stir up the population and create special difficulties for the Allies to keep it in order. What makes the strength of Germany is German unity. 65 millions of people are animated by the same sentiment, and are scattered over one vast territory. It is this unity that made the population so formidable. To occupy Berlin would mean an advance of 300 miles, which is a penetration of great depth. The armies will have to pass through a very densely populated district, as well as the best organized district, and the one with the strongest military traditions. To the south, this people will have the support of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. It will be a formidable task to keep this population quiet with only 39 divisions, if the German Government really set itself to work up trouble. On the other hand, if steps can be taken by political means to weaken Germany, the situation would be ameliorated. If Southern Germany could be detached by political maneuvers, the population to be kept in order would not be 65 millions, but only 45 millions. If his strategy is directed to that end, and is helped by a separatist policy, it will enable his Armies to reach Berlin. A question he puts, therefore, is as to whether the Allied and Associated Governments are willing to deal with the separate Governments of Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria, which numbers some 12 to 15 millions of people, and thus help on a solution of the military problem. If, on the other hand, he must go forward into the middle of Central Europe, he will find a resistance which might be more or less great, according to which the danger will be more or less great, while the southern flank of his Army will be exposed. Before he can reach Berlin he will have to detach so many men to safeguard the position in his rear that only a very enfeebled Army would reach there, and its southern flank would be seriously menaced. Unless the States of South Germany can be detached, as he had suggested, by some special measures, that is the situation to be faced.

President Wilson asks what Marshal Foch means by special measures.

Marshal Foch says that as these would be the first to be encountered, they should be dealt with immediately.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether Marshal Foch would release Bavaria and Württemberg from their share of the indemnity.

Marshal Foch says he will ask for a certain sum of money and something more later.

Mr Lloyd George asks if the total would be lighter.

Marshal Foch says no.

Mr Lloyd George asks what then Marshal Foch means by special treatment. What was his form of discrimination?

Marshal Foch says that they will have a pistol at their throat at the beginning.

M Clemenceau says that political and strategic questions should not be mixed up. He asks the military chiefs not to intervene in political affairs more than statesmen do in military affairs. Marshal Foch had done right to state the difficulties which he would encounter, and he appreciates the clear statement he had made on them. He ventures to think, however, that he had not put the other side sufficiently strongly. It is true that Germany has a population of 65 millions of people within the borders of the former German Empire. But they are a beaten people and know that they are beaten. Moreover, the reaction of the German people is different from that of the French, as had been proved in the Napoleonic wars. It is true that these millions include many experienced officers and hundreds of thousands, and perhaps millions of men. But they are beaten while we were successful. It is a characteristic of the German people that they cannot resist unless highly organized. He thinks that the comparison of 39 divisions now with 198 in November last is not justified, owing to the fact that we are now confronted by an entirely different military problem. For these reasons, he thinks that Marshal Foch should have put the light in the picture as well as the shade. Moreover, the material of the two forces is not comparable. As to the stories about Germany having manufactured additional war material, these have not been confirmed, and his information is that instead of ordering new material, the Germans had rather sought to sell what they had got. The Allies, on the other hand, have a marvelously complete material. There is a superfluity of motor machine guns, tanks, heavy guns and all the elaborate equipment of modern war. All experts agree that our material equipment is vastly superior. In addition, there are military aspects on which he does not feel qualified to comment in much detail. The communications would of course have to be carefully guarded, and Marshal Foch could be trusted to do that. is it necessary, however, he asks, to weaken the Army by detaching such very large forces in the rear? This of course, is a strategic and military consideration, but as a civilian, he ventures to express doubts. As regards the number of divisions, he points out that the United States divisions are of double strength and counted for two. Moreover, there is the proposed junction with the Czechoslovaks, who number some 10 or 15 divisions and are good soldiers, only lacking munitions. It is true that they were now fighting the Hungarians, but we hope to stop them quite soon. During the march through Germany, it might be possible to send them aircraft, which would help them against the Hungarians. Then there is the Polish side of the question. The weight of the evidence is that Germany means to fight in Upper Silesia. She will probably fight there whether she signs or not. The Poles, he believe, have some 20 divisions. All this leads him to think that the Allies were not in the state of feebleness that might have been inferred from Marshal Foch’s statement. Marshal Foch had spoken of a possible detachment of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. He himself is disposed to agree that it will be good military strategy to sever south Germany from the north. If the Bavarians are attacked by the Italians also, the result will be very quick, and Bavaria could then sign the Treaty on her own account. In fact, it seems to him that this was the proper way to secure the right flank and then to march direct to Berlin, while the Poles should keep on fighting the Germans in Upper Silesia. He himself does not feel very much afraid of the action by individuals, and he cites the experience of Napoleon in support of this view. If Marshal Foch thinks that the risks of marching on Berlin are too great, he will invite him to explain frankly what his views are and make other suggestions. He hopes that Marshal Foch is in favour of the hard method, but he had spoken as though our means were not equal to this, and some other method might be necessary. Strategy is Marshal Foch’s affair, and he hopes he will explain his views. If the plans have to be changed now, action must be taken at once, as only a few days are available.

President Wilson reminds Marshal Foch that a few weeks ago he had explained to the Council his whole plan on a map, and had displayed a well-thought-out plan of advance to Berlin. It had seemed then quite clear to him that a march could be made on Berlin. He asks if anything had happened since then to modify Marshal Foch’s views and expectations.

Marshal Foch points out that since then some time had elapsed. It is incontestable that the Germans might have some organisation by this time, although he had no definite information as to its existence. It is incontestable that material might have been manufactured. It is incontestable that German public opinion had been pulled together.

To return to the subject of discussion, he fears he must have expressed himself badly, for he had been misunderstood both in the ensemble and in detail. The Allies have all the forces necessary for breaking down the German resistance. But forces would have to be left behind for occupying a great part of Germany. This would greatly reduce the forces which could appear before Berlin, and we should cut a poor figure if the occupation of the places in the rear had reduced the Army too far.

His idea had always been to adopt a separatist strategy, but to make certain of this it was necessary that he should be supported by political action. Hence, he would ask the Governments not to insist on pursuing a policy of obtaining the signature of the German Government as a whole only in Berlin, but to allow him to obtain the signature of the different parts, e. g. Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, etc., etc., separately, so as to help him in his campaign. By this means they would weaken the final resistance of Prussia which is the last enemy.

President Wilson says that the suggestion is worth considering as the armies begin to advance. The only question which arises today, however, is as to whether Marshal Foch is prepared to develop the plan he had explained for the march on Berlin.

Marshal Foch says that he could only state that he could do so subject to some reserves. He cannot go very far unless he is able to develop the plan of separatist strategy which he had just explained, or unless other forces are put at his disposal beyond those that were now available.

M Clemenceau says he must frankly state his impression that Marshal Foch’s plan is unacceptable. The situation is too grave for anyone to conceal what he felt. He reminds Marshal Foch that some three weeks ago he had explained very freely and without any reserves his plan, and second that he had then displayed complete confidence as to its practicability. Today, however, he asks that it should be accompanied by political action, otherwise the strategical plan of an advance on Berlin could not be carried out. In fact, when asked what he could do in a military way, he replied by saying: “Give me a good policy and I will give you a good strategy”. Does he ask for negotiations with Bavaria? are the Allied and Associated Powers to send High Commissioners to Munich? Are they to institute a Government there, or what? To do this would be to endanger our prestige, and for his part he could not undertake it. If the march on Berlin is, in Marshal Foch’s opinion, impossible, the question must be discussed in order to see what can be done. He had not been prepared for this, in view of Marshal Foch’s confidence on the last occasion. Marshal Foch now says he must make reservations if a certain policy is not adopted in South Germany. This would be to put the responsibility on to the civilians. He knows, however, that Marshal Foch had never refused to undertake responsibility in the war, and he is certain he would not fail now. Hence, he must ask him to complete his program and say what can be done. As regards the plan he had proposed, he himself must make express reserves. If the Allies devoted themselves to the encirclement of Bavaria, the Germans would fall on the Poles in Upper Silesia, and this was the reason he could not agree. Strategy is not his profession, and he does not desire to oppose his views to those whose lives have been devoted to it. If the situation is as Marshal Foch has described, he would have expected to have suggested the intervention of the Italians. This would have been a good negotiation to undertake. He is prepared to consider and discuss this. In leaving Marshal Foch the other day, however, he had felt that everything was all right. He did not complain if Marshal Foch had reflected over the matter, and now felt some disquietude. He felt it right to say, however, that the time is now pressing. If, in five days time, the Germans refused to sign, and the best reply that the Allies could give was a slow march along the Rhine Valley, he thinks the Germans would not be impressed.

Mr Lloyd George says that Marshal Foch is Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army, that is, of the American and British, as well as of the French Armies. Some weeks ago, he was asked to give his advice as to the military action to be taken. The Council had also asked for naval advice, and both the military and the naval advice had been given. Marshal Foch had then explained the whole situation. How he would advance with one flank on one river valley, and another flank on another river valley, making a corridor right up to Berlin. Marshal Foch had then told the Council exactly what troops were at his disposal. He had never said they were not sufficient. He did say to President Wilson; “please cancel the departure of two divisions” and President Wilson had done so. Then he had explained how the French Army was quite ready and he had turned to him and said “the British are not ready”. He had immediately placed himself in communication with the Secretary of State for War, who was in Paris, and had asked Marshal Foch to see Mr Churchill and General Wilson He himself had felt the matter to be so important that he had sent for Mr Churchill on the same afternoon, and Mr Churchill had replied that he was taking immediate steps to put matters right. He believed that this had been done. If it had not, it would be done at once. Now, Marshal Foch says he had doubts and reservations. President Wilson had asked him, “Supposing the Allies preferred to stick to your old plan, are you ready to march”. He had replied, “No”, that is, he had replied with reserves. It is very strange that he had only just told the Council this. Marshal Foch had said that changes had taken place in Germany. If so, surely Marshal Foch ought to have told the Council before what these changes were. He understands that Marshal Foch had just been to Luxemburg. He had not come back specially to tell the Council all that he had discovered. He had only come to the Council because he was pressed to come. If Marshal Foch thought that the plan he had explained three weeks ago was inadequate, as Allied Commander-in-Chief, it was his business to inform the Council. When had he discovered this inadequacy? Was it in Luxemburg? Or was it last week? The Council had never refused to see Marshal Foch. If he said he had something urgent to speak about, they would always see him. Certainly, if he had said, “I cannot carry out my plan”, they would have seen him. As the representative of one of the Governments which was proud to have its Army commanded by such a distinguished soldier as Marshal Foch, he felt he had a right to complain that Marshal Foch had never raised this question until it was almost too late for the Governments. What he feared was that Marshal Foch was mixing up politics with strategy. He hoped that Marshal Foch would not mind his saying that he feared he was allowing his judgment on political matters to create doubts in his judgment on strategical matters. The Allies had always trusted Marshal Foch, and the events of last year had shown them to be right in doing so, so long as he confined his judgment to purely military matters. He asked therefore, again for a purely military opinion from Marshal Foch. If a wrong decision was taken now, he would meet trouble in the House of Commons, and M Clemenceau would meet it in the Chamber, while President Wilson would also have his troubles. Therefore, he entreats Marshal Foch to give them the military opinion. In so important a matter, he felt it would be best to have a written opinion. He himself agreed with M Clemenceau that we must be prepared to march resolutely. If we are not able to do so, he is prepared to go back to England and to say that the Army needs strengthening, but he must know how much it needed. He is not prepared to advance on Berlin on the strength of anything that Marshal Foch had said today.

President Wilson adds that if Marshal Foch says his forces were insufficient, he is prepared to ask for troops to be sent back from the United States of America, but to enable him to ask for these, he must be able to tell Congress that Marshal Foch declared that 39 divisions was not enough.

Mr Lloyd George then reads extracts from the procès-verbaux of the 10th May and 19th May where Marshal Foch had explained his plans.

Marshal Foch says that things had really been attributed to him that he had never said. The plan decided on between him and the military advisers of the Allied and Associated Governments is still the basis he proposed. Incontestably, the Armies could begin their advance and could capture Weimar. As they advanced towards Berlin, however, their advance would become more difficult owing to the heavy responsibilities imposed upon them.

If some sort of military anemia set in, the march on Berlin would be more difficult, and he must state that he had never said the Armies could reach Berlin. What he had in mind was that the Armies could not get very far unless a separatist strategy was adopted. All he asked for was that his separatist strategy should be supported by a separatist policy. He would say again that he was ready to start with the existing forces but that as the advance proceeded, a separatist policy must follow a separatist strategy. He said he was quite prepared to give his views in writing on this important question.

(It is agreed that Marshal Foch should present his views to the Council in writing.)

(Marshal Foch withdraws, the experts on Reparation are introduced, and their discussions recorded as a separate meeting.)

Sailor Steve

06-16-19, 08:51 PM

Monday, June 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 17:15

Meeting of the Council of Five

The Council had before them the Financial, Economic and Reparation Clauses proposed for insertion in the Treaty with Austria.

1. President Wilson draws attention to a proposal from the American Delegation, which is read by Mr Davis, for the insertion in the Economic Clauses providing for the protection of certain German-Austrian assets in the ceded territories, in the same way that German assets in the districts ceded to Poland had been protected in the Treaty with Germany.

Mr Lloyd George expresses himself as in complete agreement with these proposals. He says he has had a communication from the British representative in Vienna pointing out that Vienna had been and is the financial center of the groups of territories which formed the Austro-Hungarian Empire and that if the Economic Clauses are allowed to stand in their present form the banks of Vienna would collapse. Moreover it is scarcely in the interest of the new States to destroy those banks.

Mr Davis points out that widely extended insurance interests are also in question.

(It is agreed that a Sub-Committee composed of Mr Baruch, S Crespi, M Loucheur, and Col Peel should draft provisions in accordance with Mr Davis’s proposals for insertion in the Economic Clauses.)

2. Sir Maurice Hankey points out that a clause respecting buildings of historical value which had been passed by the Council on June 4th had been omitted.

(It is directed that the clause should be inserted in the Financial Clauses.)

3. M Loucheur then calls attention to the fact that the Reparation Clauses have been passed by the Council subject to the conclusion of satisfactory agreements with the New States as to the payment of contributions by the New States or the adjustment of their claims. M Loucheur explains that he has lately been entrusted with the negotiations to this end. He has approached the Romanians and proposed that they should not be required to take over any of the Austrian war debt or pre-war debt and should not be asked to pay any contribution to the cost of the war and that in return for this they should renounce all claim to reparation. He has not yet had a reply but is disposed to think they will agree. He thinks the Serbians will also agree to an arrangement on the same lines though there will be a balance of payment due to them as their claim for reparation was greater than in the case of Romania. Negotiations in a favorable sense are also in progress with Italy in respect of the Trentino. He has not yet negotiated with those States which have no claims against the enemy, viz:—Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as he wished to settle first with Serbia and Romania. He asks for two days more in which to conclude the negotiations.

Baron Sonnino asks who is, then, to be responsible for the prewar debt and war debt in the ceded Austrian territories.

M Loucheur says that he imagines the Austrian Government will be responsible.

Mr Lloyd George says that he cannot agree with this proposal. He does not understand that it had ever been suggested and he is sure that the Austrian Government is quite incapable of sustaining such a burden.

Mr Davis says that he also had not understood that this proposal was to be made and pointed out that it would involve the re-casting of the Financial Clauses.

(It is agreed that M Loucheur should explain his proposals to the Sub-Committee appointed to consider the amendment of the Financial Clauses.)

Sailor Steve

06-16-19, 09:12 PM

Monday, June 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 17:45

Meeting of the Council of Five

1. The initials of the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are given to the following documents:

(a) Inter-Allied Commissions of Control.

(b) General Clauses.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate these to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

2. The Political Clauses for the Austrian Treaty as submitted by the Committee of Foreign Ministers or their representatives are approved and initialed by the representatives of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The remainder of the Political Clauses dealing with Economic and Financial matters which had been approved on Friday, June 6th, are also initialed.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate both the above to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

3. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify the Secretary-General that the various additions to complete the Treaty of Peace with Austria, which had been approved during the day, namely, the Military Clauses and Political Clauses, should be forwarded to the Austrian Delegation as soon as the Drafting Committee had put them into final shape.

4. Baron Sonnino said that at Constantinople there is a Venetian Palace which Italy would like to acquire as part of her share of reparation. The Venetian coat-of-arms is on the Palace and it has been used as the Austrian Embassy in Constantinople. Italy has not been able to claim it under the addition to the financial clauses relating to palaces in transferred territory. The Palace has been occupied by the Italians since the Armistice when the Austrians had gone out of it. They only ask for it as a part of their share of reparation, according to its value. To grant this would hurt no-one and would give great historical satisfaction from a Venetian point of view.

President Wilson says it is introducing a new principle to transfer buildings in foreign territory in this way.

Baron Sonnino reads Article 260 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany to show that the principle is not a new one. He proposes the following draft:

“The ‘Palace of Venice’ in Constantinople, other buildings affeetés for the use of the Embassy, of the Consulate, schools and of the Austro-Hungarian hospital in the same city and their annexes, as well as the church and the convent of Saint - Mary in Draperia, will be given up in Italy in count of repairs."

Mr Lloyd George says that this draft will enable the British Government to confiscate the German Embassy in London. Neither the British nor the American, nor the French Government proposes to confiscate the German Embassy in their capital. It is a great pity this question had not been examined earlier as he has no one to advise him in regard to it.

(After some discussion it is agreed that the proposal of the Italian Delegation should be referred to the Reparations Commission.)

5. M Clemenceau says he has received a reply from the Hungarian Government to the proposals for an armistice. This is read.

(After some discussion it is agreed that the question should be referred to General Bliss to advise as to the proposal of the Hungarian Government that the Military Commanders of the Hungarian Army on the one hand, and of the Czechoslovak and Romanian Armies on the other, should be brought together to confer as to the best means of withdrawing behind the line proposed.

General Bliss should be authorized to confer with the Czecho-Slovak and Romanian delegates in Paris on the subject.

President Wilson asks Sir Maurice Hankey to write to General Bliss on his behalf.)

6. Baron Makino says he is now prepared to agree to the draft declaration in regard to Religious Missions.

Baron Sonnino says he is also prepared to agree.

(It is agreed that those governments who are in diplomatic relations with the Vatican should communicate this declaration to the representative of the Vatican in Paris.

President Wilson asks Sir Maurice Hankey to communicate this decision to Mr Lansing.)

7. Mr Lloyd George says that Mr Venizelos is in favour of the calling of attention to infractions of the articles relating to the rights of Minorities being permissible only to States Members of the Council of the League of Nations.

President Wilson says that Dr Benes is of the same view.

M Clemenceau says he had not asked the question to Mr Vesnitch.

Mr Lloyd George says that Mr Paderewski had written him a long letter on the subject.

President Wilson suggests that a decision should be taken in favour of action only by members of the Council of the League of Nations.

(It is agreed that the right of drawing attention to infractions of the Articles relating to the rights of Minorities should be limited to States Members of the Council of the League of Nations.)

Sailor Steve

06-16-19, 09:20 PM

Monday, June 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr. Lloyd George’s Residence at 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, 18:45

Meeting of the Council of Three

1. There is a short discussion as to the attitude taken up by Marshal Foch in regard to the possibility of an advance on Berlin. Attention is drawn to the contrast between Marshal Foch’s confidence a few weeks ago and his attitude at the meeting earlier in the afternoon. It is generally agreed that nothing had been elicited from the Marshal which gave a satisfactory explanation of this change, which had been felt most to be due to his desire for the adoption of a separatist policy. In this connection it is pointed out that ever since his visit to London after the Armistice, the Marshal had been aiming at certain objects rather on the old fashioned lines of policy.

M Clemenceau asks that a decision as to the action to be taken might be postponed for twenty-four hours as he wishes to consult Marshal Pétain and perhaps Marshal Foch himself.

2. The Declaration by the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France in regard to the occupation of the Rhine Provinces is signed by President Wilson, M Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George.

Appendix to CF–73A
Declaration by the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France in Regard to the Occupation of the Rhine Provinces

The Allied and Associated Powers do not insist on making the period of occupation last until the Reparation Clauses are completely executed, because they assume that Germany would be obliged to give every proof of her good will and every necessary guarantee before the end of the fifteen years’ time.

As the cost of occupation involves an equivalent reduction of the amount available for reparations, the Allied and Associated Powers stipulate, by Article 431 of the Treaty, that if, before the end of the fifteen years’ period, Germany has fulfilled all her obligations under the Treaty, the troops of occupation should be immediately withdrawn.

If Germany, at an earlier date, has given proofs of her goodwill and satisfactory guarantees to assure the fulfillment of her obligations the Allied and Associated Powers concerned will be ready to come to an agreement between themselves for the earlier termination of the period of occupation.

Now and henceforward, in order to alleviate the burden on the reparations bill, they agree that as soon as the Allied and Associated Powers concerned are convinced that the conditions of disarmament by Germany are being satisfactorily fulfilled, the annual amount of the sums to be paid by Germany to cover the cost of occupation shall not exceed 240 million marks (gold). This provision can be modified if the Allied and Associated Powers agree as to the necessity of such modification.

Woodrow Wilson
G. Clemenceau
D. Lloyd George
16 June, 1919.

Jimbuna

06-17-19, 01:47 PM

17th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Bela Kun agrees to peaceable action in Hungary.

British Royal Navy attack the Bolshevik-controlled cruiser Oleg in Kronstadt, Russia and sinks it.
https://i.imgur.com/hg45mu3.jpg

At Epsom, England, several hundred Canadian troops riot after two of their numbers were incarcerated. Their clash with police results in the death of one British police officer Thomas Green (pictured).
https://i.imgur.com/vrSoeu9.png

Fernando Figueroa, former President and military ruler of El Salvador, has passed away.
https://i.imgur.com/ZBpp7rM.jpg

Ship Losses:

Cairnside (United Kingdom) The cargo ship ran aground in the North Sea off Aldeburgh, Suffolk and was wrecked. Her crew were rescued by Vaunter ( United Kingdom).

Sailor Steve

06-17-19, 08:35 PM

Tuesday, June 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Salle de l’Horloge, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers

United States America
President Wilson
Hon. R. Lansing

British Empire
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour

France
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Italy
Baron Sonnino
Marquis Imperiali

Japan
Baron Makino
Viscount Chinda

Turkey
S. A. Damad Ferid Pacha
S. E. Riza Tewfik Bey
S. E. Tewfik Bey

M Clemenceau, addressing the Delegates of the Government of the Ottoman Empire, says that they have been good enough to request leave to submit their views in regard to the questions before the Peace Conference concerning the Turkish Empire. The Allied Representatives hasten to reply to their request in the sense that they are at the disposal of the Ottoman Delegates. The latter have been good enough to undertake the journey, and it is hoped that it might be a useful one for all the parties concerned. The Ottoman Delegates are requested to be so good as to state their views.

His Highness Damad Ferid Pacha then reads out the following statement:

“Gentlemen, I should not be bold enough to come before this high Assembly if I thought that the Ottoman people had incurred any share of responsibility in the war which has ravaged Europe and Asia with fire and sword.

I apologize in advance for the development which I must give to my statement, for I am in point of fact defending today before the public opinion of the whole world and before history a most complicated and ill-understood case.

In the course of the war, nearly the whole civilized world was shocked by the recital of the crimes alleged to have been committed by the Turks. It is far from my thought to cast a veil over these misdeeds which are such as to make the conscience of mankind shudder with horror for ever; still less will I endeavor to minimize the degree of guilt of the actors in the great drama. The aim which I have set myself is that of showing to the world, with proofs in my hand, who are the truly responsible authors of these terrible crimes.

We are under no illusions in regard to the extent of the dissatisfaction which surrounds us; we are absolutely convinced that a mass of unfortunate events has made Turkey appear in an unfavorable light; however, when the truth has once been brought to light, it will warn civilized nations and posterity against passing an unjust judgment on us. The responsibility for the war in the East - assumed, without the knowledge of the Sovereign or of the people, in the Black Sea, by a German ship commanded by a German Admiral - rests entirely with the signatories of the secret Treaties, which were unknown alike to the Ottoman people and to the European Chanceries. These agreements were concluded between the Government of the Kaiser and the heads of the revolutionary Committee, who at the beginning of 1913, had placed themselves in power by means of a coup d’état. I call to witness the official dispatches exchanged between the representatives of France and Great Britain and their respective Governments during the three months which preceded the outbreak of hostilities between Turkey and the Empire of the Czars. When war had once been declared, the eternal covetousness of Russia as regards Constantinople was skillfully represented to the people as an imminent danger, and anxiety for the preservation of national existence thereupon rendered the struggle a desperate one. Our archives are moreover, thrown entirely open to an inquiry which would enable the statements which I have the honor to make to this high Assembly to be amply confirmed.

In regard to the other tragic events I beg leave to repeat here the declarations which I have repeatedly made to the Ottoman Senate. Turkey deplores the murder of a great number of her Christian co-nationals, as much as she does that of Moslems, properly speaking. In point of fact, the Committee of Union and Progress, not content with the crimes perpetrated against Christians, condemned to death by every means three million Moslems. Several hundreds of thousands of these unfortunate beings, hunted from their homes, are still wandering about today in the middle of Asia Minor without shelter and without any relief for their very existence; and even if they returned to their provinces they would find themselves just as destitute, for a large number of towns and villages, both Moslem and Christian, have been completely destroyed. Asia Minor is today nothing but a vast heap of ruins. The new Government notwithstanding its vigilant care, has been as yet unable to mitigate the disastrous effects of the cataclysm. It will always be easily possible to confirm my assertions by an inquiry undertaken on the spot. It is necessary, however, to dismiss any theory of racial conflict or of any explosion of religious fanaticism. Moreover, the Turkish people, at a time when violence could strive successfully against right, showed itself able to respect the lives, the honor and the sacred feelings of the Christian nation[al]s subject to its laws. It would be fairer to judge the Ottoman nation by its long history as a whole rather than by a single period which shows it in the most disadvantageous light.

Whatever be the names by which they are called, the principles and the methods of both the Russian and Turkish revolutionaries are the same, namely to destroy society in order to seize its ruins by putting its members out of the way and taking possession of their property. Europe and America are endeavoring at the cost of immense sacrifice to deliver the Slav people, whose ostensible attitude towards the Entente is scarcely different at the present time from that of the Turks, for both have been reduced to silence and both paralyzed by an unheard of tyranny. The Turks, who thus find themselves, under the domination of the Committee, in the same situation as that of the Russians under the Terrorists, deserve the same sympathy and the same humanitarian and kindly assistance at the hands of the rulers of the Great nations which hold the destinies of the world in their hands.

Latterly the truth has begun to filter through into European public opinion. The great trial of the Unionists at Constantinople has proved the responsibility of the leaders of the Committee - who all of them occupy high positions in the State - for the war and the other tragic events; that is the rehabilitation of the Ottoman nation.

Thus rehabilitated in the eyes of the civilized world, our mission will henceforward be that of devoting ourselves to an intensive economic and intellectual culture in order thus to become an useful factor in the League of Nations. The Ottoman People hope that the chaos in the East, fostered as it is by this abnormal state of affairs which is neither war nor peace, may at last be replaced by order, and it likewise desires to see the end of the continued occupation of its territories in spite of the Armistice. This occupation has in fact resulted at Smyrna in the most deplorable excesses which have been committed to the hurt of the defenseless Moslem population.

It desires with equal earnestness the maintenance, on the basis of the status quo ante bellum, of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which, during the last 40 years, has been reduced to the least possible limits. It lastly wishes to be granted in Thrace, to the North and West of Adrianople where the Mohammedan population is in an overwhelming majority, a frontier line which will render possible the defense of Adrianople and Constantinople.

What we ask for thus is, moreover, completely in conformity with President Wilson’s principles, which we invoked when requesting an Armistice, being convinced that they would be evenly applied in the interests of the peace of the world. On the other hand a fresh parceling out of the Ottoman Empire would entirely upset the balance in the East.

The ranges of the Taurus are moreover nothing more than a geological line of demarcation. The regions situated beyond those mountains, from the Mediterranean up to the Arabian Sea, are, although a language different from the Turkish language is spoken there, indissolubly linked with Constantinople by feelings which are deeper than the principle of nationality; on either side of the Taurus the same ideals, the same thoughts, the same moral and material interests bind the inhabitants. These form a compact block and its disintegration would be detrimental to the peace and tranquility of the East. Even a plebiscite would not solve the question, for the supreme interests of more than three hundred million Moslems are involved, and they form an important fraction of the whole of the human race.

The conscience of the world could only approve conditions of peace which are compatible with right, with the aspirations of peoples and with immanent justice.”

M Clemenceau, after thanking the Turkish Grand Vizier for his communication, proposes with his leave to adjourn the meeting for a few moments in order to deliberate, and undertakes to make to him a quarter of an hour later whatever communication is decided on.

(The meeting is adjourned at 11:30 and resumes at 11:55.)

M Clemenceau, addressing the Ottoman Delegates, says that he has been requested by the Heads of Governments and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Allied and Associated Powers to inform them that the statement made by the Grand Vizier has been listened to with the utmost attention, that it is intended to subject that statement to detailed examination and to make a reply as soon as one is ready. He adds that the Heads of Governments and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, in view of the occupations which then absorb their time, will be unable to make their reply before Saturday; and that one of the Heads of Government is leaving Paris that evening and will only return on Friday. He therefore proposes that a meeting should be held on the following Saturday at 11:00 for the presentation of the Allied reply. He further states that if the Ottoman Delegates have any comments to offer or requests to make or anything to say in regard to the program which he has just outlined the Allied representatives will be glad to hear them.

His Highness Damad Ferid Pasha says that the Ottoman Delegation is preparing a memorandum which will be forwarded as soon as it is ready.

M Clemenceau inquires on what day it will be sent.

His Highness Damad Ferid Pasha says that it will be sent on Friday evening.

M Clemenceau says that the Allied representatives will defer their reply until after the receipt of the Turkish memorandum, and will then fix a date for the next meeting.

His Highness Damad Ferid Pasha expresses his agreement.

(The meeting is adjourned at noon.)

Sailor Steve

06-17-19, 09:11 PM

Tuesday, June 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George’s Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Three

1. Mr. Lloyd George shows to his two colleagues a memorandum written by General Sir Henry Wilson.

M Clemenceau says that he had seen Marshal Petain in the morning. He had told him exactly what had occurred with Marshal Foch on the previous day. Marshal Petain had says he is not surprised. Marshal Foch had communicated to Marshal Petain part of his plan and Marshal Petain thought it rather rash in parts. Of course, M Clemenceau comments, their natures are quite different. Marshal Petain is wise, prudent, square and rather on the cautious side. He recalls that, when Marshal Foch had been appointed, Marshal Petain had advised him to insist on seeing his plans before they were carried out, but when he had shown to Marshal Petain a year ago the plan that Marshal Foch worked out for a continued offensive against the Germans, he had replied that it was a very fine thing, and that with Marshal Foch’s initiative and drive it ought to work out. Marshal Petain’s view on the present situation is that Marshal Foch’s plan should be executed, but with prudence; but, in making this observation, he had remarked that he only knows the French Army’s part in the plan and does not know the part of the British and American Armies.

Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson say that neither do they.

M Clemenceau says he had then asked Marshal Petain to return to Chantilly, where he had a first rate Chief of the General Staff, and study the plan with great care as far as he knew it and then come back to report to him. Later in the day, he, himself, had received Marshal Foch’s plan.

Marshal Foch’s plan is then read aloud.

After the reading of the plan, President Wilson says that it leaves the Council exactly where they were yesterday, with the substitution of an armistice for the previously proposed separatist policy. An armistice is not the business of the Governments but of the military authorities.

M Clemenceau agrees, and does not think the Council could take any part in it. He remarks that, when Marshal Foch had been told yesterday that Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson would, if it were essential, ask their Legislatures for more troops, Marshal Foch had not replied. He is particularly anxious not to have any trouble with Marshal Foch before the Germans have given their reply and hence he sees no need to rush matters. He asks if, in the meanwhile, the British Navy could prepare to do something against Danzig.

Mr Lloyd George says that he has already inquired into this when there was a question of landing the Poles there, and he had been told that it was heavily fortified and that the ships could do nothing. He suggested that orders to Marshal Foch should be carefully prepared and signed by the Council of Five, instructing him that his objective in the event of the Germans refusing to sign was Berlin and the object to get peace signed. It should be stated that the aim of the Allied and Associated Powers is to get peace signed, and that the center of Government is to be the military objective. Copies should be given to General Pershing and General Robertson. He suggests that someone with a military mind should prepare it, in order that it might be framed like a military order with an unmistakable meaning, such as Marshal Foch would understand.

M Clemenceau undertakes to prepare a document and to let his colleagues have it on Thursday night.

2. In reply to a question by Mr Lloyd George, President Wilson says that if the Germans sign the peace he proposes to return to the United States as soon as possible, in order to get the Treaty through the Senate.

Mr Lloyd George says he has received a well-considered memorandum from a Member of the British Delegation Staff, urging that the Austrian Treaty should be amended with the object of detaching Austria from Germany. He undertakes to give a copy to President Wilson.

Sailor Steve

06-18-19, 01:27 AM

Tuesday, June 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

1. (It is agreed that the Convention in regard to the Rhine should be published.)

2. The Council has before them a Draft Treaty with Poland submitted by the Committee on New States.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the Council ought to hear a long memorandum he has received from Mr Paderewski on the subject.

President Wilson then reads Mr Paderewski’s memorandum.

After the reading of the memorandum, Mr Lloyd George says that this is a fundamental challenge to the whole of the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to Small States. He does not feel himself competent to examine it in detail and suggests it should be referred to the Committee on New States.

President Wilson says that the point about the memorandum which strikes him is the statement that we are claiming more for the Germans in Poland than for the Poles in Germany. This is a serious indictment. He recalls that some years ago, the United States had denounced a Treaty with Russia at considerable inconvenience, because of the ill-treatment by Russia of Jews who were citizens of the United States. They had taken this action on the ground not that Jews had been maltreated but that American Jews were being maltreated, that is to say, distinctions were being made between American citizens which were not recognised in the United States. Here, there was a danger of imparting to the Jews a corporate capacity.

Mr Lloyd George says there is also something in the contention that a separate organisation for Jewish schools would tend to create a separate nation of the Jews in Poland rather than unity. This would lend itself to German intrigue.

President Wilson then puts the other side of the question. There is no doubt that Romania has done disgraceful things to the Jews in spite of the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin. If the minorities could be ill-treated without provision for appeal, they would derive no advantage from the Treaty. Romania has broken the Treaty of Berlin in this respect again and again with impunity. Hence, it was necessary to provide for some appeal. In reply to Baron Sonnino, he says that if these provisions were adopted Jews in the United States would be able to bring sufficient influence to bear to call the attention of the Council of the League of Nations to the matter. What these people feared was interference with their internal affairs.

Mr Lloyd George points out that Poland and Czechoslovakia have been called into existence by the Great Powers and cannot live without these Powers. Consequently, they were not quite in the position of the old established States.

(After some further discussion, it is agreed to refer Mr Paderewski’s memorandum to the Committee on New States to consider the objections raised to their Treaty and to see whether some of these objections could not be met.)

3. The attention of the Council is drawn to the alternative drafts put forward in regard to Article 13 of the draft treaty with Poland.

(It is agreed that States only, and not individuals should have the right of appeal to the Permanent with Poland Court of International Justice, and consequently that the draft proposed by the French, British and Japanese Delegations should be adopted.)

4. Baron Sonnino suggests that the Memorandum Further Questions, which he reads, should be referred to the Committee on New states.

(This is agreed to.)

5. The Council has before them a note from the Supreme Economic Council raising the question as to whether, after the acceptance of the conditions of peace by Germany, measures are still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevik Russia or Hungary.

President Wilson points out that a legal blockade cannot be established after peace has been made.

Mr Lloyd George points out that Germany would receive all the hides and flax of Russia which are important to all the nations of Europe. This raises the question as to whether the whole of the commerce of Russia is to be left to German exploitation. If he were quite convinced, which he is not, that the Bolsheviks could be crushed in the present year, he might be willing to make a special effort. This leads to a discussion on the subject of the prospects of the Bolsheviks, in the course of which President Wilson reads a note from General Bliss pointing out that Kolchak’s troops had evacuated 15,000 square miles and were steadily retreating from the line of the Volga. That the fall of Petrograd is not imminent since the Estonians refused to advance until they are recognised. There had been an uprising on Kolchak’s lines of communication. In Eastern Siberia, Kolchak depends upon Horvat and Semenov, while in Central Siberia he depends on Allied troops.

President Wilson then reads Paragraph 7 of the note from the Supreme Economic Council, in which it is recommended the abstention from any positive measures or public announcement indicating a resumption of trade with Russia.

Mr Lloyd George says the real difficulty is how to answer a question in Parliament or an interpolation in the Chamber. How is a question to be answered “Is it permissible to trade with Russia?” Is he to reply “Yes” or “No” to that question?

President Wilson asks if Great Britain is at war with Bolshevik Russia.

Mr Lloyd George replied that hostilities are going on at Archangel.

President Wilson says that this does not constitute a legal state of war, since there has been no formal declaration of war. Consequently, there is no legal basis for a blockade. His reply to such a question would be that there is no legal warrant for estranging trade, and that the signature of Peace removed the legal basis.

Mr Lloyd George compares the decision to what had occurred in past days between Great Britain and Spain, when we had attacked Spanish colonies and seized their ships, while keeping our ambassador at the Court of Madrid. What would his reply be if he was asked whether British subjects could buy flax and sell boots? If he replies “No”, then the Germans will get the trade.

President Wilson says his reply would be that there is no legal basis for preventing it, but that traders would do it at their risk.

Sir Maurice Hankey asks what answer he is to give to the note from the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr Lloyd George says that an answer must be given. The question arises as to whether a blockade should be maintained in the Baltic. It is necessary to prevent the smuggling of arms from Germany to Bolshevik Russia by sea. It will be difficult for the Germans to send war material across Poland and the Baltic provinces, but it would not be so difficult to send it by sea.

(After some further discussion it is agreed that the answer should be in the following sense:

After the acceptance of the conditions of peace by Germany, measures are not still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevik Russia or Hungary, but the recommendation of the Supreme Economic Council is approved, that there should be an abstention from any positive measures or public announcement indicating a resumption of such trade. The Supreme Economic Council should be asked, however, to examine as to whether, consistently with this decision, means could be found for preventing war material from being carried by sea from Germany to Bolshevik Russia.)

6. Arising out of the previous discussion of the subject of the Blockade, President Wilson says that Mr Hoover had reported to him that the Allied Maritime Transport Council had issued an order that all Allied ships on completing discharge of cargo should leave German ports, and that no more ships of the Allied and Associated Powers should proceed to German ports. One result had been that several United States’ ships had been detained in British ports. These ships were carrying foodstuffs, not for Germany’s use, but for Poland and Czechoslovakia. It had never been found possible to build up ten days’ reserve in Czechoslovakia, and the stoppage of these ships was a very serious matter. He himself had advised Mr Hoover to demand the immediate release of these ships, as his Government were prepared to run the risk of their being held up in German ports. The action that had been taken by the Allied Maritime Transport Council really amounted to a reimposition of the Blockade, notwithstanding that it had been decided that the blockade was not to be imposed unless and until a further order was given.

Mr Lloyd George says he had only heard of the matter for the first time this afternoon. He understands, however, that the Allied Maritime Transport Council is an Inter-Allied body, and that this decision had been taken for the purpose of avoiding the seizure of Allied shipping in German ports, and that the United States representative had been present and had agreed in the decision.

President Wilson says he has just ascertained from Mr Hoover that the United States representative had stated he could not acquiesce without Mr Hoover’s instructions.

Mr Lloyd George says that he cannot understand this action being taken unless at least the United States representative had said he could only agree subject to confirmation.

President Wilson points out that this action had been taken a week before the Germans had to state whether they would sign.

Mr Lloyd George says that unless ample warning is given there will not be time to extricate the ships, since it will take them some time to discharge. He understands that Lord Robert Cecil is the Chairman of this Committee.

Sir Maurice Hankey says he believes the action had been taken by the Executive of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, and not by the Council itself.

President Wilson said it was no good the Council taking decisions in regard to the Blockade, when these subordinate bodies took action without their authority. He had told Mr Hoover that he was to protest against the detention of the American ships, as he was not willing to impose privation on the population of Czechoslovakia and Poland.

M Clemenceau says that the Allied Maritime Transport Council appears to have acted outside its authority, but nevertheless he cannot consider it as altogether unfortunate.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that the threat of the Blockade might provide an additional inducement for the Germans to sign, and he undertakes to make immediate inquiries and to take the necessary action for the release of the United States ships.

Note: Mr Lloyd George immediately after the Meeting instructs his private secretary to telephone to London to order the release of the United States’ ships.

7. The Council has before them a Note from the Superior Blockade Council on the suggested agreement by Austria regarding trade with Hungary and Germany.

(It is agreed that no decision in regard to this can be taken without further explanation of what is intended.)

8. Baron Sonnino says that the Austrian Delegation is already beginning to send in Notes, and this raises the question of the machinery of the Peace Conference for dealing with them.

(It is agreed that the Notes should be referred to the same Commissions as had been established to deal with Notes from the German Delegation.)

9. Baron Sonnino raises the question of the position of the military officers of the Allied and Associated Powers, who had been sent to Klagenfurt. He understands that the Yugoslavs had, notwithstanding the communications from the Allied and Associated Powers, pushed on and compelled the Austrians to accept an armistice, under the terms of which they had to evacuate Klagenfurt. The four military officers had found the Yugoslavs in possession of Klagenfurt. They had no authority to order them to go out. The Yugoslavs were there and would probably refuse to go unless these officers were given general authority to insist upon the execution of the orders of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. If this were not done, it would be very little use arranging for the Plebiscite.

President Wilson says that personally he is of opinion that both forces ought to withdraw. The military officers ought not to be told until the Governments had been communicated with. He suggests that a communication should be made, both to the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and to the Austrians, informing them that they were expected to withdraw from the territory in question, the boundaries of which should be stated.

The question having been raised as to who should keep order in the withdrawal of the above forces, Mr Lloyd George says it would be no use to put in Italian troops to keep order, as the Yugoslavs would oppose them.

Baron Sonnino says that Italy has no desire for a permanent occupation of the Klagenfurt region.

President Wilson suggests that the maintenance of order should be left to the local police forces.

(It is agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to formulate a demand to the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and to the Austrian Government, informing them that the forces of both States should be withdrawn from the Klagenfurt area, the boundaries of which should be described in the dispatch. A copy of the dispatch should be sent to the military officers on the spot of the Allied and Associated Powers.)

10. President Wilson said that on inquiry he found that it is very difficult for him to send United States troops to occupy Upper Silesia during the plebiscite. Once peace is declared the United States troops have to be withdrawn.

Jimbuna

06-18-19, 09:34 AM

18th June 1919

Aftermath of War

British prisoners in Kurdistan rescued.

President Wilson, accompanied by the King and Queen of Belgium, tour the devastated city of Ypres.
https://i.imgur.com/jIpiPq6.png

German police protect the British Embassy in Berlin as demonstrators protest the harsh Versailles Treaty.
https://i.imgur.com/NOYc3IU.png

Future famed actor Humphrey Bogart served in WWl and was honorably discharged June 18, 1919 as seaman second class. He enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1918 and was a model sailor during his time of service. Much of his time at sea was ferrying troops back from Europe after the Armistice.
https://i.imgur.com/lZSQ6pa.jpg

Ship Losses:

Oleg (Soviet Navy) The Bogatyr-class protected cruiser was torpedoed and sunk by the motor torpedo boat HM CMB-4 ( Royal Navy) off Kronstadt. Five crewmen were killed, five others wounded.
Leitenant Shestakov (Soviet Navy) The Leitenant Shestakov-class destroyer was scuttled by her crew at Novorossiysk by order of the Bolsheviks.
Kapitan-Leytenant Baranov (Soviet Navy) The Leitenant Shestakov-class destroyer was scuttled by her crew at Novorossiysk by order of the Bolsheviks.

Sailor Steve

06-18-19, 07:26 PM

Wednesday, June 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers

1. M Pichon says that the Council of Foreign Ministers has been asked by the Council of Four to find a definite settlement of the frontier between the Polish and the Ukrainian territories, in order that the forces of the two countries be ordered to withdraw behind them. He asks M Jules Cambon, as President of the Committee dealing with the subject, to explain what conclusions had been reached.

Mr Lansing observes that he has read the report of the Committee.

M Pichon then asks if any member wishes to address any questions on the subject to M Cambon.

Mr Balfour says the Committee has been ordered to make suggestions, but to give no advice. The result is that the settlement of the question is left to the Council of Foreign Ministers. He has read the report and has talked to his military advisers regarding the situation in Galicia. He concludes that as a basis for discussion it would be preferable to put forward concrete proposals. He has therefore written a memorandum, a copy of which has been furnished to each of the Ministers members of the Council. His justification for writing it is that M Cambon’s Committee did not deal with the military question, which was of vital importance at the moment. The Bolshevists are attacking Galicia and gaining successes, and the Allies, on the other hand, are hampering the action of the Poles. This leads to an unfavorable situation. If a solution favorable to the military action of the Poles is adopted, means must be found of safeguarding the future political status of the country. His memorandum, therefore, aims at meeting the pressing necessity of keeping the Bolshevists out, and of providing an opportunity in the future for the self-determination of the Ruthenian population, which might choose to form part of Poland, or Russia, or federation with one or other, or even independence. He therefore suggests that his memorandum be taken as the basis for discussion.

Baron Sonnino says that the Committee has formulated a number of projects. Among them is one suggesting autonomy for Galicia, under Polish sovereignty. This has the advantage of supplying a definite solution. A plebiscite would lead to agitation and intrigue by all parties with ambitions connected with the final verdict. If, therefore, the Ruthenians could be guaranteed such rights as they require under Polish suzerainty, all these disadvantages will be avoided. But it must not be forgotten that many parties are interested in the decision; for instance, the Poles and Romanians wish to have a common frontier. Russia, which he hopes will ere long be restored, would doubtless wish to induce the Ruthenians to become Russian subjects. This would clash with the ambitions of the Romanians, Czechoslovaks and Poles; and the Hungarians also might wish to have a common frontier with Russia. If, therefore, the whole question could be settled once for all, peace in that part of Europe would be greatly benefited.

Mr Lansing says that his view of the question is based largely on the condition of the Ruthenian population. It must be recognised that this population is 60% illiterate, and therefore unfit for self-government. A period of education is necessary before it could be ripe for autonomy. Its natural connection by blood was with the Ukrainians, but it would seem that its disposition was rather towards the Poles, by reason of the relative stability of the Government in Poland, as compared with the Ukraine. He is therefore in general accord with Mr Balfour’s memorandum, which is that a High Commissioner be nominated by the League of Nations, or pending the constitution of the League of Nations, by the Great Powers, in general control. At the same time, Polish troops will be authorized to extend their operations up to the River Zbruck. It would be notified through the High Commissioner that the occupation by Polish troops was only temporary, until such time as the Great Powers might consider a plebiscite appropriate. Until then, the country would be under Polish military authority, subject to supervision by the Commissioner.

The Ukrainians were commonly called Bolshevik, but he was not sure that this was correct. In some places they appeared to be fighting the Bolshevik. He had received reports from the country, including one from Lieutenant Foster, from Tarnopol, dated 8th June; Lieutenant Foster observed among other things that the great majority of the population was overjoyed by the arrival of Polish troops. Secondly, that the Ukrainian régime had been one of force, and brutality, entirely destructive and not constructive in its character. This report also went to support Mr. Balfour’s solution. He understood that it would have been easy for the Poles to occupy the whole of Eastern Galicia, but for the veto of the Great Powers. The Ukrainians were now extremely aggressive, and the Poles could not stop their operations. All the Military Representatives at Warsaw appeared to take this view.

M. Sonnino said that all the reasons alleged by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing appeared to enforce the desirability of a definite solution, namely, that the country be governed under Polish sovereignty, with guarantees for the Ruthenians. If the population was as ignorant as Mr. Lansing believed, it would be a long time before an intelligent plebiscite could be obtained from them. They would meantime be wooed by Roumanian, Polish, Czecho-Slovak, Hungarian [Page 830]and Russian agitators. Hence, for the very reasons advanced by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing, he advocated a definite solution. It would be easy to guarantee the linguistic and educational rights of the Ruthenians under Polish Government. If this were not done, there would be continual unrest and strife, fomented by neighbouring countries with rival interests.

M. Cambon said that he gathered from the observations of Mr. Lansing, Baron Sonnino and Mr. Balfour that there was a considerable measure of agreement between them. The Ukrainian question as such could not be solved, as we did not know what the Ukraine was, nor what its future would be. Further, there appeared to be no ground for trusting any Ukrainian Government, as Ukrainian Governments hitherto had behaved atrociously. Among the neighbours of Eastern Galicia, the only one with a high civilization was Poland. The towns in Galicia were Polish and the best classes throughout the country were Polish. The solution proposed by Mr. Balfour, therefore, appeared to him to be excellent. Polish control would be exercised under the Great Powers, represented by a High Commissioner. Thus, a mandate would be conferred on Poland for the government of the country. He would point out that this was among the solutions proposed by the Committee. He referred to Solution “B” in Report No. III of the Committee. If the Conference left the question open, Galicia would become the arena of every form of intrigue. He thought, therefore, that Galicia, with local autonomy secured, and governed in a liberal spirit by Poland, was the solution. This solution had another advantage. One of the most troublesome questions was the Western delimitation of Eastern Galicia. Two frontiers had been proposed, and both were very questionable. If M. Sonnino’s solution were adopted, it would be unnecessary to trouble any further about the frontier question. Frontier “A” could be adopted, and the whole of Eastern Galicia could be placed under the same régime.

M. Pichon asked whether M. Sonnino’s proposal was complementary to Mr. Balfour’s.

M. Sonnino pointed out that the two solutions were different. He proposed to secure Ruthenian autonomy at once, to give sovereignty to Poland. This dispensed with the High Commissioner and with the plebiscite. In addition, the frontier question was also solved at once, and the struggle concerning Lemberg was equally dispensed with.

M. Pichon pointed out that this would place Lemberg outside Poland.

M. Sonnino said that it would nevertheless include Lemberg in territory attached to Poland.

Mr. Balfour said that there were two inconsistent policies before [Page 831]the Council. M. Sonnino’s suggestion was different to his own. He thought there was much truth in M. Sonnino’s observation that if the question of the future sovereignty of the country were left undecided, the result would be years of intrigue and unrest. At the same time, he thought M. Sonnino a little exaggerated the advantages of his plan. M. Cambon had gone so far as to say the Conference need trouble no more about the frontiers of Eastern Galicia. M. Sonnino said that frontier “A” could be adopted, among other reasons, because the Poles, who objected to handing over Lemberg to an independent Galicia, could not object to including it in a dependent Galicia. He thought this was not quite correct. He was informed that the majority in Eastern Galicia, though doubtless ill-educated, was vigorously anti-Polish, and unwilling to be absorbed. He would like to know exactly what the autonomy offered by M. Sonnino meant.

M. Sonnino said he meant administrative self-government. There were various degrees of self-government and regulations had been proposed in other cases.

Mr. Balfour doubtless knew what he meant when he spoke of Irish Home Rule.

Mr. Balfour said that personally he attributed no meaning to Irish Home Rule. He, however, pointed out that M. Sonnino appeared to confuse self-government with linguistic and educational privileges. If his policy meant nothing more than minority guarantees, he thought it would not satisfy the Ruthenians.

M. Sonnino said that a representative body could be added, as there were many degrees of self-government up to federation.

Mr. Balfour said he ventured to suggest that the matter the Council had to deal with was the Bolshevist threat to Galicia. The Ruthenians would not be satisfied with the safeguarding of their language and schools. He thought, therefore, that the method he had suggested would have to be adopted.

M. Sonnino said that they might be satisfied with the kind of autonomy granted to Finland under Russian sovereignty. Mr. Balfour’s method did not offer the Ruthenians self determination, and practically told them that they must wait for another generation before exercising it.

M. Cambon said that if the presence of Polish troops in Eastern Galicia were held to endanger the rights of the Ruthenians, it was nevertheless difficult to find any other allied troops to police the country. The Poles were the troops nearest at hand and it was for the Conference to determine the limits of Polish control and to safeguard the rights of the Ruthenians. The objection, he thought, would come not from the Ruthenians but from the Ukraine. It was clear that Galicia must not be ceded to the Ukrainians.

M Pichon asks M Cambon to give his opinion as regards Mr Balfour’s scheme.

M Cambon says that as he has not consulted his Committee he can only give a personal opinion. He agrees with Mr Balfour’s first point that the country should be occupied by Polish troops. As to the second point that control should be exercised by the Great Powers through a High Commissioner, he personally prefers Baron Sonnino’s plan. He thinks that anything that would give the impression to the undecided populations of those areas, an indication that the Peace Conference was expressing its final will, would put a stop to unrest and disorder.

Mr Lansing says that he has listened with interest to the views expressed. He is impressed by some of the points made by Baron Sonnino. He sees the difficulty of administering the country through a High Commissioner under whose authority customs and a judicial department would have to be set up. It would be extremely difficult to organize in detail out of nothing a complicated administrative machine. He therefore agrees with M Cambon that it would be more satisfactory to give a mandate to Poland to hold the country under such conditions as might be fixed by the League of Nations or the Great Powers, until such time as these might decide that a plebiscite should take place. His conclusion, therefore, is that Eastern Galicia within frontiers to be determined by the Committee be administered by Poland as mandatory under conditions likewise to be determined by the Committee, until such time as a plebiscite can be taken regarding the ultimate sovereignty of the country. He therefore suggests that the matter be referred to the Polish Committee which would be asked to submit a draft covering all the details required to carry out this policy.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks Mr Lansing’s plan is open to the objections raised by Baron Sonnino, namely, that until a plebiscite has finally settled the sovereignty of the country, there would be an open field for every sort of intrigue. Nor had the plan, he fears, the advantage of his own suggestion which, he admits is based on the hostility of the Ruthenian majority to the Polish minority. If his opinion on this subject were open to doubt, he would be prepared to revise his proposal.

Mr Lansing asks from what source Mr Balfour obtained his information.

Mr Balfour says all the information received tends to produce in his mind the impression that in Western Galicia the majority is Polish or pro-Polish while exactly the reverse prevails in Eastern Galicia. He is quite ready to refer this matter to the Committee if there is any doubt about it.

Mr Lansing said his information is totally different. He therefore thinks it would be well to refer the matter to the Committee.

Mr Balfour says that his conviction is that the Ruthenians do not wish to be ruled by the Polish minority. It would therefore be an abuse of the mandatory principle to give Poland the mandate.

Mr Lansing says that it would be a waste of time to continue the discussion based on a totally different hypothesis. There are three possible hypotheses:

1) That the Ruthenians are hostile to the Poles.

2) That they are friendly to the Poles.

3) That the Council does not know what their feelings are.

His own proposal is based on the theory that the Ruthenians are friendly to the Poles, but with a qualification that he is not quite certain of. It is for this reason that he had proposed that after a certain interval of time, the Ruthenians should have a chance of option. Meanwhile, to avoid difficulties of administration under a High Commissioner, he would give a mandate to the Poles. He is quite ready to refer back to the Committee the question whether the Ruthenians were friendly or hostile to the Poles.

Mr Balfour says that he has no objection. He would like to add that the Committee might, with advantage, examine the Constitution which had been proposed for the part of Ruthenia to be attached to the Czechoslovak State and discuss whether the adoption of a similar plan could fit the case of Eastern Galicia.

M Cambon points out that this solution is one of those suggested by the Committee.

Mr Balfour requests that it be put on record that Polish troops should have full liberty to advance up to the River Zbruck without prejudice to the future status of the country.

(It is decided that M Pichon should communicate this decision in the name of the Allied and Associated Governments officially to the Polish Government and unofficially to the Ukrainian Delegation in Paris.

It is further decided that the Committee on Polish Affairs be asked to report regarding the sentiments of the population of Eastern Galicia and also on the suitability of a scheme of autonomy similar to that devised for the Ruthenians to be attached to the Czechoslovak Republic.)

2. M Pichon says that in accordance with a minute put forward by the British Delegation it will be necessary to appoint an Inter-Allied Commission with a Naval and a Military representative from each of the Powers.

This was agreed to and the following members are nominated:

For the United States of America:
General Bliss.
Admiral Knapp.

For Great Britain:
General Sackville-West.
Admiral Hope.

For France:
General Belin,
and a Naval expert to be nominated later.

For Italy:
General Cavallero.
Admiral Grassi.

Baron Makino says that he will inform the Secretary-General whether Japan wishes to take part or not.

3. M Pichon says that action is required of the Council as a consequence of the following letter:

"17th June 1919.

His Excellency
Monsieur Dutasta;

My dear Colleague,

The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, this afternoon, considered the situation which has arisen in regard to the armistice in Carinthia.

The Council were informed that the forces of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, in disregard of the demands of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, have pressed forward and occupied Klagenfurt and have forced the Austrians to accept armistice conditions which include the abandonment by them of Klagenfurt.

In these circumstances, the Council decided that a demand should be made for the evacuation of the entire district of Klagenfurt by the forces both of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and of the Austrians.

It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to approve and send a telegraphic dispatch to the Governments of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and of the Austrian Republic demanding the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin by the forces of both contending parties. The boundaries behind which they were to withdraw will have to be defined in this dispatch. A copy of this dispatch should be sent to the Military Officers of the Allied and Associated Powers who are watching the armistice.

Since the meeting, I have learned that the Commission which has been considering the question of Klagenfurt is holding a meeting tomorrow and I am therefore sending a copy of this letter to Monsieur Tardieu, the Chairman of the Commission, with the suggestion that the Commission should be asked to prepare the boundaries for the consideration of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the afternoon.

I am directed to request that Your Excellency will confirm this action to M Tardieu and will bring the matter before the Council of Foreign Ministers in the afternoon.

At Baron Sonnino’s request, I am sending copies of this letter to the five Foreign Ministers.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

M P A Hankey.”

M Tardieu says that the Committee on Yugoslav Affairs had received a copy of this letter on the previous day. The Committee had discussed the subject and three different opinions had been expressed.

The opinions are as follows (taken from the notes of the Committee Meeting on the 17th):

Note Drafted by the Yugo-Slav Commission:

The Commission has examined the question raised by Sir Maurice Hankey’s letter to M Dutasta, dated June 17th.

The following opinions have been expressed:

1) The American Delegation recommends that the boundaries should be drawn as indicated in the Commission’s Report, in answer to Sir Maurice Hankey’s note dated June 11th, but expresses no opinion as regards the military measures to be taken.

2) The British and French Delegations: Recalling the fact that the Supreme Council has agreed, concerning Czechoslovakia, Romania and Hungary, that it would be advisable not to assign to military occupation limits that would differ from the definitive boundaries, recommend that the same solution should be adopted concerning the Klagenfurt Basin, i.e. to determine as quickly as possible the political boundaries in accordance with the above mentioned report, the Yugoslavs being authorized to occupy Zone “A” and the Austrians Zone “B”.

3) The Italian Delegation, considering on the one hand that Sir Maurice Hankey’s letter, dated June 17th, deals with the complete evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin by both the Yugoslavs and the Austrians, considering on the other hand that the lines proposed by the American, British and French Delegations as boundary lines, are, according to the Italian Delegation, only limits for the zones of plebiscite, which ought not to be considered as political boundaries, is of opinion that the zone which ought to be evacuated by both the Austrians and the Yugoslavs, ought to include the whole basin (Zones “A” and “B”) as previously defined by the Supreme Council.

Baron Sonnino says that in S Orlando’s absence he brings forward the question in the Council of Four. The following is the history of the matter. On May 31st the Council of Four had decided to send to Vienna and Belgrade an intimation to both parties to withdraw from the Basin of Klagenfurt. The Austrians are to withdraw beyond the northern limit and the Slavs beyond the southern limit. The telegram to Belgrade, it would seem, had been delayed in transmission, whereas that to Vienna had arrived in time. On June 5th, Yugoslav troops had advanced on Klagenfurt and had forced the Austrian troops on June 6th to accept an Armistice. When the Allied Generals on the spot had informed the Yugoslav Commanders of the orders of the Council, the latter said that they had received no such orders and would stand by the Armistice. The Allied Officers had not felt competent to order the troops to retire and asked for instructions from the Conference. He had therefore brought up the question in the Council of Four. The Council, on the previous day, had decided that a telegram be dispatched by the Council of Foreign Ministers requiring the evacuation of the Basin of Klagenfurt by both parties.

In his letter Sir Maurice Hankey added a further suggestion that the Commission on Yugoslav affairs should determine the frontiers behind which the opposing Forces should retire. Now these frontiers had been already settled on May 31st when the previous order had been given. The Council of Four had also decided that notice of the decision should be given to the military Officers of the Allied and Associated Powers, in order that they should watch the execution of the order and make any necessary proposals. As the result of Sir Maurice Hankey’s intervention, the Commission now proposes something quite different from the intentions of the Council of Four, namely two zones for a plebiscite, the limits of which should be the lines for the withdrawal of the opposing Armies. This was quite a new feature. M Tardieu’s view was that military lines should as far as possible be the ultimate political frontiers but the limits in this case were not frontiers of this character but only the limits of plebiscite areas. He submits that it is necessary to stand by the decision of the Council of Four, namely that both Armies must withdraw from the whole basin of Klagenfurt. M Tardieu further suggests that the void created by evacuation must be occupied, presumably in the interests of order. He would suggest that a Police Force should be evolved locally. In any case, this is not the business of the Council. All the Council was asked to do was to renew the order of May 31st, and adapt it to the new circumstances. There is no other Mandate binding on the Council and the suggestion made by the paragraph of Sir Maurice Hankey’s letter beginning with the words “Since the Meeting I have learned” has no binding force.

M Tardieu says that if Baron Sonnino is right, the Commission had been called upon to deliberate under a misunderstanding.

M Pichon, reading the letter, says that there is evidently a contradiction. In the first part the instruction was that the whole basin was to be evacuated, in the second it was indicated that boundaries should be fixed.

Baron Sonnino says that in the dispatch of May 31st, no exact definition of the Klagenfurt area had been given. The Council of Foreign Ministers was asked to define the frontier but not to establish new ones. The Council was to repeat the previous order adapted to the present circumstances.

Mr Lansing says that he could find no authorization by the Council of Four to Sir Maurice Hankey for submitting the question to the Commission. It would seem that the Council of Four had only directed the dispatch to be sent.

M Pichon says that all the Council itself has to do is to fix the outer limits of the Klagenfurt basin. This had been done.

M Tardieu says that in his opinion this had not been done. A few days ago the Council of Four had asked the Commission to report on some communications made by the Yugoslav Delegation involving this very question. The Commission had not yet reported, but it might be inferred from this that the exact limits of the Klagenfurt basin had not yet been fixed by the Council of Four.

M Pichon asks whether M Tardieu could furnish his report to the Council of Five instead of the Council of Four.

M Tardieu replies that the report is ready but has not yet been sent in.

Mr Balfour said that he could not understand Sir Maurice Hankey’s letter. Did it mean that the Council of Foreign Ministers was to “approve” without discussion what was suggested? He himself disapproves of leaving the Klagenfurt basin unoccupied. He would require a great deal of convincing argument before he approved of any such thing. Further, the Council of Foreign Ministers was asked to draft a telegram and in his view this was not their business.

Baron Sonnino restates the case as previously explained by himself.

Mr Balfour thinks that if the Council of Four only intended that their previous telegram should be repeated they would not have asked the Council of Foreign Ministers to meet to do it for them. They could presumably do this themselves.

Baron Sonnino points out that the order would not be repeated in the same terms, as in the interval an Armistice had taken place and some notice of this fact was required.

M Tardieu said that he entirely agrees with Mr Balfour. If the question is merely one of repeating the previous telegram no discussion is required. If on the other hand a new definition of the Klagenfurt basin is under consideration, he would point out that two considerable modifications had been suggested. One by the Yugoslav Delegation, namely the addition to the Plebiscite zone of the Valley of Miesthal; the other by the Italian Delegation, namely, the exclusion of the triangle of Assling.

Baron Sonnino says that it is clear that the Council of Five must take some action as the Heads of the Governments are away and the military situation is urgent.

Mr Lansing suggests that the question be adjourned until the Commission had furnished material for a delimitation of the Klagenfurt basin.

(At this stage Mr Balfour withdraws.)

M Tardieu points out that nothing would be gained by delay as the findings of the Commission were not unanimous. He can only present on the following day the same divergences of opinion that he had already explained.

Baron Sonnino further observes that the findings of the Commission, even if unanimous, cannot assign final frontiers to the Klagenfurt basin until these have been accepted by the Council of the Heads of Governments.

(Mr Lansing at this point withdraws.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

06-19-19, 09:37 AM

19th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Allies ready to occupy German territory if Peace not signed.

Petre P. Carp, former Prime Minister of Romania who collaborated with the Germans when they occupied the country during the war, has passed away.
https://i.imgur.com/oqFdJWT.jpg

Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando announces his resignation for failing to secure the Croatian city of Fiume for Italy at the Paris Peace Conference. Italian resentment towards the conference fuels the rise of fascism.
https://i.imgur.com/lZKsKw4.jpg

Returning from target practice in the Cuban waters of Guantanamo Bay, the USS DELAWARE (BB-28) follows the other battleships into New York Harbor. The “Victory Fleet” also included the USS’ TEXAS (BB-35), NEW MEXICO (BB-40), OKLAHOMA (BB-37), and NEVADA (BB-36).
https://i.imgur.com/h7Qpu9Z.jpg

Sailor Steve

06-19-19, 09:40 PM

Thursday, June 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers

1. M Pichon says that he thinks it would be best to ask M Tardieu to inform the Council of the conclusions of his Committee regarding the limits of the Basin of Klagenfurt for the purpose of the telegram which the Council was requested to send.

M Tardieu says that the answer to this question is to be found in Minute 5 of a note addressed to the Supreme Council by the Commission for Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs. The consequence is that no change is made in Zone A and none proposed in Zone B, and that the boundaries shown on what is known as President Wilson’s map are maintained by the unanimous assent of the Committee.

M Pichon says that if the Council approves the proposal sent to them from the Council of Four, it will follow that a telegram should be sent demanding the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin by both sides, the frontiers being those shown on President Wilson’s map excluding the Miesthal region.

Baron Sonnino says that as no alteration is proposed in the frontier, no specification need be made in the message. The telegram of May 31st should be repeated.

Mr Balfour says he cannot quite understand what it is proposed the Council should do. Is it to order that a large tract of country should be left with no troops in it either Austrian or Yugoslav?

M Tardieu observes that the Commission has no remarks to make on this policy as the question has not been submitted to it.

Baron Sonnino says that the Council of Heads of Governments wishes the Military Representatives on the spot to be informed of the order given for the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin. These Officers would then make proposals in accordance with events for maintaining order in the evacuated area. This is the resolution adopted in the Council of Four.

Mr Lansing says that he does not quite follow Baron Sonnino. He reads the letter written by Sir Maurice Hankey on June 17th to mean that entire evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin is to be ordered. At the same time the Council of Foreign Ministers are asked to determine certain limits. Baron Sonnino says these limits have already been laid down. If the outline of the Klagenfurt Basin has already been determined, the letter must mean lines behind which the occupying troops should retire.

Baron Sonnino maintains that this is not the meaning of the resolution of the Council of Four. Seeing that the Commission proposed no change in the outer limits of the Klagenfurt Basin, all that remains to be done is to re-affirm the orders of May 31st.

Mr Lansing points out that the Council of Foreign Ministers is asked to “approve”; for his part he did not.

Mr Balfour also says that he does not approve.

Baron Sonnino says that he has himself raised the question in the Council of Four and asked what was to happen

(a) if evacuation took place

(b) if it did not take place.

He asks whether the Council would authorize the military Representatives on the spot to take action. The Council had decided that these Officers should not take action but should make proposals to the Council.

M Pichon observed that this matter is not within the terms of reference.

Baron Sonnino says that if his Colleagues do not approve the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin in spite of the fact that it had been decided on by the Council of Heads of Governments, he can do no more. In his view the proper thing to do was to send a telegram and ask the military authorities on the spot to make proposals for dealing with the consequences.

M Pichon says that as Mr Balfour cannot approve of the telegram, it clearly cannot be sent. The Council is, therefore, at the very start precluded from doing what Baron Sonnino suggested.

Mr Lansing proposes that a reply be sent on behalf of the Council of Foreign Ministers to the effect that having been asked to approve of the total evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin, the Council returns the reply that it does not approve of this policy. It will, however, approve of the withdrawal of the opposing troops behind the line proposed by the Yugoslav Commission.

Baron Sonnino says he cannot agree to this. It appears to him quite contrary to the decision of the Council of the Heads of Governments as understood by him.

M Pichon says there is another proposal formulated by Mr Lansing and supported by Mr Balfour. He also concurs with it. All he can do is to put this to the vote. He thinks it would be a wise decision as supplementary information just received reports disturbances in the Klagenfurt area. He quotes a telegram from the French General on the spot saying that Allied troops are urgently required to keep order.

Mr Lansing says that he thinks there must be some mistake in the account given of the matter by Baron Sonnino. The more natural course would have been to consult the military men on the spot before asking the Foreign Ministers for their approval.

(At this stage Mr Balfour withdraws.)

Baron Sonnino says that the news quoted by M Pichon shows the necessity of doing something. He refers again to the history of the telegram sent on May 31st and to the subsequent events.

M Pichon says that, to sum up, as Mr Balfour and he himself supported Mr Lansing’s views, all he can do is to report to the Council of Four that with the exception of Baron Sonnino, all support a withdrawal of the contending armies north and south of the line shown on the map known as “President Wilson’s Map”.

Baron Sonnino says that his view is that a telegram should be sent renewing the order of May 31st for the total evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin and that the Military authorities should be asked to make proposals for dealing with the consequences. The following resolution is then adopted:

“The Council of the Foreign Ministers decided to reply to the Council of the Heads of Governments that their interpretation of the letter addressed by Sir Maurice Hankey to the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference on June 17th, 1919, regarding the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin was that they were asked to approve the action suggested in paragraph 3.

With the exception of Baron Sonnino, this interpretation was unanimous and, with the same exception, the answer was that the Council of Foreign Ministers could not approve of the total evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin.

It was further proposed by Mr Lansing, and approved by the other Foreign Ministers, excepting Baron Sonnino, that the troops of the contending forces be ordered to withdraw north and south respectively of the purple line drawn on the map known as President Wilson’s Map.

Baron Sonnino maintained that the duty of the Council was to send a telegram ordering the total evacuation of the Basin and to ask the 4 Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on the spot what proposals they had to make to deal with the consequences of the evacuation.”

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

06-20-19, 07:51 AM

20th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Britain: Report of Coal Commission presented; published 23 June.

Signor Orlando resigns; Signore Nitti forms fresh Cabinet.

German (Scheidemann) Cabinet decides against signing Peace Treaty, and falls.

German Prime Minister Philipp Scheidemann, who proclaimed Germany as a republic, resigns as the Allies refuse to negotiate the terms of the Versailles Treaty.
https://i.imgur.com/Ozn8KKq.jpg

Sailor Steve

06-21-19, 01:36 AM

Friday, June 20, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Ministry of War, Paris, 17:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

Jimbuna

06-21-19, 05:56 AM

21st June 1919

Aftermath of War

Turkish army advancing on Greeks in Asia Minor (Aidin).

Germans scuttle their Fleet at Scapa Flow.

Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, head of the German delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, also resigns due to the harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty.
https://i.imgur.com/aVFnUZ4.png

Admiral Ludwig von Reuter orders the German Fleet interned at Scapa Flow to be scuttled instead of it falling to the Allied Powers. 15 capital ships, 5 cruisers, and 32 destroyers are sunk. The Bayern sinking.
https://i.imgur.com/v7iGi3Z.jpg
(See post below for comprehensive list)

Jimbuna

06-21-19, 06:25 AM

21st June 1919

Scuttling of the German fleet in Scapa Flow: Admiral Ludwig von Reuter scuttles the interned German fleet in Scapa Flow, Scotland. Nine German sailors are killed.

Ship Losses:

SMS B109 (Imperial German Navy) The B97-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow, Orkney Islands, United Kingdom. She was raised in March 1926 and scrapped.
SMS B110 (Imperial German Navy) The B97-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in December 1925 and scrapped.
SMS B111 (Imperial German Navy) The B97-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in March 1926 and scrapped.
SMS B112 (Imperial German Navy) The B97-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in February 1926 and scrapped.
SMS Baden (Imperial German Navy) The Bayern-class battleship was beached in Scapa Flow. She was refloated in July. Subsequently repaired and entered Royal Navy service.
SMS Bayern (Imperial German Navy) The Bayern-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in September 1934 and scrapped.
SMS Bremse (Imperial German Navy) The Brummer-class cruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 29 November 1930 and scrapped.
SMS Brummer (Imperial German Navy) The Brummer-class cruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow, where she remains as of 2019.
SMS Cöln (Imperial German Navy) The Cöln-class cruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow, where she remains as of 2019.
SMS Dresden (Imperial German Navy) The Cöln-class cruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow, where she remains as of 2019.
SMS Derfflinger (Imperial German Navy) The Derfflinger-class battlecruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1939 and anchored in a capsized state off Rysa Little until 1946, when she was scrapped.
SMS Emden (Imperial German Navy) The Königsberg-class cruiser was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the French Navy in 1920.
SMS Frankfurt (Imperial German Navy) The Wiesbaden-class cruiser was beached in Scapa Flow. She was refloated in July 1920 and subsequently passed to the United States Navy.
SMS Friedrich der Grosse (Imperial German Navy) The Kaiser-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1936 and scrapped.
SMS G38 (Imperial German Navy) The G37-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1936 and scrapped.
SMS G39 (Imperial German Navy) The G37-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 3 July 1925 and scrapped.
SMS G40 (Imperial German Navy) The G37-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1925 and scrapped.
SMS G86 (Imperial German Navy) The G85-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later raised scrapped.
SMS G89 (Imperial German Navy) The G85-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later raised scrapped.
SMS G91 (Imperial German Navy) The G85-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later raised scrapped.
SMS G92 (Imperial German Navy) The G85-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later raised scrapped.
SMS G101 (Imperial German Navy) The G101-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in April 1926 and scrapped.
SMS G102 (Imperial German Navy) The G101-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the United States Navy.
SMS G103 (Imperial German Navy) The G101-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in September 1925 and scrapped.
SMS G104 (Imperial German Navy) The G101-class destroyer was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in April 1926 and scrapped.
SMS H145 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in March 1925 and scrapped.
SMS Hindenburg (Imperial German Navy) The Derfflinger-class battlecruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 29 July 1930 and scrapped.
SMS Grosser Kurfürst (Imperial German Navy) The König-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 29 April 1938 and scrapped.
SMS Kaiser (Imperial German Navy) The Kaiser-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1929 and scrapped the next year.
SMS Kaiserin (Imperial German Navy) The Kaiser-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 14 May 1936 and scrapped.
SMS Karlsruhe (Imperial German Navy) The Königsberg-class cruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow, where she remains as of 2019.
SMS König (Imperial German Navy) The König-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow, where she remains as of 2019.
SMS König Albert (Imperial German Navy) The Kaiser-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 31 July 1935 and scrapped.
SMS Kronprinz Wilhelm (Imperial German Navy) The König-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow, where she remains as of 2019.
SMS Markgraf (Imperial German Navy) The König-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow, where she remains as of 2019.
SMS Moltke (Imperial German Navy) The Moltke-class battlecruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1927 and scrapped two years later.
SMS Nürnberg (Imperial German Navy) The Königsberg-class cruiser was beached in Scapa Flow. She was refloated in July 1919 and subsequently sunk as a target in 1922.
SMS Prinzregent Luitpold (Imperial German Navy) The Kaiser-class battleship was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 9 July 1931 and scrapped.
SMS S32 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in June 1925 and scrapped.
SMS S36 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in April 1925 and scrapped.
SMS S49 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in December 1924 and scrapped.
SMS S50 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in October 1924 and scrapped.
SMS S51 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Admiralty.
SMS S52 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in October 1924 and scrapped.
SMS S53 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in August 1925 and scrapped.
SMS S54 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was partially salvaged.
SMS S55 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in August 1924 and scrapped.
SMS S56 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in June 1925 and scrapped.
SMS S60 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and transferred to the Imperial Japanese Navy as a war reparation, but scrapped in England in 1920.
SMS S65 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in May 1922 and scrapped.
SMS S131 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in August 1924 and scrapped.
SMS S132 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the United States Navy.
SMS S136 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in April 1925 and scrapped.
SMS S137 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Admiralty.
SMS S138 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in May 1925 and scrapped.
SMS Seydlitz (Imperial German Navy) The Seydlitz-class battlecruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 2 November 1928 and scrapped.
SMS V43 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the United States Navy.
SMS V44 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Admiralty.
SMS V45 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1924 and scrapped.
SMS V46 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the French Navy.
SMS V70 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in August 1924 and scrapped.
SMS V73 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Admiralty.
SMS V78 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in September 1925 and scrapped.
SMS V80 (Imperial German Navy) The V67-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and transferred to the Imperial Japanese Navy as a war reparation, but scrapped in England in 1920.
SMS V81 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated but sunk whilst under tow to be scrapped.
SMS V82 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Admiralty.
SMS V83 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in 1923 and scrapped.
SMS V86 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in July 1925 and scrapped.
SMS V89 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in December 1922 and scrapped.
SMS V91 (Imperial German Navy) The Grosses Torpedoboot 1913-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in September 1924 and scrapped.
SMS V100 (Imperial German Navy) The V99-class destroyer was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the French Navy.
SMS V125 (Imperial German Navy) The V125-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Admiralty.
SMS V126 (Imperial German Navy) The V125-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the French Navy.
SMS V127 (Imperial German Navy) The V125-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Imperial Japanese Navy.
SMS V128 (Imperial German Navy) The V125-class torpedo boat was beached in Scapa Flow. She was later refloated and passed to the Admiralty.
SMS V129 (Imperial German Navy) The V125-class torpedo boat was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised in August 1925 and scrapped.
SMS Von der Tann (Imperial German Navy) The battlecruiser was scuttled in Scapa Flow. She was raised on 7 December 1930, scrapping started in 1931 and was completed in 1934.

Sailor Steve

06-21-19, 09:00 PM

Saturday, June 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five with a large number of experts

1. The Council has before them a Note from the German Delegation, dated June 20th, 1919.

On the previous day, M Clemenceau, with his colleagues’ approval, had instructed the various Commissions to prepare draft replies on the various points raised in the German Note.

2. M Klotz hands in a draft reply which has been approved by all the experts on the Reparations Commission.

This draft reply is read and approved, subject to some minor alterations.

3. M Klotz then hands in a draft reply in regard to Financial Matters.

This reply is read by the Interpreter in English and approved without alteration.

4. M Clementel hand in a draft reply which has been prepared by the Economic Commission.

A translation of this is read by the Interpreter.

In the course of the discussion on this letter, a point is raised in regard to the powers of the Council of the League of Nations as affecting the period of some of the provisions of the Treaty, namely, as to whether the operation of these parts of the Treaty would continue until put an end to by a decision of the Council of the League of Nations, or as to whether they would cease unless the Council of the League of Nations decided to terminate them. This point is referred back to the Economic Commission to redraft its letter.

(M Clementel and other Economic Experts then withdraw to redraft this passage in their letter.)

5. At this point, the question is first raised as to the general character of the reply to be given to the German note.

Mr Balfour points out that the Germans in their Character of letter make two complaints. The first was that there are two treaties, one which has been handed to them originally and a second one which accompanied the reply to the German counter-proposals, and which have been amended in manuscript by the Drafting Committee but also include certain alterations in the print. Their second point is as to whether M Clemenceau’s letter commenting on their counter-proposals is binding on the Allies. This appears to be a question of international law, which should be referred to the lawyers members of the Drafting Committee who were in the adjoining room. The question on which their opinion is required is as to whether this note had the same binding effect as a protocol attached to the Treaty.

(President Wilson then leaves the room to consult the Drafting Committee.)

President Wilson, on his return, says that the opinion of the Drafting Committee is that M Clemenceau’s letter as an interpretation of the Treaty is binding in the sense that it cannot be controverted in an arbitral court. In explaining how the Treaty is to be carried out, it expresses the limitation of the powers to be exercised and this constitutes an undertaking binding, as he understands it, in honor but not in law. Mr Hurst had suggested that it would be very easy to prepare a protocol to be attached to the Treaty, summarizing the points which should be binding in a legal sense.

M Clemenceau suggests that the text of the letter and memorandum in reply to the German counter-proposals should be added as a protocol to the Treaty.

President Wilson suggests that it would be a sufficient answer to the Germans to inform them that an answer would be given in the shape of a protocol attached to the Treaty.

Mr Balfour says that he was advised by Mr Hurst that it would be a bad precedent to put the whole of the letters and memoranda, prepared in reply to the German counter-proposals, in the Treaty of Peace. This would be very liable to raise all sorts of difficulties of interpretation, since the letters are not couched in legal language. It would be better to summarize the substantive results of the letters and memoranda in the form of a protocol.

(There is prolonged discussion on this question, which is reverted to and taken up again at frequent intervals. A considerable number of experts, including the Drafting Committee, are invited to express their views. Eventually, the Drafting Committee are instructed to prepare the following documents:

1) A reply to the German Note based on the material prepared by the various Commissions.

2) A protocol for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace containing assurances to the Germans on the various points raised in their letter; these assurances to be extracted as far as possible from the actual text of the Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace.)

6. In the course of the discussion referred to above, a draft reply to the Germans on the subject of Heligoland is approved.

7. In the course of the discussion referred to above, a draft reply presented by Viscount Chinda on the subject of Shantung is approved.

(The meeting is adjourned to enable the Drafting Committee to prepare the documents.)

8. In the course of the discussion referred to above President Wilson reads the Memorandum from Mr Lansing, dated June 20th.

He draws attention to Mr Lansing’s comment that the list of individuals to be handed over to justice cannot be properly completed within the period of one month from the coming into force of the Treaty. He fears, however, that if a mistake has been made, it is too late to correct it.

(This view is generally accepted.)

(The Council then adjourns to President Wilson’s Library.)

Sailor Steve

06-21-19, 10:38 PM

Saturday, June 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 12:30

Meeting of the Council of Five with members of the Committee on New States

1. The Council has before them a letter from M Berthelot, dated June 19th, addressed to Sir Maurice Hankey containing the remarks of the Commission on New States on Mr Paderewski’s letter of June 15th, 1919.2

(After President Wilson reads a summary of the letter, it is approved.

The Commission on New States is authorized, in consultation with the Drafting Committee, to embody the changes proposed in their letter in a final text of a Treaty with Poland. The Commission is also instructed to prepare for the consideration of the Council, the draft of a letter forwarding the text of the Treaty to the Polish Delegation.)

(At Mr Headlam-Morley’s request, the Commission is also authorized to consider the nature of alterations required in the draft Treaty with Poland in order to provide that in all except the primary schools Jewish children should be instructed in the Polish, and not in the Yiddish language, thereby avoiding the risk of encouraging the use of Yiddish as one of the national languages for a part of the population of Poland.)

2. The Council has before them a letter from M Berthelot, the Chairman of the Commission on New States, suggesting that the points referred to the Commission at the instance of Baron Sonnino on June 17th are outside the competence of the Commission, and should be referred to the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs with their legal and technical experts, which have considered the political clauses relating to Italy in the Austrian Treaty.

(The proposal of the Commission on New States is agreed to and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to acquaint the Secretary-General.)

3. Sir Maurice Hankey draws attention to a letter from M Berthelot, dated June 16th. 1919, dealing with the following Tariffs for questions:

1) Clauses of a technical nature regarding the scale of tariffs for traffic towards the Adriatic intended for insertion Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

2) Suggestions from the Italian Delegation with regard to the restitution of works of art carried off during the war, and removed to territory belonging to the New States.

3) Concerning Financial Clauses relating to Poland proposed by the French Delegation.

(The Council postpones the discussion of this letter.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

06-21-19, 10:49 PM

Saturday, June 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 15:45

Meeting of the Council of Five the Committee on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs

Sailor Steve

06-21-19, 10:50 PM

Saturday, June 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

Sailor Steve

06-21-19, 10:53 PM

Saturday, June 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 18:00

Meeting of the Council of Five with the Drafting Committee

Jimbuna

06-22-19, 07:08 AM

22nd June 1919

Aftermath of War

Herr Bauer forms German Ministry.

Denikin's army 24 miles from Kharkov.

The Weimar Assembly bows to 237 votes to 138 and approves the Treaty of Versailles. It rejects however the articles on the responsibility and the criminals of war.

Canadian mounted police attack demonstrating strikers in Winnipeg, resulting in two deaths and injuring dozens.
https://i.imgur.com/Kypfr81.jpg

An Italian sentinel on watch on the Rhine river.
https://i.imgur.com/gvFuu70.jpg

Ship Losses:

Pericles (Russian Navy White Movement) The motor sailer was shelled and sunk at Henichesk by Soviet Armored Trains Nº. 4 and Nº. 85. Three crewmen and her commanding officer were killed.

Sailor Steve

06-22-19, 10:32 AM

Sunday, June 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George’s Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, 19:15

Meeting of the Council of Three

1. The Council has before it the following Notes from the German Delegation dated June 22nd: No. 68 and No. 70, which were brought to the Meeting by Colonel Henri direct from Versailles and which end with the following declaration:

“The Government of the German Republic accordingly gives the declaration of its consent as required by the Note of June 16th, 1919, in the following form:

‘The Government of the German Republic is ready to sign the Treaty of Peace without, however, recognizing thereby that the German people was the author of the war and without undertaking any responsibility for delivering persons in accordance with Articles 227 to 230 of the Treaty of Peace’”.

After Colonel Henri and M Mantoux had read a rough translation of the last-named Note, Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson express the view that an immediate answer should be sent, refusing any alteration in the Treaty.

President Wilson then reads the following draft reply:

“The Allied and Associated Powers have considered the Note of the German Delegation of even date, and, in view of the shortness of the time remaining, feel it their duty to reply at once.

Of the time within which the German Government must make their final decision as to the signature of the Treaty, less than 24 hours remain.

The Allied and Associated Governments have given the fullest consideration to all of the representations hitherto made by the German Government with regard to the Treaty, have replied with complete frankness, and have made such concessions as they thought it just to make; and the present Note of the German Delegation presents no arguments or considerations not already examined.

The Allied and Associated Powers therefore feel constrained to say that the time for discussion has passed. They can accept or acknowledge no exception or reservation, and must require of the German representatives an unequivocal decision as to their purpose to sign and accept as a whole, or not to sign and accept, the Treaty as finally formulated.”

M Clemenceau suggests to add the following words:

“After the signature, the Allied and Associated Powers must hold Germany responsible for the execution of every stipulation of the Treaty.”

President Wilson says it has been suggested to him to substitute the word “qualification” for “exception” in his draft.

(This is agreed to.)

(It is agreed to summon a Meeting of the full Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at 21:00 and submit the draft reply as amended above, for its consideration.)

2. It is agreed that Mr. Balfour should be asked to draft a letter to the German Delegation, calling attention to the sinking of the German ships in the Orkneys, which, whether or not it was a technical breach of the Armistice, was unquestionably a breach of faith for which the German Government must be held responsible. Warning should be given that the Allied and Associated Powers are considering the matter, and reserve their right to take such action as they think necessary.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to ask Mr Balfour to take this matter up.)

Sailor Steve

06-22-19, 10:38 AM

Sunday, June 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George’s Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, 21:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

Baron Sonnino accepts the draft reply.

Baron Makino, after reading both documents, accepts the draft reply, which is signed by M Clemenceau and transmitted.

(The letter is then signed by M Clemenceau, and dispatched by Colonel Henri to Versailles.)

(It is agreed to publish the letter and the reply in the morning newspapers of Monday, June 23rd.)

2. Mr Balfour says that he has prepared a draft letter to the Germans, but had sent it to Mr Hurst to check certain points of law and fact.

(It is agreed to postpone consideration of this matter until the following morning.)

Jimbuna

06-23-19, 07:00 AM

23rd June 1919

Aftermath of War

Britain: Report of Coal Commission published.

Germany announces readiness to sign Peace Treaty.

Allied advance on N. Dvina River (Archangel front).

Chancellor of Germany Gustav Bauer agrees to accept the Versailles Treaty after receiving an ultimatum from the Allies that Germany must sign or else war will be resumed.
https://i.imgur.com/kxocdSZ.png

Sailor Steve

06-23-19, 11:00 AM

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George’s Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, 09:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

1. The Council has before them Note No. 85 from the German Peace Delegation dated June 23rd, 1919, which has been distributed to the Heads of Government by the Secretary-General between 06:00 and 07:00 a.m.

[The President of the German Delegation (Von Haniel) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)

Translation From German]

"German Peace Delegation,
Versailles, June 23, 1919.
No. 85

Mr President: The Minister for Foreign Affairs instructs me to beg the Allied and Associated Governments to prolong for 48 hours the time limit for answering Your Excellency’s note communicated yesterday evening, and likewise the time limit for answering the note of June 16, 1919.

It was only on Saturday, after great difficulties, that a new Cabinet was formed which, unlike its predecessor, could come to an agreement to declare its willingness to sign the Treaty as regards nearly all its provisions. The National Assembly has expressed its confidence in this Cabinet by a large majority of votes. The answer only arrived here just before midnight, as the direct wire from Versailles to Weimar was out of order. The Government must come into contact anew with the National Assembly, in order to take the grievous decision which is still required of it in such a manner as it can only be taken in accordance with democratic principles and with the internal situation in Germany.

Accept [etc.]

Von Haniel"

Mr Lloyd George says that after carefully considering the matter he feels that the sinking of the German ships in the Orkneys weighed principally with him against granting the German request for an extension of the armistice for 48 hours. There is no doubt that the sinking of these ships was a breach of faith. If bridges were blown up, and loss of life caused, and military operations hampered by these or similar measures, the public would say that this was the reason for which time had been granted. Consequently, he was inclined to reply with a refusal, mentioning the sinking of the German ships.

President Wilson says that if he was assured that he was dealing with honorable men, or even with ordinary men, he would be willing to give not 48, but 24, hours. However, he shares Mr Lloyd George’s suspicions to the full, and does not trust the Germans. He would like to know, however, whether it is correct that the direct telephonic line between Versailles and the German Government was broken. If they could not communicate with their Government until the evening, it might make a difference.

M Clemenceau says they could obtain immediate communication by telephone.

President Wilson says that he has just been reading the German authorization given to Von Haniel. He observes that he was given full powers to hand over the reply of the Imperial Government to the Note of the President of the Peace Conference of the 16th inst. to afford explanations, to receive counter-explanations, and to conduct negotiations, but he had no powers to sign.

M Clemenceau says that so far as he is concerned, he is in favour of refusing the German request.

President Wilson says that in that case he will not say anything about the sinking of ships at the Orkneys. He would rather not mention a matter about which the full circumstances are not yet known.

Mr Lloyd George says there is no doubt about the sinking of the ships, and that they had been sunk by the Germans themselves. A possible excuse was that the German Government was so disorganized, that individuals were acting on their own initiative without higher authority. This, however, is a reason against granting an extension of time.

President Wilson says that the case for the bad faith of the Germans is so overwhelming that there was no necessity to cite specific instances. It is a fact, however, that the German Government had been formed to sign the Treaty.

Baron Makino points out that the National Assembly had passed a vote of confidence in the new Imperial Ministry by 236 votes to 89, with 68 abstentions, and had made no reserves.

Mr Lloyd George says he has just received Mr Balfour’s view, which is in favour of refusal. He takes the view that we can trust no German officer, and that in the case of the ships in the Orkneys, they had conspired together to break the armistice.

President Wilson points out that the German Admiral is reported to have said that he was ordered to sink the ships on the termination of the armistice.

Mr Lloyd George said that what influenced Mr Balfour was that the Germans cannot be trusted.

President Wilson says that nevertheless he thinks there is no need to make specific mention of the sinking of the ships.

Mr Lloyd George considers that it is only important from a political point of view.

Baron Makino says that the principal object was to get the Germans to sign. He suggests that possibly it might make it more difficult for the Germans to sign if we insisted on their giving their answer this very evening.

M Clemenceau says that the great object and the greatest difficulty was to make the Germans honor their signature.

Baron Sonnino suggests that the military authorities ought to be consulted.

Mr Lloyd George says he has already consulted the British Military Authorities, who had no doubt at all that it would be a great mistake to give any extension of time. He recalls what had been stated at the Conference of Generals on the previous Friday that the soldiers had already been sleeping in the open air for five nights, and were exposed to considerable hardships.

M Clemenceau thinks that there is no doubt about military opinion.

Mr Lloyd George urges the importance of politeness in the reply. He points out that history is apt to judge these matters by the actual terms of the letter. He recalls how Bismarck’s communications had been scrutinized from this point of view.

(After some further discussion, it is agreed to send the reply as below.)

Reply to German Note of June 23rd, 1919

(Approved by the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers on June 23rd, 1919)

"Monsieur le President: The Allied and Associated Governments beg to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of June 23. After full consideration of your request they regret that it is not possible to extend the time already granted to your Excellency to make known your decision relative to the signature of the Treaty without any reservation.

G. Clemenceau"

Sailor Steve

06-23-19, 05:52 PM

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

1. Mr Lloyd George says that he fully approves of Mr Balfour’s draft letter, subject to two slight alterations in the following sense:
1) To show that, when referring to Ottomans, the letter refers only to Ottoman Turks, and
2) To ensure that we were not committed in any way to removing the Turks from Constantinople. Mr Montagu had obtained the impression that the letter did commit us to this.

Mr Balfour says that the letter is only intended to give a hint of this possibility.

President Wilson agrees that such a hint might be useful.

(Mr Balfour is authorized to make the necessary modifications to meet Mr Lloyd George’s views, after which the letter will be communicated to M Clemenceau for dispatch.)

2. Mr Balfour says that on the previous evening he had been asked to draft for the consideration of the Council a letter to the German Delegation dealing with the question of the of the sinking of the German Ships. He had actually prepared a draft but had come to the conclusion, after examining the facts, that it was not worth considering at this point. He was advised that the sinking of the ships by the Germans was not in the narrow technical sense a breach of the letter of the Armistice. The breach was rather one against general military law than the Armistice. We now know that this action was a deliberate act of the German Admiral, who had been under the impression that the Armistice expired at noon on Saturday, and he thought, on the expiration of the Armistice, he had a right to commit an act of war.

(At this point Admiral Hope, Admiral Ronarc’h, Admiral Grassi, M Fromageot, M Weiss, Mr Hurst and M Loucheur are introduced.)

President Wilson asks Admiral Hope to describe exactly what had occurred, in order to establish the facts.

Admiral Hope states that at noon on Saturday the German ships had hoisted the German flag and the crews had commenced to abandon ship. They had not been permitted to have many boats and many of the crews consequently jumped overboard in lifebelts. British guard boats were at once ordered to the scene and directed the German boats to stop. Some of them had not done so and had been fired on. The German Admiral left his flagship in a trawler and reported that the sea-cocks had been opened. He also reported that he was under the impression that the Armistice had ended at noon and therefore he was not breaking its terms.

In reply to Mr Lloyd George, he says that it is not, he believes, correct that new crews had been substituted for the original crews. Some men had been sent back to Germany and the total numbers had been reduced, but, so far as he is aware, no new men had been brought in. Attempts had been made to tow the ships to the shore and three light cruisers and, he believed, eighteen destroyers had been beached. One battleship, the Baden, one of the latest German Dreadnoughts (the flagship), as well as four destroyers, still remain afloat. Some of the beached ships should be recoverable.

M Clemenceau suggested that, having heard the facts from Admiral Hope, the international lawyers should be heard next.

Mr Balfour says that there is apparently nothing specific in the Armistice against the sinking of these ships, but he understands it is in contradiction to the general principles governing armistices.

M Fromageot, asked for his opinion, reads the following extract from Article XXIII of the Terms of Armistice:

“Les navires de guerre de surface allemands que seront désignés par les Alliés et les Etats-Unis seront immédiatement désarmés puis internés dans des ports neutres, ou, à leur défaut, dans les ports alliés désignés par les Alliés et les Etats-Unis.

Ils y demeureront sous la surveillance des Alliés et des Etats-Unis—des détachements de gardes étant seuls laissés à bord.”

("The German warships of surface that will be indicated by the Allies and the United States will be immediately disarmed then committed in neutral harbors, or, in their defect, in the allied harbors indicated by the Allies and the United States.

They will reside under the supervision of the Allies and from Etats-Unis-des detachments of guards there alone left aboard.")

From the use of the word “demeureront”, he draws the meaning that nothing is to be changed. Consequently, the sinking of the ships implies an infraction of the Armistice. It was also states that only guard and maintenance parties are to be left on board. These parties are intended to maintain the ships and not to sink them.

Mr Hurst says that he has very little to add to what M Fromageot had stated. Two points, however, occur to him. In the official version of the Armistice, which he had in his hand, it was stated that the French text is the official one, the English and German texts being translations. On this point, the French text was much clearer. The fact that the German Admiral thought that he was entitled to sink the ships because the Armistice had expired had, in fact, no justification. The Armistice would not, in fact, terminate with the signature of the Peace nor before the ratification. Hence, his view was that there was no justification for the Admiral’s action.

M Clemenceau says that this is very important.

Baron Sonnino says that evidently the German Admiral’s opinion that he was entitled to do it because he thought the Armistice had expired favors our thesis that he was not entitled to do it during the Armistice.

Mr Balfour pointed out that the German Admiral may have thought that signature to the Armistice had been refused, in which case he would be correct in assuming that hostilities had recommenced.

M Clemenceau says that it is not an affair of ours what the Admiral had thought. We only have to consider the facts.

Mr Balfour says the next question is as to whether, apart from the damages we might demand from the German Government, the German Admiral could be tried, for example, by court-martial.

M Clemenceau asks under whose orders the German Admiral had been. Was he under the British Admiralty.

Mr Lloyd George replies that he was not; he was merely under the surveillance of the British Admiral.

Mr Hurst says that there are principles laid down in the Regulations under the Laws and Customs of War on Land which are equally applicable to naval war, from which he quotes the following:

“Article 40. Any serious violation of the Armistice by one of the parties gives the other party the right to denounce it, and even, in case of urgency, to re-commence hostilities at once.

“Article 41. A violation of the Armistice by individuals acting on their own initiative only confers the right of demanding the punishment of the offenders and, if necessary, indemnity for the losses sustained.”

M Weiss says that Article 3 of the Laws and Customs of War on Land would apply to this case, namely:

“A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to make compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.”

There is no doubt that, under this provision, a Government is responsible for the actions of its agents and officers. The responsibility of the German Government, therefore, cannot be doubted. In reply to the question as to the Court under which the German Admiral should be tried, he says it is a subject for negotiation.

Mr Balfour suggests that the Articles quoted are not quite consistent. Article 41 of the Regulations suggests that the individual is responsible, whereas Article 3 said that the Government is responsible. M Weiss uses the argument that because the German Admiral had committed this act, the German Government are responsible.

M Clemenceau says that there appears to him to be no contradiction between the two texts. The Admiral might be personally responsible, but the damages for which reparation or indemnity might be claimed will not be levied on his private property but on the German Government. Therefore, each of the articles has its own effect. If the personal responsibility is the greater, Article 41 would apply. If compensation were the more important, Article 3 would apply. What he proposes is that the international lawyers should be asked to present a text, establishing the theory of jurisprudence on which action was to be taken, but the political decision as to the punishment of the Admiral or reparation from the German Government would rest with the Heads of Governments.

Mr Balfour suggests, since it is no use asking for reparation from the Germans in the form of money, as we have already demanded in the Treaty all the money that they could furnish, the Admirals should consider whether reparation should be demanded in the way of ships.

Admiral Hope says that the Germans have only been left a few old battleships and light cruisers.

(It is agreed that, before the 16:00 meeting, the following reports should be furnished:

1) By the International Lawyers, who should prepare a text stating the theory of jurisprudence on which action could be taken.

2) By the Admirals stating whether reparation can be furnished by the surrender of German ships.)

3. Mr Balfour says that he has also been asked to prepare a draft letter to the German Delegation on the subject of their contravention of the Terms of Armistice in the Baltic Provinces. He understands, however, that the demand to the Germans to withdraw from the Baltic Provinces had been made so recently that the Allies had not yet a case against the Germans.

Mr Hurst then reads a summary of the demands made to the Germans. On June 10th, General Gough had given orders to General von der Goltz for certain withdrawals. On June 14th Helsingfors intercepted the following message:

“General von der Goltz takes orders only from his German superiors and rejects General Gough’s orders to local forces.”

Meanwhile, on June 13th, the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had decided that Marshal Foch should order the Germans:

a) To stop all future advance Northwards towards Estonia;

b) To evacuate Libau and Windau at once and to complete the evacuation of all territory which before the war formed part of Russia, with the least possible delay, in accordance with Article 12 of the Armistice Terms.
This decision was not communicated to General Nudant at Spa until June 18th. Consequently, the action was only four days old and the Germans could not yet be accused of a breach of the Armistice.

President Wilson says that it ought to be borne in mind that the Germans had altered the gauge of the railways in the Baltic Provinces from the Russian to the German gauge and had put in their rolling stock. One consequence of the evacuation of the German Army will be the withdrawal of this rolling stock, which will affect the food distribution and inflict great privations on the civil population. Mr Hoover, who informed him of this, added that the Germans claimed this rolling stock as their own.

Mr Balfour suggests that part of the rolling stock might be taken as compensation for the ships.

M Clemenceau suggests that the Baltic Provinces, who would benefit, ought to pay for the rolling stock.

President Wilson says that the Allies have no means of compelling the Germans to leave the rolling stock. Consequently, it must be remembered that entire withdrawal means the starvation of the people in the Baltic Provinces.

(Mr Hudson enters at this point.)

Mr Balfour says he will ask General Gough and such other sources of information that are open to him for information on this point.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the Allied and Associated Powers ought to ascertain the views of the Letts and Lithuanians. It is possible that they would prefer to risk the privations rather than not get rid of the Germans. He understands that their representatives were in Paris.

President Wilson says he was informed by Mr Hudson that a provision in the Treaty of Peace compels the Germans to leave half the rolling stock in the Baltic Provinces. He suggested that the question should be referred to the Baltic Commission in Paris.

(This is accepted. It is agreed to invite the Baltic Commission to report to the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the effect which the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by Germany will have on the food supplies of these regions, taking into consideration the fact that the Germans have altered the gauge of the railways from the Russian to the German gauge and would withdraw a part of their rolling stock. The Commission should be authorized to consult the representatives of the Baltic Provinces in Paris.

Mr Hudson undertakes to communicate this decision at once to the Baltic Commission.)

(The Allied Admirals and the International Lawyers withdraw at this point.)

Sailor Steve

06-23-19, 05:57 PM

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 12:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

1. Mr Lloyd George says that the British Government are of opinion that the question of surveillance requires looking into. He does not condemn those who had been responsible, but he feels that the whole matter required investigation.

He would be glad if the Allied Admiralties would express their view as to the interpretation to be put on the term “surveillance” in Article 23 of the Armistice Convention of November 11th, 1918. Supposing, for example, the German surface ships had been interned in French or American Ports, instead of in British ports, he would like to know what precautions the French or American Naval Authorities would have considered themselves at liberty to take in order to carry out as effectively as they were entitled under the terms of the Armistice the surveillance of the German ships.

President Wilson says that in the case of merchant ships, the United States Government had put guards on board.

(Mr Lloyd George is asked to formulate his proposal in the shape of a letter.)

Sailor Steve

06-23-19, 07:48 PM

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 12:10

Meeting of the Council of Five

(Mr Headlam-Morley and Mr Hudson are present during this discussion)

1. The Council has before them the draft, prepared by the Committee on New States, of the Covering Letter to be addressed to Mr Paderewski in transmitting to him the Treaty to be signed by Poland.

Mr Lloyd George raises the question of the language to be employed in the Jewish schools in Poland. He thinks that Mr Paderewski’s criticisms in this respect have force. In the United States of America or in Great Britain, for example, the religious idiosyncrasies of particular sects are given some latitude, but are fitted into the educational system of the country. It is a question, however, whether the Jews ought to be allowed separate schools in Poland.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that under the stipulations of the Treaty, the schools for Jews in the Polish State are to be administered by Committees of Jews.

Mr Lloyd George asks if that gives them more power than under the system in force in the United Kingdom, where Roman Catholics and Jews supervise their schools, but the general system and curriculum are a part of the education of the country and under the State.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the system in the Treaty had been deliberately arranged so that the education should remain under the Polish State, though the management of the schools would be under persons of the Jewish faith. This point was explained in the covering letter.

Mr Hudson says that the principles adopted in the Treaty are very elastic so as to leave the schools under the general control of the State.

Mr Lloyd George asks who would arrange the curriculum.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the State would be in a position to lay it down.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is not Mr Paderewski’s reading of the Treaty.

Mr Hudson suggests that the draft letter might be amplified to make it quite clear to Mr Paderewski.

Mr Headlam-Morley says he had suggested that the word “persons” should be substituted for “Committees” in regard to the schools, the object being that people are apt to be frightened by the use of the word “Committee”. His colleagues, however, had not agreed in this. In their latest draft, the Commission had cut out all reference to a Central Polish Committee, and had substituted the word “Committees”.

Mr Balfour points out that in the United Kingdom a Roman Catholic school was a local Roman Catholic school. No such provision was made here. Under this Treaty there might be a great Central Jewish Committee in Warsaw.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that alterations had been inserted to meet this.

Mr Balfour suggests that in Article 10 the word “local” should be added before “Committee”.

(This is agreed to.)

Mr Lloyd George asks if it should not be made clear that Yiddish should not be taught. There was no objection to Hebrew, which is a recognised language, but he does not think that Yiddish ought to be taught.

President Wilson points out that Yiddish is a spoken language in many parts of the world, including the United States. The Polish Government ought not to be in a different position towards it from other countries.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the Commission was informed that in the case of very small children, no other language but Yiddish could be used. They spoke Yiddish in their homes, and, when they first came to the school, they knew no other language. It ought not to be used, however, when the children were older.

Mr Lloyd George asks what is done in New York? President Wilson says that teachers are appointed, who understand Yiddish, and they give their instruction in Yiddish.

Mr Lloyd George says that there is all the difference between giving instruction in Yiddish and teaching the Yiddish language. Every effort ought to be made to merge the Jews of Poland in Polish nationality, just as the Jews in Great Britain or France become merged in British or French nationality. He is told there is an active movement to keep the Jews not merely as a separate religion, but as a separate race.

President Wilson points out that in this case we were not dealing with Great Britain or France or the United States, where the Jewish population know that they are governed on the same principles as the other subjects of the State. If the Polish State would adopt the same principles, it would help matters.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that in Poland there is an extremely aggressive Jewish national movement.

Mr Lloyd George reads the following resolution, which had been adopted on Saturday:

“The Commission was also authorized to consider the nature of alterations required in the draft Treaty with Poland, in order to provide that in all except the primary schools, Jewish children should be instructed in the Polish and not in the Yiddish language, thereby avoiding the risk of encouraging the use of Yiddish as one of the national languages for a part of the population of Poland.”

He thinks that this goes rather too far, as it suggests that the children will be taught Yiddish in the primary schools.

President Wilson reads the following extract from Article 9 of the draft Polish Treaty:

“Poland will provide in the public educational establishments in towns and districts, in which a considerable proportion of Polish nationals of other than Polish speech are residents, reasonable facilities for ensuring that instruction shall be given to the children of such Polish nationals in their own language.”

He proposes to add after the word “public” the word “primary”.

Mr Headlam-Morley points out that this will enable the Germans to be instructed in the German language. The majority of the Committee, he said, thought that the decision on Saturday applied only to Yiddish children. Germans in the transferred districts could be taught in the German language, but they will have no Committee as the Jews would have. In the case of the Jews, Yiddish might be used in the primary schools as a medium of instruction, but not in secondary schools. The majority of the Committee thinks that it is not fair to ask the Polish Government to devote funds for secondary instruction in the Yiddish language. The American Delegation, however, had dissents from this view.

President Wilson reads the following extract from a memorandum giving the view of the American Delegation:

“2. In pursuance of his suggestion to the Supreme Council on Saturday, Mr. Headlam-Morley wants to add to Article 10, concerning the Jews’ control of their own schools, a statement that

‘Nothing in this article shall prevent the Polish Government from making obligatory the use of Polish as the ordinary medium of instruction in the higher schools.’

This addition goes beyond my understanding of his suggestion on Saturday. It is strongly opposed by the American Jews here. I have opposed it for the following reasons:

(a) It would encourage the Poles to forbid Yiddish instruction in Jewish superior schools, thereby greatly diminishing the value of Article 10.

(b) Since the Jewish schools are to be “subject to the general control of the State”, the Polish Government is not forbidden by the articles as they stand to regulate the languages to be used in them.

(c) The articles as they stand leave the Polish Government free to require that all college and university instruction should be in Polish.

(d) The unity of the Polish State, so far as languages in schools are concerned, is already sufficiently protected by the provision that the teaching of Polish may be made obligatory.”

It is not a question, he says, of whether children should be taught Polish, but whether it should be used as the sole medium of instruction in all the primary schools.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the view of the majority of the Commission is that as the children came from homes where Yiddish only was spoken, it must be the medium of instruction in the first instance.

Baron Sonnino asks why the teaching of Yiddish should be prohibited.

Mr Headlam-Morley said it is not prohibited. The only question is how much the Polish Government is to be forced to do in the way of providing facilities for the use of Yiddish in the schools.

Mr Lloyd George says that he is not in favour of imposing as an international obligation on the Polish Government the teaching of Yiddish. He will only assent to its use as a medium of instruction in primary schools.

Baron Sonnino asks whether, supposing Poland prohibits the teaching of Yiddish, would not this be inflicting the hardship which it was desired to avoid? The Jews would then either have to teach Yiddish at home, or maintain special schools for it.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the Jewish movement in Poland is not with the object of promoting a religious movement, but a separate Jewish nationalism. A Jewish friend of his, who has just returned from Poland, told him that there is an increasing use of Yiddish in the streets.

(After some further discussion, it is agreed:

1) With regard to the use of languages other than Polish, the Polish Government should be given a free hand in all schools except primary schools. But, in those cases where there is a considerable minority, as provided in Article 9 and 10 of the draft Treaty with Poland, of children of Polish citizens speaking a language other than Polish, facilities should be given for them to receive instruction in the primary schools through the medium of their own language. The Commission on New States is authorized, in conjunction with the Drafting Committee, to make the necessary modifications in the draft Treaty with Poland.

2) The draft letter to the Polish Delegation submitted by the Committee is approved, subject to a re-drafting of the passage dealing with schools, in accordance with the above decision.)

2. Mr Balfour urges that the term “persons of Jewish faith” should be used instead of Jews in the Treaty with Poland. He is strongly in favor of only giving privileges to Jews on the ground that they are of Jewish Faith and not because they were of Jewish Nationality.

Baron Sonnino points out that if a Jew becomes a Christian, he would then not receive the protection.

(Mr Headlam-Morley and Mr Hudson withdraw.)

(M Tardieu, Captain Johnson, Mr. Leeper, Colonel Pariani and Captain de St. Quentin were introduced.)

3. M Tardieu explains a difficulty that has arisen in the Commission on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs in regard to the reference that had been given to it on June 21st. In the Treaty with Austria, certain frontiers had been drawn subject to a reservation that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to define the plebiscite area in the Klagenfurt district. The frontiers given to Austria in the Treaty included a small section of the district now proposed for the Klagenfurt plebiscite. The Italian Delegation urged that the frontiers granted to Austria should be maintained, and that the portion affected should be excluded from the plebiscite district. The majority of the Commission, however, maintained that the right to draw the plebiscite area justified the Allied and Associated Powers in including the whole area as now proposed.

Baron Sonnino urges that Austria has provisionally been given a certain line, with a possible expectation of obtaining something more. It is not fair to Austria to alter this line. The implication to the Austrians is that for the moment they must content themselves with that line with a possibility of getting something more.

M Tardieu points out that the ultimate result might be a considerable improvement in the situation from Austria’s point of view.

(After some discussion, it is agreed that no change should be made in the plebiscite area as already drawn.)

Sailor Steve

06-23-19, 07:56 PM

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

1. Mr Lloyd George says that Dr Benes wishes to bring the Czechoslovaks home to Czechoslovakia through Archangel. Mr Churchill had spoken to him on the subject. The suggestion is that the Czechoslovaks might be used to open the communications between Kolchak and Archangel, with a view to their withdrawal. At present, they are used to guard a portion of the Siberian railway, so that the result would be that the United States and Japanese troops would have to take over a part of the communications now held by the Czechoslovaks. He does not ask for an immediate decision, but requests President Wilson and Baron Makino to examine the question. Mr Churchill is ready to discuss the question with them at any time.

2. Mr Lloyd George raises for consideration the following proposals made by Sir George Riddell in connection with the ceremony of signing the Treaty of Peace at Versailles:

1) In the Hall there are to be two groups of seats for (a) the Press, and (b) the visitors respectively. Sir George Riddell asks that the front row of such group (both Press and Visitors) might be reserved for the Press.

2) He asks that the ceremony might take place at 11:00, in order to give time for the transmission of full reports for publication in the newspapers of the following morning.

3) He asks that the various sections allotted to the Press might be kept separate according to nationality. Otherwise, he apprehends a scrambling for seats.

(It is agreed that the Council should meet the principal Press Representative in Paris of each of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers on Tuesday, June 24th, at 14:30 in the Hall at Versailles, where the Treaty of Peace is to be signed.)

Sailor Steve

06-23-19, 08:04 PM

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:30

Meeting of the Council of Five with a Council of Experts on Austrian Affairs

A draft clause providing that Austrian property in the territory ceded by Austria should not be subject to retention or liquidation under the Economic Clauses of the Treaty, is placed before the council.

President Wilson reads the draft and asked Dr Taussig to explain it.

Dr Taussig explains that under the Economic Clauses as originally drafted, Austrian property in the ceded territories is subject to retention and liquidation by the Governments acquiring the territories. It was felt that the maintenance of such a provision would inflict a fatal blow on Austrian financial stability, and the Council had accordingly agreed at their meeting on the 16th June that Austrian private property within the territories in question should not be treated as enemy property. It had been referred to a Committee consisting of Mister Baruch, Colonel Peel, Monsieur Loucheur, and Monsieur Crespi to bring up a draft clause giving effect to this decision.

Mr Lloyd George agrees.

Colonel Peel calls attention to the fact that the substance of the new Article had not yet been communicated to the Czechoslovaks and the other smaller powers affected by it.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it essential that they should be informed of the Article.

President Wilson concurs.

It is therefore decided that the Article should be approved and should be communicated to the Delegations concerned, i.e. the Delegations of the countries which would acquire territory from Austria under the Treaty.

(The Article is initialed and Sir Maurice Hankey is directed to communicate it to the Secretary General for the information of the drafting Committee.)

Sailor Steve

06-23-19, 08:19 PM

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:30

Meeting of the Council of Five with a Council of Experts on Belgian Affairs

1. The Council has before them proposals for meeting the Belgian claims for priority in reparation payments.

Mr Lloyd George says that he has had no time to consider those proposals; so far as he can make out those that had been submitted to him were the result of agreement between two Delegations only. He asks that the question might be referred again to the financial experts of all the Delegations who are dealing with the matter, and that their report should be referred to the Supreme Council.

(This is agreed.)

2. M Loucheur proceeds to describe his negotiations with the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Serbia and Romania, in regard to their claims for reparation and the proposed payment by them of contributions towards the cost of the war of liberation. As regards claims for reparation, he instances the settlement suggested by him and his colleagues to Serbia. They had made an offer of Fr 500,000,000 as reparation, half of this sum to be paid in priority: Serbia to assume a part of the pre-war Austrian debt on account of the newly acquired territories but not to be liable for payment for the public property taken over in those territories. The Serbian representatives are not disposed to accept this offer and prefers to have their claims dealt with under the general provisions of the Treaty; and this is generally the view of the Delegations of the other states in question.

As regards the payment of contributions towards the cost of the war, all the states in question appear to be ready to agree to pay a sum equal to 20 per cent of the Austrian war debt held in the newly acquired territories; this sum in the case of Serbia and Romania to be set off against their claims for reparation. He desires, however, the further instructions of the Council in regard to dealing with claims for reparation: The Serbians, e. g. had suggested an extravagant sum - 5 milliards of francs - and he is disposed to suggest that these states should be dealt with under the general provisions for reparation.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether he is to understand that if, for instance, 20 per cent of the Austrian war debt in Yugoslavia amounts to 100 millions and the Serbian claim for reparation amounted to 150 millions, the Yugoslav state would receive 50 millions.

M Loucheur says that he assumes that the contributions would be payable in local currency, while reparation received would be in gold. He adds that he cannot recommend demanding a higher payment from Serbia and Romania, having regard to the fact that they have already borne the expenses of a war. He thinks, however, that Poland and Czechoslovakia should be treated on different lines and that from those two latter states payment might be demanded in external debt. He is disposed personally to suggest that no contribution should be asked from Serbia and Romania.

Mr Lloyd George points out that this latter proposal would appear to ignore the large increase of wealth accruing to these states as a result of their acquisition of territory.

Mr Lamont then recalls to the minds of the Council the history of the negotiations with those new states on the question of the payment of contributions, which he, and subsequently, M Loucheur, had conducted.

In the first instance he had been instructed by the Council to negotiate as follows:

In the case of Serbia and Romania the agreed payments contributory to the cost of the war are to be set off against their claims to reparation. Poland and Czechoslovakia, which are not entitled to claim reparation, were to be called upon to make a contributory payment. Subsequently M Loucheur had proposed to relieve the new states of any responsibility for Austrian war debt. But this suggestion, which is inconsistent with the proposed financial clauses, had been abandoned. The difficulty is, however, that Serbia and Romania are not disposed to agree, at the present juncture, to an assessment of the amount of their reparation claims.

Mr Lloyd George points out that this does not appear to be material: if they accept the principle, the Reparation Commission can fix the sum, and the amount of their proposed contribution can then be deducted.

(It is agreed that a settlement with Serbia, Romania, Poland and Czechoslovakia in regard to their proposed contribution to the cost of the war should be communicated on the following lines:

The existing financial and reparation clauses to remain.

Each of the countries to which Austro-Hungarian territory passes shall pay as a contribution to the expenses of their liberation a sum equal to 20 per cent of that portion of the bonded war debt of Austria-Hungary as legally constituted on October 27, 1918, apportioned to such territory on the same principle as the pre-war debt.

Those countries to which reparation is due shall set off the amount of the contribution referred to above and the value of the public property taken over by them in the newly acquired territory against their claim to reparation.)

Sailor Steve

06-23-19, 08:47 PM

Monday, June 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 17:00

Meeting of the Council of Five meets with a group of Legal and Naval Experts

1. M Clemenceau requests M Mantoux to read the following text prepared by the Legal Advisers:

"The terms of the Armistice signed by Germany on the 11th November, 1918, provided as follows:

'Article XXIII. The German surface warships which shall be specified by the Allies and the United States shall forthwith be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports, or, failing them, in the Allied ports designated by the Allies and the United States. They shall there remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States, only care and maintenance parties being left on board.'

On June 21st the German warships which had been handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers and were at anchor in the roadstead at Scapa Flow, with the German care and maintenance parties on board as provided in the Armistice, were sunk by these parties under the orders of the German Admiral in command.

According to the information which has been collected and transmitted by the British Admiralty, the German Admiral in command of these parties of the German naval forces has alleged that he acted in the belief that the Armistice expired on June 21st at midday, and consequently in his opinion the destruction in question was no violation of its terms.

In law, Germany by signing the terms of Article XXIII set out above, entered into an undertaking that the ships handed over by her should remain in the ports indicated by the Allied and Associated Powers and that care and maintenance parties should be left on board with such instructions and under such orders as would ensure that the Armistice should be observed.

The destruction of these ships instead of their preservation as had been provided, constituted at once a violation of the Armistice, the destruction of the pledge handed over, and an act of insubordination towards the Allied and Associated Powers.

The Admiral in command of the care and maintenance parties belonging to the German naval forces has, while recognizing that the act was a breach of the Armistice, attempted to justify it by alleging his belief that the Armistice had come to an end.

This alleged explanation is not well founded as, under the communication addressed to the German Delegation by the Allied and Associated Powers on the 16th. June, 1919, the Armistice would only terminate on refusal to sign the Peace or, if no answer were returned on the 23rd June at 7 o’clock.

According to international law, as embodied particularly in Articles 40 and 41 of the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention in 1907, every serious violation of the Armistice by one of the parties gives the other party the right to denounce it and even in case of urgency to recommence hostilities at once. A violation of the terms of the Armistice by individuals acting on their own initiative only confers the right of demanding the punishment of the offenders and, if necessary, indemnity for the losses sustained.

In these circumstances and without taking account of other grounds on which responsibility might be based, the violation of the Armistice by the German naval detachments, the destruction of the pledge placed in the hands of the Allied and Associated Powers, and the act of “sabotage” committed give them a right to reparation for the loss caused and to the punishment of the offenders, and in consequence a right to proceed to such further measures as the Allied and Associated Powers may deem appropriate.

As regards the question whether and in what manner the authors of the destruction of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow are liable to prosecution and punishment, the committee of Legal Advisers are of opinion that there is justification in accordance with Article 228 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany for the prosecution of these individuals before Military Tribunals, and for the application to them of penalties legally provided for suitable to the case."

Mr Lloyd George inquires why reference had not been made to Article 31 of the Armistice.

Mr Hurst replies that the Legal Advisers in drawing up their note had thought it desirable to avoid the employment of any argument open to doubt. Article 31, it might be argued, does not apply to the case in question. The word “restitution” in that article appears to refer to the terms of the immediately preceding article.

Mr Lloyd George says that the article appeared to him to cover all possibilities. There must be no destruction.

Mr Hurst explains that the article forbids destruction before evacuation, surrender, or restoration. The destruction in question had not taken place before evacuation or surrender. The word “restitution” could not apply.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that the article covers everything. The Germans surrendered ships to the Allies who could either restore them or keep them. In either case the Germans were forbidden to destroy them.

President Wilson says he thinks Mr Hurst’s reasoning is quite clear. The Germans were required to refrain from any destruction before certain things happened. These things had taken place, and this destruction had occurred long afterwards. He does not think that it is necessary to invoke Article 31 as the case made out by the Legal Advisers is quite strong enough without it.

Mr Lloyd George expresses the opinion that the word “restitution” in Article 31 related to restitution of the German ships to the Germans.

President Wilson thinks that the reasoning in the legal report is quite convincing, and that it is unnecessary to reinforce it by quoting an article the application of which is questionable.

M Clemenceau says he cannot accept that theory. He would be asked why he had not made use of that text. He would reply that authorized international interpreters of the text had told him it does not apply. This would not satisfy his critics, who would say that it was for the Governments to decide and not for the interpreters.

Mr Balfour inquires whether a case is made worse in law if in addition to good arguments a doubtful argument is used.

Baron Sonnino points out that the article was clearly intended to deal with the case of restitution by Germany to the Allies.

M Clemenceau said he does not accept this interpretation. In his view the case was as follows:

German ships were sent to ports designated by the Allies. Thereafter, there were two alternatives. The ships might be surrendered or they might be returned to Germany. If the text did not mean that, he gives up all faith in texts. The interpretation of texts must be ruled by sound sense.

President Wilson says he does not know what appearance the text might present in French. The English text did not mean what M Clemenceau said.

M Clemenceau says that about the word “evacuation” there could be no ambiguity, either in French or in English, as it is derived from the Latin “Vaccuus”, meaning empty. Evacuation consequently means to make empty, to quit.

Baron Sonnino again points out that Article 31 must be read in conjunction with Articles 29 and 30, to both of which it refers.

Mr Balfour questions whether it is material to settle the point. The Council desires to punish the culprits and squeeze the utmost out of Germany. It appears that they are in a position to punish the culprits, whichever of the two interpretations (M Clemenceau’s or President Wilson’s), is the right one. As to squeezing the Germans...

(At this point M Dutasta, followed by Colonel Henri and Captain Portier enter the room, with a Note from the German Delegation expressing willingness on behalf of the German Republic to sign, under compulsion, a dishonorable peace.)

(Orders were given for guns to be fired. No further discussion took place.)

The Letter From the German Peace Delegation:

German Peace Delegation,
Versailles, June 23, 1919.
German acceptance of peace terms

Translation From the German of Note From German Delegation

No. 88

His Excellency Monsieur Clemenceau,
President of the Peace Conference.

Sir: The Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed me to communicate to Your Excellency the following:

“The Government of the German Republic has seen with consternation from the last communication of the Allied and Associated Governments, that the latter are resolved to wrest from Germany by sheer force even the acceptance of those conditions of peace which, though devoid of material significance, pursue the object of taking away its honor from the German people. The honor of the German people will remain untouched by any act of violence. The German people, after the frightful sufferings of the last few years, lacks all means of defending its honor by external action. Yielding to overwhelming force, but without on that account abandoning its view in regard to the unheard of injustice of the conditions of peace, the Government of the German Republic therefore declares that it is ready to accept and sign the conditions of peace imposed by the Allied and Associated Governments.”

Pray accept [etc.]

Von Haniel

Jimbuna

06-24-19, 10:21 AM

24th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Truce between Hungarian and Czecho-Slovakian armies.

An armed uprising in Budapest against the Soviet Republic of Hungary is crushed.
https://i.imgur.com/Frtk67f.png

Francesco Saverio Nitti becomes the new Prime Minister of Italy after the previous government resigned after failing to secure territorial gains at the Paris Peace Conference.
https://i.imgur.com/1iVFoNS.jpg

[June 24th, 1919] "Germany Will Sign"- Newspaper placard for the Times.
https://i.imgur.com/0GnXUZ0.jpg

HMS Sword Dance (Royal Navy) The Dance-class minesweeper struck a mine and sank in the Dvina River in Russia. One crewman killed.

Sailor Steve

06-24-19, 01:19 PM

Tuesday, June 24, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five meets with a group of Legal Experts

1. The Council has before them proposals relating to Belgian claims for priority in reparation payments, which have already been approved by financial experts.

The following documents are approved:

1) An agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, and Italy. This document is signed by the representatives of the four Governments.

2) An annex prepared as an illustration of the method of applying the foregoing provisions. This document was initialed by the representatives of the four Governments.

3) A letter to M Hymans which is signed by M Clemenceau, President Wilson, and Mr Lloyd George.

(M Loucheur takes custody of the originals of the first two documents, and undertakes to prepare a letter for M Clemenceau’s signature covering their despatch to the Belgian Delegation. He also takes custody of the third document to dispatch it to the Belgian Delegation.)

Sailor Steve

06-24-19, 04:04 PM

Tuesday, June 24, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:15

Meeting of the Council of Five

1. Mr Lloyd George says he has received a long report from the British Admiralty regarding the sinking of the German ships at Scapa Flow. The case for the British Admiralty is that, at the time of the Armistice, the French the Orkneys and British naval representatives had pressed for the surrender of the German Fleet. Admiral Benson, however, had urged very strongly that surrender should not be demanded and that the Armistice should not be risked for this purpose. Marshal Foch had supported Admiral Benson very strongly. He had said that he did not wish to risk the lives of good soldiers for bad ships which had never fought a decisive battle. The Supreme War Council, consisting of the Prime Ministers and of Colonel House, had over-ruled the French and British Admiralties and unanimously agreed to ask only for the internment of the German ships and only for the surrender of certain submarines. It had been decided originally that the German ships to be interned should be interned in a neutral port. On further examination, it had been realized that this was impossible and the Allied Naval Council had chosen Scapa Flow as a suitable spot for the concentration of the German ships under surveillance. Then came the question of determining what kind of surveillance could be exercised. The British Admiralty had come to the conclusion that none but German crews could be put on board, as the removal of the German personnel would have been a breach of the Armistice. All that could be done was to exercise general surveillance over the fleet. He had seen the instructions issued by the British Admiralty. He quoted certain passages of those instructions. The latest report was that the Baden and Hindenburg had been saved or could be salvaged. There were, therefore, two capital ships available. He wished to add that Baron Makino had just informed him that the Japanese Admiralty did not consider the British Admiralty in any way to blame.

M Clemenceau then hands in the opinion of the French Admiralty.

Mr Lloyd George says that, as Admiral Hope had pointed out, if the original intention of interning the ships in a neutral port had been adhered to, it would not have been possible to place Allied crews on board.

President Wilson says that Admiral Benson, who had been present at the discussions at the Armistice time, had unfortunately gone home. His substitute at present is Admiral Knapp. At Mr Lloyd George’s request, he had obtained his opinion on the point.

Admiral Hope explains that the British Admiralty could not have demanded the complete removal of the German crews. This would have been equivalent to a surrender of the German ships. With any German personnel on board, it was impossible to safeguard the ships completely. Very large parties would have been required to take charge of every compartment in each ship and this could not have been done consistently with the retention of any German crews on board.

President Wilson says that he trusted Admiral Hope would not think he had expressed any opinion on the subject. All he had done was to furnish Admiral Knapp’s personal views in compliance with Mr Lloyd George’s request. The chief interest of the Council was to see what ought to be done. He thinks it is clear that the German Admiral could be held responsible and punished. It also seems clear that the German Government could be held responsible, but what profit could be derived from the responsibility of the German Government is not so clear. The object of the Allies cannot be to renew the war but to obtain some reparation, placing them in the same situation as if the fleet had not been sunk. He assumes that enough German ships remain to make the contemplated distribution, with the exception of the share due to the British Navy. This share being, of course, a very large one could not be furnished, but he thinks that there is perhaps enough to compensate the weaker navies.

Mr Lloyd George observes that there are two first class ships, one a battleship and one a battlecruiser.

M Clemenceau says that he wishes to make a few observations. First, as to the question of right. According to the legal advisers, Germany had violated the Armistice. On the previous day, the application of Article XXXI of the Armistice had been discussed. It seems clear to him that it does apply, and, in addressing the Germans, he thinks that advantage should be taken of that article. There is, further, an anticipated violation of the Peace Conditions and this must be taken into consideration. If this were all, the stories told by the German Admiral that he believed, on the strength of a newspaper, that the Armistice was over, might be alleged in defense of the act. This however, is merely an instance of German mendacity. There is further evidence of the deliberate intention of the Germans to violate not only the Armistice but the Conditions of Peace in anticipation. French flags which, under the Peace Terms, were to be restored had been burned in Berlin. This incident had been deeply felt in France both by Parliament and people. There was, moreover, a telegram seized by the Polish authorities to the effect that an insurrection was to be organised in Upper Silesia. The movement would be disavowed officially but aided unofficially in every possible manner. Von Haniel had warned the Conference that there would be an insurrection against the Polish clauses. There is a clause in the Treaty requiring the withdrawal of the German troops from Upper Silesia within 14 days after the ratification of the Treaty. It had been hard enough to get the Treaty signed, but this evidence shows that there will be even greater difficulty in obtaining its execution. He proposes, if there are no objections on the part of his colleagues, to have this intercepted telegram published in the Press to show the Germans we are awake to their intentions.

As to reparation, he is told that there might be enough ships to indemnify the French Navy. He can make no judgment on this. In regard to responsibility, he leaves the matter entirely in Mr Lloyd George’s hand, but he wishes to say that material reparation is not enough. He now formally makes a demand that reparation be exacted for the burning of the French flags, an act certainly done by order like the sinking of the ships. The question arises as to what form this reparation should take. He will not ask for money. Money can only be obtained at the expense of France and her Allies. He will take ships, if he can get them, but even that is not enough. He wishes, by a striking act, to show that the Allies do not mean to tolerate the conduct evidenced by the burning of the flags, the sinking of the ships and the plot against Poland. It must be remembered that it is difficult to bring aid to the Poles and the forts of Danzig will be able to repel a naval attack. It is quite evident that the Germans mean to violate the Treaty which they are to sign in two days. No one who was not deaf and blind to evidence can doubt it. He regrets that President Wilson is shortly to leave, but he recognizes the urgency of his business in America. The American flag, however, will remain side by side with those of the Allies. He desires that a military act be accomplished, showing the will of the Allies quite clearly not to submit to any fraudulent breach of the Treaty by Germany. He does not wish this act to precede the signing of the Treaty, and, for the present, all he will ask is that a note be sent referring to the incident at Scapa Flow and to the burning of the flags and stating that reparation for these acts will be required. The note should further state that the Allies are aware of what Germany is plotting in Silesia and that precautions will be taken to prevent the execution of the plot. He will not mention what reparation or what precautions would be taken. That is all he will say for the present, with the object of establishing the position of the Allies and their right to act. But he will state what he has in mind very clearly.

He thinks the Allies should take possession of Essen. M Loucheur, whom he has asked to come, informs him that Essen is still at the present time making armaments. It is the most powerful center of munition production in Germany. He has no intention of keeping Essen, but only of preventing supplies being made there to munition the attack on Poland. There can, in the nature of the case, be no military opposition to the operation. It will show the Germans quite clearly that their game js up. The Germans will yield and public opinion, which had supported the Allies throughout the war, will be satisfied. Failing this, there is a fear that the Germans will, one by one, get back every concession they had made. This will result in the necessity of remobilizing to engage in definite acts of war. He recognizes that it is necessary to act prudently for the time being, in order not to jeopardize the signature of the Peace, but it must be made clear to the enemy that Allied will would prevail.

President Wilson asks whether M Clemenceau would allow the discussion of this proposal to be deferred until the afternoon.

Mr Lloyd George joins in this request.

Mr Balfour asks if he understands M Clemenceau aright in thinking that his proposal is to write a letter at once or on the following day, regarding the sinking of the ships, the burning of the flags and the plot against Poland.

President Wilson asks whether M Clemenceau has corroborated the last.

M Clemenceau says that he will produce full evidence.

Mr Balfour, continuing, asks whether the letter would state that those acts violated the Armistice and therefore gave rise to a claim for reparation.

M Clemenceau observes that the case of the flags and of the ships go together and give rise to a claim for reparation. As regards Poland, a case will be made out. Reparation is not in question in regard to that.

Mr Balfour says that the proposal will be then to continue the arrangements for the signature of the Peace, whether the German answer to this letter comes before the signature or after. If he understands M Clemenceau’s intention, he would prefer it to come after. Then, if the answer is unsatisfactory, which in all probability would be the case, the Allies will have to take action, and the action proposed by M Clemenceau is to occupy Essen.

M Clemenceau says that Mr. Balfour had quite understood his policy. Of course, it will be necessary to hear Marshal Foch regarding the execution of the plan. He wishes to add that he has no intention of keeping Essen for any length of time and would, of course, give it up as soon as the Polish difficulty had been cleared up.

Jimbuna

06-25-19, 06:26 AM

25th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Bolsheviks 20 miles from Perm, and advancing east of Ufa.

An American platoon of 72 men repelled an attack by a Red Army force of 400 men at their base camp in Romanovka, Siberia, Russia, killing between 41-57 Russian soldiers while suffering 24 killed and 25 wounded.

The Junkers F 13, the first all-metal transport aircraft, makes its first flight in Germany.
https://i.imgur.com/ZBiMJtw.jpg

Siberian Bicycle and Autocycle Fighting Squad.
https://i.imgur.com/WGoVIZG.jpg

Jimbuna

06-26-19, 06:13 AM

26th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Fighting at Berlin and Hamburg.

American Commission to the Paris Peace Conference, led by President Wilson, at Hotel Crillon, Paris.
https://i.imgur.com/SyrdoNL.png

Demonstrators march in London to urge the government to protect Jews in Poland as pogroms occur across Eastern Europe.
https://i.imgur.com/pCKCkNm.png

Sailor Steve

06-26-19, 03:04 PM

Wednesday, June 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

(Captain Portier is present during this discussion.)

1. M Clemenceau reads the following letter from the German Delegation:The Rhine Convention

“Versailles, June 24th, 1919.

Mr President,

In accordance with instructions received from the Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs, I have the honor to inquire from the Allied and Associated Governments when the negotiations can begin on the subject of an agreement relating to the occupied Rhenish territories.

Von Haniel.”

Sir Maurice Hankey, at M Clemenceau’s request, reads the pertinent article of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, namely, Article 432.

“All matters relating to the occupation and not provided for by the present Treaty shall be regulated by subsequent agreements which Germany hereby undertakes to observe.”

Mr Lloyd George says he will take no risks and will insist on the Germans signing without any discussion.

President Wilson and Baron Sonnino agree.

M Mantoux, at M Clemenceau’s request, then reads the following draft of a letter prepared by the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference:

“Monsieur le Président,

In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of June 24 with reference to the agreement as to the military occupation of the territories of the Rhine, I have the honor to remind you that under Article 432 of the conditions of peace, now accepted by the German Government, Germany is bound thereby to accept the terms of this agreement.

There is therefore no need to open negotiations on the subject and the instrument in question must be signed under the same conditions as the Treaty.”

M Clemenceau suggests that in the last line the words “under the same conditions” should be deleted, and there should be substituted the words “at the same time.”

(This is agreed to, and Captain Portier is asked to prepare a text for M Clemenceau’s signature.)

Captain Portier on his return states that M Fromageot does not like the use of the words “at the same time”. His objection is on the ground that Article 432 speaks of “subsequent agreements”, whereas if signed at the same time, it would be a “simultaneous agreement”.

(It is agreed to ignore this objection and M Clemenceau signs the letter, which is dispatched to the German Delegation.)

2. President Wilson reads the Report furnished by the Allied Admirals.

M Clemenceau says that for reasons he has already given, he cannot confine himself to a purely naval point of view. The action of the Germans in sinking their ships at Scapa Flow must be considered in connection with the information as to their intentions in Poland, which is confirmed from many quarters.

Mr Lloyd George comments on the fact that the information from Poland had been published in the newspapers without any explanation being asked for from the Germans.

M Clemenceau says it is useless to ask for explanations, as the Germans will only say that we had falsified the document. His view is that nothing should be done to delay the signature of Peace. All he will do today is write to the Germans on the questions of the sinking of the ships and the burning of the flags. The Polish affair will grow in a day or two, and give ample reasons for action.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it would be much better to take action to stop the development on the Polish front. The Germans now know that the Allies are aware that the movement there was not spontaneous, and could probably be stopped.

M Clemenceau agrees that it is worth trying.

President Wilson recalls that an alleged letter from Erzberger, which had been alluded to before at the Council, had turned out to be false. It had been traced to Polish sources. While he has the utmost confidence in Mr Paderewski (Mr Lloyd George says he also has this confidence), he suspects Polish sources of information. Consequently, he would like to have confirmation of the information as to German intentions on the Eastern front from other sources, before taking action.

M Clemenceau says that he is thinking of sending an officer today to Warsaw to photograph the intercepted document.

Mr Lloyd George points out that all that has been done up to the present was to publish it in the “Matin”. We ought to write to the Germans and say that this document had come into our hands, and to inform them that if the information should prove correct, the Germans would be held responsible.

Baron Sonnino agrees, provided that the signature of the Treaty of Peace was not retarded.

M Clemenceau says he has received a dispatch from Poland to the effect that the Polish Government are doing their best to prevent the peasants in Upper Silesia from being goaded into a rising against the Germans.

Mr Lloyd George says that riots must be expected though he does not anticipate serious fighting. The German Government ought to be told that they will be held responsible.

M Clemenceau offers to bring all the papers on the subject to the afternoon meeting.

President Wilson says that the sinking of the German ships at Scapa Flow has been a constant subject in his thoughts. The more he considers the matter, the more doubtful he feels. On the previous day he had met his four colleagues of the American Delegation, in order to learn their views. Mr Lansing, who is a very experienced international lawyer, said he seriously doubts whether the German Government could be held responsible for something that had happened outside their jurisdiction. If the ships had been sunk on the High Seas, or in a German Port, his doubts would be removed, but he very much doubts whether the German Government could be held responsible in International Law for what had happened in Scapa Flow. About the responsibility of the German Admiral, he has no doubt. The Allied and Associated Powers are now about to make Peace. They are dealing with a people of such a character that this new act makes no difference to our knowledge of it. Difficulties of this kind will often occur in connection with the carrying out of the Treaty. The Germans will be tricky and would perhaps often destroy things that they had undertaken to return, alleging that the destruction had been perpetrated by irresponsible persons over whom they had no control. Hence, it is necessary to face the issue as to whether if they did so, we are prepared to renew the war. All we can say at present is that the sinking of these ships is a violation of the Armistice. If we treat it as a violation of the Armistice, it will lead to an outbreak of war. He recalls that the Armistice continues in operation until the ratification of Peace by Germany and three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Until these ratifications are deposited, the Armistice will prevail. To take any military action is to abrogate the Armistice and to create a state of war while we are awaiting ratification. It would be a very serious step after we had signed the Treaty of Peace, thus to abrogate the Armistice and renew the war.

M Clemenceau suggests that it will not be the Allies who renew it.

President Wilson points out that if action is taken by the Allies, they will have to sweep the Armistice aside and there will be a state of war.

M Clemenceau does not agree in this. He points out that in the paper by the legal advisers, the action of the Germans gives the right to proceed to such further measures as the Allied and Associated Powers might deem appropriate.

Mr Lloyd George does not consider this would entitle them to occupy a city which was left to Germany under the terms of the Treaty of Peace, which had been signed.

Baron Sonnino says that if action is taken after signing, it will be taken in France as a great recoil and a surrender of victory, as well as an act of violation of the Armistice undertaken by the Allies.

M Clemenceau says that there are two questions; one of International Law, and one of policy. As regards the first, the Council had all agreed yesterday that the action of the Germans constituted a violation of the Armistice. His own opinion is unchanged. The Allies are free to take note of it, or to say nothing about it, or to say it was an excellent thing, but they cannot say it is not a violation of the Armistice. In his view, they are either forced to act, or otherwise to find some further means of protest. It is impossible for them to do otherwise. No Parliament in France will tolerate inaction. France alone has suffered from this action. Coming to the question of policy, President Wilson said he was not prepared to renew the war. The losses of the French had been greater than those of their Allies. In all quarters, demobilization was demanded. In the lobby, on the previous day, many Deputies had spoken to him of this. Consequently, he has no desire to reopen the war. But there is a great and supreme political interest at stake which prevails over these considerations. Germany has shown every possible proof of bad faith at every point. She has committed a number of violations of the Armistice. Germany is not now in a position to resist, but if the Allies were to wait each time and take no action, the day would come when Germany would violate the Treaty of Peace, when the Allies were no longer together and when the soldiers had all been demobilized. Hence, in his view, this was the psychological moment at which to say that we insisted on proper reparation. To take action now will have a very great influence on the future doings of Germany. If this opportunity is lost, he begs President Wilson to remember that the Treaty will be in great danger.

Mr Lloyd George says he is most reluctant to intervene in this discussion. Although the British Admiralty had made the strongest possible protest against interning instead of surrendering the German Fleet, nevertheless, the ships had been sunk in a British Port and under British care. This is the reason of his reluctance. He had consulted such of his colleagues as were in Paris, and they were quite clear as to their views. It is not a question as to whether to allow flagrant violation of the Armistice by Germany to pass without protest, or for not exacting punishment or compensation. That is not the point. The real point is that the form of compensation should have some relation to the offence. Hence, the question arises as to whether in compensation for the sinking of the ships, the Allies are entitled to seize a town after the signature of Peace. This offence had taken place last Saturday. The Treaty would be signed a week later. In the meanwhile, the Treaty contained a precise definition of the areas of occupation. In these circumstances, to occupy other territory would be a little bit tricky.

If Essen is to be occupied, the Allies ought to do so now. The only reason we did not do so was because we were afraid the Germans would not sign. This was admitted in these conversations, and this was the reason why it was proposed not to tell them. At the present time the whole feeling of the world is against Germany, and their action at Scapa Flow, and more especially in burning the French flags, had accentuated this feeling. The burning of the flags is felt to be a wanton insult. But to get the Germans to sign, knowing perfectly well that after their signature we did not intend to adhere to the letter of the Treaty, but proposed to advance further into Germany, would outrage the sense of decent people. The position of British public opinion is different from that of the French, and he does not want to have trouble with it. The Germans are old enemies of the French, and were the enemies of the British for the first time. Although British public opinion had been solid to march to Berlin if the Germans would not sign, nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that there is some feeling against the Treaty, including a considerable feeling among intellectuals. He instances Lord Robert Cecil and the two Archbishops. What he wants to avoid is causing a feeling that the Allies are not exacting justice, but were trampling on the fallen foe. Hence, he begged his colleagues not to advance into Germany after Peace has been signed.

M Clemenceau, interrupting, says that the French troops would never advance without the consent of their Allies.

Mr Lloyd George says that M Clemenceau asked what was to be done. Would we allow the incident to pass? Certainly not, but whatever is done must be announced before the signature of peace. He will take the risk of that. First he would punish those who were responsible, and this would apply not only to the German Admiral, who should be court-martialled, but to those persons who had destroyed the flags, who should be put in the same category as the other Germans to be tried.

Secondly, he thinks that the Allied and Associated Powers are entitled to relevant compensation. If some action of the same kind had taken place on land, no-one would ever dream of asking for compensation on the sea. The punishment must fit the crime, and consequently must be Naval. Two German ships of the first class had been saved, namely the battle-ship Baden and the battle-cruiser Hindenburg, which he supposes is better than any battle-cruiser the British Navy had. He would say at once that as those ships had been sunk in British ports, subject to the consent of his colleagues, France must have first claim to them. To show the importance of battle cruisers, he recalls that he had had a conversation during the war with Admiral Sims, who had pointed out that in 1921 the Germans would have had a superiority in battle-cruisers, a superiority which could have been countered only by obtaining battle-cruisers from Japan. If the Germans had a superiority of one battle-cruiser it would have been extremely difficult to bring their fleet to action. In addition to the Hindenburg and the Baden, some light cruisers had been beached at Scapa, and he would say at once that so far as the British Empire was concerned, he waives all claim to them and would allow France to have them, subject to the consent of his colleagues.

President Wilson interpolated that, for his part, he agrees.

Mr Lloyd George says that as regards the rest of the German fleet, the report of the Admirals showed that it was of two categories. The first category consisted of some very useful light cruisers. Great Britain does not require these, and if France wishes to have them, he will support her claim. As regards the second category, they are said not to be of much value, but he recalls that during the war old material had often proved to be useful. He does not know what more he can offer. In regard to the flags, it is more difficult to provide for compensation. He begs, however, that France would on no account act alone in occupying some city.

M Clemenceau said he would not do so without the agreement of the Allies.

Mr Lloyd George says that nothing could be more fatal. He does not anticipate real trouble with Germany for at least ten years.

M Clemenceau thinks he is wrong, and that trouble might come at once.

Mr Lloyd George says that even if it were in five years, it is just as important that the Allies should hold together.

He feels himself to be in the position of a supplicant, handicapped by what had happened in a British port, but nevertheless he hopes that France will not insist on any action being taken as an act of retaliation after the signature of peace.

(M Clemenceau withdraws at this point to speak to M Fromageot, and on his return,)

Mr Lloyd George says that the British Government will give up all claim to the German destroyers at Scapa Flow.

President Wilson says he will give expression to the fear that had been in his mind for many weeks. So far as he can recall, the Treaty of Peace only gives one method of securing compulsion on Germany for its execution, namely that the period of occupation can be extended by the Council of the League of Nations. He has asked himself, supposing Germany acts in bad faith and does not fulfill the Treaty what can we do? In his view, any exercise of force will be an act of war and the whole Treaty would be at an end. Everyone agrees that the action of the Germans at Scapa Flow was a breach of the Armistice. But if we are to retaliate the Armistice will be off, and the war would be on.

Mr Lloyd George says that the action taken by the Germans on Saturday had been an act of war.

President Wilson says he thinks the best plan is that proposed by Mr Lloyd George, namely, to write to the Germans and tell them that the act of the German Admiral was a breach of the Armistice, and that he will be tried. Also that the Allies feel it right to demand that the German Government should make restitution as far as possible. We cannot get more than Mr Lloyd George proposed, because the Germans have no more ships. He thinks, however, that we ought to avoid military action or anything that would give the impression that we are renewing the war.

M Clemenceau says he has tried his best to agree with his colleagues, and he hopes that they will try to do something to agree with him. He had asked M Fromageot whether the occupation of Essen would be a renewal of the war, and M Fromageot had replied that it looked very much like it. It would be an act of reprisal. He will, therefore, let this drop, though he still thinks that it is the best thing to do and that this fact will be especially decisive on the Polish question. There are three questions:

First, the juridical question as to whether the Germans had broken the Armistice, and the Council are all agreed on this.

Secondly, the question of punishment of the Admiral. They are agreed on this also.

The third is the question of reparation in kind and in amount. He will acknowledge that if adequate reparation can be made in kind, this will be the best solution, but it is not easy to arrange and he does not think it is possible. He asks himself, however, whether France cannot demand some of the mercantile marine left to Germany. M Bérenger had written him yesterday and said he ought to ask for some petroleum ships. He thinks something might be done in this direction. He considers Mr Lloyd George’s proposals as to warships satisfactory in proportion to their number. Perhaps some others can be salved. His idea today is to send the Germans a letter based on the text of the report from the Legal Advisers. He will accept this report subject to the few corrections as the basis of the letter to the Germans but will add a paragraph about the burning of the flags. He will add that the Allies would demand reparation as soon as the investigations they are making allows them to do so. Today he does not wish to go further than this. A remark of President Wilson’s had put into his mind the thought that it might be useful to add a warning that if the Germans continue in this war it will be necessary for the Allies to consider the prolongation of the military occupation. This will make them think a good deal, and will be a certain compensation for public opinion in France. In the meanwhile, the naval experts should be asked to give further information about oil vessels and the merchant fleet. Consequently, he thinks he is not so far from what President Wilson had proposed.

President Wilson then reads the report by the Legal Advisers.

(It is agreed to adopt this as the basis of a letter to the German Delegation, subject to the following modifications:

In the following sentence:—

“The destruction of these ships, instead of their preservation as has been provided, constituted at once a violation of the Armistice, the destruction of the pledge handed over, and an act of insubordination towards the Allied and Associated Powers,”

It was agreed to substitute the words “Gross breach of good faith, (felonie)” for “insubordination”.

In paragraph 3 it is agreed to insert the last sentence, beginning “As regards the question whether …” as an allusion to Article 31 of the Armistice Convention of November 11th, 1918, in some such terms as the following: - “According to the principles acknowledged in Article 31 of the Armistice of November 11, 1918.”

President Wilson says he will accept it provisionally, although he does not believe Article 31 is applicable.

Baron Sonnino points out that even if the Article is not directly applicable, the principle might be applicable.

At the end of the first sentence of Para. 4, M Clemenceau suggests to add, after the word “appropriate”, the following words: - ”as reparation for the loss caused.”

(This is agreed to.)

M Clemenceau suggests an addition at the end of the memorandum in some such terms as the following:

“The fact of sinking the German Fleet not only constitutes by itself a breach of the Armistice, but the burning of French flags in Berlin, taken in conjunction with it, constitutes a deliberate and systematic breach of the Articles of the Treaty of Peace. Consequently, the Allied and Associated Powers take official cognizance of these acts of breach of faith, and as soon as they have investigated all the circumstances of the act, they will demand the necessary reparation.”

President Wilson proposes that an English and French speaking person should be nominated by the Council to draft a letter to the Germans on the above basis. He proposes that the final sentence should be put in some such manner as the following:

“These articles are in effect a breach of the terms of the Treaty in anticipation, and inevitably create an impression that shakes the confidence of the Allied and Associated Powers in the good faith of the Germans, and makes it necessary to warn them of the consequences.”

M Clemenceau urges that the prolongation of the period of occupation should be specifically referred to.

President Wilson suggests some such phrase as the following:

“Makes it necessary to suggest the probable necessity of resorting to the means provided for in the Treaty of Peace.”

He thinks, however, it would be advisable to leave the matter to the Drafting Committee.

(It is agreed that Mr Balfour and M Loucheur should prepare a letter to the Germans, based on the above discussion.)

(M Loucheur, accompanied by Mr Hurst and M Fromageot, enters the room to receive instructions from M Clemenceau.)

Mr Lloyd George undertakes to communicate with Mr. Balfour.

3. M Clemenceau says that the Germans will arrive on Friday morning, but their credentials would first have to be checked.

Mr Lloyd George says that he has been informed that a telegram received on the previous day by the German Delegation had caused great hilarity. It was rumored that the Germans were sending some persons of minor importance to sign the treaty. He recalls that they had attempted the same thing in connection with the Armistice, and suggested that an immediate demand should be made to them to state who their delegates would be.

(M Clemenceau sends for M Dutasta and instructs him to make this demand immediately to the Germans.)

4. The following resolution is approved and initialed by the five Heads of Governments, and given to Captain Portier, who accompanied the Secretary-General:

“The Secretary-General of the Peace Conference is instructed to make the necessary arrangements for the signature of the Treaty with Poland not later than the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.”

Sailor Steve

06-26-19, 08:05 PM

Wednesday, June 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

(M Dutasta, Secretary-General of the Peace Conference, is introduced.)

1. M Dutasta said that he had seen von Haniel, who told him he had telegraphed twice to Berlin asking who the German representatives would be and when they were due to arrive, but had received no answer. Von Haniel had added that the German Government had moved from Weimar to Berlin and that their first Cabinet Council in Berlin was to be held this morning. On the conclusion of that, he expected an answer. M Dutasta had asked him to communicate again and he had promised to do so immediately. According to von Haniel, the German Government was encountering great difficulty in finding persons ready to sign the Treaty. He had made von Haniel understand that an answer was expected this evening, or tomorrow at the latest.

M Clemenceau instructs M Dutasta to proceed to Versailles tomorrow morning at 09:00 unless he has heard in the meanwhile from Colonel Henri.

2. M Mantoux says that M Tardieu is in attendance to obtain a decision of principle on a point connected with the desire of the French Government to be allowed to buy or to borrow United States ships for communication with the French Colonies, for which France has a great insufficiency of shipping.

M Clemenceau says the question should first be sent to experts.

(It is agreed, on President Wilson’s suggestion, that M Tardieu should arrange for a joint memorandum to be prepared by the experts of the Allied and Associated Powers.)

3. M Clemenceau, in reply to Mr Lloyd George, says it is his intention to hand the Treaty of Peace to Parliament as soon as possible after the signature. He will not make any explanatory speech and the next step will be for the examination of the Treaty by the Commissions of the Chamber and Senate. He does not expect to make his own statement until after the various Commissions have reported, perhaps not for three weeks.

President Wilson says that he, himself, will leave Paris immediately after the signature of the Treaty. As soon as he arrives in the United States, he will take the Treaty to Congress.

M Clemenceau thinks there are advantages in President Wilson making the first speech on the subject.

President Wilson says that, in his country, questions will then be asked as to why other Governments had done nothing.

Mr Lloyd George says that he could fit in his speech about the same time as President Wilson’s, although he is anxious to be away for the second and third weeks after his arrival in England.

Baron Sonnino says that the responsibility will be with the new Italian Government, but he thinks there is little doubt they will proceed as rapidly as possible. In view of the necessity of reports by Commissions, probably a fortnight or so will elapse before the Treaty can be ratified.

4. Mr Lloyd George brings forward a proposal he had received from Sir Ernest Pollock, the English Solicitor-General, suggesting that, in the light of the experience gained at Scapa Flow and the burning of French flags, steps should be taken to make the execution of Clauses 214 to 224 (Repatriation of Prisoners) and Clauses 227 to 230 (Penalties) interdependent.

(It is generally agreed that this suggestion is a useful one and should be taken note of, but that no immediate decision should be taken for its adoption.)

5. Mr Lloyd George suggests to his colleagues that the Trial of the Kaiser should take place in some Allied country removed from those where resentment at the Kaiser was naturally the most acute. He suggests that either Great Britain or the United States of America would be the most advantageous from this point of view.

President Wilson suggests that the Trial of the Kaiser should not take place in any great city.

M Clemenceau says he would like to consult his colleagues on the subject and would give a reply on the following day.

6. Mr Lloyd George reads a Note from Admiral Hope regarding the disposition of surrendered German and Austrian surface ships and submarines.

Sir Maurice Hankey points out that a report has already been furnished by the Allied Admirals in regard to submarines, Admiral De Bon having made a minority report.

(It is agreed that the Allied Admirals should be asked to prepare a report advising the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as to what course they now recommended on all three heads.)

7. M Clemenceau adverts to the point he had raised at the morning meeting, namely, that France should be compensated for the loss she had incurred by the sinking of German ships at Scapa Flow, by being given some of the remaining German merchant ships and particularly oil tankers.

(It is agreed that a Commission, composed as follows:

Mr Baruch for the United States of America,
Mr Hipwood (or representative) for the British Empire,
M Monet (or representative) for France,
M Crespi (or representative) for Italy, and
A Japanese representative to be nominated by Baron Makino,

should meet to consider the possibility of exacting from Germany some reparation for the sinking of warships at Scapa Flow in the form of further merchant ships, special consideration being given to the case of oil tank vessels.)

8. President Wilson reads the following questions presented by the Superior Blockade Council:

1) Does the Supreme Council, in view of the authorization given by the Weimar Assembly to the German Delegates, desire that all restrictions upon trade with Germany shall be rescinded immediately upon the signatures of the Treaty of Peace by the German Delegation?

2) If not, upon what date shall these restrictions be rescinded?

3) When is the German Delegation expected to sign? If the Supreme Council desires that the blockade restrictions shall be raised upon the signature of the Treaty by the German Delegates and if the signature is likely to take place on Saturday, it is desirable that the Blockade Council should be so informed today. At least two days are required in which to terminate the present restrictions.

At M Clemenceau’s request the following note prepared by M Mantoux is read:

“Provision ought to be made for the eventuality of the German Government signing the Treaty of Peace, but delaying its ratification in the hope to embarrass the Allies and to take advantage of any incidents that might arise.

In 1871, it was stipulated by Article 3 of the Preliminaries of Peace that the German troops were to evacuate Paris and the forts on the left bank of the Seine immediately after the act of ratification. Much to the surprise of the Germans, the Preliminaries which had been signed on February 26th, 1871, were ratified by the Bordeaux Assembly as soon as March 1st, and the exchange of ratifications took place at Versailles the day after. Paris was evacuated at once, after less than two days of occupation, and the triumphal entry of Wilhelm I, which had been prepared for March 3rd, was cancelled.

It may be useful today to remind the Germans of the fact that the blockade shall cease at the same moment as the state of war, and that legally what brings the state of war to an end is the exchange of ratifications. But for the sake of humanity, the Allied and Associated Governments may concede that as soon as they have been officially notified the ratification of the treaty by the National Assembly of Germany the blockade shall be raised.

Such a declaration would encourage Germany to ratify the Treaty without delay, without fixing a narrow time limit to the debates in the representative Assemblies of the Allied and Associated countries.”

Mr Lloyd George said that this seems reasonable.

President Wilson reminds his colleagues of his reluctance to make women and children suffer for matters over which they exercised no influence. Nevertheless, the course proposed seemed the best in the circumstances.

M Clemenceau says that in the Rhine provinces there is little hardship.

President Wilson says that in the interior of Germany Mr Hoover reported great shortage.

(It is agreed that the Blockade should cease on the same date as the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, as provided for at the end of the Treaty.)

9. Mr Lloyd George suggests that a special Committee should be set up to consider the working out of the various measures for putting the Treaty of Peace with Germany into effect.

(The proposal is accepted in principle, and it is agreed that the members should be designated on the following day.)

10. The Council has before them a report by the Commission on Baltic affairs on the question submitted to it by the Council on the 23rd June, as to the effect which the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by Germany would have on the food supplies in this region, in the event of the removal of the rolling stock by the Germans.

President Wilson, after reading the report aloud, suggests that the second proposal of the Commission should be adopted, but he considers that the first proposal to take advantage of Article 375 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany is not feasible. He suggests that Marshal Foch should be asked to take the necessary action through the Armistice Commission.

(It is agreed that a copy of the Memorandum by the Baltic Commission should be sent to Marshal Foch, who should be asked to demand from the Germans that when evacuating the Baltic provinces they should leave behind the German railway material now in these provinces as part of the railway material which Germany was bound to deliver to the Allies in accordance with the terms of Clause VII of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, and which has not yet been delivered. The railway material so left would legally be the property of the Allied and Associated Powers and not of the Baltic States.

It is further agreed that it is to the interest of the Allied Powers to secure the restoration as soon as possible in the Baltic provinces of the Russian gauge on the railways in view of the closer economic connections of these provinces with Russia than with Germany.)

11. The Council has before them a report from the Commission on Baltic Affairs, covering the recommendation made by the United States, British and French representatives at Libau.

President Wilson, after reading the Report and enclosure aloud, remarks that the program unhappily is not one that is practicable.

Mr Lloyd George comments on the fact that peoples fighting for their liberties want to have even their soldiers paid by the Allies.

President Wilson says that probably they have no resources for paying them themselves.

Mr Lloyd George reads a telegram from the British Commission at Helsingfors in regard to the complicated position that has arisen involving fighting between Estonians and Latvians.

(In the course of a short discussion it is pointed out:

1) That a military mission of the Allied & Associated Powers under General Gough, has already been sent to the Baltic Provinces.

2) That Marshal Foch has already ordered the Germans to evacuate the Baltic provinces under the terms of the Armistice of November 11, 1918.

3) That the Council has sanctioned supplies being given to the Baltic provinces, and that General Gough has been asked to advise as to what these supplies should consist of, as a preliminary to arrangements being made as to who is to give the supplies.

It is agreed that no further financial assistance to the Baltic provinces can be at present given.)

12. Following on the remarks he had made at the morning meeting, Mr Lloyd George proposes the text of a note to the German Delegation in regard to their intrigues on the Eastern frontier.

After the note has been read and a few suggestions made, it is approved and signed by M Clemenceau on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers in the attached form.

(It is agreed that the letter and the enclosure should be published.)

13. Mr Lloyd George says that the present military position in Russia is that Kolchak’s thrust, intended eventually to reach Moscow, had failed. The intention had been as a first step to unite at Kotlas with the forces based at Archangel. The Bolshevists there had driven Kolchak’s army back. Meanwhile, in the south Denikin had inflicted a severe defeat on Kolchak. The Don Cossacks had risen, and had taken 50,000 prisoners and 300 guns from the Bolshevists, and were now just outside Tsaritzen. Hence the latest information is that Kolchak is doing badly but that Denikin had routed his adversaries. Russia.

14. Mr Lloyd George says he has received a note from Mr Churchill submitting a proposal for cooperation of the Czechoslovak troops in Siberia with the right wing of Admiral Kolchak’s army, and requesting that the matter might be dealt with as one of extreme urgency.

(It is agreed that the question should be referred to the military representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, a Japanese and a Czechoslovak military representative being added for the purpose.)

15. M Clemenceau says that he has received a letter from the Chinese Delegation stating that they will sign the Treaty of Peace with Germany, with a reservation relating to Shantung. He replied that they must either sign the with the intention of abiding by it or not sign. They are just as much bound to honor their signature as the Germans were.

President Wilson says that Mr Lansing had spoken to him of this, and had said that any sovereign Power could make reservations in signing.

M Clemenceau reminds President Wilson that when the Romanian and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegations had spoken of signing with reservations, they had been asked to say what they intended by this. A Treaty which was signed with reservations was not a Treaty.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the Italians had said they made certain reservations, but they would sign the German Treaty without any reservation.

Baron Makino says that the Japanese Delegation had objected to many of the decisions of Commissions, but had bowed to the decision of the majority. The Treaty would have no effect if anyone could make reservations.

President Wilson suggests that someone should be asked to inquire from the Chinese Delegation what was reserved and what was intended by their reservation. If it is merely a protest, they are entitled to make this. He understands the Chinese Delegation are acting under specific instructions from their Government.

M Clemenceau instructs Captain Portier to ask M Pichon to see a representative of the Chinese Delegation and to inquire the subjects on which they were making reservations, and whether their reservation amounted to more than a protest.

(Captain Portier telephones this decision immediately to the Quai d’Orsay.)

16. Mr Lloyd George asks that the question of Turkey might be considered. President Wilson will shortly be leaving. It is unreasonable to maintain a state of war with Turkey for the next two months. Would it not be possible, he asks, to agree on some Peace Terms which would put Turkey out of her misery, outlining the frontiers of Turkey, but leaving the final dispositions of the territory that had not to remain Turkish until it was known whether the United States would accept a mandate.

President Wilson agrees that the final dispositions of Turkey ought not to be left for two months. His colleagues know his mind on the subject, and can discuss the future arrangements of Turkey. He suggests that the portions which Turkey is to lose might be cut off and the Treaty might provide that she should accept the dispositions of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to them, just as had been done in the case of Austria.

M Clemenceau points out that this involves the question of Constantinople.

President Wilson says that the amputations will involve Mesopotamia, Syria and Armenia. The Allied troops will remain there to keep order until the final settlement between the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr Lloyd George asks what will be done about Armenia. There are no Allied troops there. Turkey at present has some responsibility for the maintenance of order. If Armenia is cut off from Turkey, the Turkish troops will be withdrawn, and the Armenians will be left at the mercy of the Kurds. It will involve putting in some garrisons.

M Clemenceau asks what will be done about the Italians in Asia-Minor.

President Wilson says that this will not concern the Turks. He thinks some formula might be worked out.

Mr Lloyd George says that the district in question either belongs to the Turks or it does not. If it does, the Turk will say “What are the Italians doing here?”, and the Allies can only reply that the Italian occupation has been made without their knowledge or consent.

Baron Sonnino demurs to this statement.

President Wilson says that his proposal in regard to Turkey would be to cut off all that Turkey was to give up, and to oblige Turkey to accept any conditions with regard to oversight or direction which the Allied and Associated Governments might agree to. His present view is that a mandate over Turkey would be a mistake, but he thinks some Power ought to have a firm hand. Constantinople and the Straits should be left as a neutral strip for the present, and it is already in Allied occupation. He would make the Sultan and his Government move out of Constantinople and he would say what was ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers. He is only arguing now as to what could be legally settled as a basis for a Treaty, and he is not attempting to decide an ultimate settlement. He only proposes an arrangement similar to what is being made in the case of Austria.

Mr Lloyd George points out that this involves the question of whether the Turk is to go out of Constantinople.

President Wilson says that so far as his judgment is concerned, that is decided. He has studied the question of the Turks in Europe for a long time, and every year confirmed his opinion that they ought to be cleared out.

17. Mr Lloyd George says he has received a telegram from Feisal in regard to the United States Mission complaining of a breach of faith that the Commission is not an Allied Commission. Feisal had interpreted a telegram that General Allenby had sent him, as suggesting that Great Britain would take a mandate for Syria if no other Power would do so. At his request Mr Balfour had drafted a telegram to General Allenby stating in the most specific terms that in no circumstances would Great Britain take this mandate, and calling his attention to Mr Lloyd George’s statement on this subject made at an earlier Meeting in General Allenby’s presence.

18. President Wilson says that the hour is approaching when some demand will have to be made to Holland in regard to the surrender of the Kaiser. He is anxious that the demand should be made in such a form as would relieve Holland of any appearance of breach of hospitality.

Mr Lloyd George points out that a new principle is involved in this Treaty. A great crime had been perpetrated against the nations of the world. It had taken five years to bring this question to fruition, and the Allies cannot afford to allow Holland to stand in the way.

President Wilson agrees that Holland is morally obliged to surrender the Kaiser, but he wishes to make it as easy for her as possible.

M Clemenceau said he would be surprised if Holland objected.

(It is agreed that Mr Lansing, who had acted as Chairman on the Commission on Responsibilities, should be asked to draft for the consideration of the Council, a despatch to the Dutch Government. President Wilson undertakes to inform Mr. Lansing.)

19. The Council takes formal note of the Note prepared for them by the Drafting Committee.

20. The Council approves the Note to the Polish Government submitted by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

(The following Note is signed by the five Heads of Governments:

“June 25, 1919.

Polish Government, Warsaw.

With a view to protecting the persons and the property of the peaceful population of Eastern Galicia against the dangers to which they are exposed by the Bolshevist bands, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers decided to authorize the forces of the Polish Republic to pursue their operations as far as the river Zbruck.

This authorization does not, in any way, affect the decisions to be taken later by the Supreme Council for the settlement of the political status of Galicia.”

The Note is signed by the representatives of the Five Powers, and is communicated by Captain Portier to a messenger who had brought it from the Council of Foreign Ministers.)

21. The Council agreed that the final text of the Note to the Turkish Government, together with the document read by the Turkish Delegation to the Council of Ten,6 should be published after it had been sent to the Turks.

22. The Council has before them the Note from the Turkish Delegation dated June 23rd, which is read aloud by President Wilson.

(It is generally agreed that the document was not a very serious one.)

Mr Lloyd George asks that before a reply is sent, a full discussion on the Turkish question should take place. It would be a great advantage if a short, sharp Peace with Turkey could be decided on while the Turkish Delegation are still in Paris.

M Clemenceau said he is not very hopeful of reaching a result.

(The proposal is agreed to.)

23. (It is agreed that, if possible, the questions of Reparation and Finance in the Austrian Treaty, which are at present the result of negotiation with the New States formerly forming part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, should be considered on the morrow.)

24. The Council has before them a draft letter to the German Delegation prepared by Mr Balfour and M Loucheur, with the assistance of M Fromageot and Mr Hurst, concerning the sinking of the German ships.

(The letter is approved with the substitution in the seventh paragraph of the word “justification” for the word “explanation”.

(It is agreed that the letter should be sent to the Germans immediately, and published in the newspapers on Thursday, June 26th.)

25. Mr Lloyd George insists on the importance of settling the form of the Mandates.

President Wilson agrees, but says he wishes to read the question up.

Sailor Steve

06-26-19, 10:14 PM

Thursday, June 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

1. Mr Lloyd George announces his intention of making a protest against some of the statements made in public speeches by Signor Tittoni, the new Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. His protest will be made in particular against the reference to the agreement of St Jean De Maurienne and to statements about African Colonies.

Baron Sonnino, in reply to a question by Mr Lloyd George, says that the proper medium for communicating such a protest would be through the British Ambassador in Rome.

2. M Dutasta says that he had during the morning seen Herr von Haniel who informed him that the Germans have already nominated two of their plenipotentiaries, namely Herr Müller, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and Herr Giesberts, the new Postmaster-General. The third member will probably be Herr Leinert, the Chairman of the Prussian National Assembly. The German plenipotentiaries are due to arrive on Saturday morning early by the ordinary train, to which special carriages will be attached. Herr von Haniel had spoken to him as to the verification of the credentials and he had replied by proposing that it should take place at 10 a.m. on Saturday, June 28th. Von Haniel had agreed, and had undertaken to wire to the Germans accordingly. Later, von Haniel had spoken of the need of verifying the text of the copy of the Treaty of Peace to which the signatures were to be appended, in order to ensure that it was identical with the 200 copies that had been sent to the German Delegation. He had replied that this would be a long operation. Von Haniel had agreed, and had said that the German Government would be willing to give up this formality if the Allied and Associated Powers would guarantee that the text to be signed was the same in every particular as the 200 copies.

Mr Lloyd George recalls that a global list of amendments had been sent and that it is important the Germans should realize that these are included.

(It is agreed that the President of the Conference should give the German Delegation the assurance they desired.)

M Clemenceau instructed M Dutasta to prepare the necessary letter.

(It is further agreed that the signature of the Treaty of Peace should take place at 15:00 on Saturday, June 28th, and that the verification of credentials should take place at 10:00 on the same date.)

3. M Dutasta says that von Haniel had wishes to know whether M Clemenceau proposes to make a speech. He had said that he could give no official reply, but unofficially he was sure Affixing of Seals that M Clemenceau had no such intention, and that the ceremony would be confined to the formality of signature. Herr von Haniel had then asked about affixing seals.

(It is agreed:

1) That the seals of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers should be affixed to the Treaty of Peace at the Office of the Secretary-General, Quai d’Orsay, on Friday, June 27th, at 14:00.

2) That the Secretary-General should arrange with the Secretaries of the various Delegations to bring the seals at that hour.

3) That the seals of the German Delegates should be affixed to the Treaty on Saturday morning at the meeting held to verify credentials.)

4. M Clemenceau states that the French Government proposes to hold a review of troops on July 14th, when the representatives of the Army would march under the Arc de Triomphe, down the Champs Elysées and thence to the Place de l’Opera. He hopes that General Pershing and General Sir William Robertson will be able to march with the French Generals at the Head of the procession and that the American, British and Italian contingents will be furnished. He also asks that any Japanese Military representatives in Paris might take part. He makes a special appeal that Naval contingents might in addition be available.

President Wilson, Mr Lloyd George, Baron Sonnino and Baron Makino agree to give the necessary instructions to the United States, British, Italian and Japanese Military and Naval Authorities.

5. M Clemenceau hands to M Mantoux, in French the following document, which M. Mantoux reads in English.

“The German Government possesses information according to which the populations of the territories in the East, which, according to the conditions of the Treaty, are to be separated from Germany, have doubts and erroneous views as to the date of the cession of these territories; the same applies to the local authorities and Military Chiefs. In order to prevent misunderstandings and disagreeable incidents, it seems desirable in the interests of the two Parties, to notify the interested circles without delay, of the fact that the Treaty of Peace will not come into force from the signature, but only at the moment provided in the definite stipulations of the Treaty, and that until then the present situation is maintained. For the territories in question which are on our side of the line of demarcation, the necessary action has already been taken on Germany’s part.

The Allied and Associated Governments are asked, so far as concerns the territories situated on their side of the line of demarcation, to take as soon as possible the proper steps.”

Mr Lloyd George says that this is the letter of a man who does not wish to see trouble.

President Wilson thinks it a perfectly reasonable request. He supposes that by “line of demarcation” is meant “the Armistice line”.

M Clemenceau says he did not understand exactly what the Germans want done.

President Wilson says it is for us to let the people on the other side of the Armistice line know what has been arranged.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the document should be referred in the first instance to the Legal Advisers for their views.

(This is agreed to.)

6. President Wilson reads a letter he has received from Mr Lansing covering a draft of a communication to the Government of the Netherlands.

Mr Lloyd George says he thinks that this was a very able document. He questions however whether it would be advisable to postpone sending this document until the ratification of the Treaty of Peace. He says he received information that morning (as he had notified his Colleagues on arrival) that the Crown Prince had fled from Holland, and had been identified driving to the East in a motor car in company with a German Staff Officer. He presumes that the Crown Prince’s flight is for mischief. The fact that he had gone with a Staff Officer gives the impression that there is some conspiracy. He had seen in the newspapers that an attempt was being made by the Military party in Germany to upset the Treaty of Peace. This makes him wonder whether it is safe to leave the Kaiser in Holland. He has often thought that action ought to have been taken before in this matter.

President Wilson questions whether action can be taken before ratification.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that action could be taken on the ground of public safety. If the Kaiser reached Germany a dangerous situation might arise, and war might be facilitated.

President Wilson says he does not dispute this. He is only seeking for the legal basis for action.

M Clemenceau says that the demand could be based on the escape of the Crown Prince and the danger of renewing the war if the Kaiser escaped.

President Wilson suggests that it would be sufficient to approach Holland at once with urgent representations, begging them that the Kaiser should not be allowed to leave the country. At present the Crown Prince and the Kaiser both had the right to leave the country if they wished, but in view of the signature of the Treaty of Peace he thought that Holland would have the right to refuse their departure.

Mr Lloyd George says that he would put the matter on the ground of the inflammable state of Germany.

M Clemenceau suggests that Mr Balfour should be asked to draft a dispatch to the Dutch Government.

(It is agreed:

1) That Mr Balfour should be asked to draft a dispatch to the Dutch Government, asking them to take precautions to prevent the departure of the Kaiser.

2) That Mr Lansing’s dispatch to the Government of the Netherlands requiring the Dutch Government to hand over the Kaiser should be approved for use when the occasion arises.)

Baron Makino reserves his assent to this despatch until he has had an opportunity to study it more closely.

7. M Clemenceau again asks that time might be given to him before he gives his final assent to the trial of the Kaiser in England.

8. The Council has before them a proposal which has been forwarded to President Wilson by Mr. McCormick recommending that after the Bela Kun Government of Hungary has withdrawn its military forces within the line fixed by the Allied and Associated Powers, and after the Bela Kun Government of Hungary has suspended military operations against the surrounding States as specified by the Allied and Associated Powers, the Blockade of Hungary be raised in the same manner as has been done for German Austria, to permit shipments of food, raw materials, animal products, manufactured articles and all ordinary commodities, excluding, however, all implements of war, gold, securities or other values which would reduce the power of Hungary to complete such reparations as may be imposed upon her.

(It is agreed that the Superior Blockade Council should be authorized to carry out this recommendation as soon as they are notified by the Allied and Associated Powers that Hungary has actually complied with the requirements of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.)

9. M Clemenceau communicates the letter which he had received from Bela Kun stating that the Romanian Army had not conformed to the formal request of the Peace Conference to put an end to all bloodshed.

It is agreed that the telegram should be sent to General Bliss, who should be asked if Bela Kun’s statement in regard to the attitude of the Romanians is correct.

10. M Mantoux reads a dispatch from the Military Representative in Paris of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State addressed to Marshal Foch, indicating that Italian units had attacked Yugoslav units and occupied certain districts in the region of Tarvis.

Baron Sonnino says he knew nothing about any action in the region of Tarvis. All he knows is that at an earlier date some Italian troops on the invitation of the four Military representatives of the Allies had advanced in the region of Villach. If he is given a copy he will undertake to make inquiry.

M Clemenceau instructs Captain Portier to send him a copy.

11. Mr Lloyd George says he has received a letter from Dr Benes.

(It is agrees that this letter should be circulated both to the Military Representatives of the Supreme war Council at Versailles and to the Members of the Council.)

12. Mr Lloyd George points out that a question of shipping the Czechoslovak forces from Vladivostok was raised by the above letter. He asks that President Wilson and Baron Makino respectively would inquire as to whether any United States shipping or Japanese shipping is available for this purpose.

President Wilson said that most of the United States shipping had been taken away from the Pacific Coast and he doubts whether much could be done. He agreed however to make inquiries.

Baron Makino said that a similar inquiry had been made by the Romanian Government who wished to repatriate Hungarian prisoners in Siberia and natives of the districts which were being transferred to Romania. He will undertake to make inquiries.

13. it is agreed that the Committee proposed on the previous day should be set up to inquire how far steps have already been taken by the Allied and Associated Powers to carry out the various provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and to make recommendations as to such further measures as should be adopted for this purpose.

M Clemenceau nominates M Tardieu to represent the French Government; President Wilson says that Mr Lansing should be asked to nominate a representative of the United States of America; Baron Sonnino undertakes to nominate an Italian Representative; Baron Makino undertakes to nominate a Japanese Representative and Mr Lloyd George undertakes to nominate a British Representative.

14. (It is agreed that the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, with whom should be associated Belgian and Japanese Military Representatives as well as Naval and Air Rep-representatives of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, should work out for the consideration of the Council all details of the Inter-Allied Military, Naval and Aerial Supervisory Commissions of Control to be set up to ensure execution by Germany of the Military, Naval and Aerial clauses in the Treaty of Peace.)

15. (It is agreed that a proposal by the Admirals of the Allied and Associated Powers that the Commission to supervise the destruction of the fortifications, etc. of Heligoland, should be a Sub-Commission of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control, should also be referred to the Military Representative[s] as above.)

16. Sir Maurice Hankey draws attention to the Report that had been furnished by the Prisoners of War Commission as to the measures to be adopted for the fulfillment of the terms of the Treaty of Peace in regard to Prisoners of War.

M Clemenceau asks that the subject should be reserved for the present.

M Mantoux, at M Clemenceau’s request, reads a telegram from General Dupont on the subject of Polish prisoners in Germany.

President Wilson points out that no steps can be taken for the repatriation of Polish prisoners until after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace.

17. President Wilson says that the only forms of mandate that he has seen were some that had been prepared by Lord Robert Cecil.

Mr Lloyd George says that he would circulate Lord Milner’s proposals on the subject.

18. Sir Maurice Hankey says that he and Captain Portier had made inquiries and had ascertained that the Reparation Commission had failed to secure an agreement with the states acquiring territory formerly part of the Austrian Empire in regard to the reparation and financial clauses.

A further Meeting is to be held at 11:00 that morning.

19. (It is agreed that the letter to Mr Paderewski that had accompanied the Polish Treaty should not be published until the signature of the Treaty.)

20. Sir Maurice Hankey hands round a document relating to the size of the Army of Occupation on the Rhine for consideration at an early date.

Note: It has since been ascertained that the document handed round is incomplete. The complete document will be circulated.

21. M Clemenceau says that he thinks the Council ought to hear the views of Marshal Foch as to what action should be taken if trouble should arise on the Eastern Frontier of Germany in connection with the Treaty of Peace. The Allied and Associated Powers have the duty to help the Poles to defend themselves if attacked, but it is a very difficult thing to do as if the Germans oppose, it will not even be possible to send any supplies through Danzig.

(After a short discussion it is agreed that the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles should be asked to consider the following questions:

1) In the event of trouble in the area ceded by the Treaty of Peace with Germany to Poland, what would they advise as to how the Allied and Associated Powers could best assist the Poles to establish their authority.

2) The composition and size of the Army of Occupation of the Plebiscite area in Upper Silesia, and the method of occupation of this area.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

06-26-19, 11:25 PM

Thursday, June 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George's Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Three

1. M Clemenceau says that Mr Wellington Koo had informed him that the Chinese Delegation would make a protest in order to satisfy public opinion in China. This would be done only in the hope that later on the clauses in the Treaty relating to Shantung would be revised. He wished to ask his Colleagues whether they thought the protest should be made before or after the signature of the Treaty. For his part, he would prefer that it should be after.

Mr Lloyd George agrees.

M Clemenceau points out that otherwise Romania might be encouraged to follow suit.

Mr Lloyd George says that it might even set a bad example to the Germans.

(It is agreed that M Clemenceau should ask M Pichon to request the Chinese Government to make their formal protest at the very last possible moment.)

2. The telegram drafted by Mr. Balfour regarding the sanctuary for the Kaiser and the escape of the Crown Prince is agreed to.

(M Clemenceau undertakes to dispatch it to the Dutch Government on behalf of the Conference.

3. M Clemenceau says that he has allocated 15 places in the Hall at Versailles for French soldiers who had specially distinguished themselves in the war, to witness the signature of the Treaty of Peace, and he will be glad to offer the same facilities to the British and American Governments.

Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson thank M Clemenceau for his offer, which they accept.

Mr Lloyd George asks what reply is to be given to the Turks.

President Wilson observes that Mr Balfour had already made a reply.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is not his meaning. He wishes to know whether the Turks are to be allowed to go or whether they are to be asked to meet the Representatives of the Powers, or should they be sent a letter suggesting that they should go home and return later on when summoned.

President Wilson expresses the opinion that it would be better to let them go. They have exhibited complete absence of common sense and a total misunderstanding of the West. They had imagined that the Conference knew no history and was ready to swallow enormous falsehoods.

Mr Lloyd George observes that this is Turkish Diplomacy.

President Wilson remarks that no promise had been made to reply to what they might say.

M Clemenceau agrees that they had only asked for a hearing.

President Wilson says that the Conference had given them sufficient attention. They had been treated favorably. They had been asked to come to the Conference and all they had wished to say had been listened to. They had been better treated in this respect than the Austrians.

Mr Lloyd George says that the question he had alluded to on the previous day was whether it was expedient to try and make Peace with Turkey without coming to a decision on the question of Mandates.

President Wilson says that he has reflected on this subject. It might be possible to tell the Turks that they must abandon their possessions in Europe and in certain specified territories in Asia, or else they might be told “Your territory will be bounded as follows - Turkey must renounce all rights over territories outside this boundary and accept in advance the disposal of these areas to be made by the Allied and Associated Powers.” Furthermore, “Turkey must accept in certain Departments of State - Finance, Police, supervision of the Coasts, the assistance of a Power, hereafter to be designated.” This appeared to him to be practicable and settlement of all other questions could be adjourned.

Mr Lloyd George says that this proposal is practicable if it be decided at once to take Constantinople from the Turks.

President Wilson observes that Constantinople is not a Turkish City; other races there were in the majority.

Mr Lloyd George says this amounts to a final expulsion of the Turks from Europe.

M Clemenceau says that he has an objection to make. If this solution is proposed to the Turks, they will refuse and will remain where they are. There is nothing ready to enforce immediate execution. What can the Allied and Associated Powers do? The whole of this question can only be settled at one time. For his part he agrees that Constantinople should not remain Turkish. The capture of Constantinople by the Turks had been, when it occurred, a very great event which had shaken up all Europe. Since then Europe has made every effort to maintain the Turks there.

President Wilson says doubtless because no successor could be found for them.

Mr Lloyd George says it is chiefly by reason of the fear of Russia.

M Clemenceau asks what immediate solution is in view. Constantinople had been offered to President Wilson, but he did not seem anxious to accept it.

President Wilson says he would take the proposal to the Powers but for the situation brought about by Italian action. The Italians had continued to land troops in Asia Minor. S Tittoni no doubt would cause these troops to advance still further. Conflicts are to be feared. What Italy aims at is to obtain a position such that she could not be evicted without hostilities. Should she continue this Policy, she would place herself outside the law. A great Nation which behaves in this manner loses all its rights. The problem of Asia Minor would be easily settled if Italy were not concerned.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it would be safer to say that Asia Minor would be “easier to settle”.

M Clemenceau agrees and points out that there would still be ticklish problems. He reminds the meeting that the Indian Mohammedans had protested against any division of Turkish Asia.

Mr Lloyd George says that they meant Anatolia.

M Clemenceau points out that the Greeks are in Smyrna and are extending up to Aidin. This was part of Anatolia. There is a considerable Turkish population in Smyrna itself. He is making no protest, merely drawing attention to facts. As to the Italians, they have seized ports and had stayed there in spite of clear warnings, they have advanced inland and are continuing to penetrate. He does not think that they will withdraw if asked to by the Council. S Tittoni now says “Smyrna was promised to us.” This means “Italy is a great nation which might perhaps make concessions. It will not leave Smyrna to others except for compensations”. He asks what is to be done.

President Wilson expresses the opinion that the Italian Government will not last. It will come to Paris and make claims which will not be accepted. These claims will be categorically refused and the Italian Government will be forced to withdraw.

M Clemenceau says that he is inclined to refuse discussion of Asiatic questions with the Italians for the present. He will say to them “We are now making Peace with Austria and we cannot allow negotiations to be suspended. The first question we must settle is that of the Adriatic.”

President Wilson says that he agrees.

M Clemenceau says that any haste in dealing with the Turkish question would be dangerous. For instance, there is the French view. France has a disagreement with Great Britain. He does not wish to raise this question until Peace with Germany had been signed. Fortunately, public opinion is not for the time being exerting any pressure. This is a piece of good luck. If, unfortunately, this question gets entangled with European questions, he is much afraid of what might be said and done by certain persons devoid of self control. If the Conference can reach satisfactory solutions of more important problems, public opinion will be greatly appeased and subsequent discussions will be rendered easier.

President Wilson says that for the time being all he proposes is to fix the frontiers of Turkey.

M Clemenceau said that is all that can be done and that as no immediate means of execution exists, the result would be deplorable.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Italian danger in Asia Minor is a matter of deep concern to him. The Italians are advancing straight before them and seizing in the interior everything that suits them. Great Britain has no ambition in this region, but he fears what the effect might be in Muslim Countries. This concerns Great Britain in Egypt and in India and France in North Africa. S Tittoni said that what Italy desires in Asia is mining concessions, but the Italians were now seizing everything that might be of use to them.

President Wilson observes that what they want is things it would be impossible for them to obtain under a mandate.

Mr Lloyd George observes that Italy alone among the Powers had not demobilized. She is afraid to do so out of fear of internal disorder. She has her troops and she is sending them to Asia Minor, to the Caucasus, and wherever she wishes.

President Wilson says that he has reason to anticipate a period of famine in the Caucasus, when British troops are withdrawn, by reason of a momentary influx of population. This is a problem to which his attention has been drawn and which must be borne in mind. As to the Italians, he thinks they should be asked clearly to state whether they remain in the Entente or not. If they do, they must take part with their Allies in the negotiations with Turkey and do nothing independently.

Mr Lloyd George points out that even according to the agreement of Saint Jean de Maurienne, the Italians have no right to the forcible occupation of all the places they have seized.

President Wilson says that he cannot go back and tell the United States Senate “Here is a Treaty re-establishing Peace”, if Italy is left a free hand. It would be on the contrary a Treaty preparing war and cannot be guaranteed by the Powers.

M Clemenceau says that as far as he is concerned, he will put the question to the Italians as clearly as possible. Fiume is at the present time administered in the name of the King of Italy. The local Government has lately asked the French General to expel the Serbians. The General had refused. The Italians had then expelled them themselves. The town is surrounded by barbed wire. This is a state of war. Is this the intention of the Treaty of London? The Italians are breaking their word there and everywhere else.

President Wilson says that they justified their presence in Fiume on the pretext that the Armistice granted them the right of advancing to reestablish order.

M Clemenceau says that they have gone so far in the last few days as to ask France for a small bit of French territory in the County of Nice to improve their frontier which according to them was ill-drawn.

Mr Lloyd George observes that this is madness.

Jimbuna

06-27-19, 06:34 AM

27th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Turkey's case and Allied Reply published.

Bolsheviks abandon Kharkov.

The Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles being prepared for the signing of the Peace Treaty tomorrow.
https://i.imgur.com/0mDiFK2.png

Ship Losses:

Thomas (United Kingdom) The schooner caught fire in the Atlantic Ocean 80 nautical miles (150 km) north east of Barbados and was abandoned. Her crew were rescued by Lillian ( United Kingdom).

Sailor Steve

06-27-19, 04:19 PM

Friday, June 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

Under consideration is the Report of those members of the Reparation Commission, who had been deputed to negotiate with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Romania with regard to the payment of contributions towards the cost of the war.

I. Colonel Peel explains that they had initiated negotiations on the basis of the instructions given at the last meeting of the Council on this subject. Taking the value of the Kroner at 25 per cent of its value had finally suggested a total sum in respect of the four states amounting to 2 milliards Francs Swiss gold. Generally speaking these states are reluctant to undertake this liability though Czechoslovakia had undertaken to do so if the other three would consent. Serbia and Romania had not absolutely declined but he doubts whether they are seriously willing to pay. He does not know what decision had been taken by the Polish representatives as they had not been present at the last discussion on the subject. He points out therefore that this liability must either be imposed on these States, or the sum might be discussed and proposals for its revision considered or the matter dropped altogether.

President Wilson asks what method is proposed to adopt to impose this obligation on the States in question.

Mr Dulles suggests that they should be told that in the event of a refusal they will again come under the terms of the Austrian Treaty and be liable to pay reparation.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that this is the best method of dealing with them, and reminds the Council that, as he had pointed out before, with regard to Serbia and Romania, a kind of book-keeping transaction could be conducted i. e. the amount of their contributions could be deducted from their claims to reparation.

M Loucheur said that in his opinion to impose on these small Powers the sum of 1, 1½ or 2 milliards is to incur a great deal of odium for very little profit. His attitude might be different if substantial sums were in question. He reminds the Council of the burden of war expenses which would have to be borne by Serbia and Romania. If, however, it is decided to impose this obligation on these States, he agrees that Mr Dulles’ suggestion is the right one. He adds that he had understands from a Romanian Delegate on the previous day that these States are prepared to offer 1½ milliards.

M Clemenceau said that he adheres to M Loucheur’s opinion.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether in effect M Loucheur intends that Serbia and Romania should present in full their reparation claims against Germany, while acquiring between them something like half the former Austrian Empire.

M Clemenceau explains that he has not looked at the matter in this light. Serbia and Romania would certainly have to diminish their claims against the reparation fund.

M Loucheur thinks that Mr Lloyd George’s position is right but in view of what had been embodied in the German Treaty with regard to the principle of “solidarity” he does not think that his attitude could now be maintained.

Mr Lloyd George says that he is not calling in question the principle of solidarity. His point is that the Reparation Commission must strike a balance in the case of Serbia and Romania and deduct the amount of their contributions from their reparation claims.

M Loucheur says that the negotiations which, as had been reported, had proved unacceptable to these smaller States, had been conducted on this basis. In any case the balance would be enormously in favour of Serbia and Romania and he adheres to his opinion that the amount in question is not worth the trouble involved. The reparation claimed by these States would very likely amount to 20 milliards and contributions as suggested to 2 milliards only.

Mr Lloyd George says that if this position is taken up with regard to Serbia and Romania, the Czechoslovaks would, he supposed, agree to make a payment. He adds that it is well known that in Czechoslovakia there are a very large number of rich Germans. He cannot consent to a proposal which would relieve them of the burdens to be borne by men in similar positions in the Allied countries.

M Loucheur suggests therefore that the total amount of contributions to be demanded should be 2 milliards of francs.

Mr Lloyd George says that he will not express an opinion as to a figure and thinks that it should be left to the Reparation Commission, when this comes into being, to assess it.

Mr Davis says that they have attempted, without success, to persuade these States to agree to this proceeding.

Colonel Peel suggests that the experts there present and previously delegated for these negotiations should have authority to settle a figure at once.

(It is agreed:

That Poland, Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Romania should be called upon to accept liability for the payment of contributions in respect of the expenses of the liberation of formerly Austrian territory to be acquired by them.

That the amount of the contributions should be fixed by the experts of the Reparation Commission who will already be deputed to negotiate with them.

That if these States refuse this settlement they should be liable for the payment of reparation under the Clauses of the Treaty with Austria.)

II. The Council approves the following provision for insertion in the Financial Clauses of the Polish Treaty:

Poland shall undertake responsibility for a part of the Russian Public Debt and of all other financial obligations of the Russian State as these shall be determined by a special Convention between the principal Allied and Associated Powers of the one part and Poland of the other. This Convention shall be drawn up by a Commission appointed by the said Powers. In case the Commission should not arrive at an agreement, the questions in dispute shall immediately be submitted to the League of Nations.

(A copy of the above provision, initialed by Council of Five is handed to M Cheysson for immediate communication to the Drafting Committee.)

Baron Makino says that he initialed the document on the assumption that provision would be made for the representation of Japan when the matter in question was under consideration.

III. The following addition to paragraph 3 of Section 3 of Annex II of the Reparation Clauses was initialed for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria, to follow immediately after this clause, “the composition of this section . . . . . . claims”.

When voting takes place the representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy shall each have two votes.

Sailor Steve

06-27-19, 06:59 PM

Friday, June 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 12:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

(As the 11:00 Meeting is breaking up the following decisions are made.)

1. The Council approves the attached additional Clause for inclusion in the Treaty with Poland.

"Poland agrees to assume responsibility for such proportion of the Russian public debt and other Russian public liabilities of any kind as may be assigned to her under a special convention between the principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand and Poland on the other, to be prepared by a commission appointed by the above States. In the event of the Commission not arriving at an agreement the point at issue shall be referred for immediate arbitration to the League of Nations."

(The Clause is initialed by the representatives of Treaty with the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and is taken by M Cheysson for immediate communication to the Drafting Committee, since the Treaty with Poland is to be signed on Saturday, June 28th.)

2. The Council takes note that since the last meeting the attached resolution in regard to their decision on the subject of the raising of the Blockade of Germany had been approved and initialed by the representatives of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and, after being initialed, had been forwarded by Sir Maurice Hankey to the Secretary-General for the information of the Superior Blockade Council.

(It is agreed that the above decision in regard to the raising of the Blockade should be communicated to the German Delegates in writing by M Clemenceau on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Peace.)

M Clemenceau reads the draft of the letter he proposes to send to the German Delegation.

3. The Council takes note of the immediate telegram to the Dutch Government, which has been drafted by Mr Balfour, and which had been approved for dispatch on behalf of the Council on the previous day by M Clemenceau, President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George, but had immediately been communicated to Baron Sonnino and Baron Makino.

Baron Makino asks that, in the sentence “He is also the potentate” the word “was” might be substituted for “is”.

(This is approved, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to use the utmost expedition to endeavor to secure the change before the telegram is dispatched.

It is further agreed that this telegram should be published in the morning papers of Sunday, June 29th.)

4. Baron Makino says he will agree to Mr. Lansing’s draft telegram to the Dutch Government.

(This telegram is accordingly taken note of for use when the time comes to give effect to Article 227 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.)

5. (It is agreed that, as soon as the Reparation and Financial Clauses have been approved, the outstanding portions of the Treaty of Peace with Austria should be communicated to the Austrian Delegation by the Secretary-General.)

(It is agreed to hold a Meeting of the Council at Versailles on the conclusion of the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.)

Sailor Steve

06-27-19, 08:24 PM

Friday, June 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

(Mr Paderewski and Mr Hurst are present during this discussion.)

1. Mr Paderewski says he has come to ask the Council to make certain modifications in the Convention to be signed between Poland and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers under Article 93 of the Treaty of Peace. The various points to which he alludes were dealt with fully in a letter, dated 26th June, 1919, he had sent to M Clemenceau, and to which he makes frequent reference.

2. The first point raised by Mr Paderewski is contained in the following extract from his letter to M Clemenceau:

“I have the honor to declare, in the name of the Treatment of Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference, that we are ready to sign the proposed Convention in execution of Article 93 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, while asking you, M le Président, in the name of justice, to stipulate that the numerous Polish population destined to remain under German domination shall enjoy the same rights and privileges so far as concerns language and culture as those accorded to Germans who become, by reason of the Treaty, citizens of the Polish Republic.”

There is considerable discussion on this point, which is only briefly summarized below.

President Wilson points out that the claim is a just one, but it is impossible now to put it in the Treaty with Germany. There are no means by which the Peace Conference can compel the Germans to observe any stipulation of this kind. The Poles, however, might enter into negotiation with the Germans with a view to some arrangement between them.

Baron Sonnino says that the obligation by Poland to Germans resident in Poland contained in the Convention might be subordinated to reciprocity by Germany.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the best plan would be for Poland to make an appeal to the League of Nations on the subject. He feels sure that the Council of the League will sustain them. He thinks this would be a much better plan than by making any stipulation on the subject. If is were a bargain by which the Germans were compelled to treat the Poles in their territory in the same manner as the Poles were bound to treat Germans in their territory, there would continually be disputes as to whether Germany had extended these privileges, and it would be an encouragement to extremists to refuse just treatment on the ground that the other party had not done the same. It is, however, to the interests of Poland to treat Germans in their territory as well as possible and to make them contented. Troublesome times might come and it would then be a great advantage that the German population should have no cause for discontent. Further, the Poles’ appeal to the League of Nations would be much stronger if they had treated the Germans well.

Mr Paderewski shares Mr Lloyd George’s point of view in principle, but points out that the question arises as to when the authority of the League of Nations would extend over Germany.

President Wilson points out that this depends upon when Germany is admitted to the League of Nations and the conditions for this had been laid down in the reply to the German counter-propositions. He considers that Mr Lloyd George’s plan is the best one. He points out that Germany is eager to qualify for admission to the League of Nations, since she is handicapped as against other nations until she has qualified. He suggests that the League might be asked to insist on corresponding treatment to the Poles in German territory as a condition for Germany’s entering into the League of Nations. He regrets that provision for just treatment of Poles in Germany had not been made in the German Treaty and that it would be necessary to postpone the matter for the present, but, in the circumstances, he thinks this is the best plan.

M Clemenceau agrees that the best plan is for Poland to apply to the League of Nations. In reply to an observation by Mr Paderewski that the League of Nations might not always consist of persons actuated by the same motives as the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, he points out that, in effect, the Council of the League of Nations could consist of the same persons as the present Council.

3. A second alteration in the Treaty, proposed by Mr Paderewski, is contained in the following extract from his letter of June 26th to M. Clemenceau:

“At the same time, we beg you, M le Président, to be so good as to modify the text of Article 9 by editing the second paragraph as follows:

‘In the towns and districts where a considerable proportion of Polish subjects of Jewish faith reside, there shall be assured to this minority an equitable part in the division of the sums which shall be raised from public funds, municipal or otherwise, for the object of education, religion or charity. These sums shall be employed for the establishment, under the control of the Polish State, of primary schools, in which the needs of the Jewish faith shall be duly respected and in which the popular Jewish language (Yiddish) should be considered as an auxiliary language.’”

This modification, Mr Paderewski explains, has been asked for by the Polish Jews.

Mr Lloyd George pointed out that this proposal goes far beyond what was contemplated under the present draft of the Treaty.

President Wilson agrees and points out that the intention of the present Treaty is that Yiddish should only be used as a medium of instruction and was not to be taught as a separate language.

Mr Paderewski says that, as this had been put forward by an influential Jewish body, he had felt it his duty to present it to the Council.

4. Mr Paderewski further raises objection to the provision in the Convention with Poland for the Internationalization of the River Vistula and its tributaries. He fears that this will enable the Germans to obtain advantages. Germany already has advantages in the control of many of the markets affecting Poland. He is ready to conclude any arrangement with the Allied and Associated Powers, but Poland has to remember that Germany does not consider herself bound by treaties. It is being openly declared in German newspapers that Germany will not be morally bound by the Treaty of Peace. The internationalization of the Vistula is not provided for in the Treaty with Germany. It had been proposed in Commissions and Sub-Commissions, but the proposal had been withdrawn, and thus the Vistula had been recognised as a national Polish river. This is why the Polish Delegation proposed the suppression of Article 6. In reply to questions as to how far the Vistula ran through territory other than Polish, he says that the river itself runs entirely through Polish territory. Its tributary, the Bug, ran part of its course through Ruthenian territory.

President Wilson points out that by this article Poland is merely bound to accept for her rivers, the same international regime as Germany had accepted for German rivers. Poland is only asked to come into the same international scheme as is contemplated in other parts of Europe.

Mr Paderewski says he feels that this clause gives privileges to the Germans.

5. In the course of the above discussions, the question is raised as to the equipment of the Polish military forces.

Mr Lloyd George says that in a short conversation he had with Mr Paderewski on entering, he had asked him about the condition of the Polish army. He was disturbed to find that this bore out the accounts that he had lately received from General Sir Henry Wilson, namely that part of the Polish forces are quite inadequately armed. The Allied and Associated Powers have plenty of material, and he cannot imagine how Poland had been allowed to be short.

President Wilson thinks it is due to the difficulty in getting supplies through.

Mr Paderewski regrets that this is not really the reason. He had been told to appeal to the Supreme Council. When he had appealed some time ago not one had been willing to help except the Italian Government who had sent several trains of ammunition through Austria. Except for General Haller’s army, however, he has received nothing from the United States of America, France or Great Britain.

Mr Lloyd George says that Great Britain had been asked to supply Admiral Kolchak, General Denekin and the Archangel Government, and they had done so. He asks if they have refused any specific appeal from Poland.

Mr Paderewski says that the appeal had not been made individually to Great Britain but was made to the Council without any result.

President Wilson says that his own recollection is that nothing has been sent, because it was impossible to get any material through.

Mr Lloyd George says there should be no difficulty about getting it through now. The whole of General Haller’s army had been transported and Danzig is also available.

Mr Paderewski says that the passage of food through Danzig is being stopped. Many of the soldiers in Poland had not even cartridge belts. He had applied to the United States Army and to Mr. Lansing personally and in writing but could not get any belts, though the surplus of these was actually being burnt in some places. The equipment of General Haller’s army was absolutely first-class, but Poland had some 700,000 men who needed everything. They had no factories themselves, and had an entire lack of raw material.

(It is agreed that the Military Representatives at Versailles should be informed that the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are anxious to complete the equipment of the Polish Army. The Military Representatives should be directed to make immediate inquiry as to the deficiencies of the Polish Army in equipment and supplies, and to advise as to how and from what sources these could best be made good. The Military Representatives should be authorized to consult the Polish Military Authorities on the subject.)

6. M Mantoux reads the following note from M. Fromageot:

(Translation)

"The Treaty with Germany must be ratified by Poland in order that it may benefit from it. On the other hand the application of this Treaty so far as concerns Poland is not subordinated to the ratification by Poland of this special Treaty with the Powers for the guarantee of minorities.

It might happen from this that Poland, while refusing to ratify this special Treaty, might become the beneficiary of the Treaty with Germany, a Treaty of which Article 93 however, provides for the protection of minorities in Poland in the form of an engagement with this country.

M Fromageot has notified the Minister of Foreign Affairs of this question, and Mr Hurst has equally notified Mr Balfour."

Mr Paderewski says there is no doubt that the Polish Diet would ratify the Treaty.

(It is agreed that no action is called for on this note.)

(Mr Paderewski and Mr Hurst withdraw.)

7. The Council has before them forms of Mandates which have been prepared by Lord Milner and circulated by Mr Lloyd George.

President Wilson says that there is some criticisms to make against Lord Milner’s proposals. In his view they hardly provide adequate protection for the native population; they do not provide sufficiently for the open door; and the Class “C” Mandates do not make provision for missionary activities. He thinks that if the Council devote themselves to this question now, they will find themselves in the position of drafting the Mandates themselves, and he does not feel they are suitably constituted for that purpose. He thinks the best plan would be to appoint a special Committee for the purpose.

Mr Lloyd George does not agree that Lord Milner’s draft does not go sufficiently far as regards the open door. He thinks that in some respects his Forms go beyond what was originally contemplated. He agrees, however, in remitting the matter to a special Committee. He thinks that perhaps the Committee might transfer its activities to London as this would be more convenient for Lord Milner. Colonel House is about to proceed to London, and as he is informed by Baron Makino, Viscount Chinda, the Japanese Ambassador in London would be the Japanese member of the Committee.

President Wilson suggests that the best plan would be to set up the Commission at once and ask them to hold a special preliminary meeting to arrange their own procedure. He thinks it would be a good plan to draw up the Mandates and publish them in order to invite criticism before adopting them. He is prepared, however, to leave this also to the Commission.

Mr Lloyd George says that a closely connected question is that of the Belgian claims to a part of German East Africa. Lord Milner has agreed a scheme with the representatives of the Belgian Government which the British Government is ready to accept. He feels bound to mention, however, that the Council of the Aborigines Society had lately come to Paris and had raised objections to the allocation of this territory to Belgium. He understands the difficulty is that Belgium desires these territories mainly for the purpose of raising labor rather than for what they contain.

President Wilson says that he believes Belgium has reformed her Colonial administration but the difficulty is that the world does not feel sure that this is the case. He thinks the best plan would be to ask the special Committee to hear the Aborigines Society.

Sir Maurice Hankey, alluding to a proposal that M Clemenceau had made that the question should be discussed on the afternoon of the following day at Versailles after the signature of the Treaty of Peace, says that not only the Belgian representatives would have to be heard, but in addition, the Portuguese representatives who had asked to be heard when questions relating to German East Africa were under consideration.

President Wilson suggests that the Special Committee might hear the Portuguese representatives in addition.

Sir Maurice Hankey points out that this would considerably extend the reference to the special Commission.

President Wilson says that the Aborigines ought to be heard in connection with the Mandates.

Mr Lloyd George says he supposes the question of German East Africa would have to be put off until the Aborigines Society had been heard.

(It is agreed that a special Commission should be immediately set up composed as follows:

Colonel House for the United States of America.
Lord Milner for the British Empire.
M Simon for France.
S Crespi for Italy.
Viscount Chinda for Japan.

for the following purpose:

1) To consider the drafting of Mandates.

2) To hear the views of the Aborigines Society in regard to the Belgian claims in German East Africa.

3) To hear the Portuguese claims in regard to German East Africa.)

(Mr Philip Kerr is summoned into the room and given instructions to invite Lord Milner immediately to summon a preliminary meeting of the Commission.)

8. Mr. Lloyd George suggests that a telegram ought to be sent to Admiral Kolchak asking him whether he is willing to agree in the scheme for the co-operation of the Czechoslovak forces with the right wing of his army.

(It is agreed that a telegram in this sense ought to be sent, and Mr Lloyd George undertakes to submit a draft to the Council at the Meeting on the following morning.)

9. President Wilson suggests that after he himself and Mr Lloyd George have left, the main work of the Conference should revert to the Council of Ten at the Quai d’Orsay. He says that Mr Lansing’s presence is required for a time in the United States, and that Mr Polk would temporarily take his place.

Mr Lloyd George agrees in the new procedure.

(It is agreed that on the departure of President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George the Council of Ten should be re-established at the Quai d’Orsay as the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers in the Peace Conference.)

10. Mr Lloyd George says he understands that the upshot of recent conversations is that the Turkish question must be postponed until it is known whether the United States of America could accept a mandate.

(It was agreed:

1) That the further consideration of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey should be suspended until such time as the Government of the United States of America could state whether they were able to accept a mandate for a portion of the territory of the former Turkish Empire.

2) That the Turkish Delegation should be thanked for the statements they have made to the Peace Conference, and that a suggestion should be conveyed to them that they might now return to their own country.

The view is generally expressed that Mr Balfour should be invited to draft the letter to the Turks.)

(M Tardieu is introduced.)

11. The Council has before them the attached report on the proposals of the French Government in regard to the allocation of certain former German passenger ships to relieve the difficulties of France in regard to passenger tonnage, especially so far as her Colonial lines are concerned.

Mr Lloyd George comments that if France and Italy are in a difficult position as regards tonnage, so is Great Britain. He says he cannot accept the report because no representative of the Ministry of Shipping had been available to take part in it. He could neither give an assent or a dissent on a shipping question unless the proper expert was available. He had telegraphed on the previous day to the Minister of Shipping, and he hoped that an expert would be available immediately.

(It is agreed that the report should be considered as soon as a representative of the British Ministry of Shipping was available.)

(M Tardieu withdraws.)

(M Dutasta entered.)

12. M Dutasta hands a letter from the German Delegation on the subject of the signing of the special Convention in regard to the Rhine to M Mantoux, who translates it into English. In this letter the German Delegation protests against having to sign the Rhine Convention simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace, on the ground that Article 232 provides only for a subsequent convention. They intimate, however, that they would not press their objection if conversations could take place later on the subject.

(On M Clemenceau’s suggestion, it is agreed to reply in the sense that the Rhine Convention must be signed on the same day as the Treaty of Peace with Germany, but that the Allied and Associated Powers would not object to subsequent meetings to discuss details.

Captain Portier drafts a reply, which is read and approved. M Clemenceau undertakes to dispatch it immediately.)

13. M Dutasta also hands a Note from the German Delegation to M Mantoux, which he translates into English, containing the German consent to the addition of a special Protocol to the Treaty of Peace with Germany, as proposed some days before.

(M Dutasta withdraws.)

14. The Council has under consideration the question of the size of the Army of Occupation of the Provinces west of the Rhine. In this connection they have before them the report of the special Commission appointed to consider this question as well as to draw up a Convention regarding the military occupation of the territories of the Rhine.

(It is agreed to refer the question to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles.)

15. (It is agreed that the Secretary-General should be authorized to communicate the decision concerning the frontier between Romania and Yugoslavia in the Banat to the representatives in Paris of the countries concerned.)

16. The following telegram is approved and initialed by the representatives of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers:

“The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers has decided to authorize the Polish Government to utilize any of its military forces, including General Haller’s army, in Eastern Galicia.”

(It is explained that this decision is consequential to the decision that the Polish Government be authorized to occupy with its military forces Eastern Galicia up to the River Zbruck, and had been recommended by the Council of Foreign Ministers on June 25th.)

(Captain Portier undertakes to communicate the initialed telegram to the Secretary-General for despatch.)

(M Claveille and General Mance are introduced.)

17. General Mance explains that the Sudbahn was the railway from Vienna to Trieste with a branch to Fiume and a branch to Innsbruck, which gtoes through to Irent. By the Treaty of Peace it is divided into five parts. The bondholders are largely French. The Governments of Austria, Yugoslavia, Italy and Hungary each have the right under the Treaty of Peace with Austria to expropriate the portion running through its territory. Various proposals have been made for meeting the difficult situation created. The simplest is that of the Czechoslovak Government, which, moreover, is disinterested. Their proposal is that there should be an agreement between the four Governments in regard to the status of the railway, including the rights of expropriation and the financial arrangements. Failing agreement between the four Governments, arbitration should be arranged by the Council of the League of Nations.

(At Baron Sonnino’s request, the subject is postponed until the following day, when Italian, as well as British and French experts might be present.)

Sailor Steve

06-27-19, 08:34 PM

Friday, June 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:30

Meeting of the Council of Three

(Note: During the 16:00 meeting, President Wilson, Mr Lloyd George, Mr Hurst, M Clemenceau, M Pichon, Sir Maurice Hankey and M Portier adjourn to an adjoining room, where a short meeting, recorded below, is held. The full meeting was then resumed.)

1. Mr Lloyd George says that Mr Hurst has prepared a text of a Convention to give effect to the agreement in regard to the guarantee to be given by Great Britain to France. The draft is based on an American draft, but one important alteration has been made. The American draft makes the agreement subject to approval by the League of Nations in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations. It has been pointed out, however, that in this case one member of the Council could interfere with the validity of the agreement. Consequently, in the British draft, it is made subject to the agreement of the majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

President Wilson accepts the new draft and asks Mr Hurst to arrange with Mr Brown-Scott to make a corresponding alteration in the American draft.

Mr Lloyd George says that M Clemenceau must realize that he is not in a position to bind the self-governing Dominions, which have their own Parliaments, and this was provided for in the Draft Convention.

M Clemenceau said that he quite understands this.

(Mr Hurst is instructed to prepare a final draft.)

Jimbuna

06-28-19, 05:13 AM

28th June 1919

Aftermath of War

President Wilson signs Treaty by which U.S.A. will assist France in case of unprovoked German attack.

Peace Treaty signed and published.

Anti-Bolshevik General Anton Denikin at Kharkiv after capturing the city in preparation for a planned offensive against Moscow.
https://i.imgur.com/5nGYUgF.jpg

British artillery officers training anti-Communist Russian troops at Novocherkassk:.
https://i.imgur.com/opFmeRf.jpg

The Black Star Line is founded, name was a play on White Star Line. It was a shipping line incorporated by Marcus Garvey, the organizer of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). The shipping company had all-black crews and a black captains.
https://i.imgur.com/6DTDy9X.jpg

Ship Losses:

Duchess of Richmond (United Kingdom) The paddle steamer struck a mine and sank in the Mediterranean Sea.
Slutskyi (Soviet Navy) The hydrographic vessel was shelled and sunk by White artillery off Unitsa in Lake Onega.

https://youtu.be/2BVpuNFFrcE

Sailor Steve

06-28-19, 02:26 PM

Saturday, June 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George's Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Council of Three

1. President Wilson reads a draft of instructions to the United States Delegation which he has prepared.

M Clemenceau says he does not think that the Allies ought to insist on the evacuation of Fiume. They have no right to demand this. What they have a right to complain of is the assumption that the Italians are masters there and could issue orders in the name of the King of Italy.

Mr Lloyd George says that Italy has no more right to issue proclamations at Fiume in the name of the King of Italy than France has in the name of the President of the Republic, or Great Britain in the name of King George.

President Wilson says the difficulty is to make the Italians recognize this. All the evidence we have is that the Italians have issued orders and proclamations for the action of their troops in the name of the King of Italy.

Mr Lloyd George says he understands that it had been arranged informally on the previous day that President Wilson on the one part and Great Britain and France on the other part were to present S Tittoni on his arrival with written memoranda explaining the attitude of their respective Governments. He thinks this would make it easier for Mr Lansing and Mr Balfour who, though plenipotentiaries, are not Heads of States, in dealing with Italy.

President Wilson says he had thought the best plan would be to give written instructions to his colleagues who could then inform the Italian Delegation that they had instructions in this sense.

Mr Lloyd George thinks their position will be stronger still if they are left a document which they were to hand to the Italian Delegation.

President Wilson thinks it possible that S Tittoni might use the document in the press to the disadvantage of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Sir Maurice Hankey, at Mr Lloyd George’s request, reads aloud a draft statement to S Tittoni on behalf of the British and French Governments, prepared by Mr Balfour. The draft is not quite complete.

Mr Lloyd George thinks the draft is admirable, but points out that the operative words are lacking. He would like to conclude the memorandum by stating that it is no use having a discussion with the Italian Delegation while their troops remain in Asia Minor, and that before any discussion of Italian claims takes place, we must insist on their moving out.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to ask Mr Balfour to draft the last paragraph in the sense of Mr Lloyd George’s remarks, combined with the first paragraph of President Wilson’s instructions to his colleagues.)

Sailor Steve

06-28-19, 06:09 PM

Saturday, June 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

1. The following Treaties are signed to provide for assistance to France in the event of unprovoked aggression by Germany.

1) For assistance by the United States, signed by M Clemenceau, M Pichon, President Wilson and Mr Lansing.

2) For assistance by Great Britain, signed by M Clemenceau, M Pichon, Mr Lloyd George and Mr Balfour.

2. The representatives of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers initial the Reparation Clauses for the Austrian Treaty.

3. The representatives of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers initial the Financial Clauses for the Austrian Treaty.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward both the Reparation and Financial Clauses to the Secretary-General for communication to the Drafting Committee.)

4. Owing to the receipt of information that the Crown Prince has not escaped, it is agreed that the dispatch to the Dutch Government in regard to the security of the German ex-Kaiser should be communicated to the Dutch Government but not published.

5. The Council has before them a letter addressed by Mr Hoover to President Wilson, suggesting the appointment of a single temporary Resident Commissioner to Armenia, who should have the full authority of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy, in all their relations to the de-facto Armenian Government, as the joint representative of these Governments in Armenia.

(This proposal is accepted.)

6. The Council has before them a draft letter prepared by Mr Balfour inviting the Turkish Delegation to return to Paris.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the first paragraph of the letter should make it clearer that the Turkish Delegation had come here on their own initiative and had not been invited by the Powers.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to ask Mr Balfour to modify the letter accordingly.)

7. Sir Maurice Hankey reports that he had not been quite clear as to the precise terms of reference to the Commission on Mandates, which it had been decided to set up on the previous day.

(It is agreed that the terms of reference should be as follows:

1) To consider the drafting of model mandates.

2) To hear statements of the Belgian and Portuguese claims in regard to German East Africa.

3) To hear statements by the Aborigines Societies in regard to German East Africa.

4) To make a report on the Belgian and Portuguese claims in German East Africa.)

(Note: At this point there is a long discussion on the question of the Sud-Bahn railway, in which M Claveille, General Mance, S Crespi and Captain Young take part. This is recorded as a separate meeting.)

(Mr Hoover, Lord Robert Cecil, Mr Wise, M Clementel and S Crespi are introduced.)

8. Lord Robert Cecil says he had asked to see the Council because he was afraid of a hiatus occurring between the disappearance of the Supreme Economic Council and the setting up of new machinery for economic consultation under the League of Nations. As the Council were aware, the Supreme Economic Council provides all the necessary means of consultation at present. He feels it is hardly necessary to notify to the Council of the very serious position that exists in regard to the economic state of Europe in matters of relief, transportation, supplies, etc. It is not too much to say that we are on the verge of disaster in the majority of the countries in Europe. At any moment there might be the greatest necessity for the Governments to consult on the subject. It would be most serious if there were a gap in the means of consultation. If only the ordinary diplomatic channels were available for consultation, it would be impossible to get anything done. The decision required might be a question of days or almost of hours. He is anxious, therefore, to remove any possibility of such a gap. He hopes that it will be one of the first tasks of the Council of the League of Nations to provide for machinery for economic consultation. At one time the French representatives had put forward a scheme, but this had happened at the very end of the proceedings of the Commission and it had not been thought possible to adopt it. President Wilson, he thinks, would not be disposed to under-rate the importance of the economic side of international relationships. These are the reasons for formulating the following proposal.

“That in some form international consultation in economic matters should be continued until the Council of the League of Nations has had an opportunity of considering the present acute position of the International economic situation, and that it should be remitted to the Supreme Economic Council to establish the necessary machinery for the purpose.”

Lord Robert Cecil says he is prepared to substitute the word “propose” for “establish”.

M Clemenceau, after reading the French text, accepts.

President Wilson says he understands that he is the only obstacle to the acceptance of this resolution. All agree that the Economic Council will continue to function till Peace is ratified, which, he fears, might be some six weeks or two months hence. Consequently, there is ample time in which to consider other methods. What he wishes to guard against is any appearance that the Powers who had been Allies and Associates in the war were banding themselves together in an economic union directed against the Central Powers. Any appearance of an exclusive economic bloc must be avoided. Any means of consultation set up must not be open to this suggestion. He agrees, however, that some means of consultation is desirable and even necessary. As regards his own powers, he has to point out that his authority to sanction such consultation ends with the ratification of peace. After that, he will have no authority, and he is not entitled to delegate authority. Hence, it will be necessary for him to consult with his advisers as to whether any machinery can be devised within the Statutes of the United States of America, and if this is impossible, he might have to get a new Statute. He has no objection to the economic Council considering plans of consultation not having that appearance, but the wording must be very careful, and he must be very careful about his own attitude.

Lord Robert Cecil says that the Trades Union Congress at Southport had voted a demand for the Supreme Economic Council to continue as the only means of assisting Germany to tide over her economic difficulties. Credit, currency and many other matters must be dealt with as a whole for a year or two. Economic questions are very much interlaced. They cannot be considered for one country alone, hence consultation is essential.

President Wilson says he is fully agreed in this.

(After some further discussion the following resolution is adopted:

“That in some form, international consultation in economic matters should be continued until the Council of the League of Nations has had an opportunity of considering the present acute position of the International economic situation and that the Supreme Economic Council should be requested to suggest for the consideration of the several governments the methods of consultation which would be most serviceable for this purpose.”)

9. The Council has before them the draft telegram to Admiral Kolchak in connection with the proposal for the use of the Czechoslovak forces in Siberia to cooperate with the right wing of Admiral Kolchak’s Army.

(It is agreed that subject to the approval of the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, who, with the addition of representatives of Japan and Czechoslovakia, are considering this subject, the telegram should be dispatched on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers by M Clemenceau as President of the Peace Conference, to Admiral Kolchak.)

Sailor Steve

06-28-19, 06:41 PM

Saturday, June 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 12:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

(This meeting takes place in the middle of the 11:00 Meeting, and involves M Claveille, General Mance, S Crespi and Captain Young in a discussion concerning the Sud-Bahn Railway.)

President Wilson asks S Crespi to be good enough to explain the situation.

S Crespi says that an agreement has almost been reached and all feel that it is very necessary to reach one. The only objection is that questions of private financial interests between Companies and States should not find a place in a Treaty of Peace. This principle has been asserted by the Supreme Council which had declared that no clause in the Treaty should mention any private interest. The Italian Delegation has a new proposal to make on this question, of which the following was the text:

“With the object of ensuring regular utilization of the railroads of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy owned by private companies, which, as a result of the stipulations of the Treaty, will be situated in the territory of several States, the administrative and technical reorganization of the said lines shall be regulated in each instance by an agreement between the owning Company and the States territorially concerned. Any differences on which agreement is not reached, including questions relating to the interpretation of contracts concerning the expropriation of lines, shall be submitted to an arbitrator designated by the Council of the League of Nations.”

S Crespi thinks that this proposal covers all the difficulties, as it refers to technical questions as well as those regarding the interpretation of the contract between the various Companies to an arbitrator appointed by the League of Nations.

M Claveille says that he has certain observations to make. He wishes to have a hearing, because if the proposals just made are accepted, the result will be that only States territorially concerned would have a share in the ultimate agreement. It is only just that France should not be detrimentally affected. The capital invested in these Companies is largely French. More than three-quarters of the bond-holders are French, and they represent a capital of more than a milliard and a half. He makes no mention of the shares which are mostly held by Austro-Hungarians. When this railroad system was partitioned it was inconceivable, seeing that the capital invested in it belonged to France, that France should have no share in the discussion. He thought a remedy to this could easily be found by a slight alteration in the proposal just made, namely, by substituting for the words “states territorially concerned” a list of the States, including France.

President Wilson says that the text used the word “contracts”. He presumes that this means contracts between the companies and the heirs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

General Mance observes that each Company would have to make new contracts with the new States.

President Wilson says that if the rights are not transferred automatically by the Treaty, the inclusion of new parties will from the legal aspect be wrong.

S Crespi said that he cannot accept the addition proposed by M Claveille. There are bond-holders in Italy also. Their interests are quite well represented by the directors of the Company, whose business it is to look after the interests of its creditors. It would be contrary to all commercial laws to allow shareholders to intervene in the administration of a Company.

M Claveille says that the Board of Directors is Austro-Hungarian and a center of Germanization. It represents worthless paper, the only paper of any value being French. The bondholders therefore in equity have a right to intervene, and it is intended to put them aside at the very moment when the railway system is to be partitioned. He thinks this proposal unacceptable.

M Clemenceau says that France is simply being denied what she has a right to. A milliard and a half is being taken from her pocket.

Mr Lloyd George says that the British interest is relatively small as compared with the interest of France. He quite understands the reasons brought forward by the French representatives, but on the other hand he had been impressed by S Crespi’s argument. It is a serious matter to have France and Great Britain represented in matters regarding Austrian, Czechoslovak, Italian or Yugoslav railways, simply because these countries had invested capital in these concerns. It is alleged that the Board of Directors is Austro-Hungarian and more or less controlled by Germany, but this must surely have been the case at the time when French and British shareholders invested their capital. S Crespi had shown the danger of introducing into this matter any State whose intervention could put a stop to everything. He says this after a prolonged conversation with his experts. He repeats that it is a very serious thing that France and Great Britain should intervene in matters regarding the administration of railroads in foreign countries merely because their subjects had invested money in them. He thinks S Crespi has gone a long way in accepting arbitration by the Council of the League of Nations for technical matters as well as for the expropriation of the lines.

M Claveille says that it is not merely a question of purchase. The railroad is nearly 2,000 kilometres long, and France, by reason of the capital invested, owns three-quarters. This railroad is to be partitioned among four Powers, each of which would be in a position to make a separate contract. This might result in the destruction of the work accomplished by France. Could the country which had paid the bill be excluded from the debate? This appears to him inadmissible. France does not ask to settle the question alone, but only to take a share in the discussion.

M Clemenceau says that it amounts to taking money from French pockets. He regards this as scandalous. This will be very deeply felt by public opinion in France, and such an action cannot be represented as in the interests of justice.

S Crespi says that there is a misunderstanding. The arbitration of the League of Nations is accepted for the solution of the whole matter.

M Clemenceau says this was no doubt so, but it was also true that if the four contracting States agree, there will be no arbitration, and the game will be lost to France. After the war waged by France, and the losses sustained by her in it, such a situation is quite unendurable, and he refuses with the utmost energy to accept the proposal. He regrets having to take such a decision, but the uncompromising spirit shown forces him to do so.

President Wilson says that such a question cannot remain an open one, as it is part of the Treaty with Austria, which cannot indefinitely wait for settlement.

Mr Lloyd George says that General Mance had explained the French point of view to him, and he thoroughly understands it. He would observe that under the previous regime the Austro-Hungarian State had the right to expropriate the Company at any moment. He would ask therefore what change had been brought about by the new situation.

M Claveille says that the proposal is unacceptable, both in form and in substance. It would amount to this - that the four States could come to an agreement, though they own but a very small share of the invested capital. It is indeed extremely likely that they would reach an agreement. Arbitration would then not be resorted to, and French interests would be eliminated without even a hearing. The question of expropriation is not as simple as it seems. The railroad stretches over four States, and affords access for Czechoslovakia to the Adriatic. France had taken a considerable share in this. According to the Treaty, the four States are free to purchase or not to purchase the line. They will be in a position to share it and to partition the material constituting it. It cannot be permitted that French savings, which had invested a milliard and a half, should have no voice in the final settlement. France has already lost 10 milliards in Russia. She has suffered more than any other country in the war, and now she is to be robbed of a milliard and a half. If this is done there will be an overwhelming torrent of indignation in public opinion.

President Wilson asks whether it is not obvious that the four States would have every interest in developing the lines, as they are essential to their economic life.

M Claveille says that he does not expect them to destroy the line, but he thinks they will appropriate it at a low rate.

Mr Lloyd George says he cannot see any difference between the new situation and that which existed before the war. If Austria-Hungary still existed, she would be able to expropriate, and France could not make any resistance. It seemed to him that expropriation is less likely at the present time since it requires the previous agreement of the four States.

M Claveille says that there is yet a further point that has not been mentioned. The Company until 1875 had owned lines in Italy. At that period the Italian lines had been expropriated. Since then Italy had paid an annual indemnity of 29,000,000 francs. According to the Treaty, he gathers that this sum is to be paid in future by the Austrians. In regard to Austria, France takes her place, with all the other Allies, among the creditors, and it is well-known how little would be received under this head. Hitherto, payment had been made by the Italian Government in Paris. This shows to what extent French interests are concerned in these lines.

S Crespi says that the Italian Government has always paid in Rome.

M Claveille says he is ready to demonstrate the contrary.

S Crespi says that in the Convention it was stated that payment should be made in gold in Rome. If no gold were available, payment should be made in Paris or London, preferably in Paris.

M Clemenceau says that France will be ready to accept payment in Rome, but not to be referred to Austria, which would pay nothing.

Mr Lloyd George says that this discussion might reopen the whole question. It appears to him impossible to delay the Treaty of Peace with Austria merely because of shareholders. If this were to come about, it would be necessary to make it quite clear that it was for reasons of this sort that France had opposed the settlement of the question. This is his view.

M Clemenceau says that he holds a different view. Moreover, he is quite ready to reveal all the details of the question to public opinion.

(The discussion is adjourned, and no solution is reached.)

Sailor Steve

06-28-19, 07:08 PM

PEACE CONGRESS (VERSAILLES), PROTOCOL NO. 2, Plenary Session of June 28, 1919, 15:00.

Signature of the Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany

The Plenipotentiaries of the Powers hereinafter enumerated met in the Galerie des Glaces at the Château de Versailles, in order to sign the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany. Their seals have been previously affixed to this instrument.

The Session is opened at 15 o’clock (3 p.m.) under the presidency of Mr Georges Clemenceau, President.

Present

For the United States of America:
The President of the United States.
Honorable Robert Lansing.
Honorable Henry White.
Honorable Edward M House.
General Tasker H Bliss.

For the British Empire:

Great Britain:
The Rt Hon David Lloyd George.
The Rt Hon A J Balfour.
The Rt Hon A Bonar Law.
The Rt Hon. The Viscount Milner, G C B, G C M G, Secretary of State for the Colonies.
The Rt Hon G N Barnes.

Canada:
The Hon C J Doherty, Minister of Justice.
The Hon Arthur L Sifton.

Australia:
The Rt Hon W M Hughes.
The Rt Hon Sir Joseph Cook.

South Africa:
General the Rt Hon Louis Botha.
Lieut-General the Rt Hon J C Smuts.

New Zealand:
The Rt Hon W F Massey.

India:
The Rt Hon E S Montagu, M P, Secretary of State for India.
Major-General His Highness Sir Ganga Singh, Bahadur, Maharaja of Bikaner.

For France:
M Georges Clemenceau.
M Pichon.
M L L Klotz.
M A Tardieu.
M Jules Cambon.

For Italy:
Baron S Sonnino, Deputy.
The Marquis G Imperiali, Senator, Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Italy at London.
S S Crespi, Deputy.

For Japan:
Marquis Saionji.
Baron Makino.
Viscount Chinda.
Mr K Matsui.
Mr H Ijuin.

For Belgium:
M Hymans.
M van den Heuvel.
M Vandervelde.

For Bolivia:
Sr Isniaël Montes, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Bolivia at Paris.

For Brazil:
Sh Pandia Calogeras.
Sh Rodrigo Octavio L de Menezes, Professor of International Law at Rio de Janeiro.

For Cuba:
Sr Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante.

For Ecuador:
Sr Dorn y de Alsua, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Ecuador at Paris.

For Greece:
Mr Eleftherios Veniselos.
Mr Nicolas Politis.

For Guatemala:
Sr Joaquín Mendéz.

For Haiti:
M Tertullien Guilbaud.

For the Hedjaz:
Mr Rustem Haïdar.
Mr Abdul Hadi Aouni.

For Honduras:
Dr. Policarpo Bonilla.

For Liberia:
Hon C D B King.

For Nicaragua:
Sr Salvador Chamorro.

For Panama:
Sr Antonio Burgos.

For Peru:
Sr Carlos G Candamo, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Peru at Paris.

For Poland:
Mr Roman Dmowski.
Mr Ignace Paderewski.

For Portugal:
Dr Affonso Costa.
Sh Augusto Soares.

For Romania:
Mr Jean J C Bratiano.
General Constantin Coanda, Corps Commander, A D C to the King, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.

For the Serb-Croat-Slovene State:
Mr N P Pachitch.
Mr Ante Trumbitch.
Mr Milenko R Vesnitch.

For Siam:
Prince Charoon.
Prince Traidos Prabandhu.

For the Czechoslovak Republic:
Mr Charles Kramar.
Mr Edouard Benes.

For Uruguay:
Sr Jean Antonio Buero, Minister for Foreign Affairs, formerly Minister of Industry.

For Germany:
Herr Hermann Müller, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Empire.
Dr Bell, Minister of the Empire.

The President, speaking in French, explains the purpose of the meeting in the following terms:

“Agreement has been reached in regard to the conditions of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and the German Empire.

The text has been drawn up; the President of the Conference has certified in writing to the identity of the text to be signed with that of the two hundred copies which were handed to the German Delegates.

The signatures are about to be appended; they will signify an irrevocable undertaking to observe and carry out, loyally, faithfully, and integrally, all the conditions which have been laid down.

I have therefore the honor to request the German Plenipotentiaries to be good enough to come and place their signatures on the Treaty which lies before me.”

The foregoing speech is translated into English and German.

The Plenipotentiaries of Germany, and after them the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers, enumerated above; successively sign the Treaty of Peace, and the Protocol indicating precisely the conditions in which certain provisions of that Treaty are to be carried out.

The Plenipotentiaries of the United States of America, of Belgium, of the British Empire, and of France, of the one part, and of Germany of the other part, sign the Agreement with regard to the military occupation of the territories of the Rhine.

The Plenipotentiaries of the United States of America, of the British Empire, of France, of Italy, and of Japan, of the one part, and of Poland, of the other part, sign a Treaty in regard to Poland.

The President records the fact that these signatures have been appended in the following terms:—

“The signatures have all been given.

The signature of the conditions of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and the German Empire is an accomplished fact.”

The Agenda being disposed of, the Session is adjourned at 15.50 o’clock (3.50 p.m.)

The President,
G Clemenceau.
The Secretary General,
P Dutasta.

The Secretaries,
J C Grew,
Paul Gauthier,
M P A Hankey,
G de Martino,
Ashida.

Sailor Steve

06-28-19, 08:44 PM

Saturday, June 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Foyer of the Senate Chamber of the Chateau at Versailles, Paris, 17:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

1. M Mantoux, at M Clemenceau’s request, reads the English translation of a letter from Herr Bethmann-Hollweg insisting that any responsibility on the part of the German Government for the events that precipitated the War in August 1914 was his and not the Kaiser’s, since he had been Imperial Chancellor of the German Empire. From this he deduced that the Allied and Associated Powers ought to call him and not the Kaiser to account.

M Clemenceau suggests that the reply should be that when the Tribunal is constituted his letter will be put before it.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the Tribunal has nothing to do except try the Kaiser and cannot be made responsible for this matter.

M Clemenceau asks if Bethmann-Hollweg is on the list of persons to be tried.

President Wilson says that there are two categories. The Kaiser is in one category alone to be tried, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. Those in the second category are to be tried for acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. Bethmann-Hollweg does not fall into either category.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the answer should be that he cannot be accepted as responsible for the Kaiser who, by the German Constitution, is alone responsible.

President Wilson says that Bethmann-Hollweg is acting on the theory that the German Constitution is similar to that of Great Britain or France, under either of which the Minister is responsible. The Chancellor of the German Empire, however, is under the direct control of the Kaiser.

Baron Sonnino says that the text of the letter will require careful study before a reply is sent.

President Wilson says that the reply should express the recognition of the Allied and Associated Powers of the spirit in which the offer was made, but should state that Bethmann-Hollweg’s interpretation of the German Constitution cannot be accepted.

Baron Makino expresses the view that by constitutional law the Minister would be the responsible party.

(It is agreed that the Commission on Responsibilities, of which Mr Lansing is Chairman, should be asked to draft a reply to Bethmann-Hollweg’s letter, but that a general indication should be given to the Commission of the Council’s view as to the nature of the reply formed without an opportunity for close examination of the facts, namely, that the Allied and Associated Powers recognize the spirit in which the offer was made but cannot accept Bethmann-Hollweg’s interpretation of the German Constitution.)

2. President Wilson says that immediately before the Meeting of the Peace Conference for the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, Mr Hoover had sent him word that two of his relief agents for the distribution of food, had been arrested by the Germans in Libau.

(It is agreed that Marshal Foch should be asked, through the Armistice Commission, to make an immediate demand for the release of these agents, laying special emphasis on the fact that this incident had occurred before an apology had been offered for the recent arrest by the Germans of British Naval Officers in the Baltic Provinces, if the Council are correct in assuming that no such apology has been made to the demand approved by them on June 4th.

3. Sir Maurice Hankey says he has been asked by various officials to supply copies of the Notes of the Meetings of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and he asks for instructions.

M Clemenceau said that in his view they ought not to be communicated to anyone and that there should be a general agreement to this effect.

Baron Sonnino points out that the question will arise immediately in connection with the Italian Delegation as to whether those records should be handed by one Government to their successors in Office. In his view this is indispensable. He cannot vouch for it that S Orlando had not already given them to S Tittoni. It would be very difficult for the new Government to conduct the business if it did not know what had been decided by its predecessors in the Council.

President Wilson expresses a strong view that these documents ought to be treated as purely private conversations. He recalls that it was on his initiative that the meetings of this small group had been held. He had invited his colleagues to meet him for the purpose of private conversations at his own house. For a long time no notes had been kept at all. Later, however, it had been realized that this was not a very convenient procedure and Secretaries had been admitted. If, however, he had thought that these Notes were to be passed on to Government Departments, he would have insisted on adhering to the system under which no secretaries were present. All the decisions had been communicated to the officials who had to carry them out, but he had the strongest objections to the communication of the accounts given in the Notes of the private conversations. All present had spoken their minds with great freedom. Contradictions could, no doubt, be found in the Notes to what had been said at different times and under different circumstances. It is even conceivable that political opponents who came into possession of these documents might misuse them. He does not think that properly speaking the Council could be described as an official body. The only official body is the Conference of Peace. The present group had rightly, as he thought, taken upon itself to formulate the decisions for the Peace Conference, but their conversations ought not to be regarded as official. He sees no objection to the communication of the notes to individuals in the personal confidence of members of the Council, for example, he had instructed Sir Maurice Hankey to communicate a complete set of the documents to Mr Lansing, who is a minister appointed by himself and in his entire confidence.

M Clemenceau says that if he had to resign Office, he would find it a great embarrassment not to hand over these documents to his successor in Office. He does not think that they can be regarded as private property.

Baron Sonnino says that perhaps these need not be regarded as official reports since they had not been carefully checked and corrected. Nevertheless, they contain important statements which, in some cases, are not recorded as conclusions. He quotes one case for example, where S Orlando had made an important statement of which the Council had taken formal note, and this, he believed, was merely recorded in the procès-verbal. It might be very important for S Orlando’s successor in office to have a copy of this.

M Clemenceau recalls a similar case where he had insisted on the importance of interpreting certain provisions in the resolutions regarding mandates, so as to enable France to use African soldiers for the defense of her territory, and Mr Lloyd George had suggested that it would be sufficient to mention it in the procès-verbal.

President Wilson says that certainly such statements should be regarded as official, but nevertheless he thinks the actual conversations which led up to the conclusions reached should be regarded as private.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the precedents ought to be looked up. For example, he would like to know whether the procès-verbaux of all conversations which took place in the Treaty of Berlin had been published.

President Wilson says that probably at the Congress of Berlin there had been recorded formal Conferences and informal conversations which were not recorded.

Mr Lloyd George says that he had never had time to look at the notes at all.

M Clemenceau says that he also had never had time. He recalls, however, that Sir Maurice Hankey had several times been called upon to refer to what had occurred at the Council, for example, an important statement by Marshal Foch had been referred to at a recent meeting.

President Wilson says that when such references had been made, he had been much struck with the accuracy of the record. He thinks that every action taken and every conclusion reached should be recorded as official and should be available in the appropriate offices, but not the conversations.

Baron Sonnino says that they certainly should not be publishable or even presentable to Parliament, but he thinks that the successors of the Government in office, if challenged, must be in a position to know what had happened.

President Wilson lays emphasis on the difference between handing on to a successor or to a set of Government officials, and to a confidential and trusted colleague.

Baron Sonnino thinks it would be very hard on a new Government not to have these documents.

President Wilson says he realizes that the United States works under a different Parliamentary system. There, no one has the right to claim documents of this kind. One adverse comment that might be made is that no Secretary had been present representing the United States of America. His reply would be that he had had complete confidence in the Secretaries who had been present, but the criticism might be made, The net result seemed to be that each Government must take the course traditional in its own country with the clear and distinct understanding that no one should, under any circumstances, make the procès-verbal public.

Mr Lloyd George says that if an attack were made on the political heads, he might feel bound, in particular cases, to refer to these notes. He gives fair warning that he might have to do this unless someone protests now.

M Clemenceau says it would not be possible to refuse extracts from the procès-verbal to prove particular facts.

4. The re-draft by Mr Balfour of a letter to the Turkish Delegation is approved.

The letter is handed to Capt. Portier to prepare a French copy for M Clemenceau’s signature.

5. The Council has before them a memorandum by M Larnaude on the suggestion that steps should be taken to make the execution of Clauses 214 to 224 Prisoner and (Repatriation of Prisoners) and Clauses 227 to 230 (Penalties) in the Treaty of Peace with Germany interdependent.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that each case ought to be considered on its merits. He would like to consider the particular case proposed by Sir Ernest Pollock, namely, supposing Germany, without adequate reason, fails to deliver up the culprits, is the return of German prisoners to be slowed down?

Baron Sonnino says that the suggestion is all right in a general way, but the question is how far the principle should be applied in particular cases.

Mr Lloyd George says that M Larnaude’s proposal deals with a substantial failure on the part of the Germans to carry out the Treaty, which is tantamount to a refusal to accept it. When the names of the persons to be surrendered is communicated to Germany, the Allies ought to be in a position to say that they will not complete the surrender of prisoners until Germany hands them over.

Baron Sonnino says he does not like linking one case with another in the manner proposed by M Larnaude.

M Clemenceau says he is afraid that all the prisoners will have been handed over before the Germans are bound to fulfill their part of the Treaty.

President Wesson says that it is physically impossible to do this. He hopes that before all the German prisoners have been surrendered, some indication would be given as to whether the Germans are carrying out the Treaty.

6. M Clemenceau says that Herr von Haniel had asked M Dutasta whether some Conferences should not now take place with the Germans in regard to the execution of the Treaty of Peace. He sees no objection to this, and if his colleagues will permit, he proposes to ask M Dutasta to make some arrangement with the Germans.

Mr Lloyd George points out that it had been agreed to set up a Committee in regard to the execution of the Treaty and he thought that they might be the medium for these conversations.

(Both M Clemenceau’s and Mr Lloyd George’s proposals are agreed to.)

7. Sir Maurice Hankey says that he has encountered difficulty in giving effect to the decision taken at the meeting in the morning, to appoint a single temporary resident Commissioner to Armenia. It appears to him that the matter requires a good deal of administrative action.

(It is agreed that the Council of Ten should be asked to concert the necessary administrative steps to give effect to this decision.)

8. (It is agreed that the Joint Note by the Admirals of the Allied and Associated Powers, dated 27th June, 1919, on the subject of the disposal of German and Austro-Hungarian warships, should be referred to the Council of Ten.)

9. The Council takes note of the letter from General Bliss, reporting that he has no information to confirm the statement of Bela Kun in regard to the alleged resumption of hostilities by the Romanians.

Sailor Steve

06-28-19, 08:54 PM

Saturday, June 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Foyer of the Senate Chamber of the Chateau at Versailles, Paris, 18:00

Meeting of the Council of Three

President Wilson reads aloud a re-draft of the proposed statement to the Italian Government, prepared by Mr Balfour.

(Note: During the Meeting Baron Makino and Baron Sonnino arrive, but Mr Lloyd George leaves the room to explain to them that the subject under consideration is Declarations by France and Great Britain on the one hand, and by the United States of America, on the other hand, to the new Italian Delegation, and they withdraw.)

The above statement is approved, subject to some small amendments the most important of which is the omission of a reference to the Dodecanese, which, it is considered, might be interpreted as a repudiation of the Treaty of London.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to obtain the signature of Mr Lloyd George before his departure, and subsequently that of M Clemenceau, who undertakes to communicate it to the Italians.

President Wilson says he is forwarding a separate statement, which he intends to contain a reference to the Dodecanese, as he is not bound by the Treaty of London.

Jimbuna

06-29-19, 05:37 AM

29th June 1919

The Treaty of Versailles is signed between Germany and the Allied Powers.
https://i.imgur.com/LvM5BEi.jpg

Men stand up on desks and chairs to catch a glimpse of the signing of the Versailles Treaty.
https://i.imgur.com/nKa129P.jpg

Town Hall of Auckland, New Zealand lit up to celebrate the signing of the Versailles Treaty.
https://i.imgur.com/OvKjO42.jpg

Some criticize the treaty for being too harsh towards Germany, while French Marshal Ferdinand Foch believes it is too lenient. He states, “This is not a peace. It is an armistice for twenty years.” (WWII starts 20 years and 65 days later).
https://i.imgur.com/nPHYA96.jpg

Harry and Bess Truman marry in Independence, Missouri after his return from the war in Europe.
https://i.imgur.com/mPJBdED.png

Sailor Steve

06-29-19, 02:32 PM

With the Treaty signed, the purpose of the Council of Three/Four/Five is ended. There are no meetings until July 1st when the new interim Council is put in place to govern until the League of Nations can take over. American President Wilson and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George make plans to return to their own countries in order to convince Congress and Parliament to ratify the Treaty, while French President Georges Clemenceau helps set up the new Council.

Jimbuna

06-30-19, 07:43 AM

30th June 1919

British tanks passing through the streets of Cologne, occupied-Germany.
https://i.imgur.com/jntL4fU.jpg

John William Strutt, 3rd Baron Rayleigh, British physicist who won the 1904 Nobel Prize in Physics, has passed away.
https://i.imgur.com/ZLRRIlS.jpg

Jimbuna

07-01-19, 11:02 AM

1st July 1919

President Wilson leaves France to return to the U.S. after the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty.
https://i.imgur.com/lTxgy9z.png

U.S. Navy dirigible C-8 (pictured is the sister ship C-7) explodes while landing at Camp Holabird, Maryland, injuring several dozen spectators.
https://i.imgur.com/pD2AEPr.jpg

Bars in New York City become crowded as prohibition of alcohol will come into effect in the city at midnight.
https://i.imgur.com/dOycCTw.jpg

Sailor Steve

07-01-19, 05:11 PM

Tuesday, July 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 16:00

First Meeting of the new Council of Five

United States:
Hon R Lansing

Mr L Harrison (Secretary)

British Empire:
The Rt Hon A J Balfour, M P

Mr H Norman (Secretary)

France:
M Clemenceau
M Pichon
M Loucheur

M Dutasta
M Berthelot
M de Bearn
Capt de St Quentin (Secretaries)

Italy:
S Tittoni

S di Martino (Secretary)

Japan:
H E Baron Makino
H E Viscount Chinda

Joint Secretariat
United States Lieut Burden
British Empire Capt Abraham
France Capt. A. Portier
Japan M. Saburi
Italy Lieut Zanchi

Interpreter Prof P J Mantoux

1. M Clemenceau says that he thinks the first business the Council should deal with is to nominate a Committee to watch the execution of the clauses of the Treaty with Germany when ratified.

Mr Balfour says that he intends to nominate Sir Eyre Crowe.

M Clemenceau says that his nominee is M Tardieu. The Committee is to have no executive power but should superintend the work of all Commissions dealing with the details of the provisions of the Treaty. The Committee will report to the Council from time to time what progress was being made and what further action might be needed.

Mr Lansing says that he will have to consider what nomination to make.

S Tittoni said that he can give the name of the Italian member on the following day.

Baron Makino nominated Mr Otchiai.

(It is agreed that the nominations should be made at the Meeting on the following day.)

2. M Clemenceau said he would ask M Loucheur to explain the functions of a Committee to deal with the Reparation clauses of the Treaty and to explain the necessity for its labors to begin at once, seeing that the Germans have already made certain inquiries regarding the execution of the provisions concerning the occupied districts.

M Loucheur says the proposal is to nominate a Committee with one member and one assistant from each of the following five nations: France, Great Britain, United States, Italy and Belgium.

S Tittoni asks whether the Committee will deal with devastated districts of all fronts including the Italian.

M Loucheur replies in the affirmative, but adds that it is not intended to form the Committee at once in its final shape. Each Government will be able to consider the question at leisure, especially as there will be a big staff and a very large organisation. What he proposes for the time being is a Committee to prepare the ground. It is to this Committee that he suggests that each of the Powers mentioned should nominate one delegate and one assistant. During the intermediate period between the nomination of this Committee and the formation of the ultimate organisation, he thinks that this body should be authorized to converse with the Germans with the object of shaping a plan for procedure in the future. Subcommittees to deal with Finance, Rebuilding, etc. can be set up at a later time.

Mr Balfour says that he understands that this Committee will have a double function:

(1) To organize the future Reparation Commission provided for in the Treaty.

(2) To deal with the Germans and the problems raised by them in the meantime. He further asks why Serbia was excluded.

M Loucheur says that it is intended that Serbia should take the place of Belgium whenever the question of Serbian devastated territory arises. Japan will take the place of Belgium in matters regarding the Far East and damage at sea. The preliminary organisation, however, should, he suggests, be done by nominees of the five Powers first mentioned. There will, therefore, be four permanent members in the final Commission and one changeable member. He would ask that the nominations should be made within 24 hours, and that the Committee should meet on the afternoon of the 3rd. July, 1919.

(It is agreed that the nominations should be made at the Meeting on the following day.)

3. Mr Lansing says that he has not brought a second American Delegate with him under the impression that this was to be a Council of Five.

M Clemenceau says that it is indeed to be a Council of Five, but he had asked M Pichon to come as he would himself have to leave the Meeting.

Mr Lansing says that his experience is that in a Council of Ten, in practice one delegate speaks. The other does not, but by sitting in the Council he becomes acquainted with the whole course of the work, and is therefore prepared at any moment to take charge, should his colleague for any reason be unable to attend.

M Clemenceau says that he has no objection to raise if it is desired that two delegates from each nation be present.

Mr Balfour says that the mere presence of a large number makes a physical difference. He thinks conversation is simpler and more informal at a gathering of five. Even a silent Delegate interposed between each of the spokesmen cramps the conversation. There had been many objections no doubt to the procedure in the Council of Four, but there had been this great advantage.

M Clemenceau asks whether Mr Lansing insists on his point of view. He himself shares Mrs Balfour’s.

Mr Lansing says he will not insist, but he feels the advantage of having a second delegate present. The day’s proceedings can be talked over with the second delegate with much advantage to both. He points out that there must always be others present in the room. He is strongly in favour of having enough secretaries present to make a full and agreed record of what took place.

S Tittoni says that he sees good reasons for both points of view, but he is prepared to agree to a Council of Five if his colleagues desire it.

Mr Balfour suggests that a start be made with a Council of Five, subject to alteration if necessary.

(This is agreed to.)

4. Mr Lansing asks whether the decisions reached by the Council are final.

M Clemenceau replies in the affirmative.

5. Mr Lansing says that a number of Notes have been received from the Austrian Delegation. None of them have yet been replied to. He would suggest that Commissions be appointed to deal with each section of the Treaty affected by any of the Austrian Notes. He has prepared a draft resolution on this subject.

M Clemenceau says that what Mr Lansing desires is being done.

Mr Lansing says that he does not allude to Committees employed on completing the unfinished portions of the Austrian Treaty. What he proposes are Committees to deal with the Austrian counter proposals to the portions of the Treaty which have been presented.

Mr Balfour said he understands that the same Committees which had prepared the answers to the German Notes are preparing answers to the Austrian Notes.

M Dutasta explains that there is a Section dealing with the Geographical questions, another dealing with the points relating to the League of Nations, another with the points raised concerning private property, in accordance with a decision taken by the Council of Four.

Mr Lansing observes that the American Delegation knows nothing of this. The American Experts on Austrian affairs are not the same as the Experts on German affairs.

M Dutasta says that the Secretariat-General had informed the Secretaries of the various Delegations asking each to nominate suitable delegates. Nominations had already been made for the Committee on Geographical questions, and the Committee was to meet on the following day.

(It is agreed that M Dutasta should make a full report on the situation on the following day.)

M Clemenceau says that the following subjects had been suggested:

Agenda for Future Meetings Frontiers in the following areas:

1) The Banat.

2) Bukovina.

3) Bessarabia.

M Dutasta says that the frontiers in the Banat had been fixed and the decision had been communicated to the Yugoslavs and to the Romanians. The frontiers in Bukovina had also been settled but not yet communicated.

It is decided that the communication should be made.

S Tittoni inquires whether the frontiers had been only recommended by Commissions or whether they had been fixed by decisions of the Council?

M Clemenceau says that they had been fixed by the Council.

M Clemenceau asks whether anything has been done regarding Bessarabia.

M Dutasta replies that as this subject concerns Russia, no decision has been made but the matter had been studied by the Romanian Commission.

Mr Balfour thinks that it is unnecessary to reach a decision concerning Bessarabia as no Treaty of Peace had to be made either with Russia or with Romania. He thinks that there are many questions of importance of which no doubt the Bessarabian question is one, but he thinks the Council should first deal with whatever is required to bring about peace with the enemy States.

S Tittoni thinks that the Council should make an effort to eliminate elements of disturbance and that the area in question is very disturbed.

M Clemenceau says that he agreed with S Tittoni. Mr Balfour’s proposals follow the logical order, but facts are louder than logic. He thinks the Council should attempt to suppress disorder as much as possible. He suggests that M Tardieu should be heard on the following day for half an hour on Bessarabia. No decision need be taken now.

Mr Balfour says that if that half hour is not required for other purposes, he will be delighted to hear M Tardieu.

Mr Lansing asks who will represent the Russians.

M Pichon suggests that Mr Maklakof might be heard.

S Tittoni said that if a Russian is to be heard, a Romanian should also be heard.

Mr Lansing suggests that if this is done, they should be heard separately.

This is agreed to, and it is decided that M Tardieu be asked to make a report on the following day regarding Bessarabia and that Mr Maklakof on behalf of Russia, and a Romanian delegate be heard separately on the same subject.

6. Mr Balfour observes that there can be no peace with Bulgaria without determining Bulgarian frontiers. He suggests that this subject be examined by a Committee. No Committee, however, can deal with the frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey since the whole Turkish question is still unsolved and was to be solved as a whole hereafter. He suggests that the Committee be instructed to consider provisionally the Enos Midia line as the extreme frontier of Bulgaria on that side.

It is agreed that on the following day nominations should be made for the special Commission regarding Bulgaria.

The Agenda for the following day is therefore:

1) Nominations for Committee to supervise the execution of the Treaty with Germany.

2) Nomination of organizing Committee for Separation.

3) Nominations for Committee on Bulgarian affairs.

4) Report of M Dutasta regarding procedure in dealing with Austrian Note.

5) Hearing of M Tardieu, Mr Maklakof and a Romanian Delegate regarding Bessarabia.

Mr Lansing says that he would like to add two short proposals to the Agenda. He has prepared two draft resolutions.

It is agreed that these draft resolutions should be considered and that the next meeting should take place at 15:30 on the following day.

Jimbuna

07-02-19, 10:06 AM

2nd July 1919

A film of the famed “Lost Battalion,” which became surrounded during the Argonne Offensive, is released, starring many of the actual soldiers of the battle as themselves.
https://i.imgur.com/avTVdmt.jpg

British airship R34 leaves Britain to attempt the first trans-Atlantic crossing by dirigible.
https://i.imgur.com/2I0tig6.jpg

Sailor Steve

07-02-19, 10:17 PM

Wednesday, July 2, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers with Mr Maklakof, Delegate from Russia.

1. M Tardieu explains that M Pichon is unavoidably prevented from attending the meeting. He asks Mr Lansing to take the chair.

Mr Lansing asks M Tardieu to take the chair himself.

M Tardieu does so. He says that he had been asked to open the discussion on Bessarabia by explaining the views of the Committee which had studied the question. He reads the Report made by the Committee:

“The Committee, after taking into consideration the general aspirations of the population of Bessarabia and the Moldavian character of that region from the geographical and ethnical points of view, as well as the historical and economic arguments, pronounces itself in favour of joining Bessarabia to Romania.

It considers that this measure should be effected in a form which will safeguard the general interests of Bessarabia, more especially as concerns its relations with the neighboring countries, and which will guarantee the rights of minorities in conformity with the provisions of the League of Nations.”

Since the Committee had reported, a protest had been received from Mr Tchaikowsky on behalf of the Russian Committees in Paris, protesting against any annexation by Romania, and stating that Russia could not recognize any such act, and further alleging that the Romanian troops had behaved in a very arbitrary manner in the country. Mr Tchaikowsky ended by demanding a free plebiscite.

Mr Lansing says that the practical question was to know whether a decision regarding Bessarabia could find a place in any of the Treaties of Peace.

Mr Balfour points out that he had made the same remark on the previous day. He had thought it was important to do all that was necessary to complete the Treaties first. M Clemenceau, however, had thought the Bessarabian question pressing and had therefore urged that it be taken up. Mr Lansing, however, points out that no resolution can be adopted on the subject, and this statement has not been met by any dissent.

Mr Lansing observes that the powers accorded to him as plenipotentiary were limited to the negotiation of Peace. They do not enable him to deal with a conflict between two friendly Powers. President Wilson, no doubt, might have been able to deal with such a question. He himself is not in that position.

M Tardieu says that it had been decided on the previous day to hear a Russian and a Romanian representative. They had been asked to come, and each would doubtless say what he thought should be the frontier line in Bessarabia. Should the two agree, which he admitted was not likely, Mr Lansing would not be placed in the difficulty to which he alluded. Should they not agree, the Council would then be forced to see what further action could be taken. He would point out, however, that it is difficult to make a Treaty with Romania if one of her frontiers were left gaping. He suggests that Mr Maklakof should be heard.

Mr Lansing agrees to this, but points out, however, that if any resolution is asked for, he could not take any share in it. He has given this warning in order that no false impression should be produced.

(At this stage, Mr Maklakof enters the room, and is asked by M Tardieu to express his views on Bessarabia.)

Mr Maklakof says that two memoranda had already been sent to the Peace Conference on the subject of Bessarabia; he would endeavor to give a gist of the argument. In the first place, he must point out that no portion of the domains of the Russian State could be disposed of by third parties without the consent of that State. Not even the Peace Conference could assume that power. He and his friends have no authority to speak for any constituted Government of Russia. He wishes to make this point quite clear at the outset.

As to the merits of the question, he would observe that there has never been any agreement between Romania and Russia authorizing the former to demand Bessarabia. Romania had entered the war on certain terms. These terms had not touched the question of Bessarabia. Romania could therefore base no claim on any clause in any Treaty. Neither could Romania claim the right of conquest. These two arguments being set aside, it is alleged that Bessarabia should go to Romania by reason of the principle that peoples had a right to dispose of themselves. He would not discuss this principle, subject to limitations, though it might be. He would admit it, and he would further admit that if there were any Russian subjects of Romanian nationality who wished to unite under one flag with the rest of their countrymen, Russia would be well-advised to permit it. Russia is big enough to make a sacrifice of this kind, but it was the very statement that Bessarabia desired to join Romania that he challenged. Bessarabia was not a Romanian country as a whole. Such demonstrations of a desire to join Romania as had occurred among a portion of the population were mere camouflage. It was on the question of fact that he joined issue and refused to allow the legitimacy of the Romanian claim.

He would point out that the word Bessarabia was often wrongly used. He would not go back to remote antiquity. In the eighteenth century, Bessarabia had been part of Moldavia, which was then a Turkish province. The Christians in those parts had always been under the moral protection of Russia. In 1812, a few months before the Napoleonic invasion, Bessarabia became a Russian province, captured from Turkey. There were at that time some 300,000 inhabitants. At the present time there were some three millions. Over forty years later, the Crimean war had taken place and in the Peace of Paris the territory captured from Russia had been restored to her, in exchange for small areas, and Ismail and Akkerman had been added to Moldavia. The rest of the country, i.e. the major part, had remained Russian since 1812. Then, in 1878, at the Treaty of Berlin, the Dobruja had been added to Romania, giving her access to the Black Sea, and territory twice as large as the portion of Bessarabia she had held. This small portion was given back to Russia to secure Russia’s access to the Danube. Ethnographically, the last census had not established a Moldavian majority in the country. There was no reason to allege that the statistics had been falsified in any manner. Parts of the country were completely Russian.

There are, however, four districts in the center which are mainly Moldavian. It is only in these districts that the question of a referendum arises. These districts might be united to Romania should the population really wish it. He would not, in principle, raise any objection. The Romanians, however, declare that Bessarabia had already expressed its will. This he denies. Immediately after the Russian revolution, municipalities elected by universal suffrage had been set up. They were the best organs for the expression of the popular will. They had not asked to be annexed to Romania. These municipalities had since been dissolved by the Romanians, and their representatives had protested against the Romanian desire to annex the country. The vote, however, had since been secured from the Sfatul Tseri, which was an emanation of the Councils of Workmen and Soldiers, the latter largely composed of Moldavian deserters. This body had resolved to make Bessarabia part of a Russian Federated Republic. This was in December, 1917. In the following March, when Romania had been forced to accept Peace, and Mr Marghiloman was in power, this statesman had got into touch with the Sfatul Tseri and obtained from it a vote in favour of joining Romania, with guarantees of local autonomy. When Romanian troops had entered Bessarabia, invited to do so, he admitted, even by Russians, in order to re-establish order, the same body, at an interval of six months, had voted for annexation to Romania, but out of 160 Members, only 46 had voted. It was a matter for surprise that a revolutionary assembly should have voted in favour of its inclusion in a Monarchy. The whole vote, he submits, was open to suspicion. It had been given during a military occupation of the country, and it was a minority vote of an arbitrarily self-appointed body. If he believed that the people backed this vote, he might be disposed to acquiesce in it, but he feels quite sure that a free plebiscite would yield a completely different result. Therefore, he asks that there should be a proper consultation of the people. He reminds the Council that there had been a time when the catastrophe in Russia imperiled the success of the Allied cause in the War. If the War had ended disastrously, and Romania had sought compensation from Russia for the losses brought upon her by Russia’s failure to continue the War, he would have understood the Romanian claim. But Romania had now come out on the side of the victors, among whom Russia was not. Romania had got all she had fought for and all she had asked for before the War.

Therefore, he protests with the greatest force against the claim now made by Romania, especially as it was not founded, as alleged, on the desire of the majority of the population. Finally, he would say that if there are districts showing a small Moldavian majority, wishing to join Romania, he would be disposed to let them go. As it is, he constantly receives complaints even from Moldavians in Bessarabia, of the treatment they received at the hands of the Romanians. The vote of the Sfatul Tseri is being used quite fallaciously to justify what a reasonably conducted plebiscite would undoubtedly upset. He points out that similar votes had been obtained in Lithuania and in Latvia, in favour of annexation by Germany. Any decision annexing Bessarabia to Romania would be a source of permanent grievance, and would do harm to Romania, which would not be in a position to absorb an unwilling population. The most he can admit iss a plebiscite in the district in which the Moldavian population is predominant.

(Mr Maklakof explains his views with the help of a map, and then withdraws.)

M Tardieu suggests that Mr Bratiano should only be questioned regarding the vote alluded to by Mr Maklakof.

S Tittoni says that the Council is in full possession of ethnical statistics and that it is unnecessary to hear Mr Bratiano on that subject.

(At this stage Mr Bratiano, Mr Misu, Mr Diamandy and M. Pellivan* enter the room.)

M Tardieu, addressing Mr Bratiano, said that the members of the Council have studied the ethnological question thoroughly. They would like to know what degree of sincerity and authority Mr Bratiano attributes to the vote obtained in the Sfatul Tseri.

Mr Lansing interposes that it matters little how that vote had been obtained. It is more important to know how the consultation of the people could be carried out in the future.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks the question put by M Tardieu arises from the statement made by Mr Maklakof.

M Tardieu says that there is a connection between the two. He therefore asks Mr Bratiano to reply.

Mr Bratiano says that he believes the vote alluded to did express the will of the people and had been given in full freedom. He admits the assembly was a revolutionary assembly but similar assemblies had expressed the will of the people in Poland, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. The Romanian occupation had found that assembly in power and in control of the country. Its authority had resulted from the various successive developments which had taken place in Russia since the downfall of Czarism. Mr Lansing suggests a plebiscite. Bessarabia, he would point out, was a Romanian country attached by force to the Russian throne for over 100 years. When Russian autocracy fell, Bessarabia had come back to Romania. The Romanians had been called in by the people and even by the only recognised Russian authority at the time, namely, the Ukrainian Government. Difficulties did not arise on the question of nationality. It was the social question that caused all the trouble. The Bolsheviks were dissatisfied with the Romanian Government merely because it established Governmental order. The agrarian reforms introduced made the peasant pay for the land obtained by the expropriation of the land owners. The land owners on their side grumbled because they were expropriated.

Mr Lansing says that he wishes to put a plain question to Mr Bratiano. Would he object to a plebiscite?

Mr Bratiano replied that he does. He does so because the choice offered the people would be that between Bolshevism and order. It is dangerous to offer such a choice to a country on the border of disturbed Russia. Should the Romanians withdraw their troops there would be endless tumult in the country.

Mr Lansing asks whether Mr Bratiano, if given possession of the country, would agree to a plebiscite in two years.

Mr Bratiano says that he would not as only revolutionary agitation would result from the knowledge that a plebiscite would take place in that period.

Mr Lansing asks whether Mr Bratiano would object to a plebiscite at any other specified time in the future.

Mr Bratiano says that he would object still more strongly, as it would only prolong the agitation. He further begs to be allowed to state that the possession of Bessarabia by Russia is now an anachronism. It had been for the Russian Empire a march on the road to Constantinople. It can no longer serve that purpose. Russia owed Romania a great debt as being largely responsible for her misfortune. Circumstances point very clearly to the best way in which Russia could discharge that debt. It would be by the cession of Bessarabia.

(At this point the Romanian delegates withdraw.)

2. The following nominations are made for the Appointment of a Commission To Supervise the Execution of the Treaty of Peace With Germany:

United States of America: Mr J F Dulles.
Great Britain: Sir Eyre Crowe.
France: M Tardieu.
Italy: S Scialoja.
Japan: Mr Otchiai.

3. The following: nominations are made for the Appointment of a Committee To Organize the Reparation Commission Provided for in the Treaty of Peace With Germany:

United States of America: Mr J F Dulles.
Great Britain: Col S Peel.
France: M Loucheur.
Italy: S Crespi.
Japan. Mr Mori.

4. Mr Balfour says that he has an explanation to make regarding the form in which the question had been put on the Agenda. He understands that the Committee on Greek Affairs had been unable to deal with the frontier between Greece and Bulgaria without knowledge of the ultimate border line between Greece and Turkey. It was for this reason that he had suggested that the Enos-Midia line be assumed provisionally as a frontier between Greece and the future territory of Constantinople. This could be used as a working hypothesis. Committee To Delimit the Frontiers of Bulgaria

M Tardieu suggests that the Coordinating Committee on Territorial Affairs should be asked to deal with this subject and to hear the various experts dealing with the different frontiers of Bulgaria.

(It is finally agreed that the Coordinating Committee on Territorial Affairs should be asked to delimit the frontiers of Bulgaria and to make a report to the Council.)

S Tittoni gives notice that Colonel Castoldi will take the place of S Salvago Raggi on the Committee.

5. The following resolution is proposed by Mr Lansing and adopted:

“That the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference shall notify the Austrian Delegation that it will be allowed a period of not more than ten days, counting from the date upon which it will receive the last section of the Conditions of Peace, in which to make such counter-proposals or observations as it may see fit.”

6. Mr. Lansing proposes the following resolution:

“That the modifications which were made in the Conditions of Peace with Germany as a result of the German counter-proposals or for any other reasons, shall, insofar as they may be applicable, be made ipso facto in the Conditions of Peace with Austria.”

S Tittoni says that he has a reservation to make. Germany had been given an option of furnishing labor as a means of reparation. Italy has a superfluity of labor and does not desire that labor be offered as a form of reparation.

Mr Lansing suggests that, if this i the only reservation, the text proposed, together with S Tittoni’s reservation, be sent to the Drafting Committee for suitable modification and incorporation in the Treaty.

(This is agreed to.)

7. Mr. Balfour observes that he had pointed out on the previous day that the frontier between Austria and Hungary required speedy attention.

(It is agreed that the Committee newly set up to answer the Austrian notes regarding frontiers should endeavor to report on the following day.)

8. M Tardieu points out that there is a clause in the draft Treaty with Austria requiring Austria to recognize “the following frontiers of neighboring countries.” As it is not likely that these frontiers will be completely settled before the signature of Peace with Austria, it is desirable to alter the wording and to require the assent of Austria to frontiers to be fixed later by the Allied and Associated Powers.

(This is agreed to, and the question is referred to the Drafting Committee.)

S Tittoni remarks that he assumed it was established that the ultimate decision regarding frontiers was a matter not for the League of Nations but for the present Conference of Allied and Associated Powers. He wishes to make the same reservation as had been made by the Italian Delegation regarding the Treaty with Germany.

9. Mr Lansing expresses the view that there should be a communiqué.

Mr Balfour says that he understands the Council to be the lawful heirs of the Council of Four which had issued no communiqués. He suggests that this example be followed.

S Tittoni says that he is indifferent.

Baron Makino says that he agrees with Mr Balfour.

M Tardieu asks Mr Lansing if he insists on his view.

Mr Lansing says that he thinks it preferable to issue a communiqué, which could be made brief. His experience is that information always leaks out, through one Delegation or another. The Delegation most faithful to secrecy suffered.

Mr Balfour says that if the communiqué is so judiciously framed as to contain no information, he is indifferent.

(After some discussion, it is decided that for the present no communiqué should be issued.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

*Jean J. C. Bratiano, President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.
Nicolas Misu, Romanian Minister at London, plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.
Constantin Diamandy, Romanian Minister at Petrograd; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.
Jean Pellivan, Director of Justice in Bessarabia.

Jimbuna

07-03-19, 06:13 AM

3rd July 1919

Total French WWI losses on land and sea 1,366,235.

2085 Soldiers of the American Expeditionary Force on board the USS Alaskan for their return voyage to the United States, 3 July 1919. Photographed while Alaskan was departing St. Nazaire, France.
https://i.imgur.com/ASWELyF.jpg

Anti-Bolshevik forces in southern Russia, led by General Anton Denikin (pictured), begin an offensive to capture the Soviet capital of Moscow.
https://i.imgur.com/53s97Vc.png

Ship Losses:

HMS Fandango (Royal Navy) The Dance-class minesweeper struck a mine and sank in the Dvina River in Russia. Eight crewmen were killed.

Sailor Steve

07-03-19, 04:31 PM

Thursday, July 3, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Clemenceau’s Office, Ministry of War, Paris, 14:30

Meeting called by M Clemenceau at the request of S Tittoni.

Present:
M Clemenceau
Mr Lansing
Mr Balfour
S Tittoni

Prof Mantoux (Translator)

1. S Tittoni brings up a question in regard to the troops in Asia Minor. He proposes that the railway line running east and west should be controlled by the British, French and American authorities, and that it should constitute the boundary line between the Italian and Greek forces, but that both the Italians and Greeks should have the right to use it.

M Clemenceau observes that the Italians had gone into Asia Minor without authority from the Conference. He also suggested that S Tittoni should draft some formula regarding the proposition of the use of the railroad and the suggestion that it be made the boundary between the Italian and Greek forces. He also points out that no matter what action is taken in this regard, the settlement of the question of Asia Minor should not be made a separate question, but that it would be considered in connection with the settlement of the whole Turkish question.

S Tittoni explains that Italy does not desire to obtain sovereignty over that portion of Asia Minor now controlled by her troops. Italy does, however, desire to secure certain concession to the coal mines at Heraklia and to the oil wells at Van.

Mr Lansing states that he is sympathetic to the Italian desire to secure coal mines at Heraklia. On the other hand he thinks that Armenia is too poor to be deprived of all her resources and that the oil wells at Van should not be taken from her.

M Clemenceau points out that the French have certain concessions at Heraklia, and that the Italians were now proposing to surround the French concessions.

Mr Lansing asks S Tittoni whether Italy has any coal mines.

S Tittoni replies that Italy has none.

Mr Lansing then asks M Clemenceau what coal mines France has.

M Clemenceau replies that of course Mr Lansing knows what coal resources France possesses.

Mr Lansing then states that under these circumstances Italy should also have coal mines.

Thereupon, M Clemenceau becomes somewhat excited and states very emphatically that he cannot bargain away the rights of his people.

2. Mr Balfour inquires if S Tittoni has anything to say regarding the Adriatic.

S Tittoni states that the Italian Delegation has based their position on the proposition that there is a Treaty of London. He also explains that the Italian Government has to consider Italian public opinion as regards this question.

Mr Lansing asks S Tittoni whether he would abide by the strict terms of the Treaty of London if the others consented to do likewise.

S Tittoni avoids a direct answer by himself asking questions.

Mr Balfour observes that S Tittoni is not answering Mr Lansing’s question.

Mr Lansing states that he has no objection to S Tittoni using what might be called “Yankee Methods”.

S Tittoni then asks Mr Lansing whether the United States would accept the Treaty of London if his question were answered in the affirmative.

Mr Lansing expresses his entire willingness to do so insofar as the terms of the Treaty of London are just. Mr Lansing repeats his question to S Tittoni.

S Tittoni states that he is forced to consider Italian public opinion.

Mr Lansing replies that if public opinion varied the faith of treaties, then there would be endless trouble. For his part he would not venture to say what public opinion in Great Britain and France would do in varying the Treaty of London.

M Clemenceau remarks that he knows well what French public opinion would do.

After some discussion it is proposed to abandon entirely the Treaty of London as a basis of negotiation, and it is agreed that S Tittoni should approach the question as if no treaty existed and prepare a plan which would then be discussed in a very confidential way between those present.

Mr Balfour remarks to Mr Lansing that President Wilson had expressed his willingness to leave the determination of sovereignty over any point on the Adriatic to a plebiscite.

In reply Mr Lansing stated that if this rule were to be applied at all it would have to be made applicable to all the Italian line which might cause trouble in the Tyrol.

It is agreed that S Tittoni will submit to those present his views in writing as stated above.

3. S Tittoni calls attention to the fact that the Yugoslavs are holding certain Italians as prisoners in the Klagenfurt Region. He suggests that his colleagues should agree to take certain steps to secure the release of these Italians.

Mr Lansing asks S Tittoni what Italians are doing in the Klagenfurt Basin.

M Clemenceau supports this question.

S Tittoni explains that the railroad had been torn up by the Yugoslavs for some 30 miles and that the Italian troops had been sent in to repair it.

Mr Lansing observes that the Yugoslavs would not have torn up the railroad if the Italian troops had not advanced.

No decision is taken but it is tacitly understood that M Clemenceau, Mr Lansing and Mr Balfour would ascertain whether they had received any information in the matter.

Jimbuna

07-04-19, 06:49 AM

4th July 1919

Italy. Food riots and strikes in Romagna and Bologna spread to other cities like Milan, Genoa, Livorno, Pisa, Florence, Palermo and others, with several people dead. Shopkeepers reduce food prices; sometimes to as much as 50 to 70 per cent.

France: Demobilisation law comes into force.

Victory Arch Erected in Tokyo, Japan.
https://i.imgur.com/l4HDEXp.jpg

Augusto B. Leguía (pictured) launches a successful military coup against Peruvian President José Pardo.
https://i.imgur.com/N5PEBez.jpg

Men representing different Allied nations compete in a 100m dash at the Inter-Allied Games in Paris.
https://i.imgur.com/DoRlf09.jpg

Jimbuna

07-05-19, 04:38 AM

5th July 1919

Aftermath of War

Britain: 104,743 officers and 2,725,403 other ranks demobilised to date.

Eugen Leviné, communist revolutionary and brief leader of the Bavarian Soviet Republic, is executed by the German government.
https://i.imgur.com/pIBgMZz.jpg

People gather around the Washington Monument to celebrate July 4th.;
https://i.imgur.com/oHwAlTy.jpg

Ship Losses:

MP-1 (Merivoimat) The minesweeper was sunk by mines.

Sailor Steve

07-05-19, 05:27 PM

Saturday, July 5, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers

1. (At M Clemenceau’s request, it is agreed that experts should not be present at the Meetings of the Council but should only enter the room if specifically requested to do so by the Chairman.)

(During the following discussion, Mr Herbert Hoover, Sir William Goode and S Luigi Crespi are invited to remain.)

2. M Clemenceau asks Mr Hoover to explain the economic position in Hungary.

Mr Hoover says that the problem is that of the economic rehabilitation of Central Europe. As matters stand there is no hope of removing and distributing the Hungarian harvest unless the Danube and the railways across Hungary are reopened for traffic. The question, therefore, is not merely an internal Hungarian question, it is one of external economic relations. The action of the Hungarians has tied up the Danube and with it a large proportion of the river craft used on it. Further, the withdrawal of the German Armies from South-Eastern Europe left behind it in Hungary a large quantity of rolling stock and river craft. In order to set the economic life of Central Europe going again, it was necessary to have control of these essential means of transport. The third aspect of the question is largely political. Bolshevik ideas are impregnating the working classes throughout the area. Unless some means can be devised of abating the infection, the economic regeneration of Central and South-Eastern Europe will be difficult. Bela Kun’s government is spending a great deal of money on sending Bolshevik missionaries to industrial centers outside Hungary. This reacts on production. Moreover, the military power of the Hungarian Government is growing. A kind of nationalist passion is thereby put at the service of the revolutionary theories advocated by the Government. It is not likely that Bela Kun will abstain from spreading his theories outside the borders of Hungary by the help of this military force. The next probable victim after Czechoslovakia is Austria. The social and political aspects of the question, Mr Hoover says, are not his province, but he would like to observe that Bela Kun’s party until the last three weeks has not represented methods of violence. Latterly, however, executions have increased, which indicates that opposition is growing in the country and that the methods of red terror are being resorted to. Previously, it might have been possible to treat the Hungarian revolutionary party with indulgence. Now that it is showing a tendency to overflow its frontiers, it must be considered as an economic danger to the rest of Europe.

M Clemenceau ask Mr Hoover what he thinks of the Szegidin group.

Mr Hoover replies that this group appears to him to be composed of extreme reactionaries without any notable intellectual capacity. For instance, their deliberations of late have been devoted to the question of the resumption of the right of dueling. He does not expect much help from that party. It appears, however, that discontent with the Bela Kun Government is growing among the working classes. Information from British sources has been received to the effect that the Trade Unions would gladly see the Government upset. Communism would not appear to have penetrated very deeply into the population and the Government is becoming, like that in Russia, a tyranny of a minority. Another difficulty applying to any solution that might be suggested is the obvious duplicity of Bela Kun. In support of this Mr Hoover quotes the following messages interchanged between Lenin and Bela Kun:

1) Message sent by Lenin from Moscow to Bela Kim at Budapest of 19th June, 1919, (includes following):

“It is necessary to make the fullest possible use of every opportunity to obtain a temporary armistice or peace, in order to give the people a breathing space. But do not trust the Entente Powers for a moment. They are deceiving you, and are only attempting to gain time in order to be able to crush you and us. Try and organize postal communications with us by aeroplane.”

2) Message sent on June 21st by Bela Kun (Budapest) to Lenin (Moscow) in reply to his telegram of June 19th:

“I thank you very much for your telegram in which you approve of my foreign policy. I am very proud of being one of your best pupils but I think in one point I am superior to you, namely, in the question of ‘mala fides.’ I think I know the Entente very well. I know that they will fight us to the end. In this war, only a state of armistice can occur but never peace. This is an out and out fight. Once more I thank you for your note.”

The authenticity of these messages is supported by the fact that they had been revealed first by British sources and subsequently intercepted by Austrian wireless. Of the various solutions proposed in the memorandum he had submitted, no doubt the military occupation of Budapest would be the best. He believes it would be welcomed by the population, but it is no doubt beset with difficulties. The alternatives to this policy are a more or less mitigated recognition of the Bela Kun Government. The plan he had suggested was that the various Inter-Allied Commissions working in the neighborhood should establish economic relations with the Hungarians. There need be no direct recognition by the Governments, but by this side entrance it might be possible to obtain the opening of the river and the setting in motion of the means of transport and thereby the distribution of necessary supplies. He admits that this might possibly strengthen Bela Kun’s Government, but, on the other hand, Bela Kun is supporting himself in favour with the working class on the back of the blockade. All the hardships of the situation are attributed to the Blockade. By removing it, the Powers would deprive him of this argument and he might find it more difficult to plead his case. Whether this would neutralize the advantage of semi-recognition, he does not know.

M Clemenceau asks what is being done to re-victual Hungary?

Mr Hoover replies that nothing at all is being done. At the time when Bela Kun came to power, the Economic Council was about to re-victual Budapest, as the situation there was thought urgent. The Communist Government, however, had, on coming into power, made a stringent search for all supplies and had, by careful re-distribution, managed to feed the population tolerably well. It appeared clear that they would reach the next harvest without starvation. Communism, therefore, had saved the Allied and Associated Powers considerable expenditure on food and supplies, as, since the establishment of the Communist Government nothing whatever had been sent to Hungary.

S Tittoni says that the question of Hungary is one of the most difficult the Conference has to deal with. The Bela Kun Government is a serious threat to the neighboring countries, including Italy. There have been two periods in this movement. In the first a peaceful revolution had been brought about. The effect of this stage had been the most dangerous. The Russian Revolution had been represented to the people of Europe as being accompanied by carnage and general destruction. The Hungarian revolution had been quiet. It was, therefore, more attractive and more dangerous. It appears to many in other countries that the sequestration of private fortunes for re-distribution and the re-allotment of house room were excellent measures which might be imitated to advantage in their own countries. The second period, however, appeared to reproduce the methods of the Russians. Not only were there executions but methodical and systematic massacres had been instituted. It is very necessary therefore, to suppress the volcano. The means of doing it, however, are not clear. He admits he has no suggestions to make. The blockade obviously is not a solution. If rigidly enforced, all non-Bolsheviks will starve and Bolsheviks would eat. If, on the other hand, food is imported into the country the Government will only grow stronger. He would welcome any feasible solution that might be proposed, but he has none to make himself. There is one point, however, to which he wishes to draw special attention, and that is the reported seizure of all securities in Budapest by the Bela Kun Government. Should these securities amounting to 6 milliards of francs be exported and sold abroad, it will be useless to demand reparation from Hungary. There will be nothing left to take possession of. He thinks it is imperative to put a stop to this.

Mr Balfour says that in his extremely lucid statement Mr Hoover had approached a question of which he recognizes the great complexity from the economic side alone. The economic problem is how to make transit by all means of communication through Hungary serve the purpose of equitable distribution of means of subsistence in South-Eastern Europe. This cannot be brought about unless the situation in Hungary is radically changed. Neither Mr Hoover nor S Tittoni offered any plan for a complete alteration of that situation. He believes, therefore, that the case must be approached from the military side. A short time ago the Council of Four had sent orders to the Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Romanian Governments with the object of promoting Peace among them. These orders had only been half carried out. Many things had happened since. Mr Bratiano, in a private conversation, had told him that the Romanians cannot and will not retire from the Theiss until the Hungarians had been disarmed. The Hungarians are withdrawing from Czechoslovakia and massing their troops in Hungary. Universal armament has been ordered. If the Romanians, therefore, retire from the Theiss, which they can defend, they do not know what lines they can hold, seeing their commitments on other frontiers. He thinks there is force in the argument put forward by Mr Bratiano. He has caused further inquiries to be made and had discovered that the Hungarians have not carried out their Armistice engagements. They have not reduced their troops to six divisions; in fact, they appeared to have doubled their forces.

He therefore suggests that the Military Authorities be requested, through their agents on the spot, to order the Hungarians to disarm in accordance with the stipulations of the armistice. This is not only the right of the Allied Powers but their duty. It should be made known in Hungary itself that until this has been done there can be no kind of negotiations with the Hungarian Government. Should it persist in breaking the terms of the armistice, military action should follow. We had some hope that the threat alone would overthrow Bela Kun’s Government. Should it not, the Powers are bound to do to Hungary what they would have done to Germany had she broken the armistice. To carry this out it will be necessary to organize the Romanian, Czechoslovak, Serbian and French troops at hand. When the Hungarians have been disarmed there will then be no excuse for the Romanians not to retire after this, when Hungary has been put into her right place, negotiations could be undertaken either with Bela Kun or his successors. By this means the evil of giving credit to Bela Kun, which Mr Hoover has shown is to be feared, will be avoided. At the present time Vienna is in danger and perhaps Romania. This could be stopped by prompt military action, which would be justified by Hungary’s flagrant breach of the armistice.

M Clemenceau says that he would like to state his opinion, though he fears it will not be a very clear one. He has agreed thus far with all the speakers. The situation reminds him of the La Fontaine fable in which a gathering of rats decided to hang a bell round a cat’s neck. All agreed this was desirable but no one knew how to do it. He thinks that the situation has been accurately described by Mr Hoover. He acquiesces in all S Tittoni had said, and he thinks Mr Balfour has said excellent things. But how were the Powers to do what he proposed? France is demobilizing and cannot stop the process. At the end of October there will be but three classes with the Colors; that is to say the Army will be on a peace footing. The French Chamber is resolutely opposed to intervention in Russia. He thinks the Chamber is right, seeing the results hitherto obtained; a milliard or so is being thrown away on the expedition in Siberia. This is an absurd expense and cannot continue. If Parliament, therefore, declines to fight Bolshevism in Russia, it will equally refuse to fight it in Hungary. Mr Balfour’s argument that the Hungarians had accepted the armistice and had then broken it and therefore deserved coercion is a strong one, if indeed they had accepted it. But what troops does Mr Balfour mean to use to coerce the Hungarians? He had mentioned Czechs, Romanians and French.

Mr Balfour adds and Serbs.

M Clemenceau says that they will require money. He for one cannot supply any. Moreover, Germany for the time being seems ready to fulfill her engagements and to behave well. Should the Germans, however, see the Entente thoroughly embarrassed in Hungary this attitude might change. The march on Budapest had been thought of before. In particular the Italians seem disposed to go there, and he heard that General Segro has gone to Rome to advocate the policy.

S Tittoni says that the Italian Parliament is of the same mind as the French.

M Clemenceau says that no strong economic argument can be brought to bear on the Hungarians. Whether the blockade is raised or not, little effect can be produced on internal policy. The population can hold out. He has some doubts about the capacity of the Czechs to fight the Hungarians. The Romanians might or might not be willing. At the present time they seem considerably dissatisfied with the Peace Conference. There are no British or American troops available. French and Italian troops therefore seem called upon to do the work. He must state clearly that for his part he cannot undertake it. He has consulted Marshal Foch and General Franchet d’Esperey, who had often wished to march on Budapest. He has asked for plans, and has been supplied with a plan more ambitious than that of Napoleon’s march on Moscow. French, British and Italian contingents are required. The fact is that both the peoples and the Parliaments of the Entente countries are anxious to settle the crisis more quickly than is really possible. After the vast upheaval of the war and the pulverization of military forces, and, on top of it, the universal inclination towards social revolution, it is hardly possible to produce order in a short time. The Conference had tried to establish justice in the world. This was not the first time that such an attempt had been made. All know what had resulted before. It is now clear to all who had taken part in the Conference how difficult it is to draw even frontiers equitably. His Italian colleague would doubtless agree with him. People like the Russians, who had been slaves under a terrible despotism, had thought that liberty could be exercised without self-control. They had betrayed their Allies and caused them immense losses. The evil had spread. Italy, though an old and wise community, had been shaken up. Great Britain and France had had their troubles. There had been disaffection in the French Navy and even in the Army. The world was sick of fighting. The Conference had therefore to deal with revolutions in military power, alterations of frontiers, and social revolutions inspired by no ideas. It had been thought that the Russian people would recover. That was a mistake; owing to the vastness of the Russian territory somehow the Russian people had survived its own disasters, but all intervention to assist them to establish a reasonable Government had been in vain. Now the evil has attacked Hungary, which had not been anticipated, as it was a country of peasants and relatively rich. The policy he had to offer was not one of which he was proud. It was simply this - to hold the issues and to wait. He says this after taking into consideration the feelings of the Entente Peoples, and of their Parliaments. All are in a hurry to cease fighting, and to resume normal life. They are probably wrong, but that feeling cannot be gainsaid. This is not a noble policy, and might be said to look like impotence. He will not deny it. But, after losing hundreds of thousands of lives and spending the national treasure, he thinks no other policy is possible. As to Hungary, he knows the country a little. Before the war the people had been the slaves of Germany, merely because they thought that Germany was the strongest power, but there was more common-sense there than in Russia. He had been struck in Mr Hoover’s statement by the fact that the trades unions were sick of the Communist Government. He would therefore follow Mr Balfour’s policy so far as to threaten Hungary with intervention should they not observe the armistice. Then he would consult the military experts. If military action has to be undertaken, all will have to help, and much money will have to be spent. In the meantime, however, he hopes that Providence might furnish some means of escape. It is not his nature to temporize, but in this case he will. Hungary could be surrounded by a “cordon sanitaire”; Communism would not last long in that country. If the Generals recommend a plan similar to that shown him some months ago by Marshal Foch he feels sure that no Government will undertake the task of coercing Hungary. It is not a showy policy that he recommends, but it was the best he can offer.

Mr Lansing observes that there is one question of urgent necessity, namely, that of making peace with Hungary. To do this it is necessary to have someone there to make peace with. Does the Council propose to make peace with Bela Kun? If not, with whom? If it cannot be made with Bela Kun, pressure must be brought to bear on him to go. The only means of doing this appear to be military means.

(At this point General Bliss, General Sackville-West, General Thwaites, General Belin and General Cavallero enter the room.)

M Clemenceau asks General Bliss to show what forces and what methods he thinks would be necessary to compel Bela Kun’s Government to respect the armistice if other means failed, and what hope of success he entertains.

General Bliss says that some six weeks ago, at the request of the Council of Four, the Military Representatives at Versailles had made a report on the means that might be taken to prevent a Hungarian attack on Czechoslovakia. The report had been to the effect that if military measures had to be resorted to, the troops used must be those on the spot, namely, Romanian, Serbian and French troops. It was then believed that the troops available locally would be sufficient. This was the opinion of the French General Staff. Since then, however, Bela Kun’s troops had increased from 150,000 to 220,000 armed men. The situation had also changed in other respects, and he is unable to say whether the troops then considered sufficient would be sufficient now. There had been an inconclusive discussion in the Council of Four on the report. Since that date he knows nothing of what had been decided. If the plan then recommended had been thought workable, it should have been submitted to General Franchet d’Esperey. This, as far as he knows, had not been done. Moreover, he cannot say whether the Romanians and Serbians would act. As far as he is concerned, he thinks the question requires study at Versailles, in order that he might exchange views with his colleagues on the new situation.

General Cavallero agrees with General Bliss that a new study of the subject is necessary. The action now required is not quite the same as that contemplated previously, and in the meantime the Hungarian army has increased.

General Belin said that all the Military Representatives had agreed that a demonstration of force would have been sufficient when they were previously consulted. He still believes that a demonstration by the forces locally available would be enough to overthrow the Bela Kun Government.

M Clemenceau says that he does not wish the Military Advisers to restrict their recommendations to the employment of forces at present on the spot. If more are required, he expects them to say so.

General Sackville-West says that he is in accord with his Military colleagues. He would like to re-consider the question.

M Clemenceau asks how soon a report can be obtained.

General Buss says that if all the information required were available, the report could be made within 48 hours.

Mr Balfour asks whether, in view of the flagrant breach of the armistice by Bela Kun’s Government, it would not be well to warn him at once that he must observe the armistice. He would be ready, however, if his colleagues preferred it, to wait 48 hours until the report of the Military Representatives had been received.

(It is agreed that the report be awaited.)

General Bliss points out that it will be necessary to consult the Commander-in-Chief on the spot.

M Clemenceau says that it will be sufficient to consult Marshal Foch, who has all the necessary information from General Franchet d’Esperey.

Mr Lansing asks that the Military Representatives add to their report a brief account of the armament at the disposal of the Hungarian Army, and of their means of replenishing this armament. In particular, he would like to know whether it was made within the country or imported from without.

(The following resolution is then adopted:

“It was decided that the Military Representatives at Versailles in consultation with Marshal Foch, should examine the military possibilities of enforcing on Hungary respect for the Armistice conditions accepted, and make a report to the Council in 48 hours. The Military Representatives were also asked to report on the means of munitionment at the disposal of the Hungarian Government.”)

(The Military Experts then withdraw.)

S Tittoni then suggests that the Allies take steps to forbid the exportation of all the securities seized by the Bela Kun Government, as the disposal of these securities abroad would render nugatory any claim for reparation on Hungary.

(The following resolution is then adopted:

“That the Financial Commission be asked to submit at a very early date to the Council, a proposal for preventing the sale abroad of securities seized by order of the Bela Kun Government in Hungary.”)

3. At Mr. Lansing’s proposal, the following resolution is adopted:

“Colonel W. N. Haskell, U. S. A., is appointed by this Council to act as High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the United States, British, French and Italian Governments, it being understood that Colonel Haskell will be coincidentally appointed to take full charge of all relief measures in Armenia by the various relief organisations operating there. All representatives of the United States, British, French, and Italian Governments in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Constantinople are to be at once instructed to co-operate with and give support to Colonel Haskell.”

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

07-06-19, 05:21 AM

6th July 1919

British troops march in London to celebrate the victory in the war after the signing of the Versailles Treaty.
https://i.imgur.com/05U3JPU.jpg

British airship R34 completes its flight from Scotland to New York, completing the first transatlantic voyage by dirigible.
https://i.imgur.com/Ha8OCog.jpg
https://i.imgur.com/kJKyq0I.jpg

Sailor Steve

07-06-19, 11:59 AM

Sunday, July 6, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

07-07-19, 07:37 AM

7th July 1919

Aftermath of War

Peace Treaty ratified by the German Government.

British Army of the Rhine, July 7, 1919.
https://i.imgur.com/U66CbHn.jpg

German physician Magnus Hirschfeld founds the Institut für Sexualwissenschaft (Institute for the Science of Sexuality), one of the first of its kind in the world. (The Nazis later shut down the institute and destroys its archives).
https://i.imgur.com/9GBQdrS.jpg

Airship R-34 compared to the Woolworth Building in Manhattan, New York City.
https://i.imgur.com/MSE16q1.jpg

Actor Jon Pertwee, later associated with Dr. Who, born.
https://i.imgur.com/RzpzhE4.jpg

Sailor Steve

07-07-19, 10:32 PM

Monday, July 7, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers

1. M Clemenceau says that before beginning the subjects on the Agenda he has a statement to make on what was going on in Italy. He does not wish to make difficulties worse, but the situation is such that it is to be feared massacres might occur. He has received dispatches, which he can show his colleagues, regarding the position at Fiume. Disturbances have taken place there, caused, it is alleged, by the misconduct of a French soldier. This is the Italian account and he will not dispute it. It might be true, and in any case similar things have happened elsewhere without leading to any serious consequences. There had followed in the Italian press a virulent attack on France and on Great Britain, but especially on France, and it can readily be believed that it was inspired by German influence. The French Ambassador had made a protest to S Nitti. S Nitti has declared that he cannot control the press. It is surprising that S Nitti cannot control the Italian press, seeing the power he has over the press outside his own country. At Fiume things have gone from bad to worse, and there is a movement tending to the expulsion of French and British troops. When the Allied Council had addressed a memorandum to S Tittoni, President Wilson had wanted to ask the Italian Government to evacuate Fiume. He had begged President Wilson not to insist on this, as it appeared to him that all the Allies had an equal right to maintain troops there. As there are French and British troops in Fiume, it is only fair that Italian troops should be there, provided they remained as representatives of the Alliance. He recalls he said this in order to show that he is not anti-Italian. The latest news from Fiume is that the condition there is going from bad to worse. French fatigue parties passing through the streets had been attacked with grenades and revolvers. Attacks had been made on British troops, but not so openly. Isolated men had been maltreated. The Italian general said he could not put a stop to these disturbances as long as French and British troops remained in the town. This is not all. At Genoa French soldiers had been knifed, and similar things had happened in other Italian towns. French consuls at Milan and elsewhere have sent him newspaper cuttings threatening a renewal of the Sicilian Vespers. In addition to this there is evidence of Government action. Supply trains for Poland and Czechoslovakia are being detained at Modane on some futile pretext of paying customs dues. These supplies are urgently required and it is obvious that they are stopped by Government action. Further, the French Consul at Rhodes reports that, at the very time when the Peace Conference was asking S Tittoni to withdraw Italian troops from Southern Asia Minor, 3,300 men had been sent two days ago to occupy a further point in Asia Minor. The French Ambassador in Rome, who has been most violently attacked, had been told by General Albricci that these attacks would cease if better news came from Paris. This is an attempt to bring pressure on the Peace Conference. Against this attempt he now makes the strongest protest. He will not deliberate under threats and he would not tolerate pressure of this kind. From an official person specially qualified, whose name he does not wish to give, but will if necessary, he learned that Admiral Thaon di Revel had put a stop to mine-sweeping, and had ordered that new mines be kept in readiness in case of war with France. He is prepared to show this information, if they wish it, to Mr Balfour and to Mr Lansing. It is further hinted that this news should not be taken too seriously, but that it might be allowed to leak out in order to influence the Conference. He has hitherto resisted two things. First, abominable attacks by the Italian Press, and secondly, the temptation to make a reply to attacks in the French Press which was being maneuvered on behalf of Italy against the French Government. He could, by making a public statement put a stop to all this but he has restrained himself in order not to make things worse. If these things do not cease, however, he will be forced to answer. This would produce a disastrous diplomatic situation which he wishes to avoid. It is for this reason that he addresses S Tittoni in the Council. He wishes to know what is at the bottom of all this. Why, when the Council is deliberating about Asia Minor, are fresh Italian troops sent there? Why is there no official protest by the Italian Government against the virulent Press campaign conducted against Fiume? He does not suggest the Italian Government should apply the censorship; but it could make a statement in refutation of what was alleged. In any case he will not be influenced by pressure. If he has to make a choice, he will not allow French soldiers to be murdered in Fiume. He has ordered back French troops from Italy where they had once been welcome in times of stress, but are now no longer well received. Nothing, however, will stop him from keeping French troops in Fiume where they have a right to be.

S Tittoni said that he thinks the Fiume incidents most deplorable. He is deeply concerned at the outbreak of dissensions among troops which had bled in the same cause. He also has received dispatches which he will not quote as they might give explanations of the origin of the outbreak not altogether in accord with those mentioned by M Clemenceau. He thinks there should be an inquiry into the incidents and suitable punishment for those responsible. At all costs friendship must be restored between the Allies. He suggests that an Inter-Allied Commission be appointed to inquire into the events at Fiume and that its findings should be awaited before any decision is taken.

M Clemenceau asks whether the Commission would also inquire into what had taken place at Genoa.

S Tittoni says that his proposal is confined to Fiume. The Italian Government has shown its anxiety to put matters right by sending General Caneva immediately to make an inquiry. General Caneva is an army commander, a senator and a man of judicial temper. He will certainly do his very best.

M Clemenceau interposes that no complaint was made against General Grazioli in person.

S Tittoni continuing says that as regards the events in Genoa an inquiry is taking place. He will inform the French Government of the result as soon as possible. Irresponsible acts should not be allowed to compromise the good relations of the Governments. It is essential that the Governments should remain closely united.

M Clemenceau says that the French Consul at Milan reports danger of massacres.

S Tittoni said that he is going there on the following day. This shows the importance he attaches to the subject. During his absence S Crespi will take his place. He would beg the Council to await his return before dealing with questions specially concerning Italy. M Clemenceau had spoken of threats aimed at the Conference. He feels bound to deny formally that there is any ground for such a belief. It would be puerile on the part of the Italian Government to attempt to coerce the Conference. Italy is represented by himself at the Conference and he trusts that the spirit of friendship and conciliation shown by him will be recognised. As to the statements attributed to General Albricci and to Admiral Thaon di Revel, he feels certain that whatever they might have said has been greatly distorted. He can, if necessary, ask these officers for explanations, but he is bound to say that he cannot believe what is attributed to them. As to the Italian Press, it is certainly true that S Nitti cannot muzzle it. The same papers that attacked France are also conducting a most violent attack on him. Party feeling in Italy is very strong and the violence of expression in the Italian Press at the present time has never been equaled. As to the alleged influencing of the French Press, he feels bound to deny that anything of the sort is going on. Since joining the Delegation he has seen all that took place and can find no evidence to that effect. He is ready, however, to do anything that might satisfy M Clemenceau. He will also point out that censorship had just been abolished in Italy. As regards Asia Minor he is not aware of the events alleged. To make sure that no misunderstanding took place he had summoned General Bongiovanni to Paris in order to give him his instructions personally. These instructions will be entirely in accordance with the confidential interview he had had with his colleagues a few days ago. As to the transit of supply trains to Serbia he is informed that certain customs dues are legitimately required. These dues Serbia promised to pay but her present attitude makes it reasonable to doubt whether she will pay. Not only food is being shipped, but arms and munitions as well. There is a report that the Serbians have asked the Czechoslovaks to join them in an attack upon Italy. He will at a later date give fuller information in writing on this subject to his colleagues.

M Clemenceau says that he has no wish to continue the debate and that S Tittoni’s proposal for an Inter-Allied Inquiry at Fiume gives him satisfaction for the moment, provided it be made at once.

Mr Lansing says that he agrees. He thinks it will be necessary to select a military man and he would like to consult General Bliss. He thinks it would be better to select an officer from Headquarters rather than one serving on the spot.

Mr Balfour says that he also is in favour of a Commission to inquire into the events at Fiume. It is the first duty of the Council to prevent the development of these unfortunate incidents into matters of international concern. He thinks the method suggested by S Tittoni a good one. He cannot immediately nominate an officer and he is inclined to agree with Mr Lansing that the best selection would be an officer not serving in Italy nor in the Adriatic. He will have to consult his military advisors. He feels it is scarcely necessary to say that he entirely agrees with his colleagues regarding the folly and wickedness of attempting to influence the decisions of the Conference by pressure from without. The effect will be exactly the reverse of that desired by anyone employing such methods.

Mr Lansing says that he has a suggestion to make regarding the work of the Commission. It should not only make an inquiry in order to determine the immediate responsibilities for what had occurred, but should also make recommendations regarding what should be done in the future. He can see no reason himself why the forces maintained by the Allies in Fiume should not be reduced to equal contingents of police.

M Clemenceau suggests that each of the Delegations should designate their officers on the following day and give them their instructions.

Mr Balfour says that he is not sure he can arrange to have the officer present on the following day.

Mr Lansing expresses the same opinion.

S Tittoni says that he agrees to the extension of the duties of the Commission suggested by Mr Lansing, but he will stipulate that no suggestions be made to the Commissioners and that they be left to propose their own solutions.

M Clemenceau says that, to speak plainly, it cannot be tolerated that Fiume should continue to be governed in the name of the King of Italy.

S Tittoni says that this was not done by the Italian Authorities but by the local municipality.

(It is decided that an Inter-Allied Commission of military officers should be appointed to make an inquiry into the incidents at Fiume and to recommend means of improving the situation for the future

It is agreed that the American, British, French and Italian Delegations should nominate their respective commissioners on the following day and that these should receive collective instructions from the Council.)

(The Members of the Drafting Committee enter the room.)

2. M Clemenceau asked M. Fromageot to tell the Council in what state the Austrian Treaty was.

M Fromageot says that the Treaty is ready, its articles and its pages numbered. It only requires a last revision which can be completed by the following evening.

Mr Balfour asks whether the question of frontiers was solved.

M Fromageot says that all that has been sent to the Drafting Committee has been put into shape.

M Clemenceau observes that the Council wishes to know what is missing.

M Fromageot replies that he is unable to answer this as he is not aware of the intentions of the Council.

M Clemenceau says that he had hoped M Fromageot would be able to tell him what the Council had omitted.

M Fromageot says that Article 27 of the Treaty provides a frontier entirely surrounding Austria. On some points it is stipulated that the exact line should be fixed at a later time. The Drafting Committee at one time had been told that they would have to insert the frontiers of the neighboring States. Later the Committee had been told to insert a clause requiring Austria to recognize such frontiers as might be laid down thereafter.

Mr Lansing says he wishes to know whether the Treaty in its present form is final.

M Fromageot says he is unable to answer this question.

Mr Balfour says that after examining Article 27 he observes that the old frontier between Austria and Hungary is maintained. He understands that the question of altering this frontier had been referred to a Commission. This Commission has not yet reported, and its conclusions therefore have not been accepted by the Council.

Mr Lansing says that certain portions of the Treaty have been handed to the Austrians. There remain other portions - Financial, Economic and the Reparation Clauses which have not been handed to them. He wishes to know whether these were completed. If so, he suggests that these portions be sent to the Austrian Delegation.

M Fromageot argues that for ease of reference it would be better to present the whole Treaty to the Austrians at one time with all the articles in due series.

(After some further discussion it is decided that the Commissions considering the boundaries of Austria should report to the Council on the 9th July, 1919.)

3. M Fromageot points out that in all other cases of new frontiers a stipulation has been introduced appointing Boundary Commissions to establish the exact line on the ground. Only in the case of the frontier between Austria and Italy is there no such provision.

S Tittoni says that if the Article is left in its present state the inference would be that the line must be settled between the Italians and the Austrians. He further asked how many members were appointed to the other Boundary Commissions mentioned. He would prefer a small Commission. For instance, one of three, with one Italian, one Austrian and one other member.

M Fromageot says that the numbers vary. They are either 7, 5, or 3. There are 3 for Danzig and 5 for the Saar Valley.

(After some further discussion it is decided to insert in the Treaty of Peace with Austria a provision to establish a Boundary Commission of 5 members to draw the frontier between Austria and Italy.)

4. The Council has before it the following document:

“The French Delegation have informed the Commission on Baltic Affairs of a telegram from the French High Commissioner in Siberia, from which it appears that Admiral Kolchak’s Government have asked the Allied Governments to support at Helsingfors the request which they have addressed to General Mannerheim to commence operations against Petrograd as soon as possible.

The Commission do not consider that they can recommend the Allied Governments to take the responsibility of involving the Finns in warlike operations whose chances of success it is difficult for them to judge at a distance. They feel, however, that the Finnish Government have been stopped several times in their desire to take action against the Bolsheviks of Petrograd by the fact that they do not know how any initiative of this kind would be viewed by the Allied Governments.

The Commission therefore think they can recommend the following suggestion to the Council of Ten:

A joint telegram should be addressed to the British, United States, Italian and French Chargés d’Affaires at Helsingfors requesting them to inform General Mannerheim’s Government that in case they felt able to grant the request to act made to them by Admiral Kolchak, the Allied Governments, without bringing any pressure on the Finnish Government, would have no objection to that operation.”

(It is agreed that a joint telegram to the above effect be drafted in the name of the Council by M Pichon).

5. M Clemenceau says that as President of the Peace Conference he had received from the Minister in Paris a request for a hearing regarding certain Norwegian claims relating:

Norwegian claims:

(a) to Spitzbergen

(b) to the Northern frontier between Norway and Finland.

(c) to reparation for Norwegian shipping sunk by the Germans during the war.

Mr Lansing says that he would prefer to entrust the Spitzbergen question to a Sub-Commission rather than to refer it to the Baltic Commission. He recalls that in 1914 there had been a Commission in Christiania on this subject, whose labors had been interrupted by the outbreak of war. The matter was a complicated one, both from the political and from the economic aspect. The American representative at the Christiania Conference is happily now in Paris.

M Clemenceau says that he accepts Mr Lansing’s proposal.

S Tittoni said that he is informed that there are extensive coal deposits in Spitzbergen. He asks that the coal situation in Italy be taken into consideration in any decision taken regarding these coal deposits. The future of Italy in respect to coal was very unpromising. Since the acquisition of the Saar Valley coal-field by France, France can obtain coal at 50 francs or 60 francs a ton. Coal in Italy cost 250 francs a ton. The prospect for Italian industries dependent on coal fuel is therefore hopeless unless this situation can be remedied.

(It is agreed to appoint a Sub-Commission consisting of one representative each of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy to consider the claims of various Powers in Spitzbergen, and to make a report to the Council.

M Pichon is asked to invite all the neutral Powers interested to present their views to the Commission.)

(b) Frontier Between Norway & Finland (It is agreed that it would be difficult for the Peace Conference to intervene in a frontier question between two neutral States, and no decision for the time being is taken on this subject.)

(c) Norwegian Claim for Reparation Against Germany (It is decided to refer the Norwegian claims against Germany for damage to Norwegian shipping at sea to the Reparation Commission.)

6. M Mantoux reads the proposed reply.

M Balfour thinks that a somewhat over-eager invitation was extended to Austria to come into the League.

M Clemenceau says that he will consent to any alteration in wording Mr Balfour would care to make.

Mr Lansing expresses the view that it is perhaps desirable to encourage the Austrians, both by reason of the threat of Bolshevik Hungary at their very doors, and also in order to dispel their tendency to join Germany.

Mr Balfour says that if soft words are likely to give the Austrians encouragement, which might be true, he will withdraw his criticism.

(The draft reply proposed by the Sub-Committee of the Commission on the League of Nations is approved.)

7. S Tittoni expresses the view that commercial censorship is part and parcel of the blockade. It must, therefore, logically cease at the same time. It might be maintained by an arbitrary act, but cannot be maintained legally.

(It is agreed that the commercial censorship as being part of the measures constituting a blockade on Germany should be abolished at the same time as the blockade.)

8. (It is agreed that the Yugoslav Delegation should receive copies of the Austrian Notes and counter proposals concerning Yugoslavia.)

9. Mr Lansing says that he has a proposal to make regarding the repatriation of certain Armenians, in order that they should be able to sow the next crop.

Mr Balfour says that so far as he remembers, on previous day a Commissioner had been appointed for Armenia.

Mr Lansing observes that what was now proposed was different. It is necessary to bring exiled Armenian agriculturalists back to the country, and to dispossess the Turkish usurpers of their land. His proposal is that General Milne be consulted as to the possibility of doing this.

Mr Balfour says that he will certainly agree to consulting General Milne as to the possibility of repatriating a certain number of Armenian refugees. He does not think, however, that he can accept the responsibility laid down in the second sentence of the proposal, namely, that their protection should devolve upon the British forces.

Mr Lansing says that all he wishes is that General Milne should report as to this also.

Mr Balfour says he will agree if a slight modification of the text were made.

(It is then agreed that the British Government should consult General Milne as to the possibility of repatriating immediately a certain number of Armenian refugees, and as to the possibility of ensuring their protection by British forces until Armenia received a mandatory. In the meantime their food will be supplied as at present by the American Relief Organisation.)

10. Mr Balfour says that he would like to draw attention to a matter which had not been put on the Agenda. General Gough represents the Allies in the Baltic Provinces. Orders have been given for the Germans to withdraw from the Baltic Provinces; this order they are carrying out but imperfectly. For instance they have been ordered to withdraw from Riga. They have removed five miles outside Riga and there halted. General Gough complains that he can only get into touch with the Germans by circuitous methods. He cannot hasten the process of German evacuation very much. He asks whether he can be given authority to treat direct with the German Command on this matter.

Mr Lansing says that he agrees in principle, but would like before giving an answer to consult his military advisers.

(It is agreed that this question be put on the Agenda for the next meeting.)

11. (It is decided that the proceedings of the Council be recorded by the Joint Secretariat, and that the procès-verbaux be distributed on the same scale as those of the Council of Heads of States.)

(The Meeting adjourns.)

Jimbuna

07-08-19, 05:23 AM

8th July 1919

Aftermath of War

President Wilson returns to the United States.

British tanks parked outside of occupied Cologne, Germany.
https://i.imgur.com/LgUSD54.jpg

The U.S. Army sends an automobile convoy of 81 vehicles across the continental U.S. to test the road system. The voyage took 56 days, demonstrating the need for better infrastructure. Lieutenant Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower is part of the convoy.
https://i.imgur.com/Oi76LnH.jpg

28 year old Dwight D. Eisenhower(far right) poses for a photo in Ohio while on the Army’s first transcontinental motor convoy. This trip would influence his role in pushing through the Interstate Highway Act of 1956.
https://i.imgur.com/XiKv3Bn.jpg

Sailor Steve

07-08-19, 11:03 AM

Tuesday, July 8, 1919

A small French steamer carries President Woodrow Wilson (on the after deck, marked by an arrow) from the Brest dockyard to USS George Washington for passage home to the United States.
https://i.imgur.com/EXSoBYy.jpg

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers

1. M. Clemenceau says that he has bad news to give to the Council. He has a report of a still graver incident in Fiume. Nine French soldiers have been killed. The day before, General Grazioli had requested the French General to withdraw from the city with his troops. The same request was apparently made to the Serbians. What the Serbians replied, he does not know. The French General refused. It was on the morrow of this that the mob, encouraged by an Italian officer, had attacked a small French post. Sailors from the Fleet had come ashore to join in the assault and warships in the Harbor had fired on the post. This had led to the death of nine men.

Mr Lansing says that he has had a report on the previous afternoon, which he had communicated to S Tittoni, to the effect that a French post of Annamite troops had been attacked by the mob. Then forces had been landed from Italian ships and the Barracks of the Annamites had been surrounded. It was at this stage that some of the latter had been killed. The report quotes a British observer who had seen three Annamites stabbed to death while holding up their hands in token of surrender. In addition to this, a French packet boat had been fired on by Italian volunteers.

M Clemenceau says that this is more than could be endured. No one in France would submit to treatment of this sort. Therefore, his first act is to ask his colleagues what should be done. He assumes that they are ready to defend the rights of France as he is ready to defend theirs. The Italian Government has installed in Fiume a gang of men, known as volunteers, who control the city in the name of the King of Italy. It was to help these volunteers that the Italian General asked his Allied colleagues to withdraw from the city. He therefore proposes to retire with his British and American colleagues and to make his decision after consultation with them.

S Crespi says that he wishes to express on behalf of his Government the sincerest regret for what had taken place. He is deeply impressed by the reports received by his colleagues. He, himself, has no news later than that which had been on the previous day in S Tittoni’s hands. He was therefore taken by surprise. He hopes and believes that the reports referred to the same incident as has been mentioned on the previous day, namely, to the incident of Sunday. The information in the hands of the Italian Delegation is to the effect that after provocation caused by a French soldier, rioting began. It is alleged that a French soldier had fired first. He had been supported by other men who came from a small post and fired on the crowd. Italian soldiers had then intervened to restore order, then French sailors had fired from ships. The information, therefore, is not quite the same as that in the hands of M Clemenceau.

Mr Lansing says that he has no other information than that of which he had given an account. It is therefore possible that it is a new version of the Sunday incident mentioned on the previous day.

Mr Balfour says that by every account it was a deplorable affair. He, himself, has no information. He has no means, therefore, of judging whether there had been one incident or two. He asks M Clemenceau whether his dispatches related to events of Sunday or to subsequent events.

M Clemenceau said that the event described had taken place on the 6th.

Mr Balfour says it might then perhaps be assumed that everything had taken place on one day.

M Clemenceau says that this might be true. On the previous day he had not known how serious the matter was. He had then been content with a Commission of Inquiry. Now he thinks this is not enough. He cannot allow French soldiers to be murdered. It must also be borne in mind that on the day before the incident or incidents, the Italian General had desired the French troops to be removed ten kilometers west of the Town in order to avoid trouble. The Italian General had no right to demand anything of the sort and the French General had rightly refused. The dispatch he had received concluded by asking that Allied warships should be sent to Fiume.

S Crespi points out that according to M Clemenceau’s news, the Italian General had not given any orders to his French colleague but had only made a proposal. Moreover, General Grazioli, the day before the incident, had driven through Fiume in the same car with General Savy, in order to show the good understanding existing between the two Commanders. He had done everything he could to avoid disturbances. Incidents of this kind where troops of various nations were gathered were liable to occur everywhere.

M Clemenceau says that incidents of this kind have not occurred elsewhere. There is no instance of British or American ships firing on French troops nor of French ships firing on British troops. On the previous day, he had not known that the Italian warships had acted in this manner. He must therefore insist on consulting his British and American colleagues separately as to the action to be taken. He proposes that they should withdraw together.

S Crespi says that he would, himself, withdraw. (At this point the Italian members of the Meeting withdraw.)

2. M Clemenceau nominates General Naulin as French representative.

Mr Lansing nominates Major-General C. P. Summerall.

Mr Balfour says that he is unable to nominate an officer at that moment.

S Crespi says he would make his nomination on the following day.

3. The following instructions are accepted:

Instructions to Commission of Inquiry:

That the inter-allied Commission of Inquiry for Fiume shall investigate and report the facts as to the incident or incidents of violence, which have recently taken place in that town, and record their opinion on the responsibility therefor. They should further submit to the Supreme Council as soon as possible their recommendations as to the best means of preserving peace and safety hereafter.

4. M Clemenceau hands S Crespi a Note regarding the stoppage of trains at Modane.

S Crespi says that it is a technical matter and that he will reply on the following day.

5. Mr Balfour says that he has prepared the following draft resolution:

"In order to expedite the evacuation of the Baltic States by Germany in accordance with the decision taken by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on June 13th and communicated to the German Government by Marshal Foch, vide his telegram No. 3029 dated June 18th President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission at Spa, it is Resolved:

(a) that General Gough shall be authorized to deal directly with local enemy commanders in the Baltic States on matters arising from the above decision;

(b) that General Gough shall have similar powers with regard to the execution of any subsequent decisions of the Allied and Associated Governments in connection with the German troops now in the Baltic States, all such decisions being in the first instance communicated to the German Government through the usual channels;

(c) that Marshal Foch will be informed of this resolution and will be requested to communicate its substance to the German Government, with a request that the German Commanders in the Baltic States may be given the necessary instructions."

There is also a resolution of the Commission on Baltic Affairs:

"The Baltic Commission having been informed of the contents of the telegrams from General Gough and Colonel Tallents of 25th, 26th and 27th June respecting the necessity of an immediate credit of £500,000 in order to pay Russian and Lettish troops in Libau required for maintenance of order, consider that it is urgently necessary that this sum should at once be placed at the disposal of General Gough on grounds of military necessity as otherwise the position of the Inter-Allied Mission and of General Gough will become shortly untenable in Latvia, and it will be impossible to enforce the evacuation of the German troops.

The Commission, however, desire to draw attention to the fact that this £500,000 is only sufficient to meet immediate military necessities and they therefore recommend that inquiries should be made as to what securities in the way of timber, flax or other raw materials the three Baltic States can give for a loan.

In case such a loan can be raised either from one or more of the Allied and Associated Governments or from private banking institutions on the basis of such security it is recommended that the above advance of £500,000 should ultimately be merged in this loan."

The first is intended to place General Gough in direct relation with the Germans in order to ensure their retirement from the Baltic Provinces.

The second relates to a different point though it is also connected with the retirement of the Germans. It appears that the Germans have been paying the Russian Forces in those parts. Those forces must be maintained, therefore paid. General Gough requires £500,000 to do this. He supposes that there is no choice but to agree. He confesses that it was news to him that the Germans had hitherto paid those troops. If, however, the Allies have to become the Paymasters of those forces, he thinks it best to entrust the money to General Gough, the Allied Representative, on the spot for proper disbursement.

Mr Lansing observes that this is a new proposal. The United States are in a difficult position in matters of this kind. He knows of no fund out of which such a cost could be defrayed. American laws are very stringent on the subject of spending money. Until July 1st, while the President was in Paris, there had been funds which he could spend at his discretion. At present there are no funds available. The only means of raising money for such a purpose that he can think of is a loan. Seeing that there is no recognised Government in the Countries in question, it does not appear possible to raise a loan.

M Clemenceau says that it is not clear to him how the French contribution could be raised.

(It is decided to accept the first resolution and to refer the second for report to the Financial Commission.)

6. (The proposed reply of the Committee (Report of the Prisoners of War Commission on the Observations Submitted by the Austrian Delegation Regarding the Conditions of Peace) is accepted.)

7. (After some discussion the French text (Reply to the Notes of the Austrian Delegation Relating to Economic Conditions) is accepted with slight alterations. The adjective “German” was suppressed in connection with the expression of “Austria” or “Austrian” and the sentence regarding the boycotting of Serbian cattle was struck out.)

8. (It is decided that the answers accepted by the Council regarding economic questions, the League of Nations and Consular and Diplomatic Agents in South America should be handed to the Austrian Delegation on the 9th July, and that the replies should be given to the Press on the evening of the 9th July, so as to be published on the morning of the 10th.)

Sailor Steve

07-08-19, 11:13 AM

Tuesday, July 8, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 17:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations from America, Britain and France

M Clemenceau says that what he proposes to do is to send a French warship to Fiume. He wishes to know whether his colleagues will agree. There is a French warship at Constantinople which can reach Fiume in four days. He would prefer to act in complete agreement with his colleagues.

Mr Lansing says that there are no American troops in Fiume. There are, however, some Naval officers. He thinks perhaps it would be wise to obtain a report on the incidents from the British Admiral.

M Clemenceau says that France has been insulted and that the French flag must be shown.

Mr Lansing says that the Italian troops are, unfortunately, very much in the majority at Fiume. It is for this reason that the crowd had been encouraged to attack the French. He had this in his mind on the previous day when he suggested that the Allied troops should be reduced to equal contingents of police.

Mr Balfour says that he sees no objection to the sending of a French man-of-war. In the meantime, he will do all he can to obtain the evidence of the British Admiral.

Mr Lansing agrees. He thinks, himself, that the Italians are to blame. American troops have also been insulted, but it might appear, on further investigation, that there were extenuating circumstances. Should this prove to be the case, M Clemenceau would, no doubt, stop his warships by wireless.

M Clemenceau says that the ship must appear at Fiume. It could be withdrawn, if necessary, after 48 hours stay there, but the French flag must be shown.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks both the British and American Governments would act in a similar manner in similar circumstances.

Mr Lansing says that he thinks perhaps they would have done so without consulting their colleagues.

Mr Balfour says that he understands that this action will not put a stop to the inquiry which had been proposed on the previous day.

M Clemenceau says that he does not mean in any way to interfere with that decision. All he wishes to maintain is that an inquiry alone will not be sufficient after what has occurred.

(After obtaining the agreement of his colleagues, M Clemenceau gives orders for the dispatch of a French Warship to Fiume.)

Jimbuna

07-09-19, 09:46 AM

9th July 1919

The German National Assembly ratifies the Versailles Treaty by a vote of 209 to 116.
https://i.imgur.com/oPLQPIE.png

President Wilson and the U.S. delegation at the Paris Peace Conference returns on the S.S. George Washington to New York harbour. Wilson will now attempt to get Congress to pass the Versailles Treaty and join the League of Nations.
https://i.imgur.com/iPbSXCp.jpg

World needs a League of Nations to stop a future generation of German people fed nothing but revenge.
https://i.imgur.com/Dvultwc.jpg

Sailor Steve

07-09-19, 06:58 PM

Wednesday, July 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

1. (Nominations continue for the Commission of Inquiry into the Incidents at Fiume.)

For Great Britain, General Watts is appointed.

S Crespi says that he cannot at present nominate an Italian officer. He thinks that there will be an officer on the spot and it is agreed that he should join his colleagues at Fiume and be sent the same instructions as are given to them.

(It is agreed that the officers nominated should attend the Council the following day at 15:30 to receive their instructions. As it is not possible for General Watts to be present, it is agreed that General Thwaites should attend to receive instructions in his stead. It is also agreed that General Cavallero should attend to receive instructions in place of the Italian officer to be nominated.)

2. M Clemenceau asks if any of his colleagues has any news from Italy.

Mr Balfour says he has nothing save what he had shown the Chairman on the previous day. Though there is a British Admiral and a British colonel commanding a battalion in Fiume, he has received no news from them. He had telephoned to London, asking for more news to be sent him.

S Crespi says that he has received a dispatch from S Nitti and one from Fiume. It appears from these dispatches that no incidents have occurred since Sunday. In any case, the Italian Government is determined to maintain order.

M Clemenceau says that the French Military Attaché in Rome again reports the words of General Albricci, to which he had previously alluded. The French Ambassador is also of the opinion that an attempt is being made to influence the Conference.

S Crespi says that he is quite sure this is a complete misunderstanding.

3. S Crespi says that he is not able to reply at once to the document handed to him by M Clemenceau on the previous day. He will, however, furnish a reply at the next meeting.

4. Mr Lansing says that, before taking up the subjects on the Agenda, he wishes to draw attention to a despatch he had received two days previously from Warsaw. It is to the affect that the retiring German troops are removing horses, cattle, agricultural implements and everything necessary for the cultivation of the next harvest. This might be the act of irresponsible soldiery, but it is necessary to put a stop to it.

M Clemenceau proposes that M Dutasta should proceed at once to the Germans at Versailles and make a formal complaint to them on behalf of the Council.

(This is agreed to.)

5. (On Mr Balfour’s proposal, it is agreed to summon the Bulgarian Government to send a Delegation to Paris to receive the Peace Terms. The Secretary-General is asked to take the necessary steps.)

6. Mr Lansing proposes that this question should be taken up before the first question on the Agenda. He thinks the two questions are connected and that the means of action should be determined before addressing any communication to Bela Kun.

(At this stage, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites enter the room.)

General Bliss is asked to make a statement and says that all that is necessary was mentioned in the report.

The report is then read by M Mantoux.

Mr Balfour says that he does not doubt that the appreciation of the Military Representatives is accurate. If the Allied Powers, France, Great Britain, Italy, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Serbia, are too weak to deal with one recalcitrant power, the position was one of great humiliation. That, perhaps, does not matter much, but Bela Kun is turning Hungary into a military stronghold of revolution. Budapest has become an armed camp and all the factories are making munitions. Propaganda is being carried on in the most dangerous fashion in the neighboring countries. If the Allies must sit still and see the Armistice broken before their eyes, they are bound to lose prestige. Central Europe is likely to lose more than prestige. The Bulgarians have just been summoned to Paris to hear the Peace Terms. Is it likely that they will obey if they see that the Allies cannot even coerce a fragment of the late Austro-Hungarian monarchy? The Bulgarians are only half disarmed and would feel that they can defy the Conference. The situation in Central Europe is both difficult and critical. The wave of disturbance might go west as well as east. The situation would, he thinks, grow more critical if it is manifest that the Conference cannot control a small and defeated nation, which is not only breaking the terms of the Armistice, but, in alliance with the Russian Soviet Government, attempting to cause general revolution. He does not favour wild military adventures, but he does not like a confession of impotence.

Mr Lansing says that he has nothing to add to what Mr Balfour had said. He thinks Allied prestige should be maintained. Bolshevism will spread to Austria if it appears to be successful in Hungary. He wonders whether the contribution suggested for Serbia in the report of the Military Representatives was not underestimated. He is not aware that Serbia is fighting or anticipated fighting on any other front. He therefore suggests that the Military Representatives should get into touch with the authorities of Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Romania, in order to find out what these States can do to help.

M Clemenceau says that he must remind Mr Balfour and Mr Lansing that there were neither British nor American troops at hand. The French have two divisions, but other help will be required. He suggests that the Military Representatives, after conferring as suggested by Mr Lansing, should return, together with Marshal Foch, and tell the Council what results they had obtained. He feels sure that Marshal Foch would ask for British and American troops.

Mr Balfour says it will be necessary for him to summon Sir Henry Wilson. Only the British Cabinet can decide whether any British troops are to be employed. He will ask Sir Henry Wilson to consult the Cabinet before fining over to Paris, in order that he might be in a position to state what could be done.

General Bliss observes that it will not be of much use for the Military Representatives to consult the Czech, Serbian and Romanian military authorities as to the number of troops at their disposal, unless there are means of knowing whether their Governments would consent to give troops for this purpose or not.

Mr Lansing says that perhaps the best course would be to confer with the heads of the Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Romanian Delegations in Paris.

(It is then agreed that the Heads of the Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Romanian Delegations be invited to attend the Council on Friday, 11th July, and that Marshal Foch and Sir Henry Wilson be also asked to be present, in order to discuss the possibility of military action against Hungary.)

(At this stage the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites withdraw.)

7. The Council has before them the following documents:

1) A Report of the Financial Commission. Sale of Securities by Government of Bela Kun

2) A draft Joint Note of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the Allied, Associated and Neutral Powers and to the Government of the German Empire and of Austria.

3) A draft Joint Note of the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to Bela Kun.

4) A draft communication to the Press.

Mr. Lansing thinks that the result of the previous discussion shows that no action can usefully be taken at present.

Mr Balfour thinks that there can be no harm in telling Bela Kun, on behalf of the Conference, that he is considered to be a thief. He might take no notice of it and put the communication in the waste paper basket, but it could do him no harm. He thinks Bela Kun should be warned that his right to steal funds for his own political purposes is not recognised. He does not think that the letters drafted are very suitably worded, but, in substance, he thinks they might be adopted.

Mr Lansing says that his objection refers specially to the note addressed to Bela Kun. He does not like threats which cannot be followed by action. He thinks the less the Conference has to do with him the better, and the less he is regarded as a power the better. The letter addressed to other Governments and that addressed to the Press, he does not object to. He thinks they will produce the desired effect without a direct threat to Bela Kun. He also points out that the expressions “Bolshevik” and “Communist” should be expunged from these letters.

Mr Balfour says that he would not object to the omission of the document addressed to Bela Kun, which he admits is not likely to have much effect on him.

S Crespi says that the question has been closely examined in the Commission. It has been recognized that the letter addressed to Bela Kun will not produce much effect, but it is necessary, before taking action in Allied countries regarding the sales of securities, to furnish such action with a legal ground. The only legal ground in this instance can be an official protest against the anticipated action of the Hungarians. The letter is therefore proposed for its legal rather than for its political effect.

Mr Lansing says that he cannot agree with this point of view. A lawless government, unrecognized by any other government, has no legal standing at all. He thinks the Allies will have as strong a legal position whether they inform an outlaw that he is doing wrong or whether they address no remonstrances to him at all.

S Crespi then suggests that the three letters should be sent back to the Commission to be re-drafted in such a manner as to contain a clear declaration that the Allied Powers define Bela Kun’s proceedings as thefts. The drafting will be done in accordance with the views expressed by Mr Balfour and Mr Lansing.

(This is agreed to, and S Crespi undertakes to obtain a re-draft by the Financial Commission.)

(At this point, M Tardieu, Mr Nicolson, Mr Leeper and S Vannutelli-Rey entered the room.)

8. The Council has before them the recommendations of the Yugoslav Committee. These and Hungary recommendations are adopted.

(The Experts then withdraw.)

9. Mr Lansing says that he is unable to act on this subject. He must take the Convention to Washington. The Economic side of the question has not been discussed in America. He suggests that as the matter does not really concern the Peace Conference it might be carried through by ordinary diplomatic methods.

After some further discussion Mr Lansing agrees that the Convention might be discussed inasmuch as it concerns European Powers - American adhesion being reserved.

(It is decided that the subject be put on the Agenda for the following day on this understanding.)

(At this point the Military Representatives enter the room.)

10. General Bliss says that a short time ago the Council of Four had sent to the Military Representatives at Versailles a of project of Mr Winston Churchill’s for repatriating the Czechoslovak troops in Siberia. These troops numbered some 60,000 men. The proposal combined the repatriation of these troops with a movement regarded as useful to the Allied cause. One group of 30,000 men at present in the neighborhood of Omsk was to operate on Kolchak’s right flank and to gain contact with the North Russian forces, and thus to reach Archangel. The other portion was to be repatriated by sea in American ships from Vladivostok. The Military Representatives are asked to examine this proposal together with Czechoslovak authorities. He himself has an interview with Mr Benes - as a consequence of which Mr Benes had attended a meeting at Versailles. Before agreeing to the movement of Czechoslovak troops to Archangel, Mr Benes wishes to know whether Allied troops will remain in Northern Russia or whether they will be removed before winter, irrespective of the arrival of the Czechs in time for shipment from Archangel before the port is icebound. Thus the matter cannot be proceeded with until it is known whether or not the Allied forces in North Russia will await the arrival of the Czechoslovaks. He had written a letter to that effect which hitherto had remained unanswered.

Mr Balfour says that at the time of Mr Winston Churchill’s proposal there had been, he understood, a fair prospect of a junction of the Czechoslovak forces with the Inter-Allied troops in North Russia. Since Kolchak’s reverses this junction appeared less probable; in fact there now seems to be little chance for the Czechoslovaks of reaching the White Sea before the ice set in. The question for them, therefore, is whether the Allied troops will wait for them. He is informed that the British Government means to withdraw its troops before the winter. If the Czechs therefore are unable to reach Archangel before November, he could not promise that they would find British troops awaiting them. He believes that the same applies to the other Allied contingents in North Russia. If this is so it appears to follow that all the Czech troops must be repatriated from Vladivostok. The result of this will be that part of the Siberian Railway will be deprived of the troops guarding it and Kolchak would have to fill the gap. Therefore, the only point to be dealt with immediately is the question whether Allied troops will stay in North Russia through the winter. As far as Great Britain is concerned, the answer is “No”.

M Pichon said that the French Government also means to recall the French troops from Archangel. He points out that the withdrawal of the Czechoslovaks had a very serious result on the whole situation in Siberia.

General Beun states that these troops are guarding 1300 kilometres of railway. If withdrawn they must be replaced. It appears that Japan and the United States must be called upon to fill the gap. The Czechs are at present along the central portion of the line. The Japanese and American troops lay to the east of them. As the Czechs are moved towards Vladivostok the American and Japanese might move westward into their place. There were at the present time 5,000 Czechs in Vladivostok. Their immediate shipment will give some satisfaction to opinion in Czechoslovakia.

S Crespi says that Italian action will be in conformity with French and British action.

Mr Matsui says that Mr Churchill had inquired some time ago whether Japanese troops could replace the Czechoslovaks on the Siberian Railway. He is now informed that it is the question of finding troops to guard 1300 kilometres. The Japanese General had not felt authorized to reply without consulting his Government. He doubts whether there are enough Japanese troops in Siberia to undertake so large a task. If more are required he is not at present able to say what view the Japanese Government will take. He has already telegraphed to his Government on the subject and will do so again.

Mr Lansing says that the problem now before the Council appears to be a military one with which he could not deal. The political question is whether the Czechoslovaks should be evacuated from Siberia. The answer to this is in the affirmative, provided it is militarily possible.

M Pichon says it will be possible if the Americans will send a few troops to reinforce the Japanese.

General Bliss says he thinks this cannot be done. American troops have been sent to Siberia to help the Czechoslovaks to leave it. Once the Czechoslovaks have left there will be no pretext to justify the retention of American troops in the country.

M Pichon says that if the United States will not take on the task it remained for the Japanese to do so; otherwise the whole country would become a prey to Bolshevism.

Mr Matsui says that he is not in a position to state whether the Japanese Government would undertake so much. He will consult them and say that the Conference desires that Japan should be responsible for the guarding of the Siberian Railway.

Mr Balfour says that the question now being discussed is not the one on the Agenda. Without knowing how much the American and Japanese Governments are prepared to do it is difficult to see any solution to the military difficulty which has been raised.

Mr Lansing says that the question on the Agenda is whether the Czechs cab be shipped from Archangel. The answer to this is in the negative. They must, therefore, be shipped from Vladivostok.

M Clemenceau says that as Mr Lansing expresses no hope of American assistance it is desirable to know whether the Conference wishes to invite Japan to undertake the defense of the Siberian Railway.

Mr Lansing says that before giving a final answer he would like to consult Washington. He suggests that the Government at Washington should be consulted by the President of the Conference.

(It is then agreed that the Military Representatives at Versailles should prepare a draft dispatch to be sent by M Clemenceau to the American and Japanese Governments regarding the necessity of providing for the defense of the Siberian Railway after the evacuation of the Czechoslovak troops.)

11. (The Report of the Representatives is accepted.)

12. Mr Lansing observes that this question was one between France, Great Britain and Italy, and that America is not concerned.

M Clemenceau, alluding to documents appended, asks S Crespi how many troops Italy is prepared to send.

S Crespi says that Italy will send two battalions if Great Britain sends two.

Mr Balfour says he was not prepared to say how many British troops will be sent.

M Clemenceau says that he does not support the proposals made by General Franchet d’Esperey that there should be three British battalions and two Italian, while there are two French divisions in the country. France has no special interest in Bulgaria. He personally does not care who possesses Cavalla. He does not agree to maintain two French Divisions in Bulgaria while Great Britain has only one platoon, and Italy two battalions. The French Army is being demobilized, and a number of the troops in Bulgaria will be automatically recalled. In his opinion, there should be an Inter-Allied occupation in equal shares, or none.

General Bliss says that on the 9th June the Military Representatives had made recommendations, which had been approved on the 16th June by the Council of Four. It had been agreed that two French Divisions should be maintained, and that Great Britain and Italy should both be represented. On consultation, Great Britain had offered one platoon, and Italy one battalion. Now General Franchet d’Esperey calls attention to the insufficiency of the British and Italian contribution.

M Clemenceau says that the situation has changed, as he is now forced to demobilize, and remove his troops from Bulgaria, unless his Allies take their share. The only Great Power which has not been demobilized is Italy. Why they have not done so is their business. The only people with interests at stake in Bulgaria are the Greeks, and they sent their troops to Smyrna.

S Crespi says that M Clemenceau has more than once declared that Italy had not demobilized. He wishes to make a formal and official statement that Italy has demobilized as much as France, and had even demobilized one class more than France.

M Clemenceau says that if that is so, Italy could take her share of the watch on Bulgaria. Meanwhile, she is sending 40,000 troops across the Black Sea to Baku.

MS Crespi says that the British Government has requested that the British troops in the Caucasus be relieved by the Italians. He is not aware that Italy has as yet decided to send even one man.

M Clemenceau says that he has nevertheless received official telegrams in support of what he said.

General Cavallero said that he has just given General Thwaites a statement in complete contradiction of the information mentioned by M Clemenceau.

(It is then decided to refer to the Military Representatives at Versailles the question of devising means for an equal Inter-Allied occupation of Bulgaria.)

13. M Clemenceau announces that, according to the Havas Agency, the Weimar Assembly has ratified the Treaty, the Rhine Convention, and the Protocols of the Treaty, by 208 votes against 115.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

07-10-19, 06:24 AM

10th July 1919

French flying ace Jean Navarre, credited with 12 aerial victories and nicknamed the “Sentinel of Verdun,” dies while preparing for a stunt where he would have flown through the Arc de Triomphe.
https://i.imgur.com/JpBcJeg.jpg

Anti-Bolshevik Russian General Sidorin addressing his troops in the city of Balashov.
https://i.imgur.com/aQRCHcu.jpg

A celebration of the first East to West Crossing of the Atlantic by air. 2019 marks the centenary of this event which saw the Airship R.34 leave East Fortune Airfield on 2 July 1919 and land in Mineola, Long Island, USA four days later. It also marks the first return flight across the Atlantic. R.34 took off again on 10 July 1919 arriving in Pulham, England, 75 hours later.

Sailor Steve

07-10-19, 10:22 PM

Thursday, July 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

1. M Clemenceau says that he has a question to submit to his colleagues. In the Council of Four there had been a question, before President Wilson left, about the secrecy of the minutes of proceedings in the Council. President Wilson had taken the view that these Minutes could not be communicated. Mr Lloyd George had not adopted a very firm attitude on the subject. He, (M Clemenceau) had said that he would not be able to refuse them to a Parliamentary Committee. At the present moment the Parliamentary Committee was asking for the Proces-Verbaux of the Commission on the League of Nations. These Proces-Verbaux had been printed and kept secret. He thinks there can be no objection to showing these documents to the Parliamentary Committee but this raises a question of the communication of other similar records. He would like to know from his Colleagues whether they would agree to the communication of records of discussions other than those of the Council of Four.

Mr Lansing says that personally he has no objection whatever but he does not know what the feelings of the President might be. He would like to have the opportunity of finding out.

M Clemenceau asks whether he might give his Parliamentary Committee the Minutes of the League of Nations.

Mr Lansing says that he does not feel sure.

M Mantoux then gives an account of the conversation on this subject which had taken place in the Council of Four on the 28th of June, at the Senate at Versailles.

Mr Balfour says that he cannot believe that any harm would result from the communication of the record in question to a Committee of the French Chamber. This, however, might create a precedent which might be inconvenient. For instance, he questions whether it would be desirable to communicate the records of the present Council.

M Clemenceau says that that is not in question. The present Council is the successor of the Council of Four and these Minutes must remain secret. He refers for the present to the proceedings of commissions.

Mr Balfour asks whether he proposes to communicate the proceedings of the Council of Ten.

M Clemenceau replies in the negative.

Mr Lansing says that even in respect to the deliberations of Committees embarrassing questions arise. For instance, concerning responsibilities there had been very frank discussions. It might be imprudent to communicate all that is consigned in the Minutes on that matter. President Wilson had been chairman of the Commission on the League of Nations and before the Minutes were communicated he ought to be consulted.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Lansing if he would consult President Wilson regarding the request he had made about the Minutes of the Commission on the League of Nations.

Mr Lansing agrees to do so.

(At this point M. Loucheur enters the room.)

2. M Loucheur says that he wishes to submit a proposal regarding the Inter-Allied Commission to negotiate with Germany on the subject of the Rhineland agreement, slightly different from that put forward on the previous day by the British Delegation. He proposes the following:

Draft Resolution Relating to Negotiations With Germany on the Subject of the Rhineland Agreement

“An Inter-Allied Commission should be appointed to discuss with the Germans the details of the Convention in accordance with the terms of the letter addressed on the 27th June by M Clemenceau to the German Delegation at Versailles. The Commission shall be composed of one representative for Great Britain, for France, for the United States, and for Belgium. In case of need this Commission shall consult on military matters the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies”.

(The above proposal is accepted.)

M Loucheur further points out that the British Member, Mr Wise, had been nominated. He would be glad to know the names of the other Commissioners.

M Clemenceau nominates M Loucheur for France.

Mr Lansing says that he will notify the Secretariat later.

M Loucheur asks that Belgium be approached through the Secretariat General.

(This is agreed to.)

(M Loucheur withdraws.)

3. M Clemenceau says that according to news he has received the Poles have made an advance in Lithuania in defiance of the orders of the Conference. He thinks that Marshal Foch should be requested on behalf of the Council to order the Poles to withdraw.

(It is agreed that the dispatch received by M Clemenceau should be sent to Marshal Foch in order that the latter can take suitable action.)

4. S Crespi says that on the previous day he had submitted three notes, one addressed to Bela Kun, another to various Governments, and a third to the Press. Mr Lansing had objected to the first, and the other two had been sent back to the Financial Commission for re-drafting. He now submits two re-drafts.

(After some discussion, the following drafts are adopted:

1) According to information received, Bela Kun has ordered all Banks established in Hungarian territory to hold at his disposal all Joint Note kinds of securities deposited with them. It appears that steps are already being taken to enforce this order.

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers hereby declare that this action is nothing less than robbery. They consider all these measures of confiscation as null and void.

The Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers desire to draw the attention of the of Government of . . . . . . . . to the danger which may be incurred to all countries by the constitution of a fund created for the purpose of a destructive propaganda in foreign countries.

It appears to them that common action is required to defeat this policy and to protect depositors threatened with spoliation.

They therefore propose to the Government of . . . . . . to forbid or at all events to supervise the importation and negotiation of all securities coming from Hungary. It would also be useful to establish a control over all Hungarian securities.

Communication to the Press

2) According to information received, Bela Kun has ordered all Banks established in Hungarian territory to hold at his disposal all kinds of securities deposited with them. It appears that steps are already being taken to enforce this order.

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers consider this to be nothing less than robbery. They consider all these measures of confiscation as null and void.

They call the attention of the Governments of all the Associated and Allied and Neutral Powers and also the Governments of the German Empire and Austria to the danger which may arise for all countries from the constitution of funds for the purpose of supporting propaganda in foreign countries. They request that all those Governments will take the necessary steps to prevent the realization or sale within their territories of the securities stolen by Bela Kun.)

Mr Lansing asks in relation to these proposals, whether the censorship on Hungarian Mails is to be maintained.

M Clemenceau observes that as a state of war still exists with Hungary censorship will automatically remain in force.

S Crespi says that he has just received from Austria a complaint that 15,000,000 kroner had been introduced into the country and that these were probably the product of sales of securities in Hungary.

5. (It is decided that all Commissions dealing with matters necessary for the Treaty with Bulgaria be asked to report not later than July 25th. It is further decided that the Bulgarian Government be asked to send a deputation to Paris on that date.)

(At this stage General Naulin, General Summerall, General Thwaites (representing General Watts) General Cavallero (representing General di Robilant) enter the room.)

6. M Clemenceau, addressing the Generals, says that they are being sent to Fiume to inquire into the events that had taken place there. They are requested to proceed to Fiume as quickly as possible and to devote all their efforts to discovering the truth about the incidents. Their inquiry was of the greatest importance to the maintenance of good relations among the Allies. The Italian member of the Commission, General di Robilant will join it on its way and the British Representative, General Watts, will follow very shortly. The Commission should report to the Council and apply for assistance should it find any difficulty in carrying out its task.

Mr Lansing asks whether the instructions drafted on the 8th had been given to the Generals.

(It is agreed that these instructions should be given in writing to each member of the Commission.)

(The Generals then withdraw.)

(General Sykes, General Groves, Mr Hurst, General Duval, General Cavallero, and Rear Admiral Knapp enter the room.)

7. Mr Lansing says that the American Representatives have no authority to negotiate an agreement.

Mr Balfour suggests that Mr Hurst be heard on the legal aspect of the question.

Mr Hurst says that Article 319 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany foreshadows an early acceptance of the air convention. He has been informed of the difficulty experienced by the American Delegation in agreeing to the convention. He points out that similar difficulties had arisen at the Hague in 1907, and the solution adopted then was to leave the question of signature open for eleven months. It will be easy in this instance to permit the postponement of signature until June 1920. This will give time for full discussion and will entail no alteration in the draft. It will also permit the fulfillment of what is provided for in the treaty with Germany.

Mr Lansing says that he had made a similar proposal on the previous day but since then he has learned that the American experts had made certain reservations. On reference to America, should Congress uphold these reservations it would be impossible to get the American signature to the Convention in its present form. There has not yet been an opportunity to discuss the economic side of the Convention with the heads of American industry. There are questions of customs and patents which need to be examined. America might therefore be deprived of the possibility of adhering to a very important Convention. For this reason he does not think the method proposed by Mr Hurst a suitable one.

Mr Balfour says that he understands it would be in accordance with international practice to make reservations at the time of signature. The Convention in its present form had been largely assented to and it would be a great misfortune if nothing were done to carry out the arrangements foreshadowed in the Treaty. He thinks, therefore, it might be possible to adopt the plan proposed by Mr Hurst, providing that the deferred signatures might be accompanied by reservations to the substance. This cannot be done in a Treaty of Peace but might be done in a Treaty of this kind. He hopes that this method might reconcile the two views.

Mr Lansing says that the document before him appears to be a report. He is prepared to accept the report with the reservations expressed by the American expert. What is being discussed are the proposed rules. These he cannot accept.

Mr Balfour remarks that if any change were made in the Convention he could not guarantee that the numerous Powers concerned in drawing it up would adhere to it in its new shape. The consent of each must be given on its own initiative.

Mr Lansing says that he is not himself endowed with full powers to sign such a Convention. He asks Mr Balfour if he is.

Mr Balfour says that he believes that he is possessed of such powers.

Mr Hurst suggests that the Drafting Committee be asked to prepare the Convention for signature. The question of full powers is one for each Government to determine. The treaty with Germany seems to suppose that the Convention would be signed in a short time. The formula he had suggested would enable full powers to be issued and further consideration to be taken by any Government concerned.

General Duval points out that the project had been completely drafted with the exception of the preamble.

Mr Lansing quotes Article 18 of the Convention as one of those to which he objects.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Lansing how long he thinks it would take him to obtain the agreement of his Government should it be willing to accept the Convention.

Mr Lansing replies that he thinks this might be done in three weeks.

General Duval says he thinks this delay would be regrettable. At the present time aircraft are confined within frontiers and it would be very discouraging to the industry to find the Convention had been postponed. The whole incentive to establishing long-distance commercial air navigation might disappear and each State might establish preferential rules in favour of its own nationals.

Mr Lansing observes that the reservations made by the American Experts require discussion. He is prepared to discuss them on the following day. If agreement could be reached the process would be hastened. He does not like the disposition shown to press the American Delegation to accept what it does not approve.

Mr Balfour says he sympathizes with Mr Lansing’s view but he would ask him in return to sympathize with the British and French view. In the United States it is possible to fly thousands of miles within one national territory. In Europe it is difficult to fly 500 miles without crossing a frontier. If commercial flying is to be of any value it is vital that frontiers should be crossed without difficulty. He would therefore ask Mr Lansing to help in this matter in order that European material interests should not suffer.

Mr Lansing says he understands the principal reason alleged for speedy signature is that the industry interested in flying should know exactly how it stands and so avoid loss on its enterprises. In this connection he asks whether the reservations made by the United States directly affect the question.

General Duval says he thinks they do not.

Mr Lansing suggests that while the United States Government is considering the Convention, European industry might be told that their Governments mean to sign the Convention.

M Clemenceau suggests that the delay of three weeks proposed by Mr Lansing be accepted.

Mr Balfour says that though this represents a loss of three weeks of summer weather he will consent if this is likely to lead to an agreement.

(It is agreed that the subject be brought up again in three weeks.)

Mr Balfour says that the House of Commons is anxious to see this Convention. He would like to know whether his Colleagues have any objection to the Convention being shown.

(It is agreed that the proposed Convention might be published.)

8. S Crespi says that he has looked through the document handed to him by M Clemenceau. This document declares that trains carrying military material for Czechoslovakia, Serbia, Romania, Poland and the French Army in the East had been held up. It concludes, however, by stating that supplies for the French troops had passed unhampered. He wishes to draw attention to this admission. The note makes no mention of consignments of food. Presumably therefore food had been allowed to proceed. Difficulties, however, had arisen by reason of the state of things on the Eastern Frontier of Italy. There was considerable tension of feeling among the Yugoslavs and conflicts of patrols have been frequent. He had received news on the previous day of a fight between a Yugoslav patrol on the one hand and a patrol on the other composed of four Italians and one Frenchman which had resulted in the death of two Yugoslavs. The Italian Military authorities had discovered on a train declared to be a food train a wagon full of machine guns. Lately a whole train composed of 32 trucks had gone to Serbia carrying heavy bombing aeroplanes. Three trains of this character had been observed proceeding to Serbia. These were French trains and there were French soldiers on them.

Mr Lansing asks whether there is anything improper in the dispatch of arms from one Ally to another. As far as he is concerned he is prepared to sell arms to the Serbians as Allies.

S Crespi said that 14 tanks had also been dispatched in the same direction. The Italian Military Authorities think that the Serbs were mobilizing against Italy. He therefore proposes that the Inter-Allied Military Representatives at Versailles should lay down some limit to the armaments sent in that direction. He would like to know why it is necessary for Serbia to receive so much equipment. He therefore proposes that some supervision should be exercised by Marshal Foch and by the Military Advisers at Versailles.

Mr Lansing asks whether S Crespi proposes that the inquiry should extend to mobilization on both sides of the Italian frontier.

S Crespi replies that it is necessary for Italy to take precautions.

Mr Lansing observes that the Serbs perhaps also thought alike.

S Crespi says that he can prove that Italy is demobilizing. Moreover she has demobilized two classes more than France. He has with him the decree ordering demobilization.

Mr Lansing asks how many Italian troops there are in Istria.

General Cavallero says that on the armistice frontier from the Tyrol to Istria there were from 700 to 800 thousand men. He does not know how many of these are concentrated in Istria. There might be 100 thousand. There are in addition perhaps half a million men in the interior. Italy has demobilized two and a half million men.

M Clemenceau asked S Crespi to furnish him with a reply in writing. He had been much struck by the assertion in S Crespi’s remarks of a right to impede the passage of arms from one Ally to another.

(S Crespi agrees to furnish the written reply on the following day.)

9. Mr Balfour says that he has no time to consider this reply.

Mr Lansing suggests that the Drafting Committee be asked to draft a reply in case the Council should decide to decide to ask one.

(It is agreed that the Drafting Committee should be asked to put up a for consideration on the following day.)

10. M Tardieu gives an explanation of the report of the Commission. He points out that the American proposal involves reopening the question of the frontiers between Austria and Czechoslovakia. As there had been no agreement in the Commission, he begs leave to make a personal suggestion. He thinks that Czechoslovakia can do without most of what had been conceded at Gmünd, and the bulk of the territory attributed to her at Feldsberg. Thus with a very slight alteration the historic frontier of Bohemia would be maintained. The very slight addition to this frontier, which he suggests, would be sufficient to safeguard the economic situation. In compensation for this, Czechoslovakia might be given the bridgehead of Pressburg. All needful precautions might be taken against the militarization of the ground on the right bank of the Danube. In any case this strip is so shallow as to be militarily indefensible.

Mr Balfour thinks that on the face of it there is much to recommend.

M Tardieu adds that the political effect in Czechoslovakia of altering the frontier announced on June 2nd, without any ostensible reason save counter-proposals from Austria, must be taken into consideration. It might encourage undesirable tendencies in the country.

Mr Lansing says that this would appear to be an argument against any change. If so, it would apply to Pressburg as well.

M Tardieu says that it was for this reason he proposes to neutralize the effect of altering the frontier between Austria and Czechoslovakia by offering the latter Pressburg as a compensation.

Mr Lansing suggests that M Tardieu should formulate his proposal and illustrate it by a line on the map on the following day in order that time should be given to consider the new proposal.

(This is agreed to.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

07-11-19, 07:33 AM

11th July 1919

President Wilson personally delivers the Treaty of Versailles to the U.S. Senate and urges the senators to approve it and join the League of Nations: “We cannot turn back. The light streams on the path ahead, and nowhere else.”

Secretary of War Newton Baker addresses Army officials and members of the Lincoln Highway Association at the "zero mile stone" marking the start from Washington, D.C., of the 60 car Army motor train with 300 men for the Pacific coast via the Lincoln highway, 11 July 1919.
https://i.imgur.com/VmyGHNT.jpg

Sailor Steve

07-11-19, 03:11 PM

Friday, July 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

1. M Pichon takes the Chair and explains that M Clemenceau is detained in the Peace Commission of the Chamber of Deputies. He sends his apologies and will come later.

(At this stage M Tardieu, General Le Rond, M Laroche, Mr Leeper, M Stranieri, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Hudson enter the room.)

M Tardieu says that he had been asked on the previous day to mark on a map the compromise he had suggested. This compromise gives back to the Austrians half of the ground given to the Czechoslovaks in the neighborhood of Gmünd, only leaving the junction of the railways within Czechoslovakia. In the region of Feldsberg two-thirds of the territory was returned to Austria, only the railway and river remaining in Czechoslovakia. In compensation to Czechoslovakia for this reduction of territory, he proposes to attribute to her the Bridgehead at Pressburg and the railway junction. He would add that in the area round Feldsberg left to Czechoslovakia there are a number of Czechs, which was not the case in the rest of the territories mentioned.

S Crespi says that the Italian Delegation has made reservations particularly in respect to the Bridgehead. He can see no reason for bringing Czechoslovakia across the Danube. There are no military reasons and he thinks it would be a cause of perpetual dissension between the two States. The possession of an isolated bridgehead had an offensive appearance both against Austria and against Hungary. Politically therefore there was little to recommend the transaction. The Italian Delegation would prefer to satisfy the Czechs in any other region than this.

Mr Lansing asks what S Crespi thinks of the other changes suggested by M Tardieu.

S Crespi says that the Italian Delegation thinks that it would be best to leave the frontier as previously decided, and also that no change should be made at Pressburg.

Mr Balfour says that he understands S Crespi’s feeling about the possession of the Bridgehead. Against this, he would set the consideration that nowhere else had a town been cut in two by a national frontier. There is an integral part of the town on the right bank of the Danube. If the river is taken as a boundary, an economic and social unit would be arbitrarily divided - moreover from the main town, the railway station, the electric works and the public gardens would be cut off, and a customs barrier would be established on the bridge connecting the two parts of the city.
S Crespi says that he was told that the portion on the right bank of the river was not an integral part of the city but a suburb.

Mr Lansing says that the United States has considerable experience of divided cities on the Mexican border. This kind of arrangement causes the greatest possible friction. He thinks it is a mistake to make a river divide in two a Town, both parts of which had grown up together under one Municipal authority, and had never been separate. If, therefore, changes are to be made in other parts of the frontier, he would be disposed to allow the whole of Pressburg on both sides of the river to go to Czechoslovakia. Compensation could be given to the German population by frontier rectification elsewhere.

M Pichon asks whether he is right in believing that Mr Balfour and Mr Lansing accepted M Tardieu’s proposal which S Crespi rejected.

Mr Lansing says that he is not quite in agreement on all points. M Tardieu wishes to give the railway junction near Gmünd to Czechoslovakia. He does not think this necessary.

M Tardieu says that this Junction exclusively serves Czechoslovak interests. His proposal withdraws one line entirely from the boundaries of Czechoslovakia. He considers, therefore, the retention of this Junction as economically essential.

Mr Lansing says that he is informed that 99 per cent of the population in the Gmünd area is German. He therefore proposes that the historic line should be reverted to.

M Tardieu says he understands that on the previous day a compromise was to be sought. His instructions were that if a compromise could not be reached, the frontier announced on June 2nd was to be adhered to. He would add that according to the Czechs, a good deal of the population was Czech though he did not make himself personally responsible for this statement. Undoubtedly the majority was of German speech, whether or not of Czech origin. Further, the Czechoslovak Government had somehow learnt that an alteration of frontier was contemplated and Mr Kramarcz had already made a protest. It must be remembered that there was a new Government at Prague inclined to seek a balance between the Allied and Associated Powers and German influence. If the compromise he suggested was accepted, the Czechs would no doubt complain.

Mr Lansing says that he would like to give Pressburg to the Czechs but not without full compensation, namely, the return of the German speaking inhabitants around Gmünd. As to the Feldsberg area, with the exception of four villages, containing he was told, 4,000 Germans and only 260 Czechs, which might without disadvantage be restored to Austria, he is content with M Tardieu’s proposal. In the Gmünd region he would like to return to the historic frontier. He dislikes the salient created by the proposal.

Mr Balfour says that M Tardieu’s compromise is like all compromises, open to criticism. Nevertheless, he accepts and supports it as the best way out of a difficult situation. In effect the Council is taking from the Czechs something already officially given to them. The problem is therefore not quite an open one. It involves undoing something already done. He thinks that if the portion of Pressburg on the right side of the Danube be given to the Czechs while the bulk of the German speaking people near Feldsberg and near Gmünd are restored to Austria, neither side ought to complain.

Mr Lansing says that he would prefer to avoid the use of the word “bridgehead”. He would prefer to say that a suburb of Pressburg was restored to the city. The line proposed in Feldsberg with the exception of the four villages in the South East of the district, to which he had referred, he would accept. In order to obtain agreement he would also accept the line proposed in the region of Gmünd.

M Tardieu says that he would like to add two remarks. The Committee thinks that the course of the Morava and Thaia which now became a frontier line should be internationalized. The second remark is that the railway going south from Pressburg which was attributed to Hungary should have a servitude imposed on it ensuring free circulation for the Czechoslovak State. He would suggest that in the Treaty with Austria an addition be made to Article 313 to the following effect:

After the first railway mentioned, the second should be:

“from Bratislava (Presbourg) towards Fiume via Hegyeshalom–Csorna–Hegyfalu–Zapabér–Zala Szent Ivan–Mura Keresztur and the branch line from Hegyfalu–Szembathely and from Mura Keresztur to Pragerhof.”

The second as at present mentioned should become the third.

Similar provision should be made in the Treaty with Hungary regarding the railway which is to be within the Hungarian boundary.

(It is decided to accept for the Austrian frontier the compromise proposed by M Tardieu, subject to a slight modification proposed by Mr Lansing.

The Slices of territory attributed to Czechoslovakia in excess of the former administrative frontier should be reduced in the regions of Gmünd and Feldsberg to a minimum by way of compensation for the suburb of Presbourg situated on the right bank of the Danube.

M Tardieu’s Commission is asked to define the new frontier line and to forward it to the Drafting Committee.

It is further decided that the course of the Morava and of the Thaia insofar as they became frontier lines should be internationalized.

It is also decided to modify Article 313 of the Treaty with Austria by the addition; after the first railway mentioned of a second

“from Bratislava (Presbourg) towards Fiume via Hegyeshalom–Csorna–Hegyf alu–Zapabér–Zala Szent Ivan-Mura Keresztur and the branch line from Hegyfalu–Szembathely and from Mura Keresztur to Pragerhof.”

The second Railway at present mentioned should become the third. And to insert a similar provision to Article 313 in the treaty with Hungary.)

2. (After a short discussion, the recommendation of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways made at its Meeting of July 9th, is accepted, and it is decided that the following insertion be made in Article 33 of Part 12, as paragraph 2 of that Article:

“The establishment of an the Frontier Stations between Austria and the contiguous Allied and Associated States, as well as the working of the lines between those stations, shall be settled by agreements similarly concluded.”)

3. With reference to a letter from the German Delegation of June 25th, it is for consideration whether an answer should be sent.

Mr Balfour expresses the opinion that it is undesirable to send any answer. His colleagues concurred in this opinion, and it is decided that no answer should be sent.

4. S Crespi begs that this question be adjourned.

Mr Lansing agrees, as he wishes to have the differences between this Treaty and that with Poland Associated examined.

S Crespi says that on the 17th of June Baron Sonnino had suggested certain additional clauses of general application. This had been referred by the late Council of Four to the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Council of Foreign Ministers has now ceased to exist. He presumes that the question might be referred to whatever body now represented the Council of Foreign Ministers. The decision to refer the question to the Council of Foreign Ministers had been taken because the Commission on New States thought the proposals were outside their competence. He explains that the proposals are to the effect that the political clauses inserted in the Treaty with Austria should be generalized in such a way as to apply to all the New States formed out of the former Dual Monarchy.

(After some discussion, it is decided to refer to the Committee on Political Clauses in Europe Baron Sonnino’s proposal tending to apply the political clauses of the Treaty with Austria to all the States formed from the territories of the late Dual Monarchy.)

(At this point the Experts withdraw.)

(M Clemenceau enters the room and the members of the Drafting Committee are summoned.)

5. Mr Hurst reads the following:

“On he Ratification by Germany of the Treaty of Peace - Note for the Supreme Council

Article 6 of the law, dated February 10th, 1919, of the German Empire, relating to the provisional exercise of the Imperial Power, provides that:

“The affairs of the Empire are conducted by an Imperial President. The Imperial President will represent the Empire in international matters, will conclude in the name of the Empire Treaties with foreign Powers, and will accredit and receive ambassadors.

Declaration of war and Treaties of Peace are made in conformity with the law of the Empire.

The instrument of ratification signed by President Ebert, and countersigned by Bauer, President of the Council of Ministers, mention being made of the approval of the “legislative bodies”, appears to fulfill the above stipulation.

It may be deemed that Article 4 of the same law, dealing with the preparation of the future constitution of the Empire, lays down that the territory of the German States cannot be altered without the consent of those States, but this provision appears only to restrict the powers of the National Assembly on this subject.

In these circumstances, the instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Peace of June 28th, 1919, forwarded by the Government of the German Empire, is not in the opinion of the Drafting Committee open to objection, but may be regarded as complete, and in due form, from the international point of view.”

M Clemenceau says that it followed from this opinion of the Drafting Committee that the blockade on Germany must be raised from the 12th of July, in accordance with a letter received by him from the Inter-Allied Blockade Committee.

(It is decided to accept the interpretation given by the Drafting Committee, and to terminate the blockade on Germany from the 12th July, 1919.)

6. Mr Balfour says that in connection with this subject he wishes to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that a blockade on Russia had been conducted under the guise of a blockade on Germany. The latter being now removed, it is for consideration whether any form of blockade can be continued with the object of preventing the passage of supplies and arms to the Russian Soviet Government. This Government has not been recognised and the Allies are not at war with it. It does not seem possible, therefore, to legally declare a blockade on it. Nevertheless, it is obviously a serious matter to allow Sweden and other countries to furnish Soviet Russia with the means of fighting our friends. He suggests this matter be considered and discussed at a very early date.

(It is decided to put on the Agenda for the following meeting the question of the consequences of the termination of the Blockade on Germany on the unofficial blockade of Russia.)

(At this stage Mr Misu, Mr Vaida-Voevod and Mr Plessia of the Romanian Delegation; M Patchitch and M Vesnitch of the Serbian Delegation; and Mr Kramarcz and Dr Benes of the Czechoslovak Delegation; Marshal Foch, General Weygand, the Versailles Military Representatives and General Thwaites enter the room.)

7. M Pichon gives the delegates a short account of what had taken place in Council at previous meetings on this subject. He also reads to them the report made by the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles regarding the military measures to be taken to enforce respect for the armistice on Hungary.

M Clemenceau asks Marshal Foch to say what he thinks of the projected operation.

Marshal Foch says that the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles contains no projected operation. It merely states what forces are available for action. He understands the purpose is to make Hungary respect the conditions of the armistice. In the meantime Hungarian forces have increased from six to nine divisions, and the success obtained over the Czechs had improved the morale of these forces. If Hungary is to respect the armistice, she must be forced to reduce these troops to six divisions, and also to withdraw from certain territories. 84,000 men are said to be available for use to effect this. This number is small for the purpose. The main contributor to this number was Romania. Not only is the total not great, but there is no cohesion between the various elements contributing to it. The Romanian Army is under Romanian Command, the Serbian army is under Serbian Command, the Czech Army is under a French General, and the French troops under French Command. A single Command is obviously the first requisite for a successful campaign. Moreover, the probable length of the operations must be taken into account. It seems unlikely that the desired end can be obtained by one rapid stroke. If this were the case the troops above mentioned would require reinforcement. Obviously assistance must be looked for in this from the neighboring states. Before making a plan it must be known what these States would do, how much they would contribute, and whether they would agree to act under one Command. The desired results were first to defeat the Hungarian army, and second to occupy Budapest. The first alone is difficult with the forces locally available. The second is still more difficult, as Budapest is the central fortress of the Hungarian plain. It is a considerable city, and if taken will require a large occupying force. Before embarking on the adventure there must first be a political understanding between the States taking part in it. Secondly a military understanding. Thirdly, a plan of operations.

M Clemenceau asks Marshal Foch whether he requires more troops than are currently at his disposal. If so, would he name a figure?

Marshal Foch says he will have to study the question. The whole operation is conditioned first by the terms of the agreement that might be made between the states concerned, and secondly by the probable length of the operations.

M Clemenceau asks the Romanian representatives to state the view of their Government.

Mr Misu said that the Romanian Government will certainly take into consideration the desires of the Conference. Romania is greatly interested in the condition of Hungary by reason of its neighborhood. Romania is already bearing a heavy burden and maintaining seven divisions in Hungary. Two army corps are forming in Transylvania and are not yet ready. Four divisions are maintained on the Russian front, and two more are being mobilized with the help of equipment supplied by the Allies. He agrees with Marshal Foch that the first requisite was an understanding between the Governments concerned. On behalf of the Romanian Government he feels entitled to say that a very willing spirit will be shown.

M Clemenceau asks the Serbian representatives to express the views of their Government.

Mr Vesnitch says he entirely agrees with Marshal Foch that a single Command is necessary. With this proviso he thinks that the forces at present available, if assisted with arms and munitions, could achieve success without much difficulty. It should also be impressed on the Government at Budapest that the Allied and Associated Powers were absolutely at one, and seriously intend to have their will respected. This will produce a moral effect perhaps even greater than the military effect of the forces employed.

As to Serbia’s share, he has no instructions from the Serbian Government, but he thinks he can go so far as to say that Serbia will make her contribution and he is prepared to advise his Government to do so. He must point out that Serbia herself is threatened at certain points and he would ask that, during the campaign, Serbia be guaranteed by the Powers against threats from without. He mentions, for example, that the Bulgarians have not yet been disarmed.

M Clemenceau asks how many troops Serbia would contribute.

Mr Vesnitch replies that Serbia will contribute what the Military Representatives at Versailles had asked for, namely, one division.

M Pichon says that he hoped Serbia might contribute more.

Mr Vesnitch says that perhaps the Serbian Government might see its way to making a larger contribution, but he can make no undertaking on its behalf.

M Clemenceau asks how far he thinks the Serbian Government will go.

Mr Vesnitch replies that this depends on general circumstances.

M Clemenceau observes that an Army cannot be made of general circumstances.

Mr Vesnitch says that the Military Representatives at Versailles had considered one division necessary.

General Belin explains that the report made by the Military Representatives had merely stated what troops were believed to be available. The figure mentioned was not a desideratum but a statement of what was ready for immediate use. The report had also stated that the troops locally available will require reinforcements.

M Clemenceau says that it is evidently desirable to have exact figures. Once they are obtained, Marshal Foch can be asked if they are sufficient. Mr Vesnitch had said that Serbia would contribute a division, but, if so, must be protected against the Bulgarians. In other words, what he offers with one hand he withdraws with the other.

Mr Vesnitch says that he had declared Serbia’s readiness to help. Nevertheless, the precarious condition of the country must be taken into account. He is prepared to offer the whole of the Serbian Army on condition that, while it was away from home, the house should not be burgled. One division had been mentioned in the report of the Military Representatives; he had understood that they desired one division. He now understands from General Belin that more, if possible, would be acceptable. It is necessary, however, for the Serbian Military Authorities to judge what can be done under the circumstances. The first business of Serbia is to ensure her own existence. She is being asked to make an effort in the common cause and on her behalf he has expressed her readiness to do her best. Marshal Foch has said that action must be preceded by political agreement between the countries concerned, namely, Serbia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. He would like to observe that, as a Military action was required and that as, for success, it ought to be rapid, a great deal of valuable time would be lost in conducting negotiations at Belgrade, Budapest, and Prague. He thinks it would be best to place the available forces directly under Marshal Foch’s command.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Vesnitch if he could inform the Council of the present distribution of the Serbian Army.

Mr Vesnitch gives the following information:

1) The Morava division in the Banat.

2) The Drina division in Batchka and Slavonia.

3) The Danube division in Croatia and Slovenia.

4) The Choumadia division in Belgrade (one regiment) and on the Bulgarian frontier.

5) The Timok division in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Fiume.

6) The Yugo-Slav division in the Sandjak, on the Albanian frontier, in old Serbia and in Montenegro.

7) The Vardar Brigade in Macedonia.

M Clemenceau then asks the Czechoslovak representatives to state the case for their Government.

Mr Kramarcz said that the Hungarian situation is undoubtedly a threat to Czechoslovakia. His Government does not desire Hungary to have a larger Army than that allowed to her in the armistice, but the present moment is not propitious for action by Czechoslovakia against Hungary. When Czechoslovakia was attacked, the moment was more propitious. At that time, Czechoslovakia had mobilized 150,000 men, but munitions and equipment were lacking. The Conference had then imposed an armistice between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Hungarians had observed this armistice and had evacuated Czechoslovakian territory. What pretext, therefore, was there for the Czechs to attack the Hungarians? The proposal now is to demand the reduction of the Hungarian forces to the number stipulated, but so far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, the Hungarians have fulfilled the conditions of the armistice required of them. He agrees with Mr Vesnitch that a political agreement between the three States is not desirable. The question is one concerning the Entente. It relates to the armistice negotiated between Hungary and the Allied and Associated Powers. No doubt Czech troops, if employed, will do their duty, but before they could be employed the Government at Prague must be consulted.

M Clemenceau inquired what contribution from Czechoslovakia had been suggested in the Versailles report?

Mr Kramarcz replied 20,000 men. He does not conceal that Czechoslovakia had more men than this available, but he cannot say whether the Government at Prague would consent to act. As the Council knows, the Government had lately changed.

Marshal Foch says that he has just received a letter from General Pellé dated 8th July. He reads this letter to the Council. It follows from this letter that Hungary is determined to react against fate. It will seize its opportunity when the Allied nations have demobilized and disarmament has set in. He would like to explain that the preliminary understanding he had referred to was the kind of understanding that could be obtained in the Council. He does not suggest that the negotiations be carried on in Prague, Bucharest and Belgrade.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Balfour whether any British help could be expected.

Mr Balfour replies that he had repeated to the British War Cabinet the argument he had set forth to the Council. He thinks the Powers cannot submit to a continued breach of the armistice by Hungary. This affects central Europe and perhaps even the whole of Europe. Unless this is put to a stop, there is no hope of peace or of restoring the economic condition of central Europe. It is of the utmost importance to act quickly. He thinks an effort must be made and that all Allied countries must contribute. A decision on this subject is one of a very momentous character. Up to the present time he has received no answer from the British War Cabinet. He does not know whether General Thwaites has received any answer from the War Office.

General Thwaites says that he has received no answer.

S Crespi says that he had telegraphed to Rome in the same sense as Mr Balfour. He thinks all are agreed in regarding the question as one of European importance. He has so far received no answer. The question, however, is being considered. Italy is passing through a critical time. Demobilization has proceeded even further than he had stated on the previous day. (S Crespi handed M Clemenceau a paper on this subject.) Italy is threatened by her own Bolsheviks. A general strike is possible if Italy acts against the Bolsheviks, whether in Russia or elsewhere. He expects S Tittoni to be back in Paris on the following Sunday. He will then be able to make a statement on the subject.

M Clemenceau says that the result of the discussion does not appear to furnish Marshal Foch with a very coherent force.

Marshal Foch says that if the military resurrection of Hungary is to be prevented, action should be rapid. If all the Governments co-operate, he thought success could be achieved.

Dr Benes says that one precaution must be taken if a campaign against Hungary is started. When the Magyars had attacked Czechoslovakia it was found that there was considerable Austrian connivance with the Hungarians. It would be necessary to take all precautions that Austria did not hamper the military action undertaken by the Allies.

M Clemenceau says that, to sum up, there appear to be six Romanian divisions, two French, one Serbian and a doubtful quantity of Czechoslovaks.

Dr Benes says there are troops in Czechoslovakia, but a scarcity of equipment. He is therefore not prepared to state a figure.

M Clemenceau says that he would be glad to know what contribution Great Britain would make. Perhaps Mr Balfour would be able to state this on the following day.

Mr Balfour says that he hopes this might be so. There are no British troops at present on the spot.

M Clemenceau says the question is whether any could be sent.

Mr Balfour says that he does not know.

M Clemenceau asks Marshal Foch whether he can act on this information.

Marshal Foch replies that preparations could be made. After discovering what each could contribute and the dates on which the contributions could be made, he thinks that he would be able in a fortnight to elaborate the first outlines of a plan.

M Clemenceau suggests that Marshal Foch should give a sketch of the plan of operations in a week, in order that the matter should be kept before the Council’s attention.

Marshal Foch says that, if he were to do this, he must be authorized to treat with the Governments concerned and find out from them what they could undertake to supply and at what period they could fulfill their undertakings.

Mr Kramarcz says that he does not know whether his Government will contribute to the operations, but should it do so he must ask that action be taken at Vienna, in order that munitions and arms stored there be delivered to Czechoslovakia.

M Clemenceau replies that this point should be explained to Marshal Foch.

(It is agreed that Marshal Foch after consulting the authorities of the countries concerned, should formulate the plan of operations and report progress to the Council in a week’s time.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

07-12-19, 07:35 AM

12th July 1919

General Afrikan P. Bogaewsky, leader of the Don Republic, is made Honorary Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George by British officers in Novocherkassk.
https://i.imgur.com/v8Dkv15.jpg

Work is approved to transform the collier “Jupiter” into the first U.S. carrier, the USS Langley.
https://i.imgur.com/GX6LNO2.jpg

Lieutenant Frank Ragan King, USN (b. 1884) was killed during minesweeping operations in the North Sea while in command of the trawler USS RICHARD BULKELEY when it was sunk by a mine on 12 July 1919. The USS KING (DD-242) was named in his honour.
https://i.imgur.com/vyRlHYD.jpg

Ship Losses:

USS Richard Bulkeley (United States Navy) The minesweeper struck a mine and sank in the North Sea with the loss of seven of her 25 crew.

Sailor Steve

07-12-19, 12:20 PM

Saturday, July 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

(M Cambon enters the room.)

1. M Clemenceau says that the Council has before them a proposal of Mr Lansing to the effect that the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments should be given 10 days to arrive at an understanding between themselves on the Teschen question. He requests M Cambon to explain his point of view.

M Cambon says that the Teschen question has been much discussed. No particular solution has been accepted, for it was hoped that Mr Paderewski and Dr Benes would be able to come to an understanding. They had not been able to do so, with the result that conflict continues in the area in question. It is therefore necessary to arrive at some solution and he thinks that Mr Lansing’s proposal is a good one.

(After some discussion it is decided to accept Mr Lansing’s proposal and to grant a period of 10 days to the Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia to arrive at an agreement between themselves on the question of Teschen.)

2. M Clemenceau says that Mr Lansing had submitted a proposal to the effect that the Orava question should be referred to the Polish and Czechoslovak Committees, in order that they might correct the frontier previously adopted, in a manner which should conform to the ethnographical data on the subject. He therefore asked the experts to accept the ethnographical frontier and asked M. Cambon for his opinion.

M Cambon said that the Czechoslovak Committee had examined the question with care: the Committee in question had decided to grant Orava to Czechoslovakia as a compensation. At present the populations affected are stated to be dissatisfied and Mr Lansing had asked for a re-examination of the question.

Mr White says that two peasants had visited President Wilson on the 28th June and that they had spoken to him on behalf of 50,000 inhabitants of the region in question.

M Cambon thinks that the two Committees might meet and submit a new proposal.

Mr Balfour says that President Wilson desired strongly that the question should be examined afresh.

M Clemenceau says that the question should be referred to the Committees, which should be asked to make a new examination of the question, without being bound by any obligation to return to the ethnographical frontier line.

(It is therefore decided that the question of the frontier between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia should be referred to the Polish and Czechoslovak Committees for examination and report.)

(M Cambon withdraws.)

3. M Clemenceau says that the Council has to look into the effect upon the Russian Blockade of the termination of the Blockade of Germany.

Mr Balfour says that while he recognizes how urgent and important the question is, he finds that it raises points of such difficulty that he would be grateful if the Council would put off the discussion to its next meeting.

(Mr Balfour’s proposal is agreed to.)

4. M Clemenceau says that it is proposed that a Committee of Experts should examine the Italian demand for the cession of the Austro-Hungarian Concession in Tientsin to them.

Mr White says that he is obliged to remark that the Government of the United States has always been opposed to any new concessions at Tientsin being made by China.

S Crespi says that it is not a question of a new concession but simply of an extension of the existing Italian concession. The Note submitted by the Italian Delegation to the Council shows that the Italian concession only consists of 124 acres whilst those granted to other countries were more extensive.

M Pichon said that the question should be summarized as follows: There is an article in the German treaty by virtue of which German concessions are restored to China. Germany had ratified the Treaty. It is to be observed that none of the concessions in question had been given to the Allied and Associated Powers, but that they had been restored to China, on the simple condition that the latter country should open its ports to international Commerce. The clauses in question are contained in Articles Nos. 128 to 132. The Italian proposal is therefore no less than an abrogation of the principle accepted by the Conference.

Mr Matsui said that he entirely agrees with M Pichon. The return of the concessions to China is part of the Treaty with Germany. The same thing applies to Austria; and the Austrian Government had received a copy of the text of the Treaty. It is therefore equitable to return the Austro-Hungarian concessions to China.

Mr White said that in spite of his keen desire to satisfy the Italian claims, it seems impossible to him to grant to Italy what belongs to China.

S Crespi says that the Italian Government has long been asking for an improvement in their concession from China.

The concession in question is very limited and surrounded by marshy ground. It does not even contain any land suitable for setting up a hospital for the sick and wounded. The Conference is very cognizant of Chinese methods and the discussions had been so drawn out that the Italian Government had received no satisfactory reply. It had therefore been decided to put the question before the Conference, with a view to making the concession a question of reparation. The Italian concession is too small to allow of any economic development and he is of opinion that the Chinese Government would not oppose the enlargement of the concession in question.

M Clemenceau says that he proposes to nominate a Committee.

Mr White says that he opposes any Committee being nominated, since the question before it would be that of ceding Chinese property. He does not see any objection to the Italian Government raising the question directly with China; but if Austria-Hungary is deprived of the concession by virtue of the Treaty, it must inevitably be returned to China.

S Crespi proposes that the question should be referred to the Reparation Committee.

M Clemenceau states that he prefers that it should be examined by experts. He reminds Mr White that no decision will be taken unless he authorizes it, since every member has a right of veto. But it seems difficult and not very conciliatory to oppose the nomination of a Committee.

Mr White says that he agrees under the reservations which he had already made.

Mr Balfour remarks that the representative of the American Delegation would always be able to refuse to accept the decisions of the Committee in question.

Mr White states that he agrees to the nomination of a Committee, but that he would be opposed to its decisions. The United States had renounced all claims to any concession and was, moreover, opposed to concessions in principle. He cannot, therefore, recognize the necessity of nominating any Committee.

S Crespi says that he does not wish to press the discussion further, but that he begs Mr White to agree to the nomination of a Committee without thereby engaging himself in any way.

Mr White states that under these circumstances, he agrees.

Mr Balfour states that he agrees to the proposal but that he does not see what good will come of it in view of the American right of veto. The work of the Committee will be without effect, but if it could give any satisfaction to the Italian Delegation, he would not be opposed to the nomination of the Committee.

Mr White states that he thinks the question should be dealt with by direct negotiation and reads Article 3 of Section IV, Part III, of the Peace Treaty with Austria:

“Austria cedes to China all her rights over the buildings, wharves and pontoons, barracks, forts, arms and munitions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless telegraphy installations and other public property which belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and which are situated or may be in the Austro-Hungarian Concession at Tientsin or elsewhere in Chinese territory.”

S Crespi states that the Article in question has not yet been submitted to the Austrian delegation and that it is only a project.

(It is decided to nominate a special Committee to examine the Italian demand that a clause which should cede to Italy the Austrian concession in Tientsin should be introduced into the Peace Treaty with Austria.)

(The American Delegation accepts the proposal while making a reservation that it will not be bound by the findings of the Committee appointed.)

5. M Clemenceau states that he is obliged to submit to the Council a document which had been communicated officially by the Serbian delegation. It had been found in Klagenfurt in the Office of the Senior Officer of the District. The document seems to show that the Austrians had been informed of the movements of the Serbian army by the indiscretion of the Italian Authorities.

(It is decided to communicate the document to the various Delegations for their scrutiny.)

6. M Clemenceau produces a document addressed to him directly by Bela Kun.

M Mantoux then reads it aloud.

Mr Balfour states that it seems to him that the Council is in a very difficult position with regard to the document in question. It should be remembered that the Allied and Associated Powers had approached Hungary with a view to making that country withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia on the condition that an analogous order should be imposed upon Romania. Hungary had accepted and had withdrawn its troops. Romania had not obeyed the order. Mr Bratiano had said in a private conversation with him that it would be impossible for Romania to withdraw her troops before Hungary had disarmed. The argument was strong. Romania was threatened by Russian Bolshevism on its eastern frontier and by Hungarian Bolshevism on its western frontier. Up to the present time the country had managed to hold its own, owing to the fact that on the Hungarian side, it was protected by the line of the Theiss which could easily be defended. The Romanians stated that if they were to abandon this line and attempt to defend themselves further back, they would have no guarantee against an attack from Bela Kun which, if made, would make it difficult for Romania to defend herself. Although Mr Bratiano had not made a precise statement to that effect, he had given the impression that if Hungary had disarmed according to the conditions of the Armistice, Romania would carry out the wishes of the Allies and would retire to the line which had been laid down. Mr Bratiano had further explained that Hungary by withdrawing its forces from Czechoslovakia had not lessened the danger to Romania, which was on the contrary more than ever menaced by the Hungarian movement.

M Clemenceau says that he supposes that Bela Kun’s ready obedience to the orders he had received could be explained in this way.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks the Romanians would be justified in not withdrawing their army so long as the Hungarians were not prevented from re-enforcing theirs and from manufacturing munitions and war materials.

M Clemenceau proposes that Mr Balfour should prepare a reply.

S Crespi says that new facts have to be taken into consideration, which had occurred since the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops. Massacres and looting subversive of human rights had taken place. The Italian representative, who was President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission, had formally protested to the Government of Bela Kun and had been able to prevent certain executions.

Mr Balfour proposes that a reply should be given to the effect that no discussion can be undertaken with Bela Kun so long as he does not comply with the Armistice conditions.

M Pichon says that the Italian representative had evidently done everything within his power. He drew the attention of the Council to a telegram received by him.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks that Mr Balfour’s proposal is the best.

(It is therefore decided to send the following telegram in reply to the wireless telegraphic message sent by Bela Kun to M. Clemenceau:

“The Peace Conference cannot discuss any matter with you while you do not carry out the conditions of the Armistice.”)

6. [misnumbered] M Clemenceau asks whether S Crespi has the report on Supply Trains at Modane asked for by the Conference.

S Crespi says that the report in question will be ready during the afternoon. The examination that had been made showed that the trains had not been held up at Modane except for a few hours on account of customs formalities.

M Clemenceau says that he will examine the report.

7. S Crespi says that he wishes to draw the attention of the Council to the following note on the subject of the actions of the Greeks in Asia Minor.

M Clemenceau says that even though the Greeks have passed the lines of demarcation laid down, they are nonetheless in the country with the authorization of the Peace Conference, and this cannot be pleaded for the Italians, who, in spite of our wishes and of our decisions, have occupied the country. In a full Conference, at which S Orlando and Baron Sonnino were present, Italy had been asked to withdraw her troops. She had not done so. If the Greeks had acted in the manner described, in the note, it was regrettable, but how could they be blamed for it? He therefore proposes that Mr Balfour should send a dispatch to the British Commodore on the spot, instructing him to report on the situation.

Mr Balfour says that he will do so, but is the Commodore to confine his inquiry to the actions of the Greeks in the region in question, without taking note of the actions of the Italians?

M Clemenceau says that what the Italians have done is well-known. The Italian forces are in the region in violation of a formal decision of the Conference. S Orlando and Baron Sonnino had taken no notice of the requests made to them, nor of the decisions made. Together with Mr Balfour, he had sent a memorandum to S Tittoni, to which a reply has just been received. It had been agreed that the Italians should send no more troops into the regions in question, and in spite of this, three thousand more have been sent. He therefore proposes that an inquiry should be made by the British Commodore, but he does not see how he can place any blame upon the Greeks.

S Crespi says that S Tittoni will soon be back, and that he, personally, does not wish to enter into the discussion, more particularly as a memorandum has been sent. He will confine himself to saying that the Italian Government thinks that it possesses rights over the region in question by virtue of Article 9 of the Treaty of London. He nonetheless thanks the Council for the proposal for an inquiry, which he agrees to.

(It is decided that Mr Balfour should direct the British Commodore in command on the Coast of Asia Minor to send in a report on the subject of the incidents that had occurred between the Greeks and Italians in the region in question.)

Jimbuna

07-13-19, 07:47 AM

13th July 1919

Captured German artillery guns are heaped on top of each other in Paris for tomorrow's Bastille Day celebrations.
https://i.imgur.com/K9JPMXB.png

A British soldier hangs from an abandoned German cannon in Ostend, Belgium.
https://i.imgur.com/kaoorpR.jpg

Sailor Steve

07-13-19, 03:12 PM

Sunday, July 13, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

07-14-19, 05:54 AM

14th July 1919

Lieutenant Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower participating in the Transcontinental Motor Convoy to test the country’s road system.
https://i.imgur.com/IQ0BOar.jpg

Australian workers and their families who came to work in British munitions factories prepare to return to Australia.
https://i.imgur.com/3UZF1FW.png

Francois Flameng- "The parade of Victory, July 14, 1919"
https://i.imgur.com/3uRiSgc.jpg

Sailor Steve

07-14-19, 02:46 PM

Monday, July 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

07-15-19, 01:44 PM

15th July 1919

During a mine-clearing operation, British airship N.S.11 (pictured is sister ship N.S.8) explodes, killing all 9 crew members.
https://i.imgur.com/qqwTxRC.jpg

British Guards Division march in Paris for the Bastille Day parade.
https://i.imgur.com/JzfaY3i.jpg

A rare sight of all six of the Royal Australian Navy’s J Class submarines together, alongside the 3445 tons purpose-built depot ship HMAS PLATYPUS. Photo was taken soon after the main body of the submarines, together with HMAS PLATYPUS and the cruiser HMAS SYDNEY arrived in Sydney.
https://i.imgur.com/ceO8S13.jpg

Ship Losses:

Derband (Soviet Union) The cargo schooner was shelled and sunk in the Caspian Sea by HMS Emile Nobel and HMS Kruger (both Royal Navy).
Useyn Abbad (Soviet Union) The cargo schooner was shelled and sunk in the Caspian Sea by HMS Emile Nobel and HMS Kruger (both Royal Navy).

Sailor Steve

07-15-19, 08:37 PM

Monday, July 15, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

1. M Clemenceau says that he has received a communication from Bela Kun, which is a reply to that sent on behalf of the Council according to the decision taken on July 12th.

M Mantoux read the communication from Bela Kun.

M Clemenceau expresses the opinion that Bela Kun has right on his side. He has been told that if his troops evacuate Czechoslovakia, the Romanians will be ordered to evacuate the part of Hungary they had invaded, but they have not done so. Mr Balfour had since informed the Council that the Romanians could not safely carry out the order. It is a pity this point of view had not been explained before the order was made. Nevertheless, whatever reasons the Romanians might allege, if the Conference does not order them to withdraw and cannot enforce the order, the Council will be in a bad position.

Mr Balfour admits there is force in M Clemenceau’s remarks. He believes that the Council of Four would not have taken the decision it took on June 12th, to arrange an Armistice involving the withdrawal of the Romanians, had they known that the Hungarians were breaking the most essential terms of the original Armistice. This had not been known until both President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George had left Paris. M Clemenceau had not been aware of it, as he had expressed doubt when the matter was first brought to his notice. No doubt the Council was in an unsatisfactory position, but it would be in a worse one if it were to order the Romanians to withdraw. Mr Bratiano, in his farewell visit, had expressed himself very firmly and concisely. He said that the Powers had no authority to demand of Romania a retreat which they could not protect. Unless the Powers could guarantee the safe withdrawal of the Romanian troops and the secure holding of another line of defense against a superior enemy, it would be unfair to enforce the demand on Romania. According to the military advice he had received, in view of the increase of the Hungarian army, Romanian national existence might be at stake if this were done. In his communication, Bela Kun alleged breaches of the Armistice by the Czechoslovaks and by the Romanians. It was the business of the military authorities to see that the Armistice was carried out. He thought that the military authorities had not treated the politicians very well, as they had not kept them informed of the breaches of the Armistice whether by one side or by the other. He would, therefore, propose to send Bela Kun’s letter to Marshal Foch before any reply was made, and to ask the latter for a report regarding the way in which both the Hungarians and our own Allies had respected or broken the Armistice. He thought it might be possible to reply that, when the Council had addressed Bela Kun in June, it was not aware that Hungary was breaking the Armistice in doubling her army. If, however, the Hungarians now agreed to respect the terms of the Armistice, the Council would obtain the withdrawal of the Romanians. It might further be stated that the frontier between Hungary and Romania had already been fixed by the Peace Conference and that no amount of local fighting would alter this decision to Hungary’s advantage or detriment. He wished to draw attention to a communication he had had from General Greenland, to the effect that the Hungarian population on the eastern side of the Theiss were greatly alarmed at the prospect of the Romanians withdrawing, lest they be left thereby to the tender mercies of Bela Kun.

(It is decided to refer the communication received from Bela Kun to Marshal Foch for a full report on the observances and non-observances of the original Armistice Conditions by all parties concerned.)

2. At M Clemenceau’s request, M Mantoux reads a lengthy document, which it is decided should be circulated and discussed at a future meeting.

3. The Council had before it a Joint Note by the Allied Blockade Committee and the Eastern Blockade Committee and a Note by the British Delegation.

(At this point, Sir W Mitchell Thomson, Mr Waterlow, Captain Fuller, M Seydoux and Mr J F Dulles entered the room.)

M Clemenceau says that the Council is considerably embarrassed in dealing with this question. He reads paragraph 7 of the Joint Note.

M Seydoux says that the question had been raised by the Supreme Economic Council, which had received in reply a communication of the decision taken on June 17th by the Council of Four, in the following terms:

“After the acceptance of the Conditions of Peace by Germany, measures are not still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevist Russia or Hungary. On the recommendation of the Supreme Economic Council it was approved that there should be an abstinence from any positive measures or public announcement indicating the resumption of such trade. The Supreme Economic Council is asked, however, to examine whether, consistently with this decision, means could be found for preventing war material from being carried by sea from Germany to Bolshevist Russia.”

This decision was communicated by Sir Maurice Hankey in a letter to Mr McCormick.

Sweden has now opened the question and it is necessary to find some solution. The solution suggested is contained in the terms of the last clause of paragraph 7 of the Joint Note. This applies only to the Baltic. In the Black Sea, the position is less acute. There are few countries anxious or able to import much into Russia. In Petrograd, however, the situation is critical. It is but a few hours’ steam from Stockholm and Copenhagen. The means suggested are, he admitted, opportunist methods, based on the fact that naval hostilities are taking place in the Baltic. It might be possible without declaring a blockade, which is legally impossible, to proceed on the ground of these hostilities to enforce an embargo which should only be raised at the discretion of the Allied Powers. There is, however, another way out. The Allied and Associated Powers have offered help to Admiral Kolchak on certain terms. If this help is to be given to him, it must be given at all points. If neutrals ire to be allowed to furnish supplies to the Bolsheviks whom he was fighting, Allied assistance elsewhere would be neutralized. The neutrals might therefore be told that the Allied and Associated Powers would consider it an unfriendly act on their part should they send supplies to Bolsheviks. This could now be stated with more confidence since help had been promised to Admiral Kolchak. He suggests that the Council adopt one or other of the two plans proposed.

Mr Balfour said that Mr Seydoux’s statement was very clear. The question is an extremely embarrassing one. The Council is being hampered at every turn by difficult questions of international law, both in relation to new States and to unrecognized or de facto Governments. There are two areas to be considered, first the gulf of Finland, and second the Black Sea. The White Sea is already provided for. Trade with the Baltic States of Finland, Latvia etc., need cause no concern because trade with them would not lead to the percolation into Soviet Russia of any arms or ammunition. Of the two doors into Soviet Russia, one would be closed by ice at the end of November. Until that date, the means of stopping trade from passing through it, which had been suggested amounted to this - that neutral States be informed that the Allied and Associated Powers are not making a formal blockade on Soviet Russia; but, seeing that active hostilities were in progress in the Gulf of Finland, they must insist on the right of turning back trading vessels from the zone of operations. The waters in question are mined, and operations must for success be provided with secrecy. He does not suggest that trading vessels should be subject to capture, sunk or proceeded against in Prize Courts; only that they should be sent back to their port of origin. This course is no doubt open to objection, but less so, he thinks, than any other, and it seems the best that could be done to carry out the policy laid down by the Council of Four. As to the Black Sea, he understands there is a proposal to recognize a blockade to be declared by Kolchak and Denekin. These methods he would be inclined to accept.

M Clemenceau says that as temporary expedients the proposals put forth by M Seydoux might be adopted.

M Seydoux says it must be clearly understood that no legal right can be appealed to. In order to endow Kolchak and Denekin with some powers to enforce the blockade, he suggests that they might be supplied with a Destroyer or two by the Allied Powers.

S Tittoni says that the proposals are expedients, but as he can see no better, he will accept them.

Mr White says that all that has been suggested amounts to a pacific blockade. The American Government is extremely sensitive regarding matters of this kind. Without special instructions he would hesitate to accept any proposal tending to stop traffic on the High Seas in time of Peace.

Mr Balfour says that in his view, what is proposed is not quite a pacific blockade. The régime in the Gulf of Finland is not peace. Even though it might not legally be war, active hostilities are being waged. As the Soviet Government has not been recognised these hostilities cannot lawfully be considered war, since it appears that war can only be waged against a recognised Government. The military operations going on have an object accepted by all the Allied and Associated Governments, namely, to preserve the small border Republics which have sprung up in the north-west of Russia. Commerce, therefore, cannot be allowed to interfere with these operations. He thinks the suggestion made in the last paragraph of the Addendum by the British Delegation to the Joint Note might be adopted.

S Tittoni observes that the Powers cannot escape the anomaly of assisting Kolchak in one quarter, and allowing his enemies to be assisted in another.

M Clemenceau observes that President Wilson has offered his help to Kolchak.

Mr White says that he is willing to send a cable message to Washington, explaining the views of his colleagues, but he cannot accept them without reference to his Government. Theoretically there is peace with Russia. He will ask whether he might join in the proposal before the Council which he understands his Colleagues all accept.

Mr Balfour says that he fully understands Mr White’s position, but the question addressed to the British Government by the Swedes has to be answered. He does not know how long the answer can be postponed.

M Clemenceau suggests that Mr White inform the Council of the views of his Government within two days.

Mr Dulles says that it will be necessary to explain to President Wilson why the question was re-opened. At the time when the Council of Four had made its decision, it was well aware that the present situation was bound to come about. The question had been considered first in the Blockade Council, then in the Supreme Economic Council, and lastly, in the Council of the Heads of Governments. No aspect of the situation, therefore, had been lost sight of and the very contingency now being discussed was that in view when Sir Maurice Hankey sent his Note to the Supreme Economic Council. It would, therefore, be necessary to inform President Wilson of whatever new circumstance might exist which justified the re-opening of the question.

Mr Balfour says that it was no doubt quite accurate to say that the Council of the Heads of Governments had decided that nothing could be done, and it was doubtless reasonable to say that President Wilson must be informed of the reason why the present Council desired a different decision. He would point out that, in the decision of the Council of Four, Hungary was coupled with Russia. Nevertheless, a blockade on Hungary had been imposed. At the time of the latter, there was some hope that Petrograd would fall; this would have removed all necessity for a blockade. It might, further, be pointed out that the Soviet Government was conducting active hostilities against the small Baltic States. Should the Powers not protect the latter, the Soviet Government could land troops in the rear of their forces and destroy them. Hence it was necessary for the Powers to maintain maritime control of the Baltic. This could not be done without active operations, as the Soviet had ships and showed fight. It was impossible to carry on naval operations in narrow waters and to allow merchant shipping to go through with food and arms. The removal of the blockade was, therefore, inconsistent with the conduct of the policy unanimously favored by the Powers.

Mr Dulles observed that the blockade on Hungary was maintained because the Powers were still at war with Hungary. They had never been at war with Russia.

(It is agreed that Mr. Dulles should draft a telegram to be sent in the name of the Council to President Wilson explaining the reasons for maintaining in the Baltic and the Black Sea an embargo on merchant shipping trading with Soviet Russia.

It is further agreed that the subject should again be put on the Agenda on the 17th instant.)

4. M Clemenceau says that he had received a communication stating that the Belgian and Dutch Governments had nominated their representatives for the Commission which was to revise the Treaties of 1839. It was, therefore, desirable to summon the Commission. The Belgian Government asked that the first meeting should be fixed for Tuesday, July 29th, as the two Belgian representatives, Mr Orts, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mr Segers, Minister of State, were detained in Brussels until the 28th, for the festivals in honor of the President of the Republic. The British and Italian representatives on the Commission had already been nominated. The American and French remained to be appointed. On behalf of France, M Clemenceau nominated M Laroche - on behalf of the United States of America, Mr White nominated Mr Hudson.

(It is agreed that the first meeting should take place on 29th July, at 10:30 at the Quai d’Orsay.)

5. The Council has before it the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles.

(At this point, the Military Representatives and their Chiefs of the Staff enter the room.)

Mr Balfour says that he has read the report. The only difficulty he has is in finding 13,000 men.

M Clemenceau says that he has none to offer. He counts on Mr Balfour.

Mr Balfour says he had none to offer. He counts on General Bliss.

General Bliss says that it is not beyond the limits of possibility that Allied troops might be entirely dispensed with. The Inter-Allied Commission which, is to conduct the plebiscite, is to spend six months studying the country. It will be able to report whether order can be maintained without armed forces. It has been provided that there should be neither German nor Polish troops in the area. He suggests, therefore, that the Commission, together with its staff, which will be numerous, should go to the country and report later whether it requires an Allied force or not.

Mr Balfour quotes paragraph “D” of the general consideration set forth in the report and points out that it seems to have been the intention that the Commission should have an Allied force until local police can be organised. If, however, General Bliss considers that the risk of doing without an Allied force can be taken, he will not insist on a pedantic adherence to the original intention.

General Buss says that the plebiscite is not to take place until six months after the coming into force of the Treaty. This will give the Commission plenty of time to find out whether an armed force can or could not be dispensed with.

M Clemenceau asks what would happen should the Commission find that they require troops.

Mr Balfour draws attention to the provision excluding any participation of the Germans in the forces of occupation. He asks whether this should be held to apply to police forces.

General Bliss thinks that it will not apply to police forces.

Mr Balfour asked when the Commission is to proceed to Silesia. He also asks whether members have been nominated.

Mr White says that he understands the Commission is to proceed to Silesia 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty. As to nomination, so far as the United States are concerned, no American member can be appointed until the American Senate has ratified the Treaty.

M Clemenceau says that he is informed that the Commission to supervise the execution of the clauses of the Treaty has examined this question and that it can furnish a report at the next meeting.

(The question is therefore postponed till the following day.)

6. The Council has before it a Report from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council.

M Clemenceau observes that in spite of the platonic recommendations of the Military Representatives, it appears from the footnote that Italy will contribute one battalion, Great Britain 40 men, America none, while Trance has in the area two divisions, two-thirds of which he proposes to demobilize. The only way out of the difficulty that he can think of is to ask the Italians who were on good terms with the Bulgarians to stand surety for their good behavior.

S Tittoni says that he is not aware of any special intimacy between Italy and Bulgaria.

M Clemenceau says he can show S Tittoni evidence to that effect. He makes no complaint; in fact he would be glad if Italian policy could produce in Bulgaria the results desired by the Conference. The only end in view is to make the Bulgarians behave peacefully towards the Greeks.

S Tittoni said that Italian policy is to conform with the policy of the Allies.

M Clemenceau says that he had dreamed that Italy was inaugurating a new policy, and is now seeking to make friends with her neighbors in the Adriatic, applying in case of misunderstanding to her Allies for arbitration, which would be most willingly undertaken.

S Tittoni said that he is quite willing to conform with M Clemenceau’s dream.

M Clemenceau says that if an agreement between the Bulgarians and the Greeks could be arranged through Italy it would be a great service to the Allied cause. The Bulgarians have been summoned to be in Paris on the 25th. There remain only ten days. If in this period S Tittoni could give the Allies a foretaste of the new policy, the situation on the arrival of the Bulgarians would be much easier.

S Tittoni said he would be very pleased to do his best.

M Clemenceau suggests that S Tittoni should have private conversations on behalf of the Council with Mr Venizelos.

Mr Balfour asks to what extent disarmament had proceeded in Bulgaria.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks the situation unsatisfactory. He does not think that General Franchet d’Esperey has controlled events very successfully according to the instructions given him. He has the impression that the Bulgarians mean to resort to force should they be dissatisfied with their new frontiers. He is asking General Franchet d’Esperey’s opinion on Bulgaria and its present condition from the military point of view. If, meanwhile, S Tittoni would have a talk with Mr Venizelos, good results might be obtained.

Mr Balfour says that he presumes that S Tittoni’s conversation with Mr Venizelos would be on the basis of what had been decided at the Conference.

M Clemenceau says that it must undoubtedly be on the basis that the Entente was victorious, and that Bulgaria had been defeated.

S Tittoni asks that he might be supplied with the requisite information by his colleagues.

Mr Balfour inquires whether the intention is that S Tittoni should discuss frontiers with Mr Venizelos.

M Clemenceau says he suggests no plan whatever. He leaves the whole matter to S Tittoni’s ingenuity. He has heard among other things that Greece thinks of giving Bulgaria a share in the port of Kavalla. If so this is a good beginning which deserves encouragement.

(S Tittoni agrees to engage in conversation with Mr Venizelos and report the results obtained daily to the Council.

It is further decided that General Franchet d’Esperey should furnish as soon as possible all available information regarding the military situation of Bulgaria.)

7. The Council has before it a Report from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council.

M Clemenceau asks General Belin what the conclusion of the Report was.

General Belin says that it is proposed that the Frontier Delimitation Commission should begin to function at once instead of waiting for the time appointed, namely, 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty.

M Clemenceau says that he does not think there is any authority to set the Commission at work before its time. This can only be done by agreement with the Germans. Should they refuse the Council can do nothing. It is important not to exceed Treaty Rights. In this connection he wishes to inform the Council that the Germans had approached him with a request for permission to occupy Frankfurt with troops by reason of disturbances expected there. On the strength of the Treaty he had refused this request. It is therefore hardly possible to ask Germany for favors. He suggests that the Report expected from the Commission to supervise the execution of the Treaty be awaited.

(It is therefore decided to postpone the consideration of this question till the following day, when the Report of the Commission to Supervise the Execution of the Treaty will be heard.)

8. M Clemenceau says he wishes to read a dispatch he has received from General Franchet d’Esperey.

S Tittoni says he will immediately make an inquiry into the allegations made in this despatch.

9. M Clemenceau causes a letter from Mr Venizelos to be read:

"Greek Delegation to the Peace Conference,
Paris, 10 July

The Head of the Greek Delegation (Venizelos) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)

Mr. President: I have the honor of informing you that, according to the news which comes to me from Constantinople, military preparations are being continued by Turkey in an undeniably aggressive spirit, and are assuming such a magnitude that one risks seeing the war kindled again in all Anatolia and the settlement of the affairs of the East rendered impossible.

Nearly 60,000 men are already concentrated at Konia. Mobilization continues throughout the country and it is probable that a total force of 300,000 men will soon be on a war footing. The leaders of this organization, with whom the Minister of War himself collaborates will have at their disposal material and munitions in sufficient quantity for such an army.

This information is known by the Allied Military Command at Constantinople.

I am forced to say that the gravity of this news is increased by the fact that the Turks appear to be encouraged in their designs by the Italian authorities.

Indeed, it has been proven that the zone occupied by the Italian forces south of Aidin served as a base of operations for the Turks in their successive aggressions against the Greek troops north of the Meander. The first Greek division has just seized Turkish proclamations dated July 4, in which was printed a telegram sent from Mylassa by the Italian general reassuring the Turks that they had nothing to fear from the Greeks because their troops were obliged to withdraw to the north of the Meander and that in case they did not, the Italian forces would take the necessary measures.

Moreover, two distinguished young Turks who are very influential, Mahmoud Essad and Chukri, have just gone from Lausanne to Milan, for the purpose of directing the attentions of the Italian authorities to a position on the coast of Smyrna. It is likely that they were accompanied by their friend Kiazim Nourri, deputy of Aidin, relative of the ex-vale of Smyrna, Rahmi Bey.

Under these conditions, I believe, Mr. President, that the situation will be aggravated to the point of compromising the settlement which the Peace Conference plans in the East, if prompt and energetic measures are not taken by the Allied and Associated Powers to restrict the mobilization of the Turkish Army and to put an end to the encouragement encountered up to now from the abettors of dissension.

Please accept [etc.]

E. K. Venizelos
His Excellency Mr. Clemenceau
President of the Peace Conference"

S Tittoni says that he denies in a most formal manner the allegations made in this letter. Greek troops are refusing to obey the orders of the British Admiral on the ground that they are receiving direct instructions from the Peace Conference sent to them by Mr Venizelos. It will be necessary for the Conference to settle this matter. The British Admiral’s powers will have to be increased. The Italian Commander is in complete accord with the British Commodore at Smyrna. He has himself summoned General Bongiovanni and given him personal instructions that no further Italian troops should be landed, and that no new localities should be occupied. He is, moreover, to act only in concert with the British Admiral. It is necessary to enforce a similar line of conduct on the Greeks. The Turks at present believe that they are being invaded by the Greeks, and that they must fight them. The Greeks must conform to a common plan, and must realize that they form part of the forces of the Allied Powers. The Greeks must therefore first halt on their present positions.

Mr Balfour suggests that Mr Venizelos be asked to attend the Council in order to give a frank explanation of what was going on. He would like to ask the Military Experts what they think of the allegation made in the letter read by M Clemenceau that there were 300,000 well-armed Turkish troops in the field. The British Military Experts are of the opinion that this is far from the mark.

General Belin replies that he thinks that these figures very much exaggerated. He agrees that there are perhaps some 60,000 men in all Anatolia.

(It is agreed that Mr Venizelos should be invited to attend the Council on the following day to discuss the situation in Asia-Minor.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

07-16-19, 04:16 AM

16th July 1919

Soldiers of the Colonial Army at the Cenotaph's Feet dedicated to the dead for the Homeland of Etoil, Paris (VIIIth arrondissement), France.
https://i.imgur.com/q6lhzLX.jpg

Itagaki Taisuke, Japanese politician and soldier who founded Japan’s first political party, the Liberal Party (Jiyūtō), has passed away.
https://i.imgur.com/Y5RbxI4.jpg

German chemist Emil Fischer who won the 1902 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his work on sugar and purines (including the first total synthesis of caffeine) has passed away.
https://i.imgur.com/45XAVVc.jpg

Ship Losses:

HMS Gentian (Royal Navy) The Arabis-class sloop-of-war struck a mine and sank in the Gulf of Finland.
HMS Myrtle (Royal Navy) The Acacia-class sloop-of-war struck a mine and sank in the Gulf of Finland.

Sailor Steve

07-16-19, 11:09 AM

Tuesday, July 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

(M. Venizelos is introduced.)

(Captain Fuller, Major Temperley, Captain Macindoe, and Mr Butler enter the room.)

1. Mr Venizelos says that on the 18th June he had sent a letter to the President of the Peace Conference calling attention to the concentration of Turkish troops in various places, notably the Smyrna region. On June 23rd the situation had appeared to him to be so disquieting that he had told the Greek General to take such action as was necessary in order that he should not be driven into the sea. What he must ask the Council to grant him is either a definite line or liberty of action for his troops. He points out that there are three railway lines converging on Smyrna. His suggestion is that Greek troops should occupy these lines up to a fixed point. He further suggests that in the space left between the Greek and Turkish advance posts small detachments, for instance a company of Allied troops, be placed. The moral effect of this would be great and would probably render any conflict unlikely. He wishes to put an end to the present situation in Smyrna. This situation is such that he is compelled to keep a whole army there. There are five Greek divisions in the area. He wishes to reduce them to two. This would enable him to reinforce his troops in Macedonia against the Bulgarians.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Venizelos to indicate on the map the area in Anatolia occupied by Greek troops.

Mr Venizelos does so. He further states that if there is real collaboration between the Greek and the Italian troops and if this collaboration is manifest to the Turks the situation will be completely remedied.

S Tittoni agrees.

Mr Venizelos says that he does not wish to extend Greek occupation. All that he wants is to be safe in Smyrna and to maintain his hold on certain places the population of which is entirely Greek. He is well aware that no conquest would influence the decisions of the Conference.

M Clemenceau says he understands the Greek population is entirely on the coast.

Mr Venizelos replies that it extends to 80 or 100 kilometres inland.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Venizelos for his estimate of the number of Greeks in Smyrna.

Mr Venizelos replies that there are 230,000 Greeks and 95,000 Turks and the rest of the population is of other nationalities. A large number of Greeks live on the land and cultivate figs and grapes, in fact these Anatolian Greeks are among the best Greek cultivators.

M Clemenceau says that Mr Venizelos apparently considers the Greeks in Smyrna form a majority.

Mr Venizelos says he does.

Mr Balfour says that without going far back into the history of the case, he would like to put the present situation on a sound basis. There are three separate armies in the area; one Greek, one Italian and one Turkish. The last is of uncertain size, largely composed, presumably, of irregulars, formidable for attacks on lines of communication but not for a set battle. How this had come about is not very material. Mr Venizelos had sent troops to Smyrna and beyond at the invitation of the Council of Four. Italy had sent troops because of her local interests and because she interpreted the Treaty of London as giving her certain rights. Unquestionably much of the trouble arose not from the action of the Turks but from the mutual distrust of the Greek and Italian troops. There are, therefore, three bodies of troops all afraid of attack from each other. According to his information the Turks are undoubtedly actuated by fear in all that they had done. They see the Greeks at Smyrna spreading out to Aidin and elsewhere. This seems to them the prelude of a great advance; this might lead to massacres. If it were made clear to the Turks that there would be no advance beyond a definite line it might be possible to control them, especially if they realized that it would not be armed action but the deliberations of the Council that would prescribe the final settlement. As to the relations between the Greeks and Italians Mr Venizelos had just stated and S Tittoni had previously more than once stated that he would base no claim to territory on armed occupation. Both agreed that the Peace Conference alone had the right to determine frontiers. S Tittoni, while recognizing this, had made an appeal to the Council begging that he be not asked to withdraw Italian troops entirely from Asia Minor by reason of the effect this would produce in Italy. Mr Venizelos was in Asia Minor at the request of the Council, but no limit had been laid down to his advance. It is clear that the machinery for the co-operation of the Greek Commander and the British Commodore had not worked smoothly. It would therefore be best to lay down the principle that there were definite lines within which the Greek and Italian troops must remain and the Turks could then be told that there was to be no trespass beyond this line if they maintained a proper attitude. He would like to remind the Council that General Allenby is still technically in authority over the whole of Turkey in Asia on behalf of the Allied Powers. This fact has been lost sight of and he has not been consulted either by the Council of Ten or by the Council of Four, nor had the Italians or Greeks referred to him. Nevertheless, he still remains the Military Representative of the Powers in Asiatic Turkey. He suggests that General Allenby be asked to send Officers to investigate the situation at Smyrna and to mark out the boundaries of each force. Thus any difficulty as between Greece and Italy or Greece and Turkey would be avoided and the scheme would be in harmony with the general course employed elsewhere for managing conquered territory during the armistice.

S Tittoni says that he agrees in the main with Mr Balfour. All advance should be stopped and the Turks should be convinced that there is no intention to declare war on them and that the Armistice continues. Both the Greeks and the Italians should stay where they are. He would also favour the interposition of Allied troops between the Greeks and the Turks.

Regarding the collaboration of the Greek and the Italian Armies, Mr Balfour suggests that the delimitation of their spheres should be carried out by General Allenby. He, himself, thinks that direct agreement between the two would be more rapid and more satisfactory. Should no agreement be reached, another authority could then be called in.

M Clemenceau said that he is disposed to favour S Tittoni’s plan. If need be, he might even agree to the employment of General Allenby should S Tittoni and Mr Venizelos fail to reach an agreement. Happily this seems unlikely. As to the means of reassuring the Turks, he thinks this could best be done by the Conference directly. He hopes that on the following day S Tittoni and Mr Venizelos would be able to bring a definite agreement to the Council. It would then be possible to send the Turks a message telling them exactly what to expect and that the ultimate solution would not be prejudged by any military occupation.

Mr White asks who would deliver the message on behalf of the Conference. He thinks perhaps this should be General Allenby, as the Turks have the greatest respect for military authority.

Mr Balfour agrees as General Allenby is Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the Powers.

S Tittoni asks whether Admiral Calthorpe, High Commissioner in Constantinople, would not be the right authority.

M Clemenceau says that he does not quite agree with Mr Balfour. General Allenby commands in Syria and Mesopotamia, not, he thinks, in Anatolia. When the Greeks had been sent to Smyrna, General Allenby had not been consulted. Admiral Calthorpe had been informed. The Conference could correspond with the Turks and had already done so. Surely a direct message from the Council would have more effect on the Turkish Government than anything else, especially if it be made clear to the Turks that the Italians and Greeks would stop their advance.

Mr Balfour says perhaps the advance would not be arrested for long.

S Tittoni says that if he and Mr Venizelos make themselves personally responsible, he thinks there would be no further advance of their respective forces.

Mr White says that it is of great importance that the communication to the Turks should be made in the name of the Conference, otherwise they would think that the Italians and Greeks had plotted to partition the country. He doubts, however, whether the authority of the Sultan really controls events in Anatolia.

M Clemenceau says that this is perhaps true as the rebellion of the Turks had been spontaneous and not controlled in Constantinople.

S Tittoni says that the General in command had nevertheless come from the capital.

Mr Venizelos observes that it might be necessary for the Greek troops to make certain movements. It is therefore desirable that some military authority should lay down exactly in what conditions it would be safe for the Greek advance to be halted. Where Greek and Italian troops were neighbors, both could safely halt on the same line; where the Greeks faced the Turks, it might be necessary to occupy a few additional points.

S Tittoni says he thinks the whole front should halt, otherwise the Turks would not believe in the message sent to them.

(It is decided that S Tittoni and Mr Venizelos should seek an agreement regarding the delimination of the Italian and Greek zones of occupation in Asia Minor and that they should submit the result of their conversation to the Council as soon as possible.

In case an agreement is reached, a communication would be made in the name of the Council to the Turkish Government informing the latter of the decision taken and offering assurances regarding the intentions of the Allied Governments.)

(At this stage Mr Venizelos and the experts withdraw.)

(At this point the Drafting Committee enters the room.)

Treaty With Austria:

(a) M Fromageot explains that the Drafting Committee has been asked by the commission on New States to modify the provisions in the Austrian Treaty, as handed to the Austrian Delegation, in order to make them conform with similar provisions regarding Minorities in the Treaty with Poland. This amounted to an aggravation of the terms. He therefore asks for orders from the Council.

M Clemenceau expresses the opinion that the Commission on Minorities has no authority to direct the Drafting Committee to make this alteration.

Mr Balfour points out that it had previously been decided that every mitigation made in the Treaty with Germany after considering the German Counter-Proposals, should be introduced into the Treaty with Austria without discussion. Any aggravation of the terms would therefore be inconsistent with this policy.

(It is decided not to accede to the request of the Commission on New States and to maintain without modification Section 6 of Part III (Protection of Minorities) of the Treaty as presented to the Austrian Delegation on the 2nd June.)

(b) M Fromageot says that the Treaty with Germany (Article 373) contains a general provision regarding the obligation of Germany to allow the construction of certain railways on her territory. The Treaty with Austria (Article 312) had been endowed with a similar provision concerning the special cases of railway lines over the Reschen and Predil passes. The Treaty with Germany had been modified and the present Article 373 had been substituted for the previous one and only stipulated for the construction of certain lines interesting to Czechoslovakia at the cost of the latter. The Council had issued instructions on July 2nd that all concessions made in the German Treaty should be inserted in the Treaty with Austria. An attempt therefore had been made by the Drafting Committee to modify Article 312 accordingly. There had not, however, been unanimity and the Drafting Committee therefore asked for instructions. The proposed Article reads as follows:

“Within five years, from the coming into force of the present Treaty, Italy may require the construction or improvement on Austrian territory of the new Trans-Alpine lines over the Reschen and Predil passes. The cost of construction or improvement shall be borne by Italy”.

S Tittoni says that there is no analogy between the two cases. The lines which the Treaty with Germany requires to be constructed on German soil are exclusively for Czechoslovak interests and are very trifling in extent. In the other case the lines were far more costly and though they are very necessary to Italy, they were also of great importance to Austria. He would prefer that arbitration should decide the allotment of the cost. He can see no reason for saddling Italy with all the cost without any inquiry. Should it be shown after arbitration that only Italy was interested, Italy will pay. If Austria is interested, why should Italy bear all the cost? He therefore proposes that the text on the lines of the original draft be maintained.

(General Mance and Mr. Hudson enter the room.)

Mr Balfour says that the original provision in the Treaty with Germany had demanded of Germany that she should construct lines on her territory at the request of her neighbors and at her own expense. The German Delegation had protested and their protest had been accepted. The general clause had been suppressed and a special clause introduced enabling the Czechoslovaks to build two small lines on German territory at their own expense. His feeling is that it would be wrong to impose on Austria anything more severe than what had been imposed on Germany. Austria will undoubtedly be poor and even though the lines in question might be advantageous to her, she might think her resources insufficient for the enterprise. If S Tittoni’s plan is adopted, Austria might be forced into an expense which she herself judges to be beyond her means.

S Tittoni suggests that the arbitrator might decide whether or not Austria’s resources justified any expenditure on the railways.

Mr Balfour says that he would be prepared to agree to a formula which entitles the Austrians to plead before the League of Nations that they could not afford these lines.

M Fromageot expresses the opinion that a clause could be drafted to cover this case.

S Tittoni says that the arbitrator might also be empowered, even should the initial cost be furnished by Italy, to decide whether or not profits had accrued to Austrian lines, as a consequence of the construction, and to apportion to Italy out of these profits, if any, something towards the cost of construction.

(It is decided that the cost of constructing the railways mentioned in Article 312, if desired by Italy, should be borne by Italy. If, however, the construction of these lines should subsequently prove to have increased the profits of Austrian railways, part of the cost of construction should be made good to Italy out of the increased profits above mentioned, in accordance with the decision of an arbitrator, to be nominated by the League of Nations.)

The Drafting Committee is asked to draft an Article in the above sense.

3.

(a) M Tardieu reads and explains the General Recommendations concerning the establishment of Territorial Clauses.

(The report is accepted.)

(b) M Tardieu reads and explains the Report on the establishment of Schleswig.

(With the exception of the passage at the end of paragraph 8, requiring the German Government to issue certain orders to its military and civil authorities in the third zone and under certain conditions to evacuate the area, the report is accepted.)

It is pointed out that these provisions go beyond the stipulations of the Treaty.

(It is therefore agreed to suppress these passages, and only to ask the German Government to abstain from making any arrests for political reasons in the area concerned.

With this exception, the report is accepted.)

S Tittoni says that should the Inter-Allied Commission consider that the voting had been influenced by German action in the third zone, the result might be declared void.

(This is agreed to.)

With regard to Article 3 of the report, Mr Balfour says that he understands that the American and British arrangements are complete. There is some difficulty about the French arrangements, but the British Admiral had undertaken to step into the breach and furnish the required number of troops should French troops be lacking. He suggests, therefore, that the arrangements made by the Americans and British be allowed to proceed and that French help be called for only in case of need.

(This is agreed to.)

(c) M Tardieu reads and explained the report on the establishment of the Free City of Danzig.

(The proposals contained in it are accepted, and it is agreed that the nominations for the Commission should be made on the 18th instant.)

On the subject of the supply of an Inter-Allied force, M Tardieu expresses the hope that it might be possible to do without. In any case, the Commission can proceed to the spot without troops, and report at a later date whether it requires any.

4. M Tardieu points out that the Committee over which he presides has been asked to provide for the execution of the political and territorial clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. M Loucheur presides at a Committee to supervise the execution of the Reparation Clauses. There remains economic and colonial clauses, the execution of which was at present supervised by no Committee. He suggests that the former be entrusted to the Supreme Economic Council. The latter, might perhaps, be dealt with by the Committee which had just met in London to consider the question of Mandates.

(It is agreed that this question should be brought up on the following day.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

07-17-19, 06:36 AM

17th July 1919

Cavalry of the anti-Bolshevik Don Cossacks on parade at Novocherkassk.
https://i.imgur.com/rGmgymW.jpg

The Lithuanian-Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, chaired by Kazimierz Cichowski (pictured), is dissolved after a few months after Polish troops conquer much of its territory.
https://i.imgur.com/bOqkiTw.png

Sailor Steve

07-17-19, 08:16 PM

Thursday, July 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

(The Members of the Commission on Tientsin enter the room.)

1. The following Report was before the Meeting:

The Commission entrusted with the examination of the Italian claim for the Austro-Hungarian concession at Tientsin, considering on the one hand that

1) The demand of the Italian Government that the Austro-Hungarian concession at Tientsin should be handed over to them is contrary to the principle laid down by the Allied and Associated Powers in Article 260 of the Treaty of Peace signed on the 28th of June 1919 by the Allied and Associated Powers and the German State,

2) The said principle has been embodied after deliberation by the Allied and Associated Powers in Article 22, Section IV, Part IV, of the conditions drafted for re-establishing peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria, and that this Article was submitted to the Austrian Delegation at St. Germain-en-Laye on the 2nd June last,

3) The principle of restoring to China her full rights of sovereignty over former enemy concessions was unanimously adopted by the Allied and Associated Powers in spite of the fact that certain of them might have derived advantages from acquiring possession of enemy concessions bordering their own, in order to give evidence of the confidence which the high contracting parties are disposed to place in efforts towards improvement made by China, who, through declaring war against the enemy Empires, showed her determination to side with the Nations which defend the cause of right,
considering on the other hand that the objects of the Italian claim are deemed justifiable in the following respects:

I) As regards the urgent work which should be carried out for clearing the marshy portions of the former Austrian-Hungarian concession bordering the Italian concession,

II) As regards the works which should be carried out in the Austro-Hungarian concession for regulating the course of the Hei-Ho river and preventing the recurrence of floods damaging to the Italian concession,
is of opinion,

i) That it is inadvisable to modify the principle embodied in Article 22 of Part IV (section IV) of the draft Treaty of Peace with Austria;

ii) That it would be expedient that the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers should request from our Chinese Allies a formal promise that within a period of one year from the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Austria the necessary works of sanitation in the late Austro-Hungarian concession and the necessary works of improvement in the course of the river shall be undertaken with all desirable promptness and shall be entrusted to the Hei-Ho Commission which has already given proof of its competence and activity.

S Tittoni says he wishes to make the following declaration:

The Italian Delegation expresses the wish that the minutes of today’s sitting of the Supreme Council should show that His Majesty’s Government, while giving its assent to what is set forth in Art. 22, Part IV, Section IV, of the draft text of the Conditions of Peace with Austria, insists, nevertheless, on the soundness of its claims submitted in 1917 by the Legation at Peking to the Chinese Government for a rectification of the boundary line separating the Italian concession of Tient-Tsin from the former Austro-Hungarian concession.

M Pichon says that the Report of the Commission will be adopted, and no alteration will be made in Article 22. S Tittoni’s declaration, however, will be inserted in the Minutes.

Mr Balfour questions whether the declaration referred to the same subject as the Report of the Commission.

Mr Gout explains that the Italian concession is separated from the river by a small strip of the Austrian concession. The Italian Government in 1917 had asked for an alteration of the boundaries in order to obtain easier access to the river. The Commission has asked for fuller information on this subject than is available. The Italian delegate had undertaken to obtain it, but it has not yet been received, and the Commission therefore has reserved judgment on the subject.

M Pichon says that the Council is therefore asked for no decision on this matter. It would, however, be necessary to fix a time limit within which the works of sanitation should be undertaken. He thinks it might be sufficient to state that the work should be undertaken within a “reasonable time”.

Mr Balfour thinks perhaps the matter might be left to the League of Nations.

M Pichon observed that there is a Health Section of the League of Nations which might take an interest in the matter.

Baron Makino observes that the sovereignty over the ground in question is Chinese; the Chinese Government will, therefore, have to be approached on the subject.

Mr Gout said that if the Chinese Government takes steps within a year to set the enterprise going, there need be no complaint. Once the Hei-Ho Commission had taken the work in hand, it will certainly complete it thoroughly well.

Baron Makino observes that if the Chinese Government is asked by the Powers to execute a sanitary measure it would surely agree. The determination of the time limit would appear to be a sort of imposition.

M Pichon says that it might be difficult to get the Chinese Government to undertake the work. Once it has undertaken it, it will no doubt execute it.

After some further discussion it is agreed to fix a time limit of one year for the undertaking of the work.

Baron Makino says that as his objection is a matter of form he would agree.

(The Report of the Commission as above quoted is therefore adopted, and it is decided that no alteration need be made to Article 22, and that the Chinese Government should be asked in the name of the Powers to undertake the sanitary work required by the Italian Delegation within a year.)

(The Members of the Commission withdraw.)

(Mr Hoover, M Seydoux, S Crespi and Mr Gorvin enter the room.)

2. M Pichon asks how much, in Mr Hoover’s estimation, has been spent on the revictualling of Austria?

Mr Hoover says he estimates that to complete the present program up to the 15th of August, Eighty Million Dollars will have been spent.

M Pichon asks whether Mr Hoover thinks there are securities in Austria enough to cover the cost of the scheme he proposed to undertake.

Mr Hoover says that he doubts whether the sums already spent could be recovered for three or four years. Everything that could be realized had already been realized. The Austrian Authorities latterly had gone so far as to offer the National Art Galleries in payment for food.

M Pichon says that under these circumstances it seems hardly possible to advance money.

S Tittoni says that the alternative is Bolshevism.

Mr Hoover says that his hope is if priority is given to payment for food, even over payment of reparations, the Austrian Government might take heart and set to work in order to meet its liabilities. This is the only means of giving the present Government enough encouragement for it to hold on. Should the harvest succeed in Hungary, there will be a surplus of food in that country. It was only Allied help that had hitherto kept Austria from Bolshevism. The Hungarians are employing most active propaganda. Should they take the place of the Allies in the supply of food, it can hardly be expected that the Austrians would not join them and become Bolshevik. It seems clear that the Austrian Delegation sincerely wishes to keep a moderate Government in Power in Austria. If they could be assured by the Powers that the help he suggested would be given them, he thinks they might resist Bolshevism.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks Mr Hoover had made out a most serious case. He is not quite sure that the Bolsheviks in Hungary would have much food to spare. He was told that Bela Kun had quarreled with the peasants, who would be inclined to resist requisition. The main point is that it is desirable to set up Austria economically. She cannot be left to starve. Food must be advanced to her either on such securities as existed, or she must be put in a way to earn money. She cannot produce the food she required, as the territory left her by the Treaty is insufficient. Mr Hoover’s proposal is first to encourage the Austrians by a promise, and secondly, to tell the Reparation Committee to think first of making Austria a paying concern before getting money out of her. This appears to him to be the most statesmanlike method. If a man were kept alive by charity, he could not be asked to pay his debts. He is not quite sure, however, what the functions of the Reparation Commission are, or whether the Council cab give it orders as suggested by Mr Hoover.

Mr Hoover says the wording of the German Treaty enables the Reparation Commission to furnish food and raw material to Germany, and to obtain payment for these in priority to payment of reparation. In any case, as the Reparation Commission had complete control of all resources, no other body can intervene.

S Crespi says that the Reparation Commission has the right to raise resources with the object of obtaining food. The Reparation Commission could certainly be given orders by the Governments as it was itself merely an Agent of the Government.

(At this point M Clemenceau entered the room.)

M Clemenceau asks how payment for food will be obtained?

S Crespi says that money can be raised by taxation. Hungarian food might turn Austria Bolshevik. It is for this reason that Italy has sent food into Austria.

Mr Balfour says that he is ready to accept Mr Hoover’s plan, but he will take the opportunity of telling the Austrians that they must give up the arms and ammunition in Austria to the Czechs.

Mr Hoover suggests that the Austrians might be told that the food supplies will cease unless they did so.

S Tittoni considers that the question of the delivery of the arms should be kept quite separate from the question of food. These arms represent one of the securities in Austria for the payment of Reparation. He does not say that the arms should not be delivered, but an equivalent in value should be available for the Reparation fund.

Mr Balfour says that it is most urgent to send the arms to Czechoslovakia at once.

Mr Hoover says that this difficulty has already arisen. Trade has been arranged between Austria and Serbia. Five steel bridges are to be given to Serbia in exchange for food. The same objection had been raised, that these bridges represent a security for the payment of reparation. The Czechs are prepared to exchange coal for arms, but once the Czechs have given coal and the Serbians food, there is no means of making them contribute anything towards the reparation fund.

Mr Balfour says that if S Tittoni’s thesis is carried to its logical extremity, all Austrian trade would be stopped. Austria could get neither food nor anything else. He has no wish to reduce the reparation fund to Italy’s detriment. He thinks it imperative that Austria should be fed, and Czechoslovakia armed.

S Tittoni said that he acquiesces regarding food, which is a matter of primary necessity. It is not so vital a matter to arm the Czechs. Italy and the other Allies should get some equivalent for the liquidation of a valuable Austrian security. If the Czechs are ready to give coal in exchange, Italy should obtain her share of this coal, for the coal situation in Italy is as bad as that in Austria.

Mr Balfour said that in his opinion it is to Allied interests that the Czechs should be armed. If so, it was nearly as important that commerce between Austria and Czechoslovakia should be carried on as between Austria and Serbia for food. He thinks nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of the passage of arms from Vienna to Prague.

S Tittoni says that Italy recognizes the need of Austria for food, but as to coal, Italy needed it just as badly. Italy must therefore have her share in the coal which pays for the arms.

Mr Hoover says that the amount of the surplus of Bohemian coal is infinitesimal, and barely enough to supply the needs of Vienna. Moreover, the Czechs have ceased to export coal because they received no arms from Austria. Austria is afraid of exporting these arms out of fear of the Hungarian Bolsheviks. By a threat to withhold food, the Austrians could be prevailed upon to deliver the arms. They could also be promised, if they did so, Bohemian coal. The Italians, short as they were of coal, had realized Austrian needs, and had themselves supplied coal to Vienna.

S Crespi observes that it is the duty of the Separation Commission to see that all Austrian securities are not one by one spent to the detriment of the common reparation fund.

Mr Balfour says that he will be content to allow the arms to go, and to find out afterwards in what way payment can be obtained. So long as they are delivered to the Czechs, he does not mind in what way the re-adjustment was made for the benefit of the reparation fund.

Mr Hoover suggests that if his formula is adopted, a few lines might be added regarding the sending of arms to Czechoslovakia.

(It is therefore agreed that the following reply should be made to the Austrian Delegation:

“In respect to the Request laid before the Supreme Economic Council from the Austrian Delegates that provision of further food supplies should be immediately undertaken by the Allied and Associated Governments, this request has been laid before the Council of Five and the Council wishes to state that as food and raw materials for Austria during the forthcoming year are fundamental to her recuperation and her ability to make reparation, the method of provision of such food and raw material will be one of the first considerations of the Reparations Commission.

The Council wishes, however, to make this assurance contingent on an undertaking by the Austrian Government. The delivery of arms to Czechoslovakia has been greatly delayed despite the offer of coal in exchange. It must be understood that the continuation of the present supplies of food to Austria, as well as the above assurances, depend on the execution by Austria of the delivery of the arms and ammunition required by Czechoslovakia.”

The question raised by M. Tittoni was remitted for further study to the Supreme Economic Council.)

(At this stage, Marshal Foch, General Weygand, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, Dr Benes, Mr Kramarcz, Mr Pachitch, Mr Misu, and Mr Vaida Voevod enter the room.)

3. Marshal Foch reads a memorandum regarding possible military action in Hungary. He also quotes from a telegram sent on the 10th July to the British War Office by Colonel Cunningham from Vienna to the effect that the red army is composed of 9 divisions, one of which, the 4th infantry division, has been disbanded. Each division can only muster a small number of rifles. For instance, the 9th division had only 2 to 3,000 rifles. To liberate Hungary from Communism in one week a force of 8 infantry divisions, one cavalry division, 100 aeroplanes and as many armored cars as possible would suffice.

Mr Balfour says that one statement in the very remarkable report read by Marshal Foch gives him some apprehension. He refers to the passage in which Marshal Foch alludes to the necessity of establishing in Hungary a Government with which the Entente could negotiate peace. Such a Government would not appear to be a Hungarian Government, but one set up by the Entente Powers. The Peace would be represented for all time, not as one between the Powers and the Hungarian people, but as a Peace between the Powers and their own puppets. This would furnish a weapon to all the enemies of the Entente. He will not ask Marshal Foch to say how this difficulty can be avoided, as the Marshal would doubtless reply, with justice, that this is the business of the politicians.

S Tittoni says that the Hungarian situation is a very difficult one. As to the military proposals, he has nothing to say, but regarding the political side he had some observations to make. Hungary is ruled by a small minority. 80 per cent of the Hungarian troops are against Bela Kun, so are the peasants and the bourgeoisie. At Szeged, there is an opposition Government which was a nationalist center. If the Council determines to have Hungary attacked by Czech, Romanian and Serbian troops, Bela Kun will be able to drape himself in the national colors and pose as a patriotic Hungarian. In the end, it will not be Bela Kun who would be destroyed, but the Hungarian nation. If the Allies, on the other hand, can act in concert with the Szeged Government, they will appear as the deliverers of the country from tyranny. All the Governments have to contend with the criticism and opposition of the Labor parties in their own countries. It is, therefore, highly opportune to appear to act on behalf of the majority in Hungary. He makes no criticism of the military means proposed by Marshal Foch, but he thinks they should be accompanied by political action of the kind he has described.

Mr White asks in what manner S Tittoni would suggest that this political action should be begun?

S Tittoni says that he would send Allied Agents to get into touch with the Government at Szeged before any military action began.

Marshal Foch says that he had, in his report, asked for Governmental instructions. When the armies set out for Budapest, they would be preceded by proclamations conveying the intentions of their Governments. It is for the Governments to determine what these proclamations should be.

Dr Benes says that he thinks S Tittoni’s proposals are based on wrong premises. From information he has received, the Hungarian Officers, though not sharing Bela Kun’s opinions, were loyal to him, because they think the Communist Government would give them means of fighting their neighbors. All of them are passionately attached to the integrity of Hungary. They would like to win back for it Transylvania, Croatia, and Slovakia. There is no hope of seducing these Officers. As to the civilians, no doubt the bourgeoisie parties would like to be rid of Bela Kun, but they will not cooperate with the neighboring nations to that end. If the Powers begin to negotiate with the Magyars, they must count with the suspicions and mistrust of the Romanians, of the Yugoslavs and of the Czechoslovaks. The Magyars do not admit their defeat. They remain Imperialist in spirit and they will use any conversation they might have with the Great Powers to turn the tables on their neighbors. He thinks for these reasons that there are strong objections to the course of negotiating with any Hungarian Party.

M Clemenceau asks Dr Benes whether he agrees to Marshal Foch’s plan?

M Benes says that he does but not to S Tittoni’s.

Mr Kramarcz says that the armies must march under the banner of “Respect for the Armistice”. The existence of a Hungarian army forces the neighboring countries to remain armed. They are anxious to disarm and demobilize. Enforcement of the Armistice Conditions is a complete and sufficient justification for action, and it will serve as an answer to criticism. He has the same fears and interests as S Tittoni, but he is convinced that there should be no talk with any Hungarian parties, as this will only revive Hungarian nationalist ambition. Action should be taken on military grounds if only to uphold the decrees of the Conference.

Mr Vaida-Voevod says that he agrees with Mr Kramarcz and Dr Benes. He thinks it is necessary not to give Bela Kun a pretext for posing as a defender of his country. The majority of the Hungarian population wishes to remain quiet and to be ruled neither by a communist nor by a reactionary government. When the Allied armies have taken Budapest, they might proclaim to the people that it is open to them to choose their own Government. The Allied Commander-in-Chief, however, should consult non-Magyar elements as well. There are Romanians, Serbs and Slovaks of Hungary who know the devices of the parties and who could help the Commander-in-Chief.

General Bliss says that the general purpose aimed at was one he would gladly see carried out, but only the Head of his Government could decide on any action in this respect. In spite of all disguises it is manifest that what is proposed is a renewal of war on Hungary with the object of destroying its present Government. If action is to be based on the pretext of a breach of the Armistice by Hungary, the Allies must be quite clear that the fault is entirely on the side of the Hungarians. In the Armistice arranged by General Franchet d’Esperey on the 13th November at Belgrade, a certain line had been fixed by Article I. North and west of this line the Serbians and Romanians respectively are not to advance. The second Article requires the demobilization of the Hungarian Army down to six Infantry Divisions and two Cavalry Divisions. It is alleged that the Hungarians had broken Article II.

Mr Balfour asks whether there is anything in Clause I forbidding the Serbians and Romanians to cross the line.

General Bliss says that the Romanians should not have crossed west of the line. When they had been relieved of German domination, they had crossed the line in spite of General Franchet d’Esperey. He had then tried to stop them on another line further west, but without avail. The matter had been discussed in Paris and the discussions had lead to the establishment of a neutral zone approximately representing the line fixed in the Treaty of 1916. Even this, however, had not stopped the Romanian advance. At a Meeting held by the Military Representatives at Versailles on the 25th February, 1919, General Charpy, Chief of Staff to General Franchet d’Esperey, had given the following evidence:

"On November 7th, 1918, General Franchet d’Esperey and Count Karolyi had met at Belgrade to sign a supplementary armistice with Hungary on the same lines as General Diaz had signed with Austria. At that time Romania was still under German domination and therefore only French, Serbian and Hungarian representatives were present at Belgrade. They all knew the terms of the Hungarian armistice. A certain zone was to be definitely occupied and further zones could be occupied for strategic reasons. The Armistice was signed on November 13th, and the Hungarians had made no difficulties and had carried out all the conditions. The French and Serbians advanced as agreed. The only difficulties occurred with Romania.

Without informing General Franchet d’Esperey, the Romanians had advanced, especially in the region of Klausenburg. The Hungarians at once protested that this was a breach of the armistice conditions. The Romanians replied that they were in agreement with the Hungarians. This was not correct, but eventually an agreement was reached. The Romanians were allowed to advance up to a line well in advance of the armistice line. This was reported to the Allied Governments.

Unfortunately, the Romanians advanced still further with the result that certain incidents took place; the Romanians oppressed the local population and the Hungarians became incensed. Up to that time, however, the position had not become serious.

The Romanians stated that they feared an attack by Hungarian armies; this was absolutely impossible. Hungary had no organised troops, whereas the Romanian army was well organised. Naturally there was much unrest in Hungary and some Bolshevism, but nothing important, and Bolshevism in Transylvania was not apparent. The Romanians had for some time tried to advance to the Treaty line, but General Franchet d’Esperey had refused so far though he had sent a mission to make inquiries into alleged atrocities. The information received was that the local situation was quite quiet.

Taking these facts into consideration the Romanians should remain on their present line as all the trouble had been caused by their advance. It was not for him to give advice on a political question, but the Romanians should not be allowed to cross the line Arad–Grosswardein–Szatmar–Nemeti and it would be preferable to send Allied troops there; a neutral zone would be of no advantage as there were not sufficient Allied troops to guard it.

To maintain order it would be sufficient to garrison Grosswardein and Szatmair with Allied troops; there were already some at Arad.

In spite of this the neutral zone had been accepted. The Romanians had advanced to the Eastern limit of this zone and finding it empty had proceeded as far as the Theiss. An American observer had informed him that as soon as the Hungarians came to know of the decision taken on March 12th, the Karolyi Government would go. He had written a letter to this effect to the Council. The Hungarian Government had only received information on the 19th. On that very date the Karolyi Government resigned and handed over its powers to Bela Kun. Bela Kun had succeeded in raising an Army solely to repel the unwarranted invasion of the Romanians. The violation of the armistice was first made by the Romanians in spite of the Powers and at a time when the Hungarian Army had gone to pieces. If the Council meant to take action on the ground that the Armistice had been violated, it should examine carefully at what date the Hungarian Army had been reconstituted. He is confident that it would be found that this had taken place after the violation of the armistice by the Romanians."

Mr Balfour says that he has three observations to make on General Bliss’s very important statement. In the first place he agrees with him that the American delegates and he himself as British representative could not initiate a considerable military policy without consulting the Governments at home. He personally cannot authorize a new war, or the resumption of an old war, without reference to London. In the second place he begs to dissent entirely, as far as he was concerned, from the allegation made by General Bliss that the breach of the armistice was merely alleged as a pretext for attacking the Communist Government of Hungary. He wishes it to be understood that he is not animated by any consideration of Hungarian internal politics, little though he might approve of Bela Kun. He agrees with Mr Kramarcz that it is intolerable to allow the Hungarian State to become a military stronghold, from which economic and political disturbances radiates over Central Europe. When he insists on the disarmament of Hungary by reason of her breach of the armistice, he is not disguising his intention, but stating exactly what he wishes. Without the disarmament of Hungary, there can be no peace or settlement of frontiers in Central Europe. On the third point he speaks with more diffidence. General Bliss’ argument is based on the view that the Allied Powers are precluded from sending troops across the line beyond which the Hungarians are not to advance, according to Article I of the Armistice. He is surprised at this view. The Article forbids the Hungarians to go beyond the line, but does not explicitly forbid the Allies to cross it. Clause III moreover gives the Allies the “right of occupying all places and strategic points which may be permanently fixed by the general Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.” It is difficult to reconcile this with General Bliss’ interpretation of Article I. There is another small point on which he does not wish to rely, namely, that when the Convention was signed Romania was not a belligerent. He would like to be told by experts in military jurisprudence whether the Romanian advance, regrettable though it might be, amounts to a breach of the Armistice in the same sense as the obvious and important breach made by Hungarians.

General Bliss says that the interpretation of Article I of the Armistice does not require a lawyer. The very word Armistice means the laying down of arms by both sides on a given line in order that civil plenipotentiaries should negotiate. It cannot impose a purely unilateral obligation. As to Article III, giving the Commander-in Chief of the Allied Armies the right to occupy strategic points, no such provision has been made in the Armistice with Germany. But it had been feared that hostilities with Germany might begin again, and when the Armistice Convention with Austria had been negotiated, it had been stipulated that the Allied Armies should have passed through Austrian territory in order to threaten Germany from the South. A similar provision had also been made in the Convention with Hungary. The provision, however, does not mean that any Allied Commander could occupy any point he liked without reference to the Commander-in-Chief. Romanian action had been taken in defiance of the wishes of General Franchet d’Esperey.

Mr Kramarcz said he does not wish to enter into the legal question. Czechoslovakia is threatened by the Hungarians. The Army of the Hungarians kept Czechoslovakia and other countries armed and mobilized. This is the only question for consideration.

Mr Pachitch says he agreed with Mr Kramarcz, Dr Benes, and Mr Vaida. Action ought to be taken to force Bela Kun to fulfill Hungary’s engagements under the Armistice. The Yugoslavs have reason to expect that they would be the third victim of Hungary. The Hungarians undoubtedly desire to re-establish Hungary in her historic frontiers.

M Clemenceau says that all concerned have now expressed their views. Two Governments, however, have to be consulted before action could be taken.

Marshal Foch observes that on July 11th, when he had been asked to study a plan of operations, the principle of action itself had not been in question. If it is questioned now, it will seem that the Council is in contradiction with itself.

Mr Balfour says that he dissents entirely from what Marshal Foch had just said. He cannot consult his Government on the propriety of military operations unless he knows what their nature is and what chance of success they offer.

Mr White says that as he understands the case, Marshal Foch had been asked to make a report to send to the Governments. Marshal Foch had made a most able report. He cannot commit his Government and even the President would have to be assured that the proposal does not involve a new war before he can assent, without consulting the Senate.

M Clemenceau says that this is not a subject that can be discussed. Each of the members of the Council is free to consult his Government. Marshal Foch has presented a remarkable report showing that success could be hoped for without a great expenditure of effort. General Bliss has put forward certain questions which deserve close examination. He will remind the Council that Mr Balfour had lately drafted a telegram in which the Council had informed Bela Kun that it cannot hold any conversations with him as long as he does not respect the Armistice. No one had then raised any objection.

Mr White says that he wishes that he had followed his usual method, and asked for time to consider the matter.

M Clemenceau says that he would like to point out that a state of war with Hungary still exists and there can be no question of a new war.

S Tittoni asks that the greatest secrecy be observed regarding the discussion.

(It is agreed that the discussion should be resumed on the following day at 10:30 by the Members of the Council.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

07-18-19, 06:39 AM

18th July 1919

The Cenotaph in London, as designed by Edwin Lutyens, is unveiled to commemorate the dead of World War I.
https://i.imgur.com/S9onYlU.jpg

[803rd Pioneer Infantry Battalion on the U.S.S. Philippine (troop ship), from Brest harbor, France, July 18, 1919] no. 15, Part of 4000 troops on U.S.S. Philippine.
https://i.imgur.com/e05Y9lz.jpg

Riding as a passenger, Raymonde de Laroche dies along with the pilot in the crash of an experimental Caudron airplane at Le Crotoy airfield in France.
https://i.imgur.com/Am07bbc.jpg

Sailor Steve

07-18-19, 11:38 AM

Friday, July 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

1. M Clemenceau says he has received a dispatch stating that the Greeks have committed atrocities in Smyrna and its neighborhood.

The Sheikh-ul-Islam formally accuses them. He wishes to propose to his Colleagues that they should send a Commission of Inquiry. The Council is not without responsibility, seeing that it had sent the Greeks to Smyrna.

Mr Balfour says he has been much concerned about the reports from Asia Minor. A question has been asked in the House of Commons. It has been found on investigation that the Greeks have in fact committed atrocities. Mr Venizelos has been greatly perturbed, and has himself been forced to admit the truth of the allegations.

S Tittoni says that fighting between the Turks and Greeks must be put to an end. It is very bitter, and no quarter is given on either side.

M Clemenceau asks whether his colleagues would be prepared to agree at once to the dispatch of the Commission.

Mr Balfour says that he would prefer, before deciding to do this, to discuss the whole question of Asia Minor. He does not object to the proposal in itself, though he would point out that if Commissions of Inquiry have to be sent to investigate all charges of atrocities throughout the world, he does not think he would be able to lay his hand on a sufficient number of officers.

M Clemenceau says he proposes to send French Commissioners, even if his Colleagues appoint none. He would, however, prefer that they should do so.

Mr Balfour says that he has no objection, but that it is more important to prevent recurrences of atrocities in the future than to investigate those which have already taken place. Control could only be exercised by the Conference through the local Commander-in-Chief.

M Clemenceau says that Mr Balfour’s plan would only result in the issuing of a proclamation, which would have no effect at all. The Allies would have to deal with the Turks hereafter, and it must be made clear to them they did not send the Greeks to Smyrna merely to commit atrocities.

S Tittoni said that he agrees with M Clemenceau. It is very important to make the Turks feel that the Allies did not propose to have them massacred.

Mr Balfour points out that the atrocities complained of had been committed by soldiers. They should be checked by the Commander-in-Chief in Anatolia. Orders of the Council could be sent and executed through him. He would have certain proposals to make on this subject, and he thinks that M Clemenceau’s plan would fit in with his own.

(It is decided that the question of appointing a Commission of Inquiry should be postponed till the Meeting in the afternoon.)

2. M Clemenceau says that he has received an account of proceedings at Dédéagatch which, seeing that Italy as well as the other Allies, is still at war with Bulgaria, deserves comment and perhaps action by the Italian Government.

S Tittoni said that he agrees with M Clemenceau that the behavior of the Italian officers in fraternizing with the Bulgarians is, if correctly reported, highly reprehensible. He undertakes to have an inquiry made into the matter, and asked that M Clemenceau’s information be handed to him.

3. Mr White informs the Council that he has received the following telegram from President Wilson, and asks his colleagues what answer he should give on their behalf:

“Respecting the decision announced in your telegram of June 30th, to postpone further discussion of the Treaty with the Ottoman Government until the Government of the United States is in a position to say whether it will be able to undertake a mandate for a part of Turkish territory, I am afraid that the delay which this will involve will be very considerable and should like to know what attitude towards Turkey the Powers propose to take in the meantime.”

M Clemenceau says that the only attitude the Powers could adopt as far as he knows is one of expectancy. He is for certain reasons not ready to talk about Asia Minor. He does not know what kind of declaration the President expects the Council to make.

Mr White says he thinks perhaps the President had the maintenance of order in his mind.

M Clemenceau says that on this subject the Council will take the necessary measures in concert. As to the future he can at present enter into no pledges. If the Greeks, Turks, and Italians are fighting it is not his fault.

Mr White asks if M Clemenceau’s intention is to wait until the Government of the United States was in a position to say whether it will undertake a mandate.

M Clemenceau says he will not undertake to wait indefinitely. For the time being he can make no statement. When other work has been done, the Council will do its best to settle the affairs of Turkey. All he can say in reply to the President’s message is that the Council has taken note of it. President Wilson knows full well what the difficulties are. He wishes to obtain a mandate in Armenia and an American Commissioner has been appointed. He asks for part of Cilicia, and is favorably disposed towards accepting a mandate for Constantinople. The question of Constantinople is one of the greatest importance for Europe. It had caused wars in the past, and required the closest study.

Mr Balfour agrees that no definite answer can at present be given to President Wilson. The President is unfortunately prevented by the American Constitution from undertaking anything for the time being. Meanwhile the Council will try and maintain order in Turkey.

(It is agreed that Mr White should reply in the above sense to the President’s telegram.)

4. S Tittoni reads the following agreement between himself and M. Venizelos:

“The line of division between the Greek and Italian occupations in Asia Minor begins from the mouth of the Küçük Menderes river: thence it will follow the course of the river up to the Ayassoluk-Scala-Nova road: thence it will follow the line of the Greek occupation of Ayassoluk and old Ephesus.

From old Ephesus it will follow a line at an average distance of 600 meters from the railway Smyrna-Aidin to the west, then to the south of the said railway, the line to be fixed on the spot by the Greek and Italian Governments in order to allow the Greek troops to protect the railway from sudden attacks from Comitagis.

The line will then reach the Muschluk-Deresi river which will be followed to its junction with the Menderez.

Thence it will follow the bed of the Menderez to the east as far as Keuehk.

The two Governments agree not to pass beyond the line above established. Moreover this occupation has only a provisional character corresponding to the actual state of affairs, the consideration of the definite regime for these regions being reserved to the Conference.

Each of the two Governments agrees to afford in the territory which it occupies full and complete protection to the co-nationals of the other.

Instructions will be given to the commands in order that the officers of the two armies may maintain towards each other most friendly relations.”

He explains that the expression “occupation” implies occupation at the present time.

Mr Balfour says that the question must be considered from a larger aspect than that of a friendly agreement between the Greeks and the Italians. The Entente had told the Greeks to go to Smyrna. Since their arrival there was a divergence of opinion as to whether they had or had not obeyed the instructions of the British Naval Authority on the spot. Commodore Fitz-Maurice considers that they had exceeded their orders, which were not to go beyond the Sandjak of Smyrna. This might not be the fault of Mr Venizelos, but nevertheless it would seem that the harm was done. As to the Italians (he knows this was not S Tittoni’s policy) they had gone to Asia Minor without informing their Allies, and they had made successive advances into the country, also without informing them. The Council of Three had informed S Orlando that there could be no possible conversations until the Italian troops had been entirely withdrawn. Then a change of Government had taken place in Italy, and there had been a friendly meeting with S Tittoni. S Tittoni had said that the Italian Government would be put into a very serious difficulty if the British and French Governments insisted on the total withdrawal of the Italian troops. No formal decision had been taken as a result of this declaration, but the French and British Governments had not insisted.

M Clemenceau observes that it had been decided to send S Tittoni an answer.

Mr Balfour, continuing, says that, in effect, nothing had been done. There were, therefore, in Anatolia, Greek troops who were disobeying orders, and Italian troops who were there without orders. From this resulted a difficult and confused situation. He is anxious that no national susceptibilities should be hurt, but he supposed that the Council also had susceptibilities. He thinks, therefore, that he might suggest that the whole method of procedure should be altered. The Greeks had been told to consult a naval officer before making any movement. It was not the business of a naval officer to know all the intricacies of land operations. This system had not worked well. The Italian troops, on the other hand, acted in an irresponsible manner, and are under no Allied control. Would it not be better for the orders of the Council to be conveyed to all the troops in Asia Minor through its local Commander-in-Chief? In Eastern Europe, General Franchet d’Esperey is the medium for the Council’s policy and Marshal Foch in the rest of Europe. Why should the same procedure not be adopted in Asia Minor, where the Commander-in-Chief is General Allenby? It is not because General Allenby is a British officer that he suggests this, but because he is Commander-in-Chief. There might even be some advantage in his being British, seeing that the British Government has no interests in the region affected. He suggests, therefore, that General Allenby be utilized as an agent of the Council just as Marshal Foch and General Franchet d’Esperey in other parts of the world. If this were done, the Turks would realize that the Conference does not approve of outrages, and that they are to be put a stop to. The face of both Greeks and Italians would be saved, and order would be established in Turkey. This solution would not only be logical, but would conducive to sound administration. This method could not injure Italian pride, as there are Italian troops at Konia already under General Allenby’s command. A very difficult situation could thus be regularized and some order could be made to reign over the trespasses of the Greeks and the unauthorized presence of the Italians.

M Pichon says that he thinks that General Milne is directly in command.

Mr Balfour says he thinks that is the case, but that General Milne is under the superior authority of General Allenby.

M Clemenceau says that to speak his mind freely, though he has great respect for General Allenby, he feels that, in Turkey, he acts as a British officer receiving orders from the British Government rather than as an Allied Commander-in-Chief. The effect of his activities is distinctly anti-French. This ambiguous situation is unsatisfactory. General Allenby commands British troops as a British General. As an Allied Commander-in-Chief he refuses to allow French troops to be relieved. He refuses to allow them to enter Syria. He places them in Cilicia, knowing that the mandate of Cilicia is likely to go to the Americans. All his agents were consistently against the French. On every occasion, he says that the unpopularity of the French troops renders their relief or their stationing in Syria undesirable. There is a pyramid of files on this subject, and he could prove what he said. General Hamelin had telegraphed that he did not dare celebrate the 14th of July, to which he (M Clemenceau) had replied, ordering that the day should be celebrated. It had been done and there had been no trouble. In Damascus, the French had been welcomed, in spite of all General Allenby had said. As a result of all this, a condition of confidence does not exist. He would have more to say on the subject later, but he is so anxious to make peace, that he does not absolutely refuse Mr Balfour’s proposals, provided some assurance would be given that General Allenby would consider himself not a British, but an Allied agent.

Mr Balfour says that he regrets M Clemenceau had raised the vexed question of Syria. He does not believe that his charges against General Allenby would be sustained. M Clemenceau says that he had provoked agitation against the French.

M Clemenceau says that General Allenby’s agents had done so even if he had not. He had also refused to allow the relief of French troops already in the country.

Mr Balfour says that he feels sure that no responsible British officer desired to impair French popularity in Syria. They know that, under no circumstances, would Great Britain accept a mandate in Syria. The British Government, therefore, had no motive for creating difficulties in the path of others. He did not wish to pursue this matter, but only to enter his caveat against these allegations. M Clemenceau might be thoroughly assured that any officer, British or other, to whom the work was entrusted, would be impartial. He thinks, in fact, the officer in charge would be General Milne, acting under the directions of General Allenby. This said, he does not think he need add anything to the arguments he had previously used.

M Clemenceau says that he has not disagreed with the proposal, but has felt it necessary to make a reservation.

Mr White says that he is inclined to approve of Mr Balfour’s proposal. An arrangement made only between the Italians and Greeks would not reassure the Turks. The proposal would regularize the position of the Italians, who had gone to the country without the authority of the Conference. The Commander-in-Chief would be able to issue orders to Turks, Greeks and Italians, and thus the Conference would be put in charge of the situation.

S Tittoni says that (as Mr White had observed), the proposal under discussion would amount to an official recognition of Italian presence in Asia Minor. He takes note of this, as he thinks that this ultimately must be done. Italian troops are there. They can not physically be there and officially not be there. He, personally, had not sent them there, but he is, nevertheless, in an equivocal position and he would like it regularized.

M Clemenceau says that though S Tittoni is not responsible for sending Italian troops to Asia Minor, he seems disposed to take advantage of their presence there. He trusts that whatever arrangements are made, S Tittoni will not base any claim on this situation again.

S Tittoni says that he undertakes not to plead accomplished facts, but to rely entirely on justification, based on title.

M Clemenceau says that provisionally the Council should accept the arrangements made between the Greeks and the Italians, and that it should also accept Mr Balfour’s proposal as giving the Council a means of being obeyed, provided only that the question of substance is entirely reserved. On this understanding only would he accept these arrangements. He suggests that Mr Venizelos be asked to come into the room to express his formal adhesion to the arrangement made with S Tittoni.

(Mr Venizelos then enters the room.)

M Clemenceau, addressing Mr Venizelos, says that the Council is about to take two decisions, to one of which he is a party.

Mr Venizelos says that he was in full agreement with S Tittoni.

M Clemenceau says that the agreement is accepted by the Council subject to the proviso that it does not affect the ultimate decision either on Greek or on Italian rights. Furthermore, the local Commander-in-Chief will be in control of all troops - Turkish, Greek and Italian. They will have to obey the orders of General Milne. It is probable also that Commissioners will be sent to inquire into the atrocities which it is reported have been committed by Greek troops. Mr Venizelos is doubtless aware of what had taken place.

Mr Venizelos says that he fully understands. He would, however, observe that the Government at Constantinople is not in full control of the situation. Action at the Capital therefore might not produce all the effect desired in Anatolia. The Committee of Union and Progress still has more power than appears on the surface.

M Clemenceau observes that Mr Venizelos himself does not always control the actions of his countrymen.

Mr Venizelos says that whenever excesses had been complained of, he had caused the culprits to be severely punished. There have been two executions. He does not wish to conceal anything and is quite ready to accept the Commission of Inquiry. He wishes, however, to leave a note with the Council, asking for the execution of two Clauses of the Armistice, namely the disarmament of Turkey and the control of railways either by Allied troops or failing them by Greek troops and Allied Officers. He further asks that he might be heard when the Council comes to determine the southern frontier of Bulgaria.

(This is agreed to.)

(Mr Venizelos then withdraws and it is decided that his note should be submitted to the Experts.)

(It is decided provisionally to accept the agreement reached between S Tittoni and Mr Venizelos as given above.)

It is further decided to adopt the following Resolution proposed by Mr Balfour:

1) Resolved that the Conference shall communicate to the Turkish Government their intention of immediately marking out the limiting lines beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops will be permitted to move, all rights secured to the Allies under the armistice being of course reserved. The Turkish Government is required to withdraw its troops to a position which will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief. The Turkish Government shall be at the same time informed that the limiting lines above referred to, have no relation to the ultimate territorial arrangements which will be imposed by the Peace Conference.

2) The Commander-in-Chief of the forces belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers in the Asiatic possessions of Turkey shall be directed to send officers who, after communicating with the Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna, and the Italian and Greek Generals, shall fix the military lines above referred to.

3) Any future movement of the Allied forces shall be under the supreme direction of the Commander-in-Chief who is responsible to the Conference for military operations in the Asiatic portion of the Turkish Empire.

M Clemenceau questions whether it would be useful to discuss this matter before Mr Balfour and Mr White have obtained the views of their Governments.

Mr White says that he would like more precise information before he consults his Government.

Mr Balfour says that the policy he would like to see carried out is:

1) That the execution of the Armistice by Hungary is required by the Conference.

2) That if the Armistice is carried out, Romanian troops should withdraw to the original frontier.

3) That the Allies cannot negotiate Peace with those who are breaking their engagements.

4) That the Conference cannot tolerate the continuation of conditions which would make Peace, Commerce and disarmament in Central Europe impossible.

Unless satisfactory evidence of compliance is obtained the necessary steps should be taken to enforce the will of the Conference. His attention has been drawn that morning to certain figures given on the previous day by Marshal Foch regarding the forces at the disposal of Bela Kun. His own hypothesis has been that the Hungarians are trying to collect an aggressive force to attack their neighbors. If this is untrue, the policy built upon it naturally must be abandoned, but if the hypothesis is true, he will recommend his Government to agree to military action.

M Clemenceau suggests that four Officers representing each of the Powers concerned should be sent to Hungary to verify the military situation and that Bela Kun be asked to allow them to make their investigation. Should he refuse, he would be admitting his guilt. Should he accept, the Council will be in a position to form an accurate judgment. A short time ago the Council had addressed him and said that no further conversation could be held with him because he had broken the Armistice. He had replied that a breach of the Armistice had been committed not by him but by the Romanians. The Council before acting, wished to know the exact truth.

S Tittoni says that he has no objection but he would like to re-enforce this action. The Council is dealing with a man whose ill-faith is proverbial. He has already used such communication as he had had with the Powers for his own advantage. He represents a small minority ruling an immense majority which is deprived of the means of rebelling. If his permission is solicited, this would increase his prestige. The Commission should be sent to Hungary without asking for his consent.

M Clemenceau said that he entirely agrees.

Mr White draws attention to the resolution of the Council recorded in H. D. 7 Para. 1,7 taken on July 15th:

“It was decided to refer the communication received from Bela Kun to Marshal Foch for a full report on the observances and non-observances of the original Armistice conditions by all parties concerned.”

M Clemenceau says that information obtained direct from the country would be more valuable than any information accessible to Marshal Foch.

S Tittoni said that the Commission should be numerous in order that it should produce a great moral effect.

M Clemenceau thinks that four General Officers would be sufficient. Instructions could be given to them, before they started, by the Council.

Mr White says that he would prefer to reserve his opinion until the afternoon’s meeting.

(It is agreed that the decision should be postponed until the next meeting at 16:00 on the same day.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

07-18-19, 09:55 PM

Friday, July 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

1. M Clemenceau says that he will ask M. Loucheur to explain the problem of the Austrian railways.

M Loucheur says that every year the Italian Government pays in a sum of 29,000,000 francs to the Sudbahn Company. The payment has been suspended since the outbreak of hostilities. The Italian Government had considered that it had a right to keep the annual payment of the 29,000,000 francs in question by way of reparation. The French Delegation does not agree. It has thought itself bound to protect the interests of shareholders of all nationalities, including German and Austrian Bondholders. The problem is not applicable for these latter, however. With regard to the other shareholders, the Italian Government had agreed to continue to pay in the sum in question to Paris. It had been further decided that a complete reorganization of the Sudbahn was necessary and that this reorganization would be both financial and technical, in view of the fact that the railway line in question now passes through several States. The shareholders will therefore be heard in the event of disagreement; they will be in a position to call for arbitration and the arbiter can be nominated by the League of Nations. Each person’s rights are therefore protected and all can participate in the reorganization that has been foreshadowed.

Mr Balfour says that the question includes two problems: the first one which is financial has been settled. The second is was a question of transportation between the five countries concerned. Has it been settled?

M Loucheur says that it has not been settled up to the present but that it has been decided that in the three months following the signature of the Treaty, a general meeting will be convened in order to settle the question arising out of the reorganization. No special clause for insertion in the Austrian Treaty has yet been thought of although possibly it would be preferable to insert one in order to be able to act at greater advantage in the case of Yugoslavia and the other countries concerned. If the Council so decides it could be drawn up and when decided upon, sent to the Drafting Committee.

(This proposal is accepted and M Loucheur and General Mance withdraw to draw up the text of the Article in question. When the text of the Article had been prepared, M Loucheur and General Mance re-enter the room.)

M Loucheur says that in collaboration with General Mance he has taken the text drawn up by the Italian Delegation and accepted by the Experts, and that they have decided to add the following paragraph:

“This arbitration might, as far as the southern railway lines in Austria are concerned, be demanded either by the Administrative Committee of the Company or by a representative of the Shareholders.”

S Tittoni asks whether the Italian Experts have been consulted and whether the text is in agreement with what they had consented to.

M Loucheur says that they have not been able to find S Crespi: that the text presented differed slightly, since it gives to the Representative of the Shareholders the right to demand arbitration.

S Tittoni says that the point is a new one and that he desires it to be laid before S Crespi.

(After a short discussion it is decided to accept the text given hereunder subject to its being accepted later on by S Crespi: the text is to be sent to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Austrian Treaty:

“With the object of ensuring regular utilization of the railroads of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, owned by private companies, which, as the result of the stipulation of the Treaty, will be situated in the territory of several States, the administrative and technical reorganizations of the said lines shall be regulated in each instance by an agreement between the owning companies and the States territorially concerned. Any differences on which agreement is not reached, including questions relating to the interpretation of contracts concerning the expropriation of lines shall be submitted to an arbitration designated by the Council of the League of Nations. This Arbitration may, as regards the Company, be required either by the Board of Management or by the representatives of the bond holders.”)

2. M Loucheur says that the question only concerns France, Great Britain, the United States and Belgium. The Representatives of these countries had received the Report.

S Tittoni asks whether the Commission deals with the economic questions.

M Loucheur said that it does not do so, but that a Report has been accepted unanimously by the Experts: it is based on the two German notes annexed to the Report. In order to summarize the question it is sufficient to say that the Germans in their note has always desired to modify the text of the Treaty as submitted to them, and that they have further attempted to interpret it in their own way. Our Commission has always rejected the modifications asked for, but it has always taken up a conciliatory attitude in questions of interpretation. The Commission thought that in acting in this way it was following the political lead which had been given to it. Among the modifications asked for, it has been thought necessary to reject the one which dealt with an Imperial Commission. The Commissioner who would have been nominated by the Germans ought, according to them, to be consulted by the Inter-Allied Commission which ought only to act in agreement with him. The Germans had also given a wrong interpretation to certain terms in the Convention; they had thought the terms in question full of pitfalls. They thought that the Allies desired to intervene in questions of primary education and in religious problems. They had been reassured and told that such a thing had never been in the intentions of the Allies. During the discussions there had only been one difficult point. The Germans had stated that the Imperial Commissioner had been nominated: they had been told in reply that the Commissioner should be acceptable to the Allies. In addition to this it had not been possible to agree to the Commissioner being a Representative of the Federal States.

The Germans had been told that if all the Federal States agreed to nominate the same person he would be accepted.

Mr Balfour asks whether the German Constitution had been examined.

M Loucheur replies that the German Constitution had been carefully examined. The remarks made to the German Delegates on the subject of the Commissioner had been suggested to them by the members of the Commission for the Rhine Convention. In, addition, by one of the Clauses of the Convention given we had the right of having delivered to us persons who having committed crime on the left bank of the Rhine, had taken refuge on the right. The Germans replied that they could not accept this clause on account of the question of extradition. They had been told that the question of extradition did not arise since both the banks of the Rhine were German territory. The proposals had therefore been rejected and the clause in question upheld. If the report were accepted, it was proposed that it should be sent in the form of a note to the German Delegation by the President of the Peace Conference.

(The reply to the German notes on the Rhine Convention unanimously recommended by M Loucheur’s Commission is therefore accepted, and it is further decided that an English text should be presented along with the French one after examination by the Drafting Committee.)

3. S Tittoni says he wishes to present the following note in the name of the Italian Government:

“The Italian Delegation reminds the Conference in the following terms of the reservation which it had made previously in similar terms with regard to the Peace Treaty with Germany: the first reservation had been accepted by the Supreme War Council at its meeting of the 16 June. The Italian Delegation thinks that the stipulations contained in the Convention of the League of Nations do not apply to territorial questions, or to such arrangements as may arise out of them; for these latter have been part of the duties of the Peace Conference, and have not yet been definitely settled.”

Mr Balfour says that S Tittoni’s statement amounts to this: the Italian frontiers have not yet been settled. If, therefore, the Italian Delegation agrees to sign the Treaty without reservation, as this latter includes the Covenant of the League of Nations, they might be compelled to accept decisions which they did not fully know before hand. It would not be just, and for this reason the Italian reservation has been made.

S Tittoni said that the reservation only applies to frontiers not yet settled. He thinks that the duty of settling such frontiers falls to the Peace Conference, and not to the League of Nations.

Mr Balfour says he agrees entirely, but that he wishes to ask a question. If the reservation is accepted and an agreement arrived at with regard to frontiers, could Italy at some future time, ten years hence possibly, raise the question again on the plea that it had made reservations? He therefore asks that the reservation should lapse at the date of the settlement of the frontier question.

S Tittoni says that the text of his reservation allows for that, since it deals with frontiers “not yet definitely settled”. When once the frontiers are settled the reservation lapsed.

Mr White says that they are only called upon to take note of a reservation.

M Clemenceau says that possibly they might be called upon to take note of it under Mr Balfour’s interpretation.

S Tittoni said that all that is asked for is that the frontiers between Italy and Yugoslavia should be settled by the Council and not by the League of Nations.

(Cognizance is taken of the following reservation made by S Tittoni on behalf of Italy:

“The Italian Delegation desires to recall and to renew in the following terms the reservation made by it on the subject of the Treaty with Germany which the Supreme Council accepted at its Meeting on June 16th.”

The Italian Delegation is of the opinion that stipulations of the Covenant of the League of Nations are not applicable to territorial questions and to the arrangements connected therewith, which having been made the subjects of consideration by the Peace Conference have not yet been settled.”

4. M Clemenceau says that they are called upon to send out a Commission of Inquiry into Asia Minor.

Mr White says that he has examined the question, and that he does not think he is able to reply to it without first referring it to his Government.

Mr Balfour says that he accepts the principle of the Committee of Inquiry, but that he cannot nominate his representatives before Monday.

S Tittoni said that he is in the same position as Mr Balfour.

(It is decided to send a Commission to Asia Minor consisting of one Commissioner each from Great Britain, France and Italy. The participation of the United States in this Commission is referred to the American Government.)

5. The question of nominating a Military Commission to inquire into the situation in Hungary is adjourned until Monday, so as to await Mr Balfour’s and Mr White’s acceptances.

6. At this moment the experts, General Bliss, Mr Hoover, General Belin, General Cavallero, Col. MacReady, Col. Kisch, and Commandant Lacombe enter the room.

Mr Hoover summarizes the report.

M Clemenceau says that the question involves shipping.

Mr Hoover says that M Clemenceau’s remark is true, but that a decision has to be arrived at as to the port into which the boats were to be sent and the method of transport by railway. The repatriation of the prisoners might take two to three months, and they would have to be fed during that period.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks the question is a military one, and that it should be studied by the military experts at Versailles.

Mr Balfour says that the British Red Cross has spent nearly a million pounds in the upkeep of these prisoners. This would have to be discontinued on account of the approaching demobilization, but that the Red Cross organisation is willing to devote its stores to this purpose, they would suffice to feed the prisoners for 15 days.

Mr Hoover remarks that the stock in question will only feed the 35,000 prisoners in the charge of the British Red Cross, and that it will not supply the other prisoners.

Mr Balfour asks why the Germans should not be approached in this matter. We have undertaken the feeding of these prisoners for seven months without having been obliged to do so. The Allies have done it in order to prevent the Germans from repatriating the prisoners under circumstances disadvantageous to themselves. Ought not, therefore, the Germans be invited to take charge of the feeding of the prisoners. He is told by his experts that Marshal Foch might quite well deal with the question.

Mr White says that a plan of repatriation had been accepted by the Council of Ten in the month of June. He thinks that the Ukrainians and the Poles had prevented the plan from being put into execution.

Mr Hoover says that the military authorities ought, therefore, to investigate the means of transport necessary, and study the question of feeding the prisoners. It should not be forgotten that a political question also arises, since the Allies had maintained the prisoners in Germany in order to prevent them joining the Bolsheviks.

M Clemenceau says that he does not think Marshal Foch can deal with the question, which is a political and financial one. The Allies are not dealing with prisoners taken by themselves, but with prisoners made by an enemy army. He, therefore, proposes to deal with the political and financial questions. Once they are decided upon, the manner in which they can be carried out could be investigated. He desires to have the opinion of his Military Experts on the point in question, which is, after all, a problem of military politics. It had been desired to avoid sending the Russian prisoners lest they should reinforce the Bolshevik Army or spread themselves out over Poland. The danger today is not so great as far as Poland is concerned, and Military Experts could deal with it.

General Bliss says that the question does not seem to him to be in a condition to be submitted to Versailles. It contains two problems. Mr Hoover had stated that there are no funds available for feeding the prisoners. How could they be supported, therefore, if the Germans refused to have anything to do with it? After that, the question arose as to how they should be repatriated and this raised the following problems; Firstly, are the prisoners to be repatriated immediately? Secondly, were they to be repatriated through Poland to the nearest Russian territory. Thirdly, are they to be repatriated to Black Sea Ports? Fourthly, if one of these alternatives is accepted, who would undertake to execute it? Fifthly, who would undertake to send the supplies and the personnel necessary in the interval? Could not the proposal made by the Economic Commission on the 17th June be accepted? In any case, it was necessary to take immediately the necessary measures for repatriating the prisoners. Some solution had to be adopted rapidly, because the operations would require a good deal of time and must be concluded before Winter. If the proposal is accepted, our own Delegation and the Allied Delegations could telegraph to their Governments to obtain the necessary powers. The repatriation must be carried out as rapidly as possible. The Military Authorities could then be put in touch with the question and may study the best means of carrying out the repatriation.

M Clemenceau says that it involves a great danger for Poland. As far as the Russian prisoners are concerned, the question is not one of feeding 35,000 under the charge of the British Red Cross, but of supplying all.

General Bliss says that some decision must be arrived at, because the repatriation will take a long time.

M Clemenceau says that the question should have been presented to the Council at an earlier date.

Mr Balfour says that Marshal Foch had received a communication on the subject four months ago.

Mr Hoover says that the Council had been put in touch with the question four months ago, and that it was noted that nothing had been done. There was a solution possible. There are Armies of Occupation in Germany with the necessary Army Service Corps Units attached. The Armies of Occupation had been reduced in number on account of demobilization with the result that the Army Service Corps Units could take charge of the prisoners.

Mr Balfour says that Mr Hoover’s solution is very ingenious, but that it only settles one of the two questions, that of feeding. The repatriation question remains open, and to settle it more tonnage was necessary together with the consent of the Polish Government with regard to the passage across that country of the prisoners in question. The method of repatriation was the most difficult. Were the Military Authorities at Versailles competent to resolve the question? If they were not, a special Committee would be necessary in which the Versailles Experts should be represented, together with Naval Experts and possibly political Experts.

M Clemenceau says that the Council could decide on political questions.

Mr Balfour says that at the present time 500 Americans are dealing with the supplies and feeding stock. It had been said to him that these 500 Americans were about to be withdrawn, but that the Army Service Corps Units in the Armies of Occupation could carry on the work. The Commission would, therefore, only be concerned with the question of railways, ports, etc.

M Clemenceau says that, under these circumstances, the question could very well be dealt with by the Military Experts at Versailles, to whom Naval Experts could be joined. His proposal was accepted.

(It is therefore agreed

a) That upon the failure of the supplies already provided for the feeding of Russian prisoners now in Germany, they should be fed and supplied by the Military Authorities of the Armies of Occupation until repatriated.

b) That the means of repatriation of the Russian prisoners now in Germany and maintained at the cost of the Allies should be referred for study to the Military Representatives at Versailles with whom would be associated for this purpose the Naval Advisers.)

7. Mr Hoover makes a short résumé of the memorandum on the subject.

He draws the attention of the Council, moreover, to the fact the Georgian Authorities had only agreed to allow the supplies to pass through their territory on condition of a certain proportion being given to them. They now demand one-half of the supplies. This demand is not from necessity, because they do not lack food, but is made simply for the purpose of speculation. For this reason the Council is asked to send a menacing telegram to the Georgian Authorities, in order to facilitate the transport of supplies during two or three months. The future destiny of Georgia depends on the Conference, and there was every hope that they would yield to our wishes.

(It is therefore decided that M Clemenceau, as Chairman of the Peace Conference, should send the following telegram in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Government of Georgia:

“The Council has been made aware of the interference of the Georgian Authorities when food supplies are sent into Armenia in an endeavor on the part of the Allied Governments to stem the tide of starvation and death among these unfortunate people. The Council cannot state in too strong terms that such interference and that such action taken by the Georgian Authorities together with the continuation of such action must entirely prejudice their case. The Council therefore expects that the Authorities in Georgia shall not only give the privileges of transportation over the Railway routes at which they at present control, but will devote themselves to assisting in the transmission of these supplies at no more than the normal charge and remuneration for such service. The Council awaits the reply of the Authorities in Georgia as to whether or not they are prepared to acquiesce in this arrangement.”)

8. M Pichon, who has studied the question, reads an extract from a report of the military authorities dated 11th July.

Baron Makino says that he wishes to make a remark. It had been decided some time back by the Supreme Council that the Czechoslovaks should be evacuated through Omsk to Archangel, and that the Japanese Government should then be asked to protect the railway. He had telegraphed to his Government in that sense. Their reports tended to show that since the Czechoslovaks do not accept the proposal the Japanese Government had suspend its decision. The question now is of repatriation by Vladivostok. This is a new proposal which must be submitted to the Japanese Government. It is probable that it will wish to obtain all the information available and possibly would desire to consult the local authorities. The examination would take several days during which it would be impossible for him to reply to the Supreme Council.

(After a short discussion it is decided that with regard to the repatriation of the Czechoslovaks from Siberia, that M Clemenceau should send a copy of the following telegram to the American Government and that Baron Makino should send the same telegram to the Japanese Government:

“In view of the condition and wishes of the Czechoslovak troops in Siberia, the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers consider it urgently necessary that arrangements should be made for the systematic repatriation of the troops from Vladivostok.

This involves the replacement of those troops along that portion of the trans-Siberian railway which is at present guarded by them.

Information is therefore requested as to whether the American/Japanese Government will furnish the necessary effectives or will co-operate with the Japanese/American Government to this end. A similar telegram has been addressed to the Japanese/American Government.”)

Jimbuna

07-19-19, 08:26 AM

19th July 1919

Aftermath of War

Peace celebrations in the United Kingdom.

General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, and Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for War and Secretary of State for Air, converse in London.
https://i.imgur.com/Prr4uFK.jpg

American troops participate in a victory parade in London and salute King George V.
https://i.imgur.com/ObOD1gQ.jpg

American troops on the ship U.S.S. Philippine as they depart Brest, France to return home.
https://i.imgur.com/nKy46NN.jpg

Jimbuna

07-20-19, 09:55 AM

20th July 1919

British soldiers of the Graves Registration Unit rests on the beach at Ostend, Belgium.
https://i.imgur.com/Z1kSfj8.jpg

Military units are taking part in the 'Peace Day' parade through central London. This shot of Westminster Bridge was taken from Big Ben and shows the partly built County Hall top left.
https://i.imgur.com/dCpTczz.jpg

Troops of the anti-Bolshevik Russian Don Army in Balashov.
https://i.imgur.com/pVlQFtX.jpg

Race riots break out in Washington D.C., as white servicemen and civilians attack black businesses and homes. 15 people are killed on both sides in the following days.
https://i.imgur.com/No3Bv6o.png

Jimbuna

07-21-19, 07:31 AM

21st July 1919

Aftermath of War

The United Kingdom ratifies the Treaty of Versailles.

French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau famously states, "It is easier to make war than make peace."

Race riot breaks out during celebrations to welcome home the African-American veterans of World War I
https://i.imgur.com/gZkRt9J.png

United Kingdom flag created out of a giant human formation.
https://i.imgur.com/dDeqXC5.jpg

Sailor Steve

07-21-19, 01:02 PM

Friday, July 19 & 20, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings these two days.

Sailor Steve

07-21-19, 10:00 PM

Monday, July 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

1. (a) Mr Balfour says that before starting with the subjects on the Agenda, he would like to observe that there is not a single item on it touching Peace with Bulgaria, or indeed touching any Treaty of Peace at all. The subjects for discussion ire no doubt important subjects, but the Bulgarians are to come to Paris on the following Friday. He thinks it will be discreditable if the Conference is not ready to hand them a Treaty on their arrival, or shortly after it. He understands that the delay comes from the re-opening of the frontier question. The Reparation and Financial Clauses are delayed in consequence. Unless the ultimate size of Bulgaria were known, it is difficult to estimate what sums she will be able to pay. Another question that is delayed is that of responsibilities, and the method of procedure to be adopted against persons who had broken the laws of war. He has inquired why Clauses similar to those inserted in the Treaties with Germany and with Austria are not adopted for the Treaty of Bulgaria, and he has been given the following explanations. In the other Treaties it had been stipulated that if the crime had been committed to the detriment of a Frenchman, the trial should be in a French Court, and if against an Englishman, in an English Court. If against Nationals of several countries, in a mixed Court. It appeared, however, that a Greek, Serbian, or Romanian Court would not be regarded as offering a fair trial to a Bulgarian who had committed an offence against a Greek, Serbian or Romanian. This might or might not be, but whatever the merits of the case, he thinks the Council should insist that the work be terminated rapidly. He would suggest that M Clemenceau should request the Commissions to expedite their labors.

Mr White says that he would like to add a word to Mr Balfour’s remarks. He wishes to propose that the Council should give authority to the Commission on New States to take up the protection of minorities clauses for the Treaty with Bulgaria. He understands that the Economic Clauses and the clauses prepared by the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission are ready.

Mr Balfour thinks that Mr White’s information is not quite accurate. The Port question for instance, was held up, pending a decision as to whether or not Bulgaria is to have Dedeagatch (modern Alexandroupoli).

Mr White says that in any case the Commission on New States might get to work on Clauses for the protection of minorities.

(It is agreed that the Commission on New States be asked to prepare for the Treaty with Bulgaria.)

(b) S Tittoni says that in accordance with the request of his colleagues, he has discussed the question of frontiers between Greece and Bulgaria with Mr Venizelos. The latter demands the whole of Eastern and Western Thrace, and declines to reduce his claims in any respect. It is therefore impossible to obtain any concession and the question must be decided by the Council. Consequently he considers his mission ended as he can obtain nothing further from Mr Venizelos.

(c) M Clemenceau says that he will ask M Tardieu to explain the situation regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria.

(M Tardieu entered the room.)

M Clemenceau says that the Bulgarians are expected to arrive in four days. He asks him, as President of the Commission dealing with Bulgaria, to explain to what extent the Treaty is ready for them.

M Tardieu says that he is only President of the Commission dealing with the frontier question. In that Commission, the result obtained is total disagreement between the American and Italian Delegations on the one hand, and the British, French and Japanese Delegations on the other. M Tardieu then reads and explains the report. He says that he would like to add a few words in support of the opinions he had himself backed in the Commission. In western Thrace there is no choice between Greece and Bulgaria on ethnological grounds. The vast majority of the population was Turkish. The country, however, is not to be given to the Turks. The next most numerous population is, according to French statistics, Greek; according to other statistics, Bulgarian. It is very likely that the war has brought about alterations in the relative proportions of the population. As to the possession of a Port, the Bulgarians have a good Port on the Black Sea. The internationalization of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles will give them free access to the open sea. As to discontent, there will undoubtedly be discontent in Bulgaria, but the Balkans are the natural home of discontent, and the only question is whether discontent should be chiefly on the side of those who had fought against us, or mainly, among the Balkan Nations who had fought for us. He would remind the Council that the impossible desire to produce union in the Balkans had wasted precious months during the war. It led to the Allied defeat at the Dardanelles, and to numerous troubles in Salonika. The mistakes made in the war should not be repeated in the Peace. As to the ultimate disposal of Eastern Thrace, he did not wish to prejudice the question. It might perhaps be most fitting to attribute it to the territory of Constantinople should the Council decide not to give it to Greece. The point was, not who got it, but who lost it.

M Clemenceau says that the question is evidently one which the Council must solve. He is prepared to discuss it at once, but he is afraid that Mr White will not be able, without consulting his Government, to reach a decision immediately.

Mr White says this is so.

M Clemenceau says that unfortunately he cannot be present in the Council on the following day, and that M Pichon also would be unavoidably detained in Brussels. He is not sure that a meeting can be held on Wednesday. He hopes that by Thursday Mr White can obtain the views of his Government.

Mr White says that he will send a second telegram that very evening to endeavor to obtain instructions by Thursday.

Mr Balfour says that he regrets the delay as he regards the matter as very urgent. He will, however, as it is necessary, assent to a postponement until Thursday.

(In view of the importance of terminating the Treaty of Bulgaria at the earliest possible moment, it is decided that the first item on the Agenda for Thursday, July 24th, should be the determination of the frontiers of Bulgaria.)

2. M Clemenceau says that he has just received a communication from Bela Kun announcing that he proposes to attack the Romanians, in order to enforce upon them respect for the Armistice arranged by the Powers. M Clemenceau adds that he does not know whether the Romanians will be able to resist the attack. They have two divisions with which to oppose it. French troops are not far off and General Franchet d’Esperey has ordered them to fire if attacked. This news perhaps renders the appointment of the Committee unnecessary.

Mr Balfour says that he considers himself authorized to nominate a General to go to Hungary. The General in question is Major-General Gorton.

M Clemenceau says that the Generals might proceed to the front and report on what was going on there.

Mr White says that he has, as yet, received no orders from Washington.

S Tittoni says that, according to news from a good source General Boehm, who had been Commander of the Hungarian Red Army, had paid a visit to Vienna. He had ceased to be Commander-in-Chief but appeared to be still in touch with Bela Kun. It would seem, from what he had said in Vienna, that an effort was being made to convert the Communist Government of Hungary into a Socialist Government. He suggests that the Allied Representatives at Vienna be asked to inquire into this report and inform the Council of the results of their inquiry.

(It is decided not to nominate the Committee of Inquiry until such time as Mr White should have obtained the views of his Government. It is further decided that the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers in Vienna should be asked for information regarding the visit of General Boehm to that city, and to investigate the report that he had declared that he was trying to bring about a movement in Hungary aiming at the transformation of the present Communist Government of Bela Kun into a Socialist Government. The truth and eventual importance of the alleged scheme should be verified.)

(At this point the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites enter the room.)

3. The Council has before it a report of the Military Representatives on the Army of Occupation in Upper Silesia.

Report of the Military Representatives on Army of Occupation in Upper Silesia General Belin reads the conclusions of the report to the effect that 1 division of 13,000 men will be required.

Mr Balfour asks whence this division could be obtained.

General Belin says that, in the first draft of the report it has been suggested that the division should be drawn from the troops employed in the occupation of the Rhineland. He would suggest, therefore, that Marshal Foch be asked if he can spare the troops. These troops would not be lost to Marshal Foch’s command: they would be stationed on the confines of Poland and Prussia, and, should any trouble arise requiring armed intervention, these troops, which would remain under Marshal Foch’s orders, could be utilized to co-operate with any movements made in the west.

M Clemenceau says that Marshal Foch’s estimate for the troops of occupation is 150,000 men. He will certainly be able to spare 13,000 from this number. He entirely agrees with the judicious remarks of General Belin. The division, would, no doubt be composed of international elements.

(It is agreed that the report of the Military Representatives, together with the suggestion that the necessary troops should be furnished by the Army of Occupation on the Rhine, be approves in principle and be submitted to Marshall Foch for his views regarding the possibility of furnishing the divisions required and on its composition.)

4. The Council has before it a report of the Military Representatives.

General Belin reads the conclusions of the Report under the heading “Material Assistance.”

M Clemenceau says that the means of transport to Poland are unsatisfactory. An inter-allied train, laden with munitions on its way to Poland, has been blown up on German territory. The German Government does not appear to be involved. The train was guarded by Polish soldiers, who had apparently been neglectful. It would perhaps, therefore, be advantageous to organize transport by sea.

Mr Balfour points out that the only port available is Danzig and that Allied control over it was not very good.

M Clemenceau says that the situation at Danzig had improved. The turbulent elements are quieter and the German Government appears to be resigned to losing the port. He suggests that the best plan would be to ask Marshal Foch to telegraph to General Nudant in Berlin to open negotiations with the German Government regarding transport by sea.

(It is decided that Marshal Foch be asked to initiate negotiations with the German Government for the transport of material for Poland to Danzig.)

General Belin then reads the conclusions of the report under the heading “Preventive Measures.” He explains that there are Allied officers serving in the Polish Army. Some of these might be nominated in advance to posts on the Delimitation Commission, which, as such, are only to be appointed 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty. These officers might, in anticipation of their future duties, undertake to supervise the handing over of the ceded districts.

(This proposal is agreed to. It is decided that Marshal Foch be requested to report on the possibility of appointing Allied Officers serving in the Polish Army, who would ultimately be nominated to the Delimitation Commission, to supervise the transfer of the ceded territory from Germany to Poland.)

5. M Clemenceau says that he received a letter from Mr Venizelos regarding the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. Mr Venizelos desires that a Greek Commissioner be appointed. This proposal does not appear to be very acceptable.

Mr Balfour points out that the Council had sent French and Italian officers to investigate the incidents at Fiume.

M Clemenceau observes that the case is different. At Fiume the incidents had occurred between Nationals of the Great Powers. In Asia Minor the incidents concern Greeks and Turks. It appears to him unreasonable to appoint a Greek to investigate a case of that kind. If his colleagues disagree with him, however, he will not press this point of view.

S Tittoni says that he is of the same opinion as M Clemenceau. The investigating Commission would be the direct emanation of the Council. It should, therefore, conform to the composition of the Council. If a Greek officer were to be appointed to the Commission in Asia Minor, it might be argued on the same lines that Mr Venizelos should have remained in the room, at a previous meeting, when the Council deliberated on the subject of the Greek occupation in Anatolia.

Mr Balfour said that in the early days of the Conference, it had been laid down that Powers with limited interests should be represented when matters directly affecting them were discussed.

M Clemenceau said that they were heard on matters regarding their interests, but the deliberations were conducted by the Five Powers.

Mr White says that he thinks the argument on both sides is strong, and that he had no very definite preferences.

Mr Balfour asks the military experts present in the room whether they think the collaboration of a Greek officer would be conducive to a sound finding.

General Thwaites expresses the opinion that it is undesirable to appoint a Greek officer.

General Bliss says that the presence of officers of all Allied Nations would give an appearance of impartiality. He does not feel strongly on the subject, but he is inclined personally to think that there should be officers from each of the Allied Nations on the Commission.

M Clemenceau says that the presence of a Greek officer on the Commission would doubtless not matter much.

S Tittoni objects to it as creating a precedent, which challenges the whole mechanism of the Conference.

Mr Balfour observes that the Greek officer would go as a representative of the Powers.

(After some further discussion it is agreed that Mr Venizelos be informed that he might appoint a Greek officer to follow the labors of the Commission. This officer will not, however, have a vote on the Commission and will take no part in its finding.

The following nominations were then made:

For Italy: General Dallolio.
For France: General Franchet d’Esperey to nominate an officer.
For Great Britain: General Milne to nominate an officer.
For The United States of America: An officer to be appointed after a reply from Washington has been received.

It is decided that the Commission should begin its labors at once, and should gather as early as possible at Constantinople.)

6. (It is agreed that nominations to this Commission should be communicated to the Secretary-General on the following day.)

7. Mr Balfour says that the report is to the effect that the Commission is unable to say whether the money required by General Gough is really necessary, whether the Allied Governments could furnish the money and what security exists for repayment. For all the assistance given to the Council, the Commission might as well not have reported at all. He quotes from a telegram from General Gough to the effect that the Germans are paying 15 million marks a month to support the Baltic Landwehr and the troops of Prince Lieven, and suggesting that to deliver Latvia and Russia from financial obligation to Germany, the Germans be ordered to continue payment into a British bank to the account of the Ulmannis Government as a portion of the reparation due from Germany. Mr Balfour adds that it is surprising that the Germans should be able to pay such a sum while all the Entente Powers together could not afford half a million a month.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks the matter cannot be settled at that meeting.

(The question is therefore postponed.)

8. M Tardieu says that, as he had previously explained, there is a Commission to supervise the execution of the Territorial and Political Clauses of the Treaty, and another to supervise the execution of the Reparation and Financial Clauses. There are, however, two other important chapters in the Treaty requiring similar Commissions, namely, the Economic and Colonial. He pointed out that the existing Committees could not perform this work He, therefore, proposes that a Committee be appointed to supervise the execution of these Clauses of the Treaty.

Baron Makino says that, as regards the Colonial Clauses, the most important of these were covered by the work of the Reparation Commission, and the remainder by the Committee dealing with Mandates. The work of these two bodies appeared to cover the main part of the Articles dealing with German colonies. If anything is left over, there might be a reason for appointing a new Commission, and he would be glad to know what remains over.

M Tardieu says that he agrees. The Reparation Commission can, he thinks, in a few hours deal with all questions which the Committee on Mandates left untouched. All he wishes is that some body should be required to do the necessary work on behalf of the Council.

Baron Makino suggests that the Committee on Mandates should be asked to make a report.

(After some further discussion, the two following resolutions are then adopted:

1) That the supervision of the execution of the Economic Clauses of the Treaty with Germany should be entrusted to the Economic Commission. The Commission was asked to report to the Council at an early date.

2) That the supervision of the execution of the Colonial Clauses of the Treaty with Germany should be entrusted to the Mandates Committee. The Committee is asked to report to the Council at an early date.)

9. M Tardieu says that he has just seen a letter which had not been communicated to the Commission dealing with the question of Klagenfurt.

S Tittoni observes that the question relating to war material was totally different from that of the Armistice line.

M Tardieu says that the Council had required a line to be drawn behind which the two belligerent parties could withdraw. It had then been thought right that this line should, as nearly as possible, be the boundary between the plebiscite areas. This had been done. An argument was now raised by the Yugoslavs against withdrawing behind the line on the plea that there was a certain stock of arms and munitions captured by them from the Austrians which they were entitled to remove. He thinks this excuse for not withdrawing should not be tolerated.

Mr Balfour says that he had imagined that it had been arranged that the Serbs should retire leaving behind them a small guard under Allied officers to watch those stores, to which it appeared they had a legitimate title. There appears to be no serious objection to the execution of this plan. The stores belonged to the Serbs and should they have to abandon them they would have a real grievance.

S Tittoni says that the matter is not as clear to him as it seemed to be to Mr Balfour. Mr Balfour seems convinced that these stores belong to the Serbs. The Serbs had occupied the territory in which these stores were after the armistice. They had no right, therefore, to claim as war booty material taken after the armistice. These stores represent a security for the reparation due from Austria. In it the Serbs were entitled not to the whole, but to one-fifth. The whole question should therefore be handed over to the Reparation Commission. If all the armaments in Austria were bartered away, there would finally remain nothing in the country to pay reparation. Further, he thinks the presence of Serbian troops, even in small numbers, is incompatible with the due observance of the plebiscite. As it is, the inhabitants complained that the Serbians threatened them. The same plan therefore should be adopted in this territory as was adopted in the areas in dispute between Germans and Poles. A police force is required, but not one representing either claimant.

Mr Balfour says that S Tittoni’s argument was a strong one, but it could hardly apply to a very small section of Serbian troops posted to guard a building. This he thinks is all that the proposed force amounts to. He would like to ask at what date the plebiscite was to take place.

M Tardieu said that S Tittoni’s observation might have force at the time when the plebiscite was to occur, but this was to be from three to six months after the coming into force of the Treaty. The Treaty had not yet been signed.

Mr Balfour said that long before this the munitions would have been removed, and the Serbian guard would have gone with them.

M Tardieu says that he would suggest a slight modification of Mr Balfour’s proposal, namely, that instead of a Serbian guard, the Allied generals in the area be asked to take charge of the stores, and to give the Serbians a receipt.

(The following Resolution was then adopted:

“It was decided that the troops of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes be required to evacuate the whole of zone “B” in the Klagenfurt Basin, in conformity with the boundary already communicated to them. The arms and stores claimed by them will be handed over for custody to the Allied Generals, who will furnish a receipt for the same.”)

10. M Clemenceau says that there is a complaint communicated by Mr Paderewski that the Germans are removing from Danzig all that is necessary for the working of the factories. The complaint emanates from a Committee of the working population of Danzig.

M Clemenceau proposes that Marshal Foch be asked to deal with the question.

(It is decided to refer the document communicated by Mr Paderewski regarding German action in Danzig to Marshal Foch for suitable action.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)