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Sailor Steve

07-26-19, 09:00 PM

Friday, July 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

1. Mr White states that before dealing with the questions on the Agenda he would like to communicate to the Council some information that had been received with regard to General Boehm’s visit to Vienna. The information in question had been transmitted through Mr Hoover whom he requests the Council to ask for information.

(At this moment Mr Hoover enters the room.)

Mr Hoover states that the proposal in question has been submitted to the Allied representatives at Vienna by General Boehm, who had been the Commander-in-Chief of the Bolshevik Hungarian armies. General Boehm had stated that if he could be suitably supported by the Allies and given certain assurances, more particularly on the subject of raising the blockade, and the importation of foodstuffs, together with the re-opening of traffic on the Danube, he on his part, would be ready to set up a social democratic government with himself as temporary dictator. Bela Kun would be deposed from power; all terrorist actions will cease, and order would be restored.

Mr Balfour stated that he had seen Mr Hoover on the previous evening who had communicated the contents of the telegram to him, and that, moreover, he had had the advantage of discussing the matter with his Military Experts. He now wonders whether the best way of getting rid of Bela Kun is by means of military intervention. It is now possible that the best solution lay in adopting the suggestions contained in Mr Hoover’s telegram. As the Hungarians have now assumed the offensive and have crossed the Theiss they opened their flank to an attack from the south by the Serbian and French armies. It was evident that it would be preferable to conduct military operations with Hungarian assistance, but the following question presented itself. Was it possible to place full confidence in General Boehm? Even though it were possible to place full confidence in him, he would not be disposed to enter into an elaborate political arrangement with him. He thinks that it will be best to direct General Boehm to carry out his promises by means of the army which he states was under his control, and to tell him to confine his action to establishing some kind of military dictatorship with a view to calling a Constituent Assembly which should be in a position to express its will freely. Such a solution had a great advantage. In each of our countries there are sections of opinion which, without being actually Bolshevik, have none the less a certain sympathy for Bolshevik programs. Those portions of the public were most strongly opposed to military action against the Bolsheviks. All these disadvantages would be avoided by proceeding through General Boehm. He will be given the moral support of the Allies, who would promise him the guarantees demanded, if he is actually in a position to set up his dictatorship and to convene the Assembly which would determine the future of Hungary. The one question which had to be determined was whether confidence could be placed in General Boehm’s promises. Before deciding, it was necessary to have a formal assurance to the effect that he was able to carry out his promises, because, if he were not, fresh delay would be caused by entering into further discussions, which would prejudice the opportunity of successful military action which now presented itself.

M Clemenceau states that he believes it will be well to take this question up again on the following day, in order that the Council might have time to reflect upon it. He considers it would be well to have Marshal Foch at the meeting in order that he might give his advice on the military situation.

Mr Balfour observes that the important question is to know whether the Allies could have complete confidence in General Boehm.

Mr Coolidge states that he has with him a copy of a telegram which he had personally sent three months ago. In this he had stated that General Boehm was very popular in Hungary, that he had a strong political party supporting him, that his political views did not tend to the extremists and other parties of the Left, but rather inclined to those of the Right. He further observes that General Boehm was not a military man, but is none the less popular in army circles and with the working classes and that, if the situation has not changed since the time in question, he still had a powerful political faction behind him.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Council had any reason to believe that General Boehm was solely actuated by personal ambitions, and is working for his own selfish interests.

Mr Coolidge states that he does not believe this to be the case, for the reason that General Boehm had mentioned in the course of his conversations, three men whom he, Mr Coolidge, knew personally, and whose names he had mentioned in his telegram and in whom he had the greatest confidence.

Mr Hoover asked whether the Supreme Council could not at once establish a general principle, and declare that it is ready to sustain any non-terrorist Government and furnish supplies of food to it. By doing this the Council would in no way bind itself adversely, even though the movement instituted by General Boehm should fail. Military operations should always be preceded by a political declaration. The important thing he believes is to make such a declaration at once.

Mr Balfour asked whether the proposition extended to raising the blockade and furnishing food supplies to the country without undertaking military operations.

M Clemenceau states that the difficulty is not in going to Budapest, but as to what steps should be taken thereafter.

Mr White states that he would prefer to have the military operations carried out by the Hungarians themselves.

Mr Balfour observes that he would prefer to see a written proposition before taking a definite decision on the matter, and asked whether Mr Hoover cannot submit a report to the Council on the following morning.

M Clemenceau stated that he would request Marshal Foch to be present at the meeting which could be fixed for 10:30 the following morning, and that the proposals of Mr Hoover could then be examined.

Mr Balfour observed that he would like to know what was the decision from the point of view of international law in which Hungary now stood in regard to the armistice. She had accepted the Allies conditions, and yet at the present moment was attacking one of the Allied Powers, and he feels that in acting thus she had re-opened hostilities against all the Allies.

(It is decided that the question of further action on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments in Hungarian affairs, in view of the latest information received with regard to General Boehm’s proposals, should be discussed by the Council on the following day, and that Marshal Foch and Mr Hoover should attend.)

(M Cambon enters the room.)

2. M Cambon says that the Supreme Council has granted the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia a period of ten days in which to attempt to settle between themselves the question of Teschen, and that this period expired to-day. The representatives of these governments had not yet reached a satisfactory solution. A dispatch received from Warsaw indicates that the Polish Government wishes to obtain an extension of time. He had brought this matter to the attention of the Czechoslovak and Polish Sub-Committees, and these bodies were disposed to grant the extension. He has also taken the matter up with Dr Benes and Mr Dmowski, and these latter are also disposed to grant the extension but believed that the same should be short. He stated that it was therefore proposed to grant an extension of ten days. If, on the expiration of this, no agreement had been reached the matter should be decided by the Supreme Council. He believed that the Governments at Prague and Warsaw were doing everything in their power to reach an agreement, as they had already constituted two small committees for the matter, and these were at present studying the question.

Mr White states that he thinks that the Czechoslovak and Polish Committees ought to take advantage of the extension of time by themselves examining the question and preparing a solution for the Supreme Council, in the event of the two governments concerned not being able to come to an agreement.

(It is decided that a further period of ten days should be granted to the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, to arrive at an agreement between themselves on the Teschen question.

It is further agreed that the Czechoslovak and Polish Committees should in the meantime examine the question in order that the Council should be in a position to decide, if no agreement should be reached by the aforesaid Governments.)

At this point the military representatives of the Supreme War Council and General Thwaites enters the room.

Military, Naval & Aerial clauses of the Bulgarian Treaty (Mr Hoover and Mr Coolidge leave the room.)

M Clemenceau states that the Council had received the proposed Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty, which had been prepared by the Supreme War Council at Versailles. He requests General Belin to inform the Council regarding the matters upon which the experts had differed.

General Belin stated that no differences of opinion between the military experts existed with one exception, that the Italian military representative had made one reservation, which was indicated on the draft, regarding the method of recruiting. Briefly the Italian military representative insisted upon the reservation which he had already made for the Austrian and Hungarian States, namely: That the Bulgarian army should be organised on a basis of one year compulsory service.

S Tittoni said that this was a question of detail which he did not wish to press.

(It is decided that the report of the Military Representatives with regard to the Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria should be accepted.)

(At this point the Military Representatives leave the room, and M Larnaude enters.)

Clauses of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty Relating to Responsibilities M Clemenceau asks M Larnaude to explain the question.

M Larnaude stated that he merely wished to outline the manner in which the Committee had discussed the question. They had found themselves faced by Articles 227, 228 and 229 of the German Peace Treaty, and the question had come up whether these Articles should be adopted as they stood in the Bulgarian Treaty. The Greek, Serbian and Romanian Governments had opposed this, as indicated in the Report presented by the Committee. They feared that their good faith would be questioned adversely and therefore preferred that persons guilty of crimes against their citizens should be brought to judgment before international tribunals and not before national military tribunals of each of the Powers whose citizens had been injured, as was the case in the German Treaty. The American Delegates had made certain reservations and the French Delegates, whom he represented, had merely requested that note be taken of the position which they held with regard to this proposal. The French Delegates believed that it would be difficult and dangerous to adopt a different method of punishing the same criminal acts, should they agree to the proposal to grant to Bulgaria international guarantees of impartiality, which they had refused to grant to Germany.

M Clemenceau observed that it would be well to know whether the same differences of opinion existed in the Council.

M Larnaude stated that the United States and France had made certain reservations, but that the British Government supported the Greek, Serbian and Romanian proposals.

Baron Makino observed that the Japanese Delegates had also made reservations, having reiterated those which they had already made regarding the Treaty with Germany, and that he wished to take the same position as his experts on the Committee.

M Larnaude stated that the Japanese Delegates had merely renewed the reservations which they had previously made, in regard to the prosecution for breaches of the laws and customs of war of enemy Heads of States, before a tribunal constituted by the opposite party.

S Tittoni says that, if the question arose theoretically as to a choice between two tribunals, the Council might hesitate, but, as the Greek, Serbian and Romanian Governments themselves believed that they might be suspected of bad faith, and therefore requested the support from an international government, it seemed to him difficult for the Council to refuse them its support.

M Clemenceau observe that another question was involved, namely, that of the precedent established in the German Treaty.

M. Tittoni answered that, in the case of Germany, the good faith of the Allies’ judgment was not questioned and no one of the Allies thought of it. In the case of Bulgaria, the very Powers themselves who were interested in the matter had brought the question up.

M Clemenceau remarks that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had had the courage to undertake their responsibilities, and that the Council should reply that the Governments now in question should take theirs.

S Tittoni stated that he did not wish to carry his point of view as the solution of the matter. It did not vitally concern him.

Mr Balfour said that the Council must not lose sight of the fact that the Greek, Serbian and Romanian Governments considered themselves competent to try the Bulgarian prisoners actually in their hands before military courts, but that they did not believe themselves competent to try persons who might be turned over to them under the terms of the Treaty.

M Larnaude said that the point in question had not been missed and that he had drawn the attention of the representatives of these various Governments to the fact that they were open to the charge of inconsistency. One of these latter, however, M Politis, had stated that the number of persons to be brought before military courts was not great.

Mr White states that it was for this reason that they wished to place the responsibility of trying the numerous persons who were to be handed over to them by the Treaty upon the Great Powers. It had been stated that the Serbians had a list comprising from 15,000 to 20,000 persons.

M.
Larnaude stated that he did not wish to enter into a discussion, but only to explain the point of issue. He did not see why there should be any difference between the two countries, and that justice should be applied everywhere in the same manner.

Mr Balfour stated that the proposal originally submitted to the Council of Four with regard to Germany was that an international tribunal, such as was now demanded by the Greek, Serbian and Romanian Governments, should be set up. In spite of the favorable view taken by the Committee, the Council had actually decided otherwise. He did not know why the modification had been adopted, but it must certainly have been based upon strong arguments. For this reason, he was not inclined to adopt a contrary principle.

S Tittoni said that the decision would be a matter of indifference to him.

M Clemenceau then stated that he proposed to adopt the same formula as had governed the German Treaty.

(It is decided that the Clauses relative to Responsibilities in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria should be drafted on the same principle as that governing the corresponding clauses in the Peace Treaty with Germany (National Military Tribunals competent to judge the crimes committed by the Bulgarians.) See Articles 228–230 of the German Peace Treaty.)

(At this point M Larnaude leaves the room and M Tardieu enters.)

The Report of the Committee Supervising the Execution of the Peace Treaty With Germany on the Subject of Belgium M Tardieu stated that the Committee supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany did not foresee any difficulty in the nomination of five members by the Allied and Associated Powers to the Committee of Seven Members, who, by virtue of Article 35 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, should lay down locally the new frontier between Belgium and Germany. There was, therefore, no special recommendation to be made. It would be sufficient if the Allied and Associated Powers would nominate their representatives, in order that the Committee might start work as soon as possible.

(It is decided that, at the next meeting of the Supreme Council, each Delegation should nominate its representative on the Committee provided for under Article 36 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, for the purpose of determining, locally, the new boundary line between Germany and Belgium.)

6. M Tardieu stated that Article 48 of the Peace Treaty provided for the nomination of three members by the League of Nations, who could act in a Commission of five members, which should be charged with the duty of delimiting locally the boundary line of the Saar Territory as laid down in the Treaty. He admitted that it was not impossible, theoretically, for the League of Nations to make the necessary nominations within the fifteen days following the signature of the Treaty. The Convention in question was part of the Treaty, and the Powers represented on the Council of the League of Nations were named; the Committee supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty thought, however, that it would be difficult in practice for nations whose members were on the Council of the League of Nations, and who should not have ratified the Treaty, to be able to nominate representatives to the Committee. If such a participation were impossible, the Delimitation Committee might be nominated in the manner foreseen in the Peace Treaty, but the Supervising Committee thought that the necessary nominations might be made temporarily by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Such a procedure would make an agreement with Germany necessary, since nominations made in this manner were not foreseen in the text in the Treaty. The ratification of the Pact of the League of Nations would take place as soon as possible. The Committee therefore recommended that the Supreme Council should come to a decision on the subject. Report of the Committee Supervising the Execution of the Peace Treaty With Germany on the Delimitation of the Saar Basin

Mr Balfour states that the League of Nations had certain defined duties with regard to the Basin of the Saar, but the League could only act after ratification. It followed that the American Government, which did not appear to be able to give the necessary ratification in a short time, would be prevented from taking its place on the Commission for some while. It was therefore proposed that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should make a temporary nomination; it was open to question, however, if they had the right to do so.

M Tardieu stated that they had not such a right without arriving at an agreement with Germany.

Mr Balfour stated that he did not favour any request being made of Germany, but, that in the case in question, he thought no difficulty would arise.

M Tardieu stated that at the present moment there was no use in [approaching the German Government, but that the Council could agree to the principle which should be applied when the time came.

Mr White stated that he could not take any decision with regard to the ratification without referring to President Wilson.

M Pichon stated that the point was important, since the American Government had the duty of convening the Council of the League of Nations.

M. Tardieu stated that the text of the telegram to be sent to President Wilson could be made out.

(It was decided:

That M. Tardieu, at the next meeting of the Supreme Council, should present a draft telegram for transmission to President Wilson, on the subject of the Commission for the delimitation of the Saar Basin.)

7 M Tardieu stated that the Committee had submitted a Note, which had been sent to the various Delegations. Note From the Drafting Committee on the Subject of the Sale of State Property in Slesvig

The Committee proposed a slight modification to the text submitted to the Supreme Council. A formal assent was all that was necessary. (It was decided:

That the Drafting Committee’s proposed modification in the text of the notification to be sent to the German and Danish Governments on the subject of the sale of State property in Slesvig should be adopted.)

8 M Tardieu suggests that a Note dated 8th July had been received from the German Delegation on the subject of the preparatory measures which should immediately follow the ratification of the Peace Treaty, in order that the clauses of the Treaty with regard to the Eastern Provinces of Germany, should be carried out.Evacuation of Territories Ceded by Germany to Poland

The Committee supervising the execution of the Treaty submitted a draft rep

(It is decided that the draft reply to the German Delegation, submitted by the Committee to supervise the execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany, with regard to the opening of negotiations between the Allied and German Governments, on the subject of the preparatory measures to be taken for enforcing the provisions of the Treaty dealing with the cession of the Eastern Provinces of the German Empire, should be accepted.)

9 M Tardieu stated that the German Delegation had sent a Note dated 16th July 1919 asking that the names and powers of the Allied Commissioners for Eastern Prussia, should be communicated to the German Government. The Committee had drafted a reply.

(It is decided that the draft reply to the German Delegation, submitted by the Committee, to supervise the execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany, with regard to furnishing the German Government with the names and powers of the Allied and Associated Commissioners in East Prussia, be accepted.)

10. (At this point M Tardieu left the room and Mr Ignace enters.)

Clauses in the Peace Treaty With Bulgaria With Regard to Prisoners of War Ignace stated that the clauses inserted into the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria and submitted by the Committee were only a repetition of similar clauses in the Austrian Treaty with the exception of Article 9, which provided for an Inter-Allied Committee of Inquiry to examine the question of subjects of the Allied and Associated Powers not yet repatriated. The Inter-Allied Committee would further examine the cases of those persons who desired to remain in Bulgaria, and would investigate criminal actions which might be punished. The Article provided for the manner in which the Committee should be constituted. It lays down also that its inquiries shall be communicated to each Government concerned, and after that, to the Tribunal provided for in Article 3 of the Treaty. He had just learned that the Supreme Council had decided that there should be no Inter-Allied Tribunal, but that each Government should judge actions coming under the above head, by means of a Military Court.

M Clemenceau states that it had been decided to act in the same way as had been done in the case of Germany.

Mr Ignace states that it would be sufficient to make a slight modification in the text of Article 9, and to suppress the second paragraph, numbered 2.

(It is therefore decided:

That the proposed Articles for the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, presented by the Prisoners of War Committee should be accepted with the exception of the second paragraph numbered 2 in Article 9, which should be deleted.)

(At this point Mr Ignace leaves the room.)

11. M. Clemenceau reads the Austrian Note dated 21st July. He draws attention to the statement in the Note:

Austrian Reply on the Subject of the Delivery of Arms and Munitions to the Czechoslovaks “That all arms and munitions demanded hitherto are being handed over to the Royal Italian Armistice Mission at Vienna. The Mission in question has undertaken to transmit the materials to the Czechoslovakia Government, which procedure has been decided upon with the full consent of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Vienna”.

He draws attention to the fact that he has no knowledge of this.

Mr Balfour states that he also has no information and would like to have certain points cleared up. He asks whether the arms and munitions had been handed over to the Head of the Italian Mission only, or to the French and Italian representatives conjointly?

M Clemenceau states that the arms and munitions belong to all the Allies.

Mr Balfour says that he would like to know how long it is since the delivery of arms and munitions had been taking place, what quantity had been handed over, and how much was still to be delivered.

M Clemenceau states that it is also necessary to know who had consented to the procedure.

(It is decided:

To send the following telegram to the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Vienna with regard to the delivery of arms and munitions to the Czechoslovaks:

“The Austrian Delegation has replied to a communication from the Peace Conference, wherein the aforesaid Government was directed to deliver up its war material in the following terms:

All the arms and munitions demanded up to date are at present being handed over to the Royal Italian Armistice Mission at Vienna. This Mission has undertaken to transmit the materials in question to the Czechoslovak Government with the knowledge and consent of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Vienna. The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers therefore request that it may be informed:

1) Who gave the consent referred to in the Austrian reply and in what form?

2) Whether the arms and munitions delivered by the Austrian Government have been handed over to the Royal Italian Mission only, or to the French and Italian representatives conjointly.

3) Since what date has this delivery taken place.

4) What are the total amounts of the different classes of war material, and what proportion of them have been delivered.”)

12. After a short discussion it is decided that the texts of the following draft instructions for the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry into the events in Asia Minor should be accepted. The Inquiry of the Committee should take as its subject matter the acts which had taken place during and after the occupation of Smyrna, Aidin, Aivali and the adjacent regions by the Greek troops. These acts had been reported in the form of a complaint by the Sheikh-ul-Islam. The Inquiry was to be extended to all events relative to the above from the date of occupation to the present moment. The Committee was to determine the responsibilities and to submit its report to the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, together with such conclusions as it might consider relevant as soon as possible.

(At this moment M Seydoux enters the room.)

13. M Seydoux states that the question had to be resumed from where it had been left off at the last discussion. The American reply had not been received.

Mr White states that the American Government thinks that it cannot collaborate with the Allies in the Blockade of Russia since it was not in a state of war with Bolshevik Russia. The President had sent him a reply in the above sense. The President thinks that the practical difficulties of commerce would prevent any suitable assistance being given to Soviet Russia.

M Seydoux says that the President’s reply put the Supreme Council into a difficult position for it had been desired to block the Gulf of Finland. The Scandinavian Governments had made requests to be authorized to renew commercial relations with Petrograd. No reply had been given, since it was thought that Petrograd would soon fall. This, however, had not taken place. Since that date Kolchak had been informed that the Allied and Associated Powers were ready to support him; this had, in fact, been done. He asked whether it was now possible to authorize certain nations to assist Kolchak’s enemy by their commerce. The Swedish Government had demanded quite openly that it might be allowed to re-open commercial relations with the Government of Lenin. By acceding to this, Lenin would be assisted, and by taking the measures necessary, might distribute what he received in whatever manner he chose. The excuse of assisting unfortunate peasant populations could not be brought forward. A new note had been received moreover to the following effect: The French Minister at Copenhagen who has been informed of the questions laid before the Supreme Council by the Blockade Committees in Paris and in London, on the subject of commercial relations with Bolshevik Russia, reports that the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs stated, in an official letter addressed to the English Minister, that the Danish Government would not assist the exportation of any merchandise from Denmark to Soviet Russia, before the deliberations on the subject, now going forward in Paris, had been concluded.

Mr Balfour states that he knows nothing of this communication.

M Seydoux says that information had been received from Stockholm to the effect that the Swedes had not renewed their request and had not dispatched vessels since they knew that they would be stopped. They had not been undeceived. The questions might be raised again at any time however, and it would be difficult to know how to deal with them.

M Clemenceau states that the discussion with President Wilson should be taken up again since new arguments could now be brought forward. Everyone had to undertake a certain amount of responsibility. Should they not, therefore, submit the questions afresh and wait for his reply.

S Tittoni states that it was known from an authoritative source that the Soviet Government was making a large number of Allied bank notes. If commercial relations were renewed it would facilitate the circulation of these false notes.

Mr Balfour states that Mr White’s remarks submitted to President Wilson are very complete. On the other hand one or two important points had been omitted.

Mr White had spoken of Kolchak and of the assistance that should be given to him. In his opinion the question was much more serious for at that moment British forces were fighting at Archangel. In addition to this the populations of the Baltic States were being organised and armed in order that they might fight against Bolshevism. So at the moment we were asked to assist our enemies by allowing them to receive arms, munitions and material of every kind, which although they were not sent to men with whom we were legally at war, were none the less being dispatched to persons who were fighting against us. What would be the position of the League of Nations if it were in existence? Supposing that it had existed and decided, as the Supreme Council had decided, to assist Kolchak, Denikin and the Baltic States to fight against the disorder of Soviet Russia. How would it operate? Undoubtedly it would declare a blockade for no other means would be at its disposal. Englishmen, and soldiers in Kolchak’s and Denikin’s armies were being killed daily in the fighting against the Bolsheviks. If a state of war does not exist legally, it existed none the less in point of fact. The position of the Allied and Associated Powers was, however, difficult. If the question were examined from the political point of view, was it possible to ask peoples already pressed by heavy taxes to make new sacrifices in order that arms should be sent to our friends; whilst at the same time, arms were being allowed to pass into the hands of those against whom we were fighting.

Mr. White stated that he would have to consult an expert in international law. He desired, however, to draw attention to President Wilson’s reply. What the President had said was not an article of a Treaty binding upon all, and the other Powers were free to set up a blockade without American help.

M Clemenceau states that before arriving at any solution, he thinks President Wilson should again be approached and he proposed that Mr Balfour should draw up a telegram in the sense of his remarks.

Mr Balfour stated that in reply to Mr. White, he recognizes that President Wilson in his reply did not bind us, but he asks what position should we be in if an American vessel were to carry munitions.

M Clemenceau stated that, if it became necessary to act without American assistance, President Wilson would have to be asked to give an undertaking to send no ships.

M Seydoux states that, in his opinion, this is a point which should be insisted upon. Assistance to the Bolshevik Government could not be justified by the argument that relief was being given to an unfortunate populace. The Government of Lenin was such that his agents centralized all foodstuffs and distributed them as they wished. Little or no food would be sent to the populace. The only result would be that Lenin’s Government would be strengthened.

(It is decided that Mr. Balfour should prepare, for the next meeting of the Supreme Council, a new dispatch to be sent to President Wilson on the subject of the Blockade of Russia.)

(At this point M Seydoux leaves the room.)

14. M Clemenceau states that a declaration which was to be signed by the Austrian Plenipotentiaries had been submitted to the Conference. (Agreement by the Austrian Government With Regard to Vessels Sunk by Their Naval Forces

(After a short discussion, the draft declaration is accepted.)

15. S Tittoni states that, as the Agenda had been worked off, he wishes to draw attention to the grave situation in Italy with regard to coal. The stocks of that material would be practically exhausted in a fortnight. During the war an Inter-Allied body had decided on the manner in which coal should be distributed among the Allies. This body no longer existed. He asked whether it would be possible to re-constitute it and asked, further, that this should be done, because the situation in Italy was of the utmost gravity.

Mr Balfour states that it is one of the most urgent questions of the immediate future.

Mr White says that Mr Hoover is in agreement with Mr Balfour.

M Clemenceau says that he proposed that S Tittoni in collaboration with Mr Hoover should make a proposal in writing.

Mr Balfour states that Mr Hoover has reported on the coal situation in Europe in an extremely pessimistic sense. He thinks that the cause of the evil was that workmen were no longer working. This was more particularly the case in Central Europe and Upper Silesia. The reduction of the number of hours had made the situation even worse. It had been improved by the fact that the German authorities had threatened to cut off the provisions from mining districts where production diminished. This measure had increased the quantity of mineral taken from the mines, but the progress had been short. It was, therefore, not a question of war but a social crisis.

(It is decided that S Tittoni should submit to the next meeting of the Supreme Council his proposals with regard to the re-constitution of the Inter-Allied Committee for the distribution of coal.)

16. M Clemenceau states that the Drafting Committee had brought the following note before them:

The Drafting Committee would be obliged if the Supreme Council would give information as to whether Treaties with the Serbian, (Croat-Slovene) State, and with Czechoslovakia and Romania, all of which are to be signed at the same time as the Treaty with Austria should, like this latter, be drawn up in English, French, and Italian. The French text being authoritative in case of divergence.

(After a short discussion, it was decided that the proposal of the Drafting Committee to the effect that the Peace Treaties with the Serbian (Croat-Slovene) State, with Czechoslovakia, with Romania and with Bulgaria, should be drawn up in three languages, the French text being authoritative in cases of divergence.)

17. M Clemenceau says that the French Delegation had submitted a note with regard to the credentials of the German Diplomatic Agents. It had drafted a letter to the President of the German Delegation. (This draft is accepted.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

07-27-19, 06:56 AM

27th July 1919

Ataman Hryhoriiv is shot dead during a parley with Makhno. (Ukraine).

A member of the state militia faces off against an African-American veteran during the 1919 Chicago Race Riot. July 27, 1919.
https://i.imgur.com/3fD9hN9.jpg

Belgian cyclist Firmin Lambot wins the 1919 Tour de France, which had been put on hold since 1914 due to the war.
https://i.imgur.com/R9hMqEx.jpg

Ship Losses:

Admiral Knight (United States) The cargo ship was destroyed by fire off the mouth of the Fraser River. Her crew were rescued.
USS May (United States Navy) The naval yacht ran aground off Cape Engaño, Dominican Republic. She was abandoned as a total loss on 28 February 1920.
Synovya (Russian Navy White Movement) The steamer was beached and burned to prevent capture in the Volga Estuary.
Yekaterina (Russian Navy White Movement) The steamer was beached and burned to prevent capture in the Volga Estuary.

Sailor Steve

07-27-19, 07:09 PM

Saturday, July 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

(At this point Marshal Foch, General Weygand, and the Military Representatives from Versailles enter the room.)

1. M Clemenceau states that, before passing to the subjects on the Agenda, he would ask Marshal Foch to explain the dispute that has now arisen between the Poles and the Lithuanians with regard to the line of demarcation that had been laid down by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Marshal Foch shows the demarcation line upon a map which he presents to the Council, and draws attention to the point at which the line in question has been violated. He points out that the question of the German evacuation of the territories under discussion was involved, and that, according to latest reports, General von der Goltz had begun a general withdrawal.

M Clemenceau states that, as certain aspects of the problem are new to the Council, he would propose that the question should be adjourned until the afternoon’s meeting, and that M Cambon should attend.

(It is therefore decided that the question should be re-discussed at the afternoon’s meeting and that M Cambon should be present.)

2. M Clemenceau reads two telegrams, dated July 7th and 24th respectively, relative to a rupture of communications through Warsaw between Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries, and asks Marshal Foch whether he is familiar with the details of this matter.

Marshal Foch replies that the question has not been brought to his attention.

(It is therefore decided to adjourn the discussion of this question until the afternoon’s meeting, at which time Marshal Foch would have investigated the matter.)

(At this point Mr Hoover and Mr Coolidge enter the room.)

3. Marshal Foch refers the Council to his military report of July 17th. He reminds them, however, that the political side of the question still asserts itself, and that this could not be dealt with by him.

M Clemenceau draws attention to the fact that the question of General Boehm’s action had now arisen.

Marshal Foch replies that General Boehm’s proposals are of a purely political nature, and that the military situation had altered to a certain extent by reason of the Hungarian attack upon the Romanian forces. These latter had been prepared, however, and were in a position to resist. The situation, therefore, was in the same posture as it had been when he reported on July 17th.

Mr Balfour asks whether Marshal Foch knows anything about General Boehm.

S Tittoni remarks that General Boehm is the Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Bolshevik forces.

Marshal Foch says that, according to his latest information, General Boehm had held a Lieutenant’s rank.

M Pichon remarks that he is actually the Hungarian Minister at Vienna.

Mr Balfour states that, while the problem is both military and political, one side of it is half way between the two. Boehm stated that he had sufficient influence with the Hungarian Armies to crush Bela Kun and set up a Constituent Assembly without the Allies being called upon to strike a blow. This presents the question partly political and partly military. He would therefore like to know whether, in Marshal Foch’s opinion, Boehm had the degree of military influence that he claims and what are the probabilities of his being successful.

Marshal Foch replies that he knows nothing about Boehm, nor of his military qualities. At the same time, the small countries surrounding Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Romania, would not keep a passive attitude for very long in the face of Hungarian aggression and would shortly take an initiative of some kind, since it was obvious that they could not keep their armies mobilized indefinitely.

S Tittoni says he thinks that the information received from Hungary during the past month gives a tolerable picture of the state of affairs in that country. It is clear that Bela Kun represented no more than a minority and that he had raised against himself internal and external enemies. It is even stated that 80 per cent of the Bolshevik Armies in Hungary are hostile to him; if this were so, the offer of Boehm was only a manifestation of this discontent. Whatever was going to happen, it is evident that the Great Powers must lend some kind of assistance, either military or moral, since the reconstruction of Hungary from within was going to be a lengthy process. Two courses were now open. The first was to send out the Committee, as had been contemplated, and to support it with the promise of ultimate military force. The second course was to adopt immediately, and to put into effect, the military action proposed by Marshal Foch. All reports agree in thinking that Austria would soon be affected by Bolshevism.

M Pichon says that he agrees with S Tittoni, but thinks that the functions of the Committee must be kept distinct from the negotiations arising out of Boehm’s proposals.

S Tittoni remarks that, when the Committee has been decided upon, it has been agreed, at the same time, that it should not enter into relations with Bela Kun.

M Pichon states that the telegrams from the Allied Ministers prove that Boehm’s proposals were being taken seriously. It was therefore for consideration whether the Committee should not, after all, be authorized to deal with him.

S Tittoni states that, if Boehm is actually in a position to overthrow Bela Kun, it is none the less certain that he requires something from the Allied and Associated Governments. What is it, therefore, that he really wants?

M Clemenceau said that Boehm asks for nothing except moral support.

Mr White states that, by sending out the Committee, it might appear that the Allied and Associated Governments wished to enter into negotiations either with Boehm or with Bela Kun; it was not desirable to give this impression. Mr Hoover has a proposal to make which avoids this difficulty.

M Mantoux then reads aloud Mr Hoover’s proposal.

Mr Balfour then reads a draft proposal of his own, stating that it has the fault of coming to no definite conclusion.

M Clemenceau says that, as S Tittoni had observed, the Council is not entirely clear as to the requests and proposals which Boehm had made to the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr Balfour remarks that both the military plans and the proposals of Boehm had as their object the expulsion of Bela Kun.

S Tittoni then says that the following distinct questions should be put to the Allied representatives at Vienna:

1) Is Boehm in good faith, or was he merely acting as an agent of Bela Kun?

2) Is Boehm able to carry out his promises, or does he want assistance?

3) What does he require?

Mr Hoover says he thinks Boehm had definitely asked that the blockade should be raised, foodstuffs sent into the country and navigation on the Danube reopened, if he, on his part, established himself as a temporary dictator.

Mr White confirms Mr Hoover’s point of view by reading a portion of the relative document.

M Pichon says that Boehm had made no demand, but had submitted proposals.

Mr White states that the Allied Representatives at Vienna evidently think that Boehm is to be taken seriously.

Mr Balfour summarizes S Tittoni’s questions, and states that he thinks they had been answered by the fact that our representatives at Vienna believed that Boehm was to be trusted, and was doing no more than asking for certain specific things.

S Tittoni says that he is not of the opinion that explicit answers had been given, and that more detailed replies should be obtained.

Mr Balfour then asks Mr Hoover if he is not justified in saying that the questions had really been answered.

Mr Hoover replies that, in his opinion, it is dangerous for the Allied and Associated Governments to open negotiations with secret agents. Would it not be possible to make a public declaration of policy and to allow Boehm to make his own deductions from it? Such a declaration might take the form of a statement to the effect that economic assistance would be given to a properly constituted government, and that such a statement would not bind the Conference to subsequent military action.

Mr Balfour points out that the fact that Bela Kun had not carried out the Armistice and had made war against our Allies stood out. He remarks that he would conclude his proposals by saying that, if any responsible government should be set up in Hungary, economic aid would be furnished it by the Allied and Associated Powers. He asks, however, whether the conclusion of the Council was that whether military action should be taken or the situation allowed to remain in its present state. He ask, in conclusion, how the declaration could be made public.

M Clemenceau replies that it could be published in the press.

Mr White read from a telegram to the effect that Colonel Cunninghame had, on that day, interviewed Boehm, who would be ready to act in a month’s time and undertook to overthrow Bela Kun in 48 hours, but that Boehm could not act until he knew whether the Allies would approve of his plans.

M Clemenceau remarks that the capture of Budapest seemed to be an easy matter, but that the questions which would follow it were most difficult. For instance, if the Romanians entered Budapest, a very strong feeling would be excited among the Hungarians. He then asks Marshal Foch for his opinion on the actual situation of the Hungarian Army.

Marshal Foch replied that Hungary has actually not disarmed. The Army is still in the field and it mattered little whether its leader was Bela Kun or Boehm. Even though a political formula were adopted, as the basis of subsequent action, any person who received support from the Allies might subsequently adopt a new attitude with every prospect of success.

M Clemenceau then asks how Hungary could be disarmed.

Marshal Foch replies that it could be done by laying down terms so severe that disarmament would be certain. The fact remains that, instead of the 6 divisions which had been allowed to the Hungarian Army, 12 are actually in the field.

Mr Balfour then asks whether Marshal Foch believes that an effective disarmament of the Hungarian Army could take place without an occupation of a portion of their territory.

Marshal Foch answers that an ultimatum, backed by military force, could effect what was desired. The threat to attack must remain. He has already stated that the Allied Armies acting in Hungary must be commanded by a single General, who would possibly be a foreigner. Could not the civil government be instituted in the same way by the assistance of a Czechoslovak or Romanian or other nominee? Some decision was none the less necessary.

Mr Balfour points out that there is no inconsistency between the points of view of Mr Hoover and Marshal Foch. In a public notification it could be stated why the Allies could not deal with Bela Kun, and what kind of person they would consent to deal with.

(It is therefore decided that Mr Balfour and Mr Hoover should confer in the preparation of a public notification to be sent to Hungary, and that it should be presented to the Council at the afternoon meeting.)

4) M Clemenceau asks Marshal Foch to explain his report to the Conference.

Marshal Foch then reads the conclusions of his report, in which he had stated that the total strength of the Army of Occupation should be 6,500 Officers, 151,000 men and 35,000 horses. He states that these figures had been reached in consultation with the Allied Military Representatives at Versailles. He had since received a letter from General Pershing in which the latter stated that the strength of the American Forces of Occupation would be approximately 6,800 men comprised of one regiment of infantry, one group of cavalry and certain auxiliary troops. He asked whether the proposals in his report were acceptable to the Council.

Mr Balfour then asks whether the proportion and numbers of troops to be supplied by each of the Allies in the Army of Occupation had been definitely fixed; because he himself was not aware of this having been done.

General Weygand states that the only question which had been discussed at Versailles was the total effective strength and not the proportion of the strength to be furnished by each Country.

General Thwaites remarks that the proportion to be furnished by Great Britain had not yet been considered by the War Office.

(After some discussion it is agreed that the proposals of Marshal Foch’s report on the subject of the total eventual effective strength of the Armies of Occupation upon the Rhine should be accepted. It is further decided that the question of the proportions in which this total strength was to be furnished by each of the Allies should not be discussed until the War Offices of the Countries concerned had been able to examine the question.)

5) Marshal Foch submits his reply to the question laid before him by the Council, with regard to the Allied Forces necessary in the plebiscite zone in Upper Silesia. In commenting upon his reply, he draws attention to the fact that the Division required must be an Allied Division, and that each Ally must furnish an equal quota. He further draws attention to the fact that there is a clause in the Peace Treaty providing for the armed Forces under consideration.

Mr Balfour says that the question of employing British troops was most difficult and that the War Cabinet must be consulted.

M Clemenceau remarks that the question had been decided by the Council of the Heads of Delegations in the sense that an Inter-Allied Division would be necessary. He reads the previous decision on the subject.

Mr Balfour asks whether it has been decided that the Armies of Occupation on the Rhine should supply the troops.

Marshal Foch said that such a decision had been arrived at but insisted that the force must be made up by equal numbers of Allied troops.

Mr White remarks that in his opinion the former resolution of the Council had been inconsistent in that it contemplated the use of the troops taken from the Army of Occupation alone, whereas the clause of the Treaty, referred to by Marshal Foch, states that troops of all the Allies should be used. Italy, one of the Allied Powers, has no troops in the Army of Occupation.

The question of the length of time during which the Army of Occupation of the plebiscite zone would be necessary, was then raised and it was stated that whilst it might be six to eight months, the longest period contemplated was eighteen months.

Mr White, further commenting upon the resolution of the Council, asks Marshal Foch whether the Division could be raised from the Armies of Occupation when they had been reduced to their ultimate strength of 150,000 men.

Marshal Foch says that the Division could be raised under those circumstances from the Army of Occupation, but that at the same time it was necessary to get it ready at once.

(Mr Balfour again draws attention to the fact that it is necessary for him to refer the matter to Sir Henry Wilson and after a short discussion it was agreed that the question should be adjourned until Mr Balfour should have consulted with the British War Office.)

6) Mr Balfour reads aloud a draft of the telegram that he had prepared for President Wilson.

(It is agreed that M Clemenceau should communicate the despatch to the President of the United States.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

07-28-19, 02:17 AM

Saturday, July 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

(Marshal Foch, the Military Advisers, Mr Hoover and the experts on Polish Affairs enter the room.)

1. M Cambon says that the line proposed by Marshal Foch include in the Polish area the districts of Suvalki and Seiny. The population of this area was Polish. It is therefore preferable so to fix the line as to attribute those territories to Poland.

M Clemenceau asks whether these areas are still occupied by the Germans.

M Cambon says the Germans are evacuating the territories slowly.

Mr Balfour says he would like to know how the various lines which have been drawn had come about. He understands that the territory is Polish but that it had been deliberately excluded from Polish occupation by the Council of Five. If it is true that the Council has laid down a policy to which the Poles had refused to submit, it would not be very satisfactory to reverse the Council’s policy in favour of the Poles merely because they had been insubordinate.

General Le Rond explains that when it had been a question of establishing a line of demarcation between Poles and Germans a line had been drawn north and east of the districts of Suvalki and Seiny, giving these to the Poles. This line had been notified but had never been acted on. It had been drawn in accordance with a recommendation of the Committee dealing with the eastern frontiers of Poland. The recommendations of the Committee had come up before the Council but had not been accepted. All the experts had agreed that the territory in question was Polish.

M Clemenceau says that he has been told that the territory was mostly Lithuanian. He would like to know what the opinion of the experts really is.

(The American, British, French and Italian experts agree that the population in these districts is mainly Polish.)

General Le Rond continuing, says that at a later date, according to the demands of the Lithuanian Military Mission, the question was brought before the Council and a line passing just north of Augustovo had been fixed as the line of demarcation between the Polish and Lithuanian forces. This is the green line on the annexed map. The Poles have complained that there are distinctively Polish areas north of this line and on the 20th June they had proposed that the line of demarcation should be that shown in blue on the map. This line, not only enclosed Polish areas, but also a wide defensive zone in addition. The line since proposed by Marshal Foch, enclosed what were really Polish areas and only a shallow defensive zone in addition. This is the red line on the map.

M Clemenceau asks whether the change from the green to the red line had been accompanied by or was the result of an offensive action taken by the Poles.

General Weygand said that this is not so. General Henrys has been told to allow the Poles to occupy Polish territory evacuated by the Germans.

Mr Balfour says that he had been given the impression that the Poles had defied the orders of the Conference, but he is prepared to accept the explanation given and to agree to the line proposed by Marshal Foch, in view of the unanimous opinion that the territory which would be assigned to the Poles was Polish in character.

(Marshal Foch is then instructed to communicate through General Henrys the line of demarcation between Polish and Lithuanian forces in the region of Suvalki, Grodno, and Vilna, in accordance with the red line on the annexed map.)

2. Mr Balfour says that he has had a talk with Mr Hoover and as a result of his conversation, has prepared a draft Hungarian which he then reads:

“The Allied and Associated Governments are most anxious to arrange a peace with the Hungarian people, and thus bring to an end a condition of things which makes the economic revival of Central Europe impossible, and defeats any attempt to secure supplies for its population. These tasks cannot even be attempted until there is in Hungary a Government which represents its people, and carries out in the letter and the spirit the engagements into which it has entered with the Associated Governments. None of these conditions are fulfilled by the Administration of Bela Kun: which has not only broken the Armistice to which Hungary was pledged, but is at this moment actually attacking a friendly and Allied Power. With this particular aspect of the question it is for the Associated Governments to deal on their own responsibility. But if Peace is to be settled, if economic reconstruction is to be attempted, if the blockade is to be removed, if supplies are to be made available, the co-operation of the Hungarian people is required. It is only with a Government which really represents them that such a settlement can be arranged.

The Associated Powers think it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of Hungarian territory, as defined by the Peace Conference, will cease as soon as the terms of the Armistice have, in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, been satisfactorily complied with.”

Mr Balfour, continuing, says that the last paragraph means that the Romanians would have to evacuate territory occupied in what was to be Hungary according to the Treaty, as soon as the Armistice had been carried out on the Hungarian side. The draft deals with one half of the Allied policy. It would explain to the world and to the Hungarians the intentions of the Powers. What instructions should be given to Marshal Foch to carry out this policy remained to be decided. He is strongly of opinion that the Council could not allow the Armistice to be violated with impunity. Having ordered the Hungarians to reduce their troops to six divisions and by implication to remain at peace with the Allies of the Powers, the latter cannot sit and watch the Hungarians double their forces and attack their Allies. If Marshal Foch could put an end to this with the forces available, it appears clear that he ought to do so.

M Clemenceau says that when Mr Balfour says that the Powers cannot tolerate violation of the Armistice, he presumably means all the Powers. It is noticeable, however, that there are no Italian, no British and no American troops available, but only the remnants of the two French divisions, together with Czechoslovaks, Romanians and Yugoslavs. According to Marshal Foch, the initial effort required will not be great, and the troops at hand might suffice, but the sequel must be considered.

S Tittoni said that regarding Italian co-operation, he sees no difficulty in the region of foreign policy, but in respect to internal politics, the outlook is not so clear. Any campaign against Hungary would produce a general strike in Italy. The cost of living had reached heights unequaled in any other country. As to coal, there is only a fortnight’s margin. He must therefore state, with great regret, that the economic situation in Italy and its political consequences will not allow Italy to contribute any force for action against Hungary, although action in this direction would suit his foreign policy admirably.

Mr Balfour says that two questions are raised by M Clemenceau’s remarks. One is a general question, and the other a military one. As to the latter, he needs to say little, as Marshal Foch considered he has enough troops on the spot to undertake action. As to the general question, he would like to ask whether in M Clemenceau’s opinion, it is necessary, whenever Inter-Allied military action is required, that the troops be furnished by an equal contribution of all the Powers interested.

M Clemenceau says that he did not mean his remarks to be stretched to that extent. He would like to say, however, that his situation, though not as serious as S Tittoni’s, had some analogies with it. There are two French divisions in Bulgaria who were expected to assist the Greeks, and there were two in Hungary, which were expected to act without any Allied assistance whatever.

Mr Balfour says the only question remaining then is whether Marshal Foch is right in saying that he had enough troops to proceed with.

Marshal Foch says that he had reported on July 17th. Nothing has happened in the intervening week to make him alter his views, provided a definite policy is adopted and an agreement is reached between small States who would be called upon to furnish the main contingent.

Mr Balfour asks M Clemenceau what alternative he has to the policy suggested.

M Clemenceau says that his alternative would be to allow Hungary to settle her own fate without military intervention. The war is over, the American Army has been withdrawn very rapidly, the British Army nearly as rapidly, and the French Army is being demobilized. He is forced to demobilize very quickly; it could not be helped. He cannot, therefore, contemplate the sending of two French divisions into Hungary unsupported by their Allies. There would shortly be only two classes under the colors in the French Army. Marshal Foch quite reasonably asks for a definition of the exact intentions of the Conference. This is a political question, and to tell the truth, it is hard to give him an answer. In any case, he is not ready to begin fighting again. He feels inclined to adopt the proposals made by Mr Balfour and Mr Hoover. He will encompass Hungary with a ring of hostile States, and rely on her to rid herself of the tyranny of a minority in her own way. Hence, it will be well, as Marshal Foch suggests, to consult the small Powers, who are, in any event, principally concerned. Their position is not clear. The Serbians will only act on certain conditions, the Romanians also make reservations, and so do the Czechs. What is the net result?

Marshal Foch says that it is for this reason that he recommends that the small Powers should be consulted, in order that the Conference might determine whether their terms could be accepted.

Mr Balfour says that he quite understands M Clemenceau’s position. It means, however, that the Allied and Associated Powers confess their impotence to enforce their will on a small nation. If what had been said in the Council were known outside, namely, that all the Powers had demobilized so fast under the stress of domestic necessity, it would certainly be regarded as absurd that the Powers, which, eight months ago, were the conquerors of the world, could not, at the present moment, impose their will on an army of 120,000 men. This inglorious situation he does not particularly mind, but he wondered how the Conference would be able to terminate its work successfully. An unpleasant Treaty would have to be imposed on the Bulgarians, and a still more unpleasant one on the Turks. Further, the new small States lately created, must be controlled, and prevented from attacking one another. If the Conference cannot enforce its will on Hungary, can it do all these things? If the picture drawn by M Clemenceau is accurate, the Conference will have to leave its work unfinished.

M Clemenceau says that he does not take such a gloomy view. All that he wishes to do is to adapt the means at the command of the Conference to the ends it had in view. He believes Mr Hoover holds the key of the situation. The offer of food in return for good behavior would be a very effective weapon. The case was similar to that of Russia, but in the case of Russia, there is no means of coercion; against the Hungarians there were. They can be surrounded, and in time, will have to come to terms. This might be inglorious, but there was little glory in fighting without men, or in making threats that cannot be carried out.

Mr Balfour says that there is not a very great difference between his policy and M Clemenceau’s. Marshal Foch might be requested to demand that the Hungarians at least observe the Armistice.

M Clemenceau says that a reiteration of this demand would not be of much avail, as it has already been made and neglected. He would prefer to accept the proposal Mr Balfour had read, to avoid issuing any ultimatum, to refrain from engaging Marshal Foch or any troops and to give General Boehm the month for which he had asked. At the end of this time, the situation would not be much worse than the present, one-third of the French troops would have been demobilized, but there would still be means of action, if absolutely necessary.

Marshal Foch says that as long as there is no understanding between the great and the small Powers the situation would not be clear. It would not improve after the lapse of a month or even two or three months. It is even possible that the smaller Powers would get out of hand and destroy the edifice so laboriously set up by the Conference.

Mr Balfour says that if assured that the situation would not grow worse he would raise no objection. He presumes that if the Military Authorities say that they can settle the matter at once, failing which the situation would grow worse, M Clemenceau would agree to act. If Bela Kun is going to fall there need be no anxiety, but on the other hand if he is going to have a military success the result might be grievous.

M Clemenceau says that he is not prepared to prophesy what would happen. The world had just gone through a fearful war and had only secured fragments of peace. The people were looking out for means of starting their economic life again. He wishes to do nothing to jeopardize this reasonable ambition. He cannot ask his people to go to war again. They would not do it with the same readiness as they did in 1914. The situation appears to him to require prudence. No doubt prudence involves some elements of risk but there is a greater risk in giving an ultimatum which, if rejected, would lead to war. Marshal Foch does not offer a clear solution. He makes his action conditional on the definition of a certain policy and on the agreement of the lesser powers concerned. Any check would have very serious results in Italy, as S Tittoni said, in France and also probably in Great Britain. He does not wish to run this risk. The plan General Boehm offers for the moment is a better outlook than existed a week ago. If the Hungarians are really in the majority opposed to Bela Kun they might under the stress of M Hoover’s blandishments over-throw the Bela Kun Government. There might then occur a favorable opportunity of which Marshal Foch could avail himself.

Mr Balfour says that he sympathizes with M Clemenceau as he also has no wish to plunge the world into war again. He would add that without a French Commander-in-Chief and without the cooperation of the two French divisions he thought there was little prospect of success. As M Clemenceau said that neither of these conditions could be fulfilled the case was judged; but he would like to say in justification of the advice he had given that he is not animated by any spirit of adventure. He wishes to get his own and other countries out of an adventure. He wishes to avoid further misfortunes in the future. He wishes the Conference to have the authority which power alone could give. He agreed that the economic weapon was still available. Nevertheless rapid demobilization had put the Conference into a difficulty which is almost comic. Right months ago the Allies had fifteen million men in the field; now it was difficult to lay hands on a single battalion. His fear has been that if Bela Kun is allowed to know that the Conference was militarily powerless he might use this knowledge to great effect and the evil might spread all over the world. If the French Government who had two divisions available declined to use them, it was not for him to press for the campaign. Possibly the prestige of past victories and economic power might enable the Allies to over-come this difficulty. He would therefore content himself with half of the policy he had proposed.

Mr White says that he agrees with M Clemenceau. According to his information Bela Kun is backed by a strong Nationalist movement. Military interference would only reinforce this sentiment which it was not desirable to inflame. The less national support Bela Kun had, the better. The action exercised by Mr Hoover would therefore have, he thinks, greater chances of success than military intervention.

After some further discussion it is decided to issue in the Press and by wireless the following declaration:

“The Allied and Associated Governments are most anxious to arrange a Peace with the Hungarian People and thus bring to an end a condition of things which makes the economic revival of Central Europe impossible and defeats any attempt to secure supplies for its population. These tasks cannot even be attempted until there is in Hungary a Government which represents its people, and carries out in the letter and the spirit the engagements into which it has entered with the Associated Governments. None of these conditions are fulfilled by the administration of Bela Kun: which has not only broken the armistice to which Hungary was pledged, but is at this moment actually attacking a friendly and Allied Power. With this particular aspect of the question it is for the Associated Governments to deal on their own responsibility. If food and supplies are to be made available, if the blockade is to be removed, if economic reconstruction is to be attempted, if peace is to be settled it can only be done with a Government which represents the Hungarian people and not with one that rests its authority upon terrorism.

The Associated Powers think it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of Hungarian territory, as penned by the Peace Conference, will cease as soon as the terms of the armistice have in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, been satisfactorily complied with.”

M Clemenceau says that in the meantime conversations might be undertaken with the smaller powers.

Mr Balfour thinks that if it is intended to do nothing this is hardly desirable.

M Clemenceau says that he has not meant to convey that he would never act: on some favorable occasion he might. Meanwhile if possible he would like to see the success of General Boehm.

Mr Balfour says that if the smaller Powers are called in consultation, the state of demobilization would have to be revealed to them.

M Clemenceau says they could be dealt with individually and asked to state under what conditions they would act should action be decided on. The Serbians, for instance, had certain desiderata.

S Tittoni says that they desire that the Conference should intercede between them and the Italians.

M Clemenceau says the Conference would do so.

Mr Balfour asks what news Marshal Foch had received of the Romanian Forces.

Marshal Foch says that the news was not bad and that the Romanians were not alarmed by the Hungarian attack.

Mr Balfour says that it would make a great difference if the Hungarian attack fails. Should Bela Kun fall of his own weight it would certainly be better than if he were overthrown by the Allies.

(It is then decided that Marshal Foch should continue negotiations with the Serbo-Croat-Slovene, Romanian and Czechoslovak Delegations in order to obtain from them their exact views regarding the guarantees they required for military intervention in Hungary.)

3. M Clemenceau reads the telegram from General Henrys asking, in agreement with the Entente Military representatives, that energetic action should be taken to force the Germans to cease hostilities in Silesia and in Posnania. The village of Wirruszom had been daily bombarded and partially destroyed. Women and children have been killed and the population is abandoning the village and the cultivation of the fields.

Marshal Foch says that on the 24th instructions had been sent to General Nudant asking him to order the Germans to put a stop to this at once.

Mr Balfour suggests that it would be desirable to send a Mission immediately.

Mr Hoover says the situation in Silesia is producing a very serious diminution of the output of coal. Most of central Europe depends on Silesia for coal. For instance, the parlous condition of Vienna resulted from this situation. The best hope resided in an early appointment of a Commission which might restore order. In view of the plebiscite, both Poles and Germans are conducting active propaganda which is having a demoralizing effect on production.

S Tittoni says he has already nominated the Italian member on the Commission.

M Clemenceau asks Marshal Foch, in consultation with the French War Office, to arrange for a designation of the French member.

(It is decided that each power should nominate one member for a Commission to undertake the administration of the plebiscite area of Silesia during the period of plebiscite.)

(It is further decided that the Commission for the delimitation of the Eastern frontiers of Germany be appointed as speedily as possible. It should be composed of four officers for each power (one Commissioner, Head of the Commission, one Assistant Commissioner, two Technical officers.) The nominations are to be made on the following Monday.

Mr White says that he cannot make a nomination without reference to Washington; in fact, no American nomination will be possible before ratification of the Treaty by the Senate.

M Clemenceau said that the other members can be nominated in the meantime.

(Marshal Foch and the Military Experts withdraw, and M Clementel and the Financial & Economic Experts enter the room.)

4. (After a statement by M Clementel, it is decided that the examination of the question should be resumed on the following Monday.)

Baron Makino gives notice of an amendment to Article 29, which he will propose at the next meeting.

5. Colonel Peel says that there is unanimous agreement about these clauses. The gist of the proposals is that Bulgaria will undertake to pay two milliards and a francs in gold. This sum might be reduced by the Reparation Commission should it consider it excessive. An international body, distinct from the Reparation Commission, on which France, Great Britain and Italy will be represented, would be established in Sofia to work out the details. It will have considerable powers, both of raising and controlling taxation in order that the Reparation clauses should be duly executed.

(The Reparation clauses submitted are then accepted.)

6. Mr Sergent said that there was complete agreement regarding the Financial Clauses.

Mr White says that the American Expert has a word to say.

Mr Dulles says that he thinks the text of the Reparation and Financial Clauses should be communicated to the Serbians, Romanians and Greeks, as they are concerned.

Mr Balfour asks what had been done regarding similar clauses in the Treaty with Austria.

Mr Dulles says that there has been a plenary meeting at which the smaller Powers had complained of the short time they had for considering the proposals.

Mr Balfour asks whether they are likely to wish to discuss the proposals or merely to hear them.

Colonel Peel says that he feels sure that they would be anxious to discuss them and that the discussion would be interminable. He agrees however that the clauses should be communicated to them.

(It is agreed that the Serbian, Romanian and Greek Delegations should be informed by the President of the Committees, which have drafted the financial and reparation clauses for the Treaty with Bulgaria, of the provisions of these clauses. Should no modification of the present draft result, the text should be communicated forthwith to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Treaty.)

(The Experts then withdraw.)

7. It is agreed that the nominations of this Commission should be sent to the Secretary-General as speedily as possible. A Commission for the Delimitation of Frontier Between Belgium and Germany

(Members of the Commission on Baltic Affairs enter the room.)

8. The following document is read:

“Considering the importance of maintaining ordered and stable Governments in the Baltic territories as a barrier against Bolshevism on the one hand and against German aggression on the other, and the necessity of close co-operation between these Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments which can only be secured if the Baltic peoples have complete confidence in the intentions of the Allies to protect their liberties in case of the re-establishment of a strong centralized Government in Russia, the Baltic Commission are of opinion that the time has come when the Allied and Associated Powers should clearly define their policy towards these Governments and recommend that a joint declaration be made to them in the following sense:

In response to the representation addressed to the Peace Conference by the Estonian, Lettish and Lithuanian Delegations, the Allied and Associated Powers desire to draw the attention of the Governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the fifth condition of their Note to Admiral Kolchak, which runs as follows:

‘If a solution of the relations between Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognize these territories as autonomous, and to confirm the relations which may exist between their de facto Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.’

The Allied and Associated Governments are anxious and willing to do all in their power to assist the Baltic Governments to organize their local defenses and to re-establish in the interests of general peace an orderly and stable government in these countries.

They further declare their intention to protect their liberties in the event of the re-establishment of a strong centralized Government in Russia.

At the same time it seems to them impossible to reach any definite solution which will guarantee a durable peace without a previous arrangement with a recognised Russian Government, and while reserving to themselves the right of collaboration either directly or through the League of Nations to obtain a settlement satisfactory to both parties, they cannot at the present moment take any steps which would bind them as regards a definite settlement pending the restoration of a recognised Russian Government.

The Allied and Associated Powers would add that they feel confident that if they assist the Governments of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, they may rely on these Governments to accept such provisions as the Allied and Associated Powers may consider necessary for the protection of racial and religious minorities in these territories.”

Mr Balfour says that the objections to these proposals are clear to him. Their advantages are not manifest.

M della Torretta said that no precise instructions had been given to the Commission on Baltic Affairs. It had therefore studied questions connected with the New States set up on the north west frontier of Russia. There are in these countries de facto Governments which had been encouraged by the Allied and Associated Powers to resist, both the Germans and the Bolsheviks, who were either intriguing against them or fighting them. The Commission had thought that these Governments required some moral support from the Entente. A dispatch had been sent to Admiral Kolchak from the Conference in which reference had been made to these New States. A satisfactory answer had come from Admiral Kolchak, The Commission thinks that it is opportune to do something to encourage these New States. They cannot be offered independence, but they might be offered some guarantee for the preservation of their liberties without interfering with Russian sovereignty. In some way or other these de facto Governments must be recognised.

Mr Balfour says that he had some doubt concerning the Policy proposed. He did not see whom it would please but it would certainly displease the Russians who desired Russia to be restored to its old frontiers. It is unlikely even to please the new states. In one paragraph the telegram to Kolchak was quoted. This telegram was known to the Lithuanians, Letts and Estonians. Nothing was therefore gained by restating it. The first paragraph added to this extract from the telegram no doubt expressed a truth; but unfortunately the Allied and Associated Powers cannot do all they desired to do. There was not much money to give. As to arms and munitions they are being given. If this declaration were made, the Lithuanians, Letts and Estonians might be led to suppose that they were about to receive more; but this was impossible. The declaration therefore would either merely restate what was being done or raise false hopes. The next paragraph is either not new or represents a somewhat formidable undertaking on the part of the Entente Powers to enter into antagonism with a strong centralized Government in Russia. Such a declaration will not help the Baltic States and might greatly embarrass the Allied Powers. The first sentence of the next paragraph appears to him to go too far. He hopes that Russia will reconstitute itself, but for the time being he sees no elements tending in that direction. Is it desirable to tell the Baltic States that they must wait for the settlement of their fate until a very remote contingency had taken place? Such a statement could only discourage them. As to the last paragraph, desirable as the proposals suggested might be, it was not an opportune moment to ask for the acceptance of these provisions at a time when the Allied Powers could only offer a very slight assistance to the Baltic States. He could not help thinking that the proposal was a dangerous one and that it failed to convey the encouragement it wished to convey. He will not advise the Council to accept it.

M della Torretta says that the Commission has been unanimous and has considered that its proposals followed directly from the Allied Policy outlined in the telegram to Kolchak. There seemed to be no other way of reconciling the unity of Russia with an offer of autonomy to the Baltic peoples. Certain things had been done which had led these peoples to believe that their fate would be settled by the Conference. They are being supplied with money, arms and munitions. The declaration suggested made no essential alteration in the Allied attitude. All that was aimed at was a transitory regularization of the situation and a confirmation of the declarations previously made. The Commission is informed that the Baltic Governments required some encouragement of this kind to continue action against the Bolsheviks on one hand and the Germans on the other.

M Pichon says that the Lithuanians, Estonians and Letts had repeatedly asked the Governments of the Powers to recognize them. They had always been told that their efforts were sympathetically regarded and help had been given them as de facta Governments in their struggles against Bolsheviks. They had always been told, however, that the Powers can go no further. The ultimate solution must depend on the outcome of the Russian situation. The Council of Five had always kept these two considerations closely connected. The Baltic Delegates had asked whether the Conference would end without settling the question of Russia. He had replied that he hoped it will not but he cannot undertake to make a definite statement. The declaration suggested by the Commission would not, he thought, give them any particular satisfaction nor would it please the Russians. What the Baltic States really wanted is separation. This the Conference can not for the time being offer them. Promises of autonomy would not satisfy them. No other declaration, however, could be made without producing a very difficult situation in regard to Russia.

M della Torretta says that the Commission recognizes that the declaration will not entirely satisfy the Baltic States. It will, however, be a beginning. On the other hand it would not displease the Russians as it does not threaten the separation of the Baltic Provinces which they feared.

(After some further discussion the question is adjourned.)

9. M Clemenceau reads a telegram suggesting that three Karelian Delegates elected by an Assembly held at Olonetz be heard by the Peace Conference in order to express the wishes of the population of that region. The Finnish Government is greatly interested in the question and would like the affairs of Karelia to be explained to the Conference.

(After some discussion it is decided to refer the question to the Commission on Baltic Affairs.)

10. M Clemenceau said that the Council of Transylvania has asked the French Representative at Bucharest to grant passports to five Swabians of the Banat anxious to come to Paris to explain to the Conference the desires of the populations they represented. S Bratiano favors their request. Before authorizing the Delegation to proceed to France the French Government wished to know the opinion of the Allied and Associated Delegations.

(It is decided that this question should be referred to the Committee on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

07-28-19, 02:50 AM

Saturday, July 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Ministry of Commerce, Paris, 18:00

Meeting held under the chairmanship of M. Clémentel.

269. Finance Section.

The Council considers a report submitted by the Finance Section in accordance with the request of the Council at its 26th Meeting.

The American Delegates point out that the Committee for the Organisation of the Reparation Commission needed the assistance of the Finance Section and its technical organisation in the decision of financial questions arising with reference to reparations, and suggested that as a practical matter it would be desirable for the Finance Section henceforth to report to the Committee for the Organisation of the Reparation Commission instead of the Supreme Economic Council.

After further discussion it is agreed:

i) That the Finance Section should be maintained until the definite organization of an International Economic Council and of the Reparation Commission.

ii) That the Finance Section should be asked to collaborate with the Committee for the Organisation of the Reparation Commission in all financial questions which are in process of execution or the solution of which is urgent.

iii) That the Finance Section should refer to the Committee for the Organisation of the Reparation Commission all decisions to be made relative to financial questions concerning

a) The supply of food and raw materials to ex-enemy countries and

b) Reparations.

270. Sub-committee on Germany.

The American Delegates suggest that the Sub-Committee on Germany should in future report to the Committee for the Organisation of the Reparation Commission instead of to the Supreme Economic Council.

The French Delegates call attention to the fact that the Organisation Committee is already dealing directly with the Germans.

It is agreed that the decision of this question should be deferred until the Meeting of the Council to be held in London on August 1st, at which time the report of the Sub-Committee would be presented for the consideration of the Council.

271. Allied Maritime Transport Executive.

It is agreed that the Allied Maritime Transport Executive as one of the sections of the Supreme Economic Council, should in future refer for final decision to the Committee for the Organisation of the Reparation Commission, instead of to the Supreme Economic Council, all questions of enemy tonnage which relate to reparations.

Appendix 250.

Report to the Supreme Economic Council on the Necessity of Maintaining the Finance Section.

I.

The Supreme Economic Council, in its meeting of the 10th July, decided that the Finance Section should be authorized to continue its work, with a view to settling all questions which are still pending as quickly as possible.

The Finance Section has in fact been principally engaged on investigating and applying the financial means of execution of the Armistice clauses:

(a) The carrying out of the Spa, Trèves and Brussels Agreements as far as Germany is concerned.

(b) The carrying out of the Armistice with Austria, and of the subsequent agreements concerning the provisioning of Austria by the Allied Powers.
The raising of the blockade of Germany only dates from the ratification of the Peace Treaty by the German National Assembly.

The Agreements with Austria are still in process of execution, and a letter from Dr Renner, dated the 9th July, requests the continuance of Allied assistance. The National Assembly of German Austria only voted the laws concerning the requisitioning of securities and the organisation of mortgages on the forests in its meeting of the 8th July.

The Finance Section has still to undertake the final solution of the following questions:

A) As regards Germany:

1) The ultimate disposition of the gold delivered by Germany in payment for foodstuffs. The amount intended for the United States will be sold by Germany without option of repurchase.

The Germans have not yet replied on the question of the proposed sale with option of repurchase on the part of the United Kingdom.

2) The procedure to be followed in the sale of the requisitioned securities transferred to Amsterdam by the Germans, and the division of the proceeds of this sale among the Allied and Associated Powers.

3) Utilization by the Germans of Argentine securities for German purchases of foodstuffs in the Argentine.

4) Final examination of a proposition made by a consortium of Dutch banks to make an advance for which requisitioned securities would serve as guarantee.

5) Settlement of the French account; provisioning of Germany by France.

6) Utilization of proceeds of the sale of lignite briquettes to Switzerland (application of the Agreement of 25th March).

B) As regards Austria:

1) Final settlement of the conditions of the new advance of 3 million dollars allowed by the Government of the United States to the three Allied and Associated Powers.

2) Delivery of gold and securities. This delivery was demanded to take place on the 12th July in the case of gold, and on the 31st July in the case of securities. These periods will have to be extended.

3) Supervision of the transport of the gold and securities to Venice.

4) Nomination and despatch of experts to Venice to examine the gold and securities.

5) Nomination and despatch of forestry experts to Austria to fix the value of the pledge.

6) Settlement of the food accounts among the Allies in consequence of supplies provided by Italy for the account of France and Great Britain.
It would seem that the Finance Section, which is acquainted with all these questions, is better fitted than anybody else to supervise the execution of the decisions which have been made, and that in any case it is most desirable that the Section should be able to continue and complete this part of its work.

II

The work of the Supreme Economic Council, however, has not been confined to the provisioning of Germany and Austria. The Council has had to listen to appeals from the reconquered or liberated countries, from the new nations and from the devastated regions.

The Finance Section has had to grapple with the difficult problem of the financial measures necessary for the reconstruction or the provisioning of countries or of groups, but it has only been able to deal with the most urgent affairs; the most immediate requirements have been satisfied, thanks to the great relief work undertaken by Mr Hoover’s organisation and by each of the Associated Governments. Thus it has been necessary to defer the settlement of questions which are now of extreme urgency, and the solution of which has as yet only been outlined by the Section.

Thus, to mention only questions which have been raised and are not yet settled, the following should be quoted:

(a) Financial assistance to be given to the three Baltic States. General Gough has requested that 500,000l, should be placed at his disposal immediately, and other credits will become necessary in the near future.

(b) The agreement for the expenses of maintenance of Russian prisoners in Germany.

(c) The expenses of the restoration of navigation on the Danube.

(d) Expenses for the supply of locomotives and trucks to Lithuania.

(e) The investigation of methods of coordinating the advances which have already been made to Russia by the different Treasuries.

When the Council decided to transform itself into an International Economic Council, it recognised that collaboration in economic affairs between the Allied and Associated countries must continue. Such collaboration necessarily involves corresponding financial collaboration, and it is desirable that there should be no breach of continuity between the action of the Finance Section of the Supreme Economic Council and that of whatever body is to fulfill similar functions in the International Council.

III

It is necessary, on the other hand, to take into account the fact that the raising of the blockade of Germany and the approaching signature of the Peace Treaty with Austria will involve the disappearance of the bodies set up to co-ordinate the measures which had to be taken during the Armistice.

The execution of the financial clauses of the Peace Treaty is to be entrusted to the Reparations Commission, which is at present in process of organisation.

As a matter of fact, the Preparatory Committee entrusted with setting up the Reparations Commission has not limited its activities to this only. It has already had before it such definite questions as the utilization of the proceeds of German exports, and it will doubtless shortly have to consider the question of the provisioning of Germany, all of which matters have hitherto been dealt with by the Finance Section, acting as a Sub-Committee of the Supreme Economic Council.

It would seem, both in view of avoiding at present any clashing of functions and, in the immediate future, to hasten the solution of problems with which the Finance Section is better acquainted, as it has dealt with them for several months, that it would be desirable for the Finance Section to act in close collaboration with the Preparatory Committee of the Reparations Commission, even if only to transmit to the latter such questions as are at present being investigated or negotiated, and which will henceforward fall within its competence.

Consequently, the Supreme Economic Council may think fit:

1) To decide that the Finance Section be maintained until the definite organisation of an International Economic Council and of the Reparations Commission.

2) To recommend to the Council of Representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers that the Finance Section should be asked to collaborate with the Preparatory Committee of the Reparations Commission on all financial questions which are in process of execution, or the solution of which is urgent.

Jimbuna

07-28-19, 06:52 AM

28th July 1919

Today marks the fifth anniversary since the start of the Great War in 1914 and the first anniversary to be observed in peacetime.

In Newberry, South Carolina Elisha Harper, who just returned from WWI, narrowly avoids getting lynched for insulting a 14 year old white girl.

Two seventy-year-old Czech members of the Czech Legion, survivors of the terrible Siberian campaigns against the Russian Bolsheviks.
https://i.imgur.com/tq73F68.jpg

Sailor Steve

07-28-19, 09:53 PM

Monday, July 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

1. M Clemenceau says that as his colleagues know, he has informed the Chamber of Deputies that he could not communicate to them the records of the proceedings of the Council of Four. This had been in accordance with the wishes of his colleagues. The Minutes of the Council of Four had been given to the members of the Council only. The present Council, it had been agreed, should proceed in the same manner. He now heard that the British Delegation wished to distribute the Minutes to as many as twelve experts or departments, while the French and other Secretariats were interpreting the order more strictly. He thought that the Minutes should only be sent to persons present in the Council.

Mr Balfour asks how many copies of the Minutes were sent to French experts or departments.

M Clemenceau says that none were sent.

S Tittoni says that he agrees with M Clemenceau that the distribution should be very carefully restricted, and that only extracts be sent to the experts or departments concerned.

Mr Balfour explains that a request had been made from London that various Departments should receive copies of the Minutes, as they concerned the work in which they were engaged. As his colleagues desired that the circulation should be restricted, he would reply that this could not be done.

(It is agreed that a strict interpretation of the Resolution adopted on the 7th July should be adhered to.)

(At this point, M Loucheur and Mr Waterlow enter the room.)

2. S Tittoni put forward the following proposal:

“In consideration of the fact that the persistent difficulties of provisioning Allied countries necessitate the continuation of a united and coordinated course of action in order to avoid the danger of famine.

It is resolved that the Allied and Associated Powers shall form an organisation whose duty it will be to control and determine the respective requirements so far as concerns the most essential products (grain, coal, etc.) and to coordinate action so far as concerns purchases in the various producing countries and transport; and

It is also resolved to refer the question to the Supreme Economic Council with a recommendation to the said Council to name a Commission which shall determine as speedily as possible the working details of the above-mentioned organisation and which shall render the said organisation effective.”

M Loucheur says that the French Delegation had always supported the continuance of the Supreme Economic Council, in spite of British and American opposition. The British opposition had since been modified, as Mr Lloyd George had come to see the importance of a common purchasing policy. The American Delegation, however, seems still firmly opposed to the proposal.

Mr White says that the United States are, in fact, quite unwilling to sanction the continuance of the Supreme Economic Council.

S Tittoni says that the question he had raised was one of extreme importance for Italy. Italy was in distress. This distress was a consequence of the war and should be treated in the same manner as it would have been treated had it come about during the war. As long as the Government could keep the people fed and supplied with work, it could maintain order. Without these conditions, it could not. He felt it necessary to make this statement. If Italy were left without succor he would decline all responsibility as regards the future.

Mr White says that he expected Mr Hoover back from Brest on the following day. In the meantime, he does not object to the reference of the question to the Supreme Economic Council, as it still existed.

M Loucheur says that, quite apart from any questions of the official constitution of the Council he and his colleagues had agreed to meet to see what measures could be taken to assist an Ally in distress. There is still a small sub-Committee dealing with coal. He is himself Chairman of this Committee, and he is ready, should the Council desire it, to call the Committee together to study the question raised by S Tittoni.

Mr Balfour asks who the British Representative is.

M Loucheur says that he would be able to inform Mr Balfour later.

Mr Balfour says that the question is not merely one of help from one country to another. It goes deeper than that. The war was now over and new problems but equally difficult problems, had arisen. The situation resulting from the war had to be liquidated. The various Allied States were mutually indebted. Their only means of discharging their debts was by exports. Great Britain could only pay off her indebtedness by the production and exportation of coal. For coal is not only one of the principal British exports, but it is also the means necessary for every form of manufacture. The situation could not be solved, as during the war, by suppressing train services and doing away with superfluities. It goes to the roots of the whole economic relations of all countries, not merely of the Allied countries between themselves. It is not simply a question of the rich helping the poor in any one particular commodity. It was for this reason that he had inquired who the British Representative on M Loucheur’s Committee was. It is necessary that a matter of this sort should be dealt with by a first-class Minister, intimately acquainted with the whole economic and financial situation. He understands that the future Economic Council, if created, would include first-class Finance Ministers from each of the countries concerned.

M Clemenceau said that the question, nevertheless, was one of life or death. Whether it be a peace question or a war question, it makes little difference whether a man died by bullet wounds or by starvation. He, therefore, suggests that the matter be discussed on the following day, together with Mr Hoover and M Loucheur.

(This is agreed to.)

M Loucheur asked if he was authorized to examine the situation in the meantime with the Italian experts.

S Tittoni says that he would be able to furnish him with all the figures showing the stocks at present existing in Italy.

(M Loucheur’s suggestion is approved.)

3. M Loucheur says that, before he leaves, he would like to draw attention to an item on the Agenda which is a Report of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways, affecting the distribution of rolling stock in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. This rolling stock represents a security in the hands of the Allied and Associated Powers on the same footing as other possessions of the Enemy States. The Commissions mentioned in Article 371 and 372 of the Treaty with Germany should not, in his opinion, act independently of the Reparation Commission. He is in no manner opposed to the nomination of the Committee of Experts, as suggested, but he thinks this Committee should work in conjunction with the Reparation Commission.

(Note is taken of M Loucheur’s views on the subject, and the question of the appointment of a Committee of Experts is postponed for a future meeting.)

(M Loucheur then withdraws.)

(At this point M Seydoux enters the room.)

4. M Clemenceau says that he understands that the United States of America and Great Britain had resumed postal relations with Germany without informing France.

Mr Waterlow states that a notification had been published in the British Press to the effect that postal relations might be resumed.

Mr White says that, when it had been decided to put an end to the Blockade and to the Censorship, it had been understood that a resumption of postal relations followed automatically.

Mr Balfour says that the main decision had been to put an end to the Blockade and to the Censorship and that the logical consequence of these decisions was the resumption of intercourse.

M Clemenceau says that, nevertheless, no warning had been given to France. Further, until ratification, the Allied and Associated Powers were still in a state of war with Germany.

M Seydoux says that the Supreme Economic Council had been asked to study the question of resuming postal relations. It was obvious that some letters must be allowed to pass, if the Blockade and Censorship came to an end. Technical experts had, therefore, prepared the document before the Council. At the very same time, he had read in the “Daily Mail” the notification alluded to by Mr Waterlow and had since heard that the United States had taken similar action. He then read and commented on the following document:

“The Special Committee charged by the Supreme Economic Council to study the question of the re-establishment of postal relations with Germany, has unanimously taken the following decisions:—which are submitted for the approval of the Supreme Council of the Heads of Governments.

1) The Post Offices of the Allied and Associated countries are authorized to enter into direct relations with the German Post Office for the immediate re-establishment of postal relations both for ordinary and registered post, and for samples and parcels.

2) The question of transport of postal matter by Germany will be examined by the German Delegation at Versailles together with the Allied and Associated Delegates.

3) The telegraph offices of the Allied and Associated countries are authorized to enter into direct relations with the German telegraphic office for the provisional re-establishment of telegraphic and telephonic communication.

4) The public will be notified as soon as possible that postal and telegraphic relations with non-occupied Germany will be re-opened under the following conditions:

a) Commercial correspondence can be sent sealed.

b) Private correspondence can only be sent by postcard.

c) The above-mentioned correspondence can be registered.

d) Telegrams should be written en clair and only in the following languages: French, English, Italian or German.

e) Each administration will later publish the conditions under which the telephone service will be re-started.

5) The postal and telegraphic control services will be notified of the above decisions so that they may take any necessary measures.

6) In submitting the above propositions to the Supreme Council of the Heads of Governments, the Special Committee recommends that the resolution of the Communications Section concerning the immediate re-establishment of international railway services with Germany may be adopted, in order to render the lifting of the blockade effective, and that this resolution be passed for action to the Governments concerned.”

M Clemenceau asks why private correspondence is restricted to postcards.

M Seydoux replies that the Censorship had asked for this.

Mr White asks how it will be possible to distinguish between a commercial and a private letter. If all sealed letters were presumed to be commercial, anyone wishing to make a private communication would enclose it in a sealed letter.

(It is agreed that this Article be omitted.)

M Clemenceau says that he considers the proposals excellent, but he notes that it is recommended that international railway services with Germany be started again. He thinks this was going too fast, seeing that there is still a state of war. As to telegraphic and postal communications, there was nothing to be done, seeing that America and Great Britain had stolen a march on France.

Mr Balfour says that he understands that France had allowed the resumption of commercial relations with Germany.

M Clemenceau asks M Seydoux if this is the case.

M Seydoux says that, when the Blockade had been raised, it had been declared that trade could be re-established under certain conditions. Had this not been done, only the Neutrals would have profited by the cessation of the Blockade. All commercial regulations consonant with the state of war were maintained, but certain licensed exceptions were being made. General exceptions in favour of certain categories had been established.

M Clemenceau says that a very curious situation appeared to result from this. The German Delegates are closely watched at Versailles by Colonel Henri’s Mission, yet French frontiers were going to be opened to German traders, who would therefore be able to come freely to Paris, while the only Germans prevented from doing so would be the official Delegates of the country.

M Seydoux says that the passport regulations still exist.

Mr Waterlow observed that there is no question of allowing Germans to come to England or British subjects to enter Germany. Only goods are allowed to pass.

M Clemenceau says he understands the proposal is to allow free passage of letters, but not of persons.

Mr Balfour says that there was a small matter in this connection which he must bring to the notice of the Council. If the Council agreed, he would ask Mr Waterlow to state the case.

Mr Waterlow says that, under Article 289 of the Treaty with Germany, bi-lateral agreements could be revived by a notification within 6 months of the coming into force of the Treaty. Among these bi-lateral agreements was one between Great Britain and Germany concerning the parcel post and money orders. Great Britain was in a different situation in these matters from the other Powers. The latter had been parties to a general International Convention. Great Britain has made separate agreements. The British Government now proposes to take steps, without further delay, to revive the agreement with Germany regarding the parcel post and the money order service in advance of the coming into force of the Peace Treaty. It is suggested that the agreement be revived by means of direct communication between the British Post Office and the German postal authorities. This was subject, of course, to the agreement of the Council, to whom it had been thought right to submit the question.

M Seydoux says that, in regard to parcel post, he sees no objection, as the parcel post is a means of sending goods. This was consistent with the cessation of the Blockade and the resumption of commerce. But the money order service involved financial questions which he was not competent to judge.

Mr Waterlow says that only small sums were involved, and the service would be revived subject to the proviso that no clause in the Peace Treaty was violated.

Mr Balfour says that he does not wish to ask the Council to accept anything that was not clearly understood. He suggests that M Seydoux should examine the question with the French financial experts and that the question be brought up again on the following day.

Baron Makino draws attention to the languages enumerated in paragraph 4 (d) of the Note read by M Seydoux. He would like that “Japanese” be added to this list, unless there were objections to this course.

(No objection is raised, and this is agreed to.)

(It is then decided that the whole question, together with the subsidiary question of parcel post and money orders, raised by the British Delegation should be put on the Agenda for the following day.)

(The proposals of the Special Committee are modified in two respects, and were provisionally approved, as follows:

“4. The public will be notified as soon as possible that postal and telegraphic relations with non-occupied Germany will be re-opened under the following conditions:

a) Commercial “and private” correspondence can be sent “closed”.

b) The above-mentioned correspondence can be registered.

c) Telegrams should be written en clair and only in the following languages: French, English, Italian, German “or Japanese.”

d) Each administration will later publish the conditions under which telephone service will be re-started.”)

5. M Clemenceau says that in this connection he wishes to inform his colleagues that the process of demobilization forced him to withdraw 45,000 men from the French Armée D’Orient. He was not able therefore to undertake the conquest of Hungary, as only three Brigades mixtes would be left.

S Tittoni observes that the Anti-Bolshevik Government at Szeged expected to conquer Hungary if supplied with arms and Munitions.

M Clemenceau said that Anti-Bolshevik Governments had made similar statements before, but had never been successful.

M Seydoux says that the Blockade of Hungary is a special case. Allied posts had been situated all round the circumference of Austria. Since peace had been made with Germany, the blockade along the Bavarian frontier has been raised, but it was maintained on the other frontiers. The blockade had been exercised by Inter-Allied agency. He had lately heard, however, that the American Government wished to recall its personnel. He also pointed out that the British Government had never sent any personnel with the exception of a single representative at Vienna. The work was disagreeable and unpopular, and it would be shared by France and Italy. It is evidently desirable that all the Allied and Associated Powers should play their part in this. Before addressing an urgent request to the British and American Delegations, the Blockade Committee has taken into consideration the stipulations which were to be required from the Austrian Delegates to the effect that Austria should undertake to maintain the blockade against Hungary.

The Committee has therefore prepared the following Note:

"July 21, 1919.

“Question of the Blockade of Hungary

The Committee of the East considers it necessary to submit to the Supreme Council of Heads of Governments the question of the blockade of Hungary, the maintenance of which was decided upon by the latter on June 26 last.

At the time when they sign the treaty of peace, the Austrian delegates should sign a declaration in the following sense:

‘Except in case of a contrary request presented by the Associated Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, the Government of Austria shall continue effectively to prohibit the importation, the exportation and the transit of all merchandise between Austria and Hungary, and to maintain these prohibitions until the moment of the formal acceptance by the Hungarian Government of the peace conditions which shall be proposed to, it by the Associated Governments.’

It seems to result from this declaration that, after the signature of the peace treaty, the Austrian Government alone shall have the responsibility of taking measures to maintain the blockade of Hungary on its border.

However, if the measures taken are not effective, the arms, munitions, and other materials of war still to be found in Austria in large quantities could pass into Hungary during the interval allowed by the treaty of peace for the delivery of this material to the Allies.

Under these conditions, the Committee on the Blockade of the East wishes to know:

1) Whether the Austrian Government should be, from the signature by its delegates of the declaration presented above, placed in sole charge of maintaining the closure of the Hungarian border. In this case, the Allied military posts maintained on this border should be withdrawn from the date of the signature;

2) If, on the contrary, the Austrian Government should be assisted in its task by Inter-Allied cooperation, it is important to know whether the Allied military posts on the border should be maintained:

a) either until the coming into force of the treaty,

b) or until the expiration of the interval provided for the delivery of arms and munitions,

c) or until the conclusion of peace with Hungary. An immediate decision is necessary because the American delegate at Vienna has announced the intention of his Government to withdraw at the end of the present month its agents from the service of the Hungarian border, and the British Government has not yet sent its agents. At present the military posts on the Hungarian border are for the most part occupied by American personnel.”

In his opinion the best proposal was that Inter-Allied assistance be given to Austria. This would be welcomed by the Austrian Government, and the French Minister at Vienna had strongly supported the plan. The Austrian Government was weak, and if it was desired that the blockade should be maintained effectually against Hungary, it was desirable to reinforce the Austrian Government by Allied assistance.

M Clemenceau asks how many men would be required to fulfill this plan.

M Seydoux says that two officers and five or six men from each Nation would be enough.

There remained the question of the time for which this blockade should be maintained. Probably, he thinks, it would have to be maintained until the conclusion of peace with Hungary.

M Pichon says that the period might be shortened if General Boehm succeeds.

Mr White says that he understands that the American Government maintains three posts, but had since ordered their withdrawal.

M Seydoux replies that this is so.

Mr Balfour says that Austria had been required to undertake the maintenance of the blockade against Hungary. He quite agrees that Austria must be assisted in doing so. If the Allies desire the blockade to be effective, it was manifest that they must assist in maintaining it. He thought that all the Allies should participate, and he undertakes to try and induce the British Government to take their part.

Mr White says that he would do likewise.

Mr Balfour says that as to the time at which the blockade could cease, it might be decided to raise it as soon as Hungary showed signs of good conduct, and sent Delegates to negotiate Peace. This point, however, need not be settled at present, and might be allowed to depend on events.

(It is then decided that the Blockade of Hungary should be maintained until the Council should decide otherwise, and that the participation of the Four Powers should be arranged for to assist the Austrian Government in maintaining it.)

6. M Seydoux reads a note of the Supreme Economic Council.

Question of Imports Into Serbia M Clemenceau observes that in theory at least there is no blockade at Fiume. In practice, however, there was. The Italian Government, without justification, continually stopped trains.

S Tittoni says that the question of transit was quite distinct. He has already sent a full explanation to M Clemenceau, but no decision had yet been taken.

M Clemenceau says that the French base at Fiume had been hampered many times in its operations.

S Tittoni said that pending a final solution, orders had been given by him, that all trains should proceed without interference.

M Berthelot says that a telegram has been received to the effect that the food situation in Serbia was very serious in consequence of the stoppage of goods from Fiume. Men, women and children have been dying of hunger while stores are accumulating in the port.

S Tittoni says that he has sent telegraphic orders two days previously for the free passage of trains.

M Clemenceau asks S Tittoni whether he guarantees that his orders will be carried out.

S Tittoni replies that he did. He requests, however, that the situation be regulated speedily. As far as he knows, the goods in question are not landed on the quays in Fiume at all. They go by train and the railroad is open.

M Berthelot says that, according to information he had received, the railroads are blocked with traffic. In consequence, disembarkation of goods at Fiume is asked for.

M Clemenceau asks whether S Tittoni recognizes that the Serbians have a right to expedite goods through Fiume.

S Tittoni says that it is not a question of transit through Fiume, but a question of establishing Serbian bases there. This would prejudice the question of Fiume and he is not prepared to accede to this.

M Berthelot says that they would be satisfied if they obtained free passage either through the French base at Fiume, or through the Italian commissariat.

Mr Balfour asked when the Council might have information that this was being carried out.

S Tittoni says that he would give telegraphic orders that goods destined for Serbia through the port of Fiume should proceed immediately, and that the revictualling of Yugoslavia in food, clothes, petroleum and other goods at present waiting at Fiume, should not be hampered by the interruption of communication, as the forwarding of these goods was of vital importance for the army and population of Yugoslavia.

S Tittoni agrees to the use by the Serbians of Fiume as a port of transit, provided the French base or the Italian commissariat be used exclusively. The choice of either should be left with the Serbians.

Note is taken of S Tittoni’s declaration regarding the orders given by him two days previously for the resumption of transit by land.

S Tittoni urges that a solution of this question be reached as early as possible.

(General Mance and Mr Hudson enter the room.)

7. M Berthelot reads and explains the note attached for Clauses for Insertion.

Clauses for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria on Ports, Waterways and Railways (It is agreed that there is no objection to the nomination of a French Member to the Commission.)

S Tittoni says that he would express his view later.

Mr Hudson says that final action on paragraph 24 should, he thinks, be postponed until the settlement of the territorial question. He therefore asks that the question of the insertion of clauses regarding Ports, Waterways and Railways be deferred until the territorial solution had been arrived at.

Mr Balfour says there ys force in this proposal, but he would like to know when a decision on the territorial question could be expected. The Bulgarians had already arrived.

Mr White says he has received a communication from President Wilson and therefore was able to discuss the question of Western Thrace. He would be ready to do so on the following day. In this connection, he wishes to communicate the following document:

“Regarding the events mentioned in the report of the British, French and Japanese members of the Central Bulgarian Territorial Committee with respect to the alleged desire of the Mussulmans of Western Thrace that this territory be ceded by Bulgaria to Greece, the United States Chargé d’Affaires at Sofia, under date of the 24th instant, reports that the petition was prepared by one Mussulman deputy, who drew it up without the authority or knowledge of the other persons whose names were signed thereto. The Deputy in question has fled from Bulgaria and is believed to be in Italy or in Turkey. All the other Muslim Deputies made an official denial before Parliament and also stated in a letter to the Prime Minister that they had not signed the petition and added that their views were entirely opposed to the sentiments expressed therein. In the opinion of the Chargé d’Affaires, the Muslim population of Western Thrace, if forced to choose between Greek and Bulgarian rule, would greatly prefer here, as well as elsewhere, the latter, in spite of the fact that the Greeks have spent large sums in this district for purposes of propaganda. The Chargé d’Affaires concludes by saying that, in his opinion, an impartial investigation or a plebiscite would prove the foregoing beyond any question of doubt.”

Mr White, continuing, says that the belief that the Mohammedan population of Western Thrace desired union with Greece had had considerable weight with the American Members of the Commission dealing with Greek Affairs. If this belief was as ill-founded as his later news implied, the situation was considerably modified.

M Clemenceau asks Mr White whether he is able to obtain the official denial of the Mohammedan Deputies referred to in the Note.

Mr White says he would try to do so.

M Clemenceau says that Mr Venizelos must be heard on this subject, and he proposed, with Mr White’s consent, to send him a copy of this Note.

(It is then agreed that Mr Venizelos be invited to attend the Council at 17:00 on the following day, when the question of Western Thrace would be discussed.

It is further decided to postpone until the following meeting the discussion of the Clauses relating to Ports, Waterways and Railways, for settlement in conjunction with the territorial questions affecting Bulgaria.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

07-28-19, 11:29 PM

Monday, July 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

(At this moment M. Tardieu enters the room.)

1. M Tardieu states that the question of setting up the Committee for coordinating the clauses of the Peace Treaty with Germany had been submitted to the Committee for supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty, by the American representative. After three meetings, the Committee had adopted a plan.

Mr Balfour states that the proposal is to the effect that a Committee should be set up in Paris to supervise the execution of the Peace Treaty, and to coordinate its provisions. Would not there then be some confusion between this new Committee and the League of Nations? There would be a Permanent Committee at Geneva and another Permanent Committee at Paris; this might lead to disputes.

M Tardieu replies that Mr Balfour’s question had been answered in Paragraph 1 of the Report. The manner in which the functions of the Committee had been limited was clearly expressed; and there was therefore no risk of overlapping. In addition to this, paragraph 5 of the Report states that the Allied and Associated Governments would determine what the relations between the two bodies in question should be.

Mr Balfour replies that he is entirely satisfied; but that he would like to raise another, not very important question. Did the Council see any objection to the members of the Paris Committee being ambassadors.

M Tardieu replies that paragraph 2 of the Report answers the question. It had been thought that there was nothing to prevent ambassadors being appointed as representatives to the Committee, but, on the other hand there is no need specially to recommend that ambassadors should be appointed.

(It is agreed that the Report of the Committee for supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty, with regard to setting up a Coordinating Committee to deal with questions of interpretation and execution should be adopted.)

(M Leygues and the Naval experts enter the room.)

2. M Clemenceau states that the Naval experts had met to discuss the question, without being able to come to an agreement except on one point, which was, that, before they could deal with their side of the matter, a decision with regard to their general policy in the matter must be taken by the Governments concerned.

Admiral Ronarc’h states that the admirals had met several times without coming to an agreement and that their remarks on the differences of opinion between the Admiralties of the countries concerned could be seen in the Report submitted to the Conference.

M Clemenceau states that he does not see how the question of whether the vessels should be destroyed, sunk, or distributed, could again be raised. It had already been discussed by the Council of Four, and, finally, in reply to the French request, it had been decided that the vessels should be distributed; and that each recipient country should put the vessels allotted to it to what use it chose. There could be no doubt on the question, because, when the Scapa Flow incident occurred, Mr Lloyd George had expressed his regret for what had happened, in view of the fact that France was to receive a certain number of the vessels sunk. He had again renewed his promise, and had given a list of vessels that might finally be given to France by way of compensation. The Scapa Flow incident had added itself to the question of disposal. The German vessels had been placed under the guard of the British Admiralty. He did not wish to be critical; but simply to draw attention to the fact, that a report on the whole question had been promised to the Supreme Council, and that the report in question had not yet been tendered. He had intended, at the time, to send a French Admiral over, but, since Mr Lloyd George had not received the suggestion favorably, he had not insisted. The responsibility rested with the British Admiralty, and it was therefore necessary that a report should be submitted to the Council, in order that responsibility for the affair might be determined. The German Admiral was going to be tried by a British court martial; but it should not be forgotten that the Admiral in question was at the time Commander-in-Chief of the German Fleet; and that he had admitted to having given orders to sink it. The German Government was therefore clearly responsible, and the Allies had a right to demand reparation. Mr Lloyd George had stated that reparation would be given, but, after inquiring, he had not appeared to think this possible. An argument had been brought forward, to the effect that the provisions of the Armistice did not establish sufficient control over the German vessels; Mr Lloyd George had further recalled Marshal Foch’s opinion against surrendering these vessels. Before discussing the question of distributing the German fleet, it was necessary to know where the fleet in question actually was: one portion was at the bottom of the sea in Scapa Flow, another, smaller, portion was possibly afloat in the same locality; finally, there were vessels in German ports. How could the Admirals have given any other reply? They could only do what they had done, and draw attention to the fact that no political decision had been taken. This was the essence of the question, and before pursuing the discussion further, he wished to know the opinion of his colleagues.

Mr Balfour states that the remarks of the President of the Council raised three points. Firstly, he had alluded to a declaration of Mr Lloyd George in favour of distributing the Fleet.

M Clemenceau states that the question had been twice discussed, and that finally, President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George had acceded to French wishes by accepting the principle that the Fleet should be distributed.

Mr. Balfour says that the Council of Four had agreed that the distribution should be made between the Allied Powers, but that he was not aware of the exact basis of this distribution. He asked whether it had been decided, for example, to make an equal division of all surface vessels of the same class, or whether compensations in another form were to accompany the distribution.

S Tittoni states, that, inasmuch as the principle of distribution had been determined upon, it is necessary to know the manner in which it was to be carried out.

M Clemenceau answers that the principle of distribution had alone been discussed, and not the details of this distribution.

Mr Balfour asked whether the matters included in the minutes of April 25th represented a definite decision taken by France.

M Clemenceau replies that he is quite ready to re-discuss the question for the fourth or fifth time. He wishes to draw attention, however, to the fact, that, as Mr Lloyd George had proposed to hand over to the French a certain number of vessels whose names were given, this in itself proved his admission of the principle of distribution.

Baron Makino states that he can remember this statement.

Mr Balfour states that it is very important to know what had been decided upon by the Council of Four, in order that the question should not continually recur. He did not think, that, as a matter of principle, it is advisable to re-open matters already discussed and decided upon by that body.

M Clemenceau answered that he could not entirely accept Mr. Balfour’s statement of principle. It was contradicted by the fact that a decision had been made to occupy the Rhine territory for fifteen years. Notwithstanding this, six days before the Treaty had been signed, Mr Lloyd George had re-opened the question and it had been re-discussed. He is nevertheless in agreement with Mr Balfour. It is necessary to see exactly what had been said and to consult the minutes drawn up by the secretariat. In addition to this, the report promised on the Scapa Flow incident should be forthcoming.

Mr Balfour states that he sees no objection to a report being made.

M Clemenceau stated that the British Admiralty is not of that opinion.

Mr. White stated that the question was new to him, and that it was necessary for him to examine carefully the minutes of proceedings, in order that he might know what President Wilson had thought.

M Clemenceau states that they were therefore in agreement on the two points previously raised by him.

S Tittoni stated that the principle of distribution was agreed upon; but the manner in which it was to be carried out had yet to be decided.

M Clemenceau states that the last point had never been discussed; and that Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson had only agreed to the principle. He further drew attention to the fact that he had raised the question of German responsibility.

Mr Balfour states that he does not doubt that such a responsibility existed, but even if established, what advantages would accrue?

(It is agreed that the secretariat should examine the minutes of proceedings in order to report on all that had been said in the Council of Four with regard to the distribution of the German Fleet. It was further decided that Mr. Balfour should ask the British Government for the report on the Scapa Flow incident).

(M Leygues and the Naval Advisers then leave the room.)

3. M Tardieu reads Article 65 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, which read as follows:

“Within a period of three weeks after the coming into force of the present Treaty, the port of Strasburg and the port of Kehl shall be constituted, for a period of seven years, a single unit from the point of view of exploitation. Nomination of a Director for the Port of Kehl

Nomination of a Director for the Port of Kehl

The administration of this single unit will be carried on by a manager named by the Central Rhine Commission, which shall also have power to remove him.

This manager shall be of French nationality.

Pending appointment of the first manager by the Central Rhine Commission, a provisional manager, who shall be of French nationality may be appointed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, subject to the foregoing provisions.”

He points out that the French Delegation requested the Supreme Council to appoint the temporary Director provided for under the above Article, and that the Delegation had proposed to the Council the name of M Detousse, Ingénieur des Fonts et chaussées.

Mr White points out that under the terms of the Treaty, the Allied Governments themselves were called upon to ratify the appointment.

(It is decided that the nomination of M Detousse as Temporary Director of the port of Kehl, and of the port of Strasburg, should be submitted by each respective Delegation to their Governments for approval.)

4. M Tardieu states that the Yugoslav Delegation had addressed several Notes to the Council on the subject of their claims to certain territories.

Report of the Commission of Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs Regarding the Demands of the Yugoslavs in the Banat Balfour stated, that before pursuing this discussion, he wishes to remark that he prefers not to take up the Yugoslav claims, during such time as the Serbians refused to respect the decisions taken by the Council with regard to Klagenfurt.

M Tardieu remarks that as the claims are rejected in the proposed replies, these letters are in line with Mr. Balfour’s remarks.

S Tittoni says that he considered it useless to discuss the question, as the Council’s decisions are not being respected.

M Tardieu answers that the proposals themselves might be considered, because they did not grant the Serbians claims.

M Clemenceau states that the entire discussion is put aside by Mr Balfour’s remarks, with whom the Council agrees.

M Tardieu states that since the questions could not be further discussed, despite the fact that the claims put forward had been rejected, the Council would presumably be less inclined to discuss points upon which concessions had been made. There remained a question of Ada-Kalessi Island which does not concern Yugoslavia. In a telegram dated 11th July General Franchet d’Esperey had reported that the Romanians and Yugoslavs both laid claim to Ada-Kalessi Island, which lay in the Danube opposite Orsova, and which, after being left to Turkey by virtue of the Berlin Treaty of 1878, had been occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1908. In view of the fact that the Ada-Kalessi Island had been occupied by Austria-Hungary the Committee, proposed that it should be given to Romania, which country had received the Austro-Hungarian territories of Transylvania adjacent to the Danube. The Committee requires that the stipulations of Article 52 of the Berlin Treaty, with regard to the prohibition of Military works on the Island should be upheld.

(It is agreed that the Ada-Kalessi Island should be granted to Romania, and that the clauses of Article 52 of the Berlin Treaty, as detailed above, should be upheld.

It is further decided that M Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, should inform the Yugoslav Delegation, that, in view of the Serbian refusal to recognize decisions of the Supreme Council with regard to Klagenfurt, it was impossible to proceed further with the latest claims presented by their Delegation.)

5. M Tardieu states that the Secretary-General had informed Marshal Foch of the decision taken by the Council on the 16th July, to the effect that French troops should not be sent to Schleswig, since the means of their transport were not yet ready. Marshal Foch had now reported that the decision in question arose out of a misunderstanding. The French battalion for Schleswig had been formed, and was now ready to start at four days’ notice. Marshal Foch further reported that he had informed the British Admiralty to the above effect. Inter-Allied Forces for the Plebiscite Zone in Schleswig

Mr Balfour says that the decision that French troops should not participate had been taken, simply because it had been wrongly supposed that they were not ready. Since this was not the case it would be advantageous if the French flag were represented.

(It is decided that the French battalion now ready should participate in the military occupation of Schleswig; and that the British Admiralty should give Marshal Foch the four days’ notice in advance which was to precede the despatch of the battalion.)

6. Mr White states that an Austrian Note with regard to the minority clauses of the Peace Treaty had been presented. He suggests that it should be transmitted to the Committee on New States for report.

Mr Balfour said he believes that certain clauses on the subject of minorities had already been sent to another Committee. Would it not be preferable to submit the Austrian proposals to this latter Committee in order to avoid confusion?

M Berthelot states that the question of minorities should have been the exclusive object of study of the Minorities Committee. Other questions, involving problems of finance and transportation, had however been submitted to it.

M Clemenceau draws attention to the fact that the note accompanying the presentation of the Austrian Peace Treaty states clearly, that, as the text of the Treaty represented decisions finally arrived at, it would not be possible to reply to notes that had been received in the past, or would be received in the future, from the Austrian Delegation. It therefore seemed impossible to discuss the question raised by Mr White.

(It is decided that the Austrian proposals with regard to minorities should not be examined by the Council, in view of the letter accompanying the presentation of the Peace Treaty, wherein it is stated that no further replies would be given to Austrian notes.)

Jimbuna

07-29-19, 02:57 PM

29th July 1919

A Russian prisoner of war still held in Altdamm, Germany (today Dąbie, Poland) washes his clothes after receiving soap from the Red Cross.
https://i.imgur.com/XDI8irO.jpg

Italian Navy in the city of Pola, formerly part of Austria-Hungary. The area is disputed between Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia).
https://i.imgur.com/L5osDr3.jpg

A wounded Serbian soldier, wearing artificial legs on both legs, returns home after being a prisoner of war in Austria-Hungary.
https://i.imgur.com/TAvtmhc.png

Sailor Steve

07-29-19, 09:31 PM

Tuesday, July 29, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers

1. M Berthelot referring to the decision taken on the previous day says that he understands the decision to refer to Austrian notes dispatched before the final Treaty had been handed to the Austrian Delegation. It would clearly be necessary to reply to any Austrian notes dispatched since then. He proposes, therefore, that the note regarding minorities be examined by the Committee on new States.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks the same principle might be adopted in dealing with the Austrian notes as had been adopted regarding the notes sent by the German Delegation. In the latter case there had been a Committee to survey the whole of the replies. He would, therefore, propose that M Dutasta be asked to arrange for a similar machinery in order that the whole of the replies be coordinated.

(These proposals are accepted.)

Note: The Resolution referred to is as follows:

(It is agreed that a Committee should be appointed for the purpose of editing the reply to the German Note. The Secretary-General is requested to arrange for this Committee to meet with the least possible delay, and to communicate to it the various portions of the reply as they were approved.)

2. M Pichon said that the Austrians had asked for an extension of one week beyond the period of 10 days allowed them to present their observations regarding the Treaty. They justify their request by reference to the change of Foreign Minister which had lately occurred. He thinks the demand could not be resisted, and asked his colleagues if they agreed with him.

(It is agreed that the period of ten days allowed to the Austrian Delegation to present observations on the Treaty handed to them should be extended by one week and that this should be communicated to them by the Secretariat-General.)

(M Loucheur, M Seydoux and Mr Waterlow enter the room.)

3. M Seydoux says that on the previous day the question of the resumption of the parcels post and of the money order service had been raised by the British Delegation. He had raised no comment on the resumption of the parcels post, but he had asked for time to consult the Ministry of Finance regarding the money order service. He had consulted the Ministry of Finance and found that the question had already been considered. On the 26th June the French Postal Service had been addressed by the Ministry of Finance which took the view that the instability of the mark made it undesirable to resume any money order intercourse with Germany. He found that the same opinion still prevailed. From this he concluded that the objection of the French Finance Ministry was a technical one and was not concerned with any political consideration. If the British Government therefore felt that there was no technical objection from the British point of view, there seemed no reason to object to the resumption of money order interchanges between Great Britain and Germany. The British Government, as far as France was concerned, was, he thought, free to act as it wished. The French Government, however, did not for the time propose to restore the money order service. Re-establishment of Postal Communications With Germany

M Pichon says that the only objection would be that the Allies would not be acting identically, but as the question was not a political one the matter was not of great importance.

(It is agreed that there is no objection to the resumption by Great Britain of parcels post and money order interchange with Germany in accordance with the proposal of the British Delegation.)

(It is further agreed that the proposals of the Special Committee as modified on the previous day should be accepted.

4. The Council has before it the proposal made by S Tittoni on the previous day.

Creation of Inter-Allied Organisation for the Distribution of Raw Material M Loucheur says that S Tittoni’s proposal really amounted to the perpetuation of the Supreme Economic Council. The very functions he wishes exercised were those hitherto exercised by the Council with the help of the Wheat Executive, the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council, and similar organisations. The problem before the Council is therefore merely restated in other terms. As the Council knew, the French and Italian Delegations favor the continuance of the Supreme Economic Council. Great Britain latterly had taken the same view. Only the American Delegation disagreed, and had wired to Washington for instructions. On the following Friday and Saturday there was to be a meeting of the Council in London. Everything depended on the instructions that might be received from the Governments. Without them the members could take no action.

Mr Balfour says that he has prepared a draft resolution to the following effect:

“That the problems arising out of the present difficulties of providing food, coal and raw materials to the Allied Powers be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council for examination and report.”

He has expressed his resolution in these terms in order not to bind the Supreme Economic Council in any way. S Tittoni’s proposal appeared to dictate the conclusion in some manner.

M Loucheur observes that neither resolution offered a solution of the question. All that could be done was to postpone it unless instructions were received for the Supreme Economic Council to continue its functions. In regard to the primary necessity of finding coal for Italy, he wishes to inform the Council that he had had a conversation with S Tittoni. There is information that between the dates of August 5th and September 5th, Germany would furnish one million three hundred and fifty thousand tons of coal. This coal was intended for French uses according to agreement. France, however, had agreed, in order to assist Italy, to despatch out of this one hundred and seventy-five [Page 372]thousand tons to the latter country. This would save the situation. In addition to this, in spite of considerable shortage in France, he had given an order for the despatch from the Saar Basin to Italy of one thousand two hundred tons daily. He hoped that Great Britain would also help to ease the situation and he expected to have a conversation with Sir Auckland Geddes at the end of the week.

(It is then resolved that the problems arising out of the present difficulties of providing food, coal and raw materials to the Allied Powers be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council for examination and report.)

(At this moment Mr Hudson, Mr J F Dulles, S Fiori, and Major Greig entered the room.)

5. M Loucheur says that on the previous day he had asked that the Expert Commission for the distribution of Rolling Stock in Europe should work in harmony with the Reparations Commission. This had apparently been interpreted by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways, as meaning that the Expert Commission should work under the orders of the Reparations Commission. This was not what he meant to convey. It was clearly necessary that the work of the Expert Commission should be coordinated with that of the Reparations Commission. He therefore, proposes that the following Note, prepared by the British Delegation, be accepted:

“The Presidents of the Main Expert Commissions on the distribution of rolling-stock, will work in close touch with the Reparations Commission in order that the latter may take the necessary measures for effecting financial adjustments resulting (a) from the transfer or liquidation of the above rolling-stock, craft and installations and (b) from such other decisions within the competence of the above Expert Commissions as may affect the Reparations Commission. No final decision will be communicated to the States affected without the previous concurrence of the Reparations Commission.”

He would like to add that, should there be disagreement between the Expert Commission and the Reparations Commission, the disagreement should be referred to the coordinating Committee, the setting up of which had been agreed to on the previous day.

Mr Balfour says that two quite different considerations have to be reconciled. It is obvious that the rolling stock of Europe, as being a financial asset, should not escape the grasp of the Reparation Commission, but it is clearly important that for the economic reconstruction of Europe, so essential an instrument of reconstruction should be employed to the best purpose. Without this, work on Mines, Farms, Factories etc., would be wasted. From this point of view, there is no more important resource than rolling stock for the economic revival of Europe. This resource must be husbanded by the Experts. It is therefore necessary to reconcile these two important objects.

Mr Hudson says that the Commission of Experts which is to deal with the distribution of rolling stock is, according to the Treaty, entirely independent. It could not be subjected to the Reparations Commission. Should it be so subjected the Germans would have cause for complaint that the Treaty was not being observed. He quite agreed that it should work in harmony with the Reparations Commission, but if it were unable to take any decision without the concurrence of the Reparations Commission, the object for which it was created would be defeated. It is essential that it should be able to take independent decisions and have them executed speedily; should it have to wait for the previous sanction of the Reparations Commission it could not do its work.

M Loucheur says that the experts might be allowed to make provisional allotments of the railway stock, subject to sanction by the Reparations Commission. He disputes that the experts under the Treaty have any right to dispose finally of such material. The Reparations Commission, it had been stipulated, could intervene in all matters touching the disposal of material. He quite agreed that every day lost was a serious thing for the economic fate of Europe, but he could not admit that any of the material resources of the enemy countries could be disposed of irrespective of the Reparations Commission.

Mr Balfour said that he understands M Loucheur to agree to a temporary allotment of railway stock by the experts. They are bound, however, to inform the Reparations Commission of what they were doing. Their action would then be considered in its financial aspect, and the result of the action would be considered by the two Commissions together.

M Loucheur points out that according to the Treaty, only the Reparations Commission can receive material in discharge of the reparations debt. No transfer of material can, therefore, be made without the knowledge and concurrence of the Reparations Commission. He cannot therefore admit the complete independence of the experts.

Mr Hudson maintains that the experts should be entirely free to make a distribution of the railway stock according to the technical necessities of the case. It is the role of the Reparations Commission to consider the financial consequences of the action of the Experts.

M Loucheur quotes Articles 19 and 20 of Annex II of the Treaty. He points out that the Reparations Commission did not propose to make the allocation of the rolling stock, but should the experts make such an allocation that Germany was not able to restore her economic life in such a manner as to pay reparations at all, it was clear that the Reparations Commission had a right to intervene. In his view a mistake has been made in drawing up the Treaty, and the Experts should have been placed under the Reparations Commission. Without this there would inevitably be constant conflict of authority. However the Treaty had been signed and so he proposes that the experts should make a distribution, that they should inform the Reparations Commission, and that in case of disagreement the matter should be referred through the coordinating Committee to the Governments.

Mr White says that he sees no objection to this course.

Mr Dulles says that as the American representative on the Reparations Commission he sympathizes with M Loucheur. Should the Reparations Commission think it necessary to order a supply of coal from one country to another its intentions might be defeated, if the experts had allocated rolling stock in such a way that coal could not be moved.

Mr Hudson says that he thinks the subjection of the experts to the Reparations Commission a violation of the Treaty.

M Loucheur says that what he proposes is no violation of the Treaty, but a matter of internal arrangement among the Allies.

Mr Balfour says that the last sentence of the proposal under consideration seemed to imply that final decisions could be taken but not communicated to the Governments concerned. This appeared to be an absurd situation. He thinks that the experts can make provisional allocation, but that no communication of their allotment as final should be made till the Reparations Commission had sanctioned it.

Mr Hudson points out that the experts can only decide how the rolling stock should be distributed. They will be bound to utilize the Governments in order to have their plans carried out. For instance, should they decide that a proportion of German rolling stock was required in Denmark, they will be bound to inform the German and Danish Governments in order that they could execute the proposals. It is impossible to wait for the sanction of the Reparations Commission.

Mr Balfour says that a test question would be, should the Technical Committee desire to send 500 wagons to Czechoslovakia, are they entitled to do so without the consent of the Reparations Commission.

M Loucheur says that the answer in the case of experts would be yes, and in his own case it would be no. The experts, for instance, might lose sight of the necessity of transporting coal. If the Council of Five were in existence reference could be made to it, but, if it were not in existence, chaos would ensue. He thought it absurd that experts should act irrespective of orders. They should receive instructions from the Governments. The Clauses of the Treaty operated as against Germany, not as against the Allies among themselves. The various parts of the machinery employed for the execution of the Treaty must work together, otherwise there would be complete disorder. He therefore asked that definite instructions be given to the experts, so that they should not work independently of the Reparations Commission.

Mr Hudson says that M Loucheur had stated the issue very clearly. Poland, for instance, had been attributed certain territory which had been German. The accepted theory was that a certain amount of rolling stock went with this territory, in order to make its economic life possible. It might, in the opinion of the Reparations Commission, be necessary to allot Poland some rolling stock by way of payment in the Reparations account. Restitution is no business of the experts, but, after the Reparations Commission had done what it thought fit, it might appear to the experts that Poland required more rolling stock. The experts would then take a decision for the sole purpose of employing the rolling stock available to the best general advantage. According to M Loucheur, Reparations questions came in at this point. This, he submits, is widening the sphere of the Reparations Commission unduly. The Expert Committee, in his view, ought to be able to say that for technical reasons, rolling stock is required at such and such a place. M Loucheur’s view falsified the intentions of Article 371. Was this Article to be applied in its obvious interpretation, or was its application to be made subject to the political situation of Europe as a whole? For instance, is Poland to be deprived of necessary rolling stock because the Reparations Commission decided to pay Belgium in coal?

M Loucheur says that he thinks the clauses drawn up by the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways have entirely left financial considerations out of account. He does not say that the Expert Commission should not allocate rolling stock, but that this allocation should be provisional. The value of the rolling stock thus assigned, must be determined by the Reparations Commission. If, for instance, Poland can not pay for the rolling stock allotted her, was she to receive it for nothing? This would entirely stultify the work of the Reparations Commission. What he asked for was coordination. It was regrettable that better liaison had not been maintained by the various Commissions which had framed different portions of the Treaty. As the Treaty itself did not provide for coordination, arrangements must be made for co-ordination in its execution.

Mr Balfour said that he thinks perhaps the following proposal would reconcile the two points of view:

“The immediate distribution of rolling stock shall be made on the authority of the Expert Committee; but no such distribution shall be final until the financial aspects of the question have been considered and approved by the Committee of Reparation.”

(This proposal is accepted provisionally subject to further examination by the Experts present of the Reparations Commission and of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways.)

Mr. Hudson asked that subject to this, the nomination of the experts should be made in accordance with proposal annexed.

(With the addition of a French member in the Principal Commission Para. 1(a), the proposals contained in the Report—Appendix “C”—are accepted.)

(M Loucheur, Mr Hudson, Mr Dulles and S Fiori withdraw.)

(At this point Mr Polk enters the room.)

(M Clementel, M Alphand, Mr Nogara and Mr Hutchinson enter the room.)

6. M Clementel said that the draft Clauses now before the Council has been unanimously agreed to. He explains the various clauses in which alterations had been made since the last edition. Some discussion arose concerning Article 29.

Mr White asks whether the Smaller Powers might not claim equal rights with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in respect to the “most favored nation” treatment.

M Clementel explained that this provision had been inserted at the request of the Japanese Delegates.

Mr Balfour asks why it is proposed to re-impose Consular Courts on Bulgaria.

M Clementel says that it was merely a case of re-stating preexisting rights.

Mr Balfour says that he had not been aware of any right of Consular jurisdiction in Bulgaria, but, in any case, he would have thought it more in keeping with the times to abolish or curtail such a right rather than to re-assert or extend it.

Mr White says that the United States did not wish to claim extra-territorial rights in Bulgaria.

M Pichon said that the French Government are negotiating just before the outbreak of war for the abolition of the capitulations in Bulgaria.

M Clementel points out that the formula employed is permissive. Special conventions might be entered into by each of the Allied and Associated Powers with Bulgaria. There was nothing to compel them to do so. The sentence regarding “most favored nation” treatment had been added at the request of Japan.

Mr Balfour observed that things are not left just as they had been before the war, as the United States and Japan were added to the list of Powers entitled to negotiate with Bulgaria regarding special rights which they had not possessed before the war.

M Pichon observes that they need not avail themselves of this right. France has rights which had not been put into practice. Just before the outbreak of the war, negotiations were going on for the abolition of those theoretical rights. The object of the Article was therefore quite a restricted one, namely, to enable France to resume these negotiations.

Mr Balfour remarks that it is odd that an Article with so restricted an object, contrives to add two Powers to the list.

Mr Matsui says that he understands that there is in practice no consular jurisdiction in Bulgaria. Japan, however, has been for a long time urging her right to exercise such jurisdiction in Turkey. Japan would therefore seem to be weakening her position unless this sentence were inserted in the Article. If none of the Powers chose to exercise their rights under the capitulations, Japan will do nothing; should the Powers wish to do so, Japan desires to be in the same position as the rest. Nothing very substantial is being asked for, and he thought that any exercise of the right was improbable. In view of the negotiations with Turkey, however, the Japanese Delegation had thought it desirable to have this sentence inserted.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks it is strange to insist in a Treaty on a right which no one wished to exercise, and which no one approved. With this comment, however, he would be content, and would not oppose the acceptance of the Article.

The Economic Clauses as drafted are then adopted for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

It is further decided to communicate these Clauses in the same manner as the other Clauses, through the President of the Committee, to the Smaller Powers concerned.

(M Clemenceau and M Tardieu enter the room.)

7. Mr Balfour reads the following telegram. He thinks this amounts to a refusal on the part of General Pilsudski to obey the orders of the Council.

(M Clementel, M Alphand and Mr Nogara withdrew.)

Telegram From Sir P. Wyndham, Warsaw to Mr Balfour.

July 25th, 1919.

“On July 24th I saw General Pilsudski as instructed by you in your telegram of July 23rd.

Upon my raising the question of the Polish troops being withdrawn to the line of demarcation General Pilsudski said that this was a responsibility which he would not take as the immediate result would be the outbreak of disturbances, possibly leading to regular warfare. He declared that he would resign Office and leave Poland for Lithuania if we insist on the Polish troops being withdrawn, and showed absolute determination on this point.

The internal situation is now so difficult that, as it seems to me, General Pilsudski would gladly avail himself of any opportunity to resign which might be afforded to him by foreign pressure in opposition to a cause which is popular in Poland. The political consequences will be serious if he carries out his threat.”

M Clemenceau observes that the telegram is dated July 25th and that the decision of the Council had been taken on the 26th.

Reply to Herr Von Bethmann-Hollweg

8. It is decided that no answer need be made to Herr Von Bethmann-Hollweg’s letter regarding his personal responsibility for the outbreak of war.

(At this point Mr Venizelos and the Members of the Commission on Greek Affairs, enter the Room.)

9. M Clemenceau, addressing Mr Venizelos says that of the Council thinks that he would probably have something to say regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria.

Mr Venizelos said that he would have something to say on the subject, but before dealing with that, he would like to give an explanation regarding the document produced by Mr White at a previous meeting. This document had been communicated to him by the Chairman and the Council would understand that he was considerably upset by it. It was implied that he had made use of a forged document to influence the Conference. He had never stated that the Mussulmans of Western Thrace desired to join Greece. Should they be given the choice, it was obvious that they would be inclined to choose the Allies of Turkey rather than the enemies of Turkey. What he had suggested was that Allied Officers should consult the Mohammedan Deputies without the knowledge either of Bulgaria or Turkey. He then reads a letter addressed to him by 8 Mussulman Deputies of Western Thrace. This petition he had sent to M Cambon, but he had never attempted to represent the Mussulmans of Thrace as desiring a union with Greece.

Mr Venizelos then reads a series of observations he had prepared on this subject. He adds that he had made complaint to the Government at Washington regarding the imputation made against him by the American Delegation.

Mr White said that the document had been communicated to Mr Venizelos confidentially. Mr Venizelos has therefore no right to make any communication to Washington on the subject.

Mr Venizelos said that the document had been communicated to him by the Chairman of the Council, and he thinks he had a right to defend himself vis-à-vis the American Government.

M Clemenceau says he thinks Mr Venizelos would have done better to reserve his justification for the Council.

Mr Venizelos says that he would withdraw his complaint at Washington.

M Venizelos said that in Thrace as claimed by him for Greece there are more than five times as many Greeks as Bulgarians. There are, in addition, a large number of Greeks in Constantinople and in the districts surrounding it. To these he makes no claim and he argues that this reinforces his claim to the other parts of Thrace. Against the ethnographical argument which entirely favors Greece an economic argument is alleged in favour of Bulgaria. He recognised that free access to the sea was one of the principles of the Conference. Whenever interests were opposed which could not be reconciled, it was necessary to decide which deserved the greater respect. The principle of nationality should take precedence over economic considerations. Bulgaria has excellent ports on the Black Sea. An outlet on the Aegean Sea is not a matter of primary necessity since the opening of the Straits would convert the Black Sea into an open sea. The inclusion of Greek populations in Greece was however a vital interest. Bulgaria could have commercial access to the Aegean either at Dédéagatch or, if this port were regarded unsuitable, at Cavalla. Similar rights might be guaranteed to Bulgaria as had been guaranteed to other land-locked states. Four states, each of them larger than Bulgaria, namely Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary and Poland had been left by the Conference without direct access to the sea. Why should a similar arrangement not be enough for Bulgaria? Poland had not been given Danzig, in order that the nationality of the intervening populations should be respected. It has been alleged that the arrangement he proposed served Bulgarian purposes well enough in peace, but would not suit them in war. He thinks this argument operates in his favour. There will be no chance for Bulgaria to establish a submarine base on the Aegean. Bulgaria was a continental power. Greece was very largely an island power. Should Bulgaria have complete control over a port in the Aegean, she could intercept the movements of Greek troops by means of submarines. He knew that strategic arguments were not in favour at the Conference but he only used this as a secondary argument and in reply to an objection. It is needless to attempt to satisfy Bulgaria. Nothing but Hegemony in the Balkans would satisfy her. She will undoubtedly attempt to upset the settlement made by the Conference. The only hope for peace in the Balkans was to set up her neighbors as ethnic units each individually too big to be attacked. It had also been said that the Greeks had left Western Thrace. This was true. They had been driven out by the Bulgarians and had for five years been refugees in Macedonia and Greece. Mr Venizelos then reads copious extracts from a work entitled “Rapports et Enquêtes de la Commission Interalliée sur les violations du droit des Gens commises en Macédoine orientale par les armées Bulgares”. He adds that the American Red Cross Society which has worked in Eastern Macedonia thoroughly corroborates the report of the Inter-Allied Commission. He argues that it is undesirable to entrust to the rule of a nation which could behave in the manner illustrated by these extracts, any foreign population whatsoever.

(Mr Venizelos then withdraws.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

07-30-19, 12:35 PM

30th July 1919

6000 Illinois Army National Guard troops are deployed in Chicago to stop the ongoing race riot in the city.
https://i.imgur.com/WGF39dv.jpg

In Dublin, the special unit the “Squad,” formed by Michael Collins (pictured), conducts its first assassination against the Royal Irish Constabulary.
https://i.imgur.com/o4bPRwt.jpg

As part of the Hungarian-Romanian War, Romanian troops cross over the Tisza River towards Budapest. Romanian King Ferdinand and Queen Marie overseeing the operation.
https://i.imgur.com/q3WZU62.jpg

Ship Losses:

USS G-2 (United States Navy) The G-class submarine sank at her moorings, Niantic, Connecticut. 3 inspectors killed.
Toyo Maru No.2 (Japan) The cargo ship was destroyed by fire.

Sailor Steve

07-30-19, 03:52 PM

Wednesday, July 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Clemenceau stated that he wished the question to be adjourned until the following day. The Greeks are engaged in discussions with the Italian Delegation and, in addition to this, M Tardieu is required in the Chamber of Deputies. The question was therefore adjourned.

2. Mr Balfour asks whether this question could be discussed without a settlement of the frontier question.

M Berthelot admitted that the clauses dealing with Ports, Waterways and Railways are dependent on the settlement of the Cavalla frontier line.

Mr Balfour asks whether it would not be possible to accept all the Articles with the exception of Article 24 which is dependent on the frontier settlement.

(It is agreed that the draft clauses for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria dealing with the question of Ports, Waterways and Railways should be accepted with the exception of Article 24.)

3. M Fromageot states that the Commission on New States had submitted draft clauses on the subject of the rights of minorities for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria. The Articles had been drawn up on the basis of those which were to be inserted in the Austrian Treaty, with the exception of those dealing with the guarantees of the League of Nations. These latter were based upon similar provisions in the Polish and other treaties. In addition, the Committee had added Articles Nos 3 and 4 which were not in the Austrian Treaty. These lay down obligations on Bulgaria to grant rights of Bulgarian citizenship to persons living continuously in Bulgaria, despite the fact that they came of foreign parents. The Drafting Committee thinks that, though Articles 3 and 4 ought to be inserted in Peace Treaties with New States, whose legislation was as yet unknown, or in the Peace Treaties with old States, which did not give sufficient guarantees on the subject, they are none the less superfluous in the case of Bulgaria, since the legislation of that country on the point in question was in conformity with that of the most advanced European States. It had therefore been thought that the two articles should be omitted from the text, which were otherwise analogous to that prepared by the Committee on New States. In addition to this, the latter Committee had left out a clause, by virtue of which the Bulgarians would be obliged to raise no obstacle against Bulgarian subjects, at present living in territories granted to other countries, opting as to their citizenship. The text prepared by the Drafting Committee differed from the one drawn up by the Committee on New States, in that Articles 3 and 4 had been omitted, and an article dealing with the right of option inserted. Political clauses in Peace Treaty With Bulgaria.

Mr Balfour states, that as Bulgaria is an old State, and as its legislation was satisfactory on the point in question, there was no use in compelling it to modify its statute book.

M Scialoja states that it has been reported to him that the Committee had not taken up its work, owing to the fact that it was not sure that it was competent to deal with the question. It should also be noted, that the disposal of Thrace affected a portion of the work of this Committee.

Mr Hudson states that the Committee had been of opinion that articles 3 and 4 were necessary in Romania’s case in order that the Jews might be protected. In the 1878 Treaty the same rights had not been granted to the Jewish population as had been given to other citizens.

The question is, whether the article should be enforced in Bulgaria’s case.

Mr Balfour remarks, that since the clauses had been adopted for such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, he sees no reason against their being put into the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

M Fromageot says, that in the Peace Treaty with Austria, although clauses had been inserted to protect minorities, no provision had been made for special nationalities, since the legislation of the country seemed a sufficient guarantee. The clauses are therefore only applicable to countries whose legislation is unsatisfactory and to others whose future legislation could not be foreseen. Bulgaria had dealt with the question of nationality in a satisfactory manner in the past. Was it necessary, therefore, to insert the clause? The Council had to decide whether, in spite of her previous legislation, Bulgaria was to be classified definitely in one of the two categories.

Mr Balfour says that the discussion might be indefinitely prolonged. Romania is an old State, and had the obligations contained in the disputed articles imposed on her. He does not mind whether they are put into the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria; but, if a vote were called for, he would prefer that Bulgaria should be treated like Romania and not like Austria.

(It is therefore decided that the political clauses dealing with the protection of minorities, as drafted by the Committee on New States, should be accepted.

It is further decided, that a clause granting the right of option to Bulgarian citizens living in territories that had changed their sovereignties, should be inserted in the Peace Treaty.)

The Drafting Committee is directed to draw up the clause, and to insert it in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

4. M Berthelot states that Marshal Foch had submitted a letter dated 28th July to the President of the Peace Conference on the subject of the attitude of General Von der Goltz, in particular and of the Germans in general in the Baltic Provinces. The Marshal had enclosed in his letter a copy of the correspondence exchanged on the subject with the German Government, together with a letter from the British Delegation covering a report from General Gough. In submitting his report Marshal Foch was asking for precise instructions from the Council whether the proposals of the British General, which were supported by Marshal Foch, were acceptable.

It is decided to inform Marshal Foch that General Gough’s conclusions as submitted in Marshal Foch’s letter of the 28th July are acceptable.

Marshal Foch is directed to take all measures necessary for putting the proposals in question into effect.

(At this point the Naval experts enter the room.)

5. M Berthelot, at the request of the President and on behalf of Secretariat, reads out extracts from the texts of I. C. “A” 176–E.3 and C. F. 91. He draws attention to the fact that the texts of Sir Maurice Hankey and M Mantoux are virtually in agreement.

Mr Balfour says that from quotations made in previous Minutes it is evident that M Clemenceau has accurately remembered the discussion of 25th June. It nevertheless seems that, previous to the Scapa Flow incident, the Council of Four had been uncertain as to the ultimate action to be taken with German vessels. The French evidently had desired that they should be distributed. The Italians and Japanese did not appear to have been of the same opinion. The Scapa Flow incident had then occurred. He did not think that it was anybody’s fault, but the incident was none the less regrettable. Without attaching blame to the Admiralty it was none the less a fact that the German fleet had been sunk in British waters by its own crews. Mr Lloyd George had evidently spoken with great feeling, and had renounced in favour of France the British share in any compensation obtainable, at the discussions that had followed the incident. On the extracts now before the Council M Clemenceau bases his views which are (1) that no destruction of enemy vessels should take place, (2) that England renounces all claims to vessels which would have fallen to her share but for the Scapa Flow incident. He is entirely in agreement with the second point and thought that England’s renunciation must be admitted. Two important points, however, remained undecided:

1) How are enemy ships to be disposed of?

2) If division among the Allies be decided upon in what proportion shall it be made?
He does not think that Mr Lloyd George’s remarks could be regarded as a statement of a considered policy for the reason that when he made it he defined only the French position and made no mention of Italy, Japan or America.

Even admitting Britain’s claim to be lost, the questions he had put forward remained for decision.

S Scialoja states that Italy had not been represented at the Conference on the 24th June. It ts probable for that reason that Mr. Lloyd George’s remarks did not mentioned Italy. On the 25th June, the matter had been discussed and referred to the Council of Admirals. Italy’s position to-day was the same as that of France.

M Clemenceau asked in what sense the Admirals had reported.

M Berthelot replies that all the Admirals had differed, since each one upheld the standpoint which he believes to be that of his own country. He adds that the statements attributed to President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George were capable of being interpreted in the sense that the principle of distribution had then been admitted. In support of this, he quoted the phrase in which compensation to small Navies had been allowed for, and he also drew attention to the fact that President Wilson spoke in several places of the division of the enemy fleet.

M Clemenceau states that as the entire matter appears not to be understood fully by his colleagues, he wishes to make a statement as to the exact discussions which had taken place in the Council of Four, and in informal conversations preceding the meetings. Mr Lloyd George had said to him, on one occasion, that if all countries could be of one opinion, the sinking of the German fleet in the open sea, in the presence of the Allied Navies, would be a magnificent spectacle. He had dissented from this, knowing that the French people would desire to have a certain portion of the enemy fleet.

A similar question had arisen as to the disposal of the enemy submarines, Mr Lloyd George advocating that they should be sunk as their use had been illegal. President Wilson had in a way assented to this view. He, M Clemenceau, had refused to agree and maintained that the submarines as well as the surface vessels should be divided, unless all existing submarines were destroyed. It was his conclusion from the discussions that a tacit understanding had been reached between Mr Lloyd George, President Wilson and himself to the effect that the enemy vessels should be divided, and not destroyed. The Scapa Flow incident had then occurred and Mr Lloyd George had been particularly upset over it owing to the fact that he had advocated the sinking of the fleet, and its destruction by the Germans had occurred in a British port. The incident would never have aroused such feeling had any form of destruction been previously decided upon. The very fact that this distribution had been admitted had made the act of voluntary destruction by the Germans more keenly felt. In conclusion, he could only repeat that it had been decided, that the enemy vessels should be divided, and that each ally should take what action it liked with the share allotted to it. He was surprised to hear the Italian claim put forward for the first time. He admitted it, however, but insisted that, if it were maintained, a pool of all enemy vessels should be made and a distribution effected among the Allies. He still requires a report on the Scapa Flow incident.

Mr Balfour states that he had asked for a report from the Admiralty, which had replied, that it had not received any previous request to forward it.

Captain Fuller reads a telegram confirming Mr Balfour’s statement.

M Clemenceau states that the discussion could be proceeded with after the report had been placed before the Council. He points out, however, that the question of the disposal of the remainder of the enemy fleet must be settled.

Mr Balfour asks what was the American point of view on this subject.

Mr White answers that he had not been acquainted by President Wilson with the discussions which had been referred to, but he always believed the United States advocated the sinking or destruction of the warships. He added that it was impossible for him to agree to any decision until he had consulted President Wilson by telegram.

M Berthelot then points out that the minutes of April 25th indicated that President Wilson’s views on the disposal of the submarines, and the surface vessels, differed.

M Clemenceau states that he would agree to submit to President Wilson any proposal which might be put forward, but that he would never agree to the sinking or destruction of the warships.

Mr Balfour then states that the quotations from previous minutes of the Council are not sufficient authority for him to act upon; and that he proposes to send a telegram to Mr Lloyd George asking for further instructions.

Mr White and Mr Polk say that they would send a telegram in the same terms to President Wilson.

Mr Matsui says that he would ask Baron Makino to give him a statement of his impressions of the conversations that had been quoted.

(It is agreed that the discussion should be adjourned until the British and American Representatives should have communicated with their Governments.)

6. M Clemenceau states that Mr White has proposed the following Resolution:

“In view of the fact, that the Supreme Council has granted an additional delay of one week to the Austrians for submitting their answer to the Conditions of Peace handed to them on July 20th, it is suggested that the Secretary-General be requested to instruct the various committees dealing with Hungarian matters to take up and finish their reports for the Hungarian Treaty.”

(The draft Resolution is agreed to.)

7. M Berthelot stated that the Delegation of the Yugoslav State had sent a letter dated 28th July to the President of the Peace Conference asking to be heard on the subject of the Financial and Reparation clauses in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

M Clemenceau says it seems difficult to refuse the request.

S Scialoja draws the attention of the Council to the fact that the situation had changed since the letter had been sent. The Serbians had been given audience by the Committee, and had submitted a memorandum. This latter had been examined, and two requests out of the three had been acceded. The requests had been:

1) That they should be given cattle to compensate their losses in livestock;

2) That they should have the right to recover movable property carried into Bulgaria;

3) That they should take part in the deliberations of the Inter-Allied Reparation and Finance Committees in Bulgaria. The first two proposals had been granted but the third had been disallowed, since it would have created a precedent. Had it been granted, it would have been difficult to refuse similar requests made by other States, and endless disputes would have arisen.

It is decided that a report of the Economic Commission be awaited regarding the requests of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the subject of livestock, movable property and representation on the Inter-Allied Committees on Reparation and Finance.

The decision to refuse the request for audience of the above mentioned Delegation is maintained, and the Secretary-General is instructed to notify them to that effect.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

07-31-19, 07:15 AM

31st July 1919

Aftermath of War

Generals Sir H. Plumer and Sir E. Allenby promoted to Field Marshals; German Sir H. Rawlinson sent to N. Russia to co-ordinate withdrawal.

Germany: A republic is declared at Weimar and a new constitution adopted.

British Gurkha Rifles march in Baku, Azerbaijan. The area is under British occupation to protect local oilfields.
https://i.imgur.com/1Uuj3aq.jpg

Sailor Steve

07-31-19, 08:23 PM

Thursday, July 31, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M. Tardieu explains the report of the Central Committee on territorial questions regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria in the south. He explains the divergent points of view of the American and Italian Delegations on the one hand and of the British, French and Japanese Delegations on the other. If he were asked to argue his own point of view, he would argue it on three grounds - ethnological, political and moral. If Western Thrace is not given to Greece, 92,000 Greeks will be excluded from the Hellenic Kingdom. As the exclusion of Western Thrace from Greece will be followed by the exclusion of Eastern Thrace another 145,000 Greeks will be denied Greek citizenship. In the whole of Thrace, north and west of the Enos-Midia line there are 237,000 Greeks. In any case 1,835,000 Greeks will remain outside Greek Sovereignty. Unless Thrace is made Greek the Treaty which claimed an ethnological basis will leave more than 2 million persons of Greek race subject to non-Greek States. The whole Greek race only numbered 7 millions. This is a paradoxical result of a policy which claimed to be based on nationalities. It also appears to him to be quite unjust. Greece no doubt will receive a good many things but if Bulgaria obtains free access to the Aegean, obvious difficulties will ensue for the Greeks. Their communications with the Islands and with Asia Minor could very easily be intercepted, especially in time of war. Greece had taken the side of the Allies in the war of her own free will. She had incurred a war debt of 2½ billion francs, borrowed no doubt from the Allies, but most States after all were in a similar condition. She deserves some consideration for the part she had played in the war. It is sometimes said that Western Thrace belongs to Bulgaria in law and in right.

When the Treaty of San Stephano was signed in 1878, it was made according to the wishes of Russia which at that time was entirely pro-Bulgarian. The frontier laid down by that Treaty was almost the same as that proposed by the French, British and Japanese Delegations. Bulgaria had obtained Western Thrace by the Treaty of Bucharest. It is argued that if Mr Venizelos raised no claim to it then, he had forfeited any claim to it now. This is not so, for at that time Mr Venizelos was ready to do anything to establish the Balkan League. He had failed in this and after him the Allied Powers had also failed. It was clear that the Bulgarians would not be pleased, but nothing would please them save the establishment of Bulgarian authority over 9 million people, only 4 million of whom would be Bulgarian. It is not right to say that Bulgaria would be very harshly treated in this Treaty. Germany, by the terms imposed on her, lost one fifth of her population. Bulgaria, according to the terms proposed would only lose one eighteenth. The other clauses were not very severe. She was asked to pay 2½ billion francs, but on easy terms which could be made even more easy by the Reparations Commission. Moreover her debt to Germany was abolished, a provision which had not been made in favour of any other enemy State. Though she lost access to the Aegean Sea, she still preserved access to the Black Sea and to the Danube and the opening of the Straits would be to her advantage. The restitution clauses were also light. For instance, she was to restore to Greece only 1500 milch cows out of 4500 taken, 2200 horses out of 9000, 1800 oxen out of 19,000 and 6,000 sheep and goats out of 260,000. He sees no particular advantage in offering Bulgaria a premium on aggression, violence and crime. The Bulgarians had no right to keep the fruits of the robbery committed by them in 1913 and again in 1915 with the help of Turkey, especially if to do this, 300,000 Greeks were to be kept out of Greece and as a final result 34% of the Greek race were to be kept under alien domination.

Mr White says that M Tardieu had made constant allusion to Eastern Thrace. He understood, however, that Western Thrace was the subject under discussion. The main point was whether or not Bulgaria should have access to the Aegean Sea. Mr. White then made the following statement:

“In regard to the statement by Mr Venizelos before the Supreme Council on July 29th, it need only be said that the statement contained no arguments which the American delegation has not heard repeatedly and weighed carefully, unless exception be made of his references to the telegram of the American Charge d’Affaires at Sofia and his quotations from the American Red Cross report on Bulgarian atrocities. As for the telegram (which I may remark parenthetically contains no charges of any nature against Mr Venizelos or his Government, but merely referred to an active Greek propaganda, and large expenditures of funds in the district, without implication as to the source of either), it must be admitted that Mr Venizelos’ suggestion that the eight Mussulman Deputies merely denied that they had asked for Greek sovereignty, but did not repudiate the document upon which he places so much weight, does not carry conviction. Our information is explicit and unequivocal to the effect that they denied fore-knowledge of any such document and declared their signatures thereto to be forgeries. However, we do not care to stress this point, as even were it valid the American Delegation would not give it much weight as a reliable indication of the real sentiments of the mass of the Mohammedan population in Western Thrace. We merely point out that one of the chief arguments presented by the Greek Committee in support of their finding rests on evidence which, to express it mildly, needs verification.

As regards the long reading of citations of Bulgarian atrocities, we fail to see the relation between Bulgarian atrocities committed in one place and the drawing of frontiers in another. If I thought such arguments valid, I might read at length the descriptions of Greek atrocities contained in the well known Carnegie Report, and cite them in support of the American opinion that Western Thrace should not be given to the Greeks. The American opinion, however, rests on no such feeble basis. It is founded on certain facts which are not subject to dispute on certain principles which have guided this Conference in its labors hitherto, and on one and only one ambition: namely, to contribute loyally and unselfishly to the great end we all have in view: a just and enduring peace in Europe.

There is here no question of giving territory to Bulgaria. The only question before the Council is: shall we take territory away from Bulgaria and give it to Greece?

It is not denied that Bulgaria had a good and valid title to this territory when she entered the present war. She acquired it not by conquest, but through a peace imposed upon her when she was beaten and helpless. Greece and her Allies, although conquerors, saw the wisdom of according to vanquished Bulgaria an outlet to the Aegean Sea. What was wise in 1913 is doubly wise in 1919, when we are endeavoring, more earnestly than ever before, to prepare a peace which will endure.

If Bulgaria’s legal title to Bulgarian Thrace does not admit of discussion, what are the grounds upon which we are asked to deprive her of this territory and hand it over to Greece? Certainly no serious argument for such procedure can be based on ethnic grounds. It is scarcely open to doubt that following the cession of this territory to Bulgaria, and before Bulgaria entered the war, the Bulgarian population outnumbered the Greek population, while Turks constituted, as always, the overwhelming majority. It does not invalidate this fact to argue that many Greeks were atrociously expelled from the region. When we remember that according to Mr Venizelos’ own figures there were, before the Balkan wars, only 70,000 Greeks in the area as against 60,000 Bulgars, we must admit that, expulsions or no expulsions, the feeble Greek superiority in numbers must inevitably give place to a Bulgar superiority as soon as the territory was ceded to Bulgaria. Greece knew, when she agreed to give Western Thrace to Bulgaria, that with the incoming Bulgarian administration, the development of Bulgarian commercial interests at the ports and elsewhere, and the migration of Bulgarians from new Greek territory into this new Bulgarian territory, the Greek population would most certainly and altogether naturally drop to third place in the proportion of races. In such a case, evidence as to atrocities and expulsions becomes wholly irrelevant. The vital fact remains that in any case the valid occupation of the region by Bulgaria must inevitably have brought about the ethnic preponderance in Bulgaria’s favour which actually intervened.

Nor do we believe that there is reliable evidence to show that the Turkish majority of Western Thrace prefers Greek to Bulgar rule. Many of these Turks speak Bulgarian as their native tongue, while comparatively few of them speak Greek. In the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, it is natural to assume that this population would be better off under the government of those who speak their own language. The evidence to the contrary thus far presented is at least open to suspicion, and is off-set by the declarations of the Chief of the Mohammedan Church in Bulgaria to the effect that his people preferred to be left under Bulgar rule. Assuredly we cannot find in the principle of self-determination any sound argument in favour of annexing Bulgarian Thrace to Greece.

Is it sought to take this territory from Bulgaria and give it to Greece as a punishment for Bulgaria’s action in joining our enemies? If this be the pretext for the proposed annexation, we must observe that while the wisdom and the method of administering punishment may be matters for discussion, there can be no doubt of the fact that punitive annexations of territory are in flagrant contradiction with the principles upon which we agreed to make peace in Europe, and with the principles which have hitherto guided the deliberations of this Conference. The honor of the Entente will be gravely compromised if in order to punish an enemy and to pay a friend we take from the one and give to the other territory to which only the present possessor has a valid legal, ethnic and economic title. Never has the American Government approved territorial changes for punitive reasons; and it cannot now adopt a principle of procedure so fraught with danger to the future peace of the world.

The fact that Germany, Austria, and Hungary are being deprived of large tracts of territory does not constitute a reason for taking territory from Bulgaria. In the first place the cases are not analogous, for Germany and Austria Hungary had long been wrongfully annexing territory from their neighbors, whereas Bulgaria has recently been defeated and had stripped from her such territories as her neighbors saw fit to appropriate. In the very nature of events less remained to Bulgaria which can rightfully be taken from her; and the American Delegation has, in fact, agreed to deprive her of small areas at four different places along her frontiers. But far more important is the fact that all territories taken from Germany, Austria and Hungary were taken for valid reasons, and in the interests of justice and future peace. Such reasons do not exist in the case of Western Thrace, and we do not believe that to take this territory from Bulgaria would be in accord with justice or in the interest of a future peace.

On the contrary, we believe that to deprive Bulgaria of Western Thrace is to cut her off from her only direct and convenient territorial access to the Aegean Sea, to inflict upon her a loss of territory which cannot be justified by the principles according to which we stand pledged to execute this peace, will be to render impossible the conciliation of the Balkan peoples, to sow the seeds of future trouble in South-Eastern Europe, and seriously to endanger the edifice of peace we have labored so long and painfully to construct. It is for this reason that the American Delegation is unable to accept the proposal of the Greek Committee, and for this reason that its representatives on the Central Territorial Commission have recommended the formula contained in the Report of that Commission as submitted to the Supreme Council.”

Mr Balfour says that as he takes a different view to that expressed by Mr White, he thinks he had better make a statement. He feels that he need not add much to the very clear explanation given by M Tardieu. He accepts the general proposition that a punitive adjustment of frontiers was wrong. Nevertheless, when other circumstances balanced one another evenly it had been the practice of the Conference to give the benefit of the doubt to friends rather than to foes. If he were forced to appeal to this practice he would do so, but in this case he thinks that the theoretical merits lay entirely on the side advocated by M Tardieu. It is clearly both wrong and inexpedient to allow nations which embarked on aggressive and acquisitive wars to find this practice paying. In the whole war there had been no action more cynical and more disastrous than that undertaken by the Bulgarians. Had the Bulgarians not behaved as they had, Turkey would not have entered the war; the disastrous Gallipoli Campaign would not have taken place; the war would have ended years sooner, and needless suffering would have been saved. The most plausible objection raised was that if Western Thrace were taken from Bulgaria a lasting peace in the Balkans would be jeopardized. Bulgaria, if she obtained Southern Dobrudja which he hoped she would, would actually be larger than before the war. Mr White had avoided any mention of the Greeks in Eastern Thrace. This question, however, is intimately connected with that of Western Thrace. If it is desirable that the Greeks in Eastern Thrace should be included within the limits of Greece, the attribution of Western Thrace to Greece was a means to that end. He had been rather shocked at Mr White’s theory about massacre. Mr White appears ready to accept the results of massacres with great equanimity. The American Delegation had been greatly influenced by the theory that every country should have direct access to the sea. He could not believe, however, that it is good policy to allow Bulgaria to retain territory obtained from Turkey as a bribe for declaring war on us. In any case, Dédéagatch was not the only port which could serve Bulgarian ends. The opening of the Straits added greatly to the value of Bulgarian ports on the Black Sea. The value of the opening of the Straits could be inferred from the outcry there would have been in Bulgaria had the Straits been open before the war and had the result of war closed them for Bulgarian traffic. In any case the port of Dédéagatch had never been and would never be a good port. He hoped that the arrangements that were to be made at Salonika or Cavalla would suit Bulgarian purposes far better. For these reasons he supported M. Tardieu. He might also quote the earlier views of the American Delegation. These views had changed while the views of the other Delegations had not.

M Tardieu says that he would like to make a brief reply to some of Mr White’s remarks. It was probable that the real value of the letter written by the Mohammedan Deputies of Western Thrace could never be estimated. At a time when Thrace was not occupied by the Bulgarians these Deputies had written to General Franchet d’Esperey. Since the Bulgars had occupied the country the signatories had felt impelled to recant. It is reasonable to believe that their first mood was more sincere than the second.

M Clemenceau suggests that perhaps neither is sincere.

M Tardieu says that the argument that because the Turks in Western Thrace speak Bulgarian, they will prefer a Bulgarian to a Greek Government, is not to be relied on. Experience had disproved this many times. As to the diminution of population as a result of massacres, it could hardly be maintained that this should redound to the advantage of the authors of the massacres. He does not suggest that a punitive territorial arrangement should be made, but he does not think that it was good morality to recompense the Bulgarians for wrong doing. As to the legality of Bulgaria’s title to Western Thrace, he would point out that Romania’s title to Southern Dobrudja is equally good, yet the American Delegation wished to restore South Dobrudja to Bulgaria. The same legal argument could not justify the retention of Western Thrace by Bulgaria and the cession to her of Southern Dobrudja. If Bulgaria were given Southern Dobrudja, Eastern and Western Thrace and were only asked to contribute two and a half billion francs, this would amount to an invitation to begin again. As to a lasting peace, when Bulgaria possessed Western Thrace she was not prevented from embarking on an aggressive war. She was not more or less likely to do so after being deprived of it.

S Tittoni says that the population in Western Thrace is mainly Turkish and Greek. In Eastern Thrace to the south it was Greek and to the North Bulgarian. Assuming, therefore, the Enos-Midia line to be a line beyond which neither Bulgaria nor Greece could extend, he thought that a line dividing Eastern Thrace according to the national distribution of the population would be the most satisfactory.

M Tardieu says that in 1913 when the Bulgars possessed Dédéagatch they had wearied all the chancelleries of Europe to obtain Cavalla, as they considered Dédéagatch an inadequate harbor. It is unlikely that if left with this port only they would be satisfied.

M Laroche observes that they had gone to war to obtain Cavalla.

S Tittoni said that if they had had Cavalla they would have made war to obtain Salonika.

M Clemenceau said that according to S Tittoni’s plan Adrianople would be Bulgarian instead of being either Greek or part of the territory of Constantinople.

S Tittoni said that Adrianople was on the line of demarcation between the Bulgarian and Greek populations. It might be assigned to either. This is a question for the Experts to decide.

Mr Balfour asked whether the Italian Delegation had ever made this proposal in the Commissions.

S Tittoni said that the Italians had always supported the American view.

Mr Coolidge observes that the railway to Dédéagatch had been snatched from Bulgaria by Turkey after her defeat by the Greeks and Serbs. At that time the Great Powers had protested very strongly, and among them Great Britain.

S Tittoni corroborates this statement.

Mr White explains that he is not so hard-hearted as Mr Balfour has made him appear. He thought that the Greeks had withdrawn from Western Thrace rather because they feared massacre, than because they had suffered it. Doubtless the Bulgarians would withdraw from any territory invaded by Greeks as a consequence of similar apprehensions. In the East fluctuations of population commonly had this cause. As to Dédéagatch, he thought it could be converted into a good port. Access to the Mediterranean from a port in the Black Sea is obviously more circuitous and less desirable. He wishes to state that at the instance of his colleagues he had communicated with President Wilson and explained the difficulty in which the Council found itself. President Wilson, as a possible way out of the difficulty, had suggested the following:

“Bulgaria recognizes the right of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to transfer to the proposed International State of Constantinople the territory of Bulgarian Thrace as herein defined, and agrees to accept and cooperate in the effectuation of such transfer whenever it is made.”

M Clemenceau says that if the territory of the future State of Constantinople is increased to this extent, its attribution to any mandatory power will become impossible. There might be agreement if only Constantinople and the Straits were in question, but he sees no chance, if large territories are added.

M Tardieu said that Internationalized States had been invented for a definite general advantage. The State of Constantinople is considered desirable in order to safeguard the freedom of the Straits. If a large hinterland, including Thrace, were added to it, the result would be that it would include 760,000 Turks, 650,000 Greeks, and 75,000 Bulgars. On what pretext could a mass of 650,000 Greeks at the very frontier of Greece be made subject to another State? This would clearly be contrary to the principle of nationality adopted by the Conference. He thinks perhaps the experts might attempt to work out S Tittoni’s idea.

S Tittoni says that his proposal is based entirely on ethnographical considerations.

M Clemenceau says that in his opinion it was impossible to dissociate Eastern and Western Thrace.

Mr White says that he cannot decide without further reference to President Wilson.

M Tardieu says that the future State of Constantinople could be easily imagined if it were restricted to the Straits, the Sea of Marmara and the populations who made their living by the sea, but if large territories are added to it, and Adrianople and Maritza had to be administered as well, the task would be impossible.

M Clemenceau says that a very clear and restricted program must be made for Constantinople, otherwise no mandatory would be found.

M Tardieu says that the proposal made by President Wilson shows one concession at least to the opinion of the other Delegations. It denies Bulgaria direct access to the Aegean. He takes note of this concession. S Tittoni’s proposal gave Western Thrace to Greece, some of Eastern Thrace to Bulgaria, and the rest to Greece, making both Greece and Bulgaria coterminous with the new State of Constantinople. He thinks that it might be possible to work on this thesis, and to obtain some agreement.

Mr Polk asks how many Greeks inhabit the part of Thrace south of the Enos-Midia line.

M Tardieu said that there were 420,000 Turks and 408,000 Greeks, and 5,000 Bulgarians.

Mr Balfour observes that the Enos-Midia line had been introduced into the discussion not as the final boundary of the State of Constantinople, but as the limit beyond which the recommendations of the Commission on Greek and Bulgarian Affairs should not extend.

S Tittoni said that the Enos-Midia line had been invented at the London Conference of 1913. Had not the Bulgarians attacked the Greeks and Serbians, this line would have become a final frontier line.

Mr Polk suggested that the discussion be adjourned.

(It is decided to adjourn the discussion on Bulgarian frontier to Saturday, August 2nd, at 15:30. The Experts are requested to consider the suggestion made by S Tittoni, for an ethnographical partition of Eastern Thrace, and to submit a report in time for the Meeting on Saturday.)

2. General Belin reads the report of the Military and Naval Representatives.

(After some discussion of the implications of Article 101 and 103 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, the following resolution is adopted:

“Respecting the report of the Military Representatives on the Military and Naval measures to be taken for the occupation of the territories of Danzig and Memel, it is decided:

1) To forbid Polish forces from entering the territory of the free city of Danzig.

2) To compel the evacuation of German forces from this territory.

3) To postpone the question of military forces to occupy the territory.

4) To ask the Commission on Baltic Affairs to examine the question of the occupation of Memel.

It is further decided that during the intermediate period pending the nomination of a High Commissioner by the League of Nations, the Commission provided for in Article 101 of the Treaty, should receive instructions to report to the Council of any measures necessary for the maintenance and order in the territory of the free City of Danzig.”)

3. The Council has before it a request from the Swedish Legation to be heard on the subject of the Åland Islands by the Peace Conference.

(After a short discussion it is decided:

That a favorable answer should be given to the request of the Swedish Legation for a hearing by the Conference regarding the Swedish views on the question of the Åland Islands.)

(The Meeting then adjourns).

Jimbuna

08-01-19, 07:56 AM

1st August 1919

Aftermath of War

Bela Kun's Government overthrown at Budapest.

The Prince of Wales (Edward VIII) and Mayor Church at the entrance to City Hall, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
https://i.imgur.com/auUDSZP.jpg

In the face of the Romanian offensive in Hungary, Hungarian communist leader Béla Kun (pictured) flees Budapest, causing the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic.
https://i.imgur.com/d68iz1x.png

U.S. Secretary of the Navy Daniels inspecting women serving in the U.S. Navy.
https://i.imgur.com/BwJpLAf.png

Ship Losses:

No. 2 (Soviet Navy) The gunboat was bombed and damaged by British seaplanes, then damaged further by White gunboats in Lake Onega and beached, abandoned. Retrieved by the Whites and put in service as Silny ( Russian Navy) White Movement.
No. 3 (Soviet Navy) The gunboat was bombed and damaged by British seaplanes or by White gunboats in Lake Onega and beached, abandoned.

Jimbuna

08-02-19, 05:44 AM

2nd August 1919

Otto Kissenberth, a German flying ace with 20 victories, dies in a mountaineering accident in the Bavarian Alps.
https://i.imgur.com/gHixUCG.jpg

24-year-old J. Edgar Hoover is tasked at the Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation to target radical groups in the U.S.
https://i.imgur.com/JB6KdG8.jpg

Jimbuna

08-03-19, 10:03 AM

3rd August 1919

The first Romanian troops enter the Hungarian capital of Budapest as part of the Hungarian-Romanian War.
https://i.imgur.com/h1gsLxO.jpg

The Romanian army liberates Timișoara from the Hungarian occupation.
https://i.imgur.com/jpwGDp0.jpg

To avoid landing on a crowd WWI ACE Freddie McCall crashes ontop of a merry-go-round at the Calgary Stampede.
https://i.imgur.com/8AkdYlx.jpg

A Caproni Ca.48 airliner crashes in Verona, Italy, resulting in over a dozen deaths. It is the first commercial aviation disaster in Italy.
https://i.imgur.com/6l9bvX8.jpg

Jimbuna

08-04-19, 06:38 AM

4th August 1919

Aftermath of War

Romanian troops enter Budapest.

The bulk of the Romanian army begins entering the Hungarian capital of Budapest, completing the city’s capture.
https://i.imgur.com/7FFvnJR.jpg

German demonstrators protest in Berlin against the terms of the Versailles Treaty.
https://i.imgur.com/ejnSOa3.jpg

Sailor Steve

08-04-19, 02:34 PM

Friday, August 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

(Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives enter the room.)

1. M Clemenceau states that he has received a communication from Berlin through General Nudant. It is to the effect that the German Government, as a result of the revelations made by Herr Erzberger, had been violently attacked from the Conservative and Independent Socialist Sections. The question most at issue was the surrender of the military officers demanded by the Treaty. Herr Erzberger asked that the provisions to that effect might not immediately be put into force.

S Tittoni says that as the Allies have representatives in Germany, it would be best to ask their advice.

M Clemenceau says that at the present moment the situation was not quite clear. The list of German Officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war comprises over 1,000 persons, of whom some were Princes of the Blood. He believes that the list of Naval Officers who were to be surrendered is not yet ready.

Mr Balfour replies that the list made out in Great Britain is ready.

M Clemenceau remarks that the Council must be clear as to the demands that it is going to make. It is dangerous to postpone executing the provisions relating to the surrender of German Officers, if, at the same time, German prisoners are to be repatriated. M Larnaude have made a report on the question of German Prisoners, and have pointed out that the problem of their repatriation was intimately connected with the surrender of enemy officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war. Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson had themselves recognised that the two questions emphasized in M Larnaude’s report should be considered together. He thinks that it would be improper to return German prisoners if the Germans did not themselves surrender the guilty officers. He proposes that no reply should be given at once. Herr Erzberger’s telegram might certainly be based on fact, but, on the other hand it might be intended to promote a hasty decision on the part of the Council. He asked whether the matter might not be referred to a Committee of experts.

Mr Balfour says that it is evidently the President’s opinion that an answer should not at once be given. At the same time, the Treaty does not, in itself, permit the return of German Prisoners to be much postponed, and, by its very provisions, prevented the Allies from making a delay in their repatriation a political weapon. If the detention of the prisoners was decided upon, it must be put into force before the Treaty receives general ratification.

M Clemenceau states, in reply to Mr Balfour’s question that the French ratification of the Treaty would probably take place in the first week in September. He suggested that Marshal Foch, who had agents in Germany, should make a report on the subject, and that he should be given the assistance of jurisconsults.

Mr Balfour states that the British agents in Germany will be asked for information, and he supposed that the question to be put to the jurists would be, whether we should be justified in adopting a measure for the detention of German prisoners if the Germans refused to surrender the culpable officers.

M Clemenceau then says that this is not quite his meaning. He wishes to point out that the Germans in their note were asking for a definite favour - the waiving of the stipulations with regard to the surrender of guilty officers. The Allies, if they granted this, might ask for certain military measures to be carried out on the part of Germany, to compensate them for granting the German demand.

S Tittoni points out that the Germans did not quite put forward their request as a favour, but were suggesting certain measures to us, on account of the social and political situation in Germany, which menaced the Allies’ interests as well as theirs. In these circumstances, would it not be advantageous to obtain further information, and come to a decision when it had been tendered.

M Clemenceau returns to his original proposal of referring the question to a Committee of jurisconsults and military men.

Mr. Balfour then remarked that such a Committee might say “You have a right to take what measures of security you please”. He asked what Marshal Foch thought.

Marshal Foch replied that the surrender of guilty officers was not a military question, but a political one.

M Clemenceau agrees with Marshal Foch, and said that he would like his opinion as to a suitable military compensation for the favour which would be granted to the Germans by acceding to their request.

Mr. Balfour asked whether we should not be asking the military men to verify political facts.

M Clemenceau says that he did not think so, since military men would only be advising on the subject of military compensation.

Mr. Balfour said that it would be necessary, therefore, to ask our diplomatic representatives for information. In the meantime, the Military Representatives at Versailles should endeavor to find out whether the statements in the German communication were correct, and should further advise the Council as to what military measures on the part of Germany would be adequate compensation to the Allies for acceding to their demand. Whatever questions were put to Versailles, the British War Office must refer the matter to its own military representatives.

S Tittoni said that the situation would be that each country would refer the matter to whatever agents or bodies it thought capable of making a suitable examination.

Mr Polk agrees with Mr Balfour and S Tittoni.

(It was decided:

1) That no immediate reply to the German Government’s request should be given.

2) That the Military Representatives at Versailles, in collaboration with Marshal Foch, should investigate the accuracy of the statements contained in the communication of the German Government, and should utilize all available sources of information at their command.

3) That Marshal Foch should report to the Council on such military compensations as might be demanded from Germany in return for a compliance with their present request.)

2. M Clemenceau circulates two telegrams from Germany stating

1) That Germany had at present 800,000 men under arms, and,

2) That the students in Munich were being armed in violation of the Peace Treaty. Information From Germany With Regard to the Number of Men Under Arms in That Country and the Arming of Students of Munich.

Mr Balfour states, that before proceeding further with the question, he would like to have comprehensive figures comparing the total number of enemy and Allied troops at present in the field. He feared that such figures might be alarming.

S Tittoni says that as Marshal Foch was going to study the questions put to him under decision

2. He would like him to state what force was now required in Germany for the maintenance of order.

Marshal Foch replies that the question is answered by the military provisions of the Armistice and of the Peace Treaty. He considers that the significance of the events at Munich lay in the fact, that the Germans wished to show, by what they were doing, that they knows that Allied control over their actions would soon cease.

M Clemenceau remarks that the communication circulated drew attention to the point.

(It is therefore decided that the two documents circulated should be submitted to Marshal Foch for examination and report.)

3. M Clemenceau reads a telegram from General Franchet d’Esperey with regard to the Allied occupation of Thrace.

He remarks that it is obviously necessary to rein force the Allied troops in Bulgaria although the measure presented practical difficulties.

Mr Balfour says that as he understands it the situation is serious and a comparison between the available Allied and Bulgarian forces would be disadvantageous to ourselves. He had received a report that the disarmament of Bulgaria was incomplete, on account of the different way in which demobilization was carried out in such countries as England and France, and in Bulgaria. In the former case, demobilization meant that soldiers returned absolutely to their civil occupations, and ceased to appear on the list of any military unit. This was not the case in Bulgaria, where demobilization meant no more than the reduction of a military unit, from war to peace strength. The Bulgarian Army had comprised ten divisions. Under the Armistice it had been allowed to keep three and had been ordered to demobilize seven. This meant no more than that, Bulgaria now had a powerful military force of three divisions on full war strength, and seven others on a reduced footing.

Marshal Foch says that he thinks Mr. Balfour’s remarks as a whole were correct, but he could not guarantee the accuracy of the details.

M Clemenceau said that General Franchet d’Esperey had been asked to give a detailed report, but that no very clear statement had yet been received from him.

Marshal Foch says that the Bulgarian Army had never even obeyed orders it had received from the Allies. It is quite possible that they would have a superior force to that of the Allies, at the time that the Peace Treaty was presented.

M Clemenceau said that he proposes that Marshal Foch should report on the situation, and asked the approximate time necessary for the preparation of such a report.

Marshal Foch said it would require several days, as he would be obliged to refer the matter to General Franchet d’Esperey.

General Weygand states that a certain amount of information was already at hand and that a report on the basis of the information available could be presented to the Supreme Council on the following day.

(It is agreed that Marshal Foch should submit on August 2nd a report oil the present status of the Bulgarian forces, based upon information at present in his possession.)

(It is further decided that Marshal Foch should make investigations through General Franchet d’Esperey, and submit a full report when these latter had been received.)

4. M Clemenceau circulates a telegram from the Military Representatives at Klagenfurt.

Telegram From the Inter-Allied Military Representatives at Klagenfurt Relative to the Execution of the Decision of the Conference M Berthelot further explained the telegram stating that by the withdrawal of the Austrians and Yugoslavs from Klagenfurt a certain quantity of war material had been left behind, under the custody of a few Italian carabinièri. In view of the fact that the Supreme Council had asked that an Inter-Allied guard should be placed in charge of the material in question, it was now requested that it should be constituted, and, until it could be so constituted, two companies of Italian carabinièri should be authorized by the Council to form the guard. He pointed out that the value of the property in question was inconsiderable, and suggested that two platoons of Italian carabiniéri would be quite efficient to ensure the custody of the material.

(It is agreed that the Italian Command should be authorized to furnish two platoons of carabinièri, for the purpose of guarding the war material at Klagenfurt.)

5. The Council has before it a communication from Marshal Foch to the following effect:

“When the Army of Occupation shall have been organised, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies on the Western front, who was in command during the war, will no longer exercise this command.

However, it is necessary to maintain a superior After Germany Command for the group of Allied forces of occupation, were it only to establish a liaison with the High Commission who should communicate directly with the High Military Command (Art. IV of Memorandum of June 9th), also for regulating all military questions dealing with railway, river, telegraphic, telephonic and postal communications.

France, on account of the number of troops in her army of occupation, should place a General at the head of the Rhine Army. The other Nations will probably not do this.

It is proposed that this General be designated to command the group of Allied occupation forces, as soon as the command of Marshal Foch on the Western front shall have ceased, in other words, at the moment that the Peace Treaty goes into force.”

(The proposals which Marshal Foch’s communication contains are agreed to without discussion.)

6. (a) Frontier of Prekomurye.

M Tardieu states that the Roumanian and Yugoslav Committee had submitted on July 22nd a Memorandum with regard to two new claims which had been presented by the Delegation of the Yugoslav kingdom regarding the northern frontier of that State.

(It is decided to adhere to the boundary line in Prekomurye formerly adopted by the Supreme Council which line in general follows the watershed between the Mur and the Raab.)

(b) Baranya

M Tardieu reads the Memorandum regarding Baranya.

(It is decided to accept the proposal of the Committee with regard to Baranya, and the frontier which has been proposed by it.)

7. (a) Bacska.

M Tardieu reports on the notes submitted to the Supreme Council by the Committee on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs dated 25th July, 1919.

(It is decided to accept the draft proposals of the Committee on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs with regard to the Bacska region; and to uphold the frontier line previously laid down, in view of the fact that the ethnographic conditions in the locality would not allow of the aforesaid frontier line being extended to the north. It was further decided to refer the question of laying down regulations of an international kind, with regard to the working of the Deak Canal, at present in Yugoslavia, by means of hydraulic installations now in Hungarian territory, to the Committee on Ports, Railways and Waterways.)

(b) Banat.

M Tardieu draws the attention of the Conference to the Report of the Committee on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs on the subject of the Banat.

(It is decided to adopt the proposals contained in the report of the Committee on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs with regard to the Banat, as follows:

(1) Central Banat: The previously adopted frontier is to be upheld, and a notification to that effect sent to persons concerned. The Committee on Ports, Railways and Waterways will take the necessary measures to maintain and to develop, the irrigation canals in the Banat, to the equal advantage of the States to which the Banat is allotted.

(2) Northern Banat: The question is to be adjourned for further study.

8. M Tardieu says that the Committee on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs had received a note dated July 10th from the Yugoslav Delegation, asking that their troops be allowed to occupy the territories granted to Serbia by the Conference, in the region in question. The Committee had submitted a reply dated 26th July. Since the Council had settled the territorial question in Prekomurye, he proposed that the suggested military occupation should be granted.

(It is decided that the Yugoslav State should be authorized to occupy the territory in Prekomurye bounded by the frontier laid down and notified.)

9. M Tardieu states that the Committee on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs had given him a report dated 30th July, to which he has nothing to add.

Mr Balfour says that the Commission, after its first examination of the question, had decided, that, for ethnographical reasons, the small territorial area under discussion could not be given to the Bukovina. The reasons in question still hold good, because the population of the district was more Ruthene than Romanian in character. In addition to this, Poland has received Eastern Galicia, and laid no claims to the area now being considered. The desires of the population affected were the real matter for study. He asks what was the reason given by the Committee in support of these proposals. The answer probably is that it would be advantageous, from a political point of view, to maintain the historical frontiers of Bukovina since that would be a measure which would please the Romanian Government, and Romanian public opinion. The Bukovina has never belonged properly to Romania, and he was not in favour of granting it to that country, until such time as its real attitude towards the Allies had been cleared up. Up to the present time, the wishes and instructions of the Conference had been grossly disregarded by Romania. That country had never acceded to our demands, and now that a territorial change, violating the principles of nationalities, is proposed in the interests of Romanian public opinion, he prefers to adjourn the question.

Mr Polk says that he had been told in the morning that the line shown in red on the chart, runs along the bottom of a Valley; and that he does not care for such a solution.

S Tittoni said that he would like to draw attention to the following point, which was, that the frontier now proposed had been promised to Romania when she entered the war. For this reason he would uphold it willingly. On the other hand, he recognised the strength of Mr Balfour’s argument, and thinks that Romania should be informed, that it would only receive the territory in question, if it were willing to carry out the wishes of the Allies, and to sign the Treaty. Romania was now in a state of discontent. The demands of that country in the Banat had been curtailed; and it would be unwise, therefore, to displease it with regard to Bukovina, unless there were important reasons for so doing. That is to say, the proposals of the Committee might be accepted under certain conditions.

M Tardieu says that the Bessarabian question had not been settled either. Since the Council could exert pressure, it could be announced that the report of the Committee would be accepted if Romania satisfied the Council in other ways.

Mr Balfour says that there are also numerous negotiations proceeding between Romania and Hungary, of a kind that did not arise out of the Treaty. It was nevertheless important that these negotiations should be concluded in a manner satisfactory to all. Romania is not only concerned in signing the Treaty, it is also called upon to manifest its general goodwill.

Mr Polk says that he accepted the proposal in principle; but that he would prefer that the question should again be referred to experts, since a frontier running through the bottom of a Valley seems to him unsatisfactory.

M Tardieu says that the question had been carefully examined by the Committee. The difficulty is that a part of the Bukovina has already been given to Romania, and had been occupied by that country. The alternative would be to give it to Poland, who does not demand it.

Mr Polk says that he raised no objection and that he is only insisting on a point of detail.

(It is decided to accept the Report of the Committee on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs, and to grant Bukovina to Romania, with the exception of the area traversed by the railway line - Zaleszczyki-Kolomea; on the condition that Romania should show goodwill towards the Allies, with regard to the signature of the Treaty, and to the other questions in which she is concerned.)

10. M Tardieu says he wishes to draw attention to a question not on the order of the day, but one demanding an early solution; the problem is that of Bessarabia, on which the Council had taken no decision.

Mr Maklakoff and S Bratiano had expressed the Russian and Romanian points of view. After they had been heard, the Council had discussed the matter briefly without coming to a decision. It remains to be known what solution the Council would adopt, for it is difficult to settle the Romanian question as a whole, and to make that country accept clauses in the Peace Treaty on the subject of minorities, if, at the same time, its frontiers have not been notified to it.

M Pichon says that the question is particularly important, in that the minorities question would arise in Bessarabia.

M Tardieu says that the Committee has been unanimous in their wish to grant Bessarabia to Romania, but the Council had sent a telegram to Admiral Kolchak, which appeared inconsistent with that decision. In the telegram in question the council had only stated that the Roumanian rights in Bessarabia should be preserved in favour of that country.

M Clemenceau said that it is evidently important to be able to inform Romania what its frontiers exactly are.

Mr Balfour asks whether M Tardieu that the Committee would remain of the same opinion if the question were referred back to it for a further report.

M Tardieu says that the Committee had been unanimous when it had studied the problem. But they knew that certain Delegations had altered their opinions after the lapse of a few months. The difficult point was the telegram sent to Admiral Kolchak.

M Pichon says that he does not think that the Council has been inconsistent, since it had not stated to Admiral Kolchak that Bessarabia as a whole would be granted to Romania.

Mr Balfour asks whether M Pichon thinks the telegram to Admiral Kolchak was not binding on the Council.

M Pichon says that Admiral Kolchak’s attention had only been drawn to the fact that the Council upheld Romanian rights in Bessarabia.

S Tittoni said that he wishes to draw the attention of the Council to an important point, which is that the Committee has justified its proposals by saying that it wishes to maintain the administrative and geographical unity of Bessarabia, and that it would give to Romania, in compensation, a strip of territory in the Dobrudja, which belonged properly to the Bulgarians. By such a measure Romania would be compensated for the Northern portion of Bessarabia left to Russia.

Mr Balfour says he does not think he can admit compensations, which consisted in balancing the cession of groups of human beings, by the cession of others to foreign sovereignties, as a matter of principle.

S Tittoni remarked that the question had therefore still to be examined.

M Clemenceau says that the problem ought to be solved rapidly, and he proposes to put it on the Agenda for the following day.

Mr Balfour said that he ought to call attention to the fact that Romania was actually protesting strongly against the minority clauses. It would therefore be sufficient to tell that country, that it would not receive the territory now being considered, unless it accepted the minority clauses and signed the Treaty. In addition to this, Romanian Statesmen did not really deny that the Southern part of the Dobrudja should be granted to Bulgaria. Had Romania been our enemy during the war she would have been obliged to cede the territory. By the fact that she had been our Ally, she could only be persuaded to accept our solution. is it therefore possible to say to that country, that it was going to receive a great extension of territory, but only under the condition that it would be willing to consent to the cession of the Dobrudja, which had been seized in 1913, and which, if left in her hands, would be a ceaseless cause of friction. The Romanians are difficult people to deal with, and M Bratiano is no exception.

S Tittoni said that he has heard that a new ministry had been set up in Romania, and that the President of the High Court had been instructed to form it.

Mr Balfour said that he had also heard that, but the Cabinet has not been formed, and the Bessarabian question was so important that he hoped that each one of his colleagues would give it his consideration.

Mr Polk said that the policy of the United States had been to oppose the division of Russia. Admiral Kolchak in his reply, had protested against his country being divided. He thought that the effect of dividing Russia would have a bad effect in that country, and was therefore of the opinion that it would be better not to settle the question straight away, but to await the return of ordered government in Russia.

S Tittoni remarks that Russia’s point of view had been presented to the Council.

Mr Polk said that the Romanians opposed any idea of a plebiscite in Bessarabia.

S Tittoni said that that was so, because the result of a plebiscite would be the establishment of Bolshevism.

Mr Balfour says he does not desire to settle the question on that day, but that he would be willing that it should be taken up again in a few days’ time, if it were possible to settle it then. He does not, however, believe that it would be. In his opinion, he thought it better not to consider Russia, and to regard our hands as free. He is willing to wait for the formation of the new Romanian Cabinet in the hope that it would be possible to negotiate with it and to settle outstanding problems.

M Tardieu says that it would undoubtedly be better to wait for the formation of the new Government, but even if it were favorable to our point of view, we should have to inform it of our opinions on the Bukovina, Bessarabian and Dobrudja problems. It is not possible to do this at present.

Mr Balfour says that if the new Romanian Government proved satisfactory, it would send a representative to the Conference with whom the Council could negotiate. It would then be possible to tell this new representative that the Council was favorably disposed towards territorial concessions advantageous to Romania, on the condition that the Romanians themselves should give evidence of goodwill in the discussion of problems not yet solved.

M Clemenceau says that it should be remembered that the Bulgarian Delegation was now actually waiting for the Conditions of Peace at Neuilly.

Mr Balfour says that the Peace Treaty with the Bulgarians could be discussed and settled whilst the present question remains open.

(It is decided to postpone the discussion on Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Dobrudja until the formation of the new Roumanian Government.

It is further decided that the above questions should be put on the Agenda as soon as the new Government had been formed.)

(M Sergent and M Cheysson entered the room.)

(M Clemenceau left the room and M Pichon took the Chair.)

11. M Pichon said that the Council had to examine the amendments brought forward by the Reparations and Finance Committee after hearing the Roumanian, Greek and Yugoslav Delegations.

M Sergent read the report prepared by the two Committees. He adds that the Reparations Commission has been presented with a note from the Serbian Delegation. The note in question has been examined and its suggestions adopted partially. On the day in question, however, at two o’clock, a new note, couched in the most violent terms had been received, stating that Yugoslavia refused point-blank to accept article 4 in the Reparation Clauses. In the Peace Treaty with Germany the article in question had laid down that Bulgaria should transfer her debt with Germany to the Allies. In article 4 of the Reparation Clauses with Bulgaria that country is called upon to recognize the validity of the transfer of all credits due to the Governments of Germany, of Austria-Hungary and of Turkey, to the Allied and Associated Governments comfortably with article 261 of the Peace Treaty with Germany; and to the corresponding articles in the Peace Treaties with Austria-Hungary and Turkey. At the same time, the Allied and Associated Governments had taken these debts into account, when they had considered the sums payable by Bulgaria, and had undertaken not to put forward any further claims under this head. Serbia stated in her note, that, while the Allied and Associated Governments might be in a position to forego later claims, they had no right to impose a corresponding renunciation upon Serbia. The note ended in what amounted to a threat to refuse to sign the Peace Treaty. The Reparation Committee had fixed the indemnity payable by Bulgaria at 2 billion francs. 250 million francs due from Bulgaria to Germany had been added to this sum. Since the Committee had taken the debt into account it thought that nothing further could be done.

Mr Balfour says that the principle guiding the Council and the Reparations Committee has been that Bulgaria should pay the maximum amount that her resources allowed. It is of little importance, from the Bulgarian point of view that the sum should be paid to any particular Ally, since Serbia would have her share.

M Sergent said that the Reparations Committee had first intended to divide the indemnity into two heads. Under the first head, would have been reparations amounting to 2 billion francs, and, under the second, 250 million francs owed by Bulgaria to Germany. This would have avoided giving the impression of renouncing the debt due to the Allies by Germany. It seems that Serbia had not taken this simple calculation into account.

M Pichon said that the Reparations Committee, being now informed of the issue, could submit a report, which should be waited for.

Mr Polk says that Serbia is dissatisfied on another point, which is the amount of livestock to be delivered to her by Bulgaria. is it possible to know what extra amount, under this head, had been granted to the Serbians?

M Sergent says that the original figures had been doubled except in the case of the oxen. Serbia was actually going to receive 6,000 milch cows 5,000 horses and mares, 1,000 mules, 4,000 yoke oxen and 12,000 sheep. Notwithstanding this, the Serbian demand amounts to ten times that figure.

M Berthelot says that in spite of the figures having been doubled, Serbia is only going to receive one tenth part of that which had been taken from her by the Bulgarians.

(It is decided to accept the Reparation Clauses, with the exception of article 4, dealing with the transfer of credits, and of article 6, dealing with the delivery of live-stock.)

(M Sergent and M Cheysson then leave the room and Generals Duval, Groves and Rear Admiral Orsini entered.)

12. General Duval says that he has to submit a report, dated 30th July, on the subject of the distribution of aeronautic material delivered by the enemy Governments.

Mr Balfour says that the Note brings forward two questions:

(1) What principle is to govern the distribution of war material - a difficult question which had already raised considerable controversy?

(2) How is this material to be dealt with when distributed between the Allied and Associated Powers?

The Committee proposes that the material in question should become the property of whatever Government it is given to, so long as this latter should undertake not to alienate it. He proposes to adjourn the first question and to accept the second principle enunciated.

S Tittoni says that he accepts Mr. Balfour’s proposal, but asks that the first question should be referred to Versailles, in order that the settlement should be made conformable to the general principles guiding the general distribution of war material, in general.

(This proposal is adopted.)

(It was therefore decided:

To request the Military Representatives at Versailles to submit a proposal regarding the principles to govern the distribution of all aeronautical war material turned over by the Central Powers in accordance with the Peace Treaty.

It is further decided that the Inter-Allied Commission of Control should be charged with the details of the distribution to be made in accordance with the principles established above. It is further decided that once this material has been allotted to and accepted by any one of the Allied and Associated Powers, it should become the property of such Government, which latter should agree not to alienate the material in question by any form of transfer.)

13. S Tittoni presents the President with a report from the Italian Delegation on the subject of the delivery of arms and munitions to Czechoslovakia by Austria.

Jimbuna

08-05-19, 10:41 AM

5th August 1919

Royal Navy cadets cheer passing boats during a naval pageant on the River Thames.
https://i.imgur.com/yuqtO7S.jpg

A refugee family living in a boxcar in Western Siberia.
https://i.imgur.com/ClvY9OG.jpg

Queen Marie of Romania visiting a hospital for typhus patients.
https://i.imgur.com/SdCNiDV.jpg

Sailor Steve

08-06-19, 08:05 AM

Saturday, August 2, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Clemenceau informs the Council that he has received a wireless message from Lt-Col Romanelli, commanding the Italian Military Mission at Budapest. This message was addressed to M Clemenceau.

M Mantoux then reads the dispatch.

S Tittoni says that he thinks there is some misunderstanding as to the acceptance of proposals by the Allied Powers. He does not think the Allied Powers have made any proposals, as was suggested in the message. He thinks that what was alluded to was the plan explained by General Boehm to the Allied Representative in Vienna. He has himself received a telegram from Vienna, which does not quite agree with the message read out. According to his information, General Boehm and Mr Peidl had told the Prince Borghese and Colonel Cunninghame that if the Romanians are stopped, they would be able to form a Government more completely representative of public opinion.

M Clemenceau asks whether it was General Boehm who had caused the Revolution.

S Tittoni said that the proposals had been made by General Boehm as representative of the Socialists and of the Labour Party. It is necessary that the Allies should take precautions not to be deceived a second time.

M Clemenceau observes that there is no motive for negotiating a second armistice. There already is one.

Mr Balfour says that he was in agreement. He thinks the proposals refer to were those contained in the message discussed on the 26th of July. He has no objection to these proposals, but what he does object to was that the responsibility for them should be laid upon the Allies. The Council was concerned with the armistice and its observance. It was not concerned with the internal Government of Hungary. No proposals had been made by the Council. That was the first point that should be made clear.

M Clemenceau says that the second point to make clear was that there is already an armistice, and no need of a new one.

Mr Balfour said that it was clear that hostilities must stop, but no new contract was required for this. The Romanians could be told to stop by the Council, and they must obey. The Hungarians must also be told that they were not authorized by the armistice to advance.

M Clemenceau says that on this subject he wishes to ask Marshal Foch a question. Is it not true that the present line of the Romanians was quite different to the line they held under the armistice?

Marshal Foch said that the line was in fact quite different. It was at the present time the line of the Theiss.

Mr Balfour said that the Council about the 13th of June, had ordered the Romanians to go back from the line of the Theiss within their own frontiers. They had not done so. Their excuse had been that as the Hungarians had not disarmed as they were bound to do under the armistice, it is impossible for them to risk giving up a defendable line for one which was strategically far worse. Under the present circumstances, he thought that the Romanians should be ordered to withdraw to the line originally laid down for them.

S Tittoni thought that an order of this kind should be deferred. He thinks for the time being that the Romanians should be ordered to stop on the positions they now held. If the Hungarians gave evidence of good behavior, the Romanians could then be told to withdraw within their own frontiers. If, on the other hand, the Hungarians are again deceiving the Allies, any withdrawal of the Romanians would be regretted. Should the Hungarians do all that was required of them, it would be easy to order the Romanians to withdraw, and they would certainly comply.

M Pichon said that there was another reason in favour of this. When the Romanians had been assigned the armistice line, they had made it clear that it was indefensible. Nevertheless, they had conformed to it. Then they had been attacked, and, in order to repel attack, they had advanced to the Theiss. It would clearly be unfair to them to order them now to abandon that line. It was the Hungarians who had really violated the essential clauses of the armistice by maintaining a larger army than was allowed to them. The first necessity, therefore, was to force the Hungarians to reduce their forces.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks there is no great difference between his views and those of S Tittoni and M Pichon. Historically, however, he thinks that M Pichon was not quite accurate. He does not think that the Roumanian advance to the Theiss had been made as a consequence of attack by the Hungarians. The Romanians had gone to the Theiss, and the Council had stopped them there. The Council had then ordered them to go back, and they did not do so. They had given no official reason for this, but, privately, S Bratiano had explained that he must keep a defendable line against the large Hungarian army.

M Clemenceau says that this explanation had also been given officially.

Mr Balfour said that he had not been aware of this. In any case, the Hungarians had attacked the Romanians on the plea that the latter had not observed the armistice. The Hungarians had been defeated, and Bela Kun’s Government had fallen. He quite agreed that the Council should avoid making the same mistake as before, but, personally, he would not make it a condition that they should have a humane and orderly Government or any specific kind of Government whatever. This was an interference in their domestic affairs. He would adhere strictly to the armistice, and call on the Hungarians to observe it. It might further be added that if the Government set up in Hungary were such as could be recognised, the Allies would make peace with it speedily.

S Tittoni says that he thinks there is really agreement. He points out that General Boehm at Vienna had not asked for a withdrawal of the Romanian troops, but for their advance to stop.

M Clemenceau said that the Council had no cognizance of General Boehm.

Mr Polk asks whether the Council has not made a declaration in any manner tying its hands.

M Clemenceau said that all that had been done was to make a general declaration to the world.

Mr Polk asks whether the Council is not tied in any other way?

M Clemenceau says it is not. It appears to him that the Council is agreed that the understanding alleged in the message, between General Boehm and Prince Borghese was not binding on the Council, and that it was unnecessary to negotiate any new armistice as the old one was still in existence.

S Tittoni says that though there is no agreement between General Boehm and Prince Borghese, nevertheless, the Allied Agents in Vienna had been instructed to conduct conversations with General Boehm, the result of which had been certain proposals agreed to by General Boehm.

(It is then decided to send a telegram in reply to the wireless message received from Lt. Col. Romanelli at Budapest, dated August 1st.)

2. M Clemenceau says that he has received a question from the Danish Government regarding the cost of the troops of occupation during the plebiscite period in Slesvig. The Danish Government wishes to know whether expenses under the head of “Plebiscite Expenses” are to include the maintenance of these troops.

(It is decided to notify the Danish Government in answer to their Note of August 2nd, that the Inter-Allied Military and Naval expenses of occupation during the period of the Plebiscite, should be included in the general expenses of the Plebiscite.)

3. M Clemenceau says that he has received a request from the Danish Government for the immediate despatch of warships to Flensburg, so that in case of need, order should be maintained by their help in the plebiscite zones of Slesvig.

(It is decided to notify the Danish Government in answer to their Note of August 2nd, that in the opinion of the Council, the British warship now present in Danish waters, together with a French warship at present on its way there, should suffice to maintain order. The British Admiral Commanding the Naval forces would be able to estimate the situation at Flensburg, and to take necessary measures.)

4. (It is decided to refer to the Commission on Political Clauses the Articles proposed by the Greek Delegation for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.)

(Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives at Versailles enter the room.)

5. Marshal Foch reads a statement regarding the Bulgarian Forces.

Mr Balfour says that his comment on the conclusion of the statement read by Marshal Foch, is that it would appear that the Allies must make a Peace agreeable to Bulgaria because they were unable to enforce a disagreeable one. He was not very willing to acquiesce in such a conclusion unless it were inevitable.

Marshal Foch says that Bulgaria had nine Divisions. These Divisions are easily convertible to war strength. Against them are very weak Allied Forces. The British force consisted of 40 men - the Italian of one Battalion - the French of two Divisions, which would be reduced by demobilization to 15,000 men. There were also two thin Romanian Divisions - one Serbian Brigade & six Greek Divisions. The last represented the bulk of the available forces.

M Clemenceau asks Marshal Foch what he thinks of the military value of the Greek Divisions.

Marshal Foch said that he is not prepared to express any opinion.

M Pichon observed that General Guillaumat had thought well of them.

Marshal Foch says that the troops that General Guillaumat had thought well of, were National Defense troops. Since the check received at Smyrna by the Greek Army, it was not unlikely that the morale of the Greek troops had suffered.

Mr Balfour said he would like to inquire whether the Military stores, which, according to a clause of the Armistice, had been deposited under Allied guard within Bulgarian territory, could be seized by the Bulgarian Army should it wish to resist the orders of the Conference?

Marshal Foch replies that the Bulgarian Army could probably seize them.

Mr Balfour says it is regrettable that such a provision had been made in the Armistice.

Marshal Foch remarks that when the Armistice was made, better terms could not be obtained.

M Clemenceau asked whether a portion of the military material had not been withdrawn outside Bulgarian territory.

General Weygand said that the firing mechanism of one-twentieth of the rifles - one-tenth of the machine guns, and one-sixth of the guns, had been removed to Salonika. The remainder was still on Bulgarian soil under Allied guard.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Allied guard would be sufficient to protect these stores against the Bulgarian Army?

General Weygand replied that he thinks not, but he suggests that General Baird, who had just come from Bulgaria, should be asked to make a statement on the present condition of affairs there.

Marshal Foch says he thinks it would be well to hear General Baird. He thinks the Bulgarian Government is not inclined to resist the Conference, but it was possible that the population might rise and gain possession of these stores.

M Clemenceau says that he is not very much alarmed by the Bulgarian situation. He agrees with Marshal Foch that the Government was unlikely to resist. As to popular risings, he thought they would not be very serious. Popular forces did not count much against regular troops. There were in all 15,000 French troops and 6 Greek Divisions, which should, and must, act. Greece was particularly interested, and her troops would doubtless behave well when acting in a national cause. Moreover, some of the Greek troops in Asia Minor could, if necessary, be recalled. If, however, it were required, Great Britain and Italy would doubtless come to the rescue. Moreover, he did not think that Bulgaria by herself would defy the whole victorious Alliance. Germany had been defeated, and the only quarter to which Bulgaria could look was the Entente. Germany had not dared to defy the Conference, and it was most unlikely that Bulgaria would. He quite agreed, however, that it would be useful to hear General Baird, and, if then thought necessary, to make a communication to the Bulgarian Delegation at Neuilly.

Mr Balfour says that he is inclined to agree with M Clemenceau’s estimate of the situation. Unfortunately, Bulgaria is not the only quarter in which the Allies are weak. The American Congress, the British House of Commons and the French Chamber are all anxious to demobilize.

M Clemenceau says that modern war differs from wars in the past, and the weakness indicated by Mr Balfour, which came about at the cessation of hostilities, applied to the enemy as well as to ourselves. He himself had apprehended resistance by the Germans to the terms relating to Poland. Germany, however, had acquiesced. He felt sure that Bulgaria would do likewise.

(It is decided to request General Baird, through the British delegation, to be present at a meeting of the Council on August 4th, and to make a statement on the present situation in Bulgaria.)

6. General Weygand reads a letter from General Nollet and a covering letter from Marshal Foch on the subject of allowances for Allied Officers on the Missions of Control in Berlin.

It is decided to refer to the Military Representatives at Versailles for study and report, the question of allowances for Allied Officers on the Missions of Control in Germany.

7. General Belin read the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles.

S Tittoni says that it was important that the prisoners should be repatriated in small groups. One of the reasons for obstacles raised by Poland, Lithuania and other neighboring States, was the fear that large batches of Russian prisoners should escape and take to looting.

General Belin said that this was a point of detail which the Commission might deal with.

Mr Polk asks whether General Belin could make any estimate of the time that the whole operation would take.

General Belin says that General Malcolm thinks it should be completed before the end of the year.

Mr Polk says that from the American point of view there was a difficulty. There were about 800 American Officers and men on duty with the American Mission in Germany. Owing to the American demobilization, no money would be available for the upkeep of this Mission, nor for the supplies of food for the Russian Prisoners of War for the length of time indicated by General Belin. He points out that there were originally two million Russian prisoners in Germany, but that this total had now been reduced to 200,000. He suggests that it would be as well to charge the German Government with the care of the remainder.

General Bliss said that the substance of what he means to say had already been explained by Mr Polk. He would recall that it was a report by Mr Hoover to the effect that the funds available for the upkeep of these Russian Prisoners, had been exhausted which had led to the examination of the subject at Versailles. He and Mr White had recommended in Washington that the Armies of Occupation on the Rhine should be made responsible for the care of these prisoners, but this view had not prevailed. It is now necessary to withdraw all American conscripted men from Europe. In support of this he reads the following letter:

"General Headquarters
american expeditionary forces
office of the chief of staff

August 2, 1919.

Dear General Bliss:

The Commander-in-Chief desires me to request you to use your best efforts with your colleagues to hasten the permission for him to withdraw our officers and troops in Berlin. At the time of the signing of the Peace orders had already been given for the withdrawal of the entire mission numbering approximately 700 persons. At the request of Marshal Foch on the 30th of June, General Pershing agrees to suspend the orders for a few days. On taking the matter up again on his return from London on the 24th of July, Marshal Foch informed him that the matter of the withdrawal of our representation there had been taken out of his hands and was vested in the Commission to Negotiate Peace. With the Conference between you and me, on the subject since that time, you are familiar.

Without assuming to discuss the desirability of the United States maintaining troops in Berlin after Germany has ratified the Peace, in connection with the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war, we have imperative orders from the War Department to get all temporary personnel home by a certain time. It is necessary from that standpoint that the most expeditious action be had and a decision reached at the earliest date possible which will enable General Pershing to withdraw all officers and men now on that mission.

May I ask that you will help us in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

J G Harbord
Chief of Staff

General Tasker H Bliss,
American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Hotel Crillon, Paris.

He suggests that the only solution is for the Allies to relieve the Americans of their share in this work, or for Germany to take over the whole thing.

Mr Balfour says that he does not think the scheme elaborated at Versailles very practical. What is proposed is a Commission. A Commission alone could do nothing. The American share alone at present required the services of 700 men. The British Red Cross has, he believes, a considerable personnel, and undertook a considerable share of the work. Their funds were exhausted, and their personnel was being recalled. It was clear that this system could not be continued. A Commission without an Army behind it, could not act as substitute. The Americans could not provide men. Without consulting Experts, he was prepared to say that the British could not supply any. He doubted whether France or Italy could find them. The system would, therefore, break down. There was another objection. If the old arrangement is patched up, it would appear that the Allies still regarded themselves as responsible. If they undertake the responsibility and failed to carry out their undertakings, they would be discredited. He thinks the responsibility should be repudiated. After Peace, it was quite unnecessary for the Allies to continue supporting Russian prisoners taken by the Germans. He noticed that it was suggested that 145,000 Russians should be repatriated by rail. It would be extremely difficult to prevail upon the Poles and Lithuanians to forward them over land. Meanwhile, he wished to ask who should feed them. Another 70,000 or 80,000 were to go by sea. He had the greatest doubt whether shipping could be found for them except at the expense of more vital services. He therefore recommended that the responsibility be thrown on the Germans. It was a responsibility they should have always borne. If the Germans then applied to the Allies for assistance, it would be time to consider what could be done. This policy was clear and freed the Allies from a task which they could not undertake without incurring discredit.

Mr Polk then suggests the following resolution:

That the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers notify the Government at once that all restrictions heretofore placed on the repatriation of the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, are removed, and that henceforth the responsibility of supporting them must rest with the German Government.

(This proposal is accepted.)

8. M Clemenceau says that the question was whether or not the Baltic Commission should concern itself with the question of access to the Baltic.

Mr Balfour says that access to the Baltic from the North Sea at present depended not on any Treaty, but on immemorial custom. It was now suggested that this custom should be regularized by formal Inter-Allied sanction. This would establish a common régime for all the channels. In the Sound and the Great Belt, traffic, he believed, had never been stopped by the neutrals on their shores. They interfered neither with trading vessels nor with warships. In the Little Belt, however, the Germans had stopped traffic, and had laid mines. They could do so again, and this was not contrary either to the law of nations or to the practice thereof. If the proposals now before the Council were accepted, all the channels would be made free for traffic. Whether it is worth while to engage in difficult negotiations to obtain this, he does not know.

S della Torretta explains that the Commission has not examined the merits of the question, as it does not know whether it is empowered to examine it at all.

Mr Polk questions whether it would not be better to send the question to a Special Commission rather than to the Baltic Commission. He understands that the Baltic Commission was not composed of naval men. This appears to be a naval question.

S Tittoni suggests that naval experts be attached to the Baltic Commission for the purpose of examining the question.

(It is decided that the report of the British Delegation relative to access to the Baltic Sea be referred to the Baltic Commission, assisted by the naval experts, for examination and report.

The Baltic Commission should be responsible for summoning a joint meeting.)

9. (It is decided to refer the letter of the Roumanian Delegation dated August 2nd, proposing an amendment to the Economic Clauses of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty to the Economic Commission, for examination and report.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

08-06-19, 08:07 AM

Sunday, August 3, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Sailor Steve

08-06-19, 08:09 AM

Monday, August 4, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

(Marshal Foch, General Weygand, Mr Hoover and Mr Waterlow entered the room.)

1. Mr Hoover said that the situation had changed since since he last attended the Council. The Romanians were now entering Budapest. What he proposes is a relaxation of the Blockade, the opening of the Danube and the supply of foodstuffs to Hungary from the Banat. He thinks action should be taken without delay. The new Government though very radical, represents the Trade Unions. He thinks Trade Unionism is an instrument that should be used to upset Bolshevism. If this is a correct estimate the present Hungarian Government should be encouraged, as a very important reaction, even on Russia, might result. A member of the Food Administration in Vienna held the opinion that the new Government might take in a certain number of peasants. This might lead to a really representative Government.

Mr Balfour asks whether Mr Hoover has read the telegram sent by the Council. He thinks the conclusion of that telegram contains a policy very similar to that Mr Hoover recommended.

Mr Hoover says he has read the telegram. The only thing that it does not mention is relaxation of the Blockade, the opening of the Danube and the supply of food from the Banat. He thinks these measures represent the practical application of the policy outlined in the telegram, and that instructions to that effect should be given at once. As long as the Council is able to threaten a reimposition of the Blockade it will be able to control the situation. A week or two of relaxation would not give the Hungarian Government such economic strength as to make it independent. If the Government by then had not shown itself satisfactory by fulfilling all the conditions of the Armistice, by demobilizing and by doing what the Council wished, the Blockade could be reimposed. If, on the other hand, action were not taken at once the opportunity would be lost.

Mr Balfour says he thinks that the Council should both reopen the Danube and declare that it would close it again if it so wished.

Marshal Foch says that he has no objection to raise.

S Tittoni agreed but he thinks that it should be made clear that the Hungarians must conform to the Armistice.

M Clemenceau suggests that Mr Hoover should furnish a draft.

Mr Hoover then suggests a draft, which after some amendments suggested by S Tittoni, is adopted in the following form:

“It is agreed that instructions should be sent to the representatives of the various Allied Governments at Vienna and to the Blockade Commission in that area and to the Danube River Commission and to General Franchet d’Esperey that the Blockade on Hungary shall be lifted at once and that the Danube shall be opened and shall remain opened so long as the present Hungarian Government gives practical evidence of its intention to comply promptly with the conditions of the Armistice.”

Mr Hoover continuing says that there is a surplus of food in the Banat. The Council has tried to supply Vienna from this surplus. The Serbians, however, had stopped the exit of the supplies. The Banat was now the only source from which Budapest can be fed. One of the reasons for the obstacles raised is that German agents were offering bigger prices for the food than could be afforded by the Allies. The result of all this was that the relief of Vienna and Budapest is jeopardized. He asks whether the Council will be ready to address a request to the Government of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes not to hamper the export of food stuffs from the Banat.

Mr Balfour says that Mr Hoover puts the blame in one sentence on the Serbian Government for the stoppage of relief from the Banat, and in another says that the reason was that German Agents outbid everyone else. If the latter is the case, he cannot understand why the Serbian Government is to blame. No Government could make a merchant sell cheap if he could sell dear.

Mr Hoover says that the explanation is a very long story. The Economic Council has negotiated the cession of an iron bridge to the Serbians in exchange for food stuffs. The Serbian Government has put an embargo on all food exports from the Banat. By means of this, the Serbian Government entirely controls the direction taken by food exports. The intervention of the Germans has only complicated the question. The main element, however, remains the control of the Serbian Government. There are in the Banat 500,000 or 600,000 tons of food; the only source of supply from which Vienna and Budapest could be fed. He has prepared a draft to be addressed to the Serbian Government which might perhaps be too strong, but which might form the basis of the redraft. He then reads the following draft:

“The Council is informed by the Supreme Economic Council and by its various Allied representatives that there is a very considerable surplus of foodstuffs now lying in the Banat and surrounding counties and that with the impending favorable harvest in Greater Serbia there is now no reason for the reservation of these supplies from general distribution through Central Europe. The continuation of provisioning of Vienna is absolutely dependent upon the free shipment of these supplies to that city and the recent over-turn of Government in Budapest makes it of prime interest to the Allies and to all hope of stability in Central Europe that the City of Budapest should be given every facility for the purchase and export of foodstuffs from these counties.

Therefore, the Council wishes to urge upon the Serbian Government in the strongest terms that not only will the greatest contribution be made by Serbia towards the re-establishment of order and stability in the countries adjacent to her borders, but that the dictates of humanity demand that no obstruction of any character shall be placed in the way of food exports from the Banat to the surrounding counties and that, in fact, the Serbian Government is requested to join with the Allies and through their various agencies in promoting the export and distribution of these supplies. The Council hopes for an early and favorable reply to this representation, the importance of which it cannot over-emphasize, and it trusts that the Serbian Government will realize that unless the Allies can receive cooperation in the labors they have undertaken for the restoration of stability in Central Europe that it is impossible that the Allied Governments should continue the economic support which they have given and expect to continue giving to the Greater Serbian Government.”

M Clemenceau says that before pursuing this question any further, he wishes to inform his colleagues of two communications he had received - the first from Lt Col Romanelli and the second from the new Hungarian Government.

Under these conditions, M Clemenceau says that he approves Mr Hoover’s policy.

M Pichon says that he thinks it was overstepping the mark to threaten Serbia. The measures taken by the Serbian Government had been in accordance with the views of the Council at the time. The Government had acted in good faith. The Serbs were now to be asked to adopt another policy. This is not a sufficient reason for addressing any threats to them.

Mr Hoover says that he does not agree that the Serbian Government had acted in good faith. In respect of Vienna, the Serbian Government had refused to supply certain goods which had already been paid for. He agreed, however, that it might be as well not to threaten the Serbians.

M Clemenceau suggests that a redraft of Mr Hoover’s proposal should be made. He asks M Berthelot to make a draft.

Mr Polk said that the latest news received was to the effect that the Romanian advance guard had reached Budapest and that the Trade Union Government fears an occupation of the City by the Romanians and a further invasion by the Czechoslovaks. These fears would doubtless rouse nationalist feelings. At 14:00 the news was that 600 Roumanian cavalrymen were to the west of Budapest, where they had cut all communications with Vienna. Looting was said to have begun in the suburbs. To avoid worse trouble the Hungarians suggested that an inter-allied police force should be sent immediately to Budapest.

Mr Balfour asks what the Council can do to enforce good behavior on the Romanians.

Marshal Foch said that he does not know.

S Tittoni said that the Romanians have been invited to go to Budapest together with the Serbs and the Czechoslovaks. All they had done was to go there by themselves.

M Clemenceau said that as the Council can neither blame the Romanians nor praise them, it was perhaps best to say nothing.

S Tittoni said that he advocates sending an Allied Mission.

Mr Polk said that he agreed to this. He also thought it was essential that the Romanians should withdraw from Budapest.

Mr Balfour says that if the Romanians insisted on going forward and occupying Budapest the result would be the fall of the present Government in Hungary and an outbreak of nationalist feeling. He could not see what the Romanians could gain either for themselves or for the common cause by persisting in their present course. Their only excuse previously for not withdrawing was that they feared an attack by the Hungarians, this they had no reason to fear now. The Hungarians have said that they would observe the Armistice; the Council is therefore bound to give them an opportunity of proving that they meant what they said. It was not giving them a fair chance to send Romanians to plunder the suburbs of Budapest.

Marshal Foch says that an inter-Allied character could be given to the occupation of Budapest either by sending allied regiments as suggested by the Hungarian Government, or by sending Missions of Allied Officers. The former, under the circumstances, it was not easy to realize. On the other hand it was possible that the Romanian Government might wish to settle the whole situation by itself.

M Clemenceau says that the Romanian Government would then be solving the Council’s problems; if so the Council would settle theirs without them.

Mr Polk says that the Romanians had not shown all the respect for the Conference that was desirable. They are not likely to treat the Hungarians in accordance with the laws of war. If the Council allowed Budapest to be looted, the effect on Russia would be instantaneous. The whole effect of the overthrow of Bela Kun would be lost. Any Occupation of the city was dangerous. He asked whether the Romanians could not be required to remain outside.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Romanian army is not under the command of General Franchet d’Esperey.

Marshal Foch says that it was not.

M Pichon says that he had sent a telegram on the previous night to the French Minister at Bucharest, requesting him to ask the Romanian Government to stop the advance of Roumanian troops immediately on the positions then occupied. He had further asked the French Minister to inform him of the result of his démarche.

Marshal Foch says that the first thing that must be done is to disarm Hungary. The only guarantee of disarmament was the occupation of the country. This occupation must be effected with the available troops.

M Clemenceau asks whose the available troops were.

Marshal Foch replied that they were Romanian or Czech troops.

S Tittoni said that the worst possible results would be obtained by sending Czech troops into Hungary. The Hungarians detested the Czechs even more than the Romanians. He thought an Allied Mission, if sent at once, could judge on the spot what measures should be taken and would be able to exercise sufficient moral influence to have them carried out.

Mr Polk says that the occupation of Budapest would make it impossible for the Hungarians to surrender their arms. National feeling would prohibit this unless the Hungarians could rely on Allied protection. An Allied Officer (not American) had heard a Romanian General say that he expected to plunder Budapest. If this were to happen the Allies would be responsible should they take no steps to protest against the entry of the Romanians.

Marshal Foch says that he would agree to S Tittoni’s suggestion that a Mission composed of Allied Generals with an escort of one company from each Power should be sent to Budapest. This Mission could take charge of affairs and reduce the Romanian occupation to the strict minimum necessary. The President of the Mission could be chosen by the Great Powers.

Mr Polk agrees that this is desirable. He thinks action should be taken at once. In addition to this the Romanians should be warned that no abuses would be tolerated. He had already that morning sent word to the Romanian Delegation in Paris that if any incident occurred in Budapest likely to rouse American public opinion against them, the consequence must be that the Romanian Government could not rely on any further help from America in the future. He asks whether the Allied military Mission would have control over the Romanian army.

M Clemenceau says that it would only have a moral influence over it.

S Tittoni said that the Mission should have the right to tell the Romanians to withdraw if this appears necessary.

M Pichon said that the sending of the Mission reestablishes the situation existing before the establishment of the Bela Kun Government. There had then been a military Mission in charge of the execution of the Armistice.

Mr Polk says he thinks it will be necessary to obtain from the Romanian Government an agreement to accept the decisions of the Mission. The Mission would have no authority unless the Governments concerned are notified.

Mr Balfour says that he agrees to the despatch of a Mission provided it is endowed with all the authority the Conference could confer. Further, he thinks that the American member might be empowered to make the economic threat mentioned by Mr Polk. He suggested sending for Mr Misu and requesting him to telegraph to Bucharest that any excesses committed in Budapest during this needless occupation would have the most disastrous results. The Hungarian Government having promised to accept the Armistice it was for the Conference to see that it did so. He would suggest, like Mr. Polk, that the Romanians should occupy high ground outside Budapest, and Stop there. He would like to ask Marshal Foch whether if they did so, they would safely control the situation.

M Clemenceau observes that there is a hill in Budapest but that all the surrounding country is flat plain.

Mr Balfour asks whether an army in the vicinity could be itself safe and also able to control the situation.

Marshal Foch says that it depended on the size of the army.

Mr Polk asks whether the Allies could not make the same sort of economic threat as he had made on behalf of the United States. He further observes that it would be difficult for the moment to promise an American company as escort. He would however endeavor to find the men.

Mr Balfour says that he does not think that he can promise any British troops. Admiral Troubridge, however, had suggested going up the Danube with a Monitor.

M Clemenceau said that the Mission must have written instructions. These instructions he hoped Mr Balfour would draft as regards their political side. Marshal Foch might then add the military instructions. At the same time a telegram could be sent to Bucharest, stating that the Council considered the Romanians responsible for any disturbances that might take place in Budapest and that unless they conformed to the wishes of the Conference the economic consequences to themselves would be to their detriment.

M Pichon says that he thinks it is undesirable to threaten the Romanians. Even though they are not obeying orders they are helping the Allied cause. They do not deserve to be treated like enemies.

S Tittoni agrees. It was possible he thinks, that the withdrawal of the Romanians might not be desired by the Mission. He thinks they should be informed that a Mission was being sent under the authority of the Conference and that the Conference expected the Romanian Government to order their Generals to obey the instructions given by this Mission.

M Clemenceau asks if Mr Balfour would make a draft at once.

M Pichon says that the same communication should be made to the Czechoslovak and Serbian Governments. They would be pleased at receiving it and reassured that Romania is not to be allowed undue expansion.

Mr Polk says he has no objection. The American Delegation would like to go further and say that the Conference would hold the Romanians responsible for any untoward incidents that might take place. On this condition he was ready to waive the economic threat.

(After some further discussion a draft prepared by Mr Balfour to be addressed to the Romanian Government and one prepared by M Berthelot to be addressed to the Serbian Government are accepted.

(It is also agreed that the telegram addressed to the Romanian Government should be communicated to the Serbian and Czechoslovak Governments.)

(It is decided to proceed at once to the nomination of a Mission of Allied Generals to be sent to Budapest accompanied by a small escort of Allied troops.)

(It is agreed that written instructions should be given them to be prepared by Mr Balfour and Marshal Foch.)

(Mr Hoover withdraws and Count Wrangel, Count Ehrensvärd and Capt Akerblom enter the room.)

Hearing of Swedish Point of View on the Subject of the Aaland islands Count Ehrensvärd then reads a document.

(M Clemenceau thanks the Swedish Representatives, who then withdraw.)

(It is then resolved at Mr. Polk’s suggestion that the question of the Swedish claims to the Aaland Islands as embodied in the declaration read by Count Ehrensvärd, be referred to the Baltic Commission for examination and report.)

(The Military Representatives, General Baird, Colonel Mougin and Colonel Georges enter the room.)

3. General Baird says that it is doubtless the intention if the Great Powers to make a lasting peace in the Balkans. He assumes that was their first intention. The punishment of Bulgaria was their second purpose. It is therefore necessary to punish Bulgaria so as not to jeopardize a lasting peace. The most contentious questions in the Balkans are territorial questions. As regards Bulgaria there are two such questions which might be said to be analogous to that of Alsace-Lorraine. There is even possibly a third in Thrace. It was the question of Macedonia and the question of the Dobruja that had brought Bulgaria into the war against the Allies. Proof of this could be found in the fact that while the Bulgarian attitude was still undecided, the Allies had urged the Serbians and Romanians to make concessions in these very areas in order that the Bulgarians should be inclined to take the Allied side. What held at that time probably held now. If the Powers took no heed in this they would have to face the consequences. The Romanians had taken the Dobruja for strategic reasons, and also to penalize the Bulgarians. Their strategic reason need not prevail. The Bulgarian forces at the present time could be reduced to any extent desired, and it could also be laid down that no Bulgarian troops should be sent beyond a line from Varna to Ruschuk. The Romanians freely admit that the Southern Dobruja is Bulgarian in population; but no Romanian statesman would offer to return it, lest he be reproached for alienating his country’s possessions. It is therefore necessary to exert pressure on the Romanians, if a lasting bone of contention is to be removed. It would be easier for the Romanians to yield to Allied injunctions than to offer the country themselves. Macedonia had been taken by the Serbians in 1913 because they were in effective occupation; secondly on grounds of compensation, seeing that they had not obtained access to the Adriatic; thirdly to maintain a balance of power.

Mr Balfour asks whether Serbia has not claimed the country on the ground that it was peopled by populations of Serbian blood.

General Baird replies that in 1912 Serbia had admitted the country was not Serbian. Only one portion of it known as the “contested area” had been reserved for arbitration by the Czar of Russia. If the main purpose was to establish peace and not to punish Bulgaria, some other solution of the Macedonian problem must be found. No one could expect that Bulgaria after the war should be rewarded by an accession of territory. Macedonia was neither Greek nor Serbian, it was Bulgarian. Nevertheless it does not desire to be, and need not be placed under Bulgarian Government. The situation was now very different from that in 1912. Serbia had obtained her compensation towards the west, and there was no fear that Bulgaria would now become the most powerful military state in the Balkans. Very much the same might be said about the Greek claims to Thrace. In the opinion of all the Allied Officers in Sofia, there would be a repetition of the Smyrna episodes if Bulgarian Thrace were given to Greece. The population was principally Pomak, and the next most important element in it was Bulgar. He heard from General Bridges that General Franchet d’Esperey is opposed to the cession of Thrace to Greece. General Milne was also opposed to it as well as all the Allied Generals. The Greeks would not be able to administer the country. In addition, some of the Pomaks had appealed to General Franchet d’Esperey not to be put under the Greeks. He thought that should the Dobrudja be returned to Bulgaria, the Romanians would never go to war to get it back, because the Romanian people would feel no enthusiasm on the subject. He thinks the same applies to Macedonia and Thrace. Neither the Serbs nor the Greeks would willingly wage a war to regain those areas. On the other hand the Bulgarians would go to war wholeheartedly to regain them if they were taken from them. As to the present situation, he thinks a wrong impression prevails in Paris that Bulgaria has been turbulent since the armistice. Bulgaria complied with every demand made. Her army had been reduced below the figures required by the armistice. The armistice allowed an army of 4,000 officers and 80,000 other ranks. The Bulgarian army really numbered 3,500 officers and 55,000 other ranks. There were 8 infantry divisions instead of 10, and in each of them one class was serving instead of two. Bulgaria had attempted to do nothing against the interests of the Allies. Moreover, the Allies had no troops, and, if a national rising were provoked, it would be impossible to stop it. There would, moreover, be no Bulgarian Government to appeal to.

M Clemenceau asks Marshal Foch whether the armistice enables Bulgaria to maintain 10 divisions.

Marshal Foch says that the Bulgarians have not been asked to reduce the number of their divisions, but to keep only 3 of them mobilized.

General Baird says the Bulgarians had not even kept 3 mobilized. He observes that the Bulgarians could be very heavily fined in money, cattle and corn. Moreover, the Allies could administer and develop certain state resources such as railways and mines, and thus obtain what they required without touching territory and incurring the permanent hostility of the Bulgarians and a readiness on their part to take the side of any possible enemy of the Entente. He suggested that the same kind of peace as the British Government had made with the Boers should be made with the Bulgarians. It would be better to have the Bulgarians on our side next time than against us.

Mr Balfour says that it might comfort General Baird to know that inside the Conference there had never been any idea of subordinating everything to a desire to punish the Bulgarians.

(M Clemenceau thanks General Baird, who then withdraws.)

M Clemenceau then asked Colonel Mougin to give an account of the present military situation of Bulgaria.

Colonel Mougin said that the clauses of the armistice had been carried out by the Bulgarians as regards the number of their troops. It might be possible, with tact, to induce the Bulgarians to disarm still further. This would be advantageous, seeing that if they disliked the treaty, they would only find weak Allied forces opposed to them. The bulk of the available Allied force would be French. It might not be numerous enough to cope with the situation. It would certainly not be adequate should a popular rising occur. It must be remembered that in these parts every man had a rifle, and since the war a great many had machine guns. The question then is whether the Greeks can be depended on. He thinks not. Of their 11 divisions, 5 were in Smyrna. Their policy in that region was such that they would require a large number of troops to enforce it. Of the remainder, the bulk must be kept in Macedonia, which was not Greek, but either Bulgarian or Mohammedan. Thrace also, if Greece should have it, could only be held by force. Unless the Allies supplied the force, Greece would have to do so. It followed that Greek troops could not be relied on to cope with the Bulgarians should they rise. This would not lighten the task of the French troops, which would also have to cope with difficulties of transport. The troops at General Franchet d’Esperey’s disposal might, if he were warned in time, be able to keep the railways, the stores of ammunition, and the arsenals, but it must also be borne in mind that the Turks would take sides in favour of the Bulgarians as a consequence of what had happened in Smyrna. They were now less anti-Bulgarian than anti-Greek. In a word, throughout Thrace the majority was Mussulman. The Turkish peasants might be armed by the Bulgarians, and all would make common cause against the Greeks. His personal opinion was that the Allies were in a fair way to making permanent enemies of the Turks, who lately had been friendly.

Mr Balfour asks what Colonel Mougin had meant by tactful methods of reducing Bulgarian armaments.

Colonel Mougin says that he thinks that the methods might be left to General Franchet d’Esperey. All the Council need do is to tell him what is desired.

(Colonel Mougin then withdraws).

M Clemenceau said that he was not sure that the discussion could be pursued with advantage. In any case, it must be understood that French troops would not fight alone against the Bulgarians in the interests of Greece. The Greeks had gone to Smyrna, with the result known. They would also have trouble in Macedonia. They courted further trouble by claiming Thrace. He was quite prepared to give them Thrace, but not to meet the trouble for them.

S Tittoni said that the Italian battalion was there for the purpose of bringing about peace, not for war.

M Clemenceau said that the same applied to the 15,000 French troops.

Marshal Foch says that whatever form the treaty takes, it is unlikely to be entirely to the taste of the Bulgarians. The question then arises: what can the Allies do? There are a few French troops under General Franchet d’Esperey. In front of them is the Bulgarian army and its store of arms. General Franchet d’Esperey might perhaps prevail on the Bulgarians to yield some of these arms. That would be so much to the good, but it must be done at once, because the process of demobilization would reduce his troops to a negligible quantity in a month. He therefore proposes to tell General Franchet d’Esperey to get possession of the Bulgarian guns. The Allies would be more able to cope with the situation when the treaty was signed. At that time only the small states - Greece and Serbia, and, possibly, Romania - would be able to furnish the police force. They would only be able to secure the execution of the Treaty if the Bulgarians had been disarmed before-hand. He therefore concluded that General Franchet d’Esperey should be ordered to disarm the Bulgarians as far as possible.

Mr Polk asks whether the Allies are entitled under the armistice to give him this order.

M Clemenceau said that no such order can be given to the Bulgarians. They might or might not comply with General Franchet d’Esperey’s request. He is inclined to ask Marshal Foch to do as he suggested under the reservation that the use of the French divisions remained at the disposal of the French Government.

Marshal Foch reads a draft telegram he proposes to send to General Franchet d’Esperey.

M Clemenceau suggests that it be made quite clear to General Franchet d’Esperey that he must obtain his results by diplomacy, and not by giving orders to the Bulgarians, who were entitled under the armistice to disregard them.

Mr Balfour thinks it most unlikely that the Bulgarians would agree, but, if the Military Authorities thinks there was some hope, he is quite ready to try.

(After some further discussion, the telegram is adopted, subject to final consideration at the next Meeting.)

S Tittoni suggests the holding of a plebiscite in Thrace.

M Clemenceau observes that as the population was predominantly Mussulman, the result would be a foregone conclusion.

M Pichon suggests the country should be given to the League of Nations.

4. The following nominations were made: Appointment of Allied Commissioners for Negotiation Between the German and Polish Governments

For France General Dupont.
For Great Britain General Malcolm.
For Italy General Bencivenga.

(The Meeting then adjourns).

Sailor Steve

08-06-19, 08:10 AM

Tuesday, August 5, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Draft Telegram Annexed as Appendix “F” to the Minutes of the preceding Meeting, H. D. 23, is finally adopted. Marshal Foch is requested to forward this telegram.

(Mr Hoover, M Seydoux, Mr J F Dulles and M Loucheur enter the room.)

2. M Clemenceau asks Mr Polk if he has any news of Budapest.

Mr Polk reads the following telegram:

“Hoover, American Relief, Paris. August 5th, 1919.

Last night there were 15 or 20 people killed in Budapest which I have definitely verified. It absolutely necessary that the Romanians be taken out of this situation as rapidly as possible and pending their departure General Gorton should act for the rest of the Commission. I was sure that these conflicts would take place. They also demand hostages and threaten definitely to kill 5 persons for each one who is injured in Budapest, naturally after their starting the killing further difficulties are apt to occur. The railroads are all tied up with machine-guns on the bridges. The Police Force has been dispossessed and whole city in absolute military control. This condition cannot continue and the movement to reorganize Hungary succeed. Gregory”

Mr Hoover says that half an hour before the meeting he had received a message for M Clemenceau, from Lt Colonel Romanelli:

“Budapest, August 4th, 1919.

“I have the honor to inform you that I communicated your orders to the High Command of the Romanian Army but the Romanian troops have advanced in spite of this and continue to come. At the present time they have occupied the city of Budapest, have cut communications, taken hostages and made prisoner one member of the new Government. The Serbians also are advancing from the South and pillaging. The situation makes it impossible for the new Government to explain itself.”

M Clemenceau says that under the circumstances it might be desirable to send a more threatening message than the one sent on the previous day.

Mr Polk says that the orders referred to in Colonel Romanelli’s telegram are probably those sent on the previous Sunday.

S Tittoni said that the moral of this was that the Military Commission should reach Budapest as soon as possible.

M Clemenceau asks if all the members had been nominated.

Mr Polk says that the American member had not yet been nominated, but informed the Council that General Bandholtz was appointed.

The Commission is composed as follows:

For the United States of America: General Bandholtz.
For Great Britain: General Gorton.
For France: General Graziani.
For Italy: General Mombelli.

(At this point Marshal Foch and General Weygand entered the room.)

Mr Balfour readd the following draft instructions for the Inter-Allied Commission to Budapest:

“The Mission are desired:

(1) To enter into communication with the Hungarian Government with a view of securing the observance of the Armistice.

(2) To report on the present position of this question, and its probable developments.

(3) To enter into communication with the Romanian Generals in order to prevent any action by the successful army which, by rousing nationalist sentiment in Hungary, or otherwise, may perpetuate the unhappy condition of that country and delay the conclusion of peace.

It may be of assistance to the Mission to remind them:

(a) That the frontiers of Hungary having been already determined by the Conference, and communicated to all the Governments immediately concerned, it is the policy of the Conference to remove without any unnecessary delay all foreign troops from the country. The Romanians, it should be noted, have promised to withdraw their Armies as soon as the disarmament of the Hungarians has been accomplished according to the terms of the Armistice.

(b) That orders have been given to terminate the blockade of Hungary and to further the immediate importation of necessaries.

(c) That the maintenance of this new condition of things must depend on the behavior of the Hungarian Government to the Allied and Associated Powers, and

(d) That while those Powers have not the slightest desire to interfere with the Hungarian people in their choice of a Government, they can only have dealings with one which can be trusted loyally to carry out its international obligation.”

Marshal Foch says that he agrees to these instructions, but would like to add to them certain more definite instructions regarding the Armistice. The Hungarians must have no more than six divisions. They must be made to deliver war material, not only Hungarian war material, but the war material left by General Mackensen’s Army. He therefore suggests the following draft instructions:

“The Mission of Allied Generals sent to Budapest in the name of the Supreme Council is to be entrusted with the duty:

(1) Of supervising the execution of the military armistice signed on 13th November, 1918, between the Allied Command and the Hungarian Government and in addition of the following measures:

(a) The establishment of the maximum number of effectives under arms, in each branch of the Hungarian Army, with the sole purpose of insuring the maintenance of internal order.

(b) The disarmament of all demobilized units and the dispersal of Depots or Centers of mobilization.

(c) Delivery to the Allies of arms, munitions and war material in excess of material necessary for the units maintained, including material having belonged to General Mackensen’s Army.

(d) In concert with the Allied Staffs, to regulate the distribution of this material among the Allied Powers concerned, in proportion to the military contribution made by each, and in consideration of the present war situation.

(e) Immediate stoppage of production in the arsenals or industrial establishments producing war material.

(2) The Mission will further:

(a) Determine according to present circumstances the strength and distribution of Romanian and Serbian troops which it may be necessary to maintain on Hungarian territory to ensure order and the execution of the Armistice.

(b) Arrange with the Romanian and Serbian Commands for the withdrawal of any superfluous troops.”

Mr Balfour says that he wishes to ask two questions regarding this proposal. Firstly, have the Allies any right to make the terms of the Armistice more onerous? In the Armistice, there had been no question of demobilizing six divisions. He thinks perhaps this might be justified on the ground that Hungary had, in the interval, made war. Secondly, he agrees that the evacuation of Hungarian territory should be gradual and under control. Unfortunately Marshal Foch was not Commander-in-Chief of the Romanian Army. He was afraid that four Generals escorted by two Companies of Inter-Allied troops would not be able to control the Romanian Army.

M Clemenceau says the violation of the Armistice gives the Allies a right to enhance the terms.

Mr Balfour observes that he feels uneasy in that not only are the Armistice terms made more onerous, but the increased severity of the terms is coupled with orders given to the Command of the Romanian Army. It was probable that the first part will be carried out by the Hungarians. Could he be assured that the second part would be carried out by the Romanians? If not, the Conference will incur great discredit. It might be argued that because the Hungarians had made war, they deserved severer terms, but it must be admitted that they had made war against people who had invaded their territory in spite of the orders of the Conference.

Marshal Foch says that he admits his proposals exceed the terms of the Armistice. The Armistice, however, had been made a year ago. At that time it had been necessary to leave the Hungarians a certain force on a war footing, in order that Hungary should be defended against the Germans, who were then still in the field. The situation is now quite different. It was quite unnecessary for Hungary to maintain any forces on a war footing. The Hungarian Army should be demobilized. As to the Romanians, he thinks that, if properly addressed, they will do as they are told.

General Weygand says that the Romanian Military Adviser to the Peace Delegation, Colonel Dimitresco, had called on him to say that the Romanian Army considers itself in Hungary as the mandatory of the Conference. It wishes to carry out Marshal Foch’s orders. In other words, he asks for instructions from Marshal Foch, although he is not in command of the Romanian Army. He adds that the Romanian Commander in the field has been instructed to send direct reports to Marshal Foch.

M Pichon says that the Romanians have not actually disobeyed the Conference. They have been given a certain frontier which they had declared they could not defend. While this was being discussed, the Hungarians had attacked them. In self-protection they had advanced beyond the line fixed for them.

Mr Balfour says that he has no wish to make a case against the Romanians, but he thinks that M Pichon’s statement is too favorable to them. On the 14th June, the Romanians had been ordered to retire by a certain date. They had not done so, and they had not given any explanation.

Mr Polk adds that in February last they had flatly refused to obey the orders of the Conference.

S Tittoni said that he has the greatest confidence in the moral authority of the four Generals who would go to Budapest. He believes that neither the Romanians nor the Serbians would disobey them. To reinforce their action, he suggests that a diplomatic démarche be made at Belgrade and Bucharest.

M Clemenceau suggests that the instructions drafted by Mr Balfour and Marshal Foch should be welded in one, and that S Tittoni should prepare a dispatch to be sent to the Romanians and the Serbians.

Mr Polk says that he wishes to inquire whether an alteration of the Armistice terms would not put the Council in contradiction with itself, seeing that on August 2nd the Council had addressed the Hungarian Government, and taken its stand on the Armistice as it originally stood.

Marshal Foch says that it is absolutely necessary to obtain demobilization in Hungary at the present time. A year ago, this had not been desired. The situation had entirely changed since then.

Mr Polk says that whatever the reasons might be, and however good they might be, the Council is committed by what it had said three days before.

Mr Balfour says that Marshal Foch wishes to reduce the Hungarian forces below the figures stated in the Armistice. He wishes to draw attention to the fact that the Armistice conferred on the Allies a right to occupy such places as they wished in Hungarian territory, in order to establish peace. Would it not be possible to offer the Hungarians the choice either to reduce at once to the allotment which was to be made to them in the Peace Treaty, in which case no occupation by Allied troops would be required, or to submit to occupation by Romanians.

Marshal Foch says that if the Hungarians are offered two solutions, they would propose a third. This would lead to endless argument. He suggests that the military Mission be instructed to obtain such reduction as they could.

Mr Polk says that he does not object to any attempt the Mission might make by persuasive methods, but he thinks the Council should not contradict itself and order the Generals to violate the Armistice.

Marshal Foch points out that the instructions he had drawn up were addressed not to the Hungarians, but to the Allied Generals.

Mr Polk observed that if the Romanians are asked to occupy Hungary in the name of the Conference, they would be entitled to demand the cost of occupation, presumably out of the available resources of Hungary.

M Clemenceau said that for the time being the Romanians are asking for nothing. Nor was it Marshal Foch’s idea to employ Romanians as agents of the Conference. He asks Marshal Foch if he requires a Company of French troops.

Marshal Foch replies in the affirmative.

S Tittoni says that he will supply a Company of Italian troops.

Mr Balfour says that Admiral Troubridge and a monitor will be available from the British side.

S Tittoni proposes a draft telegram to the Romanian and Serbian Governments.

(After some discussion, this telegram is agreed to in the form given in Appendix “A”.

It is agreed that this telegram should be communicated in toto to the Romanian and Serbian Governments and the first part of it to the Hungarian Government by M Pichon.

It is further decided that the instructions contained in Appendix “B” should be given to the Allied Military Mission to Budapest.

Marshal Foch is asked to transmit these instructions to each of the four Generals nominated.)

3. Mr Hoover makes the following statement:

“I desire to again raise to the Council the Coal situation in Europe.

Under the direction of the Supreme Council and the Supreme Economic Council, my Administration undertook the promotion of production and so far as possible to control the distribution of coal during the Armistice in Central and Eastern Europe. A considerable staff has been employed upon this labor and numerous agreements and undertakings entered upon, involving the old States of Austria, the Balkans, Poland and to some extent Germany. While the result could not be ideal they have at least served to maintain sufficient supplies for the transportation of municipal and domestic services necessary to maintain life. With the ending of the Armistice (and this authority) and with the super-imposition of the Reparation Commission over a considerable part of this problem, the supervision which we have exerted must necessarily cease.

Colonel A G Goodyear and Colonel W G Atwood of our staff have compiled a summary of the 1913 production and consumption of the principal countries in Europe (excluding Russia and the Balkan States) and have also conducted a careful inquiry into the probable production during the year 1919, based upon the experience of the first six months of the year. The net result shows that from a production of about 679,500,000 tons in the principal countries in Europe (except Russia) the production in these States has fallen to a rate of about 443,000,000 tons per annum. Of the 1913 production above mentioned about 614,000,000 tons were consumed in these States (i. e. outside the Balkan States and export markets foreign to Europe). In other words, the production has fallen approximately 236,500,000 tons, or down to 65% of normal production. The consumption cannot be decreased in this ratio (35%) upon certain vital consumers, such as transportation and municipal and other essential services, so that a shortage for manufacture and household use must be on a far greater ratio. Beyond this, the very natural tendency of productive countries to reserve a larger degree of their normal consumption will and does result in an under-supply to the non-producing countries far below a 35% reduction. Furthermore, the summer accumulation against winter use has not been in progress and therefore the hardships of the coming winter are even further increased.

It seems almost unnecessary to repeat the causes of this diminished production but they may be again summarized as due to certain specific causes which in fact are much the same in all productive industries.

To a minor degree, compared with the whole, there has been a loss of equipment and skill, due to the war; there has been a retardation of advance exploitation during the war; there has been a relaxation of effort as a reflex from the physical exhaustion of large sections of the population through privations and the mental and physical strain of the war; there is a shortage of railway rolling stock for prompt movement from the mines; there has been an unsettlement of political destiny of a number of coalfields by the peace terms; and, above all, the proper and insistent demand of labor for higher standards of living in the general unbalance of economic conditions has been manifested in repeated strikes and other deterrents to production. Unfortunately European labor at many points has become infected with the theory that the limitation of effort below physical necessity and the obstruction of labor-saving devices will increase their own comfort and improve their conditions. In turn, the reactions from undue profits earned by proprietors during the war has brought a shock to the theory of private ownership, which has discouraged further investment and consequently a renewed opening of new areas which the maintenance of production demands. All these causes are operating to varying degree in different localities but their summation is shortage of production below the living necessity of the population of Europe.

With the arrival of a harvest and thus the solution of immediate food pressure, the problem of coal now comes to the front as the greatest menace to the stability and life in Europe. It is a problem domestic to Europe and incapable of solution from the United States. Disregarding all other questions, an additional load of 1,000,000 tons per month on American ports would indeed be a large tax in the face of the trebling of the United States food exports above pre-war normal. Furthermore, even such a tonnage would entail a tax on the world’s shipping that cannot but affect freight rates generally. With a shortage in production of 20,000,000 tons per month a contribution of even double this amount from the United States would be but little help.

The solution of the problem demands, first, increased production and second, organisation of distribution.

It would perhaps contribute to the first problem if the coal miners and coal owners of all Europe could be brought to a realization that the fate of European civilization now rests in their hands to a degree equal to - if not greater than - in the hands of providers of food supplies during the next year.

The solution of the second problem - distribution - is vital if the non-producing States are not to collapse and in its conduct it should be possible to force the maximum production in those States who are partially supplied.

I urgently recommend that some form of coal control should be set up in Europe with view to the stimulation of production and to secure a distribution that will maintain the essential services upon which economic and political stability must rest. The problem cannot be solved for any one European country alone but the energies of all must be enlisted and the position of all must be considered. It is purely a domestic problem for Europe.”

He therefore proposes the following Resolution:

“That the Supreme Council should invite the British, French, Italian, Belgian, Polish and Czechoslovak Governments each to nominate one member to a European Coal Commission to be immediately set up to undertake the co-ordination of the production, distribution and transportation of coal throughout Europe. The Reparation Commission, the Teschen Commission, the Plebiscite Commission for Silesia, and the different Commissions charged with matters of transport by sea, railroad and canal, should all be instructed to co-operate with this Coal Commission and to assist the work of the Coal Commission to the full extent of their powers”.

M Loucheur agrees with Mr Hoover except in one particular. He considers that the United States should be represented upon the proposed Commission.

Mr Hoover states that American representation had been omitted because it was felt that this matter was a domestic problem of Europe. Furthermore, the United States is faced with a crisis at home. At the best, the United States can only ship to Europe about 500,000 tons in a year, by reason of Port troubles and lack of shipping. As production of coal in Europe had declined 35% this assistance was negligible. Under the authority of the Council he had been concerned with the coal production in Central and Eastern Europe, but the Reparation Commission set up under the Treaty was now taking charge of the mines, and his own work was therefore coming to an end.

Mr Balfour says that he is not quite sure that he understands what Mr. Hoover means by saying that the coal crisis was a European domestic problem. As the British representative, he might in the same way say that the problems of continental Europe are domestic problems in which Great Britain is not concerned. In reality, all countries of the world are inter-dependent, and their mutual interest in one another’s condition has never been better understood than by Mr Hoover himself. Therefore, he does not quite follow Mr Hoover’s reasoning in excluding America from representation on the Commission. He has no doubt, however, that the Port and Shipping difficulties mentioned by Mr Hoover make it difficult for America to do all she would wish to do to help Europe. One portion of the Resolution proposed by Mr Hoover appears to him a little obscure. He alludes to the passage in which it was said that the Commission should “undertake the co-ordination of the production, distribution and transportation of coal throughout Europe”. Does this mean that the Commission will take charge for instance, of the Belgium coalfields and the coalfields of Northern France? Will it attempt to regulate the conditions of production in England? As was well known to the Council, it was difficult to obtain coal from English coalfields even to keep British industries going. In what manner could the proposed Commission intervene in the internal affairs of the various countries?

Mr Hoover says that the question of the sovereignty of Commissions of this kind has always proved an insuperable difficulty. In practice, it has always been agreed that such Commissions have no authority. No Government can give a right, even to its representative, to dispose of its national resources. The Commissions therefore, confined themselves to giving advice as to ways and means, and the best methods of co-ordination. For instance, Germany is in a position to produce more coal than was required of her for indemnity purposes and for home consumption. Italy has offered a supply of skilled workmen; by offering a bonus on production, a surplus could be obtained for the benefit of the world at large. In Silesia, on the other hand, the production of coal had diminished 50% by reason of the political situation in that area. The Relief Commission which had formerly controlled the production of coal in Silesia had been superseded by the Plebiscite Commission; the resulting situation had had a detrimental effect on the output. In Teschen for similar reasons the production of coal had also diminished. The political situation there had re-acted on the mines. Czechoslovakia produced an excess of brown coal. This coal is useless for transportation purposes but is employed in certain industries which by reason of the political situation could not obtain it, and are now using black coal. An exchange of this brown coal for black coal could be suggested as a means of obtaining a more profitable distribution. In fact, the Commission could suggest many ways of co-ordination which the ordinary play of political affairs impeded.

M Loucheur suggests that if an American Member cannot be appointed to the Commission, Mr Hoover’s Agents should at least be allowed to continue their work in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Mr Hoover says that he thinks perhaps a solution could be found if he were allowed time for consultation with Mr Polk.

S Tittoni suggests that Mr Hoover might at least continue his activities for the first six months of the operations of the Commission.

Mr Balfour says that he is in entire agreement

Mr Polk asks that the question be left open for a decision between himself, Mr Hoover and M Loucheur.

It is then resolved:

“That the Supreme Council should invite the British, French, Italian, Belgian, Polish and Czechoslovak Governments each to nominate one member to a European Coal Commission to be immediately set up to undertake the co-ordination of the production, distribution and transportation of coal throughout Europe. The Reparation Commission, the Teschen Commission, the Plebiscite Commission for Silesia, and different Commissions charged with matters of transport by sea, railroad and canal, should all be instructed to cooperate with this Coal Commission and to assist the work of the Coal Commission to the full extent of their powers.”

It is further decided that Mr Polk, Mr Hoover and M Loucheur should confer regarding American representation on this Commission.

4. Mr Balfour says that he wishes to introduce a subject not on the Agenda. He does so with all due apologies. He would remind the Council that at the same time as the Treaty with Austria, the Treaty with Czechoslovakia must be signed. The latter has not yet been passed by the Conference. Seeing that the Austrian Delegation has been in St Germain since May, he thinks the Conference should be ready to deal with their final reply as soon as it comes.

(It is agreed that the question of the Treaty with Czechoslovakia, together with that of the Treaty with Romania should be placed on the Agenda for the following day.)

5. M Clemenceau says that after hearing General Baird and Colonel Mougin, he has come to the conclusion that it would be desirable to hear Mr Venizelos regarding some of the problems raised. He has taken the liberty of asking Mr Venizelos to address the Council, and he has also summoned M Tardieu. He has done this without consulting his colleagues, and hopes they will forgive him.

(At this stage Mr Venizelos, M Tardieu, and a number of experts on Bulgarian Affairs enter the room.)

M Clemenceau says that he wishes to have a conversation with Mr Venizelos about Thrace and Asia Minor. The troops of the Great Powers are being demobilized very rapidly. It will therefore be impossible for any of the Great Powers to undertake a new campaign. The situation in Asia Minor, according to his information, is not good, and as Mr Venizelos knows, a Commission of Inquiry has been sent. The Turks appear to be greatly incensed against the Greeks. The situation in Bulgaria, on the other hand, causes anxiety also. The Bulgarians have demobilized in accordance with the terms of the Armistice, but they still had a respectable force under arms. In Thrace, even should the Bulgarian Government not interfere, there might be popular risings against the Greeks, should the country be given to them. What has taken place in Asia Minor has produced the effect of making the Turk and Bulgarian in Thrace feel a common interest antagonistic to Greece. France has, in the Balkans, 15,000 men, but he must warn Mr Venizelos that the French Government has no intention of embarking those troops in a campaign. They are needed at home, and he wishes to recall them as soon as possible. All the Powers are in the same case. The evidence leads to the conclusion that if the Peace terms offered to Bulgaria are not to her taste, the resulting situation might be very serious. Greece, at the present moment, has five divisions in Asia Minor.

Mr Venizelos said that there were four Greek divisions in Asia Minor; owing to the improvement of the situation there, a fifth division, which had been forming, had been withdrawn to Macedonia.

M Clemenceau says he has not been made aware of any improvement in the situation in Asia Minor. On the contrary, he has heard that the situation there had reacted unfavorably in Constantinople. The Allies have somewhat ingenuously undertaken to disarm the Bulgarians beyond the stipulations of the Armistice. They would doubtless understand that this intention of disarming them is a prelude to something not to their advantage. They would probably decline to be disarmed. The question he personally wishes to ask Mr Venizelos is this: Can the Greeks undertake to defend themselves on two fronts - in Thrace and in Asia Minor - without any assistance from the Allies?

Mr Venizelos said that before replying to this question, he would like to speak a few words regarding the Greek Army in Asia Minor. He begs the Council to reserve its opinion on this subject. The Turks have made a great outcry, which has perhaps been too much attended to in certain quarters. No doubt excesses had taken place but there were extenuating circumstances. The troops have been attacked in the streets by people firing at them out of windows and from roofs. He does not attempt to exonerate the massacre of prisoners, but he will assure the Council that after investigation, it will be found that these are very rare and isolated instances. He need not remind the Council that the Greek troops which had fought in Macedonia and Russia side by side with the troops of the Great Powers had borne themselves well. Greek troops had been accused of excesses at Menemen. In all seventeen people had been killed and twenty wounded. Trouble had arisen there because a tired Greek Battalion withdrawing from Bergama had been attacked as it entered the town with sloped arms. Regarding what had been alleged at Aidin, he begs leave to read a telegram received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek forces. As to the effect of these events on the feelings of the Turkish population in Thrace, he thinks it would be a mistake to attribute much importance to it. On July 29th he had received a telegram from Kavalla, conveying the appeal of a number of Thracian Mohammedans for liberation from Bulgaria.

As to M Clemenceau’s question, whether Greece could undertake simultaneous action in Asia Minor and in Thrace, he is bound to answer in the negative, but he hopes that simultaneous action will not be required. The local situation in Asia Minor has improved, and he expects to reduce the Greek forces there by one division. Latterly, one Greek division from Bessarabia had been brought back to Greece, which it had been intended originally to send to Asia Minor. It might be possible therefore to leave only three divisions in Asia Minor, though doubtless it might be necessary to restrict the area occupied. This is all the easier as, in consequence of the agreement with Italy, there was nothing to fear on the side of Aidin, and only two roads of access to Smyrna needed guarding. This leaves eight divisions for use on the Greek front in Europe. He fully understands that the Great Powers cannot undertake to enforce the Peace for him. He fully understands that Greece must help herself in this respect. Two things are possible. Bulgaria will sign the Treaty, or will refuse to. If she signs it, he thinks she would also execute it and withdraw her troops from Thrace. The occupation of Thrace under these conditions would be an easy operation. All measures would be taken to avoid resistance by the population, and damage to property. He would like to suggest that the best means of obtaining these results would be to send British and French officers to advance in front of the troops. If Bulgaria refuses to sign the Peace, he thinks that not Greece alone, but Greece and Serbia, and perhaps also Romania will be together in forcing Bulgaria to comply. He has heard it said that the Southern Dobrudja is to be restored to Bulgaria. Should this not be the case, and should Bulgaria attempt to resist the Treaty, he is confident that Romania would help Greece and Serbia, though she was not definitely pledged to do so. He thinks it would be of advantage to let the Bulgarians understand that if they did not accept the Treaty offered to them, they would have to be coerced by their neighbors, who would compensate themselves at her expense and eventually impose upon them much harder terms. For instance the Dobrudja would not be left to them. He thinks this would make the Bulgarians think twice before resisting. There would be against the Bulgarians the overwhelming force of eight Greek divisions, two Serbian divisions, (at least two Serbian divisions can reasonably be expected) and five or six Roumanian divisions. Should the last not act, the eight Greek and two Serbian divisions, by prompt intervention, could easily take Sofia and dictate Peace.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Venizelos what he thinks about the Turkish population in Thrace. The information he has received is that these Turks are in league with the Bulgarians against Greece.

Mr Venizelos says that if it is only the Thracian population that gives trouble, eight divisions is an ample force to cope with the situation.

M Clemenceau says that he is not entirely reassured. Mr Venizelos answers his question by saying that though he cannot conduct a simultaneous campaign in Asia Minor and in Thrace, he hopes the Turks will be good enough not to attack him in both places at once.

Mr Venizelos says he had understood M Clemenceau to ask whether Greece can fight Bulgaria and Turkey at the same time. This, Greece cannot do, but she was not afraid of local risings in the population. Before concluding his remarks, he would like to draw the attention of the Council to a curious historical fact. It has often been alleged that the shape of Greece towards the East is such as to render her Eastern frontier untenable.

He shows by the help of an atlas the persistence throughout the centuries of a territorial distribution of the Hellenic world very similar to the territorial claims of the Greek Delegation.

(The work quoted is The Bulgarians and their historical ethnographical and political frontiers, 679–1917. Preface by Dr Rizoff, published in Berlin, 1917.)

M Clemenceau says that a suggestion has been made by Mr Venizelos which he will not accept. If he is unable to send French troops, he is equally unable to send French officers to risk their lives in Thrace.

M Pichon says that Mr Venizelos has only considered the hypothesis of resistance by Bulgaria to the Treaty. In that case the Serbians and Romanians are expected to make common cause with Greece. But is it not possible that Bulgaria will acquiesce in all the clauses concerning Romania and Serbia, in order to detach them from Greece and in order to be able to cope with Greece alone?

Mr Venizelos says that as to Serbia, he feels certain of her cooperation. He has stood by Serbia at the risk of civil war in his own country and he has no doubt of Serbia’s loyalty. There is, moreover, a Treaty between Greece and Serbia. There is none with Romania and he admits that Romanian co-operation is less certain. He does not, however, think that Bulgaria will abandon the Dobrudja without contest.

(Mr Venizelos then withdraws.)

M Tardieu then explains that the Commission has attempted to work on the lines suggested by S Tittoni, but that no agreement had been reached up to the present.

(Certain alternative suggestions are made and the question is deferred for discussion at a later date.)

Jimbuna

08-06-19, 10:44 AM

6th August 1919

Aftermath of War

Britain: Peerages, etc., awarded to high Naval and Military Commanders.

Troop train carrying soldiers of the Czechoslovak Legion enter a town in Siberia.
https://i.imgur.com/ijTmMxr.jpg

With the Hungarian capital Budapest under Romanian control, Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Peidl is forced out of office after only six days.
https://i.imgur.com/rvC10jm.jpg

Sailor Steve

08-06-19, 09:09 PM

Wednesday, August 6, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. At the suggestion of Mr Balfour it is agreed to modify the text of the decision taken by the Conference on the 1st August, 1919 and to request Marshal Foch to submit a report on the military measures necessary order to oblige the German Government to surrender the persons guilty of breaches of the Laws of War.

(It is agreed that no compensation should be demanded from the German Government. The revised text of the decision taken by the Conference on the 1st August, 1919, would therefore read as follows:

It is decided

1) That no immediate reply to the German Government’s request should be given.

2) That the Military Representatives at Versailles in collaboration with Marshal Foch should investigate the accuracy of the statements contained in the communication of the German Government, and should utilize all available sources of information at their command.

3) That Marshal Foch should report to the Council on the military measures that might be enforced in order to oblige the German Government to comply with the Clauses of the treaty relating to the surrender to the Allies of officers guilty of breaches of Laws of War.)

2. Mr Polk says that before the questions on the Agenda paper come under discussion, he wishes to communicate to the Supreme Council the latest information received from Budapest.

(Mr Polk then distributes copies of the documents included in the relevant discussion.)

M Clemenceau says that from the telegram sent on the 5th August by Mr J A Logan, it would appear that the Romanians had proposed an armistice to the Hungarian Government. He does not think that the Romanians had been authorized by the Allied and Associated Powers to take such action.

S Tittoni thinks that the Roumanian Government had merely put forward certain proposals.

Mr Balfour says that the Romanian Government regards itself as absolutely independent, and had acted and put forward its conditions as if the Allied and Associated Governments did not exist. Technically, Romania is quite independent since Marshal Foch had not been placed in command of the Roumanian troops. Romania had quarreled with the Allies: S Bratiano had left Paris thoroughly discontented, and is now acting as the head of one independent State dealing with another equally independent State.

Mr Polk informs the Conference that he has that morning had a long conversation with Mr. Misu, shortly after the receipt of the documents he had just distributed. He has communicated the contents of those documents to Mr Misu and has explained to him that Romanian action amounted to an attempt to conclude a separate peace. He (Mr Polk) had pointed out that he did not consider it right that the Romanians should obtain the delivery of the war material referred to in the document under consideration. Mr Misu had replied that the measures taken were dictated by military necessity. He further stated that Romania had not been treated with justice in regard to the matter of reparations. He maintained that the Belgians, whose territory had similarly been invaded, had been permitted to appoint a representative on the Commission of Reparations and had thereby been able to look after their interests. On the other hand, Romania had not been permitted to appoint a representative on that Commission.

Mr Balfour suggests that Mr Misu should be invited to attend in order to discuss the question under reference. Mr Misu is a very sensible man with whom it might be possible to arrive at an agreement.

M Clemenceau sees no objection to Mr Misu being heard by the Council.

Mr Polk thinks it would be preferable for Mr Balfour in the first place to have a private conversation with Mr Misu. He thinks that procedure would yield better results.

Mr Balfour agrees that talking alone gives opportunities for the excuse of a certain flexibility of conversation that could not be got in a formal conference. On the other hand he thinks a greater impression would be produced by an interview with the Council as a whole. He proposes, therefore, that Mr Misu should be received in that room. Otherwise, that M Clemenceau be authorized to speak on behalf of the Conference.

S Tittoni inquired whether it will be possible for the Generals forming part of the Allied Mission to Budapest to start at once.

M Clemenceau thinks that a telegram should at once be sent to the Romanian Government stating that the Council does not recognize the right of Romania to conclude an Armistice. Should the Romanians fail to accept those instructions, the situation will become exceedingly grave.

Mr Balfour points out that the Armistice proposed by the Romanians will in addition deprive the Commission on Reparations of material and property which belonged to the whole of the Allies.

Mr Polk adds that Mr Hoover has also drawn attention to the fact that by withdrawing 50% of the rolling stock from Hungary, the Romanians will thereby render the distribution of supplies impossible.

(Marshal Foch, General Bliss, General Weygand, General Belin and Col Georges enter the room.)

M Clemenceau says that the Supreme Council has decided that the four Generals should forthwith be sent to Budapest. He inquired what measures Marshal Foch had taken to give effect to that resolution.

Marshal Foch replies that the four Generals who are to form part of the Military Mission to Budapest are scattered, consequently the following measures had been taken = General Graziani, being under the orders of General Franchet d’Esperey, a telegram had been transmitted to him through General Franchet d’Esperey together with copies of instructions. General Franchet d’Esperey had also been asked to forward copies of these documents to General Mombelli who is said to be at Sofia.

S Tittoni, intervening, says that General Mombelli is now actually in Turin. He will therefore himself send him copies of the instructions. General Mombelli had, as a matter of fact, already been warned and will be ready to start within six hours after receipt of orders to that effect.

General Weygand says that he has forwarded to General Bliss the instructions intended for General Bandholtz, the American Representative. In regard to the British General, he believed him to be at Pressbourg, and he has consequently asked General Sackville-West to forward the necessary instructions. He had, however, just learned that General Gorton had already reached Budapest. It will therefore be necessary to forward his instructions to that town.

Mr Polk wishes to call attention to a certain matter connected with the instructions to be issued to the four Generals. Yesterday S Tittoni had proposed an amendment in order that the Generals might fully realize that the instructions given them should be carried out in agreement with the Hungarian Government: that is to say, the required results were to be obtained rather by persuasion than by the issue of orders. The text of the telegram which he had received that morning from General Weygand does not appear to contain that amendment. He proposes, therefore, that the words “in agreement with the Hungarian Government”, should be inserted in paragraphs (b) and (d).

General Weygand thinks that the first paragraph of the instructions fully meet Mr Polk’s view, since it is therein clearly stated that the mission should place itself in communication with the Hungarian Government in order to obtain certain concessions which were detailed in paragraphs which follow. He thinks that sentence clearly indicated that an agreement should be reached between the mission and the Hungarian Government.

Mr Polk agrees that his objection has been fully met.

M Clemenceau suggests that the Council should proceed to draft the text of a telegram to be sent to the Romanian Government, stating that the Allied and Associated Governments would not admit her right to conclude an independent armistice with Hungary; that such an armistice would not receive recognition, particularly as it was intended to take away large quantities of material, the joint property of all the Allies and not of Romania alone.

Mr Balfour says he has prepared a draft telegram.

(After a short discussion, the following draft telegram is approved:

“Supreme Council have learnt that Roumanian Military Authorities at Budapest have imposed Armistice on Hungarian Government, to be accepted at a few hours’ notice. Terms of this armistice render it impossible for Hungarian Government to fulfill armistice concluded with Allied Powers on November 13th. Moreover, terms in themselves pay no regard to rights of reparation of other Allies. Supreme Council desire formally to record their refusal to recognize right of Roumanian Commander-in-Chief to impose any armistice without authority of Allied and Associated Powers.”)

(At this stage Mr Misu and Mr Vaida-Voevod enter the room.)

M Clemenceau says that the Council has invited Mr Misu and Mr Vaida-Voevod to attend in order to consider the situation in Hungary, which is very grave. The Romanians have seized Budapest.

Mr Misu, intervening, says that he has received no official communication on the subject.

M Clemenceau, continuing, says that information which leaves no doubt on the matter has been received from various sources. Furthermore, the Supreme Council had learnt that the Romanians has proposed an armistice to the Hungarian Government.

Mr Misu says he has received no information on that subject, with the exception of the telegram which Mr Polk had shown him that morning.

M Clemenceau, continuing, says that the Supreme Council has just decided to send a telegram to the Roumanian Government.

(M Clemenceau then reads the telegram above quoted.)

Mr Misu says he would forward a copy of the telegram to his Government, laying stress on the view expressed by the Council.

M Clemenceau says that the Allied and Associated Powers have given many proofs of goodwill to Romania. S Bratiano had not always received these in the spirit in which they had been meant. The situation to-day, however, is very grave, and he is authorized to say that the Supreme Council are determined that the Armistice of Versailles should be respected and executed everywhere.

Mr Misu draws attention to the fact that the situation has entirely altered in consequence of the last attack made by the Hungarians.

M Clemenceau remarks that the relative position of the Entente and Romania have in no way altered.

Mr Misu, continuing, says that Mr Polk had that morning communicated to him a list of the material which had been demanded by the terms of the alleged armistice. He wishes to point out that the Romanians demand the delivery of this material solely in the general interest. This material is being taken over solely with the view of disarming Hungary, since it is essential to disarm her as rapidly as possible. The measures so taken will not however, in any way prejudge the eventual distribution between the Allies of the material so obtained.

M Clemenceau says he wishes to read to the Romanian Delegation a copy of the instructions which had been sent to the Allied Generals who are proceeding to Budapest.

Mr Misu says he has received the text of the telegram that morning, and has already telegraphed the same to his Government. On the other hand, the Council should not lose sight of the fact that Romania has been treated unjustly by the Commission on Reparations from which she had been excluded. Romania has consequently not obtained the authority to seek out the material which had been looted from her territory by her various enemies.

Mr Vaida adds that the Romanians have merely claimed the return of their own property.

M Clemenceau inquired how the Romanians could pick out their own personal goods from the mass of material in question?

Mr Vaida points out that the Romanian rolling stock had been taken by the Bolsheviks with the result that at the present moment Romania only possessed some 50 locomotives. On the other hand, Romania has been obliged to incur serious expense in order to maintain the army at a time when their Allies had already begun to demobilize. Mackensen, during the course of his retreat, had carried off a large quantity of material, which had subsequently fallen into the hands of the Magyars. The Romanian Delegation has on several occasions requested the Conference to return this material, but no answer has ever been vouchsafed. It is essential that the material in question should be returned with as little delay as possible; otherwise the marks and signs, which will enable the Romanians to recognize their property, will disappear. Should this material at once pass into the possession of the Romanians, he thinks it will be quite as safe as if it remained with the Magyars, and should it subsequently be proved that the engines, which would be used to revictual his unhappy country, in reality belonged to any particular one of the Allies, the Romanians would be ready to surrender them without a murmur. The Council will undoubtedly agree that the material in the hands of the Romanians would be a safer guarantee than if left in the hands of the Magyars.

M Clemenceau fears he has explained himself badly. The exact question that he wishes to place before the Delegates is the following: The Council will not permit Romania to conclude an Armistice which will in any way hinder the Hungarian Government from executing the terms of the Armistice which she has already concluded with the Allies. For some months past the Principal Allied and Associated Governments had endeavored to enforce the execution of that Armistice. It has been agreed to enforce that Armistice, and even if possible to enlarge its scope by agreement, in order to obtain a more complete disarmament. The Romanians had now seized Budapest. Nevertheless, the conditions of the Armistice concludes with the Entente would have to be fulfilled. The Allied and Associated Governments intend shortly to make peace with Hungary, and they cannot allow the action of Romania to retard the conclusion of peace. With that object in view, the Generals had been sent to Budapest.

Mr Misu says that he will transmit the wishes of the Conference to his Government.

M Clemenceau points out that these are not the wishes, but the final decisions of the Conference. Furthermore, the Council wishes to know as soon as possible what action Romania intends to take in the matter. In regard to the material, he wishes to point out that the Allied and Associated Governments has no desire to deprive Romania of that portion of the material to which she was entitled; but the whole must enter into the common pool. That is the principle which Romania is required to accept.

Mr Misu points out that it is a matter of urgency that the Inter-Allied Commission should proceed to Budapest with as little delay as possible. The Commission would then be in a position to obtain particulars, and to give the necessary instructions.

M Clemenceau expresses the view that the situation at present in Hungary is so confused that it will be necessary, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, that all questions should be settled directly between the Conference and the Roumanian Government.

Mr Balfour says that he can add very little to what has been said by M Clemenceau. It is quite clear that Romania has been cruelly treated both by Germany and by Hungary. Without doubt, she will never recover all that she has lost, since an act of spoliation necessarily involved an act of destruction, and it will be impossible to get back material which has been destroyed. Romania will doubtless find herself in the same situation as Serbia, Belgium and France. It is equally true to say that the Magyars had taken from the Romanians the greater part of their rolling stock, but the fact that rolling stock constitutes the material which Europe most urgently requires in order to reconstitute her economic life should not be lost sight of. Consequently, in spite of her rights, Romania should realize that in the general interest this material must be distributed in an equitable manner for the benefit of all parties.

In regard to the proposed Armistice he wishes to invite attention to the following paragraph which the Romanian Government desires to impose on Hungary, namely:

“The factories existing in Hungary which may have served for the manufacture of arms and munitions of all kinds must be demolished to the benefit of Romania. This operation will be carried out by Romanian specialists with the help of Hungarian Officers”.

He need hardly point out that in Hungary, as in all Allied countries, every factory and every workshop has been utilized for the production of war material. Consequently, the whole of the Hungarian factories would have to be handed over to Romania. Such a solution was impossible for Hungary, and he thought that it would be equally unacceptable to the Allied and Associated Governments, since it contravened the principles which had hitherto guided the Conference in their labors.

Mr Vaida says that the opportunities of presenting their case to the Conference which has hitherto been offered to the Romanian Delegation had been so few and far between that he could not allow the present opportunity of making a statement to escape. He wishes to impress upon the Conference the fact that the Magyars had never complied with the conditions of the Armistice of the 13th November, 1918. The Entente had for many months past struggled against the situation so created, and had on frequent occasions issued instructions which the Romanian Government has always accepted whatever might have been the consequences entailed. On the other hand, the Allied and Associated Powers have never been able to compel the Hungarians to accede to their wishes. Finally, the Hungarians had attacked Romania thereby annulling the Armistice. In spite of the Armistice, the Hungarians had treated the Romanians as enemies and compelled the latter to take military measures to defend themselves.

He wishes on this occasion to beg the Conference to make certain alterations in the terms of the existing Armistice. He would ask the Conference to add to the instructions to be issued to the Generals a clause to the effect that the Armistice of the 13th November having been broken no longer existed, and that it must be replaced by a new Armistice to be imposed in Budapest by the representatives of the Entente. Many of the clauses of the Armistice of November, 1918, cab no longer be carried out; others have no further value. Yesterday, the Hungarians were the enemies of Romania, to-day they are conquered, and Romania in the future desires that they should become her friends. He begged the Conference therefore, to reconsider the text of the telegram which it was proposed to send to the Romanian Government and to modify it so as to add a sentence which would prove to his Government that it could still count on the same goodwill as the Conference has extended to himself personally. Every telegram issued by the Conference is invariably at once published in the newspapers of Vienna and Budapest. Consequently, it is essential that the message should not be open to the interpretation that the Conference desired to blame Romania when a word of encouragement would cause hope to arise, which will lead more easily to the desired goal.

M Clemenceau promises that this request would receive the favorable consideration of the Conference.

Mr Misu adds that the Roumanian Delegation merely asked for some sign of goodwill.

(Mr Misu and Mr Vaida-Voevod then withdraw.)

M Clemenceau expresses the view that the remarks made by the Romanian representatives are just, and that a sentence should be added to the draft telegram to give effect to their wishes.

S Tittoni points out that Mr Vaida-Voevod have also declared that the Hungarians have no further claim to the maintenance of the first Armistice, and that the four Allied Generals should be charged with the duty of dictating new conditions.

(After a short discussion it is decided to insert in the telegram above quoted the following sentence:

“Fully recognizing the just claims of Romania and her devotion to the common cause”.)

(It was agreed:

1) To transmit the following telegram with all due urgency to the Romanian Government through the French Chargé d’Affaires at Bucharest:

“The Supreme Council has learned that the Romanian Military Authorities at Budapest have imposed Armistice on Hungarian Government to be accepted at a few hours notice. The terms of this Armistice render it impossible for Hungarian Government to fulfill Armistice concluded with Allied and Associated Powers on November 13, 1919. Moreover, the terms in themselves paid no regard to rights of reparation of other Allies. The Supreme Council, whilst fully recognizing the just claims of Romania and her devotion to the common cause, desired formally to record their refusal to recognize the right of Romania’s Commander-in-Chief to impose any Armistice without authority of the Allied and Associated Powers.”

2) To forward instructions to the four Generals, members of the Military Mission to Budapest, to proceed there without delay.

3. M Clemenceau says he wishes to communicate to the Conference, for information, the following telegram dated Constantinople, 4th August, 1919:

“The High Commissioners of Great Britain, France and Italy on the 3rd August, 1919, transmitted to the Turkish Government, the decisions of the Supreme Council in regard to the delimitation of the Greek and Italian zones of occupation and in regard to the creation of a Commission of Inquiry into the events which have taken place in consequence of the occupation of Smyrna.

“The Grand Vizier received this communication with great satisfaction and declared that the Conference had thereby increased by 50 per cent, the authority of the Government.

“An official communiqué dated on the 4th August ends as follows: “Without doubt the humanitarian decision of the Peace Conference will fill everyone with gratitude.”

4. M Clemenceau reads the following telegram, dated 5th August, 1919, which he has received from the French Ambassador in Washington, in reply to the request made by the Conference to the American Government on the subject of the repatriation of the Czechoslovaks in Siberia:

“The American Government possesses no tonnage which could serve for the repatriation of the Czechoslovaks, and does not believe that any other country is in a position to supply tonnage for that purpose. In view of the fact that the matter relates to the repatriation of people who would no longer fight, it inquires whether it would not be possible to send these people to the Black Sea passing through the region occupied by General Denikin.

The American Government is considering at the same time the repatriation which must soon take place of the 200,000 German-Austro prisoners still in Siberia.”

M Clemenceau, continuing, says that the Conference is faced with a cruel situation. The Military Experts at Versailles, to whom the question had been referred, have reached the conclusion that the Czechoslovaks could only be repatriated by the sea route. To the demand for tonnage made to the American Government, the reply was that no tonnage is available, and that the repatriation of the Czechoslovaks could only be made by the land route. The Conference feels obliged, therefore, as a last resort, to turn to the Japanese Government to whom the question had already been submitted.

Mr Matsui say that during the course of the Meeting at which this question of repatriation had first been discussed, the view had been expressed that the Czechoslovaks should be withdrawn from the Trans-Siberian railway and placed on the right of Kolchak’s army, in order to reinforce the latter. It had then been suggested that the Japanese Government should furnish military contingents in order to relieve the Czechoslovaks along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Later, the situation had altered, and it had been found that the Czechoslovaks could not be used to reinforce Kolchak’s army since they desired to be repatriated and refused to fight. The situation having thus altered, Baron Makino had telegraphed to the Japanese Government for fresh instructions. No reply had yet been received. He does not wish to prejudge the question, but he feels compelled to inform the Conference that he does not think the Japanese Government would be in a position to accept the proposal. He is led to that conclusion by the refusal of his Government to comply with a similar request made by the Romanian Government, who had asked for tonnage to repatriate the Romanians at present in Siberia, whose numbers fall far below those of the Czechoslovaks. Nevertheless, his Government has been unable to obtain the necessary tonnage.

M Clemenceau gathers that, under the circumstances, it would apparently be impossible to repatriate the Czechoslovaks either by the land or by the sea route. On the other hand, all information goes to show that they cannot spend the winter in Siberia.

S Tittoni inquires how the Czechoslovaks at present obtain their supplies?

Mr Balfour replies that they receive their supplies from America via Vladivostok.

M Clemenceau inquired whether the ships which bring these supplies do not return empty, and, if so, whether they could not be used for repatriating the Czechoslovaks.

Mr Balfour think that the steamers are not suitable for employment as troopships.

M Clemenceau thinks that the men would prefer to be repatriated in discomfort rather than not to be repatriated at all.

Marshal Foch expresses the view that the shortest route would be via Vladivostok and Vancouver and thence across the Atlantic to Europe. He inquired whether the ships which came to fetch the American troops could not be used for bringing the Czechoslovaks across the Atlantic.

M Clemenceau urges that some solution should be found.

Mr Polk said that if the Council would adjourn the question for a few days, he would again refer the matter to his Government.

(It is decided that Mr Polk should telegraph again to the American Government to urge the necessity of supplying the tonnage required for the repatriation of the Czechoslovaks, the American proposals to send the men across the territories occupied by General Denikin having been found to be unworkable.)

5. M Clemenceau says that the following telegram dated 3rd August, 1919, had been received from the French Military Attaché at Stockholm:

“From information supplied by our Military Mission at Libau, the Germans, far from evacuating Courland, as promised, continues to reinforce themselves by fresh drafts and additional materiel. They at present possess 35,000 men in that region.

Von der Goltz is determined not to leave. He encourages the entry of Russian Bolshevists, and German Spartacists who have considerable funds at their disposal. He counts on their action to provoke a revolutionary movement which would give him the excuse for intervention.

The situation is extremely critical and will become more so after the 10th August, the date from which the American revictualling must cease except for the children at Riga. Unless the Ulmannis Government receives at once the arms, material and money which the British Mission had caused it to expect, it cannot maintain itself beyond the 15th August, and will be replaced by extreme Socialists. This will bring about a Bolshevik Revolution. The Germans will then intervene as saviors and definitely occupy the country.”

M Clemenceau, continuing, calls on Marshal Foch to express his views on this question.

General Weygand said that the Conference had decided on the 30th July, to accept the proposals made by General Gough. The telegram giving effect to that decision has only been dispatched by Marshal Foch on the 1st August. The telegram to the French Military Attaché at Stockholm had been dispatched on the 3rd August, and he doubted whether Marshal Foch’s telegram which had to be forwarded through General Nudant in Berlin, could have reached General von der Goltz by the 3rd August.

On the other hand, that morning, Marshal Foch had received the following telegram from General Gough:

“Please thank Marshal Foch for the firm attitude taken by him in regard to von der Goltz. Should the latter carry out the orders now sent him, many of the difficulties will have been overcome. I shall do all that is possible in regard to the Lithuanian Polish question.”

He (General Weygand) thinks it would be best to await the receipt of later information.

(It is decided to postpone the consideration on this question until the receipt of further information.)

6. Mr Matsui proposes that the Japanese Delegation should be authorized to appoint a Japanese Officer to form part of the Allied Commission appointed on August 4th, 1919 to negotiate between the Polish and German Governments.

(It is agreed that a Japanese Officer should be nominated to represent Japan on the Allied Commission for negotiation between the German and the Polish Governments.)

7. Mr Headlam-Morley invites attention to the draft of a Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand, and Czechoslovakia on the other hand.

The Commission on New States are anxious that a copy of the Treaty should be communicated to the Czechoslovak Delegation, and he had been deputized to obtain the sanction of the Council to this procedure being adopted. The Treaty had been unanimously accepted by the Commission on New States, but it was considered politic that the Czechoslovak Delegation should at once have an opportunity of expressing their views. Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Czechoslovak State

(It is decided to approve the draft of the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia as submitted by the Committee on New States; the draft to be submitted to the Czechoslovakian Delegation by the Secretariat-General.)

8. Mr. Headlam-Morley says that the Commission on New States has proposed that the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Romania should also forthwith be communicated to the Roumanian Delegation.

The treaty deals with matters of very great complexity. The Commission has therefore refrained from entering into direct negotiations with the Romanian Delegation. It was now considered expedient that the draft Treaty in its final form, should forthwith be communicated to the Roumanian Delegation, with the intimation that though the general principles had been accepted, the Romanian Government would have the opportunity of making their observations on matters of detail. He pointed out that the same procedure had been followed with advantage in the case of Poland.

Mr Polk inquires whether any reservation had been made by any of the representatives on the Commission.

Mr Headlam-Morley replies that the American representative had made a reservation in regard to the clause dealing with navigation on the Dniester.

Mr Polk says that he can only accept the Treaty with the reservation on the question of the Dniester. President Wilson himself is greatly interested in this question.

Mr Hudson suggests that the clause dealing with the Dniester should not be communicated to the Roumanian Delegation. The Dniester is situated in Russian territory.

Mr Polk states that for that very reason, the inclusion of this clause might convey the idea to the Romanians that the Council accepts their claims in Bessarabia.

Mr Headlam-Morley maintains that if the Dniester is not mentioned, great difficulties might subsequently arise. He suggests that in communicating the Treaty to the Romanian Delegation, a forwarding letter should be sent explaining that certain questions could not be definitely decided until the frontiers of Czechoslovakia had been settled.

(It is decided to approve the draft of the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Romania as submitted by the Committee on New States; the clause concerning the Dniester River to be revised by the Committee to meet the objections of the American Delegation; the draft thus revised to be submitted to the Romanian Delegation at once by the Secretariat-General.)

9. Mr Headlam-Morley reads the following report submitted to the Council by the Commission on New States:

“Complying with the direction of the Supreme Council under date of 29th July, 1919, the Commission on New States has studied the comments of the Austrians on the clauses concerning the Protection of Minorities, as included in the Conditions of Peace, and the Commission has the honor to submit to the Supreme Council the attached draft of a reply to the Austrian counter-proposals.

“The Commission favors the revision of Articles 79 and 87 of the Conditions of Peace to which the Austrian comment has taken particular exception. This revision would have the effect of bringing the Austrian Treaty into conformity with the Treaty already signed with Poland, and the Treaties to be signed with Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria, in that which concerns the League of Nations enforcement of the guarantees to minorities. The Commission on New States had previously made an informal suggestion that this course should be adopted. The Austrians, in their comment, have stated the objections which the Commission had anticipated. As originally presented to Austria, Articles 79 and 87 are far from clear and are perhaps not altogether consistent. In the opinion of the Commission, the suggested revision will in some points constitute a distinct mitigation of Austria’s terms, for the following reasons:

1) Whereas the former Article 79 conferred jurisdiction on the League of Nations over all obligations in this part of the Treaty, the revision would limit the jurisdiction of the League of Nations to the provisions regarding racial, religious and linguistic minorities.

2) Whereas the former draft outlined no definite procedure for the League of Nations and made it possible that appeals might be prosecuted by interested minorities, or even individuals, the revised draft would limit the League of Nations jurisdiction to disputes between States, and would prescribe a definite procedure to be followed. By recognizing the jurisdiction of the International Court, the judicial feature of disputes is emphasized and the possibility of political interference to which the Austrians object is greatly diminished.

3) Whereas the former Article 87 required the consent of the Council of the League of Nations for any modification of those clauses, meaning the unanimous consent of the Council, the revised draft would allow a modification to be made if it received the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

“The Commission on New States is convinced that the suggested revision will more effectively serve the purpose of the Allied and Associated Powers in including these clauses in the Austrian Treaty, at the same time that it more clearly meets the views of the Austrians, as expressed in their counter-proposals.”

Mr Headlam-Morley, continuing, says that the Commission on New States has prepared a Draft reply to the Austrian counter-proposals giving effect to the conclusions contained in the report just read.

(It is agreed:

1) To accept the draft reply to the Austrian Counter-Proposals on the protection of Minorities, submitted by the Commission on New States.

2) To forward the same to the Editing Committee for incorporation in the final and comprehensive reply to the Austrian Counter-Proposals.

10. Mr Headlam-Morley said that Mr Venizelos had submitted a report dealing with certain difficulties in the Balkans by the encouragement of voluntary emigration. Mr Venizelos’ proposals had been discussed unofficially by the Committee on New States, who considered these to be so good as to justify their extension to all the Balkan States. It had been suggested that an Inter-Allied Commission should be appointed by the League of Nations to control the proposed emigration. The Commission now seeks permission from the Council to discuss the question in the first place with Mr Venizelos and subsequently, should an agreement be reached, with the various Balkan States concerned. The Commission on New States had drawn up a report which has already been submitted to the Council.

s Tittoni says he would accept the proposal provided a strict control were established so that the suggested emigration should not be used by the Governments concerned as measures of expulsion.

Mr Headlam-Morley points out that the proposal to create a strong Commission of control under the League of Nations had been brought forward with the very object of preventing any such abuses.

M Clemenceau expresses the view that since the question had not been placed on the Agenda paper, it should be adjourned for further consideration at a later date.

(It is agreed to adjourn to a later date the further consideration of the report submitted by the Commission on New States on the proposals submitted by Mr Venizelos on the subject of encouragement of voluntary emigration in the Balkan States.)

(Mr Headlam-Morley then withdraws. M Laroche enters the room.)

11. M Laroche reads the note submitted by the Committee on Political Clauses on the subject of the eventual restitution to the Allies of Rolling Stock moved beyond the Armistice frontier in violation of the Armistice of Villa Giusti.

(It is agreed to refer the question raised by the Italian Delegation to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles for examination and report.)

12. M Laroche reads the note submitted by the Committee on Political Clauses respecting the desirability of reconciling the Clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Austria with those of the Treaties to be concluded with the Allied States formed out of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

(It is agreed to accept the proposals contained in the note above referred to and to authorize the Committee on Political Clauses to prepare as soon as possible in conjunction with the Drafting Committee and the Commissions concerned, the new text of the Clauses of the Treaty with Austria therein referred to.)

(M Laroche then withdraws.)

13. M Dutasta reads the following Note, dated Paris, July 30th, 1919, addressed by S Tittoni to the President of the Peace Conference on the subject of the dispatch of war material to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

“Confirming declarations made yesterday to the Supreme Council, I have the honor to inform you that the Italian Delegation has telegraphed to the competent authorities in order that necessary steps be taken to avoid every obstacle to the passage through Italy of French trains transporting merchandise including these the destination of which was Serbia, as well as the military trains agreed upon between France and Italy.

As for the war material destined to Serbia, as I had the honor to ask of you in my note of the 20th instant, as well as at yesterday’s session, I would be infinitely obliged to you if you would be good enough to submit the question as soon as possible to the Inter-Allied Council of Versailles.

Please accept, etc. …”

Mr Polk draws attention to the fact that Mr Lansing has maintained the view that the Allied and Associated Governments have no right to prevent the material going to Serbia; but he, personally, would raise no objection to the question being discussed by the Military Representatives at Versailles.

(It is agreed forthwith to submit the question above referred to, to the Military Representatives, Supreme War Council, Versailles.)

(At this stage General Groves enters the Room.)

14. General Groves says that under the Peace Treaty, Germany is forbidden to have any Naval or Military Aviation, and was required to surrender all her service aircraft to the Allied and Associated Powers. The Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control appointed to supervise the carrying out of the Air Clauses would not be able to begin work until after ratification of the Treaty. Reports received from the British Military Commission at Berlin and from other sources, show that Germany is circumventing the Air Clauses by the following means:

1) She has sold and continues to sell her aircraft and aircraft material to various neutrals.

2) She was adapting her aircraft to commercial use.

3) She is also negotiating to sell to private companies for the sum of 400,000 marks some 500 aircraft engines captured from the Allies.

With regard to (1), namely, the sale of aircraft to neutrals, that entailed the securing of neutral markets at the expense of the Allies. Those markets would also support the German Aircraft Industry, which was the production of her air power, and also the basis of her commercial aeronautical development, which will be in competition with that of the Allied and Associated Powers. It is therefore suggested that this sale shall be forbidden through the Supreme Council, and that Germany shall be called upon to refund to the Allies the sums which she had already made out of such sales.

With regard to (2), that is, the conversion to commercial use of service types of aircraft, a service type of aircraft could be converted to commercial use by slight structural alterations within 48 hours. Such aircraft could equally well be re-converted to service use within the same period. It is suggested that the German Government shall be informed that the Allies are aware that service types are being converted to commercial use, and that the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control shall be the sole judge as to whether any aircraft is of a service type or otherwise.

With regard to (3), that is the sale of aircraft material captured from the Allies, under the Military Clauses all war material captured from the Allies was to be returned. This material is required by the Allies, particularly the engines.

It is, therefore, suggested that the German Government should be informed that the 500 engines referred to shall be delivered to the Allies at once, at a place to be specified, and all other material of this description shall be handed over to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

Mr Balfour inquires whether the fact that the German Government had sold a certain number of captured aircraft engines to private firms re-acted in any way to the detriment of the Allies from a commercial point of view?

General Groves replies in the negative. He would point out, however, that the engines in question are in very good order; they have been well looked after; and they are urgently required by the Allies.

(It is agreed to accept the proposals made by General Groves, namely:

1) That the sale of aircraft and aircraft material to neutral Powers shall be forbidden through the Supreme Command, and that Germany shall be called upon to refund to the Allies the sums which she has already made out of such sales;

2) That the German Government shall be informed that the Allies are aware that service types of aircraft are being converted to commercial use, and that the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control shall be the sole judge as to whether any aircraft is of a service type or otherwise;

3) That the German Government be informed that the 500 engines sold to private companies shall be delivered to the Allies at once at a place to be specified, and all other material of this description shall forthwith be handed over to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control.)

(General Groves withdraws, and Colonel Morgan enters the room.)

15. Colonel Morgan points out that the situation referred to in M Pachitch’s letter, on the subject of the immediate liberation of prisoners of war has already been covered by a decision of the Supreme Council taken on May 23rd, and, if that decision were duly acted upon, no difficulties should arise.

S Tittoni says that the Supreme Council had on May 23rd passed the following resolution:

“The Heads of Governments agree that all war prisoners, formerly nationals of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, now subjects of an Allied or an Associated Nation, should be immediately liberated in a measure to conform with transportation possibilities, and where the frontiers of the States shall have been definitely fixed. In any event, they should not be liberated later than the prisoners of war who are subjects of the new Austrian States.”

Since that date, the Italian Government has taken every possible step to give effect to that decision, with the result that 80,000 prisoners had been repatriated even though the frontiers of the new States had not yet been definitely fixed. 60,000 prisoners still remained in Italy. The Italian Government has no wish to keep those men: but, owing to want of coal at the present moment, fewer trains are running than in wartime. The immediate repatriation of all prisoners of war no doubt deserved every consideration: but the essential needs of the population must in the first place receive attention. His Government had done, and would continue to do, all in their power to repatriate the prisoners in question at the earliest possible date.

(The Supreme Council takes note of S Tittoni’s statement.)

16. Colonel Morgan explains that at the present moment there are 112,000 Turkish prisoners of war in Egypt. The safe custody of these men called for the maintenance of a considerable force. The British authorities feel they cannot afford the man-power required for the purpose. The British War Office is therefore very anxious to repatriate anticipation of the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. The British Government considers that it cannot authorize the execution of these measures without first obtaining the approval of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers thereto.

(It is agreed to authorize the British Government to undertake the immediate liberation of the Turkish prisoners of war in Egypt.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-07-19, 06:40 AM

7th August 1919

French pilot Charles Godefroy flies through the Arc de Triomphe to protest the fact that airmen had to march on foot during the victory parade last month.
https://i.imgur.com/AYJ3u7g.png

Sailor Steve

08-07-19, 01:34 PM

Thursday, August 7, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

(M Tardieu, M Laroche, M Aubert, Colonel Peel, Colonel Castoldi, Mr Coolidge, S Adatci, Mr Kato, and Mr Shigemitsu enter the room.)

1. Mr Polk hands to M Clemenceau a telegram, which M Clemenceau asked M Mantoux to read.

(The following telegram is read:

1) Vienna, Aug 7, 1919, 12 noon.

“Causey will stay Budapest until General Bandholtz arrives and you can phone him easily from Prague, situation in Pest more nasty than ever. You have already been told of changes and situation becoming very acute on account of stoppage of boats on river which are preparing to move this morning in accordance with James plans, also on account of cutting all lines of communication, including blowing up of railroad to Vienna, also manner of military occupation and treatment of inhabitants, their property and supplies. General Gorton, Causey, Romanelli and James went to Roumanian General with written protest against these things, acting under their authority given in the several different ways by the Entente. Romanian General declined to permit them to read statement, acted very discourteously, and was told so. He declined to receive communication, stating that it should be sent to Romanian General Headquarters, which of course is out of reach of communication, even if they knew where it was. He also stated he was acting under orders when he destroyed all communications out of city, which of course cuts off supplies coming in from country, of which there were eighty carloads vegetables in one lot. I plan to go to Buch tonight, meeting you there. I will arrive in time to have conference with General Bandholtz there, who I understand leaves tonight. Will you tell him to be looking for me? There is nothing to be done with this situation except to settle whether Romanians are going to loot this country under one guise or another and if France is going to back them; then to determine whether other members of Entente are going to have a voice in determining the future policy of Central Europe. It is just as difficult, perhaps even more so, to utilize Hungarian equipment of railways and Danube in this situation as it was under Bela Kun. There is no resistance their troops, no necessity for their occupying with the force they have, except for a misguided military policy or a selfish desire on their part which is not in accord with broad principles of reconstruction and future peace of this country and the world.”)

Mr Polk says that as he has already informed M Clemenceau, all supplies to Hungary have been stopped by Mr Hoover, who does not propose to supply the Romanian Government with food that was meant for the Hungarians. He also asks that the following telegrams be heard:

2)“A. R. A. Received Aug 7, 1919.

Budapest Aug 6, 1919.

Supreme Council Paris.

As indicated in telegram sent by me earlier tonight the Archduke Joseph with three members of the new cabinet called on myself and the representatives of the Italian and American Governments to announce the partial selection of his cabinet and to state that he was forming a coalition government in line with the suggestions made by the Supreme Council in Paris. The Archduke is known as the Governor of the State. He is accompanied by Friedrich the Minister President; General Schnetzer Minister of war; General Tanczos Minister of Foreign Affairs; Bleyer Minister of nationalities; Caillery Minister of Health. The other ministry appointments to be made tomorrow to complete the cabinet will consist of two agrarians, one or two of the Szeged party and a social Democrat. The Minister President is a bourgeois. The Minister of War and the Minister of Foreign Affairs are both late Generals in the Austro-Hungarian army. The Minister of Nationalities is a university professor. The Minister of Health a physician. Other details will be wired later. General Gorton and Causey just reported from Budapest that Romanians under the pretext of searching for arms are entering and pillaging a great many different houses in outlying districts as well as in town. The army is living on the country and taking for both animals and men.

Gregory”

3) “A. R. A. Received August 7, 1919. For Action.

Budapest Aug. 6, 1919.

Supreme Council, Paris.

The Hungarian Gendarmerie arrested at 18:30 today the Social Democratic Government while the latter were holding a sitting at the National Palace. The coup d’état was carried out without any disorder. The Archduke Joseph is head of the new Government. General Schnetzer was sent here at ten o’clock tonight to impart this information and to state that policy and other details of new Government will be handed later tonight.

General Gorton”

4) “A. R. A. Received Aug. 7, 1919.

Budapest Aug. 7, 1919.

Supreme War Council, Paris.

The Romanians have informed the Hungarian Government that as the latter have not accepted the terms of their armistice they intend to cross the Danube tomorrow, August seventh. I have ascertained that General Holban refused to let appear in the press today the publication of M Clemenceau’s telegram of fifth instant to the Hungarian Government. The Romanians continue to perpetrate acts which are most discreditable to a power associated with the Entente. Harmless individuals are assaulted, food, live stock, agricultural implements, and rolling stock are requisitioned and sent to Romania and through the purposeless blockade and destruction of railways, Budapest is on the verge of starvation. The latest act of wanton destruction is the demolition of the railway between Budapest and Vienna. Unless instant measures are taken to compel the Romanians to evacuate Budapest and cease their predatory operations in Hungary, the confidence of the Hungarians in the good will of the Entente will be destroyed.

General Gorton”

M Clemenceau expresses the view that the Romanian action cannot be tolerated.

Mr Polk says that in the opinion of the American Delegation, interference in the domestic affairs of Hungary will do more to encourage Bolshevism than any event in the last six months. Lenin would point to the example of what had taken place on the downfall of the Soviet Government in Hungary, in order to scare Russia and preserve his own regime. The setting up of a reactionary Government in Hungary in place of a moderate Socialist Government was a very threatening feature in the situation.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Romanian General committing these follies and wickednesses is the same man that had put himself under Marshal Foch’s orders.

M Clemenceau says that as the General is not named, it is impossible to know.

Mr Polk said that one of the American Experts on the Economic Commission had prepared a memorandum showing in what way the armistice demanded by the Romanians interfered with the Reparation terms of the Conference.

M Clemenceau says that an energetic telegram must be sent to the Romanian Government.

Mr Balfour entirely agrees. He adds that the Commission of Generals should be informed of the message sent to Bucharest, and asks to communicate it to the Romanian Government. If the Romanians still persist in going forward it will be necessary to break off relations, or to do something very serious. He asks whether there is any economic weapon that could be brought to bear on Romania.

Mr Polk said that Romania would soon be quite independent of the Allies in this respect for a short time. There is a good harvest about to be reaped, and abundant rolling stock is being stolen from Hungary, but, for the future Romania will not be able to count on any assistance from the United States.

S Tittoni said that on the previous day he had heard a rumor that the King of Romania is to enter Budapest.

Mr Balfour suggests that the telegram to be sent to Romania should begin by a brief recital of the various things which had been required of the Roumanian Government by the Conference, and of the omissions by the Roumanian Government to fulfill these requests. This part, he thinks, will be easy, as it amounts to a list of requests by the Conference and of disobediences by the Romanians, but it is harder to discover exactly what threat should be added at the end. No opinion has as yet been expressed in the Council as to how far it was desirable or possible to go.

M Clemenceau suggests that it be stated that Romania has broken the Alliance and must suffer the consequences.

M Pichon agreed that the Romanians has proposed an armistice which was not in harmony with the armistice made by the Allies, and that they had set up a reactionary Government which was contrary to Allied policy.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Council would agree to a threat of blockade by sea.

M Clemenceau says that he would prefer to threaten Romania for the time in general terms. He thinks that the mere breach of the alliance would frighten her sufficiently.

Mr Balfour says that the result of this action should be borne in mind. This would be the first public quarrel in the alliance. It is also taking place in a part of the world where the tension was very great. The fact must be faced that the consequences might be very serious.

M Clemenceau says that the alternative is to submit to the insolent defiance of the Romanians. He is not prepared to submit to it. He would rather leave his place in the Council. The Romanians have always behaved like this, and deserved to be told that if they continue they will be regarded as having broken the alliance. They were in conflict with the Conference, and must suffer for it.

M Tardieu inquired whether there really exists any alliance with Romania. It has been declared at the Peace of Bucharest that the Romanians have ceased to be Allies.

Mr Polk says that even after this, when they desired to raise a loan in America, the Romanians have declared themselves to be among the Allies. They cannot be Allies only for financial purposes.

M Tardieu suggests that the Romanians be told that they must leave the Conference and suffer all the consequences of ceasing to belong to it. The Conference is a definite thing. The alliance is a vague thing. The Romanians would be able to estimate advantages and disadvantages more clearly.

Mr Balfour then undertakes to draft a telegram. He says that what he is about to read should be prefaced by a recital of the various instances in which the Roumanian Government had refused to carry out the policy of the Conference. After some discussion the following draft was accepted as the conclusion of the telegram to be sent to the Romanian Government:

“The Conference in the face of these facts is compelled to believe that the Roumanian Government intends to defy the Conference and to sever themselves from the Allied and Associated Powers. If the Conference is mistaken in these views it desires that the Romanian Government will give it an immediate contradiction not only in words but by acts which will prove to all the world that Romania accepts and is prepared to carry out in good faith the policy which the Conference has thus laid down”.

(It is also agreed that the telegram should be transmitted to General Gorton at Budapest for communication to his colleagues and to the Romanian Commander.)

2. M Clemenceau asks M Tardieu if he has anything new to say about Thrace.

M Tardieu says he has nothing to add to what he said the day before.

Mr Balfour says that he has had a talk with Mr Polk. The original proposal of the Committee was strongly objected to by the American Delegation, which is supported by the Italian Delegation. He had himself on the previous day suggested a compromise which restored to Bulgaria a large population in Western Thrace, but gives the coast to Greece as a line of communication with Eastern Thrace. Mr Venizelos had not liked this solution. As an alternative he had proposed that Thrace be made an autonomous State like Ruthenia under Greek sovereignty. This solution did not commend itself very much nor did it meet the American objection which he understood to be that Bulgaria could not now be deprived of access to the Aegean which had been given her before the war by a Treaty. The American Delegation believed that this was bound to lead to war very soon. They said they also thought it was useless to allege that Dedeagatch is an indifferent port not worth a quarrel. Whatever its merits the Bulgarians we are attached to it, and it has a sentimental value about which there can be no argument. If peace in the Balkans is to be established, Dedeagatch must be left to Bulgaria. This he understood to be the American view. To meet this view a suggestion had been made that a corridor to the Aegean including Dedeagatch be given to Bulgaria under full sovereignty, the allotment of Thrace, both Eastern and Western, being left very much as the Committee had proposed. It had then been agreed between himself and Mr Polk that the American and British experts should set to work on this suggestion to see if it could be geographically carried out. They were then to see Mr Venizelos without committing either of their Principals or the Conference.

Mr Polk says that one argument has weighed considerably with him. All military authorities say that the cession of Thrace to Greece means war in the Balkans. They added that of the Balkan States Bulgaria was the best able to wage war. It was therefore imperative to find some compromise which had a chance of lasting at least for a while.

M Tardieu says that he is not much in favour of the ‘corridor’ proposal. In another instance a ‘corridor’ had been proposed to link Czechoslovakia with Yugoslavia. This had been rejected by the Council as impracticable, though it would have been a matter of European interest and favorable to two of our Allies, as well as separating Austria from Hungary. As to the military opinion mentioned by Mr Polk, he does not like to pit himself against the military authorities, but the Conference had been repeatedly told that all the enemy countries would go to war. Germany had not done so. He personally thinks it most unlikely that Bulgaria would defy the Conference.

Mr Polk points out that in the case of Germany the Allies are in possession of a good argument namely, Marshal Foch and his armies on the Rhine. No similar argument exists in Bulgaria.

M Tardieu said that Mr Venizelos has declared himself ready to cope with the situation. In any case he thinks, as the corridor would include Dedeagatch, a Greek town, and other towns also Greek, that it should, like Danzig, be made into the territory of a Free State.

S Tittoni said that he had previously suggested an alteration of the line in Eastern Thrace; now Mr Balfour suggests one in Western Thrace. He thinks perhaps the two might be combined.

M Tardieu says that if Western Thrace is not to be Greek there is no special reason why it should be Bulgarian. The population is Turkish.

Mr Polk observes that the country is at the present time Bulgarian.

M Tardieu says that Western Thrace is held by the Bulgarians just as Southern Dobrudja was held by the Romanians. The American Delegation wishes to take Southern Dobrudja from Romania because it is Bulgarian and to give Bulgaria Western Thrace because it is Turkish.

Mr Polk says that the question is whether Greece has a better claim to the country than Bulgaria. Secondly, if the transfer means war is it advisable to make it?

M Tardieu says he would agree if necessary not to give the country to Greece but he would not agree to give it to Bulgaria.

Mr Polk observes that the American suggestion had been to attribute the country to an international state. This had been scoffed at.

M Tardieu says that possibly a working arrangement might be made giving Dedeagatch as a commercial outlet to Bulgaria, under international administration as a free city. An international administrative commission would also control the railway leading to it. Thrace, both Eastern and Western, might be granted autonomous rights, similar to those granted to Ruthenia, under the sovereignty of Greece. It might even be possible to re-enforce the arrangement made for Ruthenia by an international commission. This scheme would take into consideration all the observations made, except that it would not permit direct access of Bulgaria to the Aegean, but he thinks Bulgaria could do without this and the Allies have no real interest in furthering this desire. In any case he thinks it is more inexpedient to work for the party of Constantine in Greece than to annoy the Bulgarians who, after what they had done, must expect severe treatment.

Mr Polk agrees that it is desirable to uphold Mr Venizelos. He has no desire to favor the Bulgarians but it was not always advantageous to give even a good boy all he wanted. In Western Thrace, the figures of the 1914 census showed 100,000 Bulgarians against 30,000 Greeks. It is true that this proportion had been different in 1910 but present figures showed a great preponderance of Bulgarians. The American Delegation is convinced that to give this country to Greece was dangerous and would do no good. In Eastern Thrace, by changing the Enos-Midia line, it might be possible to give Greece a larger Greek population. The Greeks were more numerous towards Constantinople and less numerous towards Adrianople where the Bulgarian population was denser. He urged that 100,000 Bulgarians should not be placed under Greek rule. What had happened in Smyrna would happen again in Western Thrace. Mr Venizelos had quoted a number of Bulgarian atrocities. Out of the Carnegie report an equal number of Greek atrocities could be cited. The Turks in Western Thrace spoke Bulgarian and preferred Bulgarian to Greek rule.

M Tardieu says that his own experience has satisfied him that the inference from language to political preference was false.

Mr Polk said that this might be so. Nevertheless, there still remain 100,000 Bulgarians as against 30,000 Greeks.

M Clemenceau asks what Mr Polk thought of the proposal to make Dedeagatch and the corridor a free city.

Mr Polk says that this solution would still give the uplands of Thrace where the Bulgarian population was densest to Greece. The corridor is on the Eastern rim of Western Thrace.

M Tardieu says that he sees no possibility of giving to Bulgaria, Greek or Turkish territory. The figures of the 1914 census did not deserve any attention. The reduction of the Greek population had been obtained by wholesale massacre. He could not admit that massacre created title.

Mr Polk said that he has taken care to say that no title arises from massacre. What he had drawn attention to was the actual condition of the population.

M Tardieu says that under a Greek or International Government, the Greeks would flock back to the country.

Mr Polk says they would doubtless do so if the Bulgarians allowed them. That was the point. His instructions from President Wilson are very clear that a large Bulgarian population was not to be handed over to Greece.

M Tardieu asks whether a commercial outlet for Bulgaria to Dedeagatch through an internationalized territory was consistent with Mr Polk’s instructions.

Mr Polk says that this might be consistent with the instructions. He is not quite certain, as there has been some confusion in the cable. What is quite positive was that the transference of a large population in Western Thrace to Greece was not approved.

M Tardieu asks whether autonomy similar to that given to the Ruthenians or even reinforced by further guarantees would be accepted by the American Delegation.

Mr Polk says that only international control would be accepted.

M Tardieu asked if Mr Polk would oppose the cession of any part of Western Thrace to Greece.

Mr Polk says his instructions do not amount to this. He will be prepared to accept the compromise suggested by Mr Balfour. The whole matter might, as Mr Lansing had suggested, be referred to an International Commission.

Mr Balfour points out that the present Council is, in itself, an International Commission. He thinks that for the time, being, no further progress could be made in the discussion and suggested that the views of Mr Venizelos on the various compromises should be obtained.

M Tardieu says that he knows what Mr Venizelos’ views are. He has seen him since his conversation with Mr Balfour and Mr Polk. Mr Venizelos is not willing to give up the numerous Greeks of Eastern Thrace merely on account of a few thousand Bulgarians in Western Thrace.

M Clemenceau asks whether Mr Polk accepts autonomy for Thrace under Greek sovereignty.

Mr Polk replies in the negative.

M Clemenceau says that he does not think that the granting or the withholding of Dedeagatch from Bulgaria will put an end to conflict in the Balkans. On one thing he is determined - that no territorial reward should be given to Bulgaria.

(It is decided to adjourn the discussion.)

3. M Tardieu says that a small piece of frontier remained unsettled. He alludes to the frontier between Romania and the Ruthene territory attached to Czechoslovakia. The recommendations of the Committee on the Territorial Questions relating to Romania and Yugoslavia are to be found in Report No. 1 of April 6th, 1919. Frontier Between Romania and the Czechoslovak State

(It is then decided to accept the frontier between Romania and the Czechoslovak State (Ruthene territory) as drawn by the Committee for the study of Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs in Report No. 1 of April 6th, 1919, and to notify this line to the two Delegations concerned.)

4. M Cambon says that the Czechs and Poles have not been able to reach a solution on the question of Teschen. Mr Paderewski had suggested that the negotiations should be resumed in Paris. Dr Benes, who feels that he will not be able to yield, had asked to be heard by the Council. The Council had already had discussions on the question of Teschen, and is doubtless unwilling to hear lengthy statements on the subject again. He therefore suggests that Dr Benes and Mr Paderewski be heard before a joint meeting of the Polish and Czechoslovak Committees. As neither side will yield it is obviously to the advantage of both to have a solution imposed by the Conference. The joint meeting would then make a short report to the Council.

(It is decided to accept M Cambon’s proposal regarding the reference of the Teschen question to a joint meeting of the Polish and Czechoslovak Committees for speedy examination and report.)

(M Cambon withdraws and Mr. Strachey enters the room.)

5. Mr Strachey says that on May 7th the Supreme Council decided that the mandate for German East Africa should be given to Great Britain. This decision is published. M Hymans thereupon addressed a protest to M Clemenceau as he considered that the claims of Belgium to receive a mandate for the portion of the colony occupied by her troops should not have been overlooked. Lord Milner is asked by the Prime Minister to discuss the matter with M Hymans. M Hymans delegated M. Orts to represent him, and Lord Milner has meetings with M Orts and also correspondence during the month of May. On the 1st June Lord Milner informed the Secretary of the British Empire Delegation that he had agreed with M Orts to join with him in a proposal to the Supreme Council that Belgium should be allowed to retain, under mandate, a certain portion of the territory of German East Africa occupied by her troops. The limits of this territory so retained were marked on a map, a copy of which was submitted by Lord Milner. Lord Milner adds: “It is clearly understood that in recommending this solution, which I am personally prepared to support, I have not in any way committed the Supreme Council”. The decision to create a special Commission to consider, among other things, the claims of Belgium in German East Africa, was taken on June 27th. The Meeting of that Commission which heard the Belgian claims took place on July 17th, and the above-mentioned agreement between Lord Milner and M Orts was communicated by Baron de Gaiffier d’Hestroy.

M Clemenceau asks how much of German East Africa would thus pass under Belgian mandate.

Mr Strachey replies that it would be about one-twentieth of the Colony and the most thickly populated part of it, containing about 2,500,000 people.

Mr Balfour says that he supports the views of Lord Milner. He understands that there are some objections as Belgian administration, owing to its past achievements, does not inspire universal conviction.

Mr Strachey says that this point has not been raised by the United States representative. A different point had been raised by him at the meeting of the Mandate Committee.

S Tittoni says that, in consideration of the great sacrifices made by Belgium during the war, this satisfaction could not be denied her. He is in favour of ratifying the agreements made between the British and Belgian Delegates.

M Clemenceau agrees.

Mr Polk asks if he might for the time being reserve his vote, as he wishes to consult an American Expert who was not present. He would notify the Secretariat later.

(With the reservation that Mr Polk would inform the Secretariat-General at a later date whether he was able to accept or not, the agreement is accepted by the Council.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-08-19, 05:40 AM

8th August 1919

Aftermath of War

Afghan War ends.

German prisoners of war filling up holes caused by artillery at the former battlefields in France.
https://i.imgur.com/RzPLynD.jpg

Archduke Joseph August of Austria also declares himself Regent of Hungary. As a Habsburg, he is opposed by most Allied governments.
https://i.imgur.com/S7ZrUpq.png

István Friedrich, a Hungarian right-wing counterrevolutionary, becomes the new Prime Minister of Hungary with the backing of the occupying Romanian forces.
https://i.imgur.com/elXpQ8P.jpg

That wonderful sight to so many American soldiers, The Statue of Liberty, as it greeted the 2nd Division as it arrived at New York. August 8, 1919.
https://i.imgur.com/NNL6xhe.jpg

Jimbuna

08-09-19, 06:07 AM

9th August 1919

The serialized novel “The Curse of Capistrano” begins publication, featuring the character Zorro for the first time.
https://i.imgur.com/cjEIgfm.jpg

Buddahaid

08-09-19, 07:09 PM

Jim, I'm getting error message for most all of the images you've been posting for the past week or so.

Sailor Steve

08-09-19, 09:00 PM

Friday, August 8, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

(Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council are present.)

1. M Clemenceau communicates a letter from the Financial Italian Delegation on this subject to the Council.

S Tittoni asks that the question should be submitted to the Finance Committee for examination and report.

(It is therefore agreed that the letter from the Italian Delegation with regard to the Financial Situation in Fiume should be submitted to the Finance Committee for examination and report.)

2. M Clemenceau asks whether the Americans have any news from Budapest.

Mr Polk communicates a telegram.

M Clemenceau said that he does not see that the Council can do anything at present.

Mr Balfour, commenting upon the telegram, asks why the Allied and Associated representatives at Vienna had received some, and not all, of the instructions given to the Committee of General Officers.

Mr Polk said that he can only say that the instructions had been sent through Warsaw to General Gorton.

General Sackville-West says that the instructions had been sent on the previous day, in writing, and by telegram. The former would go by courier, but the latter would have to be communicated by the best means that the Allied representatives in Vienna could devise.

Mr Balfour asks whether the American organisation for telegraphic communication with Central Europe had been employed.

Mr Norman replies that an attempt had been made to send the communication by wireless telegraph from the Eiffel Tower.

Mr Balfour said that he did not think the question was of great importance, so long as every means had been employed for communicating with the Allied and Associated representatives concerned.

S Tittoni then draws attention to the instructions to the four Generals, dealing with the distribution of war materials to the Allies.

He thinks that the insertion of the phrase in the instructions in question was somewhat premature. He understands that the Council is to decide finally on the distribution of the total war material taken from the enemy, on the general principle that each Ally was to have a share proportionate to its effort. The question, therefore, still remains to be settled.

Mr Balfour says that he does not quite understand how the phrase objected to by S Tittoni had been inserted.

M Clemenceau agrees with the principle enunciated by S Tittoni, and said that he thinks a telegram should be sent to the Generals.

General Weygand said that he would draft the necessary telegram to the Generals.

(It is decided that General Weygand should send a telegram to the four Generals on the Commission to Budapest, informing them that as the general principle governing the distribution of enemy war material to the Allies had not as yet been decided on by the Council, their functions in the matter should be limited to making such recommendations as they might think fit.)

3. Mr Balfour states that the Austrian Delegation has just sent in a general reply on the subject of the peace terms. The communications in question would be sent to the various Committees for examination, in accordance with the procedure established. Furthermore, each Committee would report separately on the points in the Note with which it is immediately concerned. The Council, after receiving and considering the replies of these various Committees, would send them to the Coordinating Committee for the necessary action. He therefore proposed a modification of the procedure, which would consist in sending the replies of the various Committees to the Coordinating Committee first, which latter body, after considering them as a whole, should report to the Council. Replies to Austrian Notes

Captain Portier informs Mr Balfour that this procedure has already been adopted.

(The Finance Experts enter the Room.)

4. M Cheysson drew the attention of the Council to the telegram contained in Appendix “C”. He says the Council is faced with the alternative of the eventual bankruptcy of the Turkish state, or of partially consenting to the measures which the Ottoman Government were taking. He thought it would be better to have further information before taking definite measures. Such information would take the form of a general report on the financial position of the Turkish Government. He did not think that it would be proper to allow the Turks to proceed with the sale of state property without further inquiry. He suggested that they should be asked why the sale of their credits and property was so urgent, and what form of realizable property they proposed to sell. Sale of State Property by the Ottoman Government

S Tittoni said that he agrees with M Cheysson as to the need of a general report upon the financial position of Turkey. He thinks, however, that a distinction should be made between

1) The private property of the Sultan

2) The properties of religious foundations, and

3) The State domains.
No. 3 constituted a fund of State property which was a most important guarantee of ultimate reparation. The private property of the Crown could be sold by the Turkish Govt. as it could not be regarded as confiscated property, subjected to the payment of war damages. The properties of religious foundations could not be seized in payment of war damages, and the Turkish Government might, in a similar manner, sell them.

M Cheysson said that in the Peace Treaties with Austria and Germany, the Crown property had been regarded as belonging genuinely to the State, and as being, in consequence, liable to confiscation.

S Tittoni said that he can not quite agree, as a distinction had been established between the private and public property of the Ruler, the later falling under the jurisdiction of the National Executive.

M Pichon says that he does not think that distinctions of the kind were applicable to Eastern countries, and that it would be better to adopt a simpler general rule.

S Tittoni said that he only desired that in communicating a general report upon the financial situation in Turkey, the Financial Commission should take into consideration the point that he had raised.

Mr Balfour asks whether, under the terms of the Armistice, we were empowered to ask for the exact information required. Could we, for instance, have made a similar request to Germany?

M Cheysson remarks that he thinks that until such time as the Peace Treaty should be signed, the Allied and Associated Governments were able to take whatever measures they thought necessary for the preservation of their interests.

Mr Polk says that as it would be a long time before the final peace could be arrived at, with Turkey, and as the existing Armistice was incomplete in certain points, due to its having been drawn up at an early period, would it not be advantageous to draft a more complete and conclusive Armistice, which would enable us to tide over the intervening time?

Mr Balfour says that he thinks Mr Polk’s suggestion, if put into effect, would be a trifle high-handed.

Mr Polk suggests that the necessary measures might be effected by mutual agreement.

Mr Dulles draws attention to the fact that in the successive Armistices imposed upon Germany, measures had been taken with a view to preserving securities and other properties for the purposes of ultimate reparations.

Mr Balfour agrees, but says that these additional terms have only been imposed in exchange for concessions on other points granted by the German Government.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks the necessary measures could only be put into effect by Treaty provisions.

Mr Balfour then suggested that it might be best:

1) To refuse to recognize the sales of property now being carried out by the Turkish Government until the final signature of the Peace Treaty. Such a measure would put prospective purchasers on their guard, and

2) After receiving a full report on the financial position of the Ottoman Government, authorization might be given to proceed with sales of a certain class, in order that the Turkish Empire might be saved from bankruptcy.
(It is therefore decided:

1) That a communication should be sent to the Ottoman Government through the French High Commissioner at Constantinople, informing it that the Allied and Associated Governments refused, and would refuse to recognize the validity of any sales, effected by such Government, between the signature of the Armistice and the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

2) That the Allied and Associated Governments should reserve to themselves the right to grant special licenses to the Ottoman Government for the sale of such property as the aforesaid Ottoman Government might desire to realize: the conditions of sale, and the property to be realized, being specified, in detail, beforehand, to the Allied and Associated Governments.

3) That the Financial Commission should Inquire into, and present, a general report on the financial position of the Ottoman Government, and should examine the question of the sale by that Government of

a) Private properties of the Crown.

b) Properties belonging to religious foundations.

c) State domains.

(At this point Colonel Peel enters the Room and M Cheysson withdraws.)

5. Colonel Peel presents and remarked on the proposals put forward by the Reparations Commission.

He draws attention to the observations made by the Delegations of the Greek, Roumanian and Yugoslav Governments on the subject of the Reparation Clauses, and to the opinion of the Reparation Commission upon the criticism raised against the articles in the Peace Treaty dealing with reparations by Bulgaria.

In conclusion, he draws attention to the calculation made by the American Delegation on the subject of reparations in Balkan countries. The results of this calculation were that the reparations to be paid by Bulgaria were to be regarded as a national payment of Fes 600 for each citizen. The total load of debt and obligations upon Serbia, represented a payment of Fes 300 per citizen.

Finally, he wishes that a modification should be inserted into Article 14, so as to enable the Reparations Commission to collect debts due by Germany to the National Bank of Bulgaria.

(It is agreed:

1) To accept the figure of 2¼ milliards of Francs, which the Reparations Commission considered to be the maximum sum payable by Bulgaria.

2) To accept the findings of the Commission with regard to the debts due by Germany to Bulgaria, and by Bulgaria to Germany, and not to add such credits to the total sum payable by the Bulgarian Government.

3) To accept the findings of the Reparations Commission on the subject of the cattle and live stock to be delivered by the Bulgarians to the Serbs.

4) That neither Greece, nor Romania, nor Yugoslavia should be represented on the Inter-Allied Committee for Bulgaria.

5) That Article 14 of the Financial and Reparation Clauses should be modified in such a manner as to allow the Reparations Commission to collect debts due by Germany to the National Bank of Bulgaria.)

6. Marshal Foch explained his report on the subject of the German Forces in the 10 kilometre and 50 kilometre zones on the right bank of the Rhine.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch’s proposals with regard to the German Military forces for maintaining order in the 10 kilometre and the 50 kilometre zones on the right bank of the Rhine should be accepted.)

7. Marshal Foch says that the question to be discussed had been brought forward in his letter of the 6th of August to the President of the Council. His conclusion has been, that the Council ought to take an immediate resolution with regard to the constitution of the Allied Forces, and to the total forces necessary.

M Clemenceau asked whether Italy should be regards as consenting to participate in the occupation.

Marshal Foch replied that he understood that Italy would participate, and that contributions to the forces would come from four sources.

M Clemenceau says that the question before the Council is whether each Country consented to send a quarter of the total effectives.

Mr Balfour said that Great Britain is quite willing to send her share; but that a practical difficulty with regard to the provisioning of the troops called for solution. It would be very difficult for Great Britain to send the necessary provisions to any of its forces stationed in Upper Silesia; On the other hand, such an operation would be relatively easy for France. He therefore proposes that the Headquarter Staffs should examine the question of distributing the troops. England might take a greater share in any operations affecting the coastal regions, such as Danzig; while France might make a proportionately larger contribution towards operations in such regions as Upper Silesia. The total force would be the same; only the disposal of the troops would be modified.

M Clemenceau remarks that a decision has been arrived at, to the effect that the forces of occupation in Upper Silesia should be taken from the Armies in the Rhine territories. The question of transport had not therefore arisen, since troops taken from such sources would probably be sent by land. Since the provisioning of the troops on the left bank of the Rhine was carried out en bloc, the same thing would probably hold good for military forces in Upper Silesia. It was most important that all forces of occupation sent out by the Allies to various parts of Europe should, in every case, comprise a certain number of men from each one of the Allied and Associated Powers. This principle was particularly important in such areas as Danzig. He does not make any concrete proposal, but considers that the spirit of the Treaty would be violated by failing to make all forces of occupation, composite, Inter-Allied, Units.

Marshal Foch says that he concluded from Mr Balfour’s remark that the British Army would be represented in Upper Silesia.

Mr Balfour says the British forces would certainly take part in that occupation.

General Bliss said that a decision had been arrived at, to the effect that every Army was to be represented on the Rhine. He is of the opinion that the command in any one locality should be homogeneous. The United States would contribute. With regard to the proportion of troops to be furnished by each nation, he reminded the Council that he had been a Member of each Committee that had examined the problem, when the question of the Army of Occupation on the Rhine had been discussed. He had told President Wilson that the figure arrived at for the United States Forces was an absolute minimum. His observations had therefore been accepted and the necessary orders given. He had thought, however, that the American troops were to remain on the Rhine, and were not to be sent into Upper Silesia. It would therefore be necessary for him to ask President Wilson whether the United States contingent for the Rhine should be considered as indivisible, and, if sent elsewhere, whether it should be replaced.

M Clemenceau says that when the question of the occupation of the Rhine had been discussed, President Wilson’s plan of an Inter-Allied occupation had been accepted in spite of his (M Clemenceau’s) opposition. It therefore seemed difficult to admit that President Wilson was in a position to discuss the matter further.

Mr Balfour said that he believed General Belin had informed the Council that a Division in Upper Silesia could be of strategical use in the event of the recurrence of active operations on the Western Front.

General Bliss said that he was sure that President Wilson would make no objection. The only point to be considered was whether the United States force should be regarded as a Unit not capable of division, and whether if it were sent to Upper Silesia, it should be replaced on the Rhine by other troops.

Mr Polk says that the question is one of numbers.

M Clemenceau said that he realized, that, from a practical point of view, it would be better for certain Units in the Armies of Occupation not to be Inter-Allied Forces. From the political point of view, however, it was most important that Occupation Forces should be so constituted; this was more particularly desirable in view of the fact that the Allied soldiers had always worked well together, and that no friction had risen between them.

Mr Balfour says that he agrees with M Clemenceau. It was most advantageous to show everywhere, that the Allies remained associated together in the achievement of certain objects. He did not foresee any difficulty with regard to the troops; but he did anticipate numerous practical difficulties with regard to provisioning. He proposed that Marshal Foch should examine the problem in collaboration with the Headquarter Staffs of the various Governments concerned.

S Tittoni said that he did not think that the principle of equal contribution had ever been accepted, and that he could not undertake to furnish a quarter of the total effectives in the Division for Upper Silesia, more especially as Italy had no troops on the Rhine.

M Clemenceau says that although there are no Italian troops on the Rhine, Signor Orlando had none the less accepted the principle of the Forces of Occupation being divided among the Allies.

S Tittoni says that he thinks that the American and British Governments had made reservations.

M Clemenceau said that these Governments had consented to furnish their contingents; the only reservations that they had made, dealt with the subject of the distribution of troops in certain specified sectors.

Marshal Foch asked whether he is to understand that the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, would participate equally in the occupation of Upper Silesia.

S Tittoni said that he accepts the principle, but makes a reservation with regard to the number of effectives to be supplied.

M Clemenceau answers that the principle of Inter-Allied occupation had been proposed by President Wilson, and accepted by all. It has been completely understood that an equal representation is intended; for, when no such understanding had been arrived at, the question has been raised and decided. This had been the principle arrived at for the Rhine. No statement had ever been made to the effect that unequal contributions would be given by the various Governments to the Army of Occupation in Silesia. Mr Balfour and Mr Polk have accepted the general principle, and he asks S Tittoni to give his consent to it.

S Tittoni said that the theater in which the operation was to take place was further away from Italy than it was from other countries.

M Clemenceau says that such a fact might be an excuse for Italian troops arriving late, but that he insisted on knowing whether S Tittoni does, or does not, accept the principle that Italy should supply a quarter of the total effectives necessary for the occupation of Upper Silesia.

S Tittoni says that he accepts the principle.

(It is decided that the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, should each supply a quarter of the total effectives necessary for occupation of Upper Silesia.

It is further decided that Marshal Foch, in collaboration with the Allied Headquarters Staff should consider what advantage would be derived from each of that Allied Governments being represented in the Forces of Occupation in Eastern Europe. Marshal Foch should further consider the disadvantages which might arise from the constitution of composite Inter-Allied Forces, owing to difficulties of provisioning each of these contingents, and from any friction that might occur between the soldiers of the Allied Nations. Finally, Marshal Foch is to submit a report on what he considers would be the most advantageous distribution of the Allied troops.)

Marshal Foch says that the same question arises with regard to Danzig and Memel, which are occupied by Inter-Allied troops. He asks whether

a) The principle of equal contingents had been accepted.

b) Mr Balfour says that the principle is not disputed. What ought to be decided is whether it would not be more practical for each Government to have its forces concentrated in certain sectors, so as to simplify the problem of provisioning. The total number of effectives in each locality would not be altered; he takes as an example the occupations of Upper Silesia, and of Danzig, and of Memel. It might be decided that the British contingent in Upper Silesia ought to be replaced by a French contingent of equal strength. In compensation for such an arrangement, France would not have to send any contingent to Danzig. On such a basis, France would only have to send provisions to Upper Silesia, and not to Danzig; while Great Britain would only send provisions to Danzig, and not to Upper Silesia. He wishes the problem, as he has brought it forward, to be studied by Marshal Foch and the Allied Headquarters Staffs.

Marshal Foch states that the Upper Silesia question has been settled and ought not to be raised afresh. He asks for a decision with regard to Danzig and to Memel.

General Weygand says that the articles in the Peace Treaty are different with regard to the two regions. The Inter-Allied occupation of Upper Silesia had been decided upon, but no such decision has been taken with regard to Danzig. The question has been laid before the Supreme Council at Versailles; but the military experts have not been able to agree to the necessity of sending troops of occupation. The French Delegation favors such a measure; the British and American Delegations oppose it. A decision is very necessary.

S Tittoni remarked that in a previous discussion it had been decided that German troops should evacuate Danzig, which should not be occupied by Polish forces; and that the question of sending Inter-Allied troops into that region should be adjourned. Troops should only be sent into the Danzig region if thought necessary by the members of the Delimitation Committee on the spot.

Mr Balfour says that in his opinion only a very few troops will be necessary for Danzig. The Germans, whose propaganda might have been serious, now seemed to be resigned and the situation in this locality had much improved. He does not think that it is therefore very urgent to come to an immediate decision.

General Weygand said that the difficulty arises from the fact that officers sent out to the regions in question might at any moment ask for troops. The High Command must keep this in mind in drawing up its general military program. At the present moment all armies were demobilizing. Soldiers are returning to their civil occupations and if the constitution of this contingent is not decided upon it might be impossible to form it when desired.

S Tittoni says that the troops would only be sent if the officers on particular Commissions and Committee asked for them. Such officers can not even take up their posts until the ratification of the Treaty and this fact gives us time to consider the question.

M Clemenceau says that it is therefore decided that Marshal Foch should only examine the question of Upper Silesia.

General Weygand says that the Danzig question was also important and read out a telegram received that day from General Henrys:

"Warsaw, August 6, 1919:

The Polish Government requests me to intervene with you in order to obtain the dispatch of two Allied battalions to guard the supplies transported from Dunkerque to Danzig, and to prevent thefts at Danzig.

I should be grateful to be informed of the intention of the Allies on the subject of the operation of the Polish base at Danzig. If an Inter-Allied Commission is to be charged with the management of the port and of transportation at Danzig, I consider that it would be to my advantage to be represented on the Commission for questions of transport which directly concern the forwarding of supplies to Poland."

The question of sending Allied troops to Danzig and Memel is adjourned.

(S Georgi then enters the room.)

M Clemenceau asks S Georgi to explain the question of the participation of the armies in the work of clearing up battlefields in the liberated regions.

S Georgi explains the text of the letter, dated 30th June, 1919, and sent by the Minister of the liberated regions to the President of the Peace Conference.

Mr Balfour says that the question is simply a labor problem.

General Weygand says that the position is as follows: after the armistice of the 11th November, 1918, the American army had been split up into two portions. The first portion had moved eastwards towards the Rhine; the other had moved back towards its bases preparatory to re-embarkation. As a result of this, the zone occupied by it at the time of the armistice had been completely evacuated. But the zone in question had not been the theater of protracted battles; it had therefore been less devastated, and less obstructed by débris, than other portions of the front.

The French troops that had taken over the old American sectors had cleaned up the area and restored order, with the result that the general work of clearance was in a more advanced state in that sector than it was in others. In the British sector, on the other hand, English troops had remained in occupation throughout, since they needed it as a means of communication with their bases. In addition to this, the sector occupied by the British army in November 1918 had been the theater of long and protracted struggles, in which the artillery of the combatants had deluged the whole area with machine gun fire and projectiles.

Extensive protective fortifications had been set up throughout the area. The result is, that in this zone, the work of reconstruction and clearing is enormous, and is, moreover, very far behind. The British sector runs into Belgian territory; and the Belgians have asked frequently for assistance in restoring order in their war zone. It is in the sector just described that the assistance, and collaboration, of British troops is asked for. At the present moment, General Asser was concerned in sending back to England all men who could possibly be of use. All deteriorated ammunition, and all abandoned German ammunition had been left behind.

M Clemenceau calls attention to the fact, that an agreement has been reached between the Allies, to the effect that each body of troops should be responsible for cleaning up the sector occupied by it at the time of the armistice.

Mr Balfour says that he does not know it.

S Georgi said that the agreement in question was recorded by a letter dated 14th January, 1919, in which Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig undertakes to clean up the zone occupied by the British Armies. He has also offers to assist the peasants.

Mr Balfour said that the result of the situation was that the more an ally had fought, the longer it would remain behind after the conclusion of hostilities, to clear up the sector occupied by its armies.

M Clemenceau objects to the form in which the question had been raised. He reminded the Council that it had been France’s misfortune to supply the battlefields. He did not lay particular emphasis on this sad privilege, but merely stated it. It had been decided that each combatant should clear up in its own sector. If one of the Allies could not consent to doing this, France would necessarily have to carry it out.

Mr Balfour says he has only wished to draw a conclusion, and to note that, as the Americans had not fought for such a long time, and had been engaged in an easier sector, the French had done the work of clearing for them, after they had left. The British troops had been bitterly engaged for four years, and they were now asked to remain behind, for many months, in order to clear up the sectors that they had occupied. The British Government in no way withdraws from the obligations that it has entered into.

M Clemenceau says that there was no question of obligation. It was simply one of assistance.

Mr Balfour says that he fully understands the situation in which France stood. More than that, every Englishman understood it, and all the other Allies as well. All obligations would be carried out.

M Clemenceau says that he only wished the question to be put before the British military men, to see whether help could be given. By doing this, the French would be gratified and assisted.

General Weygand said that he wished to make a practical proposal. Would it not be possible to form an Inter-Allied military committee at the Ministry of Liberated Regions, in order to study the question in detail? It will be quite sufficient that each Government should make Mr Balfour’s words the instructions to its representative. This would ensure the problem being examined in a general spirit of good will.

M Clemenceau says that the French are not asking for British troops, because the clearing work was being carried out, as far as possible, with German prisoners. Great Britain is asked to help, simply because it had not been possible to carry on the work of clearing in the zones of the British Armies. He asked, therefore, whether it would not be possible for the British Government to employ the German prisoners at present in the British Army zones.

(It is decided to nominate an Inter-Allied Military Commission, which should sit at the Ministry of Liberated Regions, and should study the practical means that might be employed to ensure the cooperation of the Allied Armies in the work of clearing up the munitions, and war materials, left in the liberated regions.

It is further decided that Marshal Foch should collaborate with the Commissariat-Général for the reconstruction of the liberated regions in making nomination to the above Inter-Allied Committee.)

(S Georgi then left the room, and General Nollet entered.)

9. General Nollet says that as he is the President of the Inter-Allied Commission of Military Control, he could not speak for the Naval and Aerial Commissions of Control. The Military Commission was divided into three sub-committees:

(a) The Sub-Committee for Arms and Munitions.

(b) The Sub-Committee for Effectives and Recruiting.

(c) The Sub-Committee for Fortifications.

Sub-Committee (a) was at the present moment the most important. There are large numbers of trained men in Germany at the present time. If German arms and munitions were taken away, the value of these trained men would disappear, and security would result. This had been the reason for the provision in the Peace Treaty whereby the time for the reduction of the German forces to an ordinary standard had been limited to three months. The Sub-Committee in question would have to see to it that all material in excess of what had been laid down, should be handed over to the Allied and Associated Governments. It would, moreover, actively supervise the production of the numerous factories in Germany to prevent the country from taking up the production of war material in a disguised form. It is evident that this sub-committee ought to have a considerable personnel, and a large number of specialists, in order to be able to act with rapidity. The field of its operations extended over the whole German Army, and all the factories of Germany.

Sub-Committee (b) had a different character. Its immediate functions are obviously most important, but its work in the future would be of far greater consequence. The avowed, and actual, intentions of Germany could only be ascertained with certainty by studying closely the manner in which German mobilization would be carried out, and by examining the new legislation of that country. The members of this Sub-Committee would have to study German organisation from this point of view, and would have to see how all the questions enumerated affected the general situation. The Sub-Committee might be composed of a smaller, non-specialist, personnel.

Sub-Committee (c) on fortifications would have an easier task. Fortified works could not be disguised. Their position is actually known, and they are largely in the territory that had fallen to France. The remainder were mostly in the Rhine territories, now under French occupation.

The whole Military Commission of Control, as outlined, would be very important. It would have to be constituted by 350 officers, 150 Interpreters, and 800 ordinary soldiers. He thought that the figures given ought to be regarded as the minimum of what was necessary, in view of the large number of problems that would have to be studied locally, and the rapidity with which examinations would have to be effected. After the ratification of the Treaty, it would be necessary to spread a whole network of investigating bodies over Germany. He called upon the Council to examine the figures put forward by him, and to remember that the whole Committee would be an Inter-Allied body, and not a French one.

Mr Balfour said that he is entirely in agreement with General Nollet’s conclusion with regard to the numerous personnel necessary for carrying out the work of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control. Practical difficulties would, however, arise in points of detail, such as the transporting, provisioning and quartering of the staffs. As British representative, he would like to propose that the three Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should come under Marshal Foch’s orders, or else, later on, under the orders of the French General commanding on the Rhine.

(It is decided that Marshal Foch’s Headquarter Staff, or the Headquarter Staff of the French Commander on the Rhine, should settle all questions arising out of the transportation into Germany of the Inter-Allied Committees of Control, as well as the questions affecting their quartering and provisioning, when established in that country.

It is further decided to accept General Nollet’s proposals on the subject of the personnel out of which the Inter-Allied Commission of Control should be constituted.)

(At this point General Nollet leaves the room.)

10. Agreement Between the Military Clauses in the Peace Treaty With Hungary and Those in the Austrian Peace Treaty General Sackville-West said that a report had been presented to the Council on the subject of the Military forces, which might be maintained by the various States of Central Europe. The report on Austria had been sent back to be modified. Certain alterations had been put into it, and he asked the Council whether the articles affecting Hungary were to be remodeled, and brought into conformity with those in the Peace Treaty with Austria as finally modified.

General Belin says that the Council had decided on the maximum number of effectives which were to constitute the new Hungarian Army.

M Clemenceau says that the Council could not reply; since the Hungarian Treaty is not yet complete.

General Belin said that the Military Representatives had proposed a maximum figure of 40,000 men for Austria. The Supreme Council had lowered the figure to 15,000. The final decision was that an Army of 30,000 men should be allowed. In the case of Hungary the two extreme figures were 45,000 men and 18,000 men respectively. What figure between these two latter was the Council going to decide upon.

S Tittoni says that if the Austrian Peace Treaty was to be taken as a basis, Hungary ought to be allowed an Army of 35,000 men.

M Clemenceau says that in the present state of the Peace Treaty with Hungary it was difficult to arrive at an exact figure. He did not see that there was any particular need for deciding immediately.

S Tittoni said that the figure had to go into the Peace Treaty.

M Clemenceau says that he agrees that the Military Representatives ought to make the two Treaties agree in such articles as had been definitely settled. It was quite impossible to settle the question in the case of articles not decided upon. Austria had been allowed a large number of effectives in order to conciliate her and to detach her from German influence. His own suggestion had been for an Austrian Army of 15,000 men. It was not possible to settle the Hungarian Army on the basis of the Austrian.

(It is decided that the Military Representatives should co-ordinate the articles in the Peace Treaty with Hungary now definitely decided upon, with the corresponding articles in the Peace Treaty with Austria.)

11. M Clemenceau asks that the question should be adjourned in order that he might discuss it with Mr Polk.

(It is therefore decided to adjourn the question.)

12. Mr Balfour says that it has been the wish of the British Government not to declare a Blockade on Russia, but to concert measures for closing the ports of Baltic Russia to International traffic in which all the Allies could act conjointly. President Wilson had just replied to the effect that he could not participate in the Allied policy. It was, therefore, not possible to come to a decision at once, for, whilst regretting the necessity of abandoning the policy suggested, he would not adopt another unacceptable to America. At the present moment commercial transit was not active in the region in question, and, in another three months, ice conditions would make it impossible. All that was necessary was to tide over this short period, and to be ready to reexamine the question if any important change took place.

S Tittoni remarks that the Blockade of Hungary had only been declared because Bela Kun had not carried out the Armistice conditions. We are now refusing to Blockade Russia despite the fact that Lenin, the head of the Bolshevik Government, had defied the elementary laws of human society. Would not the Allied and Associated Governments be fully justified, in view of this comparison, in declaring a blockade on Russia? He is willing, however, to submit to the opinion of his colleagues.

Mr Polk says that morally he agrees with S Tittoni. But there is an important legal point, which should not be forgotten. No war had been declared against Russia. He proposed that President Wilson’s suggestion should be accepted, and that the Experts should study a means of effecting what was desired by means of mutual co-operation.

Mr Balfour accepts Mr Polk’s proposal.

(It is decided that the Experts of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should examine the problem of carrying out, conjointly, measures which should be equivalent to a Blockade of Russian Baltic ports. When the problem had been fully examined a report should be made to the Council.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

08-09-19, 09:04 PM

Saturday, August 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

08-10-19, 07:38 AM

Jim, I'm getting error message for most all of the images you've been posting for the past week or so.

I'm changing from imgur to another image posting site.

Jimbuna

08-10-19, 07:45 AM

10th August 1919

Aftermath of War

Anglo-Russians defeat Bolsheviks on N. Dvina River (Archangel).

New Zealand troops onboard a troopship returning home from England.
https://i.postimg.cc/fyzBB2fs/EBm-Pb55-Wk-AAqsjw.png (https://postimages.org/)

Illinois troops come home on the leviathan.
https://i.postimg.cc/9f4Mqc35/EBi-YQT9-UIAAo5qd.jpg (https://postimages.org/)first tennessee atm locations (https://banks-nearme.com/first-tennessee-bank-near-me)

Ernst Haeckel, German scientist who coined terms such as “ecology,” “phylum,” “phylogeny,” and “Protista,” among other achievements, has passed away.
https://i.postimg.cc/d1q2Y7km/EBi-YQT9-UIAAo5qd.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Wanick (United States) The 18-gross register ton, 48.9-foot (14.9 m) towing vessel became stranded and was lost without loss of life at Lost Harbour (54°13′45″N 165°36′30″W) in the Territory of Alaska.

Sailor Steve

08-10-19, 06:54 PM

Sunday, August 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

08-11-19, 06:58 AM

11th August 1919

The Weimar Republic ratifies the new constitution for Germany, replacing the Constitution of the German Empire.
https://i.postimg.cc/c4pQ8P8j/EBr-ZBe2-W4-AAh34m.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Guy W.S. Castle, commander of the troopship USS Martha Washington who received the Medal of Honor for his service during the U.S. occupation of Veracruz, Mexico, dies of suicide.
https://i.postimg.cc/W1VwHQbZ/EBn-UG69-XUAALRVw.png (https://postimages.org/)

Andrew Carnegie, Scottish-American industrialist, business magnate, philanthropist, and one of the richest people in history, has passed away.
https://i.postimg.cc/9QcypZJt/EBr0f-Ul-Xs-AEXHwu.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

50 people killed in Berlin when hungry mob riots attacks police and kills, eats their horses.
https://i.postimg.cc/Kv2TGtSS/EBr0f-Ul-Xs-AEXHwu.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

A Farman F.60 Goliath airliner flies eight passengers and a ton of supplies from Paris, France, via Casablanca, French Morocco, and Mogador, French Morocco, to Koufa, Senegal, flying more than 4,500 kilometers (2,795 miles).
https://i.postimg.cc/T2qwcSSF/EBr0f-Ul-Xs-AEXHwu.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

The Felixstowe Fury, also known as the Porte Super-Baby, crashes in Plymouth Sound off Plymouth, England, on the eve of its planned flight to South Africa, killing one of its seven crew members.
https://i.postimg.cc/1RHmFFVZ/EBr0f-Ul-Xs-AEXHwu.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Archangel (Russian Navy White Movement) Russian Civil War: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War: The minesweeping tugboat was sunk by mines in the Dvina River. One British officer was killed.

Sailor Steve

08-11-19, 05:02 PM

Monday, August 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Clemenceau asked if any of his colleagues have any news from Hungary.

Mr Polk distributes a number of telegrams.

Mr Balfour asked if there were any indication that the Romanians have received or mean to obey the orders of the Council.

M Clemenceau says that there was not the slightest sign.

Mr Balfour says he thinks the silence on the part of the Romanians is deliberate.

M Pichon said that he does not think this could be inferred with certainty. The latest news was dated 7th or 8th and by that date the orders of the Council could not have arrived. There is a rumor that the line to Budapest has been cut. He adds that a telegram had been received from the French Chargé d’Affaires at Bucharest dated 10th which is to the effect that he had handed, on the previous day, the telegrams from the Council to the Romanian Government. None of the news contained in the telegrams distributed by Mr Polk was subsequent to the 9th.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks that the Romanian Generals at Budapest must have been made aware of the desires of the Council.

Mr Polk says that according to information given to him by Mr Buxton the Allied Generals have had great difficulty in their dealings with the Romanian General in avoiding unpleasant incidents. The attitude of the Romanian General was very insolent.

M Pichon says he fully admits that the Romanians are not behaving well but he suggests that a judgment should not be based on the news received.

M Clemenceau says he thinks it would be best to wait until the following day.

Mr Polk observes that the way in which the Romanians treated the Conference might become a pattern not only for other Small States but possibly even for Germany.

S Tittoni asked what means of communications exist between the Conference and the Roumanian Generals at Budapest.

Mr Balfour says he understands the telegraph is in American hands as far as Vienna; communication thence to Budapest is by telephone. If the Romanians had cut the telephone, communications were severed. He adds that he hopes the Allied Ministers at Bucharest were being kept informed of the instructions sent to the Generals at Budapest.

S Tittoni asked whether communication by wireless cannot be maintained.

M Pichon says that he will inquire from Marshal Foch what other methods could be employed to establish communication.

2. The Council has before it a letter from Dr Benes.

Mr Balfour suggests that a suitable acknowledgment should be sent to Dr Benes of his letter and that he should be told that it would receive full consideration.

(It is then decided that Dr Benes’ letter of August 8th, 1919, regarding Czechoslovak Interests in Hungary should be acknowledged and that Dr Benes should be assured that due note would be taken of its contents.)

3. The Council has before it the following communication from Colonel Haskell.

“From: Colonel Haskell, High Commissioner for the Entente in Armenia. Situation in Armenia

To: President Clemenceau, Peace Conference.

Have received official notice from the British Command at Constantinople that all British troops at the present time in the Caucasus have orders to commence complete evacuation on August 15th; an order from London only can prevent this movement.

The Italians officially declare that they will not send troops. This retreat will leave several million dollars worth of relief provisions deposited at Batum Tiflis, Erivan, etc. without protection and will stop all measures of assistance now operating, without which thousands of Armenian refugees in Russian Armenia are exposed to death from famine. The Armenians are surrounded by enemies and have not enough arms munitions or energy to protect themselves. Two million of lives are in danger after the retreat of the British troops; anarchy will reign in the Caucasus where all the lives and properties are menaced. The French High Command in the East declares that British troops in the Caucasus are not under his jurisdiction.

In the name of the future of these regions, I ask that the British Government be requested to revoke the evacuation order until the question of the method of occupation shall have been decided. This viewpoint receives the approbation of all the authorities here who understand the situation.

Signed: William Haskell.
Allied High Commissioner to Armenia”

Mr Balfour says that the situation in Armenia is very serious and very disturbing. Historically what had led to the present position was, as far as he could remember, as follows. British troops had been sent into the country in 1918. In March and April of the current year it had been made clear to the Conference by Mr. Lloyd George that the British troops would be withdrawn. The date for withdrawal had first been the 15th July, but had since been postponed to the 15th August. It was probable that movements had already begun. It had therefore been known to the Conference for a long time that continuance of British occupation could not be expected. It had been understood that Italian troops would replace the British. Italy had accepted this exchange and the relief had been expected. From certain remarks made lately by S Tittoni, he infers that Italy regards the enterprise as too great a burden. What resulted was that British troops were leaving the country, that Italian troops were not coming to replace them and that America was not sending any men.

S Tittoni said that the question in as far as it concerned Italy, related to Turkish Armenia and not to Russian Armenia, of which Mr Balfour had spoken. Italy at one time had thought of sending troops to Georgia and Azerbaijan, not to Armenia proper. Georgia demanded complete independence and on this condition raised no objection to occupation by Italian troops. On the other hand, Admiral Kolchak was unwilling to grant the independence of Georgia, though he might be ready to grant autonomy. If Italy had accepted a mandate on the conditions demanded by the Georgians, Italy would have taken upon herself responsibility for safeguarding the independence of Georgia. This, she could not do. In any case the area to be guarded was a large one; the Railway line from Baku to Batum was of very considerable length; some 40,000 men would be required and, in addition, shipping and supplies would have to be found. The last were to have been lent by Great Britain, though it appeared at the present time that British shipping would not be available. The initial expense would be, he was told, 75 million lire and the annual cost would be as much as 1 billion lire. Italy could not undertake so heavy a burden and the idea had therefore been given up. Nevertheless, he wished again to point out that the question of Georgia was quite distinct from that of Armenia.

M. Clemenceau asks whether the United States could do anything.

Mr Polk says that the United States could do nothing until Congress acts. Troops could not be sent into a country with which the United States were not at war. The question of a mandate for Armenia would be put before Congress by the President.

Mr Balfour asked whether President Wilson is aware of the critical condition of Armenia.

Mr Polk replied that he had sent him two strong personal messages on the subject already within the last few days.

M Clemenceau says the conclusion is that France can do nothing: Italy can do nothing: Great Britain can do nothing and, for the present, America can do nothing. It remained to be seen whether, as the result of this, any Armenians would remain.

(As no Government is prepared to furnish troops for Armenia, the question raised by Colonel Haskell of August 5th, 1919, is left without solution.)

4. M Clemenceau asks his colleagues whether they had read the letter sent by General Dupont to Marshal Foch. For his part he thinks that what Erzberger had said was true. All French agents, both civil and military, are of one mind on the subject. He thinks, therefore, that General Dupont’s conclusion is sound. He has no intention of giving up the principle of demanding the surrender of culprits, but it might be advisable to confine the demand to a few symbolic persons, for instance, the Kaiser, the assassin of Miss Edith Cavell and the murderer of Captain Fryatt. A demand limited to a small number would probably not be resisted. The suggestion he would make was that each of the members should name one representative to proceed to Berlin and to consult General Dupont as to what was practicable. For himself, he would nominate M Haguenin, who knows everybody in Berlin and whom he could trust implicitly to form a correct estimate. Probably his colleagues could make equally satisfactory nominations.

Mr Balfour said that he considered M Clemenceau’s proposal very worthy of consideration, but before he can give complete assent to it, he would like to observe first that it represents an abandonment of the Treaty. Secondly, this abandonment is on a point, concerning which English public opinion had been greatly excited at the time of the Election. He thought that scarcely a Member had been returned who had not addressed his constituents on this subject and promised them that the guilty should be punished. He would therefore ask to be allowed to consult Mr Lloyd George before assenting to M Clemenceau’s proposal.

Mr Polk says that from his point of view, the proposal represented a change in the Treaty.

S Tittoni Said that he quite agreed with General Dupont’s proposal. He also concurred in the opinion that it was not advisable to try the Kaiser.

M Clemenceau said that he does not intend to abandon anything. What he proposes to do is to execute the Treaty bit by bit. It is desirable to help the present German Government to live on for a few months. He believed that the presentation of the full demand would destroy it. He, himself, had a list of 1,000 names. Doubtless his colleagues had similar lists.

Mr Balfour said that M Clemenceau’s plan was doubtless excellent. It consists not in giving up any of the culprits, but in deferring the demand for some of them. The proposal was therefore different from that made by General Dupont who only proposed to take a few. He does not think, however, that it will comfort the Germans.

M Clemenceau says that M Haguenin had a very long conversation with Erzberger who had assured him that this was not a thing to be trifled with. There was no intention on the part of France to abandon the execution of the Treaty. At first, it was suggested that a few prominent culprits should be asked for; the rest could await their fate for a few months.

Mr Balfour says there are three possible plans. One was to stick to the Treaty to the letter and ask for all the culprits at once. The second was M Clemenceau’s plan to ask for a few well selected victims at once and to put off the rest. The third, to abandon part of the Treaty entirely and only insist on the surrender of a very few. He thinks these three possible plans should be submitted to the various Governments.

(It is decided to postpone discussion on the execution of Articles 227–230 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, pending consultation of their respective Governments by Mr Balfour and Mr Polk on General Dupont’s proposals.)

(M Seydoux enters the room.)

5. M Seydoux gives the Council an explanation of the document regarding the exchange of goods between different countries.

Mr Balfour asks why, since the Blockade had been raised, it had been necessary to bring this question before the Council at all.

Mr Seydoux says he agrees with Mr Balfour that there is no particular reason for the intervention of the Council.

(It is decided that the raising of the Blockade has rendered unnecessary any action by the Council regarding the regulation of exchanges of goods between the countries of Central Europe.)

6. M Seydoux reads and comments on the report of the Sub-Committee of the Supreme Economic Council on Russia, dated 9th July, 1919:

“With reference to Minute 244 of the Supreme Economic Council, the Sub-Committee on Russia presents in Russia the following report:

1) The Committee considers that any discussion of the ultimate economic rehabilitation of Russia is at present purely academic.

2) The Committee considers that economic assistance should at once be given to those areas of Russia now under the jurisdiction of the so-called “Provisional Government of Russia” in conformity with the terms of the telegrams exchanged by the Council of Four and Admiral Kolchak.

3) This assistance should take the form of credits from the various Allied Governments to be expended in purchases and transportation of commodities from the countries furnishing such credits.

4) The Nature of these credits and the commodities to be supplied and their distribution should be determined by a Commission organised for this purpose from the countries supplying the credits and the goods. The Commodities to be furnished should be of such a character as are necessary to rehabilitate transportation and the production of manufactures. Their distribution should be organised in such a manner as to reconstitute commercial life.

5) It appears to the Committee that credits to the amount of £50,000,000 sterling would cover the amount of commodities (exclusive of arms and munitions) that could advantageously be supplied and used within a period of twelve months.”

Mr Balfour suggests that consideration of the question be deferred until the discussion of the general policy to be adopted regarding Russia.

(It is decided to defer consideration of the proposals of the Supreme Economic Council regarding the economic reconstitution of Russia until the settlement of the general policy of the Council regarding Russia.)

(At this point M Seydoux withdraws and members of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council and other experts enter the room.)

7. Captain Morizot-Thibault reads the note of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council.

Participation of the Interested Powers in the Improvement of the Railway From Chambery to Turin M Tittoni says that the question is not a military one but a financial one. The Transportation Council had, he thought strayed beyond its province. The Supreme War Council had agreed that the improvement of this Railway was a matter of common Allied interest, and should be undertaken. All the Transportation Council should have done was to allot the expenses proportionately. It had, as a matter of fact, reached conclusions which modified the original decision of the Supreme War Council, because it had suggested that the participation of the Allies should be limited to meeting the excess cost of labor and material furnished during the war. In so doing, it had exceeded its functions. It suggested that the sharing of the cost should cease at the end of 1918. But the work once begun had to be completed. If all the Allies were responsible for the beginning of the work, they must remain responsible for it up to its completion. Had the Armistice come about immediately after the decision taken by the Supreme War Council, he asked what Powers would have borne the cost. In his opinion all the work carried out on this line had the same inter-allied character. The Council, however, made a distinction between work before January, 1919, and work subsequent to that date. The resolution adopted by the Supreme War Council represents a binding contract. If Italy had not been assured of help, she would not have undertaken the work. Since December 30th, 1918, all that had been done was to complete the work begun during the war.

M Pichon says that as the question involved large sums and complicated financial considerations, it should be referred to the Financial Commission.

S Tittoni said that in any case the original contract cannot be interfered with or altered in any way.

Mr Polk says that apparently a commitment had been made during the war. He knows nothing about its exact value or the justness of either method of settlement proposed.

(It is then decided to refer to the Financial Commission for consideration and report the Note of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council regarding the division of the cost among the Powers of the improvements to the Railway from Turin to Chambery.

It is also decided to communicate the record of the discussion of the Council as well as other relevant documents to the Financial Commission.)

8. Mr Polk says that he had received a reply from Washington in which Mr Lansing states that it was possible that suitable tonnage might be available from the United States’ Army by August 30th, but neither the State Department nor the War Department has any funds of its own which could be used for the purpose in question. It was roughly estimated that repatriation would cost 250 to 300 dollars per man.

Mr Polk inquired whether any agreement had been reached as to financing the operation.

M Berthelot says that France had hitherto advanced all the money for the Czechoslovaks in Russia and in Siberia. The advances amounted to one milliard a year. Great Britain had furnished arms, munitions, and supplies as an advance. These advances were ultimately to be shared by France, Great Britain and the United States in equal thirds. Application for ships had been made to Japan and the United States. The United States had not made a definite reply but thought it might be difficult to find the ships, while Japan had found enough for about one-third of the force. It was always understood that the cost would be equally divided between Great Britain, France and the United States.

Mr Balfour asks whether it had never been thought that the Czechoslovak State should pay.

M Berthelot replies that it is a matter of course that the Czechoslovak would repay the whole cost.

Mr Polk asks if a statement might be prepared for him regarding the agreements made.

(It is agreed that M Berthelot should furnish Mr Polk with a statement of the agreements reached regarding the payment of the expenses for maintenance, transportation and repatriation of the Czechoslovak troops in Russia and Siberia.)

9. Mr Polk draws attention to the decision of the Council taken on August 6th adopting three proposals by General Groves. He thinks that the first and third Proposals To of these proposals exceeded the terms of the Treaty and that the Germans might be justified in refusing to comply with them. He thinks it is very necessary to examine the question at once as it was clearly undesirable to exceed the Treaty rights of the Council.

(It is decided to ask the Air Commission to re-examine at once the Resolution taken on August 6th regarding the sale of aeronautical material by Germany, with a view to establishing whether the action decided on goes beyond the terms of the Treaty of Peace.)

(It is further decided to suspend all action on this Resolution pending receipt of the report.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-12-19, 02:03 PM

12th August 1919

President Wilson reviews a military parade on White House grounds in Washington D.C.
https://i.postimg.cc/Z5vwVtCk/EBwo-Vj-HXo-AA5e-Ve.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Submarines to get underwater radio messages.
https://i.postimg.cc/Bn5KqMzL/EBwo-Vj-HXo-AA5e-Ve.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

08-12-19, 05:48 PM

Tuesday, August 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. On Mr. Balfour’s proposal it is agreed:

Instructions to Committees Preparing Clauses for Treaty With Hungary That all the Committees engaged in the preparation of clauses for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary except those which have already forwarded their recommendations to the Secretariat General for submission to the Supreme Council, should do so forthwith.

2. M Clemenceau says that the French Chargé d’Affaires in Vienna stated that General Graziani will be in Budapest on the 12th August.

S Tittoni says that he had no news.

Mr Polk says that General Bandholtz had arrived in Budapest on the previous day.

M Pichon draws attention to a Note prepared by General Weygand regarding the means of communication with Budapest.

(Note is taken of the statement of General Weygand regarding means of communication with Budapest.)

3. (M Tardieu, M Aubert, Mr Nicolson, Col Castoldi, Prof Coolidge and M Adatci are present during the following discussion.)

M. Tardieu says that he cannot offer the Council any agreed solution of the problem; the margin of disagreement, however, had been reduced. He would briefly recall various phases which the question had passed through. The first phase was the blue line suggested by the Commission on Greek Affairs. This line had been rejected in the Committee on Bulgarian frontiers by the American Delegation. A compromise had been sought by means of mutual concession. The initial demand of the American Delegation had been to leave Western Thrace to Bulgaria with the 1915 frontier. The British, French and Japanese Delegations had disagreed.

After a variety of views had been proposed, the American Delegation suggested that Eastern and Western Thrace should be attached to the International State of Constantinople. This had not been accepted by the other Delegations. Then, S Tittoni had proposed an ethnographical line intended to give more Greeks to Greece and more Bulgarians to Bulgaria. A solution had been sought in this direction giving both Bulgaria and Greece a frontier with the International State. No success had been achieved. The line suggested took Greece up to Lule Burgas leaving the northern part of Eastern Thrace to Bulgaria. The American Delegation had objected that this left Bulgaria no exit on the Aegean. Then it had been suggested that the South Western part of Western Thrace should be given to Greece and that an International State with an outlet at Dedeagatch should be created with control over the railway from Dedeagatch to Adrianople. Eastern Thrace would then be attributed to Greece up to a line from the Gulf of Xeros to Midia. To this the American Delegation had objected that the Western part of Western Thrace was not economically connected with the rest. The International State would therefore be economically unsound. The American counter-proposal was that North Western Thrace should be given to Bulgaria whilst the International State should be limited by a line 10 kilometres east of the Maritza including Adrianople. Disagreement was therefore limited; for it was admitted by all that the best solution was some form of international control over Dedeagatch and the railway. The French, British and Japanese Delegations wished to extend this International State West and North, maintaining on the East the 1915 frontier. The Americans wished to extend it to the East 10 kilometres from the Maritza and including Adrianople while ceding North West Thrace to Bulgaria.

S Tittoni said that a very slight concession would now produce agreement. A free State might be formed with a capital at Adrianople.

M Tardieu says that there were in Adrianople 26,000 Turks, 23,000 Greeks and a few Bulgarians.

Mr Balfour says that Adrianople is a Turkish Town in a Greek area. He sees considerable advantages in giving it to the free State as it was a Holy City for the Mohammedans.

M Tardieu says that his private opinion was that an International Commission at Dedeagatch with complete control over the railway would be quite enough to ensure all the guarantees required by Bulgaria.

M Clemenceau says that in any case he will not agree to any territorial reward to Bulgaria. He thinks that no International State will live long and that all the personal solutions suggested promised new wars.

After considerable further discussion it appears that the principal alternatives before the Council are:

1) The separation of Eastern and Western Thrace by an International State under the League of Nations, or

2) The mere control of Dedeagatch and the railway to it from Adrianople by an International Commission.
To the former scheme were attached the following proposals:

(a) In Western Thrace Greece to obtain at least the districts of Xanthi and Gümuldjina, with a frontier sufficient to protect the coastal railway.

(b) That the Port of Dedeagatch, the town of Adrianople and an area covering the railway connecting these two should be constituted into an autonomous State under the League of Nations.

(c) That with the exclusion of Adrianople, the whole of Eastern Thrace, as comprised between the existing Turco-Bulgarian frontier, and a line drawn from the Gulf of Xeros to South of Midia, should be given to Greece.
Mr Polk states that he is committed to the plan of an international state. But he is willing that Mr Venizelos should try and persuade President Wilson to accept the second plan. If President Wilson accepted, Mr Polk would be willing to be overruled.

(It is then agreed that Mr Polk should confer with Mr Venizelos, explain both solutions to him, and submit them to President Wilson. Mr Polk would inform Mr Venizelos that he was at liberty to send himself any message he desired to President Wilson.)

4. The Council has before it a communication from M Jules Cambon.

Mr Balfour says that the Allied and Associated Powers might insist on addressing the State of Austria as the Republic of Austria and in using that designation in the Treaty of Peace. More than this he thinks could not be done. Should the people of Austria choose to call themselves citizens of German Austria it does not seem possible to compel them to do otherwise.

M Clemenceau says that he entirely agrees.

(It is decided to maintain the expression “Republic of Austria” in dealings with the Austrian Peace Delegation and in the Treaty of Peace.)

5. The note of the Commission on Political Clauses is read and accepted.

(It is decided in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission on Political Clauses

(1) To send for redraft to the Drafting Committee Articles 32, 33, 34, 35 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

(2) To send Articles 36 & 37 to the Central Territorial Commission with a request that it should consult on this subject the Commission on New States.

(3) To send to the Financial Commission Articles 38 and 67. The last should also be examined by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways.)

6. The Council has before it the following resolution:

Clauses on Responsibilities in Treaty with Hungary The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties, having been invited, in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Council dated July 30, 1919, to hasten the conclusion of its report relating to the Treaty with Hungary, and taking into account the fact that its liberty of decision is restricted by the solutions already reached as regards penalties in the Treaty with Germany as well as the Conditions of Peace with Austria and with Bulgaria, is of the opinion that the Articles relating to penalties to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary probably cannot differ from the solutions already adopted with regard to the other enemy Powers.

July 31—August 5, 1919.

(The resolution proposed by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties in respect to the Treaty of Peace with Hungary is accepted.)

(The Meeting then adjourns for an informal discussion on the situation in the Adriatic.)

Jimbuna

08-13-19, 06:01 AM

13th August 1919

Die Freundschaft (Friendship),” one of the first gay magazines to be openly published, is founded in Germany (it is forced to shut down in 1933 during the Nazi era).

Ship Losses:

Basilicata (Regia Marina) The Campania-class protected cruiser was sunk at Tewfik, Egypt, by the explosion of one of her boilers. She was refloated in 1920 and later was scrapped.

Sailor Steve

08-13-19, 08:26 AM

Wednesday, August 13, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The following telegrams are before the Meeting:

“Budapest Aug. 12, 1919.

Supreme Council Peace Conference, Paris.

At the meeting today August 12th the Roumanian plenipotentiary several times stated that the Roumanian Government cannot accept orders from the Commission of Inter-Allied generals but can only enter into agreements with them for the solution of the difficulties which may come under discussion. The three generals namely American, British and Italian, who compose the commission at present (General Graziani arrived this evening but has not yet been interviewed) are of unanimous opinion that the instruction received from the Supreme Council at Paris should be interpreted as orders which the commission should give to the Roumanian army in Hungary and which the latter is obliged to carry out in order that the required solution may be arrived at (for example paragraph one sub-paragraph C and E and paragraph three sub-paragraph B). The commission urgently requests a prompt reply whether its interpretation of the instructions is correct and if it can act accordingly that is to say that it can refuse to continue discussion with the Roumanian plenipotentiary if the latter insists in his refusal to accept the instructions as orders.

Inter-Allied Mission.”

“Budapest Aug. 12, 1919.

Supreme Council Peace Conference, Paris.

The Inter-Allied Military Mission had a full day’s session this date during which a conference was had with Mr Constantin Diamandy, the Roumanian plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference. Mr Diamandy stated he was authorized to transact business with the Mission. He was furnished a part copy in French of the instructions to the Mission and asked whether or not his Government would abide by same. He replied he could not give an answer without first conferring with General Mardarescu, who is expected any moment to arrive and assume command of the Roumanian forces. He stated that the Roumanian Government was deeply hurt at press notices to the effect that the succession of the Archduke Joseph’s Government was in any way due to Roumanian influence.

It is represented to him that the food situation is serious and that famine and riots would result in case this situation was not alleviated. The Commission while disassociating itself from all responsibility for the present deplorable condition in Budapest, suggested that he immediately arrange to prevent the requisitioning by Romanians for supplies within a prescribed zone surrounding the city of Budapest and that the Romanians remove no more rolling stock. He stated that he would give the matter his immediate attention and became very angry when it was intimated that the Romanian Government might be considered as responsible for any famine or suffering in Budapest under present conditions.

He is asked to state what portions of the Mission’s instructions the Romanian Government could immediately accept and became angry, stating that Romania is not a conquered nation, that it was coordinate with the other Allies and that he would receive orders from nobody except from his Government. He finally subsided. The Mission then insisted upon the urgency of the case but he would not commit himself as to when he would give an answer but stated he would confer with General Mardarescu and they may see the Commission tomorrow August 13th. He was asked if the Romanian Government had within the past day or so delivered another ultimatum to Hungary and replied in effect that he was sure it had not, because such paper would naturally and properly have been presented by him, and he is ignorant of existence of an ultimatum, the Archduke yesterday and today gave Commission details of a plot intended evidently to demoralize his Government. He stated that the three Hungarian liaison officers attached to Holban’s headquarters had dictated to them a document by a Monsieur Ardeli, formerly Ambassador from Romania during Tisza Government. The document contained the following terms among others. The Banat is claimed by the Romanians, Bekesaka must belong to Romania. Romania has six hundred thousand men under arms. The military power of Entente is nil and they have labor difficulties. Various other inducements are offered if there is a Hungarian-Romanian union against Slav danger. If terms are not accepted Romanians will sweep Hungary like Mackensen and leave it to its destiny. This document after being signed by one of the liaison officers but not by Ardeli, was presented to Prime Minister. Today the three officers again presented themselves to Government and informed it that if terms were not immediately accepted Romanians would leave the country taking with it the Government, sweep it bare and stir up labor troubles. The above is the Archduke's story, he was much agitated on these occasions and appealed to Commission for advice. The first ultimatum, as he termed it, is in our possession signed by one of the liaison officers who, the Archduke states, has been with him throughout the war. The plot is obviously childish but it succeeded in frightening the Government. We have told the Archduke to take no notice.

Inter-Allied Military Mission.”

Mr Balfour observes that the first telegram asks for precise instructions on a definite point. The Inter-Allied Mission wished to know whether it was authorized to give orders to the Romanian Army in Hungary. Technically he supposed that the Allied Generals in Budapest had no authority to give orders to the Roumanian Commander in the manner in which a superior officer gave orders to a junior officer, but that the Commission of Generals were entitled to deliver to the Roumanian Commander the views of the Allied and Associated Powers merely as a message from the Conference. The Generals could say that they conveyed these views to the Romanian command, indicating that the Romanian Government, should it mean to remain within the Alliance, would doubtless give the requisite orders to carry out the intentions of the Conference. Should the Romanian Government decline to do so, it would shoulder the consequences of breaking the Alliance. It is obvious, in that case, that the Conference would have no further authority over Romania once she had left the Alliance.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks the Allied Generals are wrong in holding conversation with the Government of the Archduke Joseph. This Government is a reactionary Government and the public of the Entente countries would not allow any backing of such a Government. There are therefore two questions. One was the question to which Mr. Balfour had given, in his opinion, the right answer, namely, could the Allied Generals in Budapest give orders to the Romanian Army? The second was whether they should have relations with the present reactionary Hungarian Government? He thinks the answer in this case is in the negative.

Mr Polk says that there is no evidence that the Generals had, on their own initiative, sought out the Archduke’s Government.

M Clemenceau said that the telegrams indicate that the Generals are holding conversations with that Government.

Mr Balfour points out that in the instructions sent to the Generals they were asked to get into touch with the Hungarian Government.

Mr Polk observes that there is a difference between obtaining information from a Government and having relations with it implying its recognition. The Generals must obviously take steps to obtain information. He agreed that the Generals should take no action likely to commit the Allied and Associated Powers; but to prohibit their communicating with the de facto Government in Budapest would be to tie their hands.

M Clemenceau says that he thought the Conference must be careful to avoid the appearance of backing a reactionary Hungarian Government against the Romanians.

Mr Polk observes that the Romanians had established this government.

Mr Balfour asks whether M Clemenceau was aware of the report to this effect.

M. Clemenceau says that according to the telegram M. Diamandy denied it.

Mr Polk said that a warning might be sent to the Generals that they must avoid committing the Conference, but the question arose, who was to carry out the terms of the Armistice? Was the Conference to wait for another government to be formed?

M Clemenceau says that at all events the Conference should have the minimum of relations with the present Government.

S Tittoni said that this minimum should be at least enough to ensure the execution of the Armistice.

M Clemenceau says that the following dilemma then arises. The Conference would tell the present Government to carry out the original Armistice but the Romanians had another Armistice competing with the former; thus the Conference would be standing behind the Hungarian Government as against the Romanians.

S Tittoni said that it was, of course, understood that the Roumanian Armistice gave way to the previous one.

M Clemenceau says that the present government in Hungary might not last; if so the Conference would be backing an ephemeral administration against the Romanians. This would make things too easy for the Romanians.

Mr Balfour then proposed a draft of instructions to be sent to the Allied Commission in Budapest.

After some discussion the draft is finally adopted in the following form:

“We quite recognize that you cannot avoid having relations with any de facto government holding power in Budapest. You will however bear in mind that according to our information the Government of the Archduke Joseph has as yet little authority and has not so far been accepted by the country. We are most desirous of dealing directly with any genuine Hungarian Government in order to settle terms of peace and resume normal economic relations. But we must not be committed to any administration which has not authority to speak for the Hungarian people. While it will therefore be your duty to listen to anything the Government has to say, you must remember that it has not yet been accepted by those for whom it professes to speak.”

M Clemenceau said that M Berthelot had had an interview with Mr Antonescu. The latter had received a personal telegram from Mr Bratiano.

M Berthelot says that the telegram alluded to was not the official answer of the Romanian Government. This was to be sent to Mr Misu who would communicate it to the Conference. What Mr Antonescu had been told in the telegram was that the Romanians had in no manner assisted in the establishment of the reactionary Government of Archduke Joseph. As to the requisitions imposed on Hungary, they were regarded as legitimate as they did not exceed what the Hungarians had taken in Romania in cattle and railway material. In other words, the Romanians were merely recouping themselves for their losses.

Mr Balfour says that as M Clemenceau would not be present on the following day, he wished to ask him whether he would authorize his colleagues to reply to the Romanian Government on this point should its official communication be of the same nature as that made to Mr Antonescu.

M Berthelot says that Mr Antonescu had told him that the Romanian generals had made a mistake in requesting from the Hungarians a fixed percentage of their cattle, railway stock, etc., but he thought they were right in requiring from the Hungarians an equivalent for what the Hungarians had taken from the Romanians.

Mr Balfour says that it would be necessary to make the Romanians understand that they were in the wrong in doing this.

M Clemenceau said that France had lost hundreds of thousands of heads of cattle. France had only recuperated from Germany 94,000. France had submitted to the decisions of the Conference. The victory of the Allies had found Romania bound by the Peace of Bucharest, in other words at the feet of Germany. As a result of the victory of the Allies, Romania is doubling her territory. She now wishes to lay her hands on goods which belong to the Alliance as a whole. If France and Italy had behaved like this, there could have been no peace. France and Italy had obtained far less than their demands and far less than they had lost.

Mr Polk said that this was the first open defiance of the authority of the Conference. The Council was on its trial. Should this defiance be tolerated, it would form a bad example for other small Powers and ultimately for Germany. He was authorized to say for President Wilson that if the Romanians continued in their present course, he would not look favorably on any of their claims. He added that he had information that the Romanians were taking steps to hold elections in Bessarabia although the disposal of the province had not yet been settled.

Mr Balfour asks whether M Clemenceau would authorize the Council, if the Romanian official answer proved to be what was anticipated, to tell the Roumanian Government that its action could not be tolerated and that if the Romanians wished to remain in the Alliance, they must alter their policy.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks the expression “tolerated” too stiff. He would prefer to say “accepted”.

Mr Balfour asked in what manner pressure could be exercised over the Romanians.

Mr Polk asked whether Romania would not obtain Transylvania in virtue of the Treaty with Hungary. He also added that the partition of the Banat was not satisfactory to the Serbians.

S Tittoni observed that the misconduct of the Romanians was no adequate reason for rewarding the Serbs. He wished to make reservations on this matter.

(It is decided that on the receipt of the formal answer of the Romanian Government, action should be taken in accordance with the above discussion, even in M Clemenceau’s absence.

After a short discussion, it is decided to send a further dispatch to the Allied generals at Budapest and to communicate this dispatch to the Romanian Government at Bucharest. The following is the text of the dispatch:

“The Commission of Allied Generals is invested with the authority conferred on it by the Supreme Council. It is not qualified from a military point of view to give direct orders to the Roumanian generals but it is qualified to communicate to them the views of the Allied Powers.

“If the Roumanian Government means not to break away from the Allied Powers, it will give its generals necessary orders to conform to the decisions of the Conference.

“The Conference cannot believe that the Romanian Government will by refusing to conform to the views of the Allied Powers, take a decision so serious in its consequences.”)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-14-19, 06:00 AM

14th August 1919

British Brigadier General Digby Inglis Shuttleworth with the Shah of Persia in Baku, Azerbaijan. Baku is under British occupation to control the region’s oil fields.
https://i.postimg.cc/HLPCkVZf/EB68qi-PWw-AEj-HGc.png (https://postimages.org/)

American thoroughbred Man o’War (considered one of the greatest racehorses of all time) loses his only race to the colt aptly named Upset.
https://i.postimg.cc/251KTTGK/EB68qi-PWw-AEj-HGc.png (https://postimages.org/)

Sgt. Stubby, famed American war dog, returns home.
https://i.postimg.cc/CLKXzFD0/S59-Sn-Mg9-Pb7r-ex-Lu-Zi-HDvy-Kc-TWFcdlvg9bw-AIdy-M9o.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Lettie (United States) During a voyage in the Aleutian Islands from Atka to Unimak Island and Unalaska with a crew of four and a cargo of four tons off general merchandise and salted cod on board, the 27-gross register ton schooner was wrecked without loss of life in dense fog and strong tides on Samalga Reef off the southwestern end of Samalga Island in the Fox Islands subgroup of the eastern Aleutians.
Skorpion (Soviet Navy) Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War: The patrol boat was shelled and sunk by artillery in the Dvina River.

Sailor Steve

08-14-19, 05:12 PM

Thursday, August 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 17:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Pichon communicates a letter from the Romanian Minister in Paris and the Council takes note of a further communication from the same source intimating that Mr Diamandy had been appointed High Commissioner for Romania at Budapest. He then asks if Mr Balfour has any observations to make on the Romanian reply to the Note of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr Balfour says that the letter as a whole is satisfactory, since the Romanian government consented to abide by the decisions of the Entente Powers. With regard to the remainder of the letter, he asks whether it would be profitable to reply to all the controversial points raised. He does, however, think that the Romanian Government had advanced several arguments, which called for discussion, and possibly a reply. The first of these arguments is that dealing with the supposition on the part of the Romanian government, that the Armistice of November 1918 had lapsed, owing to subsequent acts of war initiated by the Hungarian government, and owing to the explicit invitation of the Conference, by virtue of which Romania was called upon to take military action against Hungary.

S Tittoni said that he regarded the first argument as a strong one, since the attack of the Hungarian army was a positive violation of the armistice. He regards the second argument as weak, because, whilst admitting that the Romanians had been invited to initiate military action against the Hungarians, a similar invitation had been sent to the Czechoslovaks and the Yugoslavs; and no action by any of the parties consulted had followed upon these negotiations.

M Pichon says that the Romanians are not in a position to claim that the armistice had lapsed on account of the invitation sent to them by the Allied and Associated Powers for the simple reason that they were invited to enforce it by the communication to which they referred. He agrees with Mr Balfour, that there was a satisfactory side to the Romanian reply. He thinks, however, that the Romanians were attempting to take up too isolated an attitude. They speak of collaborating with the Conference; they were not called upon to do that; but to obey its decisions.

S Tittoni says that M Pichon’s remark was a matter of nuance, since, if the Romanians wished to conform with the decisions of the Conference, they would evidently have to collaborate with it.

Mr Balfour says that under the circumstances, it would probably be better to make no reference, in our answer, to the ambiguous phrases of the Romanian note; but to lay emphasis on the satisfactory assurances that it contained. The next point, to which he wished to draw attention, was the protest of the Romanian Government on the subject of the Conference decision with regard to war material. It was obviously necessary that they should be assured, in a most formal manner, that the war material captured by them belonged to the Allies as a whole. The statement in their note, to the effect that they had not compromised the economic activities of the countries they had invaded, was contradicted by the information submitted to the Conference. It seems as though the Romanians assumed, that, because they had been robbed by the Hungarians at an earlier period of the war; and because booty had been carried from their country into the territories that they had now invaded, they had a right to carry away with them, whatever they could seize in order to equalize matters. This argument should be replied to, by showing them that France, Belgium, Serbia and Italy had suffered in the same manner, and would never recover the booty that had been taken from them by the German and Austro-Hungarian armies in the days of their successes.

M Pichon says that according to the information at the disposal of the Conference, the Romanians had requisitioned 50% of everything they could lay their hands on; railway rolling stock, live stock, and agricultural implements.

M Berthelot said that when General Mackensen had invaded Romanian territory, a large amount of the railway material (2000 locomotives) requisitioned by him had remained in Hungarian territory. These engines could not be restored under the armistice because they were of German make and were indistinguishable from the ordinary machines, used normally on the Hungarian railways.

Mr Balfour says that he would like to know the opinion of the French Foreign Office, and of his colleagues on the Romanian protest, to the effect that the Allies had allowed themselves to be swayed by the calumnious accusations of an unscrupulous enemy.

M Pichon says that we have not received information from such a source, but from our accredited representatives. He further remarks that the Romanians admitted implicitly the accusations, against which they protested, by trying to justify them on the plea of military necessity.

S Tittoni suggested that there should be no recriminations; the main point being that the Romanians should be made to conform to the decisions of the Conference.

M Pichon says that he agrees with S Tittoni, but thinks that the question of war material must be dealt with in our reply, which, he thinks, M Berthelot might possibly draft.

M Berthelot says that he will draft a reply, and asked whether it should not deal also with the entire disarmament of the Hungarian army, and the withdrawal of the Romanians behind the Theiss; since these points had been decided upon by the Conference, before sending out instructions to the Mission of Allied Generals to Budapest.

Mr Balfour remarks that the Romanians must be made to retire to their frontier and not only to the Theiss. They had already promised to do so after the disarmament of Hungary.

S Tittoni remarked that the moment at which the withdrawal of the Romanians should begin ought to be left to the Generals to decide. Further events in Hungary might make it most desirable to have a strong force of Romanians present in Budapest, which had been, during the past few months, the scene of Bloodshed and massacre.

General Weygand says that, under the circumstances, it might be best to examine carefully the instructions given to the Generals, and to see whether they were complete in all points. If it should be found that they are not, they can be revised and added to them if necessary.

Mr Balfour asks whether it had not been decided in these instructions what particular strategic points should be occupied by the Romanian army.

General Weygand replies that the Generals had been left free to decide on the points in Hungarian territory which ought to be occupied by the Romanians, and what forces should be employed by these latter for this purpose.

M Berthelot then reads the draft of the telegram that he has prepared for communication to the Romanian government.

Mr Balfour asks whether special mention should not be made of the rule laid down with regard to war booty and requisitions since the rule in question had been accepted by the governments of other Allied countries which had been invaded. He further asked whether these countries should not be mentioned by name.

Mr Berthelot says that it would, in his opinion, be unwise to mention Allied countries by name in this connection, on account of the Serbian actions in the Banat.

Mr Polk asks whether it is desired that the Romanian statement with regard to the lapse of the armistice should be allowed to stand.

M Berthelot says that he thinks it would be unwise to argue the question closely. There had been two armistices with Hungary. The first had not been very successful, and it had been altered by subsequent decisions of the Conference, since, by its provisions, Hungary was allowed to remain in Slovakia. The second armistice had then been substituted. It is now superseded by a third one, imposed on the Hungarians by the Romanians. The Conference could not very well re-open the whole discussion on armistices by replying in detail to the Romanian argument on the subject.

Mr Polk says that the sentence of the Romanian note stating that the armistice had lapsed owing to an invitation to take military action, communicated to Romania by the Allied and Associated Governments, could hardly be allowed to stand.

Mr Balfour suggests that a general sentence might open the reply, saying that the Conference does not wish to discuss the controversial points in the Romanian note.

(It is agreed to send a telegram drafted by M Berthelot to the Romanian Government and to the Mission of Allied Generals at Budapest.)

(At this point Mr. Hutchinson enters the room.)

2. Mr Hutchinson reports and comments on the Report of the Economic Commission with regard to the Economic Clauses in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

Mr Balfour asks whether the modification proposed to Article 25 would entail the acceptance on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments of the clauses in the Peace Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 whereby Romania obtained a certain portion of the Dobrudja.

Mr Hutchinson replies that he is unable to answer Mr Balfour’s question as the Economic Commission cannot deal with territorial questions.

(It is decided:

(1) That the proposed modification to Article 25 should be submitted to the Drafting Committee who should inform the Council whether by virtue of the aforesaid modification the Allied and Associated Governments would be bound to recognize as valid the territorial clauses in the Peace Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, more particularly those whereby a certain portion of the Dobruja was ceded to Romania.

(2) That the proposed modification to Article 36 should be accepted.)

3. The Council takes note of a telegram from the High Commissioner at Constantinople.

M Pichon says that he believed that it was intended that the Greek Officer should be present at the meetings of the Commission.

S Tittoni remarked that in his opinion the decision only implied that the Greek Officer was to be at the disposal of the Commission without being present at every sitting.

Mr Balfour says that he agreed with S Tittoni.

S Tittoni then accentuated his previous statement by saying that in his opinion the witnesses cited before the Commission would be intimidated by the presence of a Greek Officer.

M Pichon said that a decision in the same sense as the one previously taken must be made with regard to the Turks.

S Tittoni then remarked that he does not think that the resolution in H. D. 12, paragraph 5, had been accurately drafted, and points out that he had drawn attention to the inaccuracy in question on the following day.

Mr Balfour replies that the decision had been communicated to the Greeks and could not now be altered or modified.

M Pichon then says that the previous decision could be interpreted as excluding the Greek Representative from the deliberations of the Commission. The words of the decision had been that he was to “follow the labors of the Commission”. He is therefore in a position which could be compared with that of a foreign Military Attaché who followed the deliberations of the Headquarters Staff to which he was attached, without taking part in them.

(After some further discussion, it is decided that the previous decision of the Council (See H. D. 12, Article 5) should be explained to the High Commissioner at Constantinople in the sense that the Greek Representative should not be present at the meetings of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna. All necessary data should be communicated to him, however, and similar facilities should be given to a Turkish Representative, if subsequently appointed.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-15-19, 07:14 AM

15th August 1919

The “Restoration of Pre-War Practices Act 1919” receives royal assent, which gives back returning British veterans their former jobs. However, it forces out women who entered the workforce during the war.

A French Tank and soldiers patrolling Istanbul during the Entente occupation.
https://i.postimg.cc/c4mFRsCD/Vlz-UL0-L8f-QIWn-AEt-Sqy-MFKSj-V5-AHh4kft9le-GD1fqw.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Romanian war orphans at a Red Cross camp.
https://i.postimg.cc/cLWNH1jX/EB8-BVfz-Ww-AAg-KT.png (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

08-15-19, 09:45 AM

Friday, August 15, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

08-16-19, 09:24 AM

16th August 1919

The First Silesian Uprising begins in Germany as ethnic Poles launch a general strike to protest continued German control in the area.

Juho Vennola becomes the new Prime Minister of Finland.
https://i.postimg.cc/fbmBJ230/ECBYp2-IXo-AEJa-Ha.png (https://postimages.org/)

The parade of the White Guard of Finland in Helsinki August 16, 1919.
https://i.postimg.cc/FR1VXhtm/1-p-Ec5-d-V1-YEvvs-Xw4mg8-Oe-Qh9-Oyl8d-FTfh-C5-R7gric.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

08-16-19, 09:31 AM

Saturday, August 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Again the Supreme Council holds no meetings.

Jimbuna

08-17-19, 07:54 AM

17th August 1919

Major-General Herbert C. Holman, head of the British Military Mission to South Russia, with Cossack children. The region was recently captured by anti-Bolshevik forces.
https://i.postimg.cc/XJrkCrRG/download.jpg (https://postimg.cc/LYMPd862)

Alexander Izvolsky, former Russian Foreign Minister who played an important role in Russia’s alliance with Britain before the outbreak of the Great War, has passed away.
https://i.postimg.cc/Wp6h7Nsh/download.jpg (https://postimg.cc/NLFssw9c)

Observation deck on airship R. 33
https://i.postimg.cc/D0DDGVpF/download.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

08-17-19, 09:01 AM

Sunday, August 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Being a Sunday, the Supreme Council holds no meetings.

Jimbuna

08-18-19, 07:18 AM

18th August 1919

Aftermath of War

Russian Civil War: North Russia intervention – The Bolshevik fleet at Kronstadt, protecting Petrograd on the Baltic Sea, is substantially damaged by British Royal Navy Coastal Motor Boats (torpedo boats) and military aircraft in a combined operation.

British forces attack Bolshevik-controlled ships in Kronstadt Harbour, Russia and successfully sinks the cruiser Pamiat Azova.
https://i.postimg.cc/QdgXspJ8/ECPj-BKZXk-AA5-GVd.jpg (https://postimages.org/)
https://i.postimg.cc/RhvY7HnR/ECPj-BKZXk-AA5-GVd.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

U.S. Army truck catches fire during a cross-continental trip across the United States to test the country’s road system.
https://i.postimg.cc/26LksgHJ/ECPj-BKZXk-AA5-GVd.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Andrei Pervozvanny (Soviet Navy) Russian Civil War, British campaign in the Baltic: Battle of Kronstadt: The Andrei Pervozvanny-class battleship was torpedoed by HM CMB-31 ( Royal Navy) at Kronstadt and beached to prevent sinking. Never fully repaired and scrapped post civil war.
HM CMB-24 (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War: British campaign in the Baltic: Battle of Kronstadt: The coastal motor boat was shelled and sunk by Gavril ( Soviet Navy).
HM CMB-62 (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War: British campaign in the Baltic: Battle of Kronstadt: The coastal motor boat was shelled and sunk by Gavril ( Soviet Navy) after possibly being in a collision with HM CMB-62 ( Royal Navy).
HM CMB-67 (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War: The coastal motor boat sank in a storm.
HM CMB-79 (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War: British campaign in the Baltic: Battle of Kronstadt: The coastal motor boat was sunk during the battle, either by Russian shelling, being capsized by a wave/wake, or in a collision with HM CMB-62 ( Royal Navy).
Pamiat Azova (Soviet Navy) Russian Civil War, British campaign in the Baltic: Battle of Kronstadt: The depot ship was torpedoed and sunk by HM CMB-79 ( Royal Navy) at Kro.

Sailor Steve

08-18-19, 08:39 PM

Monday, August 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M. Pichon asks whether his colleagues have received any news of Hungary. He assumes that all had seen the telegram from General Bandholtz.

(This telegram is read.

M Pichon also mentions another telegram addressed to M Clemenceau by the Archduke Joseph.

Mr Balfour says that the latter telegram appears to be satisfactory. The Government undertakes to proceed to a general election in a short time, and to remit the negotiation of peace to the national assembly.

M Pichon said that the phrase used, namely, “on the basis of universal suffrage” is not very precise. It does not necessarily imply that the voting will be direct and secret.

S Tittoni says that failing this condition there will be no legitimate government.

M Pichon says that in addition the time limit “as soon as possible” is very indefinite, and the resignation of the government “when the National Assembly meets” might be considerably postponed. He thinks that instructions should be given to the representatives of the Allied Governments to arrange that the elections should take place very soon; that they should be based on direct and secret voting, and that the Constituent Assembly should be formed immediately.

Mr Polk asks whether the Allied Representatives have yet made any report on the present Government. He has himself received information from two sources: from Mr Hoover, and from certain persons who have just returned from Hungary. Both agreed that it was scarcely possible for the Council to recognize the Archduke Joseph. He only remained in power because he controls the police and the Hungarian army. No labor representative or socialist has joined his Government. The mere fact that he is a Hapsburg had greatly upset the neighboring small States. Mr Hoover’s conclusion is that this Government should not be recognised, as there could be no proper election while the Archduke Joseph remained in power. Should the Conference refuse to recognize him he would fall, and he could then be replaced by a Coalition Government.

M Pichon asks whether there was any proof that the Romanians had supported this Government.

Mr Polk says that they of course deny it. The information received is to the effect that they were present at its formation and could have prevented it. The Archduke Joseph had been put in power by the Hungarian military party.

S Tittoni said that retrospective considerations are not of much import. The Romanians denied any complicity in forming the present Government of Hungary, and their mere presence at its formation did not establish complicity. Their presence, however, inasmuch as it contributed to the maintenance of order, also contributed to maintaining any Government in power. The question for the Council was whether this Government should be recognised as a de facto government, or whether the Council should say that elections must be held by a government more representative of all parties in the country.

Mr Polk says that he understands no social democrat or labor representative would join a Coalition Government with the Archduke. Recognition of the Archduke’s Government would amount to excluding from recognition the real representation of the country. He thought, therefore, that it would be a fatal error to recognize the Archduke’s Government. He feels American opinion will be very strongly opposed to it.

S Tittoni thinks it would be better to consult the Allied Mission in Budapest before coming to a decision. The Mission might be asked whether, should the Archduke Joseph withdraw, power would be likely to pass without revolution to a Coalition Government. The Mission might also be asked whether, seeing that the Archduke Joseph did not furnish a rallying point for all parties in Hungary, it would not be well to recommend him to resign and yield his place to a Government which might be really representative.

M Pichon says that there are undoubtedly objections to any Government with a Hapsburg as chief. Such a Government is bound to be a reactionary government. The Conference, however, has said that it will not interfere in Hungarian internal affairs. Nevertheless the Allied Mission in Budapest had inevitably had relations with the Archduke, hence a very delicate situation. If the question suggested by S Tittoni were to be in the precise form he proposed, the Conference would be open to the charge of interfering in the internal affairs of Hungary. He thought that the representatives should be asked for information on Hungarian conditions. The previous instructions sent to them should be recalled. They should be told not to appear to interfere and above all to do nothing tending to convey any recognition of the present Government which, in the eyes of the Conference, has no legal existence, which did not represent the chief parties in Hungary and especially excluded all democratic elements.

Mr Polk says that he agreed that information is what the Council desires. He drew attention to the fact that the Archduke’s government had not been put in power by the Hungarian people, but by a coup d’état. It took the place of the Government in whose favour Bela Kun had resigned. If the Archduke knew that the Powers were unfavorable to him he would resign, and a Coalition Government might soon be possible. The representative of the French Government had had an interview with the Archduke, who had said that he would abdicate as soon as a Socialistic Government could be formed. If he had spoken the truth he might resign immediately.

M Pichon says that it would be necessary for the Council to make up its mind as to what it wanted. Is it prepared in the end to say to the Archduke that he must resign? If the Council was bound by its decisions not to interfere in Hungarian internal politics, it would not be easy to do this. If the Archduke were told that he could not be recognised officially, this would be of little avail, as even without official relations, the Governments were to some extent committed to the intercourse they must have with the administration in power. The Archduke had formed a program, and had communicated it to the Allied Generals in Budapest. The Generals had received him, and even their silence was construable as a sort of recognition. The question is therefore whether the Council should await the advice of the Allied representatives in Budapest or not before asking the Archduke to resign.

M Polk says that he thinks it will probably be better to wait. But he reminds the Council that M Clemenceau has made a strong point in the instructions to the Generals of not recognizing this Government because of the bad example this would set to the rest of Europe. If the Generals, therefore, had recognised the Archduke’s Government, they had exceeded their mission.

Mr Balfour says that he does not think that they had done so.

S Tittoni said that they had been visited by the Archduke. They had received his program, they had remained silent, they had made no protest. All this amounted almost to a recognition. The question therefore was should the Archduke be asked to retire.

M Polk observes that there are precedents for official relations with unrecognized Governments. For instance, the Government of Lenin and Trotsky had not been recognised, but agents of the Powers had been in contact with them.

M Pichon observed that the agents in question, at least as regards France, had not been officials. The telegram alluded to by S Tittoni had not, he thought, contained a program. It merely contained a communication by the Archduke to the members of his Cabinet.

S Tittoni said that it was necessary to take into consideration public opinion. Throughout the Allied world it was thought that the Council was in some manner favorable to the Archduke’s Government. The papers are engaged in speculations as to whether it was France, Italy or Romania that backed the Archduke. All Governments would be questioned in their Parliaments. It is therefore important that the Council should take sides openly and that all should appear to be following the same course.

M Pichon says that the Council had already declared that it would only recognize a Government representing the national will.

Mr Balfour then proposes a draft telegram for communication to the Allied Generals in Budapest He says that he thinks the advantages of this telegram were that it would recognize the need of the Allied representatives to work with the people in power. It makes it clear that the Conference does not trust these people; that the main reason for this distrust was that the head of the Hungarian Government is a Hapsburg; and that what the Conference desires is to obtain the opinion of the Hungarian people. A National Assembly based upon universal suffrage and direct and secret voting was necessary. It was only on these conditions that peace could be made with a Hungarian Government. He thinks this constitutes sufficient material for a very strong hint to the present Hungarian Government.

M Pichon says that it is undesirable to use any sentence which might suggest that the Allies were ready to agree to the restoration of the monarchy in Hungary.

Mr Balfour says that the Allies could not oppose a monarchical form of government in Hungary should the Hungarians desire it.

S Tittoni said that he agrees with M Pichon, not that he objects to a monarchical form of government, but because in Hungary it would be bound to have a Hapsburg at its head, and because the Hapsburgs were the authors of the war.

(The telegram drafted by Mr Balfour is then adopted.)

2. Mr Polk communicates to his colleagues a telegram from Mr Hoover regarding the situation in Upper Silesia.

S Tittoni says that the conclusion of the telegram is that a military occupation was necessary. The Council he understood had already decided that there should be a military occupation at Silesia.

M Pichon points out that the occupation could only be carried out after the ratification of the Treaty.

S Tittoni points out that a question affecting the very existence of Central Europe is at stake. If the coal mines of Silesia are destroyed, the life of Europe will be in jeopardy. Even if the Treaty does not give the Conference the right to intervene, he thinks that in a case of this kind it would be quite fair to exceed Treaty rights.

M Pichon says that the military occupation of Silesia before the ratification of the Treaty is a very serious matter. He suggests that General Weygand should be sent for.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks according to the armistice the Allies were entitled to occupy any strategic point they wished in Germany.

S Tittoni points out that it is not necessary to occupy the whole of Silesia. It is, however, of vital interest to save the mines.

Mr Polk reads another telegram from Mr Hoover recommending that representatives of the Coal Commission should proceed at once to Upper Silesia. He thought this might be decided upon without awaiting General Weygand’s arrival.

Mr Balfour suggests that M Loucheur, who, he understands, presides over the Coal Commission should be asked to send its representatives to Silesia.

S Tittoni says that he thinks a Commission will not be able, without military assistance, to save the mines.

(At this point General Weygand enters the room.)

General Weygand, after reading the telegrams, says that he has just received from General Henrys similar news to that sent by Mr Hoover. General Henrys also asks for troops to occupy Upper Silesia. A reply has already been sent to General Henrys to the effect that according to the Treaty the Allies had no right to enter Silesia, but that his request had been communicated to the Conference.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Allies have no rights under the Armistice.

General Weygand replies that Silesia is still German territory, and that no article in the Armistice with Germany entitles the Allied Armies to enter into German territory. All that could be done was to anticipate the terms of the Treaty.

M Pichon thinks that all that can be done for the time being is to send the representatives of the Coal Commission.

General Weygand says that the German Government, if questioned, would be bound to disavow the promoters of trouble in Upper Silesia. In this case the German Government will probably declare itself unable to control the situation. Should it do this, the Allies would have sufficient reason for offering to assist in controlling it.

M Pichon says that he understands General Weygand’s proposal to be that the German Government should be asked to remedy the condition of affairs in Upper Silesia. If it declares itself unable to do so, the Allies will tender their help.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Allies have not a right to send troops into Germany to occupy strategic points.

General Weygand says that a provision to this effect exists in the Armistice with Austria, but not in the Armistice with Germany.

Mr Balfour remarks that according to Mr Hoover the strikes in Upper Silesia have a political character, and are really fostered by the Germans themselves. If the Allies asked the German Government to suppress the strikes, the Polish party in Upper Silesia would consider itself aggrieved and this policy might amount to sacrificing the Poles to the Germans.

S Tittoni says that he understands that German troops have not yet evacuated Upper Silesia. In that case the responsibility for ensuring order was theirs.

Mr Balfour draws attention to the passage in Mr Hoover’s telegram stating that the Polish miners had been protecting the mines against the Spartacists who appeared to have combined with the German Volunteer Corps in shooting the Poles. Under such circumstances it is difficult to send German Soldiers into the district to restore order without incurring the reproaches of the Poles.

S Tittoni said that the destruction of the mines must be put a stop to by some means or other. There was really no question of sending German troops to quell the disorder, as German troops were already there.

M Pichon says that the Council is faced with a dilemma. The Germans will certainly fall upon the Poles. On the other hand, it is a big responsibility to occupy German territory before the Treaty.

S Tittoni thinks that the destruction of the coal supply in Central Europe is a worse evil.

M Pichon says that the Military Commission suggested in Mr Hoover’s telegram is not, in his opinion, very likely to have a very great effect.

General Weygand points out that such a Mission can only be sent with the consent of the German Government. Should it proceed to Silesia without the consent of the German Government, the latter might refuse to be responsible for its safety.

M Pichon says that the Allies have really no means of military intervention within the terms of the law.

Mr Balfour says that in one sense the Germans have as great an interest in putting a stop to the destruction of the mines as the Allies. German industries depend upon Silesian coal. They will therefore lose as much as Czechoslovakia, Vienna or Italy. He suggests that the Germans might be told that if they declined to help, the Allies would arrange that they should have no coal from Silesia, should the district go to Poland.

M Berthelot observes that Herr Erzberger in a recent speech had drawn attention to the diminishing production of coal in Silesia. He had added that there was reason to anticipate a still further diminution. For this reason he had urged that restrictions be imposed on the consumption of coal in Germany in order that sufficient coal should be left for the winter months. This indicated that the German Government was aware of the situation in Silesia, and had perhaps contributed to bring it about. It was not therefore quite safe to speculate on the good faith of the German Government.

General Weygand said that in negotiating on this matter with Germany, it was reasonable to assume that the German Government acted in good faith, seeing that it could not admit that it was inspiring the destruction of the mines.

M Berthelot said that the German Government would then resort to dilatory tactics. They would say that it was not a case of revolution but a case of strikes, which it was difficult to suppress.

General Weygand says that the coal from Silesia was a matter of European interest. Many arguments were at the disposal of the Conference. This coal concerned Austria, Czechoslovakia and other States. The Conference moreover was bound to hand over the territory to Poland in good condition should it ultimately be assigned to Poland.

M Pichon says that General Dupont might perhaps be asked to intervene with the German Government and ask it to take the necessary steps to remedy the situation. He suggests that General Weygand should prepare a text of a telegram to General Dupont, and submit it to the Council on the following day.

Mr Balfour says that he had been struck by one of the considerations brought forward by General Weygand. The situation should be looked at in its broader aspect. The Silesian coal question affected not merely the comfort, but the very existence of the new states created by the Conference. The question was not one of local strikes and local destruction of property, which, unfortunate though it might be, might well be considered no business of the Conference. It was the consequences elsewhere that mattered. These consequences might perhaps justify the Conference in exceeding the letter both of the Armistice and of the Treaty, and in anticipating the terms of the latter by a few weeks. He thought the policy to which the discussion pointed might be summarized under three heads. First, the representatives of the Coal Commission should be sent to Silesia; second, an appeal should be made to the German Government in the manner suggested by General Weygand, and third, Marshal Foch should be asked to devise plans for combining with the forces of order in the country, in order to protect what was not merely German or Polish property, but a world interest.

M Pichon said that he understands that the third proposal would only come into play if the two former were insufficient.

(It was then agreed that:

(a) M Loucheur be asked to send representatives of the Coal Commission to Upper Silesia without delay, to examine the situation and to report on the means of remedying it.

(b) That the attention of the German Government be called to the condition of affairs in Upper Silesia and to the danger of destruction of the coal mines, and that it be asked to take necessary steps to ensure order. General Weygand was asked to submit at the following meeting, draft instructions to General Dupont, embodying this policy.

(c) To ask Marshal Foch to prepare means of sending forces into Upper Silesia, should the need arise, in order to protect the mines from destruction.)

3. S Tittoni said he wished to draw attention to a memorandum he had received from the British Delegation, regarding the plan according to which the Conference should work. Program of work for the Conference

M Pichon suggests that this question be held over until Thursday, when M Clemenceau is expected to return.

4. S Tittoni says that he thinks the Council should not separate until the Austrian Treaty had been signed. He asks when this event could be expected.

Captain Portier said that the first meeting of the Editing Committee was to take place on the following day. The last reports from the various Commissions had only just been received. He thought that the labors of the Editing Committee could, at best, be completed in 48 hours, provided that the Committee confined itself to coordinating the answers prepared by the Commissions, and that it did not deal afresh with the various problems.

Mr Balfour says that even after the Committee has finished its work, time would be required for printing and correcting proofs.

Captain Portier said that, presumably, the Austrians would be given, as the Germans had been given, 5 days to consider whether they would sign or not.

Mr Balfour asks if a time table of the various necessary operations could be prepared by the Secretary-General. He agrees that the Council should not separate until the Austrian Treaty had been signed and the Bulgarian Treaty presented.

M Pichon says he thinks that all are agreed that the Editing Committee should confine its labors to coordinating reports of Commissions, except in case any two reports were inconsistent.

Mr Polk said that he would like to see the instructions to the Committee. He thought the Committee should not be too strictly limited, though its main task was certainly to co-ordinate the answers prepared by the Commissions. He understood that some of its members proposed to recast the Treaty.

Captain Portier pointed out that the Committee had received no instructions. There was merely a resolution to the effect that a similar organism should be set up to that set up to make the final reply to the Germans.

(It is agreed that the Editing Committee should be instructed to limit its labors to the co-ordination of the various replies prepared by Commissions, except when inconsistencies in these replies required examination of any question on its merits.)

M Tittoni observed that the Conference had dealt with many important matters. It might fairly be said that it had governed Europe, but it would be severely criticized by public opinion should it separate without having made peace.

5. Mr Polk says he had received a telegram from Sofia to the effect that General Franchet d’Esperey, acting under the authority of the Peace Conference, had ordered the Bulgarian Government to disarm its forces. He asked whether General Franchet d’Esperey had given an order to the Bulgarian Government, or had conveyed a request. The Council had agreed that no orders could be given. He would, therefore, like to know exactly in what manner the General had proceeded, as it appeared that he had obtained the removal to Constantinople of the firing mechanism of all the surplus small arms in Bulgaria. He was also informed that the General had gone to Bulgarian Thrace and told his officers to say that the country would be attributed to Greece, and that the Bulgarians must evacuate it.

General Weygand says that he had no information whatever regarding the second point, but he did not think that the information received by Mr Polk could be accurate. As to the first the measures taken by General Franchet d’Esperey were the result of the telegram sent him from the Conference. He had been told he could not exact anything from the Bulgarians which was not required of them in the armistice. The results he had obtained had been reached by negotiation.

Mr Polk asks whether he could be furnished with a copy of the request addressed by General Franchet d’Esperey to the Bulgarian Government.

General Weygand says that no other instructions had been given to General Franchet d’Esperey except those sent from the Conference. He believes that his negotiations with the Bulgarian Government had been conducted verbally.

Mr Polk says he would like to have a report from General Franchet d’Esperey regarding these negotiations, as well as a copy of any documents that might have passed between him and the Bulgarians.

M Berthelot said that there was a telegram sent by General Franchet d’Esperey to the French War Office, saying that he had gone to Sofia and had obtained his results by negotiation. It might have been pointed out that there are forty-five thousand Bulgarians under arms instead of the twenty-eight thousand to which they were entitled.

Mr Polk asked whether there was any objection to the furnishing of a report.

M Pichon says he thinks the General will have nothing to report.

Mr Polk says that the Bulgarians must be very easy people to manage if so much had been obtained from them even in excess of the terms of the armistice. Marshal Foch had told the Council that the Bulgarians had been very punctilious in executing the armistice. The honor of the Council was therefore engaged and General Franchet d’Esperey had acted as the agent of the Council. He does not question the way in which the General had acted, but he thinks there could be no possible objection to his furnishing a report to the Council.

M Pichon says that the General has only followed the instructions given him.

S Tittoni points out that the armistice only prescribes the number of divisions the Bulgarians were to keep, not the number of men in each division.

General Weygand agrees that this is so. The armistice had been deficient in this respect. Any request for reductions of the number of men under arms was in excess of the armistice, but this had been obtained by negotiation.

(It is decided: that General Franchet d’Esperey should be asked to furnish a report to the Council on his negotiations with the Bulgarian Government regarding disarmament and the alleged evacuation of Thrace.)

6. General Weygand said that according to a Nauen wireless message the German Government had recalled General von der Goltz.

7. M St Quentin says that according to the terms of Peace handed to the Austrian Delegation on the 20th July, some districts of Western Hungary had been attributed to Austria. In their note of the 1st August the Austrian Delegation complained that the Hungarian authorities, having obtained information of the intentions of the Conference, were exercising brutal reprisals on the populations of these districts. Cattle and agricultural implements were being removed. The inhabitants were being forcibly enlisted. The Austrian Delegation therefore requested that the Commission to superintend the plebiscite should be sent immediately to Western Hungary. No attention had yet been paid to this request as the Treaty did not provide for a plebiscite. Only the Austrian Delegation asked for one. The Conference had not taken a plebiscite into consideration.

S Tittoni asked why the Austrians are asking for a plebiscite in a country which the Conference had attributed to them without one.

M St Quentin says the Austrians ask for more territory than the Conference desire to give them. In addition to this the Austrians hope to create a precedent in order to ask for a plebiscite in Styria for instance, where the Conference had no intention of holding one. On the 9th August the Austrian Delegation had been authorize by the Austrian Government to ask the Conference for authority to send Austrian police into the affected districts to maintain order until the plebiscite should take place. On the 14th August a letter had been received from the Austrian Delegation saying that the Hungarians threatened to retake Western Hungary by force. The letter further expresses anxiety as to the movements of Romanian troops. It requests the Conference to forbid both the Hungarians and the Romanians to enter the area attributed to Austria, and renewed the request for permission to send police into the country. Finally on the 15th August the Delegation informed the Conference that the necessities of the case had forced the Austrian Government to act and to send police and customs officials into Western Hungary up to the frontier line laid down by the Conference. The Delegation hoped that this action would be approved by the Conference. There are therefore two questions for the Council to settle. Would it ratify the fait accompli either expressly or by maintaining silence and in that case would it notify the Romanian and Hungarian Governments?

In reply to a question M St Quentin says the Austrians had occupied the whole of the territory assigned to them.

(It is decided that no answer should be sent to the various communications of the Austrian Delegation regarding the occupation of Western Hungary.)

S Tittoni observed that this does not imply approval.

8. M St Quentin says that a similar instance arose in regard to Prekomurie. The Serb-Croats-Slovene Delegation has asked for occupation of permission to occupy the portion of this territory attributed to them. Troops had been got in readiness to occupy the area. The Delegation now asked that the Hungarian Government should be notified of the decision of the Conference, in order that opposition should not arise.

(It is agreed that as the Conference cannot deal with any recognised Government in Hungary, notification in the sense desired by the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes cannot be made.)

9. M St Quentin said that the frontier fixed in Baranya had not been notified to the Serb-Croats-Slovene Delegation. The Delegation persisted in asking for localities beyond the line adopted by the Conference. He suggested that the best means of stopping these requests would be to inform them of the frontier so fixed.

S Tittoni asks why the Delegation has not been informed.

M St Quentin replies that the general rule of the Council was that no frontiers should be communicated to any Delegation, without an express decision to that effect.

(It is decided that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation should be informed of the frontier laid down in the Baranya.)

10. The Committee has before it the following note:

It has been unanimously decided to submit the following resolution to the Council:

“The Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty, having been entrusted with the question of the expenditure of the Boundary Commission and having found no precise indications, in the Treaty with Germany, concerning the distribution of these expenses, except in the case of Schleswig, calls the attention of the Council to the advantage of adopting a general rule for the distribution of these expenditures, as regards the Treaties to be signed with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.”

The various solutions examined in the course of the discussion are the following:

A. To divide the costs between the Two States concerned (Schleswig case).

B. Expenditure divided between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

C. Expenditure charged to the League of Nations.

Mr Polk says that he thinks some difficulty will be experienced in collecting the money from the two contributing States. He thinks that it would perhaps be simpler that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should advance the funds and recoup afterwards from the two States concerned.

Captain Portier explains that what is desired was a principle for application in all cases in the future. The Treaty with Germany had only provided for the expenses of holding a Plebiscite, in the case of Schleswig. No such provision had been made for the districts in dispute between Germany and Poland. This omission caused considerable difficulties, and the Committee for the Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty wished to avoid a repetition of this difficulty in future. The question was of some urgency seeing that the treaties with Austria and Bulgaria were approaching the final stage.

Mr Balfour suggests that the Commission should decide on the incidence of the cost, in accordance with the loss and gain of the two countries concerned. The country gaining territory should pay a contribution proportionate to its gain.

(After some discussion it is agreed that the cost of the Delimitation Commissions should be shared equally between the two States concerned, and that the cost of Commissions conducting Plebiscites should be allotted in proportion to the gain and loss incurred by the States concerned. The percentages should be fixed by the Commissions in each case.)

11. General Sackville-West explained the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles regarding the allowances to be granted to officers serving on Commissions of Control in Germany. The, main conclusions are that officers should continue to receive the ordinary rate of pay of the rank held by them at the time of their appointment. The pay will therefore vary according to the nationality of the officer, but it is considered that allowances for work on Commissions of Control in Germany should be equalized. In order to arrive at a uniform principle, seeing that naval and air officers were concerned as well as army officers, it is suggested that a Committee should be formed of one Military, one Naval and one Air Officer of each Nation, together with a Financial Expert. The Council was asked to ratify this proposal, and to appoint members to the suggested Committee. Allowances To Be Assigned to Officers on Commission of Control in Germany

(The Report of the Military Representative is accepted, and it is decided to appoint a Committee composed of one Military, one Naval, one Aeronautical member and one Financial Expert for each country represented on the Inter-Allied Commissions of control, to fix under the Chairmanship of General Nollet, the rate of allowances to be granted for service on Commissions of Control in Germany.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-19-19, 09:53 AM

19th August 1919

Afghanistan achieves its full independence from Britain following the Third Anglo-Afghan War (August 19 is Afghanistan’s Independence Day).

Two British soldiers enjoying a café in Boulogne, France.
https://i.postimg.cc/SsMDvMvr/ECVx-SGx-Ww-AEIp-FB.jpg (https://postimg.cc/ZBJ89CZB)

Joseph E. Seagram, Canadian distiller and politician who owned Seagram’s, has passed away.
https://i.postimg.cc/nVwhkQt5/ECQns-CLXo-AY7k91.png (https://postimages.org/)

The United States readopts its pre-January 1918 official national insignia for U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps aircraft, a white star centered in a blue circle with a red disc centered within the star. The marking will remain in use until June 1, 1942.
https://i.postimg.cc/pr9CFnD8/crx3qb0q8ch31.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Frip (Sweden) The wooden schooner, en route from Karlskrona to West Hartlepool, sank after striking a mine from the minefields at Herthas Flak in Kattegat. One crew member was killed.

Sailor Steve

08-19-19, 09:51 PM

Tuesday, August 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

(During the discussion of this question the following were present: General Weygand, Mr J F Dulles, M Castoldi and Captain Le Vavasseur.

1. Mr Balfour said that he feels compelled to ask the Council to reconsider the decision that it has taken at its previous Meeting Some time before, the question had arisen, as to whether the Coordinating Committee should deal direct with all reports, which the various Technical Committees might prepare, on the subject of Austrian Notes; and whether, after dealing with them, they should send a unified report on the subject to the Council The decision arrived at had been, that the duties of the Coordinating Committee should be modified in that sense. But, in order to effect this, it will be necessary to give the Committee in question greater latitude. M Pichon and S Tittoni had, on the other hand, desired to restrict the functions of the Coordinating Committee, and to prevent it from dealing with any questions of principle The ill consequences of these limitations could now be foreseen. In the case of the German Treaty, all reports of Committees had gone, in the first instance, to the Council of Four, who had examined them almost word for word at a great expenditure of trouble; and had then sent them back to the Coordinating Committee, for the preparation of a unified report in which the decisions of the Council of Four were incorporated. He had hoped, by proposing that the Coordinating Committee should deal direct with the reports of the Committees, that the present Council might be spared a lot of work. In order to effect this, however, the Coordinating Committee must be given greater latitude than the decision arrived at on the previous day permitted. He would like to point out that a great number of replies from the Austrian Delegation had not been submitted to any Committee at all. He would like to know the reason for this; and further wished to be informed to what particular body the questions raised by the Austrian Delegation were being referred. The existing decision would have, as a result, that the Coordinating Committee would actually be prevented from considering the Austrian notes. In this case it would be necessary for him, as a representative of Great Britain, to work through all the controversial points raised by the Austrians, in collaboration with his experts, and, after bringing all relevant questions before the notice of the Council, to send back the result to the Coordinating Committee. Such a procedure would take a great deal of time, and would be a strain on the temper of the Council. He asked, therefore, whether it would not be better to relax the restrictions imposed by the decision of the previous day, and to allow the Coordinating Committee to survey the Austrian notes, and the Austrian Peace Treaty, as a whole, and to report to the Council. He did not think it would be proper to allow it to be said that the Austrian Delegation had never had its case properly heard, or to permit it to be thought, that the immense operation of liquidating the Austrian Empire had been effected without a due consideration of all the problems involved. He therefore hoped that the previous decision might be modified.

S Tittoni asked whether it was correct to say that the Austrian notes had not been fully examined, or that certain points in them had not been referred to any Committee.

M Pichon replies that he does not think the statement is correct, and that, in his opinion, every question raised by the Austrian Delegation had been referred to a competent Committee.

Mr Balfour replied that this was not the opinion of his experts.

M Berthelot, confirming M Pichon’s previous statement, said that only one question raised by the Austrian Delegation had not been considered. The question in point was, whether the Austrian State was to be considered as a New State, similar to Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Yugoslavia, or as an enemy State similar to Germany. The British Delegates had considered that Austria should be regarded as a New State; but the Council had already decided in an opposite sense, and their view had been strongly supported by President Wilson. It was most important that this decision should be upheld, since any withdrawal from the standpoint adopted would involve recasting the Peace Treaty with Austria.

S Tittoni says that if it were really thought that Austria was not an Enemy State, the Italians would not have fought for over three and a half years, with a loss of over half a million dead, against a mere phantom.

(At this point M Cambon and members of the Editing Committee entered the room; and M Pichon laid the question raised by Mr Balfour before them.)

M Cambon says that he did not know of any question raised by the Austrian notes having failed to receive consideration; since the whole duties of the Coordinating Committee consisted in dealing with the reports of the Technical Committees, to which the notes in question were referred. The procedure of his Committee had been as follows. He had read a draft covering note to the general reply to be given to the Austrians in which he summarized the remarks and criticisms raised by the Committee to whom the notes had been referred. In his note, he had insisted upon one point which was, that the Council should exercise to the full its rights against Austria, which had been the author of the war, by the fact that it had sent its ultimatum to Serbia; and had, moreover, before any declaration of war, performed belligerent acts against France and Belgium. When he had finished reading his draft covering letter, M Headlam-Morley had read an alternative covering note, conceived in a totally different sense; and had argued therein, that Austria should be considered as a New State, and not as an Enemy one. But the question so raised had been decided previously in the sense that Austria must be regarded as the direct legitimate heir of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. With regard to all other clauses in the Peace Treaty with Austria, dealing with economic, military and political questions, they had been adequately discussed by the Technical Committees. The one point raised by Mr Headlam-Morley could not be dealt with in that way, since it was purely political and must be left to the Council to reconsider, if necessary.

Mr Headlam-Morley draws attention to the words in the preamble of the Peace Treaty with Austria stating that Austria was to be “recognized as a new and independent State under the name of the Republic of Austria”.

S Tittoni replied that this was only intended to imply that Austria was a New State, insofar as her old frontiers and status had been altered. The question now before the Council was whether it ought to regard the old State of Austria as no longer existing in any form; in which case all possibility of reparation, or of fixing responsibilities, would absolutely disappear.

M Pichon says that President Wilson had urged that Austria should be regarded as a new and an enemy state, and the Council of Four had adopted his point of view. If the Peace Treaty with Austria is to be discussed under this new point of view, each separate clause that it contains would have to be reconsidered.

Mr Balfour said that the discussion had departed from the lines which he had originally intended for it. S Tittoni and M Pichon had explained with much fervor and eloquence that Austria must be regarded as guilty for the outbreak of war, and for a great deal of the suffering inflicted upon France and Italy; they had further shown that she could not be regarded in the same light as Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia. He has never wished to dispute this, for it had always been perfectly clear to him, that an absolute distinction existed between the Governments of Vienna and those of the other States formed on the ruins of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. He had wished to draw the attention of the Conference to a new problem, deserving special consideration; the problem in question being, how the present Austrian Government was to be treated with regard to the Peace Treaty presented to it, and to the observations that it was making thereon. If M Pichon and M Tittoni thinks that the Council should consider every problem raised by the Austrian Delegation, he has no objection to acceding to their wishes. He would, on the other hand, have preferred that the very highly qualified Committee presided over by M Jules Cambon, should have, in the first place, considered the Austrian replies. If the decision taken on the day before were upheld, he would be obliged to examine the Peace Treaty, and the Austrian notes upon it, word by word, in company with his experts. He thinks that it would be unfortunate to compel members of the Council to concentrate their attention on these points of detail, in view of the enormous responsibilities that they were called upon to bear.

S Tittoni thanks Mr. Balfour for his explanation, and says that the discussion had now been limited to a mere question of procedure. The Committees had examined the Austrian counter proposals, and the Council must now discuss their reports. Mr Balfour proposed to save time, by an alteration in procedure, which would turn the Coordinating Committee into a sort of delegation of the Council. If time would really be saved by this, he would be the first to agree to it, but he does not think that it would have that result. He thought, on the contrary, that it would introduce a new complication, because whatever the Co-ordination Committee might report, the Council would certainly have to reconsider it. When the questions raised came before the Council, he would certainly reserve to himself full liberty of discussion, in spite of anything the Coordinating Committee might have said.

By adopting Mr Balfour’s procedure, three separate discussions would become inevitable:

(1) The Austrian counter proposals would be discussed in the technical Committees;

(2) The Reports of the technical Committees would be discussed in the Coordinating Committee;

(3) The Coordinating Committee’s Report would be discussed in the Council.
But if the Council were first to consider the Committee’s reports, and then send back its decisions to the Coordinating Committee, the procedure would be shortened by one set of discussions.

M Cambon said that he agrees with S Tittoni when he said that a fresh complication would be introduced by the adoption of Mr Balfour’s proposal. At the same time S Tittoni had not shown all the steps through which the discussion of questions raised by the Austrian counter-proposals had to pass. The Coordinating Committee had been nominated in order to bring unity into the divergent questions brought before the Council by the counter-proposals of Enemy States. The Committee thinks it ought to carry its work through as rapidly as possible, and for this reason, it had asked for assistance from the Drafting Committee on that morning. If it is decided that the functions of the Committee were to be fundamentally altered, it would be necessary for the Committee in question to refer back all questions previously decided to experts and to the Drafting Committee. This would mean a delay of 15 days or more, which would be of no benefit to the Peace Conference. For this reason, it would be best to limit the functions of the Coordinating Committee in the manner laid down in the previous decision of the Council. Any member of the Committee, or the Committee as a whole, would always be in a position to draw the attention of the Council to special points worthy of its consideration. A short time previously, the report of the Aeronautic Committee had been under discussion, and it has been noted that the report in question contained certain expressions on the subject of the Austrian Government, not couched in a very diplomatic form. The Coordinating Committee, however, had no intention of submitting points of this nature to the Council. The duty of the Committee was obviously to coordinate all the questions raised, and submit them to the Council in the form of a single report.

Mr Polk remarks that points on which the Coordinating Committee had been unanimous need not further be discussed.

M Pichon said that when the Peace Treaty with Austria has been drawn up, all questions had been thoroughly examined by competent technical Committees, whose reports were to be placed before the Council of Five, who, after discussion, had sent the reports in question, together with their own decisions to the Drafting Committee. The clauses, as drawn up by the Drafting Committee, by virtue of this procedure had been resubmitted to the Council, who had transmitted them to the Austrian Delegation. The Austrian Delegates then made counter proposals, which were sent to experts, on whose reports decisions were made. The decisions and reports were sent to the Coordinating Committee, which resubmitted them to the Council. M Cambon had therefore accurately described the manner in which the Coordinating Committee was intended to work. The Coordinating Committee could not be regarded as a Court of Appeal for the Technical Committees, since the members of the Committee were Delegates and not Technical experts. If the Council should decide that the Coordinating Committee should make decisions on the reports of the Committees, it would be doing no more than making a nontechnical body decide over the Heads of Experts. Everybody wished to make the procedure of the Council as rapid as possible. This would be best effected by keeping the Coordinating Committee strictly to its coordinating functions. Mr Balfour’s wishes would be fully met by instructing the Coordinating Committee to draw special attention to points demanding consideration from the Council.

M Cambon said that he thought it important to adhere to the procedure outlined by M Pichon. If the Coordinating Committee were to be called upon to discuss questions of principle, it would of necessity, be obliged to call in experts to assist it. This would indefinitely lengthen both its own labors, and those of the Conference. The consequences of the alternative proposals of M Pichon and Mr Balfour had been very clearly exemplified by the questions arising out of Mr Headlam-Morley’s letter and his own. Mr Headlam-Morley had explained that, if his own letter were adopted, the Peace Treaty with Austria would have to be remodeled almost in its entirety, whilst, if M Cambon’s draft reply were agreed to, no important changes in the Treaty would be necessary. The Conference had drawn up a Peace Treaty largely on the basis of reports of technical Committees. Doubtless the Treaty in question was open to criticism, but it would be even more so, if it were known that a non-technical committee had been given a power of decision over the reports of experts.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that he believes that it had been stated that he wished to re-draft the whole Treaty with Austria. He wished to deny any such wish on his part most emphatically. It had been his privilege to be a member of several Committees whose duty it was to consider questions arising out of the Peace Treaty with Austria, and out of the Austrian counter-proposals. It had been his own opinion, and that of his colleagues on the Committees to which he referred, that the Peace Treaty with Austria could not stand in its present form. This was so far accepted that M Laroche’s Committee was largely re-modelling the provisions of the Austrian Treaty. To give one example, the original clauses on the subject of nationalities had been found to be inapplicable. The Austrian objection to the original articles had been supported by his Italian colleagues, and by the Czechoslovak delegates. The result was that they were now being re-drafted. This alteration in the original draft Treaty was not made in deference to the opinions of anybody so insignificant as himself, but merely because investigation had shown that the Treaty required recasting. In the case of the Peace Treaty with Germany, the Council of Four had closely studied all problems arising out of the German counter-proposals. The procedure had now been altered, and the replies were being sent, in the first place, to the Coordinating Committees, which had, in consequence, been compelled to recognize an alteration in its own functions. In the case in question, the work of considering counter-proposals was much more difficult. The German counter-proposals had raised problems referring to the cessation of a state of war. In the present instance, the Peace Conference was concerned with the liquidation of an entire Empire, and all observations on the problems raised involved a proportionately higher degree of complication. The Coordinating Committee is therefore called upon to examine answers to the Austrian Delegation, not only with a view to seeing that they were coherent, but also with the object of relieving the Council of some of its duties. The decision arrived at on the previous day prevented the Committee from duly fulfilling some of the duties that it was called upon to perform.

M Pichon said that the Coordinating Committee is left free to draw the Council’s attention to certain important points, but is not allowed to discuss questions of principle.

Mr Polk then submits a draft proposal.

S Tittoni then proposed a modification to the draft proposal in the sense that the Coordinating Committee should not, as a whole, draw attention to alterations in principle, but that its individual members should be allowed to do so.

(After some further discussion, it was agreed that the Editing Committee should:

(1) Co-ordinate the various replies to the Austrians, making only verbal changes, and

(2) Submit to the Supreme Council Annexes pointing out all questions where one or more of the representatives of the Coordinating Committee thought that changes in substance should be made.)

(At this point the Experts of the Editing Committee leave the room, and the Naval Experts, with M Seydoux, enter.)

2. M Seydoux read and commented on the report contained in Appendix “A”. He further read a telegram, received from Sweden (see Appendix “B”).

Mr Dulles calls attention to two points of practical interest: first, as prompt action is necessary, because the Russian ports would be closed in about three months by ice, it was undesirable to undertake anything which would require prolonged negotiations with the neutral States; such as getting their consent to the stopping and searching of their ships by the Allied Navies. Moreover, this is not necessary since, if they agree not to give clearance papers to ships for Russian ports, any vessels found on their way to such ports would either be without clearance papers, or would have falsified them. Secondly, he notices that, among the measures suggested, was the establishment of censorship over postal and telegraphic communications. As the United States had no agency for carrying out such a censorship, and no such agency could be re-established without the action of Congress: in asking this of the neutral States, the Allied and Associated Powers would be requesting them to do something which one of them would not be prepared to do.

M Seydoux says that he proposes that in the Note which should be sent to the neutral Powers, they should be asked to refuse clearance papers to vessels proceeding to Bolshevik Russia, passports to individuals with the same destination, and banking facilities for operations of trade. They should further be invited to exercise censorship over mails and telegrams to Russia, as far as it was in their power to do so.

Mr Polk says that Admiral Knapp had drawn attention to the desirability of asking neutral countries to exercise censorship only over their own mails and telegrams.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks it important that all action proposed under the resolution should be taken in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers.

M Seydoux then asked what measures should be taken with the Germans.

M Pichon says that, in his opinion, the German Government should be asked to take measures similar to those that neutral countries were to be invited to carry out.

S Tittoni said that it should be pointed out to the German Government that the measures proposed were in its own interests. It should be invited to carry them out for this reason, despite the fact that the provisions of the Peace Treaty gave the Allied and Associated Powers no right of dictating.

(It is decided to send a Note to the German Government and to neutral States in the name of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, asking:

(a) That clearance papers should be refused to vessels intending to proceed to ports in Bolshevik Russia;

(b) That an equivalent embargo should be placed upon goods intended to be transmitted by land to Russian destination;

(c) That passports should be refused to individuals desirous of traveling to or from Bolshevik Russia;

(d) That banks should be prohibited from dealing with the affairs of, or transacting business with Bolshevik Russia;

(e) That as far as possible, acceptance of mails and telegraphic communications destined for, or coming from, Bolshevik Russia should be refused; and informing them:

(f) That the Allied and Associated Powers had the intention of putting into force, in their own countries, measures similar to those that Neutral Governments were now invited to adopt;

(g) That ships of the Allied Navies, enforcing the intended embargo on the ports of Bolshevik Russia, would act under the authority of the Allied and Associated Governments.)

3. The resolution submitted to the Supreme Council by the British Delegation is adopted.

4. Mr Polk draws the attention of the Council to a further telegram received from the United States Minister at Warsaw.

General Weygand reads a telegram that he had drafted for communication to General Dupont and stated that he wished to make certain remarks upon it. In the first place, he desires to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the negotiations, which it is intended that General Dupont should open, would not compel the German Government in any way. General Dupont was only President of the Armistice Commission at Berlin, and could only deal with the German President of the Armistice Commission. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs had begun to bring the German Armistice Commission under his own orders. It was therefore evident, that the German Government would have opportunities for delay in considering General Dupont’s proposals, and would be able to gain time by its procrastinations; it might, therefore, carry out severe measures of repression against the Poles in the meantime. He asks whether a more speedy method of communication to the German Government could not be devised. The telegrams communicated to the Council showed that they were faced with an insurrection in Silesia. They are, therefore, called upon, not to maintain order in that country but to restore it. The Military Representative of the Supreme War Council at Versailles had decided, previously, that one division would be sufficient for maintaining order in Silesia; but this decision had been on the supposition that the country in question would be in a state of tranquillity. One division would certainly not suffice to maintain order in a populous district of 360,000 inhabitants, in a state of insurrection. The original figure must therefore be revised, and he reminded the Council that one inter-allied division had been raised with difficulty. Allied troops in Silesia must obviously be supported by some Government, and the only Government which would give them the support required, was the Government at Berlin. In order to avoid placing the troops under the orders of the German Government, he had proposed to send the Allied High Commission to Upper Silesia, in anticipation of the actual provisions of the Peace Treaty. The difficulties of maintaining troops in such a country were very great. He proposed, by way of lessening them, to ask the German Government to anticipate the provisions of the Treaty, only with regard to the disturbed parts of Upper Silesia. The Area in question is not great, and consisted only of one-third of the entire plebiscite district.

Mr Balfour says that whilst Great Britain has no diplomatic representative at Berlin, he does not know that this was the case of the other Allied Powers.

S Tittoni answered that the Italians were represented in Berlin by a Civil Commissioner who would not, however, have any diplomatic attributions until the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

General Weygand said that he proposed that the Germans should be dealt with through their Delegation at Versailles. He has negotiated with the German representatives and had found them fairly reasonable, more particularly Von Lersner.

M Pichon says that it would be necessary to hand a written note to the German representatives.

M Berthelot said that it was, on the whole, better to negotiate by means of written communications in such cases. Notes were clearer and more concise than conversations. He points out, however, that Von Lersner could only be used as a medium of transmission.

M Pichon then says that he thinks it might, after all be better to deal with the Germans through General Dupont.

General Weygand said that General Dupont could exercise no coercion upon the German Government, and negotiations through him would be lengthy. He gave as an example, the length of time necessary to obtain Von der Goltz’ recall.

M Pichon remarks that if it were true that the German Government had promoted the strikes in Upper Silesia, they would obviously show no energy in re-establishing order there.

Mr Balfour said that General Weygand had not referred to a suggestion of the previous day, which was that Germany should be threatened with the loss of the coal from Silesian coal fields. If the Government at Berlin could be shown to have stirred up strife, the Allied Governments would be justified in exerting all their efforts to prevent the export of coal to Germany until the requirements of other Allies had been satisfied. Such a measure would be equitable, and possibly effective.

S Tittoni said that the information submits to the Council at its present meeting, and on the previous day, had differed in one point. The Council had first been informed that the German Government had incited revolution in Silesia. They were now told that it had provoked insurrections against itself. The Allies should be careful not to allow the German Government the right of conducting repressive measures in the name of the Council.

Mr Balfour agrees with S Tittoni.

General Weygand says that the Polish Delegation had drawn attention to the same point.

Mr Balfour proposes that the Reparation Commission which was now in direct touch with the German Delegation at Versailles, had opened negotiations with the Government at Berlin. He asked whether it would not be possible to employ Mr Hoover. He enjoyed a special position, which gave him the right to go anywhere in Central Europe. Mr Hoover, though not an accredited diplomatic officer of any of the Allied and Associated Governments or of the American Delegation, was certainly capable of acting in the name of the Council. Would it not be possible to ask him to go and interview the Government at Berlin and to advise the Council on the result of his conversation.

Mr Polk remarks that Mr Hoover is now on his way back from Warsaw, and cannot be stopped.

M Pichon suggests that M Loucheur should be asked to attend the meeting of the Council on the following day.

Mr Polk says that, in consequence of the strike in Upper Silesia, all train services in Austria were to be stopped. The train from Vienna had been held up on the night before.

M Berthelot remarks that information from Polish sources was often exaggerated, and suggested that a delay of 24 hours would not spoil the decision of the Council.

M Pichon suggested that Paragraph (c) of General Weygand’s draft telegram should be omitted. He further suggested that General Dupont should be asked to give the Council an accurate report of the situation of affairs in Germany, and that he should suggest what measures he thought the Council might suitably take.

S Tittoni suggests that General Dupont should give what information he could as to the action that the German Government proposed to take.

General Weygand said that General Dupont might be informed, purely for his own information, that the Allied and Associated Governments were considering the possibility of anticipating certain provisions in the Peace Treaty with Germany.

Mr Balfour asks whether it would be wise to inform General Dupont of all the measures that the Council has proposed to take, and to draw his attention to the dangers that it foresaw from allowing German intervention.

M Pichon said that he thinks it would be wise to do so; providing that information of this sort was purely for General Dupont’s personal guidance.

S Tittoni asked whether General Dupont could be asked to consult with the local strike leaders in the affected districts in Silesia, and whether he could get information from them as to the possibility of a resumption of regular work.

Mr Balfour asked Mr Polk to communicate with Mr Hoover.

(It is decided:

(a) That General Weygand should re-draft a telegram to General Dupont, incorporating the wishes of the Council, as expressed in the previous discussion;

(b) That M Loucheur and Mr Hoover should attend at the Council after their return.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-20-19, 10:57 AM

20th August 1919

U.S.S. America arriving in New York Harbor bringing U.S. troops home.
https://i.postimg.cc/vH7qcyLz/ECZ2-NRQXs-AAW4pe.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

African American troops doing rifle practice at Camp Jackson, South Carolina.
https://i.postimg.cc/3Rgpn8wf/ECZ2-NRQXs-AAW4pe.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

08-20-19, 05:10 PM

Wednesday, August 20, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. Mr Balfour says that he has received a telegram from the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, asking whether, in view of the appointment of a Greek Colonel as a consultative member of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna, an Ottoman Colonel might be admitted on the same footing. Mr Balfour asks whether he is authorized by the Council to reply in the affirmative.

(It is agreed that in view of the resolution taken on August 14th Mr Balfour should reply that similar facilities to those afforded to the Greek representative should be granted to the Turkish representative on the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna.)

2. Mr Balfour says that the position in the Baltic States is very surprising. He has prepared a summary of the reports received from Reval. He thinks it might be of interest to the Council to have this report read.

The following Report was then read:

“On August 14th after negotiations in which the French, British and American representatives appear to have taken a prominent part, a North-Western Government for the provinces of Pskoff, Novgorod, and Petrograd was formed. The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs is Lianosov and General Yudenitch is Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief. General Rodzianko as acting Commander of the North-Western Army accepted this Government.

The Government proclaims its intention of convoking a Congress of Representatives of the people in order to base itself on democratic principles. It is decided to establish the Headquarters of the Government at Reval, the reason being that the majority of its members fear that if they go to Pskoff their lives will be in danger from Balahovich, the former Commander of the Russian North-Western Corps, who might attempt a coup d’état.

The Government, which proclaimed itself as ‘a group acting as an independent government in the North-Western provinces as part of a united Russia’ proceeded to make a declaration of which the following were the principal points

(a) That they assumed complete responsibility for deciding all provincial questions;

(b) That they requested financial assistance as well as stores and equipment from the Allied and Associated Governments;

(c) That they requested the immediate help of the Estonian Government with armed forces to liberate Petrograd as well as the rest of the Petrograd, Pskoff and Novgorod Governments from the Bolsheviks;

(d) That they requested the French, British and American representatives to obtain from their Governments the recognition of complete Estonian independence;

(e) That they proposed to open negotiations with the Estonian Government at once in order to obtain an outlet to the sea through Estonian ports and to regulate commercial relations between the two countries;

(f) That they were informing the Supreme Russian Government of Kolchak of the decisions taken by them and were confident that he would appreciate the necessities of the situation.
As soon as this declaration was issued, the French, British and American representatives at Reval together presented to the Estonian Government a note from General Gough urging co-operation with the Russian North-Western Government and stating that the Estonian claim to complete independence would be represented to the Allied and Associated Governments.

The Estonian Government have returned a formal reply, to the effect that they are unable to co-operate with the Russians as requested until the Allies recognize full Estonian independence.

General Gough reports that unless this is given at once the collapse of the Russian Army may be expected and it will be impossible to control the situation. He also considers that the new Government should receive immediate support.”

M Berthelot says that the French Government has received similar information. The Estonian Government does not merely require recognition as an independent Government, but also material assistance in arms and money - the financial aid amounting to 600 millions of francs.

S Tittoni says that he has read in a newspaper that General Balahovich together with the Bolshevik force which he commanded, had gone over to the Estonians and had proceeded to Pskoff. This appeared to corroborate the information received by Mr Balfour.

M Berthelot says that this General had always played an ambiguous part. He could not be seriously trusted by any side.

Mr Polk asks from what source Mr Balfour had received his news.

Mr Balfour says he has received his information on the previous day, after the meeting.

M Pichon says that he has also received similar news on the previous evening.

Mr Balfour says that the most noticeable feature of the news was that the French, British and American representatives seemed for the last week to have been engaged in fostering a coup d’état without consulting with their own Governments.

Mr Polk says that there is no American representative in the Baltic authorized to act on behalf of the American Government. There is an American General associated with General Gough, and also an officer employed on relief work. The General has lately been telegraphed to, that he must take no part in local politics. The Allied Missions in the Baltic were composed of representatives who acts independently. They were not subject to the orders of General Gough.

M Pichon says that he thinks the conference had placed General Gough in command of the Allied representatives.

Mr Polk observed that although General Gough was the senior officer, he is not in command.

S Tittoni says that the Allied representatives might have argued that as the Conference had recognised Admiral Kolchak in order that he might fight the Bolsheviks, they were justified in recognizing any other Russian organization with a similar purpose.

M Pichon suggests that Mr Balfour should ask General Gough to send supplementary information.

Mr Balfour observes that General Gough had discreetly gone on leave. The really practical difficulty was that the Estonians are, in a manner, putting a pistol at the Head of the Council. If they came to terms with the Bolshevists, there was no further hope of fighting Bolshevism in that area. They were threatening to do so. In other words, they are attempting methods of blackmail in order to be recognized and assisted with money and arms. General Gough informed the Council that failing recognition of the Estonian Government, disaster would inevitably overtake the North-Western Russian Armies.

M. Berthelot pointed out that the Estonians had been employing the same tactics for the last six months.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks the Council could do very little. He will inquire, however, what the British Government proposed to do regarding General Gough.

S Tittoni said that Admiral Kolchak might be asked whether he would recognize the independence of Estonia. He had already been asked to recognize its autonomy. With this the Estonians were not satisfied.

M Berthelot says that Admiral Kolchak would never recognize the independence of Estonia. Admiral Kolchak had, hitherto, refused to recognize the independence of Finland. In any case, the Baltic provinces were necessary to Russia as an outlet to the sea.

Mr Balfour observes that the second item on the Agenda, namely, ‘Allied Policy in the Baltic States,’ is connected with the topic under discussion. He has prepared on this subject a proposal which he begged to submit to the Council:

“The Baltic Commission are requested to submit to the Council a declaration of Allied and Associated policy with regard to the international position of the Baltic States, in the place of the draft declaration considered, but not accepted, by the Council on July 26th.

This declaration should be framed in strict accordance with the relevant portion of the letter addressed by the Conference to Admiral Kolchak on May 27, which, unless and until other arrangements are made, must be regarded as the governing document in all their transactions. The declaration should therefore provide in the first place that, unless an agreement is speedily reached between these States and Russia, a settlement will be made by the Allied and Associated Powers, in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations; and, in the second place that pending such settlement these States shall be recognised as autonomous, and fully competent to enter into relations with the Allied and Associated Governments.”

M Berthelot observes that every time the autonomy of the Baltic States is mentioned, these States are exasperated, as they continually ask for independence. He thinks it is desirable to try and find a slightly different formula.

Mr Balfour says that the expressions used had been borrowed almost textually from the letter addressed by the Conference to Admiral Kolchak.

Mr Polk says he understands the draft to be an instruction to the Baltic Commission.

Mr Balfour says that this is so. The Baltic Commission is inclined to recognize the independence of the Baltic States. It does not keep in mind the larger policy of the Conference. He thinks this draft would remind them of the wider aspect of the question.

Mr Polk says that provided the Baltic Commission was being asked merely to submit a resolution for discussion by the Council, he would agree.

Mr Balfour says this is all that is proposed.

(The draft instruction above quoted is then adopted.)

3. General Weygand explains the Report on the evacuation of Latvia by the Germans, prepared by Marshal Foch. He observes that the note is prepared exclusively from a military point of view. As regards General von der Goltz, the German Government had replied that they could not admit the right of the Conference to demand the recall of the General. Nevertheless there was news that he was at Mittau, on his way to Berlin. It is not yet clear whether he had been recalled or whether he was on his way to consult the German Government. As to the evacuation of the German troops by sea, he thinks the German allegations are wrong. The operation is really possible and can only be settled locally by General Gough. As to evacuation by land, the German reasons were equally bad. The British, as far as he knows, had never promised to furnish engines. This question also could be settled locally. As to removal of material by the Germans, the Allied and Associated Powers had authority under the Armistice to forbid it. The conclusion was that of the five things asked for, only one, namely, the stoppage of reinforcements, had been agreed to by the German Government, although the Poles said that the agreement was not being fulfilled. As to the recall of General von der Goltz, the situation was not clear. As regards the remaining three, the Allies had a right to enforce their demands and General Gough was in a position to obtain satisfaction.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Allies have any right to make one particular German evacuate Latvia before any other.

General Weygand admitted that the Allies had no right to make a special case. However, General von der Goltz is undoubtedly the source of all the trouble, and he is every now and then disavowed by the German Government. In any case, the interpretation of his movements is not clear, and the matter remained in suspense.

M Pichon says that according to the French representative at Helsingfors, General von der Goltz had certainly gone to Berlin.

(The conclusions of Marshal Foch’s Note are adopted and it is decided that General Gough should be asked by Marshal Foch to obtain the execution of the demands contained therein, with the exception of the recall of General von der Goltz, pending further information regarding that officer.)

4. M Pichon says that he has obtained confirmation of the news communicated on the previous day regarding Silesia. He caused to be read a report of a speech by Chancellor Bauer before the German National Assembly. In addition to the German version, he had received from Mr Zamoiski the Polish version. Mr Zamoiski is of the opinion that unless the Allies intervene with troops, the situation will go from bad to worse. M Pichon had told him that intervention in German territory was a very serious step, and that the Council had asked for further information. He had also told him that the Germans were to be informed that unless they could control the situation it might be necessary to intervene.

Mr Balfour says that he had received a telegram from Sir Percy Wyndham, of which the following was the most significant passage:

“Polish Foreign Office informed me this morning position considered very serious, and Government is afraid German regular army will invade Poland, and time has come when it will be impossible to resist the popular demand for intervention by Polish troops. Immediate outbreaks expected in Warsaw if this is not done. Deputation from Upper Silesia has arrived at Warsaw to bring pressure on Polish Government to above effect. Matters appear to be serious, and situation would be eased if Polish Government could be informed that the Allied Powers are bringing pressure to bear on German authorities.”

He proposes, subject to the approval of the Council, to send the following reply:

“Evidently Germans have both the right and the duty of maintaining order in Upper Silesia until Treaty is ratified. In these circumstances the Poles would be breaking the Treaty if they send troops into the disturbed area except on German invitation.

We shall endeavor without delay to send Allied representatives to the disturbed area, who will report to the Council, and may be able to act as a moderating influence on the spot.

If we can by negotiation hasten the date at which the Inter-Allied Commission take charge of the plebiscite area, we will do so.

The interest both of Poland and of all Central Europe urgently requires that work should at once be resumed in the mines; that order should be maintained; and that the Polish population should be patient during the very few weeks which still separate them from the date of the German evacuation.

You should inform your Allied colleagues of this telegram, which has been sent after discussion at Supreme Council.”

This reply contains two practical proposals. The first to send representatives to Upper Silesia. Representatives of the Coal Commission were already being sent. It might be possible to attach a civilian mission not specifically concerned with coal. The second was that the Conference would attempt to negotiate with Germany, in order to hasten the date at which the Allied Commissioners should take charge of the plebiscite zone. In this connection it might be remembered that the German Government had forwarded a demand from the inhabitants of Danzig that the date of the separation of the town from the German State should be hastened. If the Germans favored this in Danzig, they might be willing to show a similar spirit in regard to Upper Silesia.

M Pichon said that he sympathized with the proposals suggested by Mr Balfour, but he must point out that it would be meeting the desires of the Poles. It would appear that the Polish workmen had brought about the strikes in Upper Silesia, with the purpose of rendering Allied intervention necessary.

Mr Polk says that he had learned from Mr Hoover that he is conducting negotiations with the German Government regarding the coal supply. It might be possible to take advantage of this to ask Mr. Hoover to bring the situation of the Silesian coalfields to the notice of the German Government.

(It is agreed that the Coal Commission might urge the German Government to agree to an early holding of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia as a means of improving the coal supply for the coming winter.

It is further agreed that Mr Balfour should send the telegram to Sir Percy Wyndham above quoted. The telegram drafted by General Weygand and sent to General Dupont in accordance with the decision of the previous day is approved.

5. General Belin explained the revised Naval, Military and Air Clauses prepared by the Military Representatives at Versailles. He states that the only matter on which there was no definite conclusion is the number of men Hungary was to be allowed to keep under arms. The Military Representatives had attempted to act in accordance with the instructions of the Council, given on the 8th August, 1919. Various figures had been suggested, the two extreme figures being 45,000 and 18,000 men. The Military Representatives had suggested 35,000 as a compromise, and this was the only matter in which the clauses now proposed differed from the clauses inserted in the Treaty with Austria.

M Pichon said that on the matter of the number of men to be kept under arms in Hungary, he must reserve his decision pending the return of M Clemenceau. With this exception he was prepared to accept the clauses drafted by the Military Representatives.

(Subject to the French reservation regarding the number of men to be maintained under arms in Hungary, the Articles proposed by the Military Representatives at Versailles are accepted.)

6. The Council has before them draft replies to the German Delegation, prepared by the Committee for the Organization of the Reparations Commission, regarding:

(a) Calculation of damages in the territories devastated by the war. Replies to the German Delegation
(b) Restitution of topographical plans of the mines of Costeplatz.
(The proposed replies, are accepted.)

7. M Pichon says that on the previous day he and Mr Polk had had a conversation regarding the demand of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation to be heard on the subject of the reparations due from Bulgaria.

S Tittoni said that he sympathizes with the request, but he thinks the objection was that it created a precedent. There was no doubt that interested parties should always be heard before a decision affecting them was taken. But in this case the matter had been fully discussed and all the Serbian arguments had been heard. It was needless to have these arguments repeated, and unless the Serbians had anything new to allege, it was an undesirable precedent, tending to call into question decisions of the Council already made.

Mr Polk says that the Serbian delegates think that they would be discredited at home if they failed to obtain a hearing from the so-called Supreme Council. He quite agreed that it was undesirable to hear a restatement of old arguments, but he does not wish the delegates to return to their country with a sense of humiliation. He thinks that they might be required, in accordance with S Tittoni’s proposal, to confine themselves in their arguments to any errors or omissions there might be in the Treaty.

M Pichon says that he supports Mr Polk’s views. Apart from the desire to show courtesy to the Serbians, he thinks it is advisable to avoid incidents similar to those which had taken place previously. Before the Treaty is communicated to the Bulgarians it will be necessary to communicate it to a plenary session of the Conference. On a previous occasion Mr Bratiano had caused a disagreeable incident at a Plenary Session. By pacifying the Serbian Delegation before hand, it might be possible to avoid a repetition of a similar incident.

Mr Balfour says that he finds himself in a difficulty. He understands Mr Polk’s views and sympathizes with them, but he does not know what had taken place in the previous stages of the discussion regarding reparation due to Serbia. He believed that the Serbians would demand the restitution of a larger number of cattle, cows, pigs, etc., than was allowed to them. But all nations had similar claims to make, and they could rarely be satisfied. If the Serbians were to be heard, the Romanians would demand a hearing. The Romanian case against Hungary at the present time, was based on a claim for restitution of what had been stolen from Romania. The Allies, however, are saying to the Romanians that they could not recoup their losses, and that they must take their share with the rest of the Allies. The Portuguese too had a sense of grievance and would, if they heard of this, repeat their demand for representation on the Reparations Commission. It would take up a good deal of the time of the Conference to hear a restatement of the claims of all the aggrieved nations. If the Serbians can be confined to a statement of the points on which in their opinion the Commissions had gone wrong he would be content, but he was afraid that it would be difficult to restrict them sufficiently.

S Tittoni says that a compromise appears possible. M Pichon on behalf of the Conference might be deputed to listen to all the Serbians might have to say.

M Pichon says that he thanks S Tittoni, but feels that the Serbians will not be satisfied. He has already heard them and knows what they have to say. He does not think that anything they could bring forward would alter the decision greatly in their favor. If they are refused a hearing, however, he thinks that a curt answer should not be sent them, but that a reply should be made giving in full the reasons for the point of view adopted by the Conference. In substance the Serbian complaint fell under two headings,

(a) Insufficient restitution of cattle;

(b) Exclusion from membership of the Reparations Commission in Bulgaria.

M Berthelot says that Serbia is an agricultural country and cannot revive without regaining her cattle. France and Italy have been partially invaded, and partially despoiled of cattle; Serbia has been entirely overrun and entirely despoiled.

(At this point Col Peel enters the room.)

Mr Balfour explains the above discussion to Col Peel.

Col Peel says that if the Serbians are allowed to present their case, the Greeks and Romanians would ask to do likewise. A similar situation would arise with regard to Hungary. He quite agrees that the Serbians have suffered extreme hardship, but it is not the Serbians who are presenting this claim, but the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State. Two-thirds of this new state had been our enemies in the war, and probably contained quantities of cattle, some of them looted from the Allied countries. What the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation wants is far more than could possibly be granted. They want the Treaty with Bulgaria to be on the lines of the Treaty with Germany. He can see no objection, however, to the hearing of the Delegation if they have anything new to say, which they had not previously urged.

(It is agreed that M Pichon should reply to the request of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation to the effect that their request could not be accepted for the various reasons given in the above discussion. If, however, the Delegation has any new facts or arguments to bring forward, the Council will be pleased to receive them, and then to decide whether or not a hearing is desirable.)

8. Mr Polk says that he has received the following telegram:

“In the Sessions of August 18, the Commission heard Admiral Horthy, Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Forces. He gave information as to the resources on which he counts in organizing these forces. They seemed to consist chiefly of officers. He thinks that the Romanians are influenced by the Bolshevists. He thinks that the workmen have still many concealed arms. He calls attention to the considerable requisitions effected by the Romanians. The Commission summons for the 19th the General commanding the Romanian forces or his representative. He will indicate the measures that he has taken, with a view to respecting the indications of the verbal note of August 16. He will make it known whether these measures are being carried out, especially concerning requisitions.

Inter-Allied Military Commission.”

In this connection he has a proposal to make, which he would not ask the Council to accept at once, but which he would ask his colleagues to consider.

9. Mr Polk says that the American officer in touch with the Austrian Delegation informed him that the Delegation when it received the final answer of the Conference, proposed to take the terms back to Vienna to submit them to the Austrian Assembly. It is further said that in all probability should no alterations be made in the territorial frontiers laid down for Austria, and especially should a plebiscite in Syria be denied, Dr Renner will not be authorized by the Assembly to sign the peace. He would be forced to resign and a change of Government would result.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-21-19, 06:05 AM

21st August 1919

Friedrich Ebert is officially sworn in as the first President of Germany after serving as the Provisional President since February.
https://i.postimg.cc/52Ych7QL/ECe-yl-BWs-AEZXZp.png (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

08-21-19, 02:53 PM

Thursday, August 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. Mr Polk asks that the letter he had addressed to M Clemenceau be referred for examination and report to the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission.

(This is agreed to.)

2. Mr Polk says that he now begs to withdraw the reservation he had made on August 7th, regarding the Anglo-Belgian Agreement on the Belgian sphere in the ex-German Colony of East Africa.

3. Mr Hoover says that he has just returned from a trip of investigation into various economic questions. The main discovery of his trip had been the critical situation as to coal in Central Europe. There are three coal-fields, from which the entire supply for this section of Europe was drawn: first, the one in Upper Silesia, now affected by the strikes: one in Teschen, under dispute between the Czechoslovaks and the Poles; and one in Poland. The total output from these three fields is 5 to 6 million tons a month, and they constitute the very heart of Central Europe. Unless their production is kept up, it will be impossible to maintain the transportation and municipal services in Central Europe. The Upper Silesian coal-mines have practically stopped production on account of the strikes. One mine has been entirely destroyed. It would be only a matter of days before the remainder would be disabled beyond repair for several months. There are many versions as to the cause for the situation. There appeared to be four parties to the quarrel: first, the Polish workmen; second, the German Grenzschutz troops, who were in a high state of emotional nationalism; third the Spartacists; fourth, the German coal-owners and perhaps the German Government itself. The causes appear to be not economic, but political. The Polish authorities had shown him documents which, if they could be authenticated, would prove that the Germans had tried to stir up the Spartacists to make trouble, and that the German troops had actually attempted to drive out the Polish workmen. The Germans said, on the contrary, that the Polish workmen and the Spartacists had conspired together to foment the trouble, and that they were forced to restore order. One of the strange results of this state of affairs was that in one case some Polish workmen were guarding their mines to save them from destruction. In his own opinion, the only possible remedy was an occupation by Allied troops. No Commission could bring about a reconciliation between the contending parties. Colonel Goodyear, who had been in charge of coal distribution, had been sent there, and was trying to get the parties to come to some agreement together, but he was convinced that it would be impossible to do so. Mr Hoover himself had had a discussion with Herr Markenson, a German who had been a member of the Armistice Commission on the Eastern Front. He is very disturbed, and from his statement he had gathered that the German Government are not fully in control of the Grenzschutz troops, whom they were trying to replace by regular troops. This same German had said that the German Government was most anxious, as it necessarily ought to be, to restore order, but, of course, one could never tell what power the Berlin Government exercised over the various military bodies in the East. Undoubtedly, the German owners are in desperate fear of the destruction of their property, and will welcome any method of reestablishing order.

There are contradictory currents even among the Germans themselves, and it is his opinion that the racial animosities had reached such a point that nothing could stop the strife but a military occupation. He realized, of course, that this is not legally possible until after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, but the intentions of the German Government might here be put to the test, and he thinks that the German Government will probably agree to anticipate the action proposed by the Treaty, and, of course, the Poles are asking that this be done. He believes that this would be the attitude of the German Government, because of the desire Herr Markenson and his colleagues had expressed to get Allied troops all along the Eastern front, between the Poles and the German volunteer troops, and because the difficulty of controlling the latter made them fear a general conflagration.

He had had a meeting with the Trades Union Leaders of the Teschen district, and there also found the Trades Unions divided along the lines of nationality. The Polish leaders confess that they cannot help to increase production until they know to whom the mines would fall, and they will not work for the Czechs. There is here also much political sentiment. He had asked whether strikes would be used to influence the plebiscite, and was answered that undoubtedly they would be. This information he considers as of interest, both as affecting the political situation in the Teschen district, and also by analogy furnishing a clue to the situation in Upper Silesia.

There is a political question - that of restoring order; and there is also the economic question of stimulating production and getting the output from the mines necessary for the maintenance of the ordinary life of central Europe. From the last point of view, the three districts were one and the selfish interests of any one nation must be entirely set aside for the general good of that section of the continent. At present the feeling of the Czechs towards the Austrians is such as to make it hopeless to ask them to keep coal shipments going to Austria, although the Austrian transportation, which was dependent on that coal supply, was absolutely essential to the Czechs themselves, and the same sort of feelings existed everywhere. He thinks it necessary that the Coal Commission should appoint a sub-Committee to control all three Districts with the authority of the Peace Conference. He suggests that this be done at once, and he would like to see the Coal Committee enter upon its duties with the prestige that would be given it by the assurance that it would constitute the Plebiscite Commission as soon as it became possible to appoint that body. He thinks it possible to select men competent for both, and he thinks that it will only be possible for the Coal Committee to perform its duties if invested with the double authority, only this double authority could solve either question.

M Pichon asks Mr Hoover at what time he had visited Upper Silesia.

Mr Hoover replies that he had not visited Upper Silesia, but had interviewed people coming from there at a place on the Railway outside the mining area.

M Pichon says that he had asked this question because he had just received news that the situation in Upper Silesia had improved.

Mr Hoover says that on his side he had telegrams from Warsaw, informing him that there was continuous fighting along the whole of the German-Polish frontiers.

S Tittoni says he thinks the improvement in any case must be precarious. He is disposed to agree to the proposals made by Mr Hoover.

M Pichon says that there is a telegram from General Dupont which confirms most of what Mr Hoover had said.

Mr Hoover says that he was in possession of a proclamation of the socialist party, calling upon the Poles to expel the Germans from the mines. There is, therefore, a mixture of Spartacist, and Nationalist feeling which was very confusing.

Mr Polk says that he has received a telegram from the American Minister in Warsaw, stating that the Polish Government had refrained from intervening in Silesia in spite of the excitement of the Country over the situation, because they are afraid that such action would prejudice their case in the eyes of the Conference.

Mr Balfour said that Mr Hoover’s proposals are very similar to those adopted by the Conference in its previous meetings. The Council had thinks it might be possible to ask Germany to allow an anticipated exercise of the Treaty. Mr Hoover added the hope and expectation that the German Government would consent. The means by which the Council had hoped to obtain the acquiescence of the German Government was the Coal Commission.

Mr Hoover said that he would suggest that the Coal Commission be strengthened by a German member and even by a Czech and a Polish member.

Mr Balfour asked whether Mr Hoover does not think that these members might obstruct business.

Mr Hoover says that they might perhaps be disposed to do so, but that they could be controlled by the Great Powers. There had previously been a Coal Commission with a Czech, Polish and German member, together with a British and American representative, which had worked quite successfully before the signature of the Treaty.

Mr Balfour said that he is very favorably inclined to Mr Hoover’s proposals, but with regard to the suggestion that the Coal Committee should also conduct the administration in the plebiscite zone, he would like to ask a few questions. The Plebiscite Commission could not be precisely the Committee suggested by Mr Hoover; it is hardly possible to have a plebiscite area in which Poland is interested, controlled by a Czech and a German Commissioner. The Coal Committee, moreover, not only has to carry out diplomatic negotiations with Germany, to superintend the production of coal in disturbed parts of Upper Silesia and Teschen, but it is also asked to control a plebiscite area, two-thirds of which was agricultural, and not coal producing at all. In order to carry out its various duties, not only would it have to move over large areas, possess an intimate knowledge of coal production, considerable acquaintance with other industrial conditions, but it must also be endowed with political experience, tact and knowledge of the conditions of all the neighboring countries. Such universal competence might perhaps be difficult to find concentrated in one set of individuals.

Mr Hoover says that what he meant to suggest was that the four Principal Allied representatives on the Coal Committee should ultimately become the administrators of the plebiscite area, in order that they should begin from the first with additional prestige.

Mr Balfour said that the Coal Committee would be composed of technical experts rather than of administrators and men of political experience.

Mr Hoover says that he is not entirely of this opinion. The technical side of the Committee’s work was comparatively simple; the distribution of the output of the mines was well established; the mine-owners are well acquainted with the quantities sent to the various consuming areas. The Committee would have chiefly to adjudicate among the rival claimants. Their functions would be, therefore, rather administrative than technical. He adheres to the belief that a merely technical committee would be of little use. There already is one, and its influence is not great.

Mr Balfour says that he will ask one more question. It had struck him previously that, should the German Government make difficulties, it might be threatened by being told that should the coalfields be attributed to Poland, the Allied Powers would exercise their influence to see that Germany was last served in the distribution of coal from these mines. He asks Mr Hoover whether he thinks this form of pressure could be employed.

Mr Hoover says that he thinks it is possible. The method he is suggesting was not a logical one. It would be more reasonable, first to establish the administrative Commission, and under it a Coal Committee. He was reversing the process, and suggesting that the Coal Committee should be endowed in anticipation with the prestige of the administrative body.

Mr Balfour says that this method appeared to him to be very ingenious.

M Pichon says that he agrees that the method was ingenious, but he thinks that there is some danger in confusing the two functions. It is possible that the Coal Committee might at a future date, assist the Plebiscite Commission. He thinks it inadvisable to state at the present time that coal experts would become the future administrators of the country. This could not be done legally at present. Moreover, he does not think that the Germans would agree. They did not accept the Treaty in a very willing spirit. A demand of this kind would raise difficulties. The Council might make up its own mind that the Coal Committee, if, as it was hoped, it gained authority in the country, should later on assist the Plebiscite Commission. He does not think that this could be openly declared.

Mr Hoover says that his feeling was that a Coal Committee, as such, would be helpless. It could only use arguments derived from the general coal situation in Europe. He pointed out that the Council was considering the prospect of military occupation. Should this take place, the only administrative organ possible would be the Plebiscite Commission.

S Tittoni said that the essential thing was to find out whether the German Government will acquiesce. Should it do so, there will be no difficulty, and the Coal Committee could, as Mr Hoover suggested, obtain political power. The principal thing was to approach the German Government without delay.

General Weygand says that if Allied troops are sent into Upper Silesia, it would be absolutely necessary to establish a high civil authority to ensure a modus vivendi. It appears to him that this authority could not be the Coal Committee, whose functions extended to other areas than Upper Silesia. It must undoubtedly be the Commission provided for in the Annex to Section 8 of the Treaty. This Commission is doubtless that which has been called the Plebiscite Commission in the discussion. It is really a Commission to govern the country under the authority of the Allied and Associated Powers, pending the completion of the plebiscite.

Mr Hoover then suggests that the Coal Committee be sent as a Coal Committee, but that, as many Governments as might find it possible to do so, should appoint to it members who would subsequently serve on the Administrative Commission. Further, if the German Government should agree, no delay would occur in selecting new representatives.

M Pichon said that the whole question is whether the German Government will agree to the exercise of the right which only accrued 15 days after the ratification of the Treaty.

S Tittoni urged that the question be put to the German Government immediately. A reply could perhaps be obtained within two days.

Mr Balfour says that the Conference had no regular diplomatic civil agent in touch with the German Government. He therefore suggests that Mr Hoover should go to Berlin on behalf of the Council to negotiate on this matter. Mr Hoover is so identified with the economic interests of Europe that no more suitable representative could be found for such a mission. His work has been outside the political arena so he had a better hope of success than anyone else.

M Pichon says that he agrees.

Mr Polk suggests that Mr Hoover be given an opportunity of consulting his French and British colleagues on the Coal Commission.

S Tittoni suggested that in any case it should be explained to the German Government that the Allies have no political object in these negotiations. They were only animated by anxiety for the economic revival of Europe.

M Pichon proposed certain draft instructions for Mr Hoover.

(These instructions are approved in principle and it is agreed that Mr Hoover, after consultation with his colleagues on the Coal Commission, should report on the following day whether he was able to undertake the mission and whether any alteration of the draft instructions appears desirable.)

4. Mr Polk asks that Mr Hoover be heard on the situation in Hungary.

Mr Hoover says that the staff of the Belief Organisation had been in Budapest and other parts of Hungary during the past ten days; that facts which had come to their personal attention might be of interest to the Council. Up to 10: 00 on the previous Monday the Romanians are still requisitioning food all over the country and in Budapest they were taking supplies even from the Children’s Hospital. Trains carrying the requisitioned supplies are passing out of the country as fast as possible, although in one place some had accumulated because the Romanians are awaiting the repair of a bridge before the trains could continue on their way. None of the members of the Relief Organisation believed for a moment that the Romanians intended to accede to the desires of the Council. He was not concerned with the morality of their actions but with the practical effects. Two of his officials, Captains in the American Army, had themselves seen the Romanians take sixteen wagon- loads of supplies from the Children’s Hospital and eleven deaths had resulted therefrom within twenty-four hours, for there is no way of replacing these supplies. He does not think that any action by the Romanians could be secured unless the Military Mission were instructed to send agents to frontier points to stop the Romanians from shipping out any more of the requisitioned material until its disposal could be decided by the Council. In his own opinion the supplies requisitioned should be turned back to Budapest to feed the population of that city. He would like to call attention to another point which threw a sidelight on the situation. While the coup d’état, by which the Archduke Joseph’s Government had been installed was not entirely a Romanian affair, nevertheless Romanian troops have surrounded the meeting place of the Ministry and had turned their machine guns on the building in which they were. This event has had an immediate repercussion throughout Poland and Eastern Europe and the Bolshevists were making much of it and claiming that the Alliance was trying to reestablish reactionary government in its worst form and this had done more to rehabilitate the Bolshevist cause than anything that had happened for a long time. The social democrats had refused to have anything to do with the new Government and Garami, the leader of this group, thinks that if things are allowed to continue as they were, the old reactionary party would be well established in ten days and the Allied and Associated Powers would have to be prepared to see the House of Hapsburg begin to re-establish itself throughout all its former dominions. He can only suggest that the Council should instruct its representatives in Budapest to call the Archduke before them and say that his Government could never be accepted or recognised. Such action might induce the Archduke to step aside and invite the social democrats to form a coalition government.

M Pichon says that the Council had already taken a decision of a similar character. The telegram sent on the 18th August embodied this policy. In it the Council had said all that it could possibly say consistently with its declared policy of non-interference in the internal politics of Hungary. The Council cannot take the responsibility of deliberately upsetting a Government in order to set up another.

Mr Balfour says that the only further step that could be taken would be to make the telegram more public, by asking the Generals in Budapest to make it widely known that Peace will never be signed with a Government not representing the people.

Mr Hoover says that if the Hungarian people go to the polls with only a choice between Bolshevism and a Hapsburg, the result of the elections might be in favour of the latter. This would be a paradoxical and disastrous result of a consultation of the people. Eastern Europe is past the blandishments of polite suggestion. Human life in those parts had declined in value to an extent not realized in Paris. Very energetic action was required. He thinks the Generals in Budapest should summon the Archduke and tell him clearly that he would never be recognised, and that he had better resign.

S Tittoni says that if he feels certain that on the fall of the Archduke a good Government would be set up, he would risk intervening. Before doing so, however, he would like to ask the Generals in Budapest what Government they thought would result from upsetting the Archduke.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks this matter so important that he would like to wait until the following day, when M Clemenceau would be present at the Council. As to the other proposal of Mr Hoover, namely, to have the frontier between Hungary and Romania watched, in order to stop the export of requisitioned material, he thinks some decision should be taken.

S Tittoni says that all instructions sent to the Generals in Budapest should be accompanied by a proviso that they should take action if they thought action suitable; as they are on the spot, they are better able to judge what could be done.

(It is then decided to send the following telegram:

“The Supreme Council learns that the Romanian troops of occupation continue to make requisitions of every kind in Hungary, and to send the goods so obtained to Romania.

The Council begs the Inter-Allied Commission to report on the practical possibility of sending officers to the frontier posts between Hungary and Romania to prevent the export of goods requisitioned to the detriment of the Allies, and in diminution of their common security.

Should the Commission regard this suggestion as feasible, Supreme Council authorizes it to act accordingly.”

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-22-19, 08:06 AM

22nd August 1919

With the support of the Polish Army, ethnic Poles around the town of Sejny launch an uprising against the Lithuanian authorities. Polish cavalry in Sejny.
https://i.postimg.cc/Hn10qDHV/ECj4-Nc-FXYAAl0i-S.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

American solider with a Chinese family in Vladivostok, Russia.
https://i.postimg.cc/L8Jq3QK7/ECj4-Nc-FXYAAl0i-S.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

The Prince of Wales, future Edward VIII, is in Quebec City where he inaugurates the Quebec Bridge.
https://i.postimg.cc/QttvF7Wp/ECj4-Nc-FXYAAl0i-S.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

08-22-19, 09:36 PM

Friday, August 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 17:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Clemenceau asks Mr Hoover to make his statement on the affairs of Silesia.

Mr Hoover says that he and Mr Loucheur have interviewed the German delegates at Versailles, and have made an informal suggestion to them. He has told them that if the present situation develops, it will lead the German Government into a very difficult position. In two months time, however, by the provisions of the Treaty, Silesia was to be occupied by Allied troops for the purpose of the plebiscite. He suggested to them that the German Government should, in its own interests, advance the date of the Allied occupation, and invite the Allies to send troops earlier. The German Representatives had received the suggestion favorably, and had stated that a reply from Berlin would be received on the following day. It is, however, to be noted that the German Delegates in question belonged to the Reparation Commission, and had no diplomatic attributions. Their attitude on the point at issue was, therefore, not very important. He has further told them, that a Sub-Commission, to inquire into the means of increasing the coal output, was shortly to be sent to the Silesian, Teschen, & Dombrova coalfields. If the Germans should prove willing to co-operate with this Sub-Committee, the Allies would doubtless be willing to appoint a German member to it. He thinks that his suggestion in this respect might be a fair bait to the German Government.

Col Goodyear’s dispatch is then read.

In conclusion, he thinks that the further information received from General Dupont should be placed before the Council.

M Pichon then circulated a telegram from the French Representative in Berlin.

Mr Balfour, commenting upon the telegram, says that he thinks the number of Commissions now acting in Germany is very great, and asks which Commission is referred to.

Mr Polk asks the same question.

M Loucheur replies that the Allied Military Representatives at Berlin must have delegated some of their members with orders to proceed to Silesia, and he thinks that the body so formed would be the Commission referred to in the telegram. He suggests that the Allied Representatives at Berlin ought to be informed of the measures which the Council proposed to carry into effect, and that they might know that the Coal Commission was being sent out on Monday. He further suggests that the delegated Commission from the Allied Representatives in Berlin should act in collaboration with the Coal Commission which was shortly to be sent out. In the meantime he strongly recommends that Col Goodyear should continue to act as a local arbitrator in the interests of the Council.

Mr Hoover remarks that he feels the Council should know the composition of the Commission which was being sent out by the Allied Representatives in Berlin; and, if an American officer were to be included on this Commission, Col Goodyear should be designated as the American representative by the Council.

Mr Balfour remarks that according to the information at present available there are two Commissions at present acting in Germany,

(i) The Inter-Allied Commission which was coming to an end on the following day; and;

(ii) the sub-ordinate body delegated from No. (i) to act in Silesia. Col Goodyear ought certainly to be a member of this latter Commission, but the Council did not at the moment know of whom it is composed.

Mr Polk suggests that it might be a group of generals who are endeavoring to arrange matters between the Germans and the Poles.

General Weygand explains that, at the present moment, there was a Committee negotiating between the Germans and the Poles. General Malcolm, General Dupont, and General Bencivenga are assisting this body. The negotiations between the two countries had continued until the events in Silesia had produced such a state of tension, that they could not be proceeded with. General Dupont had wanted, in the first place, to send out a local Committee to Silesia, but the proposal had been opposed by the Poles. The German Government had received the suggestion favorably, and it is probably for this reason that a Delegated Committee had now been sent.

S Tittoni remarks that his information does not quite agree with that supplied by General Weygand. He had been told, that, after the rupture of negotiations, a committee had been sent out locally at the request of the Poles. He also thought that the original committee in Berlin had been negotiating on behalf of prisoners of war.

General Weygand replies that the Council has sent out a committee to deal with the question of Russian prisoners, and that it is this same committee, which had assumed the conduct of present negotiations, owing to the fact that the various members of the committee had collaborated on many other questions in the past.

M Clemenceau then reads out the decision H. D. 23, 4, and remarked that the Americans had not nominated a member to the Committee created under the resolution, as they are waiting for the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

M Loucheur says he thinks that the Inter-Allied Committee at Berlin must be informed of the present measures taken by the Council. They should be told that a coal committee was leaving on Monday. Col Goodyear ought, at the same time, to be asked to continue the action that he initiated; while on the other hand, the new Coal Commission should be kept fully informed of what Col Goodyear had done; and be told that he was at present staying at Mahrisch Ostrau, and that they should collaborate as closely as possible with him.

Mr Polk says that Mr Hoover has suggested that Col Goodyear should be attached to the Delegated Committee sent out to Silesia from Berlin. A telegram should therefore be sent, instructing the Committee

(a) to proceed at once to Silesia and

(b) to establish relations with Col Goodyear. At the same time, it is not possible for Col Goodyear to be an active member of the Delegated Committee prior to the ratification of the Peace Treaty. He would, therefore work as the representative of Mr Hoover in matters connected with food and coal and would be in touch with the Generals of the Delegated Committee.

Mr Balfour asks what would be the relation between the Delegated Committee and the Coal Commission, both of which were being sent at the same time to the same place.

M Loucheur replied that the Coal Committee was a purely technical body, and could be placed under the orders of the Delegated Committee.

Mr Hoover says that the functions of the Coal Committee would be confined to questions of production and distribution. He does not believe that it could concern itself with questions of politics, and he felt that the work of this body should not be subordinated to a military committee.

M Clemenceau suggested that M Loucheur and Mr Hoover should draw up draft instructions to the Allied Representatives at Berlin, and should submit the text to the Council.

Mr Hoover then suggests that General Weygand should assist them.

M Pichon said that he had received a visit from Mr Grabsky of the Polish Delegation. He had informed him that he would transmit a copy of the instructions sent by the Allied Generals, to the Polish authorities. He would tell them that he fully agreed with the instructions sent, and would ask that the local Polish authorities should collaborate with the Commissions sent out by the Council.

Mr Balfour remarks that a decision has been arrived at on the previous day to attach a German, a Czech, and a Pole to the Coal Committee.

Mr Loucheur then reads the draft instructions to be sent to Berlin.

It is decided:

1) That Colonel Goodyear should be instructed to continue the negotiations that he had initiated in Upper Silesia, pending the arrival of the Coal Committee, and the Committee delegated by the Inter-Allied representatives at Berlin. He is further to place himself in touch with these Bodies on their arrival and to act in close collaboration with them.

2) That the draft telegram to General Dupont should be accepted and dispatched through Marshal Foch.

2. Mr Balfour asks, in connection with the previous resolution, whether the troops, which might have to be dispatched to Upper Silesia at very short notice, were now ready.

General Weygand says that it has only been decided that the troops for Upper Silesia should be formed out of four equal Allied contingents. On the same day that the decision had been taken, Marshal Foch had been requested to study the method of victualling and the distribution of the troops in Silesia, in collaboration with the military Representatives at Versailles. The Military Representatives has referred the matter to their respective Governments, and has not yet replied. He does not think that the discussions between Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives will be particularly fruitful, since the supposed difficulty of victualling did not exist. Far more complicated problems of the same kind have been solved in the past. There remains, however, the question of the total strength of effectives. On the proposal of the Military Representatives one Division had been considered sufficient. This figure had been arrived at before the appearance of the existing difficulties. When one Division had been decided upon, the military problem consisted only in maintaining order in a tranquil country. At the present moment, the country, which contained Four Million inhabitants, 360,000 of whom were laborers, was in a state of ferment and insurrection. The fact that these insurgents had disarmed troops should not be lost sight of; for it shows they are capable of military action. In his opinion, two Divisions are required under present circumstances. His opinion had been formed without local knowledge, and it would be advisable to ask General Dupont, who is proceeding to Silesia, to report on the matter. In the meantime, however, independently of anything that General Dupont might ultimately say, two Divisions ought to be put into a state of military preparedness.

S Tittoni said that he had no objection to a simple military occupation of Silesian territory; but that if fighting occurred, parliamentary difficulties might arise in the Allied countries, and the idea that we are carrying out repressive measures might gain ground. The revolution in Silesia has an essentially Polish character. is it not therefore desirable to obtain a declaration from the Polish Government, telling the local Polish population to receive our troops in a friendly spirit, and assist them as much as possible?

Mr Balfour says that the despatch of troops is part of a policy decided upon. All that can be done therefore, was to have the troops in a state of readiness.

S Tittoni replies that he does not question Mr Balfour’s statement but thinks that a proclamation from the Polish Government would be of great help. He had interpreted General Weygand’s statement in the sense that severe repressions might occur.

M Clemenceau replied that he does not think the question arises, since the Poles will obviously welcome our assistance against the Germans.

Mr Polk states that he doubts whether authority exists under the American constitution for the United States to send troops into Silesia for the purpose of quelling a revolution in that country, since the Treaty with Germany provided only for troops of occupation during the Plebiscite. If the matters under discussion deal simply with preliminary arrangements for the eventual despatch of troops, he is prepared to agree, but he cannot commit himself to the dispatch of forces for the purpose of quelling the revolution.

General Weygand says that when one Division has been decided upon for the Army of Occupation, during the Plebiscite in Upper Silesia, it had further been decided, that the Force in question should be drawn from the Army of Occupation on the Rhine. At that time it had been decided to maintain a Force of 150,000 men on the Rhine. Subsequently, however, this figure has been reduced to 114,000 men. Marshal Foch thinks that the troops necessary for Upper Silesia should be formed from the 36,000 men who became available owing to the reduction in the original figure. As an example, France has six Divisions, i. e. 85,000 men, formed for the Army of Occupation in Germany, and one extra Contingent for Silesia. Marshal Foch would like the British Government to get ready, in addition to the mixed brigade detailed for the Rhine, a supplementary contingent which could be drawn upon for Silesia. He also wishes that the American Government would provide a force available for Silesia in addition to the 6,800 men which was its share in the Army of Occupation on the Rhine.

Mr Balfour says that Field-Marshal Wilson had arrived in Paris and he would like General Weygand to consult with him on the present question.

Mr Polk remarks that General Weygand might also confer with General Pershing.

It is decided:

1) That Marshal Foch should be requested to make all arrangements necessary for putting two Divisions, which might ultimately be dispatched to Upper Silesia on the orders of the Council, in a state of readiness.

2) That General Weygand should consult with Field Marshal Wilson and General Pershing with regard to the furnishing of British and American troops for Upper Silesia from sources other than the Army of Occupation on the Rhine.

(At this point M Serruys, Mr Headlam-Morley, the experts of the Economic Commission, and the Editing Committee entered the room.)

3. The question before the Council is whether the supply of coal to Austria from Poland and Czechoslovakia should be guaranteed by a special clause in the Peace Treaty. The opinion of the Italian Delegation had been that it should. The other solution was, that the guarantee should be obtained by clauses in the Peace Treaties with Small States.

S Tittoni said that he agrees to the guarantee being given in the Treaty with Czechoslovakia; but the Treaty with Poland had already been signed.

M Serruys says that an additional clause might be inserted in the Polish Treaty, but remarks that Italy would obviously obtain more coal from Czechoslovakia than from Poland.

1) S Tittoni suggests that the question could be referred to the Coal Committee, which could consult with Economic Commission as to the best method of securing the necessary guarantees; and could advise the Council as to which Treaty it had better be included in. He does not insist on any alteration in the Peace Treaty with Austria.

(It is agreed that the questions of obtaining the necessary guarantees for a coal supply by Czechoslovakia, and Poland, to Austria, to the new States created from the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, and to the territories of that Empire ceded to the Allies, should be referred to the Coal Committee and to the Economic Commission jointly. The above Commissions should report to the Council, on the Peace Treaties, in which the clauses ensuring the above guarantees, should be inserted.)

(2) M Serruys says that the Economic Commission has replied to the Austrian Note with regard to the Nationality Clauses in the Peace Treaty only on the economic aspect of the economic problem. There is another juristic side to it. It is very necessary that the Editing Committee should co-ordinate and unify the replies to the Austrian Note on the subject of nationalities, under the two aspects that they presented.

S Tittoni said that he did not see the use of discussing an essentially political and juristic question from an economic point of view. The economic side of the question was obviously the less important. In his opinion the Economic Commission, the Committee on Political Clauses, and the Drafting Committee, ought to confer together, and present a single report.

M Serruys says that the Economic Commission has been unanimous in their decision, and he does not see the use under the circumstances, of inviting other bodies to confer with it. It would be enough to communicate the Report of the Economic Commission to them.

S Tittoni replies that the Economic Commission has evidently been able to discuss only one side of the question. If the Commission in question had been able to say that it had examined every side of the problem, he would have no reluctance in accepting their conclusion.

M Serruys replies, that the general structure and intentions, of the Peace Treaty with Austria had decided the manner in which the problem is to be solved. He draws attention to the fact that the Economic Commission had been obliged to deal with questions not purely economic, such as the consular establishments, the repeal of the Delbruck Law, etc. The division between the functions of the Economic Commission, and those of the Political Committee, had been somewhat artificial; and, for this reason, it is necessary to co-ordinate the notes of each.

Mr Balfour says that he does not see any reason for continuing the discussion. Both the Economic Commission and other bodies were in agreement. It was therefore obvious that they could confer together and sign a complete report to the Council.

(It is decided that the Austrian Counter Proposals on the subject of Articles 225 and 226 (Nationality Clauses) in the peace treaty with Austria, which Counter Proposals also affected Articles 57, 65, and 69 of the aforesaid peace treaty, should be referred to the Economic Commission and the Drafting Committee for examination and report.)

3) The Solidarity Between the Old Austro-Hungarian Empire and the New Austrian Republic:

The Council is called upon to consider the Austrian contention, that there is a complete break of historical continuity, between the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and the new Austrian Republic.

M Serruys in drawing the attention of the Council to the above point, said that almost every clause in the existing Peace Treaty with Austria was dependent upon the standpoint previously adopted by the Council. The Economic Commission, however, cannot assume a final decision, without a definite ruling from the Council on the point in question.

Mr Balfour says that it is obvious that the previous decision of the Council of Four must be upheld. The new Austrian Republic is in an absolutely different position from the other States, which has arisen out of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The former is an enemy State, and the latter were now friendly and allied Powers. On the other hand, it is in the interests of the Allied and Associated Powers that the financial and economic clauses of the Peace Treaty with Austria should be framed in such a way that ruin and bankruptcy should not be forced upon the Austrian Republic. The result of this would be that the Government at Vienna would think that their only hope of salvation lay in joining the German Empire. If any changes were to be made in the Peace Treaty, he thinks they ought to be carried out with the above object.

M Clemenceau asks whether it is decided that the Austrian contention contained in Letter No. 707 was rejected.

Mr Balfour replies in the affirmative but adds that he thinks some of the objections raised by the Austrian Delegation are valid. For this reason, he reserves to himself the right to propose modifications in the Financial and Economic Clauses when they come up for final discussion.

S Tittoni says that he wishes to make a reservation. Mr Balfour’s proposal, if accepted, will result in a lessening of the total guarantees to be obtained from Austria. If Mr Balfour proposes a more equitable distribution of guarantees among the States of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, he agrees; but he insisted that the total amount of Reparation due to the Allies should not, on that account, be diminished. For this reason, if Mr Balfour proposes to lessen the reparation payable by Austria, he will maintain that a corresponding increase should be placed upon the obligations of the other States of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire.

(After some further discussion, it is agreed that the question of the Financial and Economic guarantees should be adjourned until the consideration by the Council of the final reply to the Austrian Note.)

4. Economic Clauses in the Peace Treaty With Austria:

(After some further discussion, it is agreed that the modifications introduced into the Economic Clauses of the Peace Treaty with Austria should be communicated by the Economic Commission to the States concerned, who should report, in writing, through their Delegations, any observations that they had to offer to the Supreme Council by Monday, August 25th.)

5. Distribution of Funds Accumulated in Social Insurance Schemes Among States Deriving Territory From the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy:

M Serruys said that in order to ensure a satisfactory solution of the problem, it has been suggested by the Italian Delegation that the matter should be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the League of Nations, if disagreement arose.

S Tittoni said, that, as the Covenant of the League of Nations provided for arbitration in such cases as these, he could not see why special bodies should be called into existence for settling disputes of this nature. If they are called upon to adjudicate in questions arising out of insurance funds, other bodies would be called into existence for other problems, and, in referring the matter to the League of Nations, he considered that the Italian Delegation was doing no more than calling upon that organization to carry out some of its recognized functions.

(It is decided that the following point should be laid before the Drafting Committee for report:

Since numerous points in the Peace Treaty have to be settled by Conventions between the States concerned, what procedure was to be followed, and what form of arbitration adopted, if one of the States opposed the decisions?

Is the procedure laid down in Article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations adequate and sufficient?)

The question before the Council is the retention or rejection of Article 12 in Section 5 of the Peace Treaty with Austria.

Mr Balfour says that he has been advised by his expert, that the clause in question had first been proposed by the Belgian Delegation. After some discussion it had been so amended as to become almost inoperative. The British Delegation and the Five Principal Powers thought that it ought to be suppressed. The Belgian Delegation, however, desired its retention, even in its present form.

(After some further discussion it is decided that Article 12 of Section 5 of the Peace Treaty with Austria dealing with the suppression of Insurance Contracts between an Austrian Insurance Company and its nationals, “under conditions which shall protect its nationals from any prejudice”, should be suppressed.)

(At this point Mr Serruys, Mr Headlam-Morley and the other experts left the room.)

(At this stage Capt Roper entered the room.)

4. Captain Roper reports on the answer to the request of the Supreme Council (see H. D. 25–146) on the subject of the sale and alienation of aeronautical material by the German Government. The Committee on Aerial Clauses had attempted, without arriving at a unanimous agreement, to find a legal argument, whereby the German Government could be forbidden to alienate its aeronautical material. It has, however, been discovered that in the Brussels Convention, the Germans had agreed not to sell their war material, while the aforesaid Convention remained in force. One member of the Committee had thought that the Brussels Convention terminated with the raising of the blockade, and that this had removed the obligations remaining on the German Government. The majority of the Committee, however, thought that the raising of the blockade, being an advantage to the German people, could not destroy the obligations which they had accepted, in order to obtain the advantages which accrued to them under the Brussels Convention. The legal point at issue is whether the Supreme Economic Council had been right in stating that the prohibition on the sale of aeronautical material would remain in force until the end of the armistice, that is to say, until the complete ratification of the Peace Treaty. Another question arises, which is whether the Supreme Economic Council is entitled to decide on such a point. The Supreme Council is the only judge of the matter. An obvious obligation is imposed by the Peace Treaty with Germany, since if the German Government alienated its material before the ratification of the Treaty, they would not be able to make the deliveries called for under that document. This point had been unanimously admitted by the Committee on Aerial Clauses. This might be regarded as a form of moral obligation which the Germans had acknowledged, as far as war material was concerned, in their letter to General Nudant, dated August 6th, 1919.

General Weygand said that General Yudenitch is at present asking for permission to purchase from Germany Russian war material previously captured by the former power. Czechoslovakia is making a similar request to be allowed to purchase war material from Bavaria. He thinks that the two questions should be considered jointly.

Captain Roper suggests that the principle of Allied ownership of war material in the hands of Germany should first be upheld. Thereafter the Allies might grant special authorizations for the sale of such material.

M Clemenceau agrees with this proposal, and suggests that, in accordance with the above principle, sales to General Yudenitch and the Czechoslovaks might be authorized at once.

S Tittoni says, that as General Yudenitch’s request for financial and material assistance could not be granted, it was incumbent upon the Council to accede to his wishes in this respect.

Mr Polk suggests that the entire question might be referred to the proposed advance Delegations of the Commissions of Control, which are about to proceed into Germany.

Admiral Knapp says that he had been a member of the Committee on Aerial Clauses, but had entertained certain doubts as to the legal position. His opinion had been that the Brussels Convention had not been binding on Germany after the Convention had lapsed. Morally he had not felt any doubt in the matter. If the majority point of view were to prevail, Germany would be restrained from consummating any future sales to neutrals, and would therefore be obliged to turn over to the Allies any sums which she had realized in the past.

Mr Balfour says that as everybody was agreed as to the existence of a moral obligation upon the German Government, he thinks it would be best to make a specific demand on Germany, leaving it to her to bring forward such legal objections as might be made. He wished that the draft telegram to be sent to the German Government should be placed before the Council on the following day.

(It is agreed that the Allied and Associated Powers should inform Germany that they maintain the principle that Germany should not alienate its war material, more particularly material of an aeronautical description. At the same time, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, by virtue of their rights of property over this material, should reserve to themselves the right to grant special licenses in certain cases.

It is further decided that, in execution of the above resolution, a special authorization should be granted to Germany for the sale of material asked for by General Yudenitch, and by the Czechoslovak Government. A draft telegram on the above lines, to be sent to General Nudant, should be prepared by General Weygand and submitted for approval at the next meeting of the Council.)

5. The Council takes note of the telegram from the French Minister at Belgrade.

S Tittoni said that he thinks explanations Intentions should be asked for from Bucharest,

Mr Balfour said that whilst agreeing with S Tittoni, he thinks it essential that the Government at Bucharest should be informed that the frontiers laid down by the Supreme Council in the Banat and elsewhere, were final.

(It is decided that M Pichon should send a telegram to the French Minister at Bucharest in the name of the Supreme Council, asking for further information on the intentions of the Roumanian Government with regard to the Banat. He should also inform the Romanian Government that the frontiers laid down by the Council in the Banat and elsewhere, are final.)

6. M Clemenceau asks Mr Hoover to make a statement with regard to the situation in Hungary.

Mr Hoover says that he has little to add to his statement on the previous day. He does not think that it would require much pressure to dispossess the Archduke of the Throne that he had seized.

Mr Balfour proposes that a telegram which he had drafted should be dispatched.

After some discussion it is agreed that the telegram drafted by Mr Balfour should be published immediately, and sent to the Mission of Allied Generals at Budapest.

Mr Hoover then reads a further telegram from Mr Gregory at Budapest.

M Clemenceau says that the telegram in question makes it all the more necessary to send off Mr Balfour’s dispatch.

7. The Council takes note of the letter from Marshal Foch on the subject of the use of the Port of Danzig and the Kiel Canal.

General Weygand says that the use of the Port of Danzig is connected with the Polish question, which was now very acute. Although Marshal Foch was in agreement with the German proposals, he does not think that the discussion could be continued at the present time. The question is therefore adjourned.

8. The Committee takes note of Marshal Foch’s proposals with regard to the immediate dispatch of certain members of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control into Germany.

Mr Polk states that he agrees with Marshal Foch’s conclusions but that he is unable to send any American Delegates until the ratification of the Treaty of Peace. He agreed, however, that General Bliss should be kept informed of the action taken by the advanced Delegations.

It is decided that Marshal Foch’s proposals with regard to the immediate despatch into Germany of Delegations representing the Commissions of Control, should be accepted; and that the representation of the United States on the aforesaid Delegations should be held in abeyance for the present.

General Weygand is instructed to draft a letter for communication to the German Government informing them of the above proposals.

9. General Weygand reports and comments on the documents contained in Appendix K. He said that the Inter-Allied Transport Committee is independent of the Supreme Economic Council, and was composed of military representatives of each of the Allied Powers. The body in question had urged that the British and American armies using French rolling-stock should pay different rates. The difference in question should be regulated by the use made of French and Belgian rolling-stock, or of German railway material, delivered under the armistice. The latter had cost nothing.

Mr Balfour says that he would like to consult General Mance.

General Weygand, continuing, says that Marshal Foch, when he had dealt with the question, had only divided up the German material surrendered, in such a way that transport should be facilitated. Railway carriages had been given to France and Belgium. Locomotives had been divided up between France and Belgium, and had been assigned to the British and American armies in France. Everybody had agreed to the principle on division. The British and Americans had now surrendered the German engines allotted to them, which had fallen into the hand of France and Belgium for the time only. But when the Peace Conference finally decided the manner in which the railway material was to be divided, every country would pay for its share. There would therefore be no ultimate difference in the nature of the rolling-stock employed, since it would belong to the country in which it was used. For this reason, he could not see that the principle of different rates of payment could be upheld.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Inter-Allied Transport Committee had been aware of General Weygand’s standpoint when it had drawn up its report.

General Weygand says that he does not know.

The question is then adjourned.

10. (It is decided that the proposal of the Committee supervising the execution of the clauses of the Peace Treaty with Germany should be adopted.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-23-19, 06:37 AM

23rd August 1919

Archduke Joseph August of Austria, a Habsburg, resigns as regent of Hungary due to Allied opposition.
https://i.postimg.cc/sfPGqmXD/ECp-Pi-TPU8-AEzg-u.png (https://postimages.org/)

Newly constructed drydocks at the U.S. Naval Base of Pearl Harbour.
https://i.postimg.cc/28fM8kr7/ECl-Knib-Xk-AAZK4x.jpg (https://postimg.cc/9zJJLj4D)

Two steamrollers pulled the German Tank Mephisto (travelling on its own caterpillar treads) from the wharf to the Queensland Museum, a journey of less than 2 miles taking 11 hours.
https://i.postimg.cc/jjp0Hz0G/ECl-Knib-Xk-AAZK4x.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Constance (United States) The 78-gross register ton fishing vessel was wrecked without loss of life on the south-central coast of the Territory of Alaska 25 nautical miles (46 km; 29 mi) east of Cape Suckling (59°59′30″N 143°30′00″W). The schooner Northland ( United States) rescued her crew of 15 from the beach.

Sailor Steve

08-23-19, 03:20 PM

Saturday, August 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

(Field Marshal Sir H Wilson, Mr J F Dulles, and General Sackville-West, together with M Loucheur and General Weygand, were present.)

1. The Council takes note of a draft telegram which it is proposed to send to the Romanian Government at Bucharest in the name of the Council.

M Loucheur says that the telegram in question was drafted by the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission.

(It is decided that the telegram for communication to the Romanian Government at Bucharest, on the subject of the requisition of war material by the Romanian Army in Hungary, should be accepted and dispatched.)

Mr Polk informs the Council, that when the Romanians first showed an inclination to collect in Hungary whatever they think due to them for reparation, he had asked the Government at Washington to stop the delivery of contracts undertaken between the United States and Romania. The Romanians had expressed indignation at this measure, but he thinks it necessary to cut off all supplies to that country. He asks whether it has any other source of supply.

M Clemenceau says that he does not know of any.

General Weygand said that the Council has previously decided to supply war material to Romania, some of which has not yet been delivered.

M Clemenceau says that the supplies not yet sent ought to be stopped.

Mr Balfour says that similar measures can be taken from London.

General Weygand asks whether supplies for which payment has been made should also be stopped.

M Clemenceau says that they should.

S Tittoni said that the Council of Four had decided on a previous occasion to reduce the armaments of new states. This decision has never been put into effect. The Military Representatives at Versailles ought to have suggested concrete proposals, but had not done so.

General Sackville-West says that a preliminary report had been given and a request made for further information on certain points; when this has been received, a final report could be sent.

M Loucheur says that he had been the Chairman of the Committee dealing with the question, and he and his colleagues had wished to know what material had been sent to the small States, but the Military Representatives at Versailles want to know the total armament under the control of each separate State. This is information that cannot be obtained, since the countries concerned will not supply the necessary data. The amount of material delivered by Great Britain, Italy, and other Powers, had been communicated to Versailles, who could now make a report.

S Tittoni, insisting on his previous point, stated that, despite the wish of the Council that armaments should be limited, so as to avoid future wars, no real effort is being made to impose this decision on the small States. It would appear that every nation was making further warlike preparations, which fact made the early solution of the question important.

M Clemenceau says that when the question had been discussed, he had made considerable reservations. He had not seen how such restrictions could be imposed upon victorious States by their own Allies.

S Tittoni remarks that some of the victorious countries appear to be making ready for war.

(It is decided that all delivery of war material to Romania by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should be stopped immediately, and that the prohibition should remain in force until further orders. The aforesaid prohibition is to extend to war material to be delivered under contract, and to war materials for which payment had been made.)

2. The Council takes note of a telegram from Colonel Goodyear on the subject of the situation in Silesia.

M Loucheur say that he and Mr Hoover are going to meet the German Representatives at Versailles, who hope that a reply from the German Government would be on hand during the course of the afternoon.

Mr. Balfour said that it would be unwise to send the telegram, drafted by the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission until we knew whether the German Government would consent to the despatch of troops to Silesia, before the date specified in the Peace Treaty.

M Loucheur replies that the German Government’s consent is only necessary for the despatch of troops, and not for the Coal Committee.

(M Loucheur and Mr J F Dulles then withdraw.)

3. Mr Balfour says that he desires to make an appeal to his colleagues of the Council. Under the provisions of the Peace Treaty, German Prisoners ought to be returned to their own country on ratification. If the Parliaments of Italy, France and of other Allied countries had been able to ratify the Treaty, the prisoners would have been returned by now. He does not wish his colleagues to think that this remark implied any criticism whatsoever upon the parliamentary procedure in Allied countries. He does, however, draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the result of the delay was extremely burdensome. He had been informed by Field Marshal Wilson that there are 220,000 prisoners in English hands, and that the cost of keeping them was £90,000 a day, that is, £1,000,000 in 11 days. There was no military advantage to be gained from the retention of these prisoners. On the contrary, they detained British troops which were needed elsewhere. He hoped, therefore, that the Council might give a “bienveillant” consideration to the point that he laid before them.

Mr Polk says that the same question arises for the United States. The Americans had 40,000 prisoners guarded by 10,000 men. The demobilization of the specially-raised American Armies was proceedings, and by the 30th September, the dissolution of the American War Forces should be complete. He had asked his legal advisors whether the prisoners in question might be transferred to another Power, and the answer had been, that, under the provisions of existing Treaties, such a transfer would not be legal. General Pershing had stated that the question was urgent. The total cost of paying the troops guarding the prisoners and of maintaining the prisoners themselves came to about 2,000,000 dollars a month.

Field Marshal Wilson then says that the total number of troops necessary for the custody of German prisoners was 60,000.

M Clemenceau says that he approaches the question from a different standpoint, in that he has 350,000 German prisoners employed in useful work on the devastated regions. He would therefore have preferred that the German prisoners should be transferred to him, so long as they remained under the control of the Government of the captor. He knew nothing of the legal aspect of the question of transfer, but wondered whether some form of contract could not be drawn up. Speaking frankly, he intended to return the German prisoners as late as he possibly could, but he had no intention of doing anything contrary to the provisions of the Peace Treaty. While seeing the force of the British point of view, it did not seem to him possible to return the prisoners before the date stipulated under the Treaty. If, however, it is possible to do so, he wants to retain the German prisoners in France to the last moment. The French Government had opened a discussion with the Austrian and Polish Governments, with a view to obtaining labor for the devastated regions, and he has reasons for hoping that negotiations will be successful. The German prisoners do not work well, and they are under custody of young soldiers of 19 and 20 years of age, who could not exercise much control over them. On the other hand, he would rather have German prisoners than nobody. He asked on what date the Peace Treaty would be ratified in Allied countries.

Mr Balfour replies that he thinks Great Britain would ratify on the 10th September.

M Clemenceau said France would ratify about the 15th September.

S Tittoni gives the same date.

Mr Polk says that America might ratify later, possibly on about the 1st October.

Mr Balfour remarked that it is not necessary for the other Allied Powers to wait for America. The ratification by the British Colonies would be early in September. The Treaty would come fully into force when Great Britain, France and Italy had ratified it.

M Clemenceau says that in accordance with the dates just given, the Treaty would come into force in three weeks’ time. He suggests that Field Marshal Wilson should consult with General Weygand. It will, of course, be understood that Great Britain should retain all her rights over the prisoners taken by her Armies. He suggested that some kind of transfer might be found possible.

Mr Balfour asks what are the provisions of military law on the point in question.

M Clemenceau replies that he does not know: he only wanted the two Generals to confer and report.

Field Marshal Wilson says that the question seems rather to be one for lawyers.

Mr Polk asks that General Pershing should also discuss the matter with Field Marshal Wilson and General Weygand.

M Clemenceau said that Generals should bear in mind that prisoners could not be sent back at once. Such a measure would put France in a most difficult position, since it was evident that she had been devastated, and required work, whilst Great Britain and America had no such special needs.

M. Berthelot remarked that a precedent for the transfer of prisoners of war exists in the case of Belgium, which country had allocated seven or eight thousand men to France.

S Tittoni adds that after Serbia had been invaded, and the Austrian prisoners taken by that country delivered to Italy, Italy had made a loan of them to France.

(It is decided that Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, General Pershing and General Weygand and General Cavallero should examine conjointly by what means German prisoners in American and British hands, and at present in France, could be transferred to the French Government. The rights of the British and American Governments over the aforesaid prisoners should remain without alteration. A report on the above question should be submitted to the Council.)

4. Mr Balfour says that Allied troops had been promised for plebiscite areas in Danzig, Memel, Upper Silesia, Schleswig, and Klagenfurt. He does not wish in any way to raise the question of the number of troops that each of the Eastern Europe Allies is to supply. He wishes to take the opportunity of repeating that Great Britain would carry out all engagements that she had entered into. He is only going to raise the question of how the troops should be distributed. He has been told that mixed forces raise difficulties of command and supply. The great harmony which existed between the Allied troops did not overcome the difficulties to which he had drawn attention. Troops were accustomed to be commanded by their own officers. They did not like passing under the orders of foreign Generals. They are, moreover, accustomed to have their own food, and be treated in their own hospitals. In a mixed division, every kind of supply had to come from four separate sources. He would therefore like to see each body of troops in a given locality, homogeneous. It is not quite possible, for the numbers of troops necessary for different localities varied. He wishes, therefore, that the military experts could advise the Council how far some such measure could be put into effect. Inter-Allied Troops for Plebiscite Areas in Eastern Europe

M Clemenceau says that he regards Mr Balfour’s argument as conclusive. There is, however, another, political, side to the question. He does not desire that any military occupation of Poland should take place without the French being represented. The relations between France and Poland were intimate, and he thinks it most important that the French Army should go to that country. He considers Mr Balfour’s remarks so forcible, however, that he thinks his proposals might be considered at once with regard to Silesia.

General Weygand says that on the previous day, the Council had taken a decision for the despatch of two divisions. He had already been in consultation with General Pershing and Field Marshal Wilson on the subject. The discussion had been based on the understanding that each country should supply one-quarter of the total force.

S Tittoni suggests that each contingent might be placed under its own command.

M Clemenceau remarks that the French troops in Asia had been placed under the orders of a British General without the slightest discord arising. He thinks, therefore, that General Weygand should continue to examine the question.

Mr Balfour said that he thought that France should not only be represented in any military occupation of Poland, but that she should be largely represented.

General Weygand, remarking on Mr Balfour’s last statement, says that the decision communicated to him had been that each Allied contingent should be equal.

S Tittoni said that he had only agreed to equal contributions for one division. He made a reservation on the same principle being applied to the composition of two divisions.

Mr Polk asks if he is right in understanding that the Committee of General Officers would report back their recommendations to the Council for final action.

(It is decided that Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, General Pershing and General Weygand should recommend a distribution among the Allies of the contingents to be furnished for the various plebiscite zones, such as to make each contingent a homogeneous national unit as far as consistent with the political necessity of having all the Allies represented in each region.)

5. General Weygand reads the draft of a telegram to be transmitted to the German Government on the sale of aeronautical war material.

Mr Polk says that he is ready to accept the draft telegram, subject to his military advisers raising no objection. If any points were raised, he would let General Weygand know in the afternoon so that the transmission should not be delayed.

(It is decided that the draft telegram for transmission to the German Government on the subject of the sale of aeronautical war material should be accepted, subject to notification by Mr Polk that he has no objection.)

(At this point General Weygand & General Sackville-West leave the room.)

6. The Council takes note of the report of the Blockade Committee on the subject of the measures to be taken in order to prevent trade with Bolshevik Russia.

Mr Polk says that certain points raised by his experts make it necessary for him to withhold his assent from the note for the present. In order to save time, however, he suggests that the ‘ note should be referred back to the Blockade Committee, and he would see that the American representative would lay before his colleagues such objections as might be raised, from an American point of view.

(It is decided that the draft note of the Blockade Committee should be referred back to that body for a further consideration of the American standpoint.)

7. The Council takes note of a draft declaration prepared by the British Delegation on the subject of the blockade of Hungary.

(It is decided that the special declaration for signature by the Austrian Delegation should be accepted.)

(At this point, M Haas, Mr Tyman, Mr. Headlam-Morley, and M. Adatci enter the room.)

8. M Haas states that the immediate application of the reciprocity clauses, as requested by Austria, had been refused in the case of the Germans, on the ground that it is not wished that the latter should profit by the devastation committed by its Armies. The Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways thinks another reason existed for postponing the application of these articles. The reason is that the economic position of the New States, previously under the government of Vienna, should be supported in the years immediately following the war. The Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways also considered, that it could not alter clauses involving material changes in the principles of the Peace Treaty.

Mr Balfour says that the Council is surely of the opinion that some kind of economic unity between the States of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire should be encouraged. If this cannot be effected, the States in question will be powerless and will become subject to German economic penetration on a more extended scale than had existed before the war. Each State formed out of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy could be given a fair power of bargaining. If the Peace Treaty is presented in its present form, the Austrian Republic will not be in a position to bargain with its neighbors. We have a right to impose this disadvantage upon her, but it was not in our interest. But he certainly considers that it was to the advantage of the Allied Powers, that Austria should not be in a position to bargain with them. He would like to know the views of his colleagues on the subject.

S Tittoni says that the Council might well consider whether immediate reciprocity could not be extended to Austria and the New States of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. He thinks that the second argument brought forward by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways, as to the necessity of stabilizing the economic conditions of the States of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, was a weak one. He does not see how the previous system of centralized government could affect transport problems in the New States. He adds that the transport system, which had previously been centralized at Vienna and Budapest, had worked very well.

Mr Polk says he thinks that they might be placing a severe handicap on the Austrian Republic by postponing the application of the reciprocity clauses. The Czechoslovak State would find it to their interest to have the restrictions, placed on Austria, removed. Bohemia had been so connected with Austria in the past, that an interference in the commercial exchange between the two States would obviously be a disadvantage to Czechoslovakia.

Mr Haas says that the Committee on Ports and Waterways has made no specific proposal; but has drawn the attention of the Council to the problem. Its opinion coincides with that of Mr Balfour. If the Council thinks that the States concerned are to be regarded as possessing equal rights, reciprocity should be applied immediately. If they are not in that position, it should be withheld for a time.

Mr Balfour says that he was in favour of granting immediate reciprocity between Austria and the New States formed out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

S Tittoni said that he would only agree on the understanding that the reciprocity under discussion should exist between Austria and the New States formed by the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. He further insists that the reciprocity should apply only to the clauses dealing with Ports, Waterways and Railways.

(It is agreed that the articles dealing with Ports, Waterways and Railways, (Part XII) of the Peace Treaty with Austria should be amended so as to allow of the immediate application of the reciprocity clauses between Austria and the States formed from the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy by virtue of acquisitions of part of her territory.)

9. (It is decided that the alterations proposed in the Articles of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria dealing with Ports, Railways and Waterways, should be accepted.)

(At this point, Mr Haas, Mr Tyman, Mr Headlam-Morley and Mr. Adatci leave the room.)

10. Mr Polk asks that the consideration of the proposed draft should be postponed to the next meeting. Reply by the Communication Section of the Supreme Economic Council to the Romanian Note Relative to Regulation of Traffic on the Danube

(This is agreed to.)

11. Draft Treaties Between the Allied & Associated Powers and Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, on the Subject of the Cost of Liberation of the Territories in the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

12. Agreement Between the Allied & Associated Powers Relative to the Contribution Payable by Italy for the Liberation of Territories Belonging to the Former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

(It is agreed that the consideration of the above draft agreements should be postponed.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-24-19, 07:02 AM

24th August 1919

Anti-Bolshevik forces, with support from the British Navy, successfully retake Odessa from the Red Army. British troops with a recaptured French Ft-17 tank, which had been captured by the Bolsheviks at Odessa earlier this year.
https://i.postimg.cc/RFgjM8d7/ECu-ZH2-GWk-AA71-TT.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Overcrowded train in Romania filled with refugees and wounded soldiers.
https://i.postimg.cc/pTL61Cvp/ECu-ZH2-GWk-AA71-TT.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

08-24-19, 03:27 PM

Sunday, August 24, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Being a Sunday there are are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

08-25-19, 07:01 AM

25th August 1919

Friedrich Ebert, first President of Germany, reviewing troops in Munich. The city was recently retaken from Communist forces.
https://i.postimg.cc/NF5WK0yp/ECze-JMNXUAI1-Ah-Y.png (https://postimages.org/)

Ralph Madsen, a Texas cowboy and the tallest man in the U.S. at 7 feet and 6 inches, shakes hands with Senator Morris Sheppard.
https://i.postimg.cc/3NXb4D8j/ECvdyg-QWk-AA2-Qv-Z.jpg (https://postimg.cc/T5PcB1Wh)

Ship Losses:

Malroe (United States) While out of service and hauled out on the bank of the Snake River near Nome, Territory of Alaska, about 0.5 mile (0.8 km) from the river′s mouth, the 12-gross register ton schooner was destroyed by fire.

Sailor Steve

08-25-19, 07:58 PM

Monday, August 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. After an exchange of views between M Clemenceau and S Tittoni, regarding the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Fiume Incidents,

Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Incidents at Fiume It is agreed to accept the conclusions of the Commission’s Report. The French and Italian Governments undertook to give effect to these recommendations.

2. M Clemenceau says that he has heard from General Graziani, who had been the last of the Generals to reach Budapest, that his colleagues had already decided that the Chairmanship of the Meetings should be held by each in turn. He had accepted provisionally, but asked for orders, as he was the senior officer. M Clemenceau thinks that for purposes of continuity it is better to have one Chairman. He will not insist, however.

S Tittoni thinks that it is best to let the Generals settle this question among themselves.

Mr Balfour says that, although alternating chairmanship was a bad system, it is, perhaps, the best way of avoiding friction.

Mr Polk says that in General Bandholtz’ view, rotation is necessary.

(It is agreed that M Clemenceau should inform General Graziani that the Council sees no objection to the maintenance of the system of rotation in the chairmanship of the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest.)

3. Mr Polk says that he is informed by General Bandholtz that General Graziani had sent a report to the effect that, in the opinion of the Allied Generals, it was necessary to break off relations with the Romanian. He begged to communicate the following telegram to the Council:

“Budapest - August 24, 1919.
Received 13:20 August 25.

Admission. Paris.

“The following instances of Romanian requisitions and seizures are given for your information. August 17, all the typewriters of the Underwood Agency about 20 were seized. August 18 - 30 car-loads of wool, the property of the Hungarian Wool Trust, were shipped out of Budapest. August 18—the Hungarian Minister Hygiene reported the seizure of all their supplies by Roumanian officials. August 21—there was seized car-loads of coal which belong to the Municipal Water Plant of Budapest. August 21 - there were seized 110 race horses at the Alge Farm. These were the property of private individuals. August 22 - all the machinery of the Hungarian State shops was dismantled, resulting in six thousand men being out of work. August 22—a demand was made on the Minister of Agriculture for topographical charts, instruments, etc, stating that if they were not delivered, same would be taken by force of arms. August 22—the Minister of Foreign Affairs reported that the Romanians [Page 837]had requisitioned all of the valuable breeding animals on the three Hungarian State stud farms. On August 23—50 per cent of all the material of the Ganz Danubius Company, Limited, a large building concern, was taken, throwing out of employment over 4,300 persons. August 22 - there was being loaded the remaining half of these supplies of the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, the other half having been previously taken about August 10. On August 22 mechanics were being sent around to remove 4,000 telephones from private houses.

“All of the foregoing occurred subsequent to the promise of the Romanians that they would comply with instructions of the Inter-Allied Mission. Many delicate instruments were thrown into boxes and other receptacles in such a careless manner that they could never be of use to anybody. Many other similar instances occurred during the period indicated. As near as can be now estimated, the Romanians have seized about 60% of all Hungarian locomotives in good condition, 95% of all passenger equipment and about 5,000 freight cars.

Bandholtz.”

Mr Polk adds that he has received another communication from General Bandholtz. He says that in his view the time of the Mission had been wasted, and that nothing was to be gained by any further intercourse with the Romanian authorities. The latter maintained their policy of procrastination and had repeatedly broken their promises. The Romanians, in his opinion, were making the Council appear ridiculous.

Mr Balfour says that he has received a telegram to the effect that the Romanian plenipotentiaries had brought the Generals in Budapest a note from their Government, stating that they were ready to act in friendly agreement and in accord with the instructions sent by the Council on the 5th August, but not without certain modifications. The security of Romania and her economic needs were considerations which must modify the instructions. The Romanian Government means to move all war material into Romania on the ground that there would be no force able to compel Hungary to give it up when the Romanian Army was withdrawn. In addition, Romania would have to requisition all that her Army required, and 30% besides for her own population. She must also take away the rolling stock, as Germany had only left her sixty engines out of twelve hundred. They also declared that they had a right to take any goods recognised as previously belonging to the Romanian Government; these goods not counting as a portion of the spoil to be divided among the Allies.

M Diamandy, questioned as to his attitude, should the Commission refuse to discuss these conditions, had replied that he would be forced to refer to Mr Bratiano. Every means of procuring delay is being employed, and in the meantime the despoiling of Hungary continued.

S Tittoni says that one thing he cannot understand was why the Mission did not make a corporate report to the Conference.

M Pichon says that one such report has just been received.

M Loucheur points out that what is practically an ultimatum has been sent to the Romanian Government on the previous Saturday. He suggests that an answer be awaited before any further decision was taken.

Mr Polk says that for the last fortnight the Council has been sending telegrams to Romania. No attention has been paid to those telegrams. It is intolerable that the Council should be flouted in this way by the Romanians.

S Tittoni says that what the Council requires is an answer from Bucharest. It cannot be satisfied with answers given by Romanian Generals. Should the Romanian Government delay its reply, the Allied representatives in Bucharest should demand an explanation.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Council can take any steps short of belligerency to signify their displeasure, should the Romanian Government unduly delay its reply.

Mr Polk says that at a previous meeting, it had been decided to stop the sending of all supplies to Romania. He notices in the minutes that the decision is limited to “war supplies”.

Mr Balfour says that in referring to the British Government, he had mentioned all supplies.

M Clemenceau says that he had done likewise, and that the export of all supplies from France has already been stopped.

(It is agreed, with reference to H.D. 37, Minute I,2 that the export of all supplies to Romania should be stopped from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, until further orders. It is further decided to send the Romanian Government, through the French Chargé d’Affaires at Bucharest, a reminder that a reply to telegrams was expected.

4. M Clemenceau said that he has received information that the British and American Armies on the Rhine are selling horses and cars to the Germans.

Mr. Balfour says that he had at once spoken about this matter to Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, who had tried to telephone to Cologne for news. The occupation telephone, however, is not working. As soon as he obtains news, the Council will be informed.

Mr Polk says he has no information whatever but that he undertakes to obtain it.

(It is agreed that the British and American Delegations should give the Council any information available regarding the alleged sales to the Germans by the Armies of Occupation.)

5. Notification to the Ottoman Government by United States High Commissioner Regarding American Massacres M Clemenceau draws attention to a report stating that Admiral Bristol, the American High Commissioner in Constantinople, has presented a threatening memorandum to the Grand Notification to the Vizier, without previous consultation of the Allied High Commissioners. He does not think that President Wilson will approve of this policy. He draws special attention to the twelfth of the Fourteen Points:

“The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured, an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees”.

All the Allies had adhered to this and the policy cannot now be changed. Least of all could one High Commissioner dictate terms to Turkey, with whom his State had not been at war, without consultation with the Associated Powers. As to saving the Armenians, he did not know what could be done. There were no American troops. British troops were employed elsewhere. The French are not allowed by the British to play any part in Asia Minor. The Italians, it is true, had gone to Asia Minor in spite of the British, but they declined to replace the British in the Caucasus. As to the Turks, they are themselves powerless, as they cannot control their own troops. He does not see from what quarter the Armenians could expect any assistance.

S Tittoni said that this was one of the inevitable consequences of delaying Peace with Turkey.

M Clemenceau says that even when Peace has been made, it is not likely that the Armenians would be better off.

Mr Balfour says that this situation was really the consequence of a lack of troops. He understands that the United States are raising a volunteer army. If so, perhaps some of these troops could be employed in Armenia.

Mr Polk says that recruiting for the volunteer army was beginning.

Mr Balfour asked M Clemenceau whether, but for British opposition, he would send French troops to prevent the massacres in Armenia.

M Clemenceau says that he will consider the matter.

Mr Balfour says that he takes note of this declaration.

M Clemenceau said that he makes no undertaking. The French had very few troops in Cilicia, but he would inquire whether they could do anything to save the Armenians. What he had meant to convey was that nothing could be expected from the Americans, who were hampered by their constitution, from the British, who were leaving the Caucasus, from the Italians, who will not go there, or from the French who were not allowed a free hand. The Turks, not being masters in their own house, were equally impotent. The Armenians were therefore no-one’s responsibility.

Mr Balfour asks M Clemenceau whether he thinks it worth while to ask the French Military Authorities whether they can do anything.

M Clemenceau said he had not come to the Meeting with this idea. As he was pushed, however, he would consent to be pushed. He will make inquiries. Possibly the French Army might be able to do something.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks it would be well worth while to find out.

(It was agreed that the French Government should inquire into the possibility of sending military protection to the Armenians.

It is also agreed that no pressure should be brought on the Sultan by any of the Allied and Associated Powers, acting alone.)

6. M Cambon explained the procedure followed by his Committee. He proposes to begin by explaining the covering letter.

M Clemenceau suggests that as the covering letter was a result of the various answers on particular questions, it had better be reserved for the end.

(a) Frontiers M Cambon said that the first question to be discussed is that of frontiers.

On the subject of frontiers, the Austrian objections had been rejected. The only dissentients were the British and American Delegates, who desired to give Gmünd to Austria.

Mr. Headlam-Morley says that the question was a simple one. The principle of the historic frontier had been adopted for Czechoslovakia. By it, the inclusion of a considerable number of Germans in the new State was justified. It was undesirable to deviate from this principle in order to add still more Germans to Czechoslovakia. The attribution of Gmünd to Czechoslovakia constituted a derogation from the principle of the historic frontier, and still further aggravated the ethnological anomaly. It is justified on grounds of railway communication. He had consulted General Mance, who told him that, on purely technical grounds, it was better to leave Gmünd in Austria. If this is so, there was no sufficient reason for taking Gmünd out of its natural surroundings. He understands that the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways had never been consulted.

M Tardieu says that the question has been studied carefully before, both in Commissions, and in Council. The Czechoslovak Delegation had also been heard on the subject. A change now would amount to a third alteration in the decisions of the Council. It was true that the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways had not been consulted, but territorial committees had never consulted that body as such. Each representative consulted his own experts. The case had therefore been judged and re-judged, and the opinion now brought forward by Mr Headlam-Morley is merely that of an individual expert.

Mr Balfour says he recognizes that it was a pity to re-open questions which have been settled. Nevertheless, the argument on the merits in this case is very strong. The rule of following the historic frontier was being broken to hand over a purely German population to Czechoslovakia. There are already too many Germans in Czechoslovakia, even if the historic line were followed. The two or three million Germans already included would certainly be a great perplexity to a new State. Nevertheless, the whole history of Bohemia afforded some justification for preserving the country as a unit. The district of Gmünd had never been Bohemian. The only ground for putting Gmünd within Czechoslovakia was economic. He is told that Gmünd was the first big railway junction out of Vienna. The population was incontestably German, and the British railway expert thought that the junction was better in Austria than in Czecho-Slovakia, on purely technical grounds. M Tardieu had said nothing on the merits except that the Council had twice decided to give Gmünd to the Czechs. If the Council was never to revise its decisions, its task would doubtless be rendered easier. It did not follow, however, that its results would be better.

M Tardieu says that he had not only referred to the decision of the Council; he had pointed out that there had been an agreement with the Czechoslovak Delegation itself. The attribution of the junction of Gmünd to Czechoslovakia had been part of a general arrangement which extended to Pressburg and other places. If this arrangement were changed at the last moment, the Czechoslovak Delegation would have reason to complain of bad faith. All the previous decisions had been unanimous. It is therefore a political reason, and, in addition, two essential Bohemian railway lines converged at this point.

Mr Polk says that Mr Lansing and the American experts had felt at the beginning that Gmünd should be Austrian. Nevertheless, in order to obtain agreement, they had yielded to the majority opinion. They still think, however, that the rule established in favour of the historic frontier should not be broken. For this reason he supports the British view.

S Tittoni said that there appeared to be good arguments on both sides. He is ready to accept either solution.

Mr Matsui says that the Japanese adhere to the former decision of the Council, and wished to maintain it.

(After a long discussion, Mr Balfour and Mr Polk, seeing that Gmünd had been attributed to Czechoslovakia as part of a compromise, the other parts of which were not called in question, withdraw the objection raised by the British and the American Delegates.

The answer prepared to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of the frontier between Austria and Czechoslovakia is accepted.)

M Cambon points out that there is a difference of opinion on the subject of Styria. The American, British, Italian and Japanese Delegations think that the Austrian demand for a plebiscite in the region of Marburg should be accepted. The French Delegation is not of this opinion. It is recognised that Marburg is German, but the surrounding districts were undoubtedly Slovene.

S Tittoni said that as the neighboring region was to have a plebiscite, it was easy to extend it to Marburg.

M Clemenceau says he thinks it would be difficult to refuse the plebiscite.

M Tardieu says he had no prejudice against plebiscites, but in this case he thinks it is unnecessary. Marburg is certainly German, but in a region peopled by Slovenes. The result of a plebiscite was a foregone conclusion, Marburg would vote German and the country round it would vote Slovene. What could then be done? Was the town to be sacrificed to the country or the country to the town? No frontier line could be obtained as a result of the plebiscite. In Carinthia, on the other hand, a frontier might be obtained. There would therefore be quite needless trouble without any useful result.

(After considerable further discussion, it is decided to accept the Austrian demands and to extend the plebiscite zone in such a manner as to include in it the district of Marburg and Radkersburg.)

M Cambon observes that the British and Italian Delegations held a minority view on the subject of the plebiscite zones in Carinthia, They proposed four instead of two plebiscite zones.

(After some discussion, the British and Italian reservations are withdrawn and the reply to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of Carinthia is accepted.

The reply to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of the frontier between Austria and Hungary and on the frontier between Austria and Italy is likewise accepted.)

(b) The reply to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of nationality questions is accepted.

(c) The question involving is adjourned.

(d) Military Naval and Air Clauses The British Delegation withdraws its objections, and the reply prepared to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses is accepted.

(e) The reply drafted to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of prisoners of war is accepted.

(f) M Cambon pointed out that there are two draft replies on this subject, one prepared by the Commission and the other suggested by the British and Japanese Delegation.

Mr Headlam-Morley observes that on the substance, he is in agreement with the majority. He wishes to defend the Treaty but he thinks that the draft he proposes defends it more accurately. There is a very technical legal point involved.

(It is decided to refer both drafts to the Drafting Committee for coordination.)

(g) The draft reply to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of reparations is accepted.

(h) After long discussion, the proposed reply to the Austrian Delegation on the financial clauses is accepted, with the exception of the alternative proposal of the American, British and Japanese Delegation regarding Article 199 which is adjourned until the following day.

7. The Agreement Between the Allies Regarding the Contribution of Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia to the Cost of Liberation of the Territories of the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is accepted.

8. The agreement annexed in Appendix H is accepted.

9. Declaration by Austria That All Action Tending To Overthrow of the Austrian State as Constituted by the Treaty Would Be Prohibited M Tardieu proposes that a Committee be charged with the examination of a proposal which had been drafted in the following terms:

“Austria undertakes not to tolerate on her territory any act whether of propaganda or of any other sort by Austrian subjects or by foreign subjects with a purpose subversive of Austria as an independent State. Acts of this character should be regarded as directed against the security of the State and treated as such. The Austrian Government should interpret on its part this enactment as an undertaking not to compromise or allow to be compromised, directly or indirectly, the independence of the State, particularly in the legislative sphere, by preparatory measures, and in the sphere of public or private instruction by propaganda. No law or regulation or official action of any sort shall conflict with these stipulations. In case there should be any divergence of interpretation between the Austrian Government and one, or several, of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the discrepancy will be referred either to the Council of the League of Nations or, when instituted, brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice. These Bodies will also pass decrees regarding measures desirable to ensure the carrying into effect of their findings and to prevent the recurrence of similar difficulties.”

S Tittoni said that this is a very serious proposal. It attempts to regulate the internal Constitution of Austria for all time, not on a special point, but through the whole of its extent.

Mr Balfour says that he hoped the Council will be very careful before putting into the Treaty, or into a letter having the force of a Treaty, any form of words which would compel the Allied and Associated Powers to impose domestic legislation on Austria, and to maintain police authority over private, as well as public, speech. He thought the proposal was really very repugnant to all that constituted an independent state. He believed, moreover, that if agreed to, it would remain ineffective. The only way to prevent Austria from gravitating towards Germany was to make terms such that she would be content to live apart. Any attempt to prevent an Austrian from saying that he wished to join Germany would, he thought, cover both the Council and the League of Nations with ridicule.

M Tardieu says that he is impressed by Mr Balfour’s criticisms regarding the methods suggested. He thinks that perhaps the first sentence alone would suffice. The suggestion is a corollary to what had been put into the German Treaty.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks that the omission of the bulk of the document would be an improvement. He observes that the corollary to the provisions of the German Treaty would be to forbid the Austrian Government to do certain things. This might be done without incurring the objections he had previously stated.

M Tardieu says that the Austrians are already saying that they had no hope of living apart unless the League of Nations takes special care of them. The Council is trying to give the Austrians conditions which might make it possible for them to live independently. What he now suggested is a counterpart to those favors. He believes that Dr Renner would readily agree, seeing that Herr Bauer had resigned because he could not convert the Government to the contrary view. It would be enough, he thought, if the mere principle were agreed to.

Mr Polk asks whether M Tardieu suggests that this should be said in the Treaty.

M Tardieu says he thinks it would be sufficient if agreed to in the covering letter sent with the replies.

Mr Polk thinks this is preferable.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks this proposal had better be put into a new form, and suggested that M Tardieu should propose one.

M Tardieu says that he would do so; what he suggested was to say in the covering letter that the Allies were confident that the Austrian Government means to do what the Allies hope will be done, and he believes that the Austrian Delegation would give a satisfactory answer.

(It is decided that a sentence to the effect desired should be introduced in the covering letter, and considered on the following day.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-26-19, 02:04 PM

26th August 1919

At a Life Guards Sports Day in Hyde Park, a cavalryman shoots a dummy while on horseback.
https://i.postimg.cc/N0XQ5FG7/EC5sa-FCW4-AAl-TRj.jpg (https://postimg.cc/R3vkYMHN)

Serbian children at a playground in Belgrade built by German prisoners of war.
https://i.postimg.cc/pTP3RLmd/EC5sa-FCW4-AAl-TRj.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

The first regularly scheduled airline service begins between London and Paris by the British Aircraft Transport & Travel Ltd (which British Airways traces its roots)
https://i.postimg.cc/ydNnLgJ0/EC0wi-I9-Ww-AARd2u.png (https://postimages.org/)

HMT Olympic returns to Belfast, Northern Ireland to be converted from a coal burning ship to an oil burning ship. During the conversion a dent with a crack was discovered below her waterline which was later concluded to have been caused by a torpedo that had failed to detonate.
https://i.postimg.cc/XvqQ8BBd/eexdxxotani31.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

08-27-19, 02:34 AM

Tuesday, August 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Pichon circulates a telegram from General Dupont.

Mr Balfour says that he did not understand the delay referred to in the telegram. It states that General Dupont could not act in the absence of precise instructions. In stating that he could have taken action had instructions been given to him earlier and with more precision, he was criticizing the procedure of the Council in a manner which did not appear justifiable.

Mr Polk said that as the instructions given to the three Generals delegated by the Inter-Allied Commission at Berlin had been drawn up after M Loucheur and Mr Hoover had been heard by the Council, he proposes that this new telegram should be referred to them for comment.

S Tittoni asked whether the Coal Committee had started.

M Loucheur replies that the Coal Committee had started last night, and that the French representative, at present in Warsaw, would meet them at Ostrau. This fact, however, did not alter the question at issue. The German Delegation had agreed that the Committee of three Generals should be sent. It had also stated that the German Government would not ask for Allied troops, for the occupation of Upper Silesia, for reasons connected with their internal politics. As the news before the Council was at present contradictory and confused, he thought that the previous decision should be maintained, which was, that the Generals should proceed to Silesia and join Colonel Goodyear; after this had been done, they were to forward a report. The Coal Committee, on the other hand, could only deal with the technical problems, connected with the distribution and production of coal: the Silesian problem did not come within its functions. He would consult with Mr Hoover on the subject of the telegram before the Council.

Mr Balfour asks whether General Dupont opposed the Allied policy.

M Loucheur says that he did not, and re-reads the telegram in confirmation of his statement. Von Lersner had said that the German Government agreed to the despatch of the Generals. This is a statement of fact, whereas General Dupont’s telegram was only a statement of personal opinion. The German representatives at Versailles might be made to confirm Von Lersner’s previous statement.

Mr Balfour says that he understands that General Dupont is opposed to the measures proposed by the Council.

M Loucheur replies that General Dupont does not oppose the Council’s decision, but only stated that it would cause more excitement than tranquillity.

Mr Balfour says that such a statement implied a very severe criticism of the Council’s policy.

M Loucheur replies that a decision had been arrived at to the effect that Generals should be sent, and this decision had been communicated to the Polish Government with a request to make it publicly known. If this decision were reversed, the Government at Warsaw must be immediately informed. Colonel Goodyear had varied his opinion. It appeared to be eminently necessary, that the Council should obtain clear and reliable information upon the situation, which is, at present, confused.

S Tittoni remarks that in his opinion there were two points calling for the Council’s attention. First, the actual intentions of the German Government should be ascertained. Secondly, as General Dupont stated that the presence of the Generals would cause excitement, this point should also be considered.

(It is agreed that the previous decision of the Council, with regard to the despatch of the Allied Generals to Silesia should be up-held, and that M Loucheur and Mr Hoover should consult together upon the latest telegram from General Dupont and report on any measures that it called for.)

2. Mr Polk says that he wished to call attention to the Resolution of the previous day (See H. D. 38, Minute 12) with regard to the report of the Commission of Inquiry on the incidents at Fiume. He wished to know whether the report dents at Fiume in question had been adopted in principle or in detail. He had understood that only the principles of the report had been accepted by the Council, and that the Council had not agreed, or committed itself, to carry out the details of execution recommended by the Commission, such as the sending of American troops to Fiume. He is unable to agree to the sending of these troops at once, without consulting his Military Advisers, and therefore limited his action in the matter to accepting the report in principle. Report With Regard to the Incidents at Fiume

Mr Balfour says that he agrees with Mr. Polk. The report raises two questions. The first dealt with the despatch of troops. According to the Resolution, responsibility for this rested entirely with the French and with the Italians, to the exclusion of Great Britain and the United States. The second question was raised by the wording of Resolution No. 11 in the report, which concerned the general economic policy of the Allies. The sentiments expressed in this Resolution were admirable, since everybody wished to assist the Italians. He thinks, however, that they were misplaced in a report of this kind.

S Tittoni said that before the report had been discussed in the Council, he had had a private exchange of views with M Clemenceau, and they had agreed to accept, and to take action, on the conclusions of the report affecting their countries. With regard to Resolution 11 of the report, he understood that it had been inserted by the American delegate on the Commission of Inquiry. He took the opportunity of thanking him for the sentiments expressed.

M Pichon in support of S Tittoni’s remarks, read the resolution of the previous meeting. He noticed, however, that the report of the Commission of Inquiry on incidents at Fiume had involved the despatch of Allied troops, and he had been of the opinion that everybody present had assented.

Mr Balfour said that the previous resolution of the Council had been examined by his experts, and that by its wording excluded the despatch of British troops. His objection, therefore, was that, whilst executive action was called for in Fiume, Great Britain and the United States appeared to be excluded from participation in it.

M Pichon says that he could not regard Great Britain and the United States as being excluded from participation in the executive measures at Fiume. He failed to see how the previous resolution could be interpreted as a separate agreement between France and Italy, since both these countries had merely accepted a report drawn up by the four Inter-Allied Generals.

Mr Polk said that he differed from Mr Balfour’s conclusions. France and Italy had special obligations between themselves in the matter; by recognizing them, they did not disregard the obligations of other Powers, such as Great Britain and the United States.

S Tittoni agree with Mr Polk.

Mr Polk says that the resolution does not imply the existence of a special agreement between France and Italy. Though assenting in principle, he cannot accept the details of the report without further consultation with his Government.

Mr Balfour says that it would be sufficient to alter the resolution to read:

“It is agreed to accept in principle, the conclusions of the Commission’s report.

The French and Italian Governments undertake to give effect to these recommendations, in so far as they are specially concerned.”

His second point had been that it was not proper for a Commission of this description to include, in its resolutions, a general recommendation with regard to economic assistance for Italy. The incidents at Fiume were quite independent of such considerations, and the Generals ought not to have raised the question, however natural their desire to assist Italy might be. As long as his protests on the subject were recorded, he would be satisfied.

S Tittoni remarked that the resolution to which Mr Balfour had objected had not been brought forward by the Italian representative on the Commission.

Mr Polk says that he accepts the report in principle as a recommendation to be made to the United States’ Government.

(It is agreed that the Resolution to Minute 1 of H. D. 38 should be amended so as to read:

“It is agreed to accept, in principle, the conclusions of the Commission’s Report. The French and Italian Governments undertook to give effect to these recommendations in so far as they were specially concerned.”)

3. At the request of Mr Polk, Captain Portier, on behalf of the Joint Secretariat, reads out Resolutions passed at the previous meeting of the Council.

The resolution with regard to Gmünd is confirmed.

The Resolution with regard to Marburg and Radkersburg is amended so that Radkersburg should be deleted.

The Resolution with regard to Carinthia is accepted and confirmed.

(b) Mr Headlam-Morley says that it is important that all answers to the Austrian note should go back to the Editing Committee for final revision and coordination. With regard to nationalities, the question is extremely complicated. The Drafting Committee has completely revised the Nationality Clauses in the Peace Treaty. The new draft of the Treaty, as amended by them, had not yet been submitted to the Council, but, by virtue of the fact, that, on the previous day, the Council had accepted the principles laid down by the Committee on Political Clauses, the Editing Committee were committed ipso facto to the existing draft of the Nationality clauses, as drawn up by the Drafting Committee. The Editing Committee were, however, compelled to introduce a few minor amendments into the replies to the Austrian notes.

S Tittoni remarked that the Editing Committee should only be free to introduce modifications of form, and not of substance, into the replies to the Austrian note.

(It is agreed that the Resolution taken on the previous day with regard to the Nationality Clauses in the Austrian Treaty, should be accepted, but that the words “subject to such modifications of form as the Editing Committee might introduce, in order to bring them into agreement with the clauses drawn up by the Drafting Committee” should be added.)

The resolution passed on the previous day is accepted and confirmed.

(c) M Loucheur said that Part IV of the Austrian Treaty had been accepted on the previous day, but that he feared there had been a misunderstanding on the point. The Italian Delegation had thought that it applied only to Austrian property in Morocco and Egypt. He thought, however, that it applied to all Austrian property wherever situated.

M Cambon says that the title showed that the Austrian Peace Treaty referred only to Austrian property outside of Europe.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that he had withdrawn his reservation quoted in Appendix “F” to H. D. 38.4 He had, at the same time, pointed out to the Editing Committee that no provision existed in the Treaty, with regard to the Diplomatic buildings in Europe belonging to the Austrian Empire. He did not know what would happen to all these embassies after the final dismemberment of Austro-Hungary, and feared they might be the cause of a great deal of most improper wrangling. Giving an example, he asked whether the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Paris belonged to the present Austrian State. He thinks that diplomatic buildings should be held as sacred, and hoped that no exception would be made in the present Treaty to this generally accepted rule. For this reason he had desired that a special Convention should be drawn up between Austria and the new States formed out of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, to settle the point with order and decency.

M Loucheur said that he could not accept Mr Headlam-Morley’s statement, since there was a most formal stipulation in the Peace Treaty with Austria with regard to the disposal of public buildings belonging to the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. He gave as an example the Palazzo Venezia at Rome, for which special provision had been made, showing clearly that the sacred character attributed to diplomatic buildings by Mr Headlam-Morley had not been acknowledged. It was the intention of the French Government, to sell the diplomatic buildings of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire situated in French territory.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that he wishes to protest most emphatically against the example of the Palazzo Venezia being quoted in this connection. The building in question had been decided to be a Venetian Palace. It had never been thought that, by making special provision with regard to it, the clause which did so would alter the accepted character of diplomatic buildings.

M Pichon says that the title to Part IV of the Peace Treaty “outside Europe” made it unnecessary to proceed with the consideration of Mr Headlam-Morley’s reservation, and added that he wished to limit the discussion to a consideration of Part IV of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and to exclude such general questions as Mr Headlam-Morley wished to raise.

Mr Balfour asked why Austrian property outside and inside Europe was to be treated in different ways. He did not know why the similar clauses in the Peace Treaty with Germany could not be followed.

M Loucheur said that the analogy of the German Peace Treaty was irrelevant. The old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had been dismembered into separate states, each one of which might ask for the embassies of the old Kingdom. Mr Headlam-Morley had asked that the States affected should make a Convention between themselves. The question then arose, who actually were the States affected. Some of the diplomatic buildings might be regarded as belonging to the Throne of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. As such they could be liquidated, and the proceeds given to the Reparations Commission. He admitted, however, that special Conventions were necessary, but he does not see what would happen if the States concerned could not agree. As a particular example of the difficulties that might be raised, the old Austro-Hungarian Embassy at Constantinople was no longer suitable to the needs, either of Austria or of Hungary or of Czechoslovakia. It is evident that, in such a case as this, the Embassy in question ought to be sold and the proceeds placed at the disposal of the Reparations Commission. The old Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Paris belonged to the late Monarch, and the Treaty provided for the sale of property of this class. The Austro-Hungarian diplomatic property in Japan had already been sold. It would possibly be better to leave the States concerned to effect the sale of diplomatic buildings, and, if discord arose to allow the Reparations Commission to adjudicate.

Mr Balfour says that he could not offer any opinion. But he failed to understand why Austrian property inside and outside Europe was dealt with under two separate sections. He did not see any distinction, either in law or in fact, between these two classes of property.

M Loucheur said that he agreed with Mr Balfour and would ask M Gout for information on the point. He proposed that the Clauses in Section IV, dealing with Austro-Hungarian property in Morocco and Egypt, should be left untouched. With regard to the diplomatic properties of the old Empire in Europe, by the fact of the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, they fell under the disposal of the Reparations Commission, which would sell them at the best prices obtainable.

(It is decided that the reply to the Austrian Delegation with regard to Part IV of the Peace Treaty (Austrian property outside Europe) should be accepted.)

(d) M Cambon said that he had received a comment from the American Delegation with regard to Article 154 in the Peace Treaty with Austria, on the subject of the enrollment of Austrians in foreign armies. (Appendix “B”.)

Mr. Polk said that he did not see how the restrictions imposed upon Austria by virtue of Article 154 could possibly be effected, since the Austrian Government had no power to carry them out. He was willing, however, to withdraw the American proposal, but wished to call the attention of the Council to the fact that restrictions of this kind could not, as a rule, be enforced.

S Tittoni said that, by an elementary principle of jurisprudence, men lost their nationality by enlisting in the armies of a foreign State. Obviously, therefore, the Austrian Government would have no legislative power over Austrian citizens who enrolled themselves in foreign armies. How, therefore, could Article 154 be put into effect?

M Pichon says that the Article had been drawn up on the basis of a similar provision in the German Peace Treaty.

(After some further discussion, the American proposal is withdrawn. The resolution passed on the previous day with regard to the Military, Naval and Air Clauses in the Peace Treaty with Austria was accepted and upheld.)

(e) Prisoners of War

(f) Penalties

(g) Reparations (The resolutions passed at the meeting on the previous day with regard to Prisoners of War, Penalties and Reparations were accepted and upheld.)

(h) Financial Clauses The Resolution passed at the meeting on the previous day on the subject of Financial Clauses was accepted and upheld.

(i) M Pichon says that the Council was called upon to consider the draft reply to the Austrian Delegation on the subject of Part X (Economic Clauses) of the Peace Treaty with Austria. (See Appendix “F”, H. D. 38.6)

M Clementel said that Austria had been compelled by the Peace Treaty to extend all customs privileges, granted to the neighboring States to the Allies. The Austrian Government had protested against this, and had said that they would be in the position of the Palace at Versailles deprived of its domains. They had asked to be able to grant special preferential treatment, in which the other Allies would not be included, to Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Economic Commission had discussed this proposal, and had thought at first, that the special preferential treatment in question ought to be extended, not only to Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but to all new States formed out of the old Monarchy. M Crespi, had in his turn, protested against this, and had said that such a provision would compel his own country to lay down special inner customs barriers. It had then been proposed to the Commission that the preferential treatment should be extended to all States which had acquired territory from any part of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This proposal would have included in a sort of “Zollverein” countries extending from Poland to Italy, and would have established a customs union from Danzig to Sicily. It had occasioned a further protest from Czechoslovakia, the Delegates of which country had stated that they could not possibly compete on terms of equality with such a State as Italy, which, by the last proposal, would be included in the Customs Union. After some further discussion the Commission had agreed that the preferential rights should be limited to Austria, to Hungary, and to Czechoslovakia; but this proposal affected the Romanians and the Yugoslavs adversely. After very lengthy discussions inside the Commission, with all the States concerned, the last proposal that he had detailed, had been accepted. If it were reversed, it would be necessary for the Economic Commission to take note of the new decision, and to discuss its consequences, which might be very onerous to the new States. The British counter-proposals seemed to him quite inexplicable in view of the fact that Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith had agreed with him, and had helped him to draft the final proposals. Large differences between the Peace Treaty with Austria and that with Germany had been introduced. In the first place, the Customs Union between Austria, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, had been accepted, the result of which would be that the thirty million inhabitants of these countries could transact their business with one another without restrictions. The second great difference was, that Germany would only be in a position to ask for equal treatment in the matter of customs from the Allies after five years, whilst Austria could obtain it in three years.

Mr Balfour says that the original proposal had been, that all the customs privileges of the States composing the old Austro-Hungarian Kingdom should be extended to the new States formed out of it; but, as these privileges would be based on the old limits of the States concerned, these latter would have been compelled to set up a political frontier, and another frontier for the purposes of customs. On the other hand, by including in the Customs Union, all countries enriched by acquisition of Austro-Hungarian territory, privileges greater than any ever possessed by the old Austro-Hungarian Empire Kingdom would be granted to them. These two proposals therefore, outlined the question now before the Conference.

M Clementel said that Mr. Baruch and Mr. Taussig had agreed with the findings of the Economic Commission. If the agreement arrived at were reversed, a vast customs union, extending from Danzig to Sicily would be established. It was absolutely impossible to ask countries to set up customs barriers inside their own frontiers.

Mr Balfour says that the Council must choose between limiting the privileges of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and extending them. He would have liked to have seen those privileges maintained as they had existed previously, but he recognized that this was no longer possible. The alternatives before the Council were (1) consenting to a vast extension of Customs Unions between States, or (2) curtailing the former privileges of the dismembered Monarchy. He felt that the compromise arrived at ought to be adhered to. The proposal of establishing an entirely new customs system over half Europe alarmed him.

Mr Polk asks what Austria’s position after three years would be in the matter of customs.

M Clementel replies that, unless the League of Nations thought that certain countries had not been sufficiently indemnified, reciprocity with all countries might be granted to Austria.

(It is decided that the draft reply of the Economic Commission on the subject of the clauses dealing with Customs regulations, duties and restrictions, in the Peace Treaty with Austria, should be accepted.)

Mr Balfour says that the Joint Secretariat in drawing up the Minutes of the previous day’s proceedings, had acquitted themselves most creditably of an extremely difficult task.

Mr Polk said that the average correctness of the work of the Joint Secretariat had been exceedingly high throughout.

(j) M Tardieu says that the resolution with regard to the Plebiscite in Marburg (See H. D. 38, Minute 6 (a) 210) had caused complete disagreement in the Central Territorial Commission. Two of the delegates had adopted the Plebiscite line of demarcation proposed by S Tittoni. The others had disputed it, and had said that it was an artificial line which would give special advantages to the Austrians, and, if adopted, would effect what had been avoided in the Klagenfurt area. The Council must therefore decide whether they wished to uphold the new demarcation line, but he suggests the Central Territorial Commission should be heard on the subject.

S Tittoni said that he regretted that the Central Territorial Commission had disagreed on the subject of the resolution under discussion. He had originally proposed the line of the River Drave. He had subsequently been shown a map, marked with a blue line and presented by the British Delegate. He had accepted the new line with the remainder of the Council, and his adherence to it had not been due to any personal opinion of his own.

M Tardieu says that the Central Territorial Commission is opposed to taking the Plebiscite, inside the area defined by the blue line on the map, to which S Tittoni had referred, because, as he had said before, it would give the Austrians an artificial majority.

S Tittoni said that he does not oppose a hearing being given to the Central Territorial Commission, but he pointed out that the decision of the previous day had been arrived at after due deliberation. The question involved was one of procedure.

M Tardieu says that the replies to the Austrian Delegation had not been properly coordinated, and confusion had resulted. Since the Plebiscite had been decided on, the area in which it was to be taken must necessarily be laid down. The Central Territorial Commission disagreed on the manner in which the line defined by the resolution of the previous day was to be established.

S Tittoni repeats that he does not wish to refuse a hearing to the Commission, but thought that the resolution taken on the day previous still held good.

(It is decided that the Central Territorial Commission should be heard at the Council on August 27th, 1919, on the question of the Plebiscite in the Marburg area in Styria.)

4. M Pichon draws the Council’s attention to a clause in the new Constitution of the German Reich; the articles in question dealt with the future relations between Austria and Germany in a manner which violated the provisions of the Peace Treaty. Violation on the Peace Treaty With Germany in the Constitution of the New German State

M Berthelot reads the Articles referred to. They showed that the German Government was making provision for the final inclusion of Austria in the new German Reich. This was in flagrant violation of Article 80 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, whereby that country formally recognized the independence of Austria. In addition to this, the articles of the new Constitution gave Austrian citizens the right of immediate representation in the German Reich, although only in an advisory capacity. The matter was rendered more difficult by the fact that the German Parliament was not at present in session, so that the urgent necessity of having this provision in the German Constitution altered, would be subject to delay. The German Constitution had been adopted in a final manner on August 11th. Previous to that date, a provisional vote had been taken, referring indirectly to the point now under discussion.

Mr Balfour says that the problem now before the Council showed the extreme inconvenience of having no diplomatic agent at Berlin. Such a representative would have called attention to the article in question long before. The military representatives of the Allies at Berlin, were, of course, not concerned with such points.

M Pichon says that he thinks action is urgently necessary and that the Drafting Committee ought to draw up a formal protest as rapidly as possible.

Mr Polk asks whether the articles in the new German Constitution could be communicated to each separate Delegation for examination and study. He agreed that the matter was extremely serious and that it demands immediate action.

M Tardieu says that, in his opinion, the news now before the Council makes it more necessary than ever to uphold the proposal that he had made on the previous day.

Mr Polk remarks that no great result could be expected from the inclusion of M Tardieu’s proposal in the Austrian Treaty, in view of the fact that Germany had not respected a similar obligation.

(It is decided that the question raised by Article 61 of the new German Constitution voted on the 11th August 1919, in the German National Assembly, on the subject of Austria should be discussed at the next meeting of the Council on the 27th August, together with such consequences as the aforesaid article in the German Constitution might have upon the Peace Treaty with Austria.)

5. Mr Polk states that he had no objection to the draft letter, prepared by the Communications Section Romanian of the Supreme Economic Council, to be sent from Relative to President of the Peace Conference to Mr Bratiano.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-27-19, 08:06 AM

27th August 1919

Louis Botha, Boer War general and first Prime Minister of South Africa, dies in office due to complications resulting from the Spanish Flu.
https://i.postimg.cc/B6Gdqrqm/EC9x-UYIXs-AYp-Oz-J.jpg (https://postimg.cc/FfDPpnkS)

The children of Millfield road in York wearing Fancy dress for the street party held in celebration of peace following the end of the War a year earlier.
https://i.postimg.cc/gk6qDny6/EC9x-UYIXs-AYp-Oz-J.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

08-27-19, 09:51 PM

Wednesday, August 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Clemenceau says that the second proposal of the British Delegation aimed at including in the Treaty no clause imposing on Austrian Nationals any disadvantage in the settlement of private debts, contracts, etc., in a word, in the whole sphere of properties, rights and interests. The Economic Commission had first of all worked on the principle that the stipulations in the Austrian Treaty were to be similar to those of the German Treaty. This principle was subsequently modified very thoroughly. The Commission in Article 261 had provided for the liquidation of Austrian properties under the control of the Reparations Commission in the case of States, heirs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, not participating in reparations. A special Committee composed of Colonel Peel, M Loucheur, S Crespi and Mr Norman Davis, had, on the instructions of the Council, changed these dispositions. The result is that Austrian properties would not be liquidated; in consequence, the Economic Commission, in the draft reply prepared for the Austrian Delegation, had laid down as far as possible, that equality and reciprocity should prevail in the settlement of properties, rights and interests between Austrian Nationals and the previous subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The British proposal, however, went much further, and suggested that Austria should have the benefit of all agreements which might hereafter be made between the various States inheriting from the Austrian Empire. So complete an assimilation appeared to him unjustified for the following reasons:

(a) Austria had taken certain measures contrary to the interests of the territories now transferred, and it is necessary to annul these measures.

(b) The States receiving portions of former Austro-Hungarian territory and the transferred territories themselves had always protested most vigorously against any such assimilation, even in the limited form suggested by the Economic Commission.

(c) Without going so far as complete assimilation, the Economic Commission had given Austria all guarantees required by justice for the liquidation of the past state of things for which she was responsible.
It is merely a question of re-drafting to make it clear that the proposal of the Editing Committee meant:

1) That Sections 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7, did not apply to transferred territories.

2) That Section 8 applies only to them.
The principle of complete assimilation of Austria to the new States or to the inheriting States was a non-economic matter. It was a political question which could only be decided by the Supreme Council. He thinks, moreover, that it would require the assent of the States concerned. The Economic Commission could only discuss this matter with them if instructed to do so by the Council.

Mr Balfour asks whether the proposals referred to applied only in the Economic sphere.

M Clementel replies in the affirmative.

Mr Balfour said that on the previous day it has been decided that economic advantages should be limited to Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

M Clementel says that the proposal before the meeting goes further. It amounted to this—that any agreement of an economic nature concluded between any of the new States and any other, must ipso facto apply to Austria. This would produce an exceptionally privileged situation for Austria. The new States, moreover, had already protested against even the amount of assimilation hitherto accorded to Austria. The Economic Commission could go no further than it had gone. The question in its present stage was a political question which must be determined by the Council. He thinks that the proposal of the British Delegation is not economically sound, and he cannot, without calling a new meeting of the Economic Commission, accept it on their behalf.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that it appears to him to be a wrong interpretation of the British proposals that Austria must be held to be party to any Convention between the new States. He had meant to refer only to the negotiations conducted by the Committee on political clauses. These negotiations apply to specific problems. The present situation made it necessary to liquidate certain questions by special pacts. It is for the purpose of these pacts that he pleaded that Austria should be placed on an equal footing with the other States. He thinks that M Laroche, who is Chairman of the Committee, will be able to state the position to the satisfaction of the Council.

M Clementel said that from the economic point of view, he is convinced that the Economic Commission has done all that is possible, short of establishing complete assimilation. For instance, in the Treaty with Germany, all pre-war contracts were annulled unless some special public interest demands the contrary. In the Treaty with Austria, all pre-war contracts were maintained unless some special public interest demanded the contrary. In any case, he thought the change proposed by Mr Headlam-Morley could not be made without consulting the small States.

M Laroche says that the question had not the scope attributed to it by M Clementel. It had been agreed on the previous day in the Committee on Political Clauses, not to demand the insertion of any special clause in the Treaty with Austria itself. The Committee would propose to the Council that Austria and Hungary should be asked to adhere to certain Conventions to be negotiated between the New States. There were for instance Conventions necessary to regulate [Page 944]the payment of civilian, Military and clerical pensions. These matters could be dealt with outside the Treaty of Peace with Austria.

Mr Balfour asks whether M Clementel maintained any objection to this, and whether he thinks it would require reconsultation of the new states.

M Clementel thinks this proposal would raise no difficulty.

M Laroche said that the new States would inevitably have to be consulted, as they have to be parties to the Conventions suggested.

M Clementel said the only thing to which he objects is any assertion of complete assimilation between Austria and the other new States.

Mr. Balfour said that he understood the policy of the Council is to give all that could be given to Austria without any ostentatious declaration, likely to offend Czechoslovakia.

(It is decided that it is unnecessary to insert any new Article in the Treaty of Peace with Austria. It would be clearly explained in the answer to the Austrian Delegation that Sections, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Economic Clauses did not apply to the relations between Austrian subjects and the former subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. On the other hand it should be clearly explained that Section 8 of the Economic Clauses only referred to the relations between persons of these two categories.

It was further decided that Austria would be required in the Treaty of Peace to adhere to special Conventions with the new States, now being prepared by the Committee on Political Clauses.)

2. M Loucheur said that the Austrian Delegation asked that a special clause be inserted in the Treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, requiring these States to supply Austria with the same amount of coal that Austria received from the areas ceded to those States before the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Czechoslovakia and Poland were unwilling to acquiesce, because they wished to be able to control the export of coal in such a manner as to exercise pressure on Austria and obtain from her equivalent advantages. For instance, Czechoslovakia would require magnesia from Austria. He therefore proposed a series of articles providing for an exchange of raw material between Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria, and as an interim measure for the control of these exchanges by the Separations Commission.

Mr Balfour asked whether the proposals stipulated for absolute quantities. If they did, difficulties might ensue. The quantities should, he thinks, be proportional and not absolute, otherwise a State might be bound by the Treaty to furnish the greater part of its production, irrespective of home needs, to its neighbors.

M Loucheur explains that this difficulty had been foreseen, and was carefully guarded against in the clauses he proposed.

Mr. Balfour said that he was satisfied with this explanation.

(It is decided that the clauses proposed by M Loucheur (Appendix A) should be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Austria.)

3. S Tittoni says that the Treaty provides that certain railways between Austria and Italy should be built by the latter. Projects for these railways had been previously completed by the Austrians. He asked that they be required in the Treaty to supply both plans and estimates to the Italian Government.

(It is agreed that an article to this effect should be drafted by S Tittoni for insertion in the Treaty.)

S Tittoni offers to the draft contained in Appendix B.

4. M Loucheur says that, in consultation with Mr Hoover, he has prepared a telegram to be addressed to General Dupont in accordance with the decision taken on the previous day.

M Loucheur reads the telegram annexed in Appendix C.

(This draft is accepted).

5. Mr Polk asked whether the telegram sent on the previous Saturday could be given to the Press. He adds that the smaller Powers had been making inquiries. Publication of Telegram in Answer to Romanian Government, Dispatched 23rd August, 1919

(It is decided that the telegram accepted for despatch to the Romanian Government on Saturday, 23rd August, 1919, should be published in the Press.)

6. Mr Polk says that the situation is just about as Mr Balfour had stated at a previous meeting. M. Clemenceau had suggested that the German prisoners of war in the hands of the American and British Armies should be turned over in some manner to the French Authorities. At the meeting of the Special Committee of General Officers, both Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson and General Pershing had felt that they are not authorized to turn over their prisoners to the French Authorities. They do not consider themselves qualified to decide the legal and political questions involved. The British Government was anxious to return these prisoners to Germany, and their Secretary of State for War had urged it very strongly. The situation was the same for the Americans. If the repatriation of these prisoners were begun now, three to four months would be necessary to complete it. It was the desire of the American Government to act in this matter in full agreement with the French Government. If repatriation could be begun immediately, he thought it would be most desirable to do so, as these prisoners were a great expense and were accomplishing nothing. Because of the time it would take to complete it, the repatriation would not embarrass the French Government in their desire to retain the prisoners in their hands until after the ratification of the Treaty. He thought that even if the repatriation were started now by the British and American Authorities, it could not be completed before the French would have made all arrangements necessary for the labor they desired.

Mr Balfour says that he would like to corroborate the last part of Mr Polk’s statement. On the previous occasion when he had spoken on this matter, he had not realized how slow the process of repatriation would be. It is now August 27th. The Treaty, he thought, would be ratified by three Powers by about the 15th of September. In other words, in less than three weeks. On the 15th September, therefore, repatriation would have to begin in accordance with the terms of the Treaty. Retention of the prisoners during these three weeks would cost the American and British Governments £150,000 a day. The number that could be repatriated was only 2,000 a day overland, and no more could be sent home until shipping could be provided to assist in the process. In the three weeks, therefore, no very considerable diminution of the prisoners held in France would take place. Meanwhile, it is difficult to ask the British and American taxpayers to continue spending so much on practically useless prisoners. He hopes, therefore, that the French Government would accede to the very modest request he had to make. He believed that no detriment would be caused to France thereby.

M Clemenceau says that he makes no comment on the internal political reasons which actuated his colleagues. On the question of legal right, he is prepared to bring forward the action of the Belgians, who had handed over prisoners to France. He was bound, however, to acquiesce in what he was asked to do by his British and American colleagues. He confesses that he does it with regret, because the retention of the prisoners represented the only hold the Allies now possessed over Germany. The insertion of the Article in the German Constitution regarding Austria showed how necessary it is to preserve some means of pressure on Germany. There has been an agreement between himself, Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson to use the prisoners as a means of inducing Germany to hand over persons guilty of breaches of the laws of war. If the British and American Governments had made up their minds, he would ask that a Repatriation Committee should be formed, representing all the Powers, in order that there should be no appearance of dissension on this point. The German Delegation would be told that for reasons of their own, the Allies proposed to begin repatriating prisoners without waiting for the ratification of the Treaty. He would ask Mr Balfour to explain this in suitable words.

Mr Balfour says that he agreed it is desirable to keep a hold over Germany. He would point out that the proposal he had made did not diminish this hold in any appreciable degree. As to the proposal just made by M Clemenceau, he entirely agrees that it is very desirable that all the Powers should appear to be acting in harmony. Unless there were any practical objection, he would welcome the proposal.

Mr Polk says that he also assents to it.

M Clemenceau says that the hold over Germany would ultimately be represented by the prisoners held by the French Army.

Mr Matsui observes that a Commission to deal with prisoners is provided for in the Treaty. He questioned whether it is desirable to set up a new Commission. It might be preferable to set the Commission provided for in the Treaty to work at once.

M Clemenceau reads Article 215. He points out that a German member is provided for.

Mr Balfour asked whether it is absolutely necessary to have a German representative on the Commission.

M Clemenceau said he thinks perhaps not, as the Treaty is not yet ratified.

Mr Matsui says that a Commission on Prisoners of War already exists. It has, he understands, prepared a provisional scheme for repatriation. Could this Commission be empowered to proceed with the repatriation suggested? Japan, he adds, had some prisoners. She had been feeding them for a long time, and was anxious to repatriate them. Repatriation from Japan would be a long process. Japan, therefore, would gladly associate herself with any measures taken to that end.

(It is decided:

(a) That an Inter-Allied Commission of one military and one civil member from each of the five Powers be set up at once to begin repatriation of German prisoners, starting with prisoners held by the British and American Armies.

(b) That Mr. Balfour should draft a letter to the German Delegation, explaining the reasons for anticipating the Treaty in this matter, and making it clear that this was a gratuitous act of humanity, and that the execution of the project would depend on the good behavior of Germany.

(c) That the nominations should be made at the following meeting.)

7. M Tardieu reads and explains the Report of the Commission on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs Regarding the Plebiscite in Styria.

S Tittoni says that the Council has decided to divide the Klagenfurt area for plebiscite purposes. He could not see why it should decline to do likewise in Styria. Moreover, the Council had already decided on a plebiscite in this area. Why should this decision be reversed? The land in question was not Italian, and he had no direct interest in its fate. It was of the utmost importance, however, that the Austrians should sign the Treaty. The Austrian Cabinet depended on a majority, in which there were 28 Styrian Deputies. Should these Deputies receive no satisfaction, they might not support the Government in signing the Treaty. This would produce a most perilous situation. He does not know whether M Clemenceau is ready to occupy Austria with French troops, but he must declare that Italy would find it extremely difficult to do so.

M. Tardieu said that in analogous cases, the Council had not decided in favour of a plebiscite. There is no strong motive for holding one in Styria. There were in the area, 75,000 Slovenes against 18,000 Germans.

S Tittoni says that in that case the result need not be feared. In order to upset the decision taken 24 hours earlier, very strong reasons should be alleged. He knew of no such reasons.

Mr Balfour says that he understands the previous resolution to have been to the effect that a plebiscite should be held in the district of Marburg. The limits of this district had not been settled. The question has been referred to the experts in order that they should examine it and make a report.

S Tittoni said that the Minutes of the meeting state that the Austrian demand was accepted, although he had himself proposed the line of the Drave as the limit of the plebiscite area.

Mr Polk said that his understanding as that the line proposed by the Austrian Delegation had been more or less accepted. He had not understood that so large an addition as was proposed by the British and French Members of the Commission was to be made. The question was whether the delimitation of the area was to be influenced by the Austrians or by the J
Yugoslav requests. If the area were made large, the result was a foregone conclusion in favour of the Yugo-Slavs. In that case, he thinks it would be preferable to attribute the territory to the Yugoslavs outright.

M Tardieu said that the Commission was not in a position to make a unanimous report. It could only place the divergent views of the Delegates before the Council. The line proposed by the Austrians is clearly to the detriment of the Yugoslavs. The latter had had good reason to suppose that the country was theirs. If the settlement was now to be altered entirely at the instance of the Austrians, they would reasonably think themselves aggrieved. Four unanimous decisions had been taken. In any case, the Slovenes were treated very hardly by the Treaty. The last decision of the Council would make their case worse. Marburg was the economic and intellectual center of Southern Styria. It had even been admitted to be so by the previous Austrian administration. In his view, the Yugoslav position should be maintained as he regarded it as entirely right.

Mr Balfour asks M Tardieu whether his Committee had e
inquired whether the area under consideration was economically connected with Marburg, as S Tittoni denied this.

S Tittoni gives certain figures about the traffic from Marburg. On the Marburg-Villach line there were 32,373 departures and 32,349 arrivals. On the Marburg-Gratz line there were 30,742 departures and 49,230 arrivals. On the Marburg-Laibach line there were 26,834 departures and 34,462 arrivals. On the Marburg-Agram line there were 1,975 departures and 2,299 arrivals. From those figures it clearly appeared that the traffic of Marburg was towards the north. The southern area was, moreover, divided from it by a mountain range.

M Tardieu says these figures are well known to the Committee. They were the result of the deliberate economic policy of the Austrian administration. The natural market of Marburg was to the south. In spite of all their efforts, the Austrians had had to abandon the idea of administering Southern Styria, except from Marburg. The Italians had good reason to know what the methods of the Austrians were, as they had experienced them at Trieste.

S Tittoni said that the comparison was not quite correct. The Italian population had never been sufficiently represented in the Austrian Parliament to obtain any concessions in its favour. The Slovenes, on the other hand, like the Poles, had been strong enough to produce a balance of parties. They had, therefore, received some consideration.

M Tardieu says that he did not wish to question the decision made on the previous day, but he thought it was paying the Austrians an undue compliment to accept their line exactly as they proposed it. The Yugoslavs had asked for consultation of the population throughout. This had been refused and the Conference was now asked to impose on them a plebiscite in an area in which they did not expect it, and in a form which would annoy them without reason.

S Tittoni said that he was willing to extend the plebiscite area to the limits of the judicial district of Marburg, in order to meet the views of the French and British Delegates.

M Tardieu says that he thought this would produce very little effect on the position.

M Pichon observed that the Yugoslavs had been in occupation of the area for the last nine months. They could not be evicted without certain trouble.

Mr Polk asked whether this occupation was under the authority of the Conference, or whether the Yugoslavs had just taken possession on their own initiative.

M Pichon said that no formal authorization had been given, but that no protest had been made.

Mr Balfour then suggested that in order to reach some decision, the whole notion of a plebiscite should be dropped.

M Clemenceau says that he agrees.

S Tittoni said that he would prefer to hold a plebiscite in the extended area.

Mr Polk says that he would rather abandon the plebiscite altogether than adopt a compromise which, he thinks, would satisfy neither party.

S Tittoni said his main desire was that the Treaty should be signed, because should the Austrians refuse to sign it, he did not know what the Conference could do.

(After some further discussion, the American, British, French and Japanese Delegations agreed to abandon entirely the idea of a plebiscite in Styria, and to stand by the territorial settlement made in the Treaty handed to the Austrian Delegation.

S Tittoni reserved his agreement and said that he would communicate his conclusion to the Secretary-General in the course of the afternoon.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-28-19, 05:52 AM

28th August 1919

Anti-Bolshevik soldiers pose on a train entering Poltava in Southern Russia.
https://i.postimg.cc/JzvTYTMq/EDC66h-XYAEAEm-D.jpg (https://postimg.cc/3kjCdFy4)

The King-Crane Commission submits its report on the Middle East to the Allied Powers, concluding the former territories of the Ottoman Empire are not ready for independence. It also opposed the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Members of the commission.
https://i.postimg.cc/d3RPwbtw/EDC66h-XYAEAEm-D.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Miss Kitty Dalton turns down the proposals of over 200 members of the military. The Newspaper, Rock Island Argus, publishes her address, 154 East, 122nd street. New York City, if anyone else wants to try.
https://i.postimg.cc/XqBqL78x/EDC66h-XYAEAEm-D.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

08-28-19, 05:11 PM

Thursday, August 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. Mr. Polk suggests that before proceeding to the order of the day, the resolutions of the previous meeting might be read, and further suggested that this might be made the rule for the future.

M Clemenceau said that such a procedure would waste the Council’s time.

Mr Balfour agrees with M Clemenceau.

(After some further discussion, it is agreed, that copies of all resolutions passed by the Council should be laid on the table of each Delegate, on the day following the meeting at which the aforesaid resolutions had been taken; and that, if no objections were raised by the Delegates, the text of the resolutions as submitted, should be considered to have been accepted.)

2. Mr Balfour circulates the following draft declaration with regard to the repatriation of German prisoners:

“In order to diminish as rapidly as possible the sufferings caused by the war, the Allied and Associated Powers have determined to anticipate the date of ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, so far as the repatriation of German prisoners is concerned. The process of repatriation will begin immediately, and it will be conducted under the auspices of an Inter-Allied Committee to which will be added a German representative as soon as the Treaty comes into force.

The Allied and Associated Powers desire to make it quite clear that the continuance of this benevolent policy, from which German soldiers will so greatly benefit, must depend on the fulfillment by the German Government and People of all their obligations.”

(The draft declaration prepared by Mr Balfour is accepted for transmission and publication.)

The following nominations were then made for the Prisoners of War Committee provided for by the resolution taken on August 27th:

British Empire:
Mr Vansittart.
General Bolfield

America, United States of:
Mr Dresel
Brig.-Gen W D Connor

France:
M Alphand
Colonel Jouvin

Italy:
Colonel Toni

Japan:
Mr Shigemitsu.
Colonel Nagai.

3. Mr Polk says that Article 61 of the German Constitution should be referred to the Drafting Committee, who should advise the Council as to the measures which might be taken, since any subsequent action by the Council ought to be taken on the advice of competent lawyers.

It is decided that Article 61 of the German Constitution should be sent to the Drafting Committee, who should examine the extent to which the aforesaid Article violated the terms of the Peace Treaty with Germany, and should advise the Council as to the measures which ought to be taken.)

4. (Owing to the illness of S Tittoni, this question is adjourned to the following day.)

5. M Laroche reads an Article for insertion in Part 3 of the Peace Treaty with Austria, on the subject of Special Conventions to be drawn up between Austria and the New States formed out of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

(It is agreed that a new clause on the subject of Special Conventions for Austria and the States formed out of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, on the subject of the rights, privileges and goods of private persons in the aforesaid States, should be accepted.)

6. M Cambon reads and commented upon the British and American reservations with regard to the reply to the Austrian Delegation, on the subject of Part 12 of the Peace Treaty with Austria.

M Tyrman says that the British reservations had been made before Article 322 of the Peace Treaty with Austria had been altered. By a previous decision of ways the Council, it had been laid down, that immediate reciprocity should be granted in the matter of Ports, Waterways and Railways, to Austria, and other states formed out of the old Monarchy. By virtue of this decision, the British reservation fell to the ground.

Mr Headlam-Morley agrees with M Tyrman, and said that the reservation of the British Delegation had been satisfied.

M Cambon explains the reservations of the British, Japanese and Italian Delegations on the subject of Article 310 of the Austrian Peace Treaty.

M Tyrman says that the reservation formulated by the British, Japanese and Italian Delegations might be met by altering the expression “cession” of Ports, Waterways and Railways to the “transfer” of Ports, Waterways and Railways throughout. In addition to this, in Part 3 of Article 310 the word “proportion” should be altered to “distribution”, and the expression “handed over” should be altered to “be effected”.

(It is decided that Article 310 of the Peace Treaty with Austria should be amended, so as to read:

Article 310

Subject to any special provisions concerning the transfer of ports, waterways and railways situated in the territories transferred under the present Treaty, and to the financial conditions relating to the concessionnaires and the pensioning of the personnel, the transfer of railways will take place under the following conditions:

(1) The works and installations of all the railroads shall be handed over complete and in good condition.

(2) When a railway system, possessing its own rolling-stock, is handed over in its entirety by Austria to one of the Allied and Associated Powers, such stock shall be handed over complete, in accordance with the last inventory before November 3, 1918, and in a normal state of upkeep.

(3) As regards lines without any special rolling-stock, Commissions of experts designated by the Allied and Associated Powers, on which Austria shall be represented, shall fix the distribution of the stock existing on the system to which these lines belong to be effected. Those Commissions shall have regard to the amount of the material registered on these lines in the last inventory before November 3, 1918, the length of track (sidings included), and the nature and amount of the traffic. These Commissions shall also specify the locomotives, carriages and wagons to be handed over in each case; they shall decide upon the conditions of their acceptance, and shall make the provisional arrangements necessary to ensure their repair in Austrian workshops.

(4) Stocks of stores, fittings and plant shall be handed over under the same conditions as the rolling-stock.

The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall be applied to the lines of former Russian Poland converted by Austria to the Austrian gauge, such lines being regarded as detached from the Austrian system.
M Cambon then explains the American reservation with regard to Part XII of the reply to the Austrian Delegation.

Mr Polk explains that the American proposal does not deal exclusively with the portion of the reply to the Austrians dealing with Ports, Railways and Waterways, but that it was concerned with the interpretative passages which had been introduced throughout the reply. Such passages referred to the Financial Clauses (Part IX), Reparation Clauses (Part VIII), the Waterways, and Railways Clauses (Part XII), and the Report of the Minorities Commission. By virtue of these passages, the Drafting Committee were really giving interpretations to the text of the Peace Treaty, and the fact might be of advantage either to Austria, or to the Allies. Such interpretations are official, and will, as such, become part of the agreement with Austria. If they did, they would have to be submitted to the United States Senate, together with the Treaty itself. If they were ratified by the Senate, the United States would be bound. He did not think that the United States should be bound by interpretative passages, unless it were understood that other Powers were bound also. It was therefore necessary either
(a) To have it clearly understood that all Powers should be bound by such interpretative passages, or;

(b) To insert a clause in the reply to the Austrian Delegation, telling them that the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers was not to be taken as in any sense modifying the text of the Treaty.

Mr Balfour says that he does not think that the Peace Treaty should be drafted in such a manner as to require any interpretation at all.

M Cambon says that the interpretative passages referred only to the text of the reply, and not to the Peace Treaty itself.

(It is decided after some further discussion that:

(1) The reply to the Austrian Delegation should be referred, as a whole, to the Drafting Committee, to co-ordinate it with the terms of the Peace Treaty.

(2) A clause should be inserted in the reply to the Austrian Delegation to the effect that the aforesaid reply was not to be taken as in any sense modifying the text of the Treaty.

7. S Scialoja draws the attention of the Council to a resolution passed by the Labour Committee at its meeting of the 4th June, 1919.

Reply to the Austrian Note on the Subject of the Labour Clauses in the Treaty of Peace With Austria.—Part XIII (After some further discussion,

It is decided that the resolution passed by the Labour Committee should be referred to the Editing Committee for consideration and report, to the Council on August 29th.)

S Scialoja says that a further problem on the subject of the labor clauses in the Peace Treaty with Austria, arose, the question being the admission of Austrian labor representatives to the International Congress of Labor.

S di Palma said that the admission of Germany into the International Congress of Labor had only been allowed for after the first Congress at Washington. S Tittoni desires to place on record, that it is his wish that Austrian representatives should be admitted to the Washington Congress after the ratification of the Treaty. But workmen of various nations were saying that they would not convene a meeting unless all ex-enemy states of the Allied and Associated Powers were represented.

M Pichon confirmed the last part of S di Palma’s statement. He says, however, that if the admission of Austrian workmen to the International Congress of Labour were allowed, this would, ipso facto, involve the admission of German workmen on the same terms. The International Congress of Labor had originally decided against the admission of German workmen to the First Session at Washington. It had now changed its mind, and was demanding that German representatives should actually be admitted, after the order of business of the Session had been drawn up. This had been done in order to prevent Germany from having any say in the matters to be discussed.

Mr Balfour asks whether any previous decision had been taken by the Council.

M Pichon says that the Council of Four had taken a decision conformable to the resolution first passed on the subject by the Labor Committee.

M Clemenceau says that the question ought to be referred to the Labor Committee, who should study the question of the joint admission of German and Austrian labor representatives to the International Congress of Labor.

(It is decided to submit at once to the Labor Committee the proposal of the Italian Delegation, regarding the admission of Austrian Labor Representatives to the Labor Congress to be held at Washington in the following autumn.

The Labor Committee should examine the question, keeping in mind the consequences that might result on the situation of Germany, in this Congress, as already defined. The Committee should make proposals regarding the admission of both countries to the Congress.)

8. M Cambon reads the covering letter to the reply to the Austrian Delegation. He draws attention to the fact that the note had been drawn up on the basis of the reports of several separate Committees.

The main object in the reply had been to settle finally the responsibility of the Austrian Government with regard to the war.

M Clemenceau says that M Cambon’s statement with regard to the character of the covering note was quite evident.

Mr Balfour says that the draft reply read by M Cambon was a most able document. He thinks, however, that the procedure followed in the case of the Peace Treaty with Germany might be adopted in the present instance. Mr. Philip Kerr had drafted the covering letter accompanying the reply to the German counter-proposals, and his letter had been very favorably commented upon by the press in all the Allied countries. He suggests that Mr Kerr should also draft the covering letter to the replies to the Austrian counter-proposals, and submit his draft to the Council on the following day.

M Tardieu said that the Reparations Commission, together with M Loucheur, had, on the previous day, drawn up a note, on the subject of reparations by Austria. He thought that the note in question ought to be embodied in the covering letter to the reply to the Austrian counter-proposals.

(It was decided:

1) That the note drafted by M Loucheur and the Reparations Commission should be embodied in the covering letter accompanying the answer to the Austrian counter-proposals;

2) That the draft of the covering letter prepared by the Editing Committee, together with the above note of the Reparations Commission, should be referred to Mr. Philip Kerr for re-draft, and that the new text, as prepared by him, should he submitted at the next Meeting of the Council.)

M Cambon then draws attention to the fact that it might be considered necessary to make some allusion in the covering note to the independence of the Austrian State, since Article 61 of the German Constitution appeared to question it.

M Clemenceau says that the whole question will be considered on the following day.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-29-19, 08:48 AM

29th August 1919

Russian Civil War: The Red Army captures Pskov from White forces.

French General Gouroud review British troops occupying Cologne, Germany.
https://i.postimg.cc/jjS2G33B/EDIEf6w-Xk-AAsq-IF.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Refugee children in Omsk, Siberia who fled the fighting of the ongoing Russian Civil War.
https://i.postimg.cc/YCsBCXq5/EDD-lh7-Xs-AIb-B4r.png (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

08-29-19, 07:19 PM

Friday, August 29, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Tardieu says that on the previous day he had received from S Tittoni a new proposal. There was no further question of a Plebiscite except in a small, area near Radkersburg. M Clemenceau asks why S Tittoni wished to hold a Plebiscite there.

S Tittoni replied that his main object was to get an Austrian signature to the Treaty. What he proposed was a considerable reduction to the Austrian demands, but the area was entirely German, and though the district of Marburg would remain Yugoslav, he thinks it is desirable to give the Austrians satisfaction somewhere. One of the reasons for holding a plebiscite in this area was that the Chief of the Christian Social Party which supported the State had been returned for Radkersburg.

M Tardieu said that without expressing any opinion on the reason alleged by S Tittoni, he thinks the area of Radkersburg ought to be attached to Prekumarie. Should the Plebiscite go in favour of Austria, the resulting frontier would be a bad one.

M Clemenceau asks General Le Rond to state what, from a geographical point of view, would be the result.

General Le Rond says that it had been recognised long ago that the population in this area was mainly German, and in making a frontier, it was not possible to take any account of every little variation in the character of the population. This was all the less necessary as a considerable number of Slovene villages had been left within Austria. If the Plebiscite suggested by S Tittoni turned out in favour of the Austrians, the frontier in this area would be geographically unsound, cutting valleys in a capricious manner and leaving Radkersburg almost on the boundary line. Should the vote be in favor of the Yugoslavs, which was unlikely, the frontier would be the same as that proposed by the Commission. In the area in question, there were about 10,000 Austrians. The number of Slovenes left outside Yugoslavia could be counted in hundreds of thousands. If the question of the Austrians in this area were raised, the question of the Slovenes left outside Yugoslavia would also have to be raised.

Mr Balfour ask whether the Austrians would still demand a Plebiscite in this region if a Plebiscite in the Slovene area left to them were required.

Mr Polk observes that the Slovenes left outside Yugoslavia would remain in Hungary and not in Austria. Austria would therefore raise no objection.

S Tittoni said that if the line of the Drave had been accepted, it would have yielded a more logical frontier than any other line. He points out further that the area in question is included in an administrative boundary. The geographical objections therefore, do not appear strong, as the frontier adopted by the Commission was not itself a good geographical line.

General Le Rond said that the line proposed by the Commission followed the crest of the Hills.

S Tittoni said that for so small a matter, he does not wish to risk a refusal of the Austrian signature.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks there is no great need to fear the refusal of signature.

Mr Balfour then suggests that the River Mur be taken as the frontier line and that no Plebiscite should be held at all. Radkersburg would then remain Austrian.

“It was then decided that no Plebiscite should be held in Styria, and that the River Mur should be accepted as the frontier between Austria and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in this area.

“Radkersburg would be attributed to Austria, and Marburg to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.”

2. M Cambon said that the proposal referred to the Editing Committee by the Council on the previous day had been examined. In the opinion of the Editing Committee, the Council had refused to recognize the principle involved, in the Treaty with Germany. The Committee therefore regards it a mistake to record in the Treaty with Austria anything so diametrically different from the treatment accorded to Germany. For his part, he would suggest, should the Council adopt the proposal, that it be communicated to Austria in the form of a special additional document. The British Delegate on the Editing Committee regarded the question as one of general interest concerning all countries, including neutral countries. He thinks, therefore, that it should be referred to the League of Nations.

S Tittoni said that he favored the suggestion made by M Cambon that the agreement be made additional to the Treaty.

M Clemenceau says that he would prefer that nothing should be said in the Treaty.

Mr Polk suggested that the proposal be referred to the International Labour Congress in Washington.

(It is then decided that no mention be made in the Treaty with Austria of the rights and privileges of Allied workpeople admitted to enemy territories and vice versa, but that the resolution passed by the Labor Committee on June 4th, 1919, should be referred to the International Labour Congress in Washington.)

3. M Clemenceau said that the Council had previously decided that German Labour Delegates should be admitted to the next meeting of the International Labour Congress, after that to be held in Washington. The same principle should presumably apply to the Austrians. The labor organisations in various Allied and Neutral countries, notably in France, were, however, asking that the German labor delegates be admitted at once. His proposal was that the question of their admission or non-admission be left to the discretion of the Congress itself.

Mr Balfour says that he understands the proposal to be that the International Labor Congress should meet according to the constitution at present laid down for it, and that it should then decide whether or not German and Austrian delegates should be heard.

M Clemenceau says that was his intention.

S Tittoni said that the Italian government declared it would not send representatives to Washington and would not recognize the International Labor Congress or its decisions unless the German delegates were admitted. No International Labour legislation could be enforced in Italy against the will of Italian labor. He believes the same conditions exist in France.

M Clemenceau says that he is not intimidated by threats. The French Labour Party had spoken to him very much in the same manner, but he thinks his proposal was sufficient to meet the situation.

Mr Balfour says that M Clemenceau’s proposal appears to him to be very reasonable, though it is a modification of a previous decision. As he has no expert on labor matters whom he could consult, he would like to postpone giving his assent until he had had time to obtain the views of the British Minister specially concerned with this subject. In referring the matter to him, he would express his personal agreement with M Clemenceau’s views.

Mr Polk says that he was in a similar situation to Mr Balfour and would take up the matter with his Government.

S Tittoni said that there is one practical difficulty in M Clemenceau’s scheme. Should the Congress decide to give a hearing to the Germans and Austrians, they would require a month to get to Washington.

M Clemenceau says that he had been assured that the Germans and Austrians would go to Washington in expectation of a favorable decision, should the Council adopt the proposal he had made.

(It is decided to postpone the decision on the question of the admission of German and Austrian Labor Delegates to the International Labor Congress at Washington, until Mr Balfour and Mr Polk had consulted their respective Governments.)

4. M Clemenceau says that he has received a disquieting telegram from Colonel Haskell, the Allied High Commissioner in Armenia. (The telegram is then read.) He added that he had ordered a note to be circulated to his colleagues to the effect that he was ready to send 12,000 men to Cilicia. This force would be able to occupy the points mentioned by Colonel Haskell. It would be necessary to utilize the Baghdad railway as a means of supplying this force. (The note is then read.)

Mr Polk asks whether the army referred to by Colonel Haskell was not one that was accessible from the Black Sea.

M Berthelot said that it is also accessible from Cilicia, as the roads were good and suitable for motor lorries. It would be possible, he considered, to send supplies into Armenia from Mersina and Alexandretta. An agreement for the use of the railway would, however, be necessary.

Mr Balfour asked whether this had been studied by the French General Staff.

M Clemenceau says that the note is a result of a study by the Staff.

(It is decided to postpone the consideration of the Note till the following day.)

(It is decided to postpone the consideration of the new English draft covering letter until the following day, and in to connection with it, to discuss the question whether or not Austria was a New State.)

6. M Berthelot said that Article 61 of the new German Constitution was to the following effect: Article No. 61 of the New German Constitution.

“Each land has at least one vote in the Reichsrat. In the case of the greater lands, one vote is assigned to a million inhabitants. An excess which is at least equal to the population of the smallest land is reckoned as a complete million, No land can be represented by more than two-fifths of the total votes.

German Austria, after its junction with the German Reich, receives the right of participation in the Reichsrat with the number of votes corresponding to its population. Till then, the representatives of German Austria have a consultative Voice.

The number of votes is fixed anew by the Reichsrat after each general census.”

Article 61 appears to be out of harmony with Article 80 of the Treaty of Peace. The American Delegation, however, question whether Article 178 of the new German Constitution did not dispel the apparent contradiction. Article 178 is to the effect that no provision in the Constitution could be held to modify the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles. The question had been submitted to the legal advisers, who thought that Article 178 rendered Article 61, in so far as it conflicted with the stipulations of the Treaty, null and void. This appeared to furnish an additional reason for asking the German Government to cancel Article 61. The Council should therefore decide whether, and in what form, the protest should be made to the German Government. It should also decide whether M Tardieu’s proposal should be carried out, namely, to insert a counter-part of Article 80 in the Treaty with Austria.

Mr Balfour says that he understands the question raised by Article 61 of the new German Constitution had been referred to the Drafting Committee, and that agreement had not yet been reached within the Committee. He thought, therefore, that it would be better to await its recommendations. He thought that the first of the problems alluded to by M Berthelot was the more important. He does not think it matters much whether anything is inserted in the Treaty with Austria.

(It is decided to postpone the question raised by Article 61 of the new German Constitution to the following day, in order to obtain the views of the Drafting Committee.)

7. S Tittoni said that he understands the Drafting Committee wanted confirmation of the decision taken by the Council on August 27th regarding the plans for the Col de Reschen and Pas de Predil Railway.

M Fromageot (who enters the room at this moment with the members of the Drafting Committee), says the only question in doubt is whether the draft contained in Appendix “B” to H. D. 407 had been accepted by the Council.

(It is decided to accept the draft contained in Appendix “B” to H. D. 40.)

8. M Berthelot explained that the people of Vorarlberg had expressed a desire to join the Swiss Federation. The Austrian Delegation as might have been expected, had protested. The Swiss Federal Council, meanwhile, had not adopted any resolution in favour of union with Vorarlberg. The Federal Council hesitated because the inclusion of this district would upset the present balance of power between the German and French cantons. The Conference, therefore, had before it only an appeal from the Vorarlberg. It could take no decision until it had before it a proposal from the Swiss Government.

Mr Balfour says he quite agrees that this is a matter that cannot be settled without the Swiss. The only question left to the Council was to know whether the door should be left open for the Swiss to invite Vorarlberg to join them. He thought it might be better to leave the whole question alone.

M Berthelot says that the following was the proposal of the Central Territorial Committee for insertion in the Treaty.

“23 aout, 1919.

En présence des manifestations des habitants du Vorarlberg en faveur d’un rattachement de leur territoire à la Suisse, la République d’Autriche, au cas où la Suisse elle-même, déclarerait formellement qu’elle accepte un tel rattachement, s’engage à reconnaître la décision du Conseil de la Société des Nations devant qui le cas devrait être porté.”

(“August 23, 1919.

In view of the manifestations of the inhabitants of Vorarlberg in favor of the union of their territory to Switzerland, the Republic of Austria, in case Switzerland should formally declare that she accepts such a union, undertakes to recognize the decision of the Council of the League of Nations to which the case should be presented.”)

Mr Balfour asks whether the petition received from the Vorarlberg represented the majority of the population.

M Laroche said that two unofficial plebiscites had been held, and they yielded the result of 4 to 1 in favour of union with Switzerland. The second had been even more decisive than the first.

S Tittoni said that he would suggest reference to a regular plebiscite.

M Clemenceau said that he would prefer to take no action. The matter had not been brought officially to the cognizance of the Conference. There was in Switzerland a balance of power between the German and French elements. The Swiss Government was satisfactory from an international point of view. It might cease to be so if its German population were increased.

M Laroche observes that it was for this reason that the Committee recommended that a formal declaration by Switzerland should be obtained.

M Clemenceau observed that so far Switzerland had asked for nothing.

Mr Balfour says that he is also in favour of not adding to the German majority in Switzerland.

M Pichon observes that the problem is complicated by a financial question. Switzerland would only accept Vorarlberg if the area were relieved of its share of the Austrian debt. The hope of escape from this burden was one of the determining motives in the result of the plebiscites.

M Tardieu said that there was also a political reason against inserting anything in the Treaty regarding Vorarlberg. The Conference is attempting to meet the Austrians as far as possible. The Austrian Delegation would be greatly offended at any Article tending to deprive it of Vorarlberg. The Conference had received expressions of opinion from Dutch Limburg in favour of union with Belgium. No notice had been taken. He thinks the question should be left for the League of Nations to consider at a later date.

(It is decided that no action need be taken on the subject of the union of Vorarlberg with Switzerland.)

9. M Clemenceau says that the conclusions of the report had been accepted by the Council (H. D. 39, Para. 2). He observes that he has taken action and fulfilled his part of the undertaking. He had given orders that the French troops in Fiume should be replaced by others. As to the suppression of the French base, this cannot be undertaken immediately, as the base must be maintained while there were French troops. In the meantime, however, there had been a recrudescence of unpleasant incidents. He thinks it is necessary that General Grazioli should be recalled forthwith, and that Italy should take as prompt action as he had taken himself, otherwise further bloodshed would occur, as threatening posters were appearing in Fiume, directed against both the French and the British.

S Tittoni undertook to act and to fulfill all the undertakings of the Italian Government.

M Clemenceau said that he took note of this declaration.

10. M Seydoux explained that the Note prepared by the Eastern Blockade Committee for the Council, and considered by the latter on the 23rd August (H. D. 37. Minute 6) had been reconsidered in order to meet the views of the American Delegation. Certain modifications had been made, but the Blockade Committee thought it absolutely necessary to maintain a sentence to the effect that any action taken by a warship of an Allied or Associated Power should be understood to be taken in the name of all the Allied and Associated Powers. Without such a stipulation, it would be impossible for the ships in the Baltic to take any action at all.

Mr Polk observes that there appeared to be no amendment in that case of the previous provisional decision. What is proposed is equivalent to a blockade.

M Seydoux says that it is not blockade, because merchant shipping could not be captured, but could only be turned back.

Mr Polk said he regretted that he could not agree. The phrase M Seydoux attached such importance to represented a blockade. The American Government had always held very strong views on this subject. He thinks, however, that some compromise might be possible. According to M Seydoux, a neutral ship, attempting to trade with Bolshevik Russia, could not be captured, but could be turned back. Should the neutral ship refuse to turn back and should its papers be in order, Allied ships would not be entitled to take any action at all. What he suggested was,

“that vessels of the Allied and Associated Powers should, in the name of those Powers as a whole, be authorized to prevent any vessel not provided with legal clearance for a Bolshevist Russian port, or any vessels whose papers are falsified, from proceeding to a Bolshevist destination.”

Mr Balfour asks what the United States Government would do if an American trader asked for clearance papers for a cargo to Petrograd.

Mr Polk says that the United States Government would refuse clearance.

Mr Balfour says the British Government would do the same.

Mr Polk points out that stopping a neutral ship at sea if it carries regular papers, is nothing less than blockade.

Mr Balfour says that the United States Government makes a distinction between fighting Russia and being at war with Russia.

Mr Polk observed that the British Government makes the same distinction.

Mr Balfour says that according to International lawyers, it is impossible to be at war with any Government unless that Government were recognised. He did not, himself, attach much value to the opinion of international lawyers.

M Seydoux said that it is known that several Swedish ships are ready to sail with cargoes for Petrograd. If the American proposal is adopted, the Allied Navies would not be able to intercept them.

Mr Polk asks how the Navies could stop them at present.

M Seydoux said that hitherto no such shipments had gone to Petrograd. He suggests that the British Admiralty Notice No. 1298 of the 18th July, warning shipping against entering the zone in which operations were taking place, should be re-affirmed in the “Journal Officiel” of the various Allied Governments.

Mr Polk says that he would try and find some formula to which the American Government could consent.

(The question is then adjourned.)

11. Mr Polk asks whether Treaties with the new States are to be between the New State on the one hand, and all the Allied and Associated Powers on the other, or between the New State on the one hand, and the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other.

(It is decided that the Treaties with the New States should be between the New State on the one hand, and the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-30-19, 06:26 AM

30th August 1919

Aftermath of War

First of series of Anglo-Russian successes in N. Russia.

German Minister of Defense Gustav Noske in Munich. Captain Karl Mayr, standing left of Noske, is the immediate superior of Adolf Hitler and will introduce him to politics.
https://i.postimg.cc/vTMKjbWn/EDNOFo9-Xs-AArs-QX.png (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

08-30-19, 02:59 PM

Saturday, August 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Cambon reads aloud the French text of the draft covering letter, in reply to the Austrian counter-proposals, prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr. On concluding, he remarks that the letter now before the Council is longer than the former communication drafted by the Editing Committee. He further remarks, that, in Mr. Philip Kerr’s draft covering letter, no mention was made of the fact that the Allied and Associated Powers had decided to call the new Austrian State the Austrian Republic, and to avoid all mention of the expression “German Austria”. The Covering Letter in Reply to the Austrian Counter proposals.

S Tittoni says says that it had been decided that the expression “Republic of Austria” should be employed in all official communications addressed to that Country. He does not think that it was within the power of the Council to do more.

M Clemenceau said that he agreed with S Tittoni.

M Cambon reads the passage in the original covering letter drafted by the Editing Committee, dealing explicitly with the point in question.

Mr Balfour says that he wishes to make a general comparison between the former document, prepared by the Editing Committee, and the one now before the Council. He accepts M Cambon’s statement that the new draft covering letter is longer than the former. He also agreed with him that the new letter omits certain points which had been dealt with by the Editing Committee. With regard to the manner in which the Austrian Government should henceforth be addressed, the Council had always referred to the “Austrian Republic” in all official documents, and it was not possible to do more than this. Neither the Council nor the League of Nations can prevent any Country from conferring upon itself any title that it might desire to be known by. The original document drawn up by the Editing Committee is an extremely able one and a proof of this statement consisted in the fact that the new draft before the Council was based entirely upon the old covering letter, to which it owed everything. None the less, he preferred the new version to the old. What is desired was a document drafted in such a form, that it should be read widely in Allied, and in enemy, countries. This document should, moreover, express in the clearest and most forcible terms, the main contention of the Allied and Associated Governments, which is that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had largely caused the war and that the Austrian Republic was the direct successor of the old Kingdom. He thinks that this main argument was expressed with greater force in the new document. If, however, the Council desired to adhere to the former draft covering letter drawn up by the Editing Committee, he would point out that it had not been the work of a single mind; that, in consequence, it contains a certain number of repetitions; and that it insisted on details, which, though important to the Allied Governments, and possibly to Austria, would not excite the interest of the ordinary public.

He thinks that in the new document, Italy’s case had been better stated. Attention is drawn to the selfish and unscrupulous manner in which the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had always tried to arrange her frontiers with Italy in such a way that she would have that country at her mercy. He does not think that too much emphasis could be given to this. In favoring the acceptance of the new document before the Council, he bases his preference on the conviction that it would be more accessible to the mind of the ordinary public throughout the world.

Mr Polk says that there is no great choice between either draft. On the whole, however, he is ready to agree with Mr Balfour to accept the one prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr, but drew attention to the fact that a few changes would be necessary in it.

S Tittoni said that the new document before the Council had been very well drawn up, and that it possessed the qualities ascribed to it by Mr Balfour. He therefore accepts it.

Mr Matsui says that he accepted the English draft.

M. Cambon drew attention to the fact that in the old draft letter drawn up by the Editing Committee, the question of a possible union between Germany and Austria is dealt with. It is not mentioned in the new document.

M Clemenceau says that the question of the future relations between Germany and Austria would be discussed.

M Cambon draws attention to the American proposal contained in Appendix F of H. D. 38.3 This proposal points out that the original covering letter was not in agreement with the preamble of the Peace Treaty on the subject of the present status of Austria.

Mr Polk, in further explanation, states that in the preamble of the Peace Treaty the words “Austria is recognised as a new and independent State under the name of the Republic of Austria” appeared. In the original covering letter, Austria had been treated as the successor of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He suggested that the matter could be settled by deleting from the preamble of the Treaty the phrase above quoted. In addition to this, the word “Austria” on page 8 of the preamble, should be replaced by the expression “Republic of Austria”.

Mr Balfour remarks that the words “Austria is recognised as a new and independent State” had been inserted by President Wilson, who would not, he thought, raise any objection to their suppression.

Mr Polk says that the manner in which Austria was referred to in the preamble had an important bearing upon the future obligations of the new Republic. The phrase in question affected the Peace Treaty; the covering letter was not concerned with it.

S Tittoni remarks that in the new document before the Council, the “tyranny” of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was emphasized in one place and the “centralization” of that Government in another. He thought that the last expression weakened the first.

Mr Balfour says that the centralization of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had been drawn attention to, in order to show the Austrian people how much the dominant position of Vienna, in former days, stood to their prejudice at present.

Mr Polk says that on page seven of the English Draft, the words “Committees who reported on the question” should be replaced by the word “Conference”. He also said that the resolution passed on the previous day, with regard to Radkersburg, made it necessary to amend the statement on the subject of the Austro-Hungarian frontiers.

M Tardieu says that a small sub-Committee of the Reparations Commission had been of the opinion that a special clause should be inserted in the draft letter.

Mr Balfour said that he thought such a clause ought to be put in a separate document.

(After some discussion, it is agreed the proposed special clause should be added to the covering letter, in some way, possibly, as a footnote.)

It is decided:

(1) That the covering letter prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr, and submitted to the Council, should be accepted as a whole, but that the following modifications should be introduced:

(a) Page 7 (English Text) Paragraph 4. Lines 8 & 9, the words “Committees who reported on the question”, should be replaced by the word “Conference”.

(b) That the statements in Paragraph 4, Page 7 (English Text) on the subject of the Austrian frontiers, should be amended in conformity with the resolution taken on the previous day with regards should be added to the covering letter in the form of a foot-note, or in some other suitable manner.

(2) It was also decided that the following changes should be made in the preamble of the Peace Treaty with Austria:

(a) On Page 8, Line 11 from the bottom, the word “Austria” should be replaced by the words “Republic of Austria”.

(b) On Page 8, Lines 5 & 6 from the bottom the words “Austria is recognised as a new and independent State under the name of the Republic of Austria”, should be deleted.)

2. The Council takes note of the reply of the Drafting Committee to the question put before it by the Council on the 28th August.

M Clemenceau says that he cannot agree with the reply of the Drafting Committee. In his opinion, Article 61 of the new German Constitution not only violates the Treaty of Versailles, but calls for the collaboration of the Austrian Republic in that very violation. The situation caused is a serious one, and must be faced. In his opinion, the attention of the German Government should be called to this act of violation and should be forced to give a reply. He thinks that the Drafting Committee’s argument is an extremely clever one, but the assent of the German Government to that argument must be obtained. International lawyers were notorious for their differences of opinion. One lawyer would assert that an object-was red, another that it was blue, whilst a third would be equally certain that it had no color at all. These differences of opinion, though entertaining, were not a suitable basis for measures affecting the peace of Europe. Article in the German Constitution Violating the Peace Treaty With Germany.

Mr Balfour says that there are two questions before the Council. Firstly, the insertion of a clause in the Peace Treaty with Austria, with a view to counteracting the provisions of Article 61 of the new German Constitution; and, secondly, the action which should be taken with regard to Germany in view of her violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. He would like to know the opinion of the lawyers of the Drafting Committee upon the legal side of the question.

Dr Scott said that, in his opinion, the insertion of Article 61 in the German Constitution showed that the German Government had willfully, deliberately, and without cause, broken the pact into which she had entered at Versailles.

M Clemenceau says that it might be sufficient to make the Austrian Government undertake not to be a party to the German Government’s maneuver.

(It is agreed that a special clause should be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Austria.)

Mr Balfour says that he agrees with M Clemenceau, but that he would like to hear a concise statement of the problem in international law raised by Article 61. He believes that the Drafting Committee had not been unanimous in its opinion on the subject.

M Fromageot said that he thinks that the new German Constitution violates the Peace Treaty, and added, that the advice to the Council, in the form submitted, had been unanimously accepted by the Drafting Committee.

M Clemenceau says that he has news, in the form of a letter, which he has not yet circulated to the Council, that the attitude of the German Government was quite unsatisfactory. They were opposing Allied action in Silesia and his latest information was to the effect, that one army corps would now be necessary for that country. All this only constituted an extra proof of the bad faith of the German people, and its Government.

Mr Hurst said that there had been a difference of opinion in the Drafting Committee as to the extent to which the Peace Treaty of Versailles had been violated, although all were agreed that it had been violated in a certain degree. The point at issue was as follows. Article 80 of the Peace Treaty with Germany contained two references to the independence of Austria. In the first, Germany was called upon “to respect strictly the independence of Austria.” In the second, she agreed that “this independence shall be inalienable.” Undoubtedly Article 61 of the German Constitution violated the letter of the Peace of Versailles, but it was in the form of an invitation to Austria to join Germany. A country’s independence was recognised by abstaining from all acts of coercion against it; and an invitation, which was the very reverse of a coercive measure, could hardly be said to threaten the independence of a sovereign State.

M Tardieu says that Mr Hurst’s argument is to the effect that Article 61 of the German Constitution exerted no pressure against Austria. The Peace Treaty of Versailles, however, stipulated that nothing should be done to interfere with Austrian independence. As an act prejudicial to that independence had been taken, the question of whether there had, or had not, been direct pressure, could be laid to one side.

M Clemenceau says that he thought a letter should be sent on the subject to the German Government, which should be called upon to reply.

M Tardieu said that the action of the German Government had been taken by the Legislative Authorities. In previous cases (Slesvig, etc.) the Executive Authorities had been concerned. In either case, the Council could act.

M Clemenceau says that the Council was called upon to take a political and not a legal decision; and suggested that Mr Balfour, who is a moderate man, should draft the communication to be sent to the German Government.

Mr Balfour says that he did not think that moderation was the exact quality required, and he thought that M Berthelot, who was not a moderate man, ought to draft the letter.

S Tittoni remarks that the cases of Austria and of Germany was not quite analogous. Germany must be called upon to perform her Treaty engagements. He did not know whether Austria could be called upon to settle, finally, her future condition, at the dictation of the Council.

M Pichon says that in the draft Article for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Austria, the manner in which the future independence of Austria was to be assured by the League of Nations was clearly provided for.

(It is agreed:

(1) That the draft Article regarding the independence of Austria (See Appendix “C”) should be accepted and inserted in the Austrian Peace Treaty;

(2) That M. Berthelot should draft a letter for transmission to the German Government on the subject of Article 61 of the new German Constitution and should submit his draft to the Council at its next meeting.)

3. The Council takes note of the Drafting Committee’s report on the draft articles to be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Austria, for the settlement of differences between States called upon by that Treaty to conclude special Conventions.

(After some discussion, it is decided that the draft articles for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Austria should be accepted.

4. The Council takes note of a document drawing attention to the divergences between the French and English texts of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Mr Balfour proposes the following draft resolution:

“The present Treaty in French, in English and in Italian shall be ratified. In case of divergence, the French text shall prevail, except in Parts I and XIII, where the French and English texts shall be of equal force.”

He says that in bringing forward this resolution, he desires to make it quite clear, that he did not wish it to be thought, that he was provoking a competition for priority between the French and English languages:

(After some discussion, it is agreed:

1) That in the case of divergence between the French, English and Italian texts of the Peace Treaty with Austria, the French text should prevail, except in parts I and XIII, where the French and English texts should be of equal force.

2) That the Drafting Committee should insert an Article in the Peace Treaty with Austria in conformity with the aforesaid resolution.)

5. The Council takes note of a communication from M Pachitch, on behalf of the Yugoslav State, to the effect that the Yugoslav Government could not undertake to sign the Peace Treaty with Austria, until the special Treaty between themselves and the Allied & Associated Govts., provided for in Article 59 of the Peace Treaty with Austria, had been communicated to them. Proposed Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Yugo-Slav State

(It is agreed that the consideration of this question should be adjourned to the Meeting of the Council on Monday, September 1st, 1919.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

08-31-19, 06:27 AM

31st August 1919

The English Football League resumes play in Britain after it was on hold for the past four years due to the war.

Anti-Bolshevik troops recaptures the Ukrainian capital of Kiev from the Red Army.
https://i.postimg.cc/Xv4VSkvh/EDSXrfy-Wk-AAcy9-A.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

08-31-19, 07:31 PM

Sunday, August 31, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

09-01-19, 04:37 AM

1st September 1919

Aftermath of War

Ongoing series of Anglo-Russian successes in N. Russia.

Russian filmmaker Vladimir Gardin opens the Moscow Film School (today the Gerasimov Institute of Cinematography), the oldest film school in the world.
https://i.postimg.cc/hvSWVFDD/EDXl14f-Xk-AEC6-SW.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

The Communist Labor Party of America is established after it splits from the Socialist Party of America.
https://i.postimg.cc/k5xpsjhB/EDXl14f-Xk-AEC6-SW.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Talk about shell games! Pile of shells that cost the British government $25 each. An enterprising Philadelphian, scenting a bargain, managed to buy them for 60 cents apiece. Now that shell cocktail shakers have gone out of vogue, wonder will he convent them into rolling pins.
https://i.postimg.cc/jjKXxRZS/wmuhx18e5tj31.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

HMS Vittoria (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War, British campaign in the Baltic: The V-class destroyer was torpedoed and sunk by Pantera ( Soviet Navy) in the Gulf of Finland off Seiskari, Finland. She was salvaged in 1925 but found to be beyond repair.

Sailor Steve

09-01-19, 09:24 PM

Monday, September 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a Draft copy of a Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and the The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the Treaty before the Council was similar to that with Romania already approved by the Council. There are three such Treaties, one with Romania, one with Yugoslavia and one with Greece, all on the same lines. The Treaty with Greece will be ready in a few days. The Committee has had the advantage of consultation with Mr Venizelos in regard to the last of these Treaties. The suggestions he has made have been very helpful. His attitude had been very different from that adopted by the other States. As to the Treaty with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the Delegation of that State had protested both against the principles of the Treaty as a whole, and also against its application to old Serbia. The first of these objections is no concern of the Committee. As to the second, the Committee is of opinion that the questions involved were questions of principle which should govern the whole policy of the State. The Committee thinks that it is not practically possible to distinguish between one part of the territory of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and another. Serbia in 1912 had had a population of three millions, but after the Balkan war, this population increased to five millions, and at the present time it amounted to twelve millions. The State, moreover, has changed its name and a Constituent Assembly is to be gathered in order to draw up the Constitution for the whole territory. The Committee therefore, thinks it is fair to consider the whole as a new State. It did not think that the stipulations in the Draft Treaty represented any real derogation from the authority of the sovereign State.

M Clemenceau asks whether the supervision of the Minority Clauses is to vest in the Allied and Associated Powers, or in the League of Nations.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the State conferred these rights on the Allied and Associated Powers pending the creation of a League of Nations, and thereafter stipulated that they should be transferred to the latter.

M Clemenceau says that this provision satisfies him.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that there is agreement in the Committee on all points save one. Before proceeding to describe this point, he wishes to draw attention to the very first sentence of the preamble. The date 1913 had been deliberately chosen in order to show that the Treaty had under consideration, not only the acquisition of territory made subsequent to the Great War, but also those which resulted from the Balkan War. This was the more necessary as the territory acquired in the Balkan war contained most of the population for whom special minority legislation was necessary, for instance, Macedonia. All were agreed that a strong and a just Government is necessary in Serbia. It is even more necessary that the Government should be strong than that it should be just. Macedonia is now to be delivered to Serbia in perpetuity. The question arises whether any restriction, not contained in the general clauses, for the protection of Minorities, should be imposed on the Serbian Government in this area. The French Delegation is of the opinion that nothing should be done in this sense. The argument is that freedom of religion and language were to prevail in Macedonia and that the population would have appeal to the League of Nations. The French Delegation thinks this sufficient. The Italian Delegation on the other hand proposes a far-reaching scheme amounting to a special form of autonomous Government for Macedonia. He will not explain this scheme as the British Delegation has not supported it. He would prefer that it should be explained by a member of the Italian Delegation. The American, British and Japanese Delegations propose what is included in the first version of Article 12. The suggestion is that the League of Nations should have their representative living in the country, who should report to the League and give advice to the Serbian Government. It is thought the presence of such a representative would be beneficial to the population as well as to the Serbian Government and might help to avoid outbreaks of violence. It is proposed that this arrangement should last five years. He has taken the liberty of consulting the Secretary-General of the League of Nations unofficially. He, on his side, makes no objection.

S Tittoni says that he would not insist on the Italian proposal. He is ready to adhere to the proposal of the majority.

M Berthelot says that the view of the French Delegation was that the Article proposed by the American, British and Japanese Delegations constituted an obvious mark of distrust of the Serbian Government. It had a further objectionable feature in that it left Macedonia open to Greek and Bulgarian intrigue, instead of allowing it to merge into Serbia, as it more naturally should, since it became part of Serbian territory. He thought the proposal would make it very difficult for the Serbian Government to accept the Treaty, especially as no special reasons for this distrust could be alleged.

Mr Polk asks whether the proposal applies only to Macedonia.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that it is intended to apply not only to Macedonia, but also to areas in the neighborhood of Albania, where a considerable part of the population is Albanian.

M Berthelot says that those people, like other minorities, had certain guarantees, including appeal to the League of Nations. The view of the French Delegation is that the Serbian Government has not deserved any special mark of suspicion.

S Tittoni observes that the measure is a temporary one, and that the Commissioner could be withdrawn after five years.

M Clemenceau says that he would prefer to tell the Serbian Government that the League of Nations will establish a Commissioner in the country if disturbances arose. The Minority Treaties are already ill-received by the Poles and the Romanians. He thinks it very undesirable to incur the ill-will of the Yugoslavs as well.

Mr Balfour says that he also would like to avoid hurting the feelings of the Serbs. Apart from their feelings, however, he thinks there were strong arguments in favour of the British, American, Japanese proposal. It is said that the people of Macedonia can appeal to the League of Nations if they were oppressed. Is it not better for the League of Nations to have an Officer on the spot who could report on the state of the country, rather than to receive Delegations from Macedonia in Geneva, Brussels or wherever the seat of the League might be? In the latter alternative, the League of Nations would have a poor chance of estimating the comparative mendacity of the reports brought to them. The Council has had experience of the kind of evidence supplied from the Balkans. There is equally hard swearing on both sides, and it was hardly ever possible to disentangle rights and wrongs. The Commissioner on the spot, assuming he were an able man, would know what really happened and he could give the League better evidence than could ever be obtained from rival Delegations. He does, however, think it is a serious matter to give offence to small Nations who were perhaps unduly sensitive about their sovereign rights. He is therefore inclined somewhat favorably towards M Clemenceau’s proposal; but it involves delivering Macedonia to the mercy of the Serbs until such time as the arrangement breaks down.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the Committee has been influenced by the evidence of people with a knowledge of Balkan affairs. They have led the Committee to apprehend not legal injustices as in Poland, but outbreaks of illegal violence, such as massacres and petty persecutions. He ventures to suggest that if the outbreak of such forms of disorder are to be awaited, the object of the Conference will not be attained. He thinks it can be fairly stated to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation that it was a matter of common knowledge that they would have trouble in governing certain areas, and it would be an advantage not only to the local populations, but also to their Government, to have a representative of the League of Nations on the spot.

M Clemenceau says that the adoption of the preventive system would cause the Conference to have great difficulties with the Serbs. On the merits, he thinks Mr Headlam-Morley is quite right, but the result of any stipulation such as he proposed would be to encourage a large section of the Macedonian population to have recourse to the Commissioner of the League of Nations in opposition to the Central Serbian Government. This would in the end probably come about, but he would prefer that it should come about as the result of the faults of the Serbian Government, rather than as the result of action by the Conference.

S Tittoni said that he thinks an extraordinary commissioner might possibly cause annoyance. The desired result might be obtained by extending the powers of Consuls in Macedonia.

M Clemenceau says that conflict will inevitably ensue with any such system. It might even amount to the re-introduction of the “capitulations”.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the object of the Committee should be to do away with any reminiscences of the old control of the Powers. A very careful attempt had been made to avoid this difficulty.

Mr Polk says that he feels the same scruple as M Clemenceau. He does not wish to hurt the national pride of the Serbs. On the other hand if nothing is done the Macedonians will suffer.

M Clemenceau says it is for this reason that he suggests the threat of imposing a Commissioner. He suggests that a formula be introduced in the Treaty to the effect that the League of Nations would send a Commissioner to Macedonia, should trouble arise in the area. The Serbs would understand that they must behave.

Mr Polk asks whether M Clemenceau suggests the insertion of this in the Treaty of Peace itself.

M Tardieu says he thinks that if anything of the sort is said, it would be better to say it in a letter, but he does not think it desirable to say anything of the kind. Why should Macedonia be specially singled out?

Mr Polk asks whether the suggestion could not be made to the Serb, Croat Slovene Delegation. Their opinion might then be obtained.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that though the Delegation has not seen the draft Treaty, he is quite certain they would refuse to sign it. He did, however, think it urgent to submit the Treaty to them. They would certainly make comment on the Article as at present drafted. It was better to submit it to them in a strong form, in order to have a margin for concessions.

Mr Polk says he thinks in the end it will be necessary to amend the Article in the sense suggested by M Clemenceau. He agrees, however, that the Article in its present form might be shown to the Serbs.

Mr Headlam-Morley said that the Committee wished genuinely to obtain the views of the Delegation. The Committee has not had the advantage of discussing the question with them in consequence of their uncompromising attitude. The conversations with Mr Venizelos on the other hand had been very fruitful.

Mr Balfour asks what the Committee will do if the Serbs regard the Article as such an insult to them that they refuse to discuss it.

S Tittoni suggested that the Article be so worded as not to impose a Commissioner, but to suggest the appointment of one if necessary.

M Tardieu says that whatever the situation in Macedonia might be, he does not think it right to add a special provision to the clauses, which in themselves are extremely unpopular. There are other areas in which disturbances might be expected. He does not look forward to the administration of part of Serbia by the League of Nations. Such a provision could not in any case be made general.

Mr Balfour says that the Commissioner, he thought, would not have an agreeable post. He would have no executive authority and no protection. He could only offer advice which might be neglected with impunity. There seem to be areas in which mutual massacres are the only method of reaching conclusions.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that this is what the Committee expects will take place if no arrangements were made in anticipation. There will be at once considerable agitation fostered by the friends of the Bulgars, in America, Great Britain and perhaps in France. They would claim the attention of the League of Nations; and the trouble would be aggravated.

M Tardieu says that if information is all that is desired, consuls can make reports.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that this is the old system, which it was desirable to eschew.

M Tardieu says that the old system includes international gendarmerie. The appointment of a Commissioner appears to reintroduce that system, in contradiction of the principles of the Conference, and in particular of the League of Nations.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that he accepts M Tardieu’s general criticism, but that he thinks this special exception is justified.

Mr Balfour says that no doubt the Serbs, if they knows their own interests, will suggest the appointment of the Commissioner themselves, but it is clear they do not.

M. Pichon says that what chiefly shocked the world in the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was the violation of Serbian sovereignty. If the Conference adopts the same course, Serbia will refuse to sign. Mr Pachitch has already declared quite clearly that he will not.

Mr Balfour inquires whether the League of Nations has a right under the Covenant to send representatives to make an inquiry, should massacres take place.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the League has this power according to the terms of the Minority Treaties; in this instance, according to Article 11, the League of Nations can act if an infraction of the Treaty occurs.

M Clemenceau after reading Article 11, expresses the opinion that these stipulations are sufficient to protect Macedonian and Albanian minorities in the Serbian State.

Mr Balfour agrees that it will be easier in practice to give effect to Article 11, rather than to Article 12.

S Tittoni suggested that the words “prendre telles mesures” be substituted for the words “procéder de telle façon” in the French text of Article 11.

(It is then decided to accept the Treaty as a whole, to expunge Article 12 entirely, to amend Article 11 by the substitution of the words “prendre telles mesures” for “procéder de telle façon”, and, after the necessary drafting amendments, to communicate the Treaty to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation.)

2. M Tardieu explains the letter sent by Mr Venizelos to the President of the Council on the 24th August. He points out that since then a new element in the situation had been introduced by a telegram from President Wilson. This telegram sets aside both the alternatives considered.

M Clemenceau said that he thinks that it is a very dangerous proposal to ask the Commissioner at Constantinople to take charge of an area containing 700,000 Greeks and 700,000 Turks, who would be in a continual state of warfare. He cannot therefore accept the proposals made by President Wilson, but he is ready to listen to any new proposals that might be made.

S Tittoni suggests that the question be adjourned, as no decision could be reached that day.

Mr Balfour points out that the Bulgarians are awaiting the Treaty, which must be completed without further delay.

M Clemenceau said that if President Wilson adhered to his proposal it was not possible to reach a settlement.

Mr Balfour says that the future of Constantinople and Asia Minor need not be settled before the conclusion of the Treaty with Bulgaria. It was possible to say that Bulgaria should have nothing south or south-east of a given line. The fate of the territories outside that line might be reserved.

S Tittoni said that if this plan is followed, difficulties will arise in Western Thrace. Eastern Thrace could be reserved without any difficulty, as it is occupied by Turkish troops. But the Bulgarians will be called upon to evacuate that part of Western Thrace they at present occupied. If so, they must be told to whom they were to deliver the country.

M Tardieu said that there is also a difficulty for Greece if the decision is adjourned until the fate of Constantinople has been settled.

Mr Balfour says that it was possible to distinguish between the questions at issue. The most pressing of the problems is to decide what was the boundary of Bulgaria. The other questions as to exactly how the parts of the Turkish Empire South of the Bulgarian boundary should be disposed of, could be for the time being deferred. As to President Wilson’s telegram, he could not help feeling the President had not given sufficient consideration to the position of Mr Venizelos. Mr Venizelos is the only statesman in the Balkans who had sincerely tried to assist the Conference, and whose policy aimed at maintaining peace in the Balkans, yet if the American policy in Eastern Europe were carried out, Greece of all these States, would fare worst. Serbia would acquire three times as much territory as she previously possessed. Romania, in spite of her constant defiance of the Conference, would double her population. Poland and Czechoslovakia were created by the Conference itself. Greece, if a large Greek population in Thrace were not added to her, would hardly increase at all, except in national debt which was as great as Bulgaria’s, even when the Bulgarian indemnity of £90,000,000 was counted in. He thinks that it is not altogether fair to treat Mr Venizelos in this manner nor did he believe it to be in the interest of Peace, especially as all Greece asks for is the application of the Fourteen Points. The President’s message, however, must be seriously considered. He therefore suggests that a line be adopted for the purpose of the Treaty with Bulgaria and that the attribution of all territories south of it be reserved.

M Tardieu says that to the reasons adduced by Mr Balfour might be added the fact that Greece since the Armistice, at the instance of the Conference, had mobilized three more divisions than she had under arms during the war. She had increased her army from 9 to 12 divisions. Greece is the only Power which had increased her Army since the Armistice. Out of 7¼ million Greeks living in compact masses in Greece, Thrace and Asia Minor, 2,300,000 living at the very gates of their own country would be excluded from it by the President’s plan. He does not think this would conduce to peace. There is also another aspect to the question. The Council had seen fit to deny the Hapsburgs the recovery of the throne in Hungary. If Greece were to be treated as was now suggested, King Constantine would be back on the throne within six months. He agrees that Mr Balfour’s solution would meet the practical necessity of framing a treaty for Bulgaria, but he thinks the arguments raised against the President’s message should be put to him.

Mr Polk says he would gladly send the arguments to President Wilson. He heartily agreed with what Mr Balfour had said concerning the attitude of Mr Venizelos during the Conference. This attitude had always been most loyal and generous. It is therefore most distasteful to the American Delegation to adopt any decision not immediately acceptable to Mr Venizelos. He does not wish to enter into all the reasons which had determined President Wilson. He would only point out to M Tardieu that, if all the Greeks outside Greece were allowed to join Greece, it was rather the territory round Constantinople than the territory round Adrianople which would become Greek. He felt sure that the danger of the restoration of Constantine was recognised by President Wilson.

(It is decided that the Central Territorial Committee should determine a boundary line in accordance with President Wilson’s message, as the Southern frontier of Bulgaria. The portion of Western Thrace to be ceded by Bulgaria will be ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers. This territory will be occupied by British, French, Italian and Greek troops, the last being kept in the portion of this territory by general agreement attributed to Greece. The Treaty should, further, stipulate for Bulgarian access to a port on the Aegean.)

3. Mr Balfour says that he has sent M Clemenceau’s proposals to the British Government with a personal opinion in their favour, and is waiting to hear further as to representatives being sent out to confer regarding details.

(It is agreed the question should be adjourned.)

4. Mr Balfour says that he understands the policy of the Conference to be that repatriation of the German prisoners in British and American hands should be carried out without delay under the auspices of an Inter-Allied Commission. It is not intended that the Commission should delay repatriation, even for an hour. The Commission itself is mere camouflage. He is ready to discuss any report the Commission might make, provided repatriation went on in the meantime. He did not, however, think that it was necessary for the Commission to make any report. All it had to do was to give a free hand to the British and American Authorities to carry out the repatriation. On Saturday he had heard that the engine drivers on the French trains said that they will take no German prisoner trains into Germany without a direct order from M. Clemenceau. Repatriation of Prisoners of War

M Clemenceau says that no obstruction has been put by him on the process of repatriation.

M Alphand explains the report made to the Council and the interpretation of its orders made by the Commission. He further points out that the Treaty stipulated that repatriation of prisoners should be carried out with the help of German rolling stock.

M Clemenceau points out that it had not been intended that the Commission should make any arrangements with the Germans. All it was to do was to facilitate in every way the repatriation of the prisoners held by the British and the Americans.

Mr Matsui asks whether there is any objection to a discussion within the Commission regarding repatriation of prisoners held by the Japanese.

M Clemenceau says that he sees no objection.

M Alphand asks whether German civilian prisoners held by the French Government should also be repatriated.

M Clemenceau replies in the negative.

5. The Council has before it a draft note to the German Government regarding the violation of the Treaty constituted by Article 61 in the new German Constitution.

M Clemenceau says that he sees several solutions, none of which are entirely satisfactory. One is to tell the Germans that the Treaty will not be ratified unless they alter their Constitution. Another is to say that, as Article 178 of the German Constitution rendered Article 61 inoperative, the German Government is asked to acknowledge the nullity of the latter. The third idea that strikes him is that the Council should avail itself of the article in the Treaty providing for a prolongation of the occupation of the Rhine if guarantees against German aggression appeared insufficient.

M Tardieu points out that Article 428 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany stipulates for something to take place after the lapse of 15 years. The breach of the Treaty complained of had just occurred. It seemed a long time to wait before taking action.

Mr Balfour said he thinks the notion of not ratifying the Treaty must be rejected. He thinks, however, it would be quite legitimate to occupy more territory on the East of the Rhine should the Germans not amend their Constitution.

M Tardieu agrees with Mr Balfour that action should be taken at once of such a kind as to discourage Germany from a repetition of the offence.

Mr Balfour points out that the German Government alone can do nothing. It cannot alter the Constitution. It can interpret it but its interpretation could be called in question by another Government. Only the German Parliament could deal with the matter and the German Parliament was not sitting. He suggests that the German Government be told that it had committed a breach of the Treaty which cannot be accepted, and that this breach must be remedied within a certain time, failing which the Allied and Associated Powers would take such action as they might think fit.

M Clemenceau suggests that such action might be the occupation of Frankfurt.

(It is decided that M Berthelot should re-draft the message to the German Government regarding the breach of the Treaty constituted by Article 61 of the new German Constitution in the spirit of the discussion and that the new draft should be considered at the following meeting.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

09-02-19, 11:03 AM

2nd September 1919

An American Red Cross dining room in Tomsk, Siberia that provides for Russian refugees fleeing the Russian Civil War.
https://i.postimg.cc/CKnvFFmr/EDcvble-Ws-AASEe-C.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Edward, Prince of Wales, lays the cornerstone of Peace Tower of the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa.
https://i.postimg.cc/cJfQ96DW/EDY4-PNv-W4-AEkd3.png (https://postimages.org/)

General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, waves goodbye to France as he returns to the U.S.
https://i.postimg.cc/XvWZvL8M/EDY4-PNv-W4-AEkd3.png (https://postimages.org/)

Jimbuna

09-03-19, 09:44 AM

3rd September 1919

US: President Wilson leaves on a tour of the country to get support for the League of Nations.

Edward, Prince of Wales, during his visit to Montreal, Canada.
https://i.postimg.cc/YqbBhNBG/EDi9s-Yz-W4-AMNAEx.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Jan Smuts, Boer War general, becomes the 2nd Prime Minister of South Africa.
https://i.postimg.cc/sD20Htbx/EDi9s-Yz-W4-AMNAEx.jpg (https://postimg.cc/0rLfbHk1)

An Airco DH4A biplane, G-EAJC, of the British airline, Aircraft Transport and Travel Limited, about to leave Hounslow Heath Aerodrome (later Heathrow), London, for Le Bourget, Paris, 3rd September 1919.
https://i.postimg.cc/s2KhL0kf/EDi9s-Yz-W4-AMNAEx.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

09-03-19, 08:29 PM

Tuesday, September 2, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council noted the new draft letter to the German Government, on the subject of the violation of the Peace Treaty, by virtue of Article 61 of the German constitution.

Mr Balfour says that he notices that the Germans were only given fifteen days in which to reply. It might be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for them to answer within such a period. Their Parliament is not now in session, and he thinks it doubtful whether their parliamentary procedure, of which he knew nothing, would permit them to accede to the wishes of the Council within the period stated.

M Clemenceau says that he had foreseen the difficulty, but thought it was rather an advantage than otherwise, to give the Germans a short period within which to reply. They would be sure to object and to say that it was impossible, but the brief period imposed upon them in the letter would make it necessary for them to deal with the subject matter of the letter without delay.

(It is agreed that the draft letter for communication to the German Government, calling their attention to the violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, by virtue of Article 61 of the new German constitution, should be accepted.)

2. Mr. Polk states that he has received a telegram sent from Colonel Goodyear to Mr Hoover. It is stated therein that Colonel Goodyear has been informed, by a telephonic message from General Dupont, that this latter officer had received no orders from M Clemenceau to proceed to Silesia. The telephonic communication had been made on 31st August.

M Clemenceau says that he has received a later telegram to the effect that General Dupont was ready to start.

Mr Polk says that he will so inform Mr. Hoover.

3. M Tardieu explains the frontier line which the Central Territorial Commission proposes for acceptance by the Council, with the assistance of a map.

Mr Polk remarks that the line drawn on the map differs from the frontier proposed by President Wilson. The United States are, none the less, prepared to adopt the frontier line now proposed by the Central Territorial Commission.

(It is decided that the frontier line presented to the Council by the Central Territorial Commission and adopted unanimously by them, should be accepted.)

M Tardieu explains the problem of the Bulgarian access to the Aegean, and says that the question has been dealt with by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways, when it had discussed Article 24 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty. The central point of the problem was whether Dedeagatch should belong to Greece, or whether it should be part of an International State. This was a question which, of course, only the Council could settle. If it should be decided that it is to belong to Greece, the Central Territorial Commission is of the opinion that a general clause ought to be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, guaranteeing to that country free access to the Aegean Sea by river and railway. The final allocation of Dedeagatch also raises the question of how the International Commission for that port ought to be constituted. The original proposal had been that the International Harbor Authority ought to be composed of a British, a Bulgarian and a Greek official. He considered that a French port officer should be added and, in addition, a representative of the United States, who would certainly act in a most impartial manner in all questions that came before him. His reason for suggesting a French representative is that France had been one of the Powers signatory to the Peace Treaty, assuring Greek independence.

S Tittoni says that while agreeing to M Tardieu’s proposals, he does not quite understand why no Italian representative was suggested for the International Harbor Commission at Dedeagatch.

M Clemenceau said that he will take note of S Tittoni’s suggestion.

Mr Polk says that it is important that a clause should be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, guaranteeing free access to the Aegean Sea for that country; it was also important that Greece should have a free economic access to Eastern and Western Thrace.

M Tardieu says that Greek troops ought to occupy such territory as is definitely to be assigned to them by common consent. With regard to the remaining portion, he has consulted with Marshal Foch’s staff and with that of General Alby. He had been told by these military experts that one mixed Brigade, composed of six Battalions, and four Squadrons of Discussion Cavalry, would be necessary. There was, at the present moment at Dedeagatch, a force composed of two Battalions of French infantry and one Squadron of French cavalry: the French contribution could not be increased, except possibly by a small contingent of mountain artillery. The four Battalions and 3 squadrons of cavalry necessary to bring the force of occupation up to the strength required could be supplied by the other Allied Powers. If necessary, small reinforcements could be supplied by the Greek Government. He does not consider the situation to be disquieting, in view of the fact that troops were already in occupation, and others might be sent.

Mr Polk says that it would, in his opinion, be most unwise to send any Greek troops, for it would be absolutely impossible to get them out again. He thought it would be preferable to leave the Bulgarian forces in the area under discussion, since they would probably behave better under the threat of the eventual occupation of the territory by Greek troops. He added that no United States’ troops would be available for any Inter-Allied occupation of Thrace. He is sure that no trouble will occur so long as Inter-Allied troops are used for the occupation of the country.

S Tittoni said that the Italians already had one battalion in Bulgaria, and that, if an Inter-Allied occupation of the areas now under discussion took place, the populations would remain in a state of tranquility, even though the military occupation were effected by small forces.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks Great Britain is in a position to make her contribution, but he did not like to make a definite statement without consulting his experts. He thinks, however, that the British troops in Constantinople might be utilized.

(It is agreed that M Tardieu should examine

(a) The question of assuring free economic access to the Aegean Sea by river and railway to Bulgaria, by means of general guaranteeing articles in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

(b) The question of an Inter-Allied Military occupation of the territories in Thrace now held by Bulgarian troops.

(c) That his report on these subjects should be presented to the Council at an early date.

4. M Tardieu explains the proposed Romanian frontier in the Dobrudja with the assistance of a map.

Mr Balfour says that the original idea of the Council had been that the southern portion of Dobrudja was properly speaking, Bulgarian but that as it was Romanian territory, and as Romania was an Allied and friendly Power, she could not be forced to cede any portion of her territory to an enemy State. At the present moment, however, Romania had almost ceased to have that character. He had just received a telegram from Admiral Troubridge showing the grave situation in Hungary caused by the action of the Roumanian authorities.

Mr Polk says that the American Delegation had received similar information from General Bandholtz on the previous day.

S Tittoni said that the four Generals are the source of information from which the Council ought to draw. He does not know why reports are being received independently, while the Inter-Allied Committee of Generals is in session.

M Clemenceau says that eight days had elapsed since a telegram had been sent to the Romanian Government by the Council, and that no reply had been received.

S Tittoni said that he thinks the Council ought to receive a collective opinion on the situation from the four Generals. It was most important that the Council should be kept informed of their views, and he did not understand why they did not communicate their joint opinions more frequently. He thinks that they ought to be called upon to do so.

Mr Polk says that the Romanians have now been defying the Conference for an entire three weeks, and had given no answer to the numerous communications sent to them. Every kind of Note had been sent to them. Some were couched in moderate terms; some in more forcible language, and others in a menacing style. Each style had failed to produce any result, and he thinks that the time for sending Notes is now over. All information received combined to show that the Romanians intend to make a separate Peace with Hungary. They were making requisitions on their own behalf, and acting in a completely independent manner. It was inconceivable to him that Romania should defy the Council, which had behind it the support of three Great European Powers, without receiving encouragement from some quarter or another.

M Berthelot says that he had recently received a visit from Mr Antonescu, who, when asked why no reply had been given to the communications of the Council, had answered that they were couched in too violent terms.

Mr Balfour then reads a telegram from General Gorton and remarks that the last sentence contained in it did not seem to be connected with the first part.

At this point the Council takes note of all the telegrams received by the French Foreign Office and signed by the Inter-Allied Military Mission, since August 26th, on the subject of the situation in Hungary.

M Clemenceau says that it appears to him to be clear that the Allied Generals are not carrying out their original instructions, which had been that they should keep in communication with the Romanian authorities, and report to the Council on what they discovered. Instead of doing this they were plunging themselves into political questions. He had come to the opinion that the Romanian situation was now so grave that prompt measures were necessary in order to prevent it from developing further.

Mr Polk says that the Inter-Allied Generals at Budapest had originally attempted to carry out their instructions. They had got into communication with the Romanian Authorities as directed, but had found that it was of no use receiving polite assurances from the Romanians, and taking note of promises which these latter had no intention of fulfilling. The Military Mission had been at Budapest for three weeks, and, having found that it was impossible to carry out their instructions as originally drafted, had none the less attempted to make themselves useful to the Council, and had, in consequence, got involved in political questions.

M Cubmenobau says that he thinks the moment has come to send an ultimatum to the Romanians. He thinks it should be communicated to them by some well-known public man, whose nationality was not a point of any importance.

Mr Balfour says that he has a plan which might be followed in conjunction with that of M Clemenceau. It had for long been evident that the promises of the Romanian authorities were of no use. The only success that the Council had obtained in its dealings with the Romanians had occurred when the authorities of that country had been told that they must either accede to the wishes of the Council, or come into open conflict with the Allied troops. He gives as an example the action of Admiral Troubridge, who, when in charge of the monitors on the Danube, had resisted the Romanian requisitions of barges, and the action of the Romanian authorities in stopping the transit of food across the river. Admiral Troubridge’s attitude had been firm, and, as it was backed by force, the Romanians had given way. At the present moment the Council was unable to get any reply to its communications to the Romanian Government, but although this was the case, he was certain that no Roumanian Statesman would take the responsibility of bringing the troops of his country into conflict with the Allied Armies. His proposal therefore, was to occupy some place in Hungary with a small body of Allied troops. He is sure that the Romanians would never fight them. It might possibly be easier to send a force of warships into the Black Sea.

Mr Polk says that the only vessels belonging to the United States of America in the Mediterranean area are stationed at Fiume and Smyrna.

S Tittoni said that, before taking the action proposed by M Clemenceau, the Council ought to wait for a complete report from the Inter-Allied Mission of Generals at Budapest.

M Clemenceau, commenting upon Mr Balfour’s last remark, says that the Romanians had recently got hold of the Paris press. He did not attach great importance to this, but, at the same time, he did not wish to let the French people think that he had performed a quasi-belligerent act against the Romanians, without having previously communicated an ultimatum to them. He thinks that Allied war vessels might be sent into the Black Sea, pending a reply from the Romanian Government, but that they should not be called upon to act until an answer had been obtained.

The three demands which he proposes to make to the Romanians are:

(1) That they should cease from making requisitions in Hungary, and should place all the material that they had seized at the disposal of the Council;

(2) That they should promise definitely that they would make no separate peace with Hungary;

(3) That they should withdraw their troops from Hungary.

S Tittoni says that he thinks that, before warships were sent to Romania, a reply to M Clemenceau’s ultimatum ought to be obtained. With regard to the three demands which M Clemenceau proposes to make to the Romanian authorities, he agrees that the Romanian Armies should be ordered to cease their requisitions, and place the material seized at the disposal of the Allies; he agrees that they should be ordered to make no separate peace; but before he could consent to ordering the Romanians to evacuate Hungary, he thinks the Council ought to be sure that the Romanian withdrawal would not open the door to a recrudescence of Bolshevism, and a revival of a new series of Bela Kuns. A police force, sufficient to maintain order in that country, should be raised.

M Clemenceau says that the occupation of Budapest by Romania, and the continued defiance of the Council, is a situation quite as grave as any produced by a Bolshevik Government in Hungary.

S Tittoni said that it might possibly be best to make the Romanians promise that they would retire on receiving orders from the Council.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks that a decision ought not to be taken finally until the following day.

(At this point a general discussion as to the most suitable person to be entrusted with the ultimatum to Romania, ensues. The names of Sir Eyre Crowe and Admiral Troubridge are mentioned in this connection.)

S Tittoni said that he cannot for the moment promise Italian participation in any Naval action that might ensue. With regard to the person who should be entrusted with the communication of the ultimatum, he thinks that sending an Admiral to Bucharest would be like making a Naval demonstration without ships. He prefers that a diplomat should convey the orders of the Conference.

Mr Polk says that, in his opinion, the dispatch of an ultimatum to Romania does not bind the United States to subsequent Naval action.

(It is decided that the question should be adjourned to the following day.)

5. M Fromageot says that the Economic Commission had, on the previous day, presented the Drafting Committee with a clause, which it proposed should be added to Article 263 of the Peace Treaty with Austria.

The Drafting Committee could not do what it had been asked to, without the approbation of the Council, and was of the opinion that the proposed clause should not be added. In the first place there were difficulties, owing to the fact that, as the boundaries of the future Hungarian State had not been settled, it was hard to lay down rules as to the future status of all citizens now situated in the territorial area provisionally called Hungary. In the second place, Article 90 of the Peace Treaty with Austria clearly lays down that Austria should recognize the validity of all the provisions of the future Peace Treaty with Hungary. He therefore thinks that the clause asked for by the Economic Commission should be added to the Hungarian Treaty, since it is obviously too late to put it into the Austrian Treaty.

(It is decided to reject the proposal of the Economic Commission to the effect that the special clause drafted in Appendix “F” should be added to Article 263 of the Austrian Peace Treaty.

It is agreed that a clause effecting the results required should be added to the Hungarian Peace Treaty.)

6. Mr. Woolsey says that the reply to the Austrian Government on the subject of the Economic Clauses in the Peace Treaty, had referred to certain concessions made in a Note from the Council, dated, July 8th, 1919,3 and addressed to the Austrian Delegation. In view of the importance of the Note, and of the decision of the Council on August 28th, to refer the reply now being made to the Austrian Government, to the Drafting Committee, in order to ascertain whether changes in the Peace Treaty were necessary, on account of interpretative passages in the proposed reply, he made the following suggestion:

Interpretations of the Austrian Peace Treaty Contained in the Replies to the Austrian Delegation:

“That the Note of July 8th, 1919, as well as any other Notes to the Austrian Delegation, containing interpretative passages on the Treaty of Peace, should likewise be referred to the Drafting Committee, to ascertain whether changes in the Peace Treaty might be necessary, on account of such interpretative passages.”

He had another point which he wished to bring before the notice of the Council. On August 28th, the Council had decided that a Clause should be inserted in the proposed covering letter to the replies to the Austrian Delegation, on the subject of the Peace Treaty, to the effect that the covering letter in question ought not to be taken as in any sense modifying the text of the Treaty. In view of the fact that the reply of July 8th, 1919, to the Austrian Delegation might be regarded as interpretative of the text of the Treaty, he suggests:

“That the clause in the covering letter should be made to cover all replies made to the Austrian Delegation, and not only the covering letter under consideration.”

(These two proposals are referred to the Drafting Committee, who enter the room to report on them.)

M Fromageot says that, in answer to the first point raised by Mr. Woolsey, he would draw the attention of the Conference to the fact that the first edition of the Peace Treaty had been presented to the Austrians on June 6th. A long series of communications had followed; and the second edition of the Peace Treaty had been presented on July 20th. It was with this second edition that all replies to the Austrian Delegation were concerned, and it was therefore not necessary to discover whether replies of an earlier date than July 20th contained interpretative passages of a superseded text of the Peace Treaty.

(Mr Woolsey’s first proposal is therefore rejected.)

He thinks that Mr Woolsey’s second suggestion ought to be adopted, and the phraseology of the covering letter altered, so as to meet the point.

(It is agreed that the wording of the general covering letter to the replies of the Austrian counter-proposals of the Peace Treaty should be so modified as to state that no passage in any of the replies should be regarded as an authoritative interpretation of the Peace Treaty.)

(The Meeting then adjourned for a discussion in camera.)

Sailor Steve

09-03-19, 08:30 PM

Wednesday, September 3, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

Jimbuna

09-04-19, 07:41 AM

4th September 1919

Turkish delegates, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (center), gather in Sivas to organize resistance against Allied occupation and the partition of Turkey.
https://i.postimg.cc/RhC2dMNd/EDn-Dxrm-Ww-AAb-NGb.png (https://postimages.org/)

Jacques Schneider Trophy National Seaplane Race officials of the Aero Club outside the hangar.
https://i.postimg.cc/y8Kpy1tZ/gkkwzk7ljik31.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

HMS Verulam (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War, British campaign in the Baltic: The V-class destroyer struck a mine and sank off in the Gulf of Finland off Seiskari, Finland. She was salvaged in 1925 but found to be beyond repair.

Sailor Steve

09-04-19, 08:08 PM

Thursday, September 4, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Clemenceau draws the Council’s attention to the objections of the German Government to the advanced Commissions of Control being sent at once. He adds that in his opinion it would be better to postpone sending out the advance Commissions of Control for a certain time. This is the opinion of General Nollet, although Marshal Foch was of another opinion. In conclusion, he draws the attention of the Council to the fact that the Allied and Associated Powers have no positive right to send out these advance Commissions of Control if the Germans now objected.

General Desticker said that the despatch of the full personnel of the Commissions of Control depended upon the date of the complete ratification of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Marshal Foch has been of the opinion that an advance detachment of the Inter-Allied Commissions should be sent forward at least ten days before the full Commissions arrived. This preliminary measure was necessary in order to prepare the work with which the Commissions will be concerned later on. The whole question, therefore, hinges upon the probable date of the final ratification of the Peace Treaty with Germany.

M Clemenceau says that Marshal Foch had thought that the Peace Treaty would be ratified by three Great Powers by 15th September.

S Tittoni said that as far as Italy is concerned that will not be possible.

Mr Balfour then suggests that the German objections appear to be based on the very large number of officers who were to be sent under present proposals. Would it not be possible to adhere to Marshal Foch’s proposal, and, at the same time, reduce the number of Commissions dispatched, by making one nation responsible for one particular department, another nation for another branch, and so on. The large number of the personnel was due to the fact that each Department contained Inter-Allied Representatives.

General Desticker says that he does not think that Mr Balfour’s proposal is practicable, and thinks that it would be better to delay sending out the Commissions of Control for a few days in order to adhere to the original program.

Mr Polk draws attention to the fact that the United States cannot, for the moment, be represented upon the Commissions of Control.

(After some further discussion it is decided that no advance Delegation of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should be sent to Germany for the present.)

2. (It is agreed that the Austrian request for a prolongation of two days of the time allowed for the consideration of the Allied, reply should be granted.)

3. The Council took note of M. Misu’s letter to the President of the Peace Conference, stating that the telegrams of the Council to the Romanian Government had, to a large extent, not been received in Bucharest.

M Clemenceau said that the situation was rather changed by virtue of S Bratiano’s plea. He had hardly credited it at first, but had, later on, come to the conclusion that there might be a certain degree of truth in the statement made.

S Tittoni said that S Bratiano’s statements were to a certain extent borne out by notices appearing in the French press, to the effect that wireless telegraphic communication from Paris was somewhat interrupted.

Mr Polk says he understands that the French Minister at Bucharest had acknowledged the receipt of the dispatches for transmission to the Romanian Government by telegram.

M Berthelot says that this is not the case. The French Minister had not acknowledged the receipt of the dispatches under discussion, nor had he stated that they had been communicated by him to the Romanians. In confirmation of this he drew the attention of the Council to the fact that a batch of telegrams received that morning by the French Foreign Office, from Bucharest, made no reference to the previous communications of the Council.

Mr Balfour says that he does not understand how the nonreceipt by the Romanian Government of previous dispatches of the Council could be explained in any credible manner.

Mr Polk said that the Queen of Romania had written a letter to Mr Hoover, wherein she protested in the strongest terms against the United States’ attitude towards her country. This was surely evidence that the Council’s dispatches had been received.

M Pichon said that the information on which the Queen of Romania’s letter had been based, might have been obtained from the public press.

S Tittoni says that it would possibly be better to make use of the military organisation for the transmission of telegrams. He draws the Council’s attention to the fact, that, according to Mr. Misu’s letter, the Romanian Government is now considering the possibility of withdrawing their armies from Hungary. This is the first occasion on which they had made any statement of the kind.

Mr Polk then reads a letter from an American officer, who had had an interview with one of the Romanian authorities in Bucharest. The conversation recorded in the letter was to the effect, that the Romanians had occupied Budapest, and intended to stay there; that they intended to settle, and manage, their own affairs in their own way; that they had received an insulting letter from the Council, which they had answered in the most suitable way, by ignoring it; and that the Romanians had nothing to fear from the Allies, who did not intend to follow their menaces, up by effective action. This, letter showed clearly that the Romanians were conscious that they were treating the Council with contempt, and that they intended to continue to do so.

M Pichon draws the Council’s attention to a telegram received that morning from M de Saint Aulaire, and remarked that the information it contained somewhat contradicts that received by Mr. Polk.

Mr Polk, commenting upon the telegram circulated by M Pichon, says he thought it was the most amazing attempt to avoid the real issue that he had ever read. In view of the act that the Allied generals in Budapest had been urging the Romanian Government to form a gendarmerie for the maintenance of order, and had been positively opposed by them in any such measure, the statement contained in the telegram from M. de St. Aulaire that the Romanians were anxious to restore order, was little short of ridiculous.

Mr Balfour says that he finds it very difficult to believe, that the Romanian Government was not playing with the Conference. The Romanian authorities at Budapest, and the Roumanian representatives in the Allied capitals, know by the papers, and from the Allied Generals at Budapest, what were the wishes of the Council. The Military Representatives at Budapest, in particular, had continually explained the wishes of the Council. It is folly to suppose that communications made to the Romanians at Budapest were not sent on to the Central Government at Bucharest. The present complaint of the Romanian Government, that they were in ignorance of the real wishes of the Conference, seemed well nigh incredible. He had not had time to weigh the evidence in support of their plea carefully; but it seemed to him that their present arguments were only advanced as part of an elaborate scheme of ignoring the wishes of the Allies, and of acting in whatever manner they themselves thought best. There was a remarkable agreement between the conversation of the American officer, communicated to the Council through Mr Polk’s kindness, and the actual facts of the case. He was far more inclined to believe the statements made by the Romanian official to Mr. Polk’s correspondent, than he was to give credence to Mr Bratiano’s assurances, that the Romanian Government was still waiting for the instructions of the Council.

Mr Polk then communicated a further extract from the same letter, in which his correspondent stated that he had been informed by the Romanian official, that the Allies had made a peace which was unfair to small nations; and that the Romanians, therefore, intended to take the matter into their own hands, and to settle the matter equitably in their section of the world.

S Tittoni said that the difficulties were increased by the fact that there was no properly constituted government at Budapest; if there had been one it would have been possible to collaborate with it, in setting up a force sufficient to maintain order, and, when this had been done, to ask the Romanians to go.

Mr Polk says that S Tittoni did not seem to have realized the exact nature of the difficulty. The Allied generals at Budapest had frequently urged the Romanians to allow the Hungarians to form a police force. The Romanians had positively obstructed any such measure. The Romanian authorities had been asked, by the Council, not to devastate Hungary. The Council had been told in reply, that it was incumbent upon Romania to get back the material taken from her at an earlier period of the war. The requisitions far exceeded anything that might have been done under such a plea. About 4,000 sealed cars had gone across the Romanian frontiers from Hungary, carrying everything that could possibly be requisitioned. He fee.s very strongly in the matter for a particular reason. There is, at the present moment, an American general officer in Budapest, who was being flouted by the Romanian authorities. The situation is, therefore, so humiliating, that he feels the President ought to be advised to withdraw the United States general officer from Budapest.

M Clemenceau says that he agrees, in the main, with Mr Polk, but thinks it is difficult to act as though the Council were absolutely certain that the Romanian Authorities are acting in bad faith.

Mr Balfour says that, although some doubt might exist as to whether the Romanian Government had received the telegrams of the Council, it is none the less certain that they are fully aware of the policy of the Allies.

Mr Polk says that a dispatch has been agreed upon at the Meeting of the Council on the 23rd August. It had been published in the papers in Paris on the 26th August, and transmitted to the Generals in Budapest on the 27th. It must, therefore, have been sent on to Bucharest. If the Romanian representative at each of the Allied capitals were summoned to the Foreign Office, and told that the Council was in earnest, he is certain that the situation in Romania would improve. All information received through the United States Secret Service was to the effect, that the opinion prevailed among the Romanian Authorities, that the Council is not serious in its intentions.

Mr Balfour then reads the letter which he had drafted for communication to the Romanian Government at Bucharest.

S Tittoni says that the letter has been very well drafted. He suggests that in the first sentence of the second paragraph the words “rightly” or “wrongly” should be deleted. The sentence as corrected would be a more impartial expression of opinion.

A long discussion then follows as to the method of communicating the letter to the Romanian Government and

(It is decided that the letter drafted by Mr Balfour should be taken by Sir George Clerk personally to Bucharest, and be presented by him to the Romanian Government.)

(It is further decided that Sir George Clerk should also take copies of all telegrams previously sent by the Conference to the Romanian Government and should communicate them with the aforesaid letter.)

4. M Berthelot commented on the report on the subject of the immigration clauses for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria. He says, in conclusion, that, in his opinion, Mr Venizelos’ proposals were too complicated to be put into effect, and that it would be better for the States affected to set up mixed Commissions to settle the matter between themselves. He did not think that any clause ought to go into the Bulgarian Treaty.

Mr Coolidge says that the opinions expressed by M Berthelot were not those incorporated in the report of the Commission on New States.

M Berthelot says that the original report of the Commission on New States had been made more than a month previously. It is too late for the Council to enter into negotiations with the States concerned, as proposed by Mr Venizelos. In the meanwhile, the Drafting Committee are asking that a decision should be given, since they cannot carry on with the work of drafting the Bulgarian Treaty unless the point is settled.

(After some further discussion, it is agreed:

(1) That no clause on the subject of reciprocal immigration in the Balkans should be inset in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

(2) That the report of the Commission on New States should be accepted, and that this Commission should be authorized to consult with Mr Venizelos as to the best method of putting his proposals into effect.

(At this point, Dr Benes, Mr Paderewski and Mr Dmowski enter the Council.)

5. Dr Benes explains the question of Teschen to the Council with the aid of maps. He says that the problem should be looked at from four points of view, namely, the ethnographical, the historical, the economic and the political.

According to the latest statistics, there are in the Teschen area, 230,000 Poles, 150,000 Czechs, and 60,000 Germans. This Polish majority is questioned by the Czechs, who doubt the accuracy of the statistics. Owing to the policy of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the resistance of the Czechs to Austrian rule had been combated by every administrative measure that could be brought against them; and in consequence, the Austrian policy had been systematically to weaken any ethnographical statistics favorable to the Czecho-Slovak population. This could be seen from the fact that the figures given vary from one census to another. The German and Polish elements are generally grouped together; because these two sections of the population were always able to agree in their opposition to the Czechs. There are, in the mining district of the Teschen area, a large percentage of workmen, who are not, properly speaking, inhabitants of Teschen. The Austrian Authorities had assisted the Polish agitation in Teschen since the year 1873, when the centralizing tendencies of the Viennese government began to be put into effect. Since that date, Polish schools had multiplied, and a continuous effort had been made to replace the local Czech, administration by Polish or German Authorities. The result of all this had been that the statistics of the Polish population had increased, but the Czecho-Slovak Government thought that false classifications had deliberately been introduced into the data on which the statistics were based. The population in Teschen did not speak the proper Polish language, but a dialectic mixture of Czecho-Slovak and Polish. It was even declared that there were no villages in which separate Polish and Czech inhabitants lived side by side. There were, none the less, centers where the Czecho-Polish dialect was universally spoken. This showed that the population of Teschen, from an ethnographical point of view, was in a transitional state. There was further to be taken into consideration the tendency of the population towards a particular form of culture, and it was certain that the tendency of the population in the area was towards the adoption of Czech customs. All these facts combined to show that the Austrian, statistics could not be trusted, or at least, that they presented only one side of the question. The Czech Government maintained that there were not more than 45 per cent of Poles in the Teschen area.

(a) Ethnographical Considerations

The situation of Czecho-Slovakia in the past, was of importance. That country had always identified itself with the ancient Kingdom of Bohemia, formed out of Moravia, Bohemia, and that Potion of Silesia which included Teschen. The strife of the sixteenth century had almost exterminated the Bohemian population. A revival of Bohemian national sentiment had occurred later, but the moral sentiment sustaining it had been based upon the historical status of the Bohemian Kingdom, and the national unity of that country. Basing itself upon these feelings, Bohemia had always resisted the attempts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to force their country into a Central European Federation. They had never, in the past, abandoned their standpoint that the old Kingdom constituted a historic unit, and ought never to be divided. This sentiment was very deep, and existed at the present moment; the population could not understand the projected division of Teschen, at a moment when the ethnographical problem had not been finally resolved.

(b) Historical Considerations

The coal question affected Czechoslovakia very deeply. There were large masses of coal in Poland, and in those parts of Upper Silesia which would undoubtedly be ceded to that country. Statistics showed that the total capacity of the Polish coalpits amounted to 86 billion tons; the pits in Czechoslovakia, including Teschen, only had a capacity of 9 billion tons. Czechoslovakia was essentially an industrial country. It had produced 70 per cent of the metal work of the old Austro-Hungarian Kingdom, 93 per cent of the sugar products of that country, and had worked a preponderating proportion of the blast furnaces employed in Austro-Hungarian industries. All this showed how much the Czechoslovak State was dependent upon a continuous supply of coal, and how little they were asking for themselves. The mines in Czechoslovakia were only capable of supplying the needs of the country for 250 years. Poland imported very little coal from Teschen, and statistics showed that in the past, only 25 trucks were sent into Poland every day. The industrial character of Czechoslovakia obliged her to import coal from Silesia.

(c) Economic Considerations

Mr. Polk then asks whether some of the coal imported by Czechoslovakia did not go to Austria.

Mr Balfour also asks whether Dr Benes’ figures included the importation of lignite.

Dr Benes, replying to Mr. Polk, says that a certain quantity of coal was transmitted to Austria through Czechoslovakia, but that two-thirds of the total importation remained in the last named country.

Replying to Mr Balfour, he says that there was enough lignite in Czechoslovakia for the domestic needs of the country.

Passing to the Railway question, he draws the attention of the Council to the fact that the most important railway line, maintaining communication between Slovakia and the disputed coal districts, runs through Teschen. This railway is absolutely necessary for the transport of the products of Czechoslovakia. (Dr Benes here illustrates his statement by a reference to a diagrammatic map, showing the great proportion of Czechoslovakian goods carried over the Oderberg-Kaschau line.) It is impossible for the new Czechoslovak Republic to build a new railway line on its own resources.

If the supply of coal upon which Czechoslovakia depends so greatly are taken from her, that country would have to rely upon Poland for the essential elements of her existence. Czechoslovakia is a more industrial country than Poland. Her sugar industries, her metallurgical works, and her blast furnaces could only be developed and continued by having a continuous supply of coal. If a decision were made unfavorable to Czechoslovakia, it would cause a great revulsion of feeling in that country. He had been surprised how deeply Czech feeling had been roused by the question. During the long negotiations of the past months, he had done everything in his power to calm the population of his country, but he had only been able to do so because his countrymen were hoping for a solution favorable to themselves. They now see themselves faced with the possibility of a situation arising in which they would be deprived of these things which were necessary for the reconstruction of their country. He had always attempted to advocate moderate views, but he doubts whether his influence would prevail over the growing excitement in his country.

(d) Political Considerations

He would like to draw attention to the economic effects of diplomatic friction between his country and Poland. In a period of strained relations, Poland would only have to hold up the railway traffic into Czechoslovakia, to paralyze that country in 24 hours. He would like the Polish representatives to understand that Czechoslovakia is not demanding rights over Polish populations, but merely putting forward a claim for things necessary for her very life. Czechoslovakia was surrounded by countries in a state of ferment, and the supply of materials necessary for her reconstruction was an absolute necessity to her, if she were to remain free of the existing political confusion in Central Europe. He had desired to see his country reconstituted on a firm economic basis as rapidly as possible, in order that he might make it a sort of rallying point for the political aims of western European policy. By doing so, he had hoped that her neighbors would gather round her, and that the western Powers would find a support for their policies in Czechoslovakia. Poland is necessarily involved in the politics of Eastern Europe. She is faced with all the difficulties of the Russian situation, in which she would be involved for a long time to come. For this reason, Poland would require the collaboration of Czechoslovakia, but this could not be given if the last named country were deprived of Teschen, which was regarded as essential to her economic existence. During the war, the Czech population had adhered to their wish for the integrity of their country. They had had the deepest faith in the policy of the Entente. He feared that if a decision unfavorable to Czechoslovakia were given on the Teschen question, there would be a deep and general reversion of feeling. He feared that the proposed solution of the Teschen question would give rise to a deeply hostile feeling towards Poland, which might be seen from the fact that the Radical Parties in Czechoslovakia are now adopting an inimical attitude towards Poland. In order to counteract this unfortunate sentiment among his countrymen, he had proposed a compromise, which he had hoped would satisfy both Poland and Czechoslovakia. He had originally suggested that the line of the Vistula should be the boundary between the two countries. It had been pointed out to him that larger concessions were necessary, and he had endeavored, with success, to make popular opinion in his country, favor the concession of the whole of the Bielitz district to Poland. His own opinions had been regarded as heretical by his countrymen: notwithstanding this, he had accepted a solution, which he hoped would have satisfied both Poland and Czechoslovakia. More than this, he had always wished to advance conciliatory proposals in the case of Glatz. He had accepted a frontier between his country and Hungary, which placed 132,000 more Slovaks under Hungarian rule than there were Hungarians under Czech administration. He is now faced by a frontier line, proposed by the Joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees, which divided the mining district into two portions. Such a solution could not possibly be accepted. The artificial nature of the division proposed, could be seen by the well known fact that there was constant communication between the districts which it was proposed to separate: large numbers of workmen were continually moving from one area to another, and back. The new frontier line would interrupt free communication with Slovakia, and would oblige the Czech Government to construct a special railway line, which would practically run through one continuous tunnel. The German population were all in favor of maintaining the economic unity of the Teschen area. He did not wish to lay emphasis on this argument, which none the less, could not be completely neglected. He had recently received a Delegation, largely composed of miners and workmen, from the Teschen district. On the news being received that the Teschen Basin was going to be divided, large numbers of Polish workmen had protested against such a measure. It was to be noted, that many of the Delegates belonged to political parties quite averse to chauvinistic feeling (Socialists, Socialist Democrats, etc). None the less, they had expressed themselves strongly on the point, and had stated that they feared for the future. He did not think he was exaggerating when he said that this population now so profoundly disturbed, would act against the wishes both of the Polish and of the Czechoslovak Governments, and deal with the problem by independent action on their own account. At the present moment, strikes of a political character were occurring, in which Polish workmen were taking part. He had tried to keep the population quiet, but he had begun to feel that a conciliatory policy on his part was more and more difficult in face of a general movement of protest and indignation. Teschen would always be of secondary importance to Poland. The Poles had complained that an economic argument was being brought against their ethnographical claims. The Poles, themselves, had not hesitated to do the same when they thought that such arguments would be favorable to them. He desires, in conclusion, to ask the Conference to consider with the utmost care, all the arguments that he had brought forward, to weigh the grave political consequences which might follow a decision contrary to the wishes of the Czechoslovak population, and to take into account the immense sacrifices which Czechoslovakia had made in supporting the Entente throughout the war.

(It is agreed that the Polish Delegates should be heard on the following day, and the meeting then adjourned.)

Jimbuna

09-05-19, 09:21 AM

5th September 1919

Soldiers of the U.S. 1st Division arriving in Hoboken, New Jersey, returning from Europe.
https://i.postimg.cc/rmcpXgJs/EDsi-I9n-Xo-AEs-Tj-I.png (https://postimages.org/)

[September 5th, 1919] Reims, Marne, Champagne, France.
https://i.postimg.cc/RZV88tKm/zrbfukhcppk31.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

09-06-19, 01:12 AM

Friday, September 5, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Clemenceau says he has received a telegram from General Dupont, regarding the situation in Silesia, which is reported as being very bad. He had nothing to propose, but only wished to communicate the news to his colleagues.

Mr Balfour observes that nothing can be done until the Treaty is ratified. He hopes that this will take place in about 10 days.

Mr Polk says that according to Mr Hoover there was a prospect of the situation in Silesia improving.

2. The Council has before it a draft Article for insertion in the Treaty with Bulgaria, proposed by the American Delegation.

Mr Polk says that, as his colleagues will remember, he has deferred his reply to the question of the frontier between Bulgaria and Romania in the Dobrudja, at a previous meeting. He realizes that there are many reasons against the insertion of any clause such as that suggested, in the Treaty itself. The American Delegation will be satisfied if a sentence to the same effect were inserted in the covering letter to the Bulgarian Delegation. It might then be suggested that the ultimate settlement should be in the hands, either of the Allied and Associated Powers or of the League of Nations.

Mr Balfour points out that the covering letter would only be sent to the Bulgarians after all their Notes regarding the Treaty had been received. In other words, several weeks would elapse before the letter was sent.

Mr Polk says that the Bulgarians will certainly raise the point in their comments on the Treaty. This will give an opportunity for making a statement on the subject.

Mr Balfour suggests that the Council should resolve to take up the subject again when the covering letter was considered. He is ready, himself, to state that the attribution of Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria would be conducive to a lasting peace in the Balkans. Secondly, he thinks that it is impossible, as long as Romania remains an Allied Power, or, at the worst, a neutral, to insert any clause in the Treaty with Bulgaria, requiring a surrender of Romanian territory. Thirdly, he thought that it would be well to consider the matter again at the time of drafting the final covering letter. By that time, the attitude of Romania towards the Conference would be defined. The Council will then know what advice could be given to the Romanians and what methods it is right to employ. In any case, it will not be possible to make Romania yield territory unless she becomes an enemy State.

Mr Polk says that he agrees. He points out, however, that according to the future provisions of the Treaty with Hungary, Romania stands a chance of receiving considerable accessions of territory in Transylvania and Bukovina. Her acquisition of these territories might be made contingent on her yielding ground in the Dobrudja.

Mr Balfour says that this might be difficult, as the frontiers in Transylvania and Bukovina had been drawn on ethnological lines. It will be difficult to alter these frontiers, without violating the principles of the Conference.

Mr Polk says that a close examination of the boundaries would probably reveal some instances on which the ethnological principle had not been strictly followed.

M Pichon says that a serious question of principle was involved. The Conference, hitherto, had never attempted to revise Treaties anterior to the war.

M Clemenceau said that he thinks that dealing with the matter in a covering letter was not very practical. A promise to Bulgaria, by the Conference, that Romania would be invited to yield territory, would amount to nothing. An invitation to Romania to do so would equally amount to this. He wonders whether the basis of a bargain existed anywhere. Without a bargain, he thinks nothing can be achieved.

S Tittoni says that he does not think the question of the Dobrudja could be made corollary to the question of Transylvania or Bukovina. The matter of Bessarabia, however, remains. He would be inclined to ask Romania to make a concession in the Dobrudja, as a condition of obtaining what the Commission recommended in Bessarabia.

Mr Polk observes that he has not suggested making any promises at present.

M Clemenceau says the case would be the same in three weeks time.

M. Tardieu observes that the advantage of the procedure suggested by Mr Polk was that the Bulgarian Treaty could be proceeded with.

S Tittoni said that he understands that the question of the Dobrudja would be considered at a later stage in connection with the question of Bessarabia.

Mr Polk says that he is ready to adopt Mr. Balfour’s plan; namely, first, that in principle, it was accepted as desirable that Romania should yield a part of the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria; second, that no clause to this effect should be inserted in the Treaty with Bulgaria; third, that the means of obtaining this result should be considered at the time of sending the covering letter to the Bulgarians. He wishes it to be understood that nothing he had said committed him to an offer of Bessarabia to Romania in exchange for Southern Dobrudja.

(It is agreed that, for the purpose of the Treaty with Bulgaria, no change should be made in the frontier between Romania and Bulgaria, as existing at the outbreak of War.)

(At this point Mr Dmowski and later Dr Benes, and still later Mr Paderewski entered the room.)

3. Mr Dmowski says that it is extremely painful to him to have to defend his cause against his friends, the Czechoslovaks. He had hoped that Poland and Czechoslovakia would always stand together throughout the Conference. Now they appear as rival litigants before the Council. He thinks that the independence of Poland and Czechoslovakia is not yet achieved, though the Conference had given a basis for both. In return Poland and Czechoslovakia owe it to the Allied and Associated Powers to be the defenders of peace in Eastern Europe. He himself had always defended the Czecho-Slovak cause as if he had been a Czechoslovak himself. He would continue to do so. He would always endeavor to secure a friendly agreement between the two neighboring countries. He thought that the worst cause of conflict between neighbors was the subjection of one nationality to another. Should this take place, as between Poland and Czechoslovakia, friendship between the two countries would never be possible. Dr Benes had said that full rights would be accorded to the Poles in Teschen under Czechoslovak sovereignty. The first right of the Poles in Teschen was to belong to Poland. Dr Benes had further said that the Polish claim was based on ethnographical reasons. This is not the case. He was prepared to leave ethnography to savants and philologists. Statesmen established their claims on the wishes of peoples. The Polish claim was based on the national sentiment of the populations in question. The population of Teschen was literate. It could not be treated like an inarticulate mass. Each man knew what his national feelings were. In the first Slav Congress at Prague in 1848, the representative of Teschen had joined the Poles, and the first newspaper published in Teschen during the nineteenth century had been Written in Polish and not in Czech or in German. His thesis was that the country was not so much ethnically Polish as sentimentally and culturally Polish. The proof of this was that the Polish Delegation had suggested holding a plebiscite and this had been refused by the Czechoslovak Delegation. On the 5th of November of the preceding year, when the Austrian Monarchy broke up, the population of Teschen had, on its own initiative, made a provisional Settlement of the country. They had divided the country into two parts, and the line thus obtained had not aroused any protest either in Poland or in Bohemia. Both nations, therefore, seemed inclined to accept it. Difficulties had been made by the political leaders. The Czech people had been led to suppose that they could obtain the whole of Teschen from the Conference. When the decision of the Commission had been communicated in vague terms to the press in Bohemia, an organised protest by means of strikes was decided on. The Czech authorities had stopped trains running from Warsaw to Paris, had used troops to force the workmen to strike, and had even threatened to flood the mines should the men go to work; A German owner, whose Polish Workmen wished to work in the mines had told them he could not guarantee their lives. In spite of pressure, nevertheless the miners had continued work. This indicated that the country was undoubtedly Polish, and unwilling to collaborate in the plan of solving the fate of the country by strikes. S
Dr Benes had impugned the Austrian official statistics of the population in Teschen. He had said that the figures had been falsified in favour of the Poles, because of the consistent opposition of the Czechs. This was really not the case. The Austrian Government had been more anti-Polish in Teschen than anti-Czech, because their strongest adversaries in the area were the Poles. In 1900 the census showed 60% Poles, 23% Czechs, 15% Germans. In 1910 the proportion was, 54% Poles, 27% Czechs, 18% Germans. From these figures it followed that the Polish percentage was shown as diminished, just as the Czech and German percentage rose. It might be inferred that a pro-German policy tended to minimize the Polish element, and to increase the Czechs. Dr Benes had introduced a number of economic reasons. These were very strong. Bohemia, being a highly industrialized country, needed coal and therefore desired to possess the mines, but it could not be laid down that need makes ownership. The Polish Delegation maintained that the balance should be in favour of the national sentiment of the population. By a very strict application of this principle, Poland had been deprived of Danzig, which was the lungs of Poland. Danzig represented far more for Poland than the mines of Teschen for Bohemia. It would not be possible to deprive the Poles of the advantage of a rule which had been made to operate against them in favour of defeated Germany. He wished to remain the friend of the Czecho-Slovak republic. Poland would desire to sell her coal to her neighbors. In this instance it was the quality of the coal that mattered. The coal derived from the Karwin Basin was convertible into coke. In Poland there was no coal of this character. Should Upper Silesia as a result of the plebiscite go to Poland, there, would be some such coal in Poland, but not much. The gas works in Warsaw employed coal from the Karwin Basin. The Poles needed it more than Bohemia, which had coke producing coal in other parts of the country. Bohemia needed ordinary coal. This could not be obtained from the Karwin Basin. Bohemia had always imported some of her coal from Upper Silesia. Should this country go to the Poles, Poland would now become her supplier. But the fact that Bohemia required coal from Upper Silesia was a poor reason for giving her the Karwin Basin. Bohemia would buy rather more coal than she used to, and Poland in return would import her industrial products. Poland was very ready to sign a Convention to supply Bohemia with enough coal for her industries. It would be far easier to settle the matter in this way, than by making an unfair settlement in Teschen. If the true national line were adopted, Poland would receive 51% of ordinary coal and 44% of coke-out of the production of Teschen. The Polish Delegation was ready to yield a certain number of mining communes in which the population was not clearly Polish. This would reduce the Polish proportion to 29% of ordinary coal, and 22% of coke.

Polish ambitions were therefore not excessive. Poland required coke perhaps in a less degree than Bohemia because less industrial, but, nevertheless, she did need some. He thought the whole coal situation could be solved on these lines and by means of a Convention between the two countries. This would be far easier than by committing an injustice in Teschen, against which Poland would always protest and which would always disturb the peace. As to the railways, M. Benes had said that the Oderberg–Kaschau line was the principal communication between Bohemia and Slovakia. He begged to point out that this line had never served such a purpose before. It was the main line between Berlin and Budapest. It carried coal from Upper Silesia to Hungary and to the Balkans. It was necessary not for Bohemia, but for Poland, when Upper Silesia became Polish. There were four other lines connecting Bohemia and Slovakia. Two of these needed small connecting tracks of 8 kilometres in one case and 12 kilometres in the other. If these tracks had not been laid, geography was not the culprit. It had been Hungarian policy to stifle the development of Slovakia. Now that Bohemia and Slovakia were united in one State, no such reasons existed. The Czecho-Slovak Republic would easily construct what was required and he undertook to prophesy that, in 20 years, Bohemia would be connected with Slovakia by at least 8 lines of railway. On the other hand, Poland required the railway from Oderberg to Kaschau to export coal from Upper Silesia. The map prepared by the Commission, which he had seen on the previous day for the first time, had somewhat alarmed him. In order to attribute to Czechoslovakia the southern portion of this railway, the Commission had handed over to Czecho-Slovakia the most Polish of the Polish areas in Teschen,—he might almost say the most Polish population in Poland. There were few parts of Poland in which the population was 100 per cent Polish: in this area it was. The population had another characteristic. It was protestant in religion. These protestant Poles had always taken a very prominent part in the Polish national movement and it was these very people whom the Commission attributed to Czechoslovakia on the pretext that Bohemia required the southern part of the Oderberg–Kaschau railway, which, in reality, she did not require. It had been pointed out to him by a military authority that the line suggested by the Commission would give the Czechs a dominant position over the Polish part of the country. He put such considerations aside, as he did not wish even to contemplate the thought of war between the two countries. On national and economic grounds, he considered the Polish claim was right and he would only repeat what he had said at the beginning, that the essential condition for good relations between two neighboring States, whose independence was not yet achieved and whose function was to be guardians of the peace in Central Europe, was to avoid the subjection of the population of either to the other. All he asked for was the application of the national principle which had been applied with considerable severity against Poland in favour of Germany.

Dr Benes says that the local agreement referred to by Mr Dmowski between the Czech and Polish population in Teschen had really been made according to the administrative districts which previously existed. It had not been intended that the question of ultimate sovereignty should, in any way, be pre-judged by this provisional settlement. In Bohemia, protests had not arisen, until the Polish Government had ordered mobilization in the Polish part of the territory, as if the provisional settlement had established Polish sovereignty in the area. Mr Dmowski had referred to various acts of Czech officials. He did not wish, himself, to go into such details, though he had numberless reports containing equivalent allegations against Poles. At Oderberg and Bogumin, Polish troops had forced the Czech workmen to sign a petition in favour of annexation to Poland. However, recriminations of this kind would be endless and he preferred to avoid the subject. Mr Dmowski had argued that the census had been falsified against the Poles. In fact, the Czechs and Germans had never united against the Poles; the Poles and Germans had always combined against the Czechs. He had previously pointed out that the mines in Teschen only exported 25 wagon loads of coke to Poland. Bohemia, on the other hand, had to import coal from Upper Silesia, which was to become Polish. Upper Silesia contained quantities of coke producing coal. Mr Dmowski had pointed out that Bohemia would always depend on Upper Silesia, that is to say, on Poland, for coal. This is too true, and Czechoslovakia only asked for what was strictly necessary, in order not to be at the mercy of every eventuality. M. Dmowski had made use of the percentage of coal Poland and Czechoslovakia would obtain from Teschen should it be divided between them, but had made no mention of the immense resources in Poland. But Czechoslovakia required 30 million tons a year and only produced 26 million tons. Moreover, the Treaty forced Czechoslovakia to supply Austria with coal. This would leave the industries of the country entirely dependent on Poland.

As to the railways, it is true that there were communications between Bohemia and Czechoslovakia, but Mr Dmowski had omitted to state that the railway from Oderberg to Kaschau was the only line going through Slovakia from west to east. The hills in Slovakia went from north to south and-no other railway could be built across the country. The Teschen question for Czechoslovakia was analogous to the question of Alsace-Lorraine for France. The culture of the country was Czech. This was evidenced by the habits of the people, their dress and the architecture of their houses. All these resembled what prevailed in Moravia. A large part of the admittedly Polish population of Teschen had declared in favour of union with Czechoslovakia; in case of a plebiscite, this population would vote in the same sense.

Mr Paderewski says that he was almost ashamed to join Mr Dmowski against Dr Benes. Dr Benes however was a champion who would, he felt sure, be equal to both of them. In any case, he did not mean to be aggressive. No one more than himself desired good relations with Czechoslovakia. It was the destiny of the two countries to live in peace and it was also their duty. They owed it to the Allied and Associated Powers who had given them independence, to humanity and to their own exhausted peoples. Discord would not prevail between Poland and Czechoslovakia if Dr Benes and he could make mutual concessions. The Teschen area interested Czechoslovakia because of its coal. It interested Poland because of its population. The arguments on one side were economic and on the other side national. Dr Benes, taking as his model the judgment of Solomon, suggested cutting the country in two. Poland protested. It might be inferred on which side was real maternity. In any case, the child had reached the age of discretion and was able to say to which country it belonged. There were, in addition, impartial observers, among whom he quoted the work of two Bohemian savants. It was true that there were some villages in Teschen with a Czech majority. Mr Dmowski had told the Council that Poland did not claim them. As the Polish Delegation had good reason to know, States were better off without alien minorities. Dr Benes’ remarks about coal might lead the Council to suppose that his country was in dire peril. Was coal so important a matter as to justify the subjugation of an unwilling population and the estrangement of a country nearly four times as big as Czechoslovakia? On the same lines, what should Italy do, seeing that she had neither coal, oil nor forests? In reality, was Czechoslovakia so poor in coal? Out of a production of 26¼ million tons of lignite throughout the former monarchy, 83 per cent had been produced in Bohemia and 86 per cent of Austrian and Hungarian coal came from Bohemia. These figures proved Bohemia to be one of the richest coal-producing countries in the world, after Great Britain, America, and Germany. These figures were derived from an authority who would not be denied by Dr Benes; they were derived from the work of President Masaryk. Dr Benes had stated that Czechoslovakia needed 30 million tons of coal and had only 26 million. If President Masaryk’s figures were not accepted, he would refer to statistics. In 1913, 34 million tons of brown and black coal (23 million brown and 11 million black), had been produced in Bohemia; divided among 13 million inhabitants, this represented two thousand kilos, per head of brown and 900 kilos, per head of black coal. Poland, in the same year, had produced 11,814,000 tons of black coal and 952,000 tons of coke for a population now amounting to 29 millions. This represented not even 400 kilos, per head. In view of the tragic situation in Upper Silesia, the Council could judge whether Poland could lightly abandon the coal of Teschen. If Upper Silesia became Polish, the situation would be different and Poland would make every concession in order to supply Czechoslovakia with the coal she required. This matter could be settled between the experts of the two countries. As to the railways, Mr Dmowski had pointed out that all Czechoslovakia need do to perfect her communications was to build two lines measuring 8 and 12 kilometres. Poland wished to be a good neighbor to Czechoslovakia and was ready to bear half the cost of construction. Before concluding, he would like to quote an incident of his last journey to Poland. At the first frontier station in Teschen in an open field were gathered some 3,000 persons, mostly workmen, women and children. It was raining hard but he was received with songs, music and speeches. Several speeches were made. The one which struck him most was made by a workman, who said that the quarrel between the Poles and Czechs should be put an end to as soon as possible. The Czechs and Poles were both Slavs and cousins. The Czechs ought to have all the coal that could be spared, but no Polish land should be given to them and no Czech land to the Poles. The speaker might now be dead, as the place he lived in had been much oppressed by the Germans, who were shooting the Poles like rabbits. The moral of his speech had been understood in Warsaw. He hoped that it might be understood in Prague.

Dr Benes says that Czechoslovakia was not only interested in Teschen for its coal. The country is connected with the rest of Czechoslovakia by history, culture and administrative bonds. Mere figures cannot determine the question. The future needs of Czechoslovakia must be taken into consideration. The statistics quoted by Mr Paderewski were not conclusive. Production had been far more intensive in Bohemia than in Poland. On the other hand, the possibilities of production in Poland were infinitely greater than in Czechoslovakia. He had been himself as conciliatory as possible, but it must be remembered that he was not alone and that the peoples in both countries were passionate and excitable. It was better that each should be self-sufficient, as if either depended for vital necessities upon the other, there would be no solid peace. In other cases the Conference had sacrificed small minorities in order to establish lasting arrangements. This was a case in which this method should be put in practice, as had been done in the case of Ratibor against Czechoslovakia. Perfection could not be attained. If Poland and Czechoslovakia were independent of one another in respect of their vital needs, agreement between them would be easy. In any case, whatever the decision of the Conference, he would faithfully observe it and, in so doing, continue the policy he had consistently followed from the start, that of seeking friendship with Poland.

4. The letter is approved and signed by M Clemenceau.

The note to the Roumanian Government was signed by all the delegates.

5. The draft of Article 48 for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria is accepted, subject to the approval of Mr Polk to be communicated later in the day to the Secretariat-General.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

09-06-19, 05:57 AM

6th September 1919

After 62 days, a U.S. Army motor convoy completes a transcontinental voyage across the U.S., revealing the poor state of infrastructure in many parts of the country. Lieutenant Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower is a member of the convoy.
https://i.postimg.cc/yYRvRYLS/EDx-QQc-OUw-AAL4sj.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Canada: George-Étienne Cartier Monument unveiled.
https://i.postimg.cc/BnLsHFdB/EDx-QQc-OUw-AAL4sj.jpg (https://postimg.cc/pmHgtmVm)

Sailor Steve

09-06-19, 04:13 PM

Saturday, September 6, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

09-07-19, 08:28 AM

7th September 1919

Poster for the Canadian National Exhibition celebrating victory in the Great War.
https://i.postimg.cc/QN4KrQ8h/EDxrw-J3-W4-AAYRy-Z.png (https://postimages.org/)

NZ Observer - "Musketry Instructor: Now, boys, remember your rifle is your best friend. Treat it as you would your wife and wipe it over with an oily rag every morning."
https://i.postimg.cc/GhP2mvr4/yo52jnk88zk31.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

09-07-19, 02:33 PM

Sunday, September 7, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

09-08-19, 09:39 AM

8th September 1919

General Pershing arrives in New York City September 8, 1919. A view of the pier, decorated in honor of the returning Commanding General of the U.S. Army, General John J. Pershing. At the side, Red Cross workers are lined up to salute the General as he leaves the USS Leviathan.
https://i.postimg.cc/6QYczRwT/p5m8fybaibl31.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

A crowd outside a factory at Quebec welcomes the Duke of Windsor, (1894 - 1972), then Prince of Wales, during his royal tour. The Duke of Windsor reigned as King Edward VIII until 1936.
https://i.postimg.cc/TY0BByRM/p5m8fybaibl31.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Arag (Russian Navy White Movement) Russian Civil War: The gunboat was sunk off Lagan Island by mines. 4 crewmen killed.
Casco (United States) The 93-ton schooner was wrecked on the southeast coast of King Island in the Bering Sea during a gale. Her wreck sank in 12 feet (3.7 m) of water on 10 September and broke up completely in a gale on 23 September.
Valbanera (Spain) 1919 Florida Keys hurricane: The passenger ship foundered off Havana, Cuba with the loss of all 488 passengers and crew.

Sailor Steve

09-08-19, 04:43 PM

Monday, September 8, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a Note from the Drafting Committee asking for instruction as to the language in which the Conventions replacing the Acts of Berlin and Brussels should be drafted.

M Clemenceau points out that the Acts of Berlin and Brussels had been in French, and that some of their provisions were maintained in the new Conventions.

Mr Balfour says that in view of this he agrees that the new Convention ought to be in French.

Mr Polk agrees.

S Tittoni also agrees.

(It is decided that the Conventions replacing the Acts of Berlin and Brussels should be drafted in French.)

2. M Clemenceau says that the Germans had first asked the Conference to send Commissions of Control to Germany before the Treaty came into force. Consequently advance detachments had been appointed and each of the Allied Powers had been represented in each section. The Germans had then sent a request that the despatch of the Commissions should be delayed as they appeared to them to be too numerous. The Council then decided to postpone the sending of the advance detachments. Now it appears that the Germans withdrew their objection to the numbers and desired the Commissions to be sent at once. He suggests that the Commissions should accordingly be sent immediately and be composed in the manner already decided on. He was informed that General Nollet was ready to begin.

M Polk says that it is understood that the United States cannot make appointments for the present.

(It is decided that the advance delegations of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should be sent to Germany forthwith.)

3. The Council has before it a reply from the German Delegation regarding the ultimatum of the Conference and a draft answer to this reply.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks the draft a somewhat rough answer. It is the general desire that Germany should carry out the Treaty, but no one constitution wishes her to do so under compulsion, whether by arms or by blockade. This would be a misfortune not only for Germany but for the Allied and Associated Powers. Germany should be given every chance of behaving reasonably. The draft says very truly that the German Government is not the final authority on the interpretation of the Treaty, but the same might be alleged against the Allied and Associated Powers. The interpretation of the Treaty has now become a subject for jurists. He does not think that the Council is the final authority regarding its interpretation.

S Tittoni observes that two points in the German reply had not been met in the answer. The first was a legal point. Article 178 of the German Constitution declares that no Article in the Constitution should affect the Treaty of Peace. Article 61 is thereby rendered ineffective. The second was, that in threatening the extension of the occupation, the Allies are not taking their stand on any Article in the Treaty. Neither of these points were met in the draft reply.

M Clemenceau says that this had been deliberately done. He does not think that either of these points requires a reply. It is hardly tolerable that Germany should violate the Treaty and that the Allies should remain bound by it. The question of legality should have been raised when the letter had been drafted on behalf of the Conference to the German Government. It is impossible now to withdraw from the position then taken up. He reminds the Council that the Austrians are at the moment represented in the German Assembly. This cannot be tolerated. He is persuaded that if the Allies threaten to carry out what they have indicated, they would not be forced to execute their threats. Austria has not yet signed the Treaty and is not, therefore, bound in the same way as Germany, but it must be remembered that she protested against the clause that prevented her from joining Germany.

Mr Polk says that he agrees with M Clemenceau’s contention that the Allies cannot withdraw from the position they had taken up. He thinks that perhaps it might be as well to begin by answering the German arguments. When this has been done the Council can be as stiff as it wishes. He would like to consult the Jurists in respect to the first part of the answer.

M Clemenceau says that he is quite ready to adopt this method and asks Mr Polk to prepare the draft.

(It is agreed that a new draft answer to the German reply concerning Article 61 of the German Constitution should be prepared by Mr Polk and submitted to the Council on the following day.)

4. The Council has before it a letter from Mr Pachitch, dated September 4th, 1919, protesting against certain of the provisions in the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

M Berthelot says that the protest of the Delegation is a long one. The main desideratum is that no mention in the preamble should be made of the year 1913, in order that Serbian sovereignty over territories acquired in Balkan wars should not be limited. The argument is that, as Serbia had settled her own affairs then without the help of Europe, the settlement she had made ought not to be called in question now.

S Tittoni asks whether this request applies to a matter of form only or to a matter of substance. If only a matter of form was involved, he would agree. Otherwise, the effect would be that minority clauses would not apply to Macedonia.

M Pichon observes that they would not apply to the part of Macedonia acquired by Serbia in the Balkan War.

S Tittoni reminds the Council that the Commission had recommended the appointment of a Commissioner to reside in Macedonia on behalf of the League of Nations the Council had decided against this. It is now asked to go much further in the opposite direction and to exclude Macedonia from the protection of the League of Nations. This, he thinks, is not acceptable.

M Berthelot says that, if the passage of the preamble objected to by the Serb-Croat Delegation were suppressed, the change would be a matter of form, but the change carried with it an alteration to Article 9, the last paragraph of which would have to be struck out. This would have to be a substantial change. It is questionable, however, whether the Conference could enact any measures affecting the pre-war acquisitions of any State. If the last paragraph of Article 9 were suppressed, some other Article would be inserted to make the language and educational clauses applicable to Macedonia. This however represented intrusion in another form. It is questionable whether such intrusion was legitimate.

M Pichon observes that when the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 had been called in question in relation to the Romanians, S Tittoni had declared that the Conference had no power to modify pre-war Treaties.

S Tittoni explains he had maintained the Treaty could not be abrogated, but that the Conference was free to introduce stipulations into its Treaties even in contradiction of the terms of that Treaty, by which they were not themselves bound. He observes that the Commission had unanimously decided that protection for minorities was necessary in Macedonia.

M Clemenceau says that he did not feel bound by the unanimous decision of the Commission. In his opinion, the Council could attach conditions to territory which it gave; it could not attach any conditions to territory previously acquired. He suggests that M Berthelot should draft the additional clauses intended to preserve the linguistic and educational guarantees of the population in Macedonia before discussing the matter any further.

S Tittoni says that the view of the British Delegate on the Committee had been that the Balkan settlement in 1913 was not final until its recognition by the Powers. This recognition had not taken place, as negotiations on the subject had been interrupted by the outbreak of the Great War.

M Berthelot says that the Treaty of Bucharest is valid, even without a recognition by the Great Powers.

S Tittoni observes that recognition is necessary to give the Treaty full authority from a diplomatic point of view. He reminds the Council of its previous conclusion, that the protection of minorities was even more necessary in Macedonia than elsewhere. It is now suggested that Macedonia should be excluded from the operation of the Treaties intended to protect minorities.

M Clemenceau says that the problem is exactly as S Tittoni states. It is for this reason that he would like to see a new formula before continuing the discussion of the question.

Mr Balfour says that the discussion is concerned with two questions - one relating to international law and practice, and the other to the situation of the Macedonian population. In regard to the first, he thinks there was no great difference of opinion between the French and British Delegations. Both think that the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 is not a completed transaction until ratified by the Great Powers. This ratification had not taken place because of the outbreak of the Great War. The French Delegation recognizes that the general situation in the Balkans, especially regarding financial arrangements, was not final before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. The French and British Delegations are, therefore, in accord in thinking that the Great War had cut into the necessary completion of the Balkan settlement. This appears to afford some justification to those who thought that on the legal point, the Conference has a right to alter what had been agreed on in the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913. On the other point, he thinks that all are entirely agreed. Special protection for the Macedonians is necessary. Some means might be found of affording the Macedonians special protection in a manner satisfactory to the Powers, but it is unlikely to be satisfactory to Serbia. The Serbians think that all they had acquired in 1913 should be outside the control of the Powers. The Powers think that the considerable accession of territory to Serbia and the special difficulties of Macedonia justified them in exercising control.

M Clemenceau says that all he desires is to find a text which might be acceptable. The Minority Clauses are unpopular and must be made palatable by some concession.

Mr Polk says that the Council had previously concluded that Macedonia requires a special guarantee.

M Berthelot says it will be very difficult to find a formula reconciling

(a) The absence of reference to 1913, and

(b) Special protection for the Macedonians. As the Treaty now stands, the Serbians will probably refuse to sign on the following Wednesday. He, therefore, suggests that he be authorized to have an interview with Mr Vesnitch. If Mr Vesnitch agrees to a compromise, the situation might be saved. If not, the reference to 1913 could be preserved, and if the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation refused to sign the Treaty with Austria, the risk must be run. As to the minor points raised in the letter, he suggests that the Committee be allowed to dispose of them.

Mr Polk suggests that the compromise, as suggested by M Berthelot, should, when drafted, be submitted to the Committee also.

M Berthelot points out that the Delegation also asked for a modification of Article 11. He does not think this could be accepted, and he suggests that the request be refused.

M Clemenceau says that this might be considered on the following day, together with the other points raised on the subject.

(It is decided that M Berthelot should consult with M Vesnitch as to a formula, affording protection to the population of Macedonia, in a manner acceptable to the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation. This formula, if agreed on, should be submitted to the Council after consultation with the Committee on New States, to which the other points raised in M. Patchitch’s letter were also referred.)

5. M Clemenceau says that he has just received a letter from the Romanian Delegation, offering to sign the Treaty with Austria, with a reservation, regarding Article 60, concerning minorities, transit and trade.

Mr Balfour asks whether any Power can sign a Treaty with reservations.

M Clemenceau says that this had not been permitted in the case of the Treaty with Germany. He thinks it is necessary that a Power should sign, or should not sign.

M Pichon observes that Article 60, which he read, covers the whole case of the protection of minorities everywhere.

M Clemenceau suggests that the substitution of the expression “League of Nations” for the expression “Principal Allied and Associated Powers” might perhaps induce the Romanians to be more tractable. If so, he would adopt the alteration. The Romanian argument is that if each of the Allied and Associated Powers considered itself the protector of minorities in Romania, there will be no end to their troubles. If, on the other hand, the League of Nations is the only Court of Appeal, the matter could be settled without repeated diplomatic interventions at Bucharest.

Mr Balfour observes that if the words “Principal Allied and Associated Powers” are deleted, and the words “League of Nations” introduced, Article 60 would stipulate that there should be a Treaty with the League of Nations. This appears to be impossible.

S Tittoni says that he understands the Clauses for the protection of minorities had been formulated by the Conference, and accepted by the Poles, Serbs and Czechs in the Treaties signed with these small States. The League of Nations had been introduced to supervise the execution, but the clauses had been framed by the Allied and Associated Powers and the Treaties had been signed with them. If so, it is hardly possible to mention clauses to be framed by the League of Nations, which did not yet exist, seeing that the clauses had already been framed by the Allied and Associated Powers. He thinks Romania must accept the clauses as laid down, but that she might be asked to accept the supervision of the League of Nations for the execution of these clauses. Since the other small States had agreed, Romania must also agree.

M Pichon points out that Romania would only acquire the Bukovina from Austria. The area she is likely to obtain from Hungary, i.e. Transylvania, is far bigger. If Article 60 in the Treaty with Austria is confined to the Bukovina, possibly Romania would accept. At all events, she would be on worse ground for refusing.

S Tittoni said that if this would induce Romania to sign the Treaty with Austria, the expedient might be accepted.

M Pichon says that he is not certain that this will induce Romania to sign.

Mr Polk says that he thinks an exception in favour of Romania cannot be made. Poland had signed the minority Treaty, in spite of its extreme unpopularity in Poland. Mr Paderewski had overcome great opposition before he was able to sign it. If Romania were now allowed to evade a similar Treaty, Mr Paderewski and his country would feel that they had been treated unjustly.

Mr Balfour agrees. He thinks that Poland deserves far better of the Conference than Romania.

M Clemenceau says that Mr Polk’s argument concerning Mr Paderewski and Poland is very strong. If Romania will not sign, he would like to know what effect this would produce on the rest of the Treaty.

S Tittoni asks whether the Minority Clauses for Romania are the same as those for the other new States.

M Berthelot says that the clauses are the same for all. There is a special clause for the protection of Jews in Romania, and this clause also applied to Poland.

(It is decided to consult the Drafting Committee on the legal issues involved.)

(The Members of the Drafting Committee now enter the room.)

M Clemenceau asked M Fromageot what legal effect would result from the absence of Romanian signature to the Treaty. Romania is unwilling to sign the Treaty without making a reservation on Article 60. The Council is unwilling to allow her to sign with a reservation. What, then, was the situation, for Romania, should her signature be refused, and for the powers that do sign?

M Fromageot says that if Romania does not sign, she would not be a party to the Treaty, could claim no advantages under it, and be made subject to no obligations established by it.

Mr Balfour asks whether Romania would still be at war with Austria.

M Fromageot says that war can cease without a Treaty, just as it can begin without a formal declaration. War is a state of fact. War, for instance, had ceased between France and Mexico without a Treaty.

M Clemenceau asks what will happen to the Bukovina.

M Fromageot says that, according to his personal opinion, Romania can claim no rights over the Bukovina on the ground of a Treaty she did not sign.

M Clemenceau said that the Romanians would doubtless stay in the country without the consent of the Powers. He asks whether she could acquire any financial or economic rights.

M Fromageot says that no such rights can be acquired under the Treaty, if Romania does not sign it.

Mr Balfour asks whether Austrian rights in the Bukovina would be extinguished.

M Fromageot says that there is an article requiring Austria to give up her rights in the Bukovina. This article would stand, even though Romania did not take up the inheritance. It might, perhaps, be stipulated that the abandonment of the rights in the Bukovina be made in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers, as it was clear that none but a signatory to the Treaty could acquire rights transferred by it.

Mr Balfour asks whether it would be possible to adopt the suggestion of substituting the League of Nations for the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, as it is their supervision that Romania appears to resent.

Mr Hurst points out that if the League of Nations is substituted for the Allied and Associated Powers, the question regarding the protection of minorities would come before the Council of the League. By the constitution of the League, Romania, if concerned, will have the right to be present in the Council. As no decision of the Council is operative without unanimity, the mere presence of Romania would secure no interference with her policy.

S Tittoni points out that a similar difficulty will arise in respect of the Treaty with Hungary. Romania might be satisfied with the actual possession of the Bukovina and Transylvania without a title de jure to either, because she might argue that neither Austria nor Hungary will be able for a long time to dispute her possession. But in the case of Bessarabia, unless she acquires treaty rights, it must be clear to her that Russia, once she was restored to power, would certainly wish to regain the country. In this instance, Romania would see that she required the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers or the League of Nations. This might be pointed out to her, and she might be influenced by this argument.

Mr Polk says that he is not prepared to bribe Romania into good behavior. He does not think that the Council has fallen so low as to be forced to resort to such tactics.

S Tittoni points out that he would not have made his proposal unless he had regarded Romania as having a good title to Bessarabia.

Mr Polk says that he quite understands this.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks the proper course is to make no mention of Bessarabia at all. He will confine himself to reasoning with the Romanians, and pointing out that Poland, Serbia, Czechoslovakia, had all accepted similar treaties. This would put the Romanians on bad ground for maintaining their refusal.

M Clemenceau says that it might be added that Romania had failed to carry out what she had undertaken to do under the Treaty of Berlin of 1878.

Mr Polk thinks it might be stipulated that the surrender of the former Duchy of Bukovina should be made in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr Balfour says this will do away with any necessity for a letter to the Romanian Delegation.

Mr Polk agrees that this might be reserved for use in case the Romanians refuse to sign. The change might be made by a special protocol added to the Treaty.

M Clemenceau says he thinks the Romanians will be sufficiently punished if they do not sign, by the effects of their not being parties to the Treaty.

Mr Balfour says that he will accept any suggestion which does not involve a postponement of the signature of the Treaty.

S Tittoni says that he will adhere to Mr Polk’s suggestion, if there is the time to spare. He points out that there is yet time to penalize Romania in the Treaty with Hungary, from which she expects to receive Transylvania.

M Fromageot points out that a special protocol could be contrived, permitting Romania to sign the Treaty with Austria, after the other Powers.

Mr Polk says that he has received visits from some of the Romanian Delegation. He thinks that the Romanians wished to be conciliatory, but at the bottom of their attitude was a sense of grievance that they were not obtaining their due share of reparations. They think that they are faring less well than France and Belgium in this respect.

M Clemenceau says he thinks the best suggestion to adopt is Mr Balfour’s, namely, that an answer be sent to the Romanians, arguing with them that Poland and the other new States had accepted the minority clauses. As to the Bukovina, Transylvania and Bessarabia, he thinks it would be better to say nothing, but to wait and see what action the Romanians would take.

(It is accordingly decided that no alterations should be made in Article 60 of the Treaty with Austria, and that Mr Balfour should prepare a draft answer to the Roumanian Delegation, in the spirit of the above discussion, and that the draft should be submitted to the Council on the following day.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

09-09-19, 10:39 AM

9th September 1919

Anti-Bolshevik armoured train heads toward the front in northern Russia.
https://i.postimg.cc/dthQRLp6/ED8v7h-OXk-AAYh3-I.jpg

Spanish steamship Valbanera sinks in a hurricane on its way to Havana, Cuba, resulting in the deaths of all 488 passengers and crew.
[url=https://postimages.org/]https://i.postimg.cc/85FDRYn5/EEA02-Y9-Xk-AE4-D1j.png (https://postimages.org/)

Boston police officers go on strike, resulting in an outbreak of crime and violence in the city, with 9 dead. Massachusetts State Guard is sent in to restore order.
https://i.postimg.cc/BQpyvgMw/EEB5hsr-Xo-AAQIn.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

President Wilson smiles from a train in St. Paul, Minnesota on September 9, 1919, during a train trip across the country to promote the League of Nations. The trip proved too exhausting for Wilson, and he suffered a stroke soon after returning to Washington.
https://i.postimg.cc/hGYhRTkX/EEB5hsr-Xo-AAQIn.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

USS St. Sebastian (United States Navy) Florida Keys hurricane: The patrol vessel was wrecked at Key West, Florida in a hurricane.
USS Sylvia (United States Navy) The patrol vessel was wrecked at Key West in a hurricane.

Sailor Steve

09-09-19, 10:17 PM

Tuesday, September 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council takes note of Mr Polk’s draft reply to the German Government’s letter of 5th September.

Mr Polk says that he had referred the matter to Dr. Scott, who has consulted with the legal experts of the Drafting Committee, and prepared the note. It appears that, in the opinion of these highly qualified jurists, the German answer had been technically correct. It therefore seems to him that, before a further contention were raised with the German Government in a subsequent letter, the cooperation of the legal experts should be called for, in order to avoid making a legal mistake. He understands that the letter drafted by him had not been agreed to by M Fromageot, although the other jurists of the Drafting Committee had been satisfied with it. He therefore requests that the Drafting Committee should be called in to advise the Council. He had only been given his draft a few minutes before entering the Council Chamber, and had, therefore, not had time to study it closely. He is not entirely satisfied with the form of the letter.

(At this point M Fromageot, Mr Hurst, Dr Scott, S Ricci-Busatti and Mr Nagaoka enter the room.)

M Clemenceau explains to the Drafting Committee the problem before the Council, and briefly recites the events that had led up to the problem now before the Conference. He further explains the main points in the Notes of the Allied and Associated Governments, and of the German Government, on the subject of the violation of the Peace Treaty. Drawing attention to the proposed extension of military occupation on the right bank of the Rhine, and to the legal arguments that had been brought forward against such a measure, he said that he would rather resign his post than consent to France being left by the American and British Governments to enforce unassisted the provisions of the Peace Treaty. America, Great Britain and France have all demobilized and that was inevitable, but, if Great Britain and America refused to support France at the present juncture, the whole weight of enforcing the Peace Treaty would be thrown on his country, and a position would result which would be quite intolerable to him.

M Fromageot says that he had not agreed with the opinion of his colleagues on the legal issue for the following reasons. In a letter, dated 2nd September, Germany had been called upon by the Allied Council to make special enactments by the Entente Governments whereby Article 61 of the Constitution, inviting Austria to participate in the legislation, and administration, of the German Reich, should be rendered null and void. The demand of the Allied and Associated Powers had been clear; they had insisted upon the abrogation and nullification of Article 61. In their reply dated 5th September, the German Government, whether knowingly or not he could not say, had repeated the request of the Allied and Associated Governments, but had repeated it in such a way as to introduce into it certain modifications. Instead of undertaking to make Article 61 of the German Constitution null and void, they had proposed to make it non-applicable and to give it no legal force. This was not meeting the Allied demand; for the Article in question remained part of the German Constitution, and could be made applicable, and given force later on. A mere admission of non-applicability was not what had been desired. In their letter, the German Government had given a special interpretation to Article 61 by virtue of a later Article in the same Constitution, (No. 178), which latter Article enacted, that no provision of the Peace Treaty of Versailles was affected by anything in the German Constitution. Now, the argument brought forward in this respect by the German Government might be good or might be bad. It did not appear to him to be acceptable. The conclusion could not be avoided that, if Article 61 were made non-applicable by virtue of Article 178, the argument could be reversed, and Article 178 be cancelled by Article 61. The Allied and Associated Governments had demanded the nullification of Article 61, and had threatened to take the necessary steps to force the German Government to make the necessary enactments. They had received, in reply, an interpretation, both of their original request, and of the Article at issue, by virtue of which it was alleged, that the measures foreshadowed by the Allied and Associated Governments would not be necessary. The Council might well repeat their original request, and state clearly that they were not concerned with the interpretation of the German Constitution, given in the German Government’s letter of the 5th September. He suggests, in conclusion, that the demand for nullification should be repeated in the strongest and clearest terms in any letter that might be subsequently sent to the German Government; who should also be informed that the Allies would feel themselves to be absolutely justified in taking any measures necessary to enforce their demands.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Hurst to explain his standpoint to the Council.

Mr Hurst says that he could only express a personal opinion, because the matter had merely been the subject of conversation and discussion in the Drafting Committee, and had never been officially referred to them. He quite feels that the prestige of the Allied and Associated Governments demand that the German Government should be told that steps would be taken to enforce compliance with the demands that had been made to them. But a further question arises, which is whether the admission of the German Government, in their letter of 5th September, is not sufficient to afford the necessary satisfaction to the Council. The German Government had clearly admitted that Article 61 of their Constitution had no legal force. He asked whether there is a sufficient difference between this admission and the demands of the Council to justify further action. Would it not be enough to tell the German Government that their admission of the non-validity of Article 61 had been noted and put on record. Another point arises, which is that, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, Austria could be admitted into the German Reich, subject to the consent of the League of Nations. This shows that the Peace Treaty itself does actually leave a means open to Austria, whereby she might eventually become incorporated into Germany. It might be argued that the Allied demand for the nullification of Article 61 was in contradiction to the terms of the Peace Treaty, which they themselves had drawn up. The real protection of the Allied and Associated Powers against an increase of strength to Germany, by virtue of the incorporation of Austria, came from the terms of the Austrian Peace Treaty. After signature, Austria would bind herself not to participate in the affairs of another State and to regard her independence as inalienable. This undertaking by Austria, combined with the admission contained in the German note, would, in his opinion, sufficiently protect the prestige of the Council, and the interests of the Allied and Associated Governments.

M Clemenceau says that he wishes to draw the attention of the Council to three points, which he regards as of primary importance.

(1) He does not see why an Article in the Peace Treaty with Austria, preventing that country from joining Germany, is of any protection, unless the analogous article in the German Peace Treaty were upheld and enforced. What is good for one Treaty is good for another Treaty. Why should an Article in the Austrian Treaty be of any greater protection than an Article in the German Treaty?

(2) The German Government is not qualified to interpret the German Constitution. In his opinion, no Government has such a right.

(3) He wishes to draw attention to a further Article in the German Constitution (No. 112), by virtue of which it had been enacted that no German citizen should be surrendered to a foreign government for trial or punishment. This article, taken in conjunction with No. 61, seemed to him to show a deliberate plan to violate the Peace Treaty; and this raises at once a very grave issue. He desires to assure the Council, that he had no wish to force quarrels; it was not in his character to do so. He is none the less deeply convinced that the German Government will use every means in its power to avoid carrying out the Peace Treaty fully. This is, after all, only to be expected; since such a line of conduct was conformable to the dictates of human nature. The Allied and Associated Governments were in danger, by the fact that demobilization had been forced upon them irresistibly by public opinion in their own countries. But Germany is attempting to reassemble her forces, and would certainly continue to try to do so. He feels that he is, at that moment, testing the spirit of the Entente. If, after making a specific demand, the Council were to allow their orders not to be complied with, a succession of events would take place, which would bring about a very grave state of affairs. By trying to avoid a small crisis at the present moment, the Allied and Associated Governments would inevitably provoke a much graver one later on, at a date which the Germans themselves would choose.

Mr. Balfour says that the decision, which the Council was called upon to take was one of the utmost gravity and importance. He agrees with much that the President has said; but has a few remarks to offer, and a separate suggestion of his own to add. He has listened to M Fromageot’s contention with interest, although he could not quite agree with it. He has understood him to say that it lay with the Allied and Associated Powers to say exactly what the Peace Treaty of Versailles meant. But it appeared to him (the speaker) that although the Allied and Associated Powers had a perfect right, originally, to insert whatever clauses they chose into the Peace Treaty, and to disregard, if they wished to do so, any complaint that the German Government might have to make upon the projected provisions, this original liberty of action did not so extend itself, after signature, as to give freedom of interpretation to the Allied and Associated Powers. Once the Treaty is signed, it seems to him that it becomes a bi-lateral agreement, and that each separate signatory to the document could argue with other signatories on equal terms. It is none the less clear to him that the persons who had framed the German Constitution had deliberately attempted to draw it up in such a way as openly to challenge and possibly to violate, the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Their intentions might be described in English slang as a “try on”. Article 112, to which the President had just called the attention of the Council, appeared to be a far worse violation of the Peace Treaty, than the Article upon which there had just been an exchange of notes. He felt amazed that not one of the Entente Governments had been told earlier that the new German Constitution was violating the Peace Treaty of Versailles, both in letter and in spirit.

He fully agrees with the President of the Council that a moment will arise, when the issue between the Entente and the German Government would be quite clear, and would have to be fought out by argument, or, possibly, by arms, or by the re-imposition of a blockade. But he does not know whether the Entente Powers are choosing a judicious ground for a dispute with Germany, if they forced a crisis on the debatable subject of the extent to which an invitation to Austria to join the German Reich, had violated the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Two most able and qualified men had just given divergent opinions on the legal issue. The differences of opinion, of which the Council had just taken note, would be repeated in the press of all European countries; if the present litigation between the Entente and Germany results in the forcible occupation of Frankfort. As soon as that important German base had been occupied by Entente troops, the press of Europe would pour out cataracts of legal and quasi-legal arguments; public opinion will take sides for and against the Entente, and, though some sections of public opinion would doubtless approve the action taken, there would be others which would bitterly dispute it. He suggests, therefore, that the conflict should be deferred, not because the Allied and Associated Governments doubt the justice of their contentions, but simply because they were not opening the conflict from an absolutely advantageous position. He proposes that a letter should be sent to the German Government, telling them that, in the opinion of the Allied & Associated Governments, two articles of the German Constitution violated the Peace Treaty of Versailles, and that, although Article 178 of the same Constitution, declaring that no provisions contained therein violated the Peace Treaty might absolve them, any argument based on such ground appeared wholly unsatisfactory to the Entente Governments. The time will soon arrive when the intentions of Germany with regard to the Peace Treaty would be absolutely clear. But so long as the Council were only concerned with a prospective agreement between Germany and Austria, requiring the active co-operation of the latter power, before it could be effected, the issue before it is doubtful and unsatisfactory. On the other hand, Article 112 of the German Constitution, declaring that no German citizen could be subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign court, would, in a very few days, bring about a decisive issue. If this article is quoted in reply to a demand for the surrender of officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, there would be no disagreement among jurists, who would be unanimous in thinking that the provisions of the Treaty were being defied and violated. As soon as the German Government should refuse to surrender military criminals, the Entente Governments will say that Article 178 had been drafted in order to throw dust in their eyes and deceive them as to the real intentions of the German Government and the German people. If Frankfort is occupied as a reply to such an open act of defiance, no argument will be possible, and the action of the Entente Governments would receive the moral support of all mankind. He therefore suggests, in conclusion, that a letter of warning, couched in the sternest language, should be sent to the German Government, telling them that, in the opinion of the Allied & Associated Governments, Article 178 of the German Constitution is binding upon them, and that they were expected to carry out, to the letter, the terms of the Peace Treaty signed by their plenipotentiaries, ratified by their Parliament, and agreed to, by the express provisions of their own Constitution.

Mr Polk says that he agrees that a struggle with Germany for the enforcement of the Peace Treaty is inevitable. The Germans will, some time or another, make an effort to avoid its provisions; but he thinks that the Council ought to choose its ground, so as to be quite certain that it is technically, that is to say legally, right. In view of the legal argument advanced by the German Government, to the effect that Article 178 of the German Constitution made Article 61 of no effect, he thought that any further reply sent by the Council ought to be carefully studied by jurists before dispatch. Until such an examination could be made he feels bound to withhold his final opinion.

M Tardieu says that attention has been called to the divergence of opinion among the jurists. He has, however, been struck by the fact that Mr Hurst had advanced arguments far more political than legal in character. Would it not be possible to deal with the question on purely political grounds? Mr Balfour had suggested that another basis should be chosen for the conflict, but by virtue of their letter of the 2nd September, the Allied and Associated Governments had joined with the German Government on a definite issue. Would it not be possible to adhere to the line previously adopted, more particularly as the new Article to which attention had been drawn (No. 112), showed clearly that the German Government wishes, and intends, to violate the Peace Treaty as far as it could?

M Cambon says he has had a long experience of German methods, and of the mental attitude of the German people. He is convinced that if the Council allows itself to be entrapped in the meshes of legal argument, it will be giving encouragement to the German Government to advance more arguments of the same kind; and to obscure the issue, whilst they themselves pursued a persistent policy of violation, behind the cloud of dust they are throwing in the eyes of the Council. By allowing doubtful legal arguments to weigh with them, the Council will be entering on dangerous ground, and will inevitably lose its authority in the eyes of the German Government.

Dr Scott says that as Mr Hurst’s opinion does not seem to be very popular, he desires, from motives of loyalty, to say that he agrees with his colleague.

M Clemenceau says that he fully understands Mr Hurst’s argument, but that it does not weigh with him strongly, as he had asked for a legal, and not a political expression of opinion from him. But the main question before the Council, a question which should not in any way be obscured, is whether the Peace Treaty is violated by virtue of Articles 61 and 112 of the German Constitution. If the Council allows itself to be blinded by the German argument on the subject of Article 178, it would very soon lose all its authority. When the Treaty is violated by one signatory, then, inevitably, the other signatory is no longer bound. He personally has no doubt that the German Constitution does actually violate the Treaty of Versailles. The Council has forwarded certain definite demands to the Germans, who had replied by an interpretation of the Treaty, and of their own Constitution. There is no country in the world where the Government had a right to interpret the Constitution. He wishes to propose an immediate measure. Mr Balfour had said that, by waiting two or three weeks, an issue would inevitably arise. His present proposal is to demand the surrender of certain Germans guilty of breaches of the laws of war, immediately and without delay. He desires to send a letter stating: that the reply of the German Government of the 5th September is not acceptable; that the Allied and Associated Governments had taken note of another Article in the German Constitution explicitly violating the Peace Treaty; and that the immediate surrender of certain persons, mentioned by name, should be effected. He agrees with Mr Balfour that the position of the Council would be more advantageous if the conflict occurred on the subject of Article 112.

Mr Polk asks whether the surrender of certain German criminals could be demanded before the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

M Pichon says that no steps could be taken before the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

A considerable discussion then follows as to the probable date of the ratification of the Peace Treaty by France and Italy, and it is thought that this could not take place in less than a fortnight.

Mr Polk asks whether an examination of the German Constitution cannot be made, with a view to ascertaining all violation of the Peace Treaty that it might contain.

M Clemenceau says that no clearer instance of violation than that now before the Council was likely to occur again. He agrees with every word of what M Cambon had said. The Council had made a demand which had virtually been refused. He notices that all his colleagues, with the possible exception of S Tittoni, who had not yet expressed himself, are agreed that the demands of the Allies should be enforced. He therefore suggests that the whole question should be considered by every delegate, during the next twenty-four hours, and re-discussed at St. Germain, after the signature of the Peace Treaty with Austria, on the following day. If any means could be devised whereby Mr Balfour’s proposals could be connected with the present demand on the German Government, he would think such a line of action absolutely perfect.

M Tardieu draws attention to the necessity of making the Germans nullify the two Articles violating the Peace Treaty of Versailles. The best means of connecting Mr Balfour’s proposals with the demands previously made probably consisted in insisting on the nullification of the two Articles objected to.

Mr Polk said that certain political demands had been made to Germany, and it is evident that the German Government must be compelled to comply. He proposed to refer the question to the Drafting Committee, to see whether the legal and political sides of the question could not be reconciled. The Committee could prepare a report and submit it to the Council at their meeting at St. Germain on the following day. In conclusion, he emphasizes the importance of being absolutely sure of the legal justification for any argument that might be brought forward in the next note to the German Government.

M Clemenceau says that he could not see any legal difficulty, since the German Government has no right to interpret its own Constitution.

Mr Balfour says that doubtless the President of the Council was a better judge of that matter than he was himself. Great Britain is protected against interpretations of her Constitution, by the fact that it had never been defined in writing. On the other hand, the Council has been interpreting the German Constitution in the notes sent to the German Government, and it seemed to him, in consequence, that the Germans have an equal right to do what the Allies themselves are doing.

S Tittoni says that in view of the fact that the Council was called upon to take action, on account of the violation of the Peace Treaty with Germany by Articles 61 and 112 of the Constitution of that country, he wished to draw attention to two points. Firstly, he agreed that Article 61 of the German Constitution absolutely violated the Peace Treaty. Secondly, with regard to Article 112, he thinks that a reply that might possibly be made later on by the German Government ought to be considered before-hand. The Germans might quite well admit that the Allies had a right to demand the surrender of certain persons guilty of offences defined in the Peace Treaty. But such an admission on their part might be made without abrogating Article 112 of their Constitution. When once the surrender of certain specified criminals had been made by the Germans, these latter might be justified in maintaining, that they had complied with the special provisions of the Peace Treaty, and could, from then onward, give Article 112 full legal validity.

M Cambon says that it was not sufficient for the present German Government to say that Article 178 of the Constitution made Article 61 of no effect. The present Government might be followed by another, which would very likely maintain an opposite point of view, if it thinks the circumstances favorable for doing so.

M Clemenceau said that whilst everybody would be free to take opinions from whatever quarter they chose during the next 24 hours, he does not think that his own was likely to alter.

(It is decided that the question of the violation of the Peace Treaty by virtue of Articles 61 and 112 of the German Constitution should be discussed on the following day at St. Germain after the signature of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and that the Drafting Committee should give their opinion on the legal issues involved, to the Council.)

2. The Council takes note of the draft letter to the Romanian Delegation prepared by Mr Balfour.

(The draft submitted by Mr Balfour is accepted.

3. Mr Polk says that he has been informed by Mr Vesnitch, that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegates do not intend to sign the Peace Treaty with Austria, on account of their objection to the Minorities Clauses contained in it.

M Berthelot says that he had interviewed Mr Vesnitch at 8 p.m. on the preceding day. M. Vesnitch had said that it was impossible for him to sign the Austrian Peace Treaty without the express permission of his Government, and had added that he had previously interviewed Mr. Balfour. He had said that, if the Treaty on Minorities were to be applicable to the territories acquired in the first Balkan War, his Government would not allow him to sign. An agreement had been reached between them, whereby the Treaty in question might be made to apply to the whole of the new Serb-Croat-Slovene State. This would avoid mentioning either Macedonia, or the date 1913, in specific terms. Mr Vesnitch had promised to telegraph this proposal to his Government, and hoped to have a reply by Wednesday morning. He had told Mr Vesnitch of the grave responsibility that he would incur by not signing the Peace Treaty with Austria. Such a refusal might result in the Serb-Croat-Slovene State losing all the advantages which it stood to gain from the Peace Treaty. He had told him that it seemed hardly reasonable to resign these great advantages on account of a question of “amour propre”. It is possible that, even when the reply comes from Belgrade, it would be in the negative. The obstinacy of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegates in the matter was very great.

(A long discussion then follows as to whether the signing of the Peace Treaty with Austria should be postponed to Thursday or Friday, and it is finally decided that the signature should take place at 10.0 o’clock on Wednesday as arranged.

It is further decided that a protocol should be drafted, by virtue of which any of the high contracting parties might be allowed to sign the Peace Treaty within a period of three days.)

M Berthelot said that Mr Vesnitch had asserted that he might be able to persuade his Government to sign the Peace Treaty with Austria, if the Council sent a letter to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, expressing confidence in their liberal views, and telling them explicitly, that the Article on the subject of minorities in the Austrian Peace Treaty would be an end to their engagements in the matter. Mr Vesnitch had alleged that Mr Polk had given his approval to such a line of action.

Mr Polk says that he had interviewed Mr Vesnitch, who had explained that a letter on the lines described by M Berthelot, had been sent to the Polish Government, when they had objected to the Minorities Clauses in the Peace Treaty with Germany.

M Berthelot said that no such letter had ever been sent to the Polish Government.

Mr Polk says that he has no objection, in principle, to sending a letter of the kind, although he had not suggested any such measure or expressed approval.

S Tittoni says that he had no objection to such a letter being sent, so long as nothing contained in it could possibly modify the obligations imposed on Serbia by virtue of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and by the Minorities Treaty.

4. M Berthelot said that certain alterations in the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State had been agreed upon by the members of the Committee in New States. Treaty between the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and the Allied and Associated Powers

(It is decided that the Report of the Committee on New States on the subject of certain modifications to be introduced into the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, should be accepted.)

5. S Tittoni says that he wishes to draw the attention of the Council to the contents of a telegram received by him from General Mombelli. This officer states that three-quarters of the Hungarian people are asking for the dispatch of an Inter-Allied body of troops (who would be very well received), in order to ensure that the elections in Hungary should be carried out without intervention or disturbance. Such a measure is necessary if a stable Government, with which the Allies could treat, was ever to be set up in Hungary. The Allied troops would, moreover, be very well received.

M Clemenceau says that he cannot employ French troops on electoral business in Hungary or anywhere else. He does not think that Mr Balfour or Mr Polk could persuade their Governments to send British or American troops for such a purpose.

S Tittoni said that he had merely wished to draw attention to the question, and is quite content that every delegate, on being duly informed, should assume whatever responsibility he thought fit.

6. (It is decided that the General Act revising the General Act of Berlin, February 26th, 1885,4 and the General Act and Declaration of Brussels, July 2nd, 1890, should be accepted, with the following modification. Convention Replacing the Acts of Berlin and Brussels.

Article 11, Page 8. The words “public order and good government” should be changed to “public security and order.”)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

09-10-19, 09:49 AM

10th September 1919

Aftermath of War

Austria signs Peace Treaty in Paris.

Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye is signed between Austria (Republic of German-Austria) and the Allied Powers, reducing Austria to a fraction of the prewar Austro-Hungarian Empire.
https://i.postimg.cc/pL23xSds/EEF2j-Ub-Ws-AEP50-R.png (https://postimages.org/)

A black veteran named L.B. Reed was hung in Clarksdale, Mississippi, after he was suspected of having a relationship with a white woman.

Ship Losses:

USS Coco (United States Navy) 1919 Florida Keys hurricane: The patrol vessel foundered off Key West, Florida in a hurricane.
USS Katherine K. (United States Navy) 1919 Florida Keys hurricane: The patrol vessel foundered off Key West, Florida in a hurricane.
USS Patrol No. 1 (United States Navy) 1919 Florida Keys hurricane: The patrol vessel was wrecked at Key West, Florida in a hurricane.
USS Sea Hawk (United States Navy) 1919 Florida Keys hurricane: The patrol vessel foundered off Key West, Florida in a hurricane.

Sailor Steve

09-10-19, 07:50 PM

Wednesday, September 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Chateau Saint Germain-en-Laye, Paris, 11:15

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council takes note of the following draft resolution with regard to the Air Convention:

“That the Air Convention shall be signed with the least possible delay by the Contracting States, it being understood that it shall remain open for a period of six months for signature by such of those States as are not at present in a position to sign it.”

Mr Polk draws the attention of the Council to the fact that he is unable to sign the Air Convention on behalf of the United States at the moment. It was even possible that the United States might not be able to give its adherence to the Convention, should the American Government maintain the reservations made by the American Delegates to the clauses relating to patents and customs duties.

(The draft resolution on the subject of the Air Convention is agreed to, subject to the reservation formulated by Mr Polk, on behalf of the United States.)

2. Mr Balfour says that he has closely considered the question left over at the last meeting of the Council. He had prepared a draft note for transmission to the German Government, but was not wholly satisfied with it. The conclusion was rather long and not decisive. Mr Hurst had devised another plan, which seemed more effective than the mere despatch of a note. After reading his own draft Note he called upon Mr Hurst to explain his plan. Violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles by Virtue of Certain Articles in the German Constitution.

Mr Hurst says that he had not been able to prepare any document which could be submitted to the Council. He had, on the previous day, made out a very rough draft, and had shown it to Dr Scott. At the previous meeting he had been aware that the desire of the Council had been to formulate some plan of action, which would combine two separate ideas. Firstly, the two separate violations of the Peace Treaty should be drawn attention to. Secondly, whatever note, or communication, were sent to the Germans, they should be compelled to reply immediately. In addition to this, whatever line of action were adopted it should be of such a nature as to avoid adverse criticism in neutral countries. The solution that had seemed best to him was to collect together all the admissions made by the Germans in their letter; to draw them up in the form of a protocol, which should be presented to the Germans for signature. When this had been done, their admissions would be given legal force, and be binding upon them. The Germans had admitted that the Peace Treaty and the Constitution were not in agreement. If, when presented with this admission in proper legal form, either the German Government, or the Reichsrat, refused to ratify it, then the intentions of the Germans would be made clear. The Drafting Committee had agreed, generally, to this proposal, at their meeting. The manner in which the protocol and the note by which it was to be transmitted were to be drafted, was doubtful, and, before proceeding to work, it was necessary that his main idea should be approved.

M Clemenceau says he understands that the Japanese Representative on the Drafting Committee had a proposal of his own to make.

Mr Nagaoka then read his draft proposal.

S Tittoni said that he had understood, on the previous day, that the Council wishes to force the German Government to make a special enactment, cancelling the Articles in their Constitution that were objected to. He understood Mr Nagaoka’s proposal to consist in demanding a declaration of nullification of the Articles in question, with the addition, that the Reichsrat should itself confirm the declaration.

Mr Balfour says that the Japanese proposal effected no more than what the Germans alleged to result naturally from Article 178 of their Constitution.

M Clemenceau said that he agrees with Mr. Hurst’s proposal, which he considered to be the best solution of the difficulty. He proposed that the Drafting Committee should bring a draft legal instrument before the Council on the following day, of such a nature as to oblige the German Government to sign, in the form of a protocol, whatever they had admitted in their letter of the 5th September. The advantage of Mr. Hurst’s proposal is that the Germans would be unable to enter into lengthy negotiations. The measures proposed, therefore, seemed to him to be the wisest and the most effective possible.

Mr Polk says that he approves of Mr. Hurst’s proposal also.

M Tardieu says that the draft protocol to be prepared by Mr Hurst and the Drafting Committee would have to be sent under the cover of a letter. He thinks that some of Mr. Balfour’s arguments and phrases might be put into the covering letter with great advantage.

(It is decided that the Drafting Committee should prepare a draft protocol, giving legal force to the admissions of the German Government in their letter of 5th September, and should present it to the Council at its meeting on the following day, together with a draft letter under cover of which, the aforesaid protocol should be transmitted to the German Government.)

3. M Cambon reports the decision of the Joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees on the subject of the demarcation line to be adopted in the Teschen area, with the aid of a map. He said that the Polish Delegates had provisionally approved of the line proposed, which is ethnographically correct.

S Tittoni says that he has received a visit from Mr Benes, who had admitted the justice of the new line, from an ethnographic point of view. He, (Dr Benes) had, however, argued, that if a strict ethnographic line were to be adopted in the Teschen area, it seemed hardly fair, conjointly with such a decision, to put four millions of Ruthenes in Eastern Galicia under Polish jurisdiction. A solution might consist in making concessions to the Czechoslovaks in the Teschen area, to balance the very great political and economic advantages that were being conferred on the Poles by virtue of the Galician decision.

Mr Balfour said that he could not consider the analogy between the Galician and Teschen situations as very relevant, for two reasons;

(1) t
The solution proposed for Eastern Galicia was provisional only, and was not intended to be a permanent settlement, an

(2) the decision on the subject of Galicia had been arrived at because the Ruthenian population in that country could not stand alone. It was inevitable that the Ruthenians should eventually be placed under the rule of a non-Ruthenian State. Nothing parallel, or similar, to those considerations arose in the Teschen problem.

M Clemenceau says that the Council proposed to discuss the Teschen question, which was quite difficult enough, without the Galician problem being added to it.

Mr Polk says that Mr Benes had proposed to him a line of demarcation following the river Vistula. The line in question would, however, be quite unacceptable to the Poles; although M. Benes considered that, in proposing it, he was making concessions.

M Pichon says that the Council had heard the point of view of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegations.
The Czech Delegates had insisted that their interest in the Teschen area was centered on the coal that it contained; the Poles had asserted that their interest in Teschen was on a political basis, and was purely concerned with the Polish population in the disputed districts. It was therefore clear that the Poles were asking for population, and the Czechs for coal. A solution might be found by giving the whole of the Karwin district to the Czechs, and the indisputably Polish districts, in the remainder of the area, to the Poles. He did not think that the line proposed by the Joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees could be upheld.

Mr Polk said that, if such a line as that proposed by M Pichon were adopted, it would separate the people working in the mines from their own homes, by a national frontier.

M Clemenceau says that a situation similar to that foreseen by Mr. Polk existed in Northern France, Belgium and the Saar Basin. It had not given rise to any serious difficulties.

Mr Balfour says that the Poles regarded the Karwin Basin as a Polish district, as indeed it was. There was no serious objection to cutting the coal-field into two halves, because geological formations in other portions of the world were frequently divided politically. He was quite sure that the French frontier did not follow the geological structure of that country, in the northern districts, where the coal strata ran over into Belgium and into Germany. This fact did not, however, give rise to serious difficulties, but M Pichon’s proposal involved cutting off a Polish population from the place where it worked, and this constituted a grave danger for the future. His conviction on this point was not only that of the Expert Committees of the Peace Conference, but also that of the International Commission in Teschen, who had studied the question locally. It was very dangerous to try to improvise another solution, more particularly as the line proposed by the Joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees was really favorable to the Czechs, to whom it granted 60 per cent, of the coal produced, and 40 per cent, to the Poles. It could not possibly be said that, under such a solution, the Czechs were being deprived of coal.

M Tardieu says that it should not be forgotten, that the Poles contended, that they could not count on the Silesian coal-fields until the plebiscite in that country had been taken. This argument was ingenious, but it was none the less certain that the Poles would eventually obtain possession of the greater part of the Silesian coal-fields.

M Pichon said that the Poles had repeatedly asserted that they did not care about coal.

Mr Polk says that Dr Benes had stated to him, that either the line proposed by him (Dr Benes) should be adopted, or a plebiscite should be held in the area.

M Berthelot said that Dr Benes had stated to him, that the situation in Bohemia was now so grave that it would be preferable to the Czechoslovaks to risk a plebiscite, rather than to consent to a solution which they regarded as so hopelessly unfavorable to them, and equivalent, in their opinion, to a refusal of all their demands.

S Tittoni said that, if a plebiscite were to be held, the area would have to be divided into two portions, as he had proposed for Kadkersburg and Marburg, when these areas were under discussion.

M Berthelot said that the Czech contention was that, if they could not possess the coal, they would be dependent upon their neighbors for it, and might be cut off from their necessary supplies at a time of diplomatic tension. M Pichon’s solution gave them the coal, and the rest of the Polish population to the Poles. By adopting it, the present state of affairs would not be altered, since the coal areas were now occupied by the Czechs.

Mr Polk said that the difficulty was that, under M Pichon’s proposal, a proportion of the Polish Teschen districts would be ceded to Czechoslovakia.

M Berthelot said that the Karwin coal district could more properly be compared to the Lens, than to the Belgian, coal district, for it was concentrated in a narrow area as in the case of Lens. The original proposals of the Joint Committees had been most favorable to the Czechs, but the proposals in question had now been withdrawn. Even by accepting M Pichon’s proposal, the Poles would be given far more than they had hoped for in the first instance. If, as he now thought possible, Dr Benes could persuade his countrymen to consent to the new proposal, it was surely worth consideration.

Mr Polk says that M. Pichon’s line would place 60,000 Poles under the administration of the Czechs.

Mr Balfour said that it should not be forgotten that even the line proposed by the Joint Committees gave a considerable number of Poles to the Czechs.

M Berthelot says that Dr Benes had based a good many of his arguments on the solution to the Galician problem, contemplated by the Council. The proposed decision was very favorable to the Poles, and the impression left upon the Czechs was that, although the Council was ready to place 4 million Ruthenes under Polish jurisdiction, they were not prepared to make a concession far smaller, from an ethnographical point of view, in favour of the Czechoslovak State. This would, in consequence produce a very bad impression. Dr Benes’ attitude had been extremely moderate and conciliatory, and it would be a great misfortune if he found himself compelled to resign his post, on account of what he considered an unconciliatory attitude of the Conference. Dr Benes’ resignation would be a political consideration, not entirely relevant to the Teschen problem, but the possibility of it could not be disregarded, and ought to be duly considered.

Mr Balfour said that he understood that the line described to the Council by M. Cambon had been adopted unanimously in the Joint Committees. As M.
Berthelot had not been a member of either Committee, he regarded his proposals as interesting, but not of sufficient authority to outweigh a unanimous proposal by an Expert Committee.

M Berthelot agrees with Mr. Balfour and said that the Committees had been unanimous, but it should not be forgotten that their unanimous opinion, for the first six months, had been to adopt a solution far more favorable to the Czechs than any now proposed. They had subsequently altered their opinion, and this, when made known, would cause a bad impression in Czechoslovakia. The Committees had studied the problem from its ethnographical and economical sides, leaving out political considerations, which seemed to be for the Council to decide. The French representatives on the Joint Committee had originally objected strongly to the line reported on by M Cambon that morning, but they gave their assent to it finally, in order to facilitate a solution of some sort. The consent of the French representatives had only been given on the understanding that the Poles should be obliged, by some means or another, to grant special facilities to the Czechs with regard to the coal and to the railways.

S Tittoni said that he understood that the line described by M. Cambon would not be adopted without a special convention, assuring to the Czechs the special economic facilities described by M Berthelot.

Mr Polk says that he had understood that the Joint Committees had been unanimous. If they had not been, the question ought obviously to be referred back to them.

M Berthelot said that the Report of the Joint Committees had only been unanimous because the French representatives had given their consent, so as not to isolate themselves from their colleagues.

M Clemenceau said that he did not understand the reasons that had prompted the French representatives on the Joint Committee to give their assent to a proposal of which they did not approve. He retained opinions independently of whether they were shared by others or not. He had thought M Pichon’s proposal a very good one, and had hoped that it might have been adopted.

Mr Balfour says that he sees grave objections to the adoption of M Pichon’s solution.

M Clemenceau said that, whilst agreeing with Mr. Balfour,
he was convinced that the coal question in Teschen was the outstanding problem.

M Cambon said it should not be forgotten that, in the Karwin Basin, which M Pichon proposed to cede to Czechoslovakia, there were nearly 70,000 Poles.

M Clemenceau said that Mr Balfour could not agree with M Pichon. He, himself, could not agree with the Committee’s proposals. He therefore proposed to refer the whole question back to the Joint Committees, who, as they had already changed their minds several times, could certainly do so again, and present another report. He would never accept a line cutting a coal basin into two, for such a solution would be like placing a man on one side of a frontier, his wife upon the other, and dividing the children up between the two.

M Cambon said that he admitted M Clemenceau’s objection, but drew the attention of the Council to the fact that it was just as unwise to devise a line giving the surface of the land to one country and the subterranean deposits to another, and this seemed to be what was required of him the Joint Committees.

(It was agreed that the Teschen question should be referred back to the joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees for report on the following day.)

4. Mr Polk drws the attention of the Council to the fact that the Bulgarian Delegation was objecting to having the Peace Terms presented to them without a formal diplomatic ceremony.

M Dutasta further called attention to the fact, that the Bulgarians were asking for a period of thirty days, after the presentation of the Peace Terms, in which they might be allowed to draft their replies. Their request was based upon the plea that it would be necessary for them to take the terms to Sofia, and discuss them in the Bulgarian Sobranie.

(After some discussion, it is agreed that the Peace Terms to the Bulgarians should be formally presented to them at the Quai d’Orsay at a date which should be decided upon later.

It was further decided that the Bulgarian Delegation should be given a period of 25 days after the presentation of the Peace Terms, for the preparation of their replies.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

09-11-19, 08:50 AM

11th September 1919

American soldiers in Siberia with their goat mascot. They are part of the Allied intervention against the Bolsheviks.
https://i.postimg.cc/g0cKrk4f/EELALem-Xk-AEH8rn.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

A welcome home parade is held for General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, after his return from Europe.
https://i.postimg.cc/FHTLWbgB/EELALem-Xk-AEH8rn.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

USS Helena I (United States Navy) 1919 Florida Keys hurricane: The patrol vessel was wrecked at Key West, Florida in a hurricane.

Sailor Steve

09-11-19, 11:14 AM

Thursday, September 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. Mr Balfour says that he wishes to draw the attention of the Council to an urgent matter. He does not suggest the matter should be discussed immediately, nor does he wish himself make any statement on the subject. He wishes to hand in a document which he had himself received on the previous day from General Seely. This document gives an alarming account of the development of aircraft industry in Germany. Internal civil aviation is being developed on an immense scale and German companies were buying up old army aeroplanes. The first difficulty which arises in this connection was whether those aeroplanes belong to the Allies or to the purchasing companies. There is the additional risk that under the guise of civil aviation Germany was merely creating a strong offensive force, more especially as civil aviation was being heavily subsidized by the Government. He suggests that the French General Staff should study this matter and in the hope that this would be done, he begged to hand the document to the Chairman. It is also worth noticing that German aircraft industry has already obtained a footing in neutral markets and it was certain that the foundation of German air power was the development of the aircraft industry. It appeared that the best military brains of Germany are being employed in the construction of aeroplanes.

M Clemenceau says that he will have the matter examined by the French General Staff.

(It is agreed that the question of aircraft construction in Germany should be reported on by Allied experts, and again brought up before the Council.)

(The Members of the Drafting Committee enter the room.)

2. Mr Hurst reads the reply to the response to Article 61 of the German Constitution.

M Clemenceau says that he had one observation to make. In the proposals made on the previous day, it had been suggested that the German Government should be given 15 days to obtain from the Legislative Assembly a repudiation of the Articles infringing the conditions of the Treaty. He does not lay any particular stress on the period of 15 days, but he think some fixed period should be laid down. If the German Delegation protests that the period allowed them as too short, and asked for an extension, he would agree to it, but he does not think it proper to leave it to them to estimate the period themselves.

Mr Hurst asks whether M Clemenceau refers to a period for the signature of the instrument itself.

M Clemenceau says that he refers to the ratification of the instrument by the German National Assembly.

Mr Balfour observes that the German Government was asked to undertake and present the instrument to the Assembly at its next Meeting.

M Clemenceau says that he would prefer, instead of the words “when it next assembles”, to say “within 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty”, that was to say, upon ratification by three of the Great Powers.

Mr Polk asks how soon the German Delegation is to sign the proposed declaration.

(It is decided to introduce into the text, the word “forthwith” in this connection.)

M Clemenceau observes that the German Delegation must have time, if they required it, to telegraph to Berlin. He also informed his colleagues of a telegram received that morning to the effect that the National Assembly was being summoned at Weimar to reconsider the provisions of the Constitution complained of. This was not official news, but informal information he had received.

(After a few slight verbal alterations, the draft reply and declaration as are accepted.)

(The Members of the Commissions on Polish and Czechoslovak Affairs enter the Room.)

3. M Cambon says that in accordance with the directions of the Council on the previous day, the two Commissions had met in the afternoon. The majority maintained their original opinions. He then reads and explained the report of the Meeting.

Mr Balfour says that he fears the result of the plebiscite in Teschen would be to deprive Czechoslovakia not of 40% of the coal, but of 100%. The territory is Polish and the Commission had attributed it to Czechoslovakia, because of the railway running through it connecting Bohemia and Slovakia. This railway would almost certainly become Polish property. Surely this is far more contrary to the interest of the Czechoslovaks than anything the Commission had proposed. Nevertheless, as Dr Benes appeared to accept a plebiscite, it must be assumed that he knows his own business best.

M Cambon says that neither Dr Benes nor Mr Dmowski could be brought to accept either of the lines suggested in the Commission. Both, however, agree to accept the plebiscite.

S Scialoja says that it is impossible for the Council to refuse the plebiscite if both claimants agreed to it.

(It is then agreed that a plebiscite should be held in the Duchy of Teschen and in the districts of Spisz and Orava in accordance with the proposals of the Joint Commissions. The detailed organization of this plebiscite is referred for examination and report to the Joint Commission.)

(At this point the members of the Labour Commission enter the room.)

4. M Clemenceau says that on the previous day he had come to an agreement with Mr Barnes. It had been agreed that the Congress should be left free to invite the attendance of the German and Austrian Delegates or not. As it was practically a foregone conclusion that the Congress would invite them to attend, the French Government would facilitate the granting of passports in anticipation to the Germans or Austrians, who might be delegated to go to Washington.

Mr Barnes says that he had received information that President Wilson was willing to invite the German and Austrian Delegates to Washington.

Mr Polk says that this is not quite correct. The President says that he was willing that the Labour Congress should decide whether or not the German and Austrian Delegates should be admitted. He, himself, as Head of the American Delegation, had undertaken that no passport difficulties would be made on the American side, to prevent the Germans and Austrians from going to Washington, in the hope of being admitted to the Labour Congress.

Mr Barnes says that he is not sure that these arrangements would be satisfactory to the Germans and Austrians.

M Clemenceau says that they should take what was being done as a sign of goodwill. He is himself making a step in the direction of conciliation, since, in the Council of Four, he had decided adversely. Now that Peace is signed, he is ready to yield to some extent. He has been assured by the French Labour Representatives that they would be satisfied with the very thing he was now offering.

S Scialoja said that Italian labor opinion required an implicit invitation to the Germans and Austrians. Otherwise, Italian working men would not attend the Congress. There were two distinct questions involved. The first was admission to the Congress and the second was admission to the International Organisation of Labour. As to the second, it must be left to the Congress to decide and each State could give its representatives instructions. The first, however, which involved the right to be heard in the Congress, could only be decided by the Council.

M Clemenceau said that nothing would ever prevail upon him to extend an invitation on behalf of the Council to German and Austrian Delegates to attend the Labour Congress. He would not submit to pressure from Italian socialism, which had been consistently against the war and pro-German.

Mr Barnes observes that the Council has already decided that Germany would be admitted to the second meeting of the Labour Congress. Consequently, Germany would, ipso facto, be let into the International Labour Organisation.

M Clemenceau says that this is no doubt the case. What he refuses to do is to invite them, in the name of the Council, to attend the Congress at Washington. He is prepared to leave the question to the Congress.

Mr Balfour says that he is of the same opinion, but he will ask Mr Barnes whether the abstention of the Italian Socialists would have any effect on Labour Organisations in other countries.

Mr Barnes says that it would have a certain effect. He had tried to anticipate it by telling British Labour Organisations that the admission of the Germans and Austrians depended upon the representation of Labour and Socialism in the Congress. This would be an inducement to Labour and Socialist representatives to attend the Congress.

Mr Polk says that he does not think the question is one the Council should decide.

S Scialoja said that he is not a defender of the Socialists. There are in Italy, as in other countries, moderate and extreme Socialists. The Italian Government wished to support the former rather than the latter. He thinks that public opinion should be made to feel that the Council is not opposing moderate demands.

M Clemenceau says that the Congress will almost certainly invite the Germans and Austrians to attend, and he will himself state in the Chamber of Deputies that the decision taken is taken in a conciliatory spirit.

(It is decided that the question of the admission of German and Austrian Delegates to the forthcoming Labour Congress at Washington should be left to the decision of that Congress. In the meantime, the Allied and Associated Governments would put no obstacles in the way of German or Austrian Delegates desirous of proceeding to Washington, in anticipation of a decision in their favour.)

5. Mr Barnes says that confirmation by the Council is asked for a resolution passed by the Labour Committee on the 4th June, 1919. In spite of a Rights decision taken some two or three months earlier, the principle embodied in this resolution had not found a place in the Treaty with Austria. The Italian Delegation had therefore suggested that a resolution be adopted by the Labour Commission. The resolution had been taken and it was hoped that the Council would endorse it.

Mr Polk says that, as the proposal involved questions of law, he is not prepared to state off-hand the attitude of the American Delegation.

M Clemenceau says that German workmen at present engaged to work on the devastated districts of France, brought with them their own rights and privileges.

Mr Balfour asks whether foreign workmen going to England are also to have their own rights.

Mr Barnes says that the case did not arise in England, as a foreign workman was granted British rights even to the extent, after a certain period, of receiving a share in the National Health and Unemployment Insurances and Old Age Pensions.

Mr Polk says that he cannot, for the time being, express an opinion, but he has no objection to the principle.

Mr Barnes observes that it is only the principle of reciprocity that was involved. It did not become binding on any given State, unless that State made individual agreements with another State.

M Clemenceau says that he is ready to vote the resolution.

(Subject to an announcement, at a future date, of the views of the American Delegation, the resolution passed by the Labour Committee on June 4th is accepted as a general principle of the Conference.)

6. M Dutasta says that the Drafting Committee requests instructions as to the language in which the Air Convention should be drafted. Should it be, like previous Conventions, in French, English and Italian, the French text prevailing in case of divergence, or in French and English, each having equal authority, as in the case of the Conventions signed at Versailles?

S Scialoja said that, as the Convention was very important for Italy, he desired an Italian text.

(After some discussion, it is decided that the Air Convention should be drawn up in English, French and Italian, the text in the two former languages having equal authority.)

7. After some discussion, it is agreed:

That the Bulgarian Delegation should be invited to receive the Treaty in the Salle de L’Horloge, at the Quai d’Orsay, and that the Greek and Roumanian observations just received should be discussed at the next meeting of the Council.

8. M Clemenceau says that he has received a letter from Mr Pachitch stating that as the Government had resigned, the Delegation was bound to wait or authority before signing the Treaty of Peace with the Austrian Republic.

9. Mr Polk draws attention to a telegram received from Budapest.

M Clemenceau says that he is not at all disposed to offer the Hungarian Government financial credits, nor is he prepared to see the Government of the country handed over to the Allied Generals at Budapest. He agrees, however, that it is desirable to send the Mission instructions.

It is decided that the question of sending further instructions to the Inter-Allied Mission at Budapest should be placed on the Agenda.

Mr Polk observes that the Romanians are under the impression that the United States alone, among the Allied and Associated Powers, raised objections against their conduct in Hungary. This impression had not been set right by Allied representatives on the spot. It is desirable that the Roumanian Government should be informed that the Council had acted only upon information received from the Inter-Allied representatives.

M Pichon observes that as M Clemenceau signed all the telegrams sent in the name of the Council, France is incurring a great deal of unpopularity in Bucharest, where it was supposed that France is particularly antagonistic to Romanian ambitions. It has therefore been pointed out to the Romanian Government that these telegrams emanated from the Council of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers and not from M Clemenceau as French Prime Minister.

Mr Polk says that he thinks it is the people on the spot who created the impression that America alone was responsible for Romanian troubles.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

09-12-19, 07:08 AM

12th September 1919

Italian nationalists led by Gabriele D’Annunzio (center with stick) occupies the city of Fiume (Rijeka, Croatia), seeking to have Italy annex it. The occupation inspires the rise of Italian Fascism.
https://i.postimg.cc/xC5LKFGp/EEQz-Jtp-Wk-AEj-Sl.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

British government bans the Dáil Éireann (Irish Parliament) and the political party Sinn Féin, forcing the organizations underground. British troops raiding Sinn Féin headquarters.
https://i.postimg.cc/T3bmkPqD/EEQz-Jtp-Wk-AEj-Sl.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Edward, Prince of Wales, reviewing Canadian troops at Saskatoon, Canada.
https://i.postimg.cc/vBKZFrGH/EEQz-Jtp-Wk-AEj-Sl.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

As an army political agent, Adolf Hitler was sent to report on an emerging far-right group, the German Workers' Party (later renamed the Nazi Party). Finding he agreed with their nationalist, anti-Semitic beliefs, he joins the obscure group as its seventh member.
https://i.postimg.cc/9MDq7FM0/EEQz-Jtp-Wk-AEj-Sl.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

09-12-19, 10:19 AM

Friday, September 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

09-13-19, 06:32 AM

13th September 1919

Thomas Orde-Lees, survivor of the Shackleton expedition, demonstrates a parachute jump over New York Bay.
https://i.postimg.cc/cLRKQ8jL/EEVFmgn-Uw-AAO5gk.png (https://postimages.org/)

The Australian Imperial Force cricket team, made up of Australian servicemen in the Great War, concludes its tour of England and returns to Australia.
https://i.postimg.cc/pTZYk66y/EEVFmgn-Uw-AAO5gk.png (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

09-13-19, 07:10 PM

Saturday, September 13, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

09-14-19, 06:40 AM

14th September 1919

Aftermath of War

G. D'Annunzio occupies Fiume.

Boston police strike ends as nearly all 1,500 strikers are replaced with returning veterans from the Great War, setting back efforts to form a police union. Massachusetts Governor Calvin Coolidge with State Guardsmen brought in to restore order.
https://i.postimg.cc/1tqXRrtm/EEa4-Ypz-Ww-AUr6-Y3.png (https://postimages.org/)

General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, attends a High School track event in Washington D.C.
https://i.postimg.cc/Qxp7Jhj8/EEa4-Ypz-Ww-AUr6-Y3.png (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

09-14-19, 02:17 PM

Sunday, September 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

09-15-19, 07:55 AM

15th September 1919

Russian Red Army soldiers captured by Anti-Bolshevik troops awaiting transport.
https://i.postimg.cc/tT8tv8yN/EEg-Pv-ESX4-AUUe-T7.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sightseers surround the captured German submarine Deutschland at Yarmouth, England.
https://i.postimg.cc/tCjF13gJ/EEg-Pv-ESX4-AUUe-T7.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

President Wilson attending a fleet review off the coast of Seattle onboard the battleship U.S.S. Oregon.
https://i.postimg.cc/WpMkPd7v/EEg-Pv-ESX4-AUUe-T7.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

09-15-19, 05:48 PM

Monday, September 15, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

...

Monday, September 15, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

...

Jimbuna

09-16-19, 10:48 AM

16th September 1919

Aftermath of War

Sir Edmund Allenby arrives in England.

A Bolshevik train destroyed in an Allied attack in northern Russia.
https://i.postimg.cc/zfp7SJx9/EEkh-GS-XYAICq-PK.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

A car wreck that occurred as the U.S. Army First Division was making its way to Washington D.C. for a Victory Parade.
https://i.postimg.cc/9M6LzL8M/EEg4-ji-Xk-AAXk-RE.png (https://postimages.org/)

The North Russia intervention, 1918-1920: A wounded officer of the East Surrey Regiment.
https://i.postimg.cc/mgP16TZv/Kr-Xz-Bi4-Eg-Wb4-Uf2tx-FS4ee2-Hdi-UVJs-Ch-BWFYkpdfws-I.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Adolf Hitler: Around this time, Hitler made his earliest known recorded statement about the Jews in a letter (now known as the Gemlich letter) dated 16 September 1919 to Adolf Gemlich about the Jewish question.
https://i.postimg.cc/j2zYjwhp/Kr-Xz-Bi4-Eg-Wb4-Uf2tx-FS4ee2-Hdi-UVJs-Ch-BWFYkpdfws-I.jpg (https://postimg.cc/2L8Kc5MG)

Ship Losses:

Belvedere (United States) Trapped in ice since 15 September in the Chukchi Sea 12 nautical miles (22 km; 14 mi) northeast of "Cape Jinretlen" – presumably a reference to Cape Dzhenretlen (67°06′48″N 173°39′00″W) – on the coast of Siberia, the 523-gross register ton steam whaling bark sank four hours after her three passengers and crew of 30 abandoned her the following morning. All on board survived.
HMS M25 (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War, North Russia Intervention: The M15-class monitor ran aground in the Dvina River in Russia after the river level fell and was scuttled.
HMS M27 (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War, North Russia Intervention: The M15-class monitor ran aground in the Dvina River in Russia after the river level fell and was scuttled.
USS R-6 (United States Navy) The R-class submarine was driven aground at New London, Connecticut. She was later salvaged, repaired and returned to service.

Jimbuna

09-17-19, 07:38 AM

17th September 1919

The North Russia intervention, 1918-1920. Wounded British troops.
https://i.postimg.cc/Hxzmq3CJ/a1a.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Oakland, CA - Secret service agents protect President Woodrow Wilson as he is driven along Broadway. Seated in front of him is Oakland Mayor John L. Davies.
https://i.postimg.cc/0jZNCPNB/a1a.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

By 60 against and 31 for, Alabama House of Representatives rejects the 19th Amendment that would give women the right to vote (Alabama would only ratify the amendment in 1953)
https://i.postimg.cc/Ss3dxb4H/EEqj-Huw-W4-AILy7g.png (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

09-17-19, 09:34 PM

Tuesday, September 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Sailor Steve

09-17-19, 09:36 PM

Wednesday, September 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Clemenceau says that he has requested Marshal Foch to be present at this meeting of the Council for the purpose of further studying the question of the evacuation of the Baltic provinces by the German troops. He has received a letter from Mr. Polk regarding this matter. He would like to know what answer had been given by Mr Lloyd George in the course of his conversation with Mr Polk.

Mr Polk states that he does not like to quote the words of another person, but that he understands Mr Lloyd George to say that he prefers to let matters stand as they are. Mr Lloyd George had thought that the question should not be brought up again until the Germans had indicated a refusal to carry out the withdrawal, should they so refuse. He has answered Mr. Lloyd George that he believes the question should be brought up at once, and for this reason had written the letter to M Clemenceau, which had just been read.

M Clemenceau suggests that Marshal Foch might read the instructions which he proposes to send to General Henrys.

Marshal Foch said that he has sent the instructions to General Henrys in accordance with the decision reached by the Council. He had told him that the principle of an ultimatum to Germany had been decided upon, but that his opinion was asked before the same should be transmitted to Germany.

Mr Polk asks whether it is agreed that the Council should take no decision until the receipt of the answer from General Henrys.

Marshal Foch states that his instructions to General Henrys had been based on the fact that the principle of an ultimatum had been decided upon. If this ultimatum is now considered as conditional, it will be necessary for him to modify the instructions which he had sent.

Mr Polk points out that he is not opposed to an ultimatum, but wishes solely to formulate objections to the use of the Polish troops.

Marshal Foch says that the sending of an ultimatum without deciding upon the means to carry it into execution would be a useless procedure. He has made a study of this question and believes that the Polish troops constitute the only force which could be used. If the Council were of the opinion that no use could be made of these troops, it is unnecessary to send an ultimatum.

Mr Polk states that the feeling of the American Delegation on this question was that the use of Polish troops against Germany in the Baltic provinces would be to cause hostilities, which had been suppressed in Upper Silesia with great difficulty, to spring up again. A military operation of this character would certainly lead to war between Germany and Poland. It is extremely necessary to maintain the situation in Upper Silesia in a calm state, in order not to increase the actual difficulties of the coal shortage. After the Treaty had been ratified by three great Powers, Upper Silesia would be occupied by Inter-Allied troops. When this occupation becomes a fact, and when no further disorders in the coal districts are likely, the Council might then decide to use the Polish forces. He is not opposed to their eventual use, should the need arise.

M Clemenceau says that in view of Mr Polk’s statement he believes the best course at present is to adjourn the discussion and to take the question up again when Upper Silesia should be occupied by the Inter-Allied troops.

Mr Polk says that the matter seems to him particularly serious. The Council is obliged to decide whether it is preferable to allow the Germans to remain in Lithuania for the moment, or drive them therefrom even at the risk of shutting down the production of coal in Upper Silesia. He has talked with M Loucheur and with Mr Hoover, who had both stated that the cutting off of the coal supply would have very serious consequences. He had talked with S Tittoni on the previous evening regarding the matter and the latter had agreed with him that an unnecessary risk will be run through this operation.

Marshal Foch points out that the Conference alone is capable of choosing between these two political courses of action.

M Clemenceau says that he personally regrets that this operation, which he believes excellent, should not take place. In the face of the opposition of the American Delegation, however, the matter must be suspended, for it was exceedingly dangerous to commence it without being sure of carrying it to a successful completion.

Marshal Foch says that on three separate occasions threats had been sent which had not been followed up.

Mr Polk says that the gravity of the situation in Silesia appeared worthy of considerable thought and should compel the Council to hesitate.

M Clemenceau says that he would hesitate if he believed that the proposed action in the Baltic provinces would have an effect on the situation in Silesia, but he was not of this opinion.

Mr Polk answers that he has recently interviewed the different American representatives, who had arrived from Poland, Silesia and the Baltic provinces, namely, Mr Gibson, Colonel Goodyear and Colonel Greene. These gentlemen are all of the opinion that the coal situation will be seriously aggravated and threatened should the proposed action be taken. He had also seen Mr Paderewski and had asked him whether he is ready to bear the expenses of the operation in question. Mr Paderewski had replied that France was to bear the expense. He had then informed Mr Paderewski that the United States would not incur any obligations therein. He believes, however, that it would be well to ask General Henrys what his opinion in the matter might be.

Marshal Foch says that General Henrys can only report on one element of the problem, namely, the condition and state of the Polish Army. It should not be lost sight of, however, that the Council, in insisting upon the evacuation of the Baltic provinces, is simply carrying into effect one of the clauses of the Treaty. The Allied and Associated Powers should stand together on this matter. It should be understood that the Polish Army would be in charge of the operation, but it would be supported both by the Czechoslovak troops and the Allied detachments on the Rhine. General Henrys would answer that he can not defeat Germany with the Polish forces alone - more particularly should Germany be able to concentrate all her troops against Poland.

M Clemenceau says that the Poles have notified the Council that they possess an army of 450,000 men.

Marshal Foch pointed out that these figures are accurate but that this force will not be sufficient to defeat Germany and that the Allies will risk seeing Poland severely dealt with, which is obviously not a situation to be desired.

Mr Polk says that he has no objections to the sending of an ultimatum, but only to the use of Polish troops. He believes that another method of pressure to compel the execution of the ultimatum can be found, either from an economic standpoint through the Economic Council, or by the retention of prisoners of war. He does not think that the risk of starting a new war between Poland and Germany should be run, because no one of the Powers was at present disposed to render financial aid to Poland. On the other hand, economic pressure might be exceedingly effective. For example, the Germans at the present time are in the process of borrowing money from the United States through the agency of private banks. The Council might put a stop to this procedure. The recent example of Romania, who had acted as an agent of the Allied and Associated Powers, seemed to him extremely unsatisfactory and should not lead the Council to stir up a similar operation elsewhere. He suggests therefore that an ultimatum might be sent, making use of economic pressure.

M Tardieu says that the retention of the prisoners of war constitutes an excellent means of pressure as well, for their immediate repatriation is necessary to the internal political situation of Germany.

M Clemenceau proposes that Marshal Foch should read the text of an ultimatum which he had prepared, and that if such text is satisfactory to the Council, it might be modified in the way suggested by Mr Polk.

Marshal Foch then reads his proposed letter to the German Government.

Mr Polk stated that he finds this text satisfactory.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks whether the steps which have been discussed as a method of pressure would be sufficient to bring about the execution of the matters covered in the note.

M Clemenceau says that Mr Polk is favorable to an economic means of pressure, such as a blockade.

Mr Polk says that he is particularly anxious not to commit the Council at the present time to the use of the Polish Army. He does not wish to intimate that this Army might not be made use of at some future time, but he wishes to leave the decision of this question open.

Marshal Foch says that on three different occasions ultimatums couched in mild language had been sent to the German Government on the following dates: June 18, August 1 and August 24.

Mr Polk remarks that as the Council has already sent three ultimatums a fourth was scarcely necessary. The best method of procedure would be to notify Herr von Lersner that the Council insisted upon the carrying out of the Armistice in question, and that in case of refusal certain measures, such as blockade, other means of exerting economic pressure, retention of prisoners of war, and, as a last resort, the use of the Polish Army, had been decided upon.

M Clemenceau says that this notice should be in writing.

General Weygand says that he is prepared to draft the text of such a letter, as he was familiar with the question. An answer has been received from the Germans to the effect that they were willing to evacuate the territory in question but that they cannot enforce the execution of their orders.

(It is decided that General Weygand should submit to the Council at its next meeting, a draft letter to the German Delegation demanding the withdrawal of the German forces from the Baltic provinces. This letter should draw attention to the means of exercising pressure on the German Government proposed by Mr Polk, viz, blockade and other economic pressure, retention of prisoners of war, and possible use of the Polish forces.)

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand then withdraw.)

2. Upon the proposal of S Scialoja the resolution taken on September 11 regarding the languages used for the convention on Aerial Navigation is modified to read as follows:

“It was decided that the Convention on Aerial Navigation should be drafted in English, French and Italian, each text to be of equal authority.”

(At this point the members of the Central Territorial Commission enter the room.)

3. M Tardieu stated that the Greek Delegation had sent a letter to the Central Territorial Commission on September 13 relative to certain points with regard to the territorial clauses of the Bulgarian Treaty. The Central Territorial Commission had been of the opinion:

1) That the request put forward by the Greek Delegation is ethnographically just.

2) That the line proposed by the Greek Delegation should, from a geographical point of view, be modified in accordance with the red line on the map annexed to the commission’s report.

The Italian delegate, in view of the principle put forward by the Greek Delegation, suggests a change in the line of Western Thrace to the advantage of Bulgaria.

The American Delegate, while not denying the weight of the opinions of the other delegations, draws attention to the inconvenience which would result from changing a line already unanimously decided upon, and it further does not believe itself to be in a position to advance an opinion without a more careful study of the whole question.

Mr Polk says that he has certain objections to formulate. President Wilson, before his departure, had personally proposed a line of demarcation. He had already agreed to a considerable modification of this line and does not feel that he had authority to make a further change therein. He points out that he has already consented to the taking of certain territories in the region of Adrianople from Bulgaria, although there is a large population of Bulgarians in such territories. He can do nothing further along these lines and in addition feels that the proposed change, even though ethnographically just, is unsound from a geographic point of view.

(It is decided to reject the proposal of the Greek Delegation with regard to a further modification of the frontiers of Bulgaria in Western Thrace.)

M Tardieu says that he wishes to draw the attention of the Council to the necessity of asking the Bulgarians to withdraw their troops from Western Thrace as they were still occupying that region as well as the Stroumitza salient. This occupation might last for a long time, as the Bulgarian delegation has requested a period of twenty to twenty-five days in which to prepare their answer to the Peace Conditions of the Allies. The Bulgarian occupation compels the Allies to maintain troops in the neighborhood which are not absolutely necessary. He suggests that the Bulgarians might be told that the Allies were likely to grant them the delay requested, on condition that they would evacuate the territories in question immediately.

Mr Polk asks what forces will relieve the Bulgarian troops.

M Tardieu answers that the military experts believe that three battalions only would be necessary to maintain order in Thrace. This force is already on the ground and there is in addition a division in Sofia which can profitably be recalled. He points out that there is no question of inserting a clause in the Bulgarian Treaty regarding this matter.

Mr Polk says that as the matter has no place in the Bulgarian Peace Treaty he proposes the consideration of the Treaty itself be terminated and the proposition of M Tardieu be adjourned to the following day.

(This proposal is accepted.)

(M Tardieu then withdraws and M Kammerer enters the room.)

M Kammerer says that the Greek Delegation had, on September 15 sent to the Secretary General some additional remarks relative to the political clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria. The Committee on New States had prepared a report on the matter which had been submitted to the various delegations.

(It is decided to accept the following clause proposed by the Greek delegation for insertion in Article 56, with regard to the protection of minorities and voluntary emigration:

Article 56, paragraph 2: “Bulgaria undertakes to recognize the provisions which the Allied and Associated Powers shall deem opportune relative to reciprocal and voluntary emigration of ethnic minorities.”

M Kammerer continuing says that the Greek Delegation has also asked that a paragraph be added to Article 50 dealing with the protection of minorities. The Committee on New States believes that the Treaty should be limited to general provisions with regard to the different religious sects, and therefore that by accepting the addition proposed by the Greek delegation the risk would be incurred of entering into details and thereby creating a precedent. For this reason the Committee on New States had recommended that the Council reject the Greek proposal.

(It is decided to reject the paragraph proposed by the Greek delegation for insertion in Article 50 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty.)

Mr Laroche says that the Greek Delegation has proposed a change in Article 44 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty. By this proposal the Greek Delegation asks solely that it be treated in the same manner as the Slav [Serb]-Croat-Slovene State, and it had appeared difficult to refuse the addition requested. The Drafting Committee upon being consulted had approved of the text drawn by the Greeks.

(After a short discussion it is decided to insert the following paragraph in Article 44 of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, in accordance with the request of the Greek Delegation:

“Bulgarian nationals, however, who became resident in this territory after October 18, 1912, will not acquire Greek nationality without a permit from Greece.”)

M Kammerer says that the Greek Delegation has formulated certain objections with regard to Article 46 by which Article Greece agrees to execute a special treaty for the protection of minorities. The refusal to execute the article is based on the fact that no additional territory was given to Greece by the Bulgarian treaty. The committee on New States is of the opinion that this point is well taken and therefore proposed that Greece, while agreeing to sign the clause of the Bulgarian treaty obligating her to execute the minorities treaty, should not be compelled to sign the latter treaty until such time as she should be assured of the grant of new territories.

(It is decided that a letter should be sent by the President of the Peace Conference to the Greek Delegation requesting the latter to accept Article 46 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty and notifying them that the special treaty provided for in this article would not be submitted for signature until such time as the Conference should be able to make known to the Greeks the territory which might be attributed to them.)

M Kammerer says that the Greeks have in addition raised certain objections with regard to the signature of special clauses in the treaty with Greece. The Committee on New States had rejected all the Greek proposals with the exception of that dealing with the option of nationalities. Should the Council accept the proposal of the Committee a simple modification of Article 3 of the proposed treaty with Greece would give effect to the objection.

(It is decided that Article 3 of the proposed treaty between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and Greece should be so modified as that the first paragraph should read as follows:

“Greece recognizes as Greek nationals with full rights and without any formalities Bulgarian, Turk (or Albanian) nationals domiciled at the date of the entry into force of the present treaty, on territory transferred to Greece since January 1, 1913.)

(At this point Mr Laroche and M Kammerer withdraw, and Mr Jouasset enters the room.)

Mr Jouasset says that the Greek Delegation has formulated certain objections relative to the reparations clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria. The Commission on the Reparation of Damages had studied these criticisms and had submitted its report in the matter to the Secretary General.

(It is decided to accept the proposal of the Reparations Commission with regard to Article 121, the sixth paragraph of which should be amended to read as follows:

“These sums shall be remitted through the Inter-Allied Commission referred to in Article 130 of this part to the Reparation Commission created by the Treaty of Peace with Germany of June 28, 1919, such as it is constituted by the Treaty with Austria of September 10, 1919, (Part VIII, Annex II, Paragraph 2); This Commission is referred to hereinafter as the Reparations Commission. It will assure the effecting of payments in conformity with the arrangements already made.”)

After a short discussion it is decided to accept the proposal of the Delivery of Reparations Commission and to add the following additional paragraph to Article 127:

“In addition to the deliveries mentioned above, the Inter-Allied Commission shall have the authority, should they recognize it as possible, to attribute to Greece, Romania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State during the two years which shall follow the entry into force of the present Treaty, such quantities of livestock as may appear to them justified; the value of these deliveries shall be placed to the credit of Bulgaria.”

Mr Jouasset then reads that portion of the report of the Commission on Reparations dealing with this question. He says that the French Delegation has made a proposal which, after liquidation of the debts and credits of Bulgaria to Germany, gives the Reparations Commission the right to decide whether the remainder of the Bulgarian debt should be demanded or whether Bulgaria should be granted certain terms or intervals of payment, or a complete remission of the debt. Such a formula will be simple and will not commit anyone to a fixed course of action in the future. It will have the further advantage of giving satisfaction to the five small States and of nullifying any pretext which the latter might have to refuse advance payments accorded them by the Allies. On the other hand, if a part of the debt is remitted in the first instance to Bulgaria, an enemy Power, the small States might take advantage of this precedent and refuse to settle their debts to the Allies.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the debt of Bulgaria in relation to Germany and Austria should not be compared to the debt of the different small States with relation to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The British Delegation was of the opinion that changes in the text of the Treaty would constitute a sign of weakness and that the most simple course to pursue was to uphold the text in its present form.

Mr Polk says that it is certain that Bulgaria cannot pay more than it is actually called upon. To make a change in the article in question would be to raise false hopes in the minds of the small Powers, that they might obtain something which they are certain not to receive. He therefore believes that the text as drafted should be upheld.

S Scialoja says that the French proposal simply transfers the difficulty to the Reparations Commission. This will lead to a delay of three months, during which time Bulgaria will not be able to obtain the credit which she needs. It is to be feared that in addition she will dispute certain of her debts, and such a loss of time might even result in the enhancement of the payment of such sums as she indisputably owed for the purpose of reparations.

(After a short further discussion, it is decided to make no change in the text of Article 124 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.)

(At this point M Kammerer and M Jouasset withdraw, and M Serruys enters the room.)

M Serruys says that the Romanian Delegation has presented three proposals regarding Articles 171, 175 and 177 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria. The Economic Commission has studied these proposals and has submitted a report thereon to the Secretary General indicating its opinion.

(After a short discussion, it is decided to accept the report submitted by the Economic Commission:

Article 171: The English text of Article 171 being the only one which is accurate, it is decided to revise the French and Italian texts to conform therewith.

Article 175: It was decided to maintain the text of this Article without change. The benefit of capitulations in Bulgaria in favor of Japan is upheld but is not to be extended to all the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article 177: The Romanian proposal was rejected and the Article maintained without change.)

4. On the proposal of M Clemenceau, it is decided that the text of the conditions of the Peace with Bulgaria should be presented to the Bulgarian Delegation at the meeting of the Supreme Council on Friday, September 19, 1919, at 11:00 o’clock, in the Salle de l’Horloge, Quai d’Orsay.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Jimbuna

09-18-19, 06:36 AM

18th September 1919

American FT-17 tanks at a victory parade in Washington D.C.
https://i.postimg.cc/WtLmvj1w/EEv-DUnc-Ww-AA44za.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

The Netherlands grants women the right to vote after a women’s suffrage bill is approved by Queen Wilhelmina. Dutch suffragists.
https://i.postimg.cc/s2vMwqVj/EEv-DUnc-Ww-AA44za.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

09-18-19, 11:13 PM

Thursday, September 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

M. Pichon says that M Clemenceau would not be able to attend the meeting and that he had asked him to make his excuses for him.

1. M Pichon said that he thinks the question should be examined at once. He does not think it necessary to read the two letters which Mr. Barnes had sent to M Clemenceau on September 12 and September 17.

Mr Polk said that Mr Barnes had concluded his letter of September 12 by saying that, as M. Clemenceau had learned on the preceding day, Mr. Polk had refused to involve his Government, although on the previous day he had given both M Clemenceau and Mr Barnes to understand that this accomplishment was within the range of possibility. He does not believe that this statement is quite correct. He had talked that morning with M Clemenceau, who agrees with him. He does not think that it is the duty of the American Government to invite the German and Austrian delegates to attend the Conference at Washington. He thinks that if the Council maintains its resolution of September 11, and if the German and Austrian delegates were invited to take part in the work of the Congress, the American Government would be entirely prepared to facilitate their voyage and accord the necessary passport facilities, in order that these delegates can go to Washington in anticipation of being invited to attend the Conference. Mr Barnes has not exactly understood him when he said that the American Government are prepared to invite the delegates.

M Pichon says that the American Government is ready to facilitate the journey of the delegates and that the American Government will inform the two countries in question.

Mr Polk says that the American Government will do this if the Council entrusts them with this task and they will not do it on their own initiative. When the question had previously been discussed, the Italian delegate had raised the question of an invitation. M Clemenceau had energetically refused to agree that this invitation should be sent in the name of the Council and Mr Balfour and he had held the same view. What Mr Barnes asked was that the American Government take the responsibility for this invitation and communicate it to the German and Austrian delegates. He felt that this could only be done if the American Government were requested by the Council to do so.

M Pichon says that Mr Polk had stated what had occurred. The Conference had rejected the proposal of S Scialoja and had taken the resolution which was still in force. The question now is whether the American Government will consent to inform the German and Austrian delegates that they can go to Washington, that the necessary arrangements for the journey would be made and that they should await the decision of the Congress at Washington, which alone was able to decide as to whether or not they are to be admitted.

Mr Polk says that he does not wish to continue a discussion which concerns only a question of form. He is ready to inform the German and Austrian delegates unofficially in the name of the American Government, that they will receive every facility for their journey. He thinks the time might be saved if Mr Barnes, Mr Gompers and their French and Italian colleagues informed the German and Austrian delegates unofficially that they would undoubtedly be permitted to participate in the Conference.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he agrees with Mr Polk that it was simply a question of form. He desired to say, however, that Mr Barnes, in his letter of the 12th September, proposed simply that the decision taken by the Council on the preceding day be communicated to the German and Austrian Governments through the medium of the Secretariat General.

M Berthelot points out that it had been said that the notification in question should be communicated unofficially. Any communication from the Secretariat General will, of necessity, be official.

Mr Polk said that the American Delegation are prepared to make this communication, if they were directed by the Council to do so.

S Scialoja said that he thinks it would be desirable to add to the communication that the American Government were prepared to facilitate the journey of the delegates, who should go to Washington before the opening of the Congress, in order that if they are permitted to participate, the work of the Congress should not be delayed. He considers it important that the workmen of the Allied and Associated Countries should be able to say to their colleagues that the Council had not wished to make this invitation official, but that it has taken every precaution unofficially to ensure its decision being communicated to the German and Austrian delegates.

(It is agreed that the American Delegation should be requested in the name of the Conference to communicate to the German and Austrian Delegations the decision of September 11, 1919, regarding the admission of German and Austrian delegates to the International Labor Congress at Washington.)

2. M Pichon says that on the preceding day General Weygand had been asked to prepare a text of a note to be addressed to the German Delegation.

General Weygand then reads the draft of the note.

Mr Polk says that the note provides for the evacuation not only of German units, but also of individual Germans, who, after being demobilized, had joined Russian units. He thinks that the Allied and Associated Powers will be taking a risk in making a demand which the German Government might not be able to fulfill. He does not know what the United States Government will be able to do if a situation arises where American citizens had enlisted in Mexican and Cuban units. He feels considerable doubt as to the legal obligations of the Germans in this matter.

General Weygand says that he has received documentary proof to show that the German Government encouraged enrollment of Germans in Russian military units, and paid them by giving them land in Russia. This land did not belong to the German Government and the position of that Government was clearly illegal. General Gough was present and could give the Council much interesting information.

Mr Polk says that he has also received the same information as to the action of the German Government. He thinks that action, such as has been described, could be provided against in the future. But he does not know whether the Council could demand that the Germans now there could be given up. It is a complicated legal question and he would be very glad to hear the views of M Berthelot and M Fromageot.

M Berthelot said that entire companies had passed into the Russian Army. The draft could however be modified, so that note would be taken of Mr Polk’s remarks.

Mr Polk said that the question was one of international law, so far as facts were concerned. Mr Paderewski had shown him documents which prove that these acts were abetted by the War Office at Berlin. He is satisfied with General Weygand’s draft in many respects, but he thinks the text too broad.

M Pichon asks Mr Polk whether he will be prepared to accept the draft in principle. It will be given to M Fromageot, who will revise it from a legal point of view.

Mr Polk says he is prepared to do this, if M Fromageot collaborates with Mr James Brown Scott.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks whether the military authorities think that the threat in the last paragraph of the note was strong enough to have the desired effect.

Marshal Foch replied that he does not think so. It is the fourth communication on this subject which had been made to the German Government. He sees no reason why it should be treated differently from the others. He suggests that the Council hear the opinion of General Gough.

Mr Polk asks whether Marshal Foch thinks that the threat to use Polish troops would have the desired effect.

Marshal Foch says that it is not only the question of the use of Polish troops; that the Allied Governments should bring pressure to bear with all their power and all their troops. Thus, there would be a beginning of action and the Allied and Associated Powers would be quite ready to march forward if the necessity therefor should arise.

Mr Polk says that there is a threat of military measures in the last lines of the draft note. There are objections to sending this fourth note, and he thinks that the end desired can be accomplished by bringing economic pressure to bear. He is ready on his part to inform the German bankers that they will not be permitted to borrow money in the United States.

Marshal Foch says that he has nothing to say in regard to this suggestion.

(At this moment General Gough enters the room.)

M Pichon says that the Council would be grateful if General Gough expresses his views on the subject of the Baltic Provinces.

General Gough says that in his opinion the greatest danger in Northern Russia is the German danger. It was far more serious than the danger of Bolshevism. There is no doubt that there was a military plot in this region, and that General von der Goltz was at the head of it. The plan consists in colonizing the Baltic States and raising a strong Russo-German Army, which would be outside of the territory of the Allies, and, in a certain degree, independent of the German Government. The persons responsible for this movement aimed at joining certain Russian parties, who are represented by General Yudenitch, or if not by General Yudenitch himself, then by persons surrounding him. A great many people were ready to accept the German authority, as they considered it a means of regaining their rights and privileges at Petrograd, and in the surrounding regions. The German authorities do not hesitate to make promises to these people in this sense. If the Allies permit this force to become constituted, the first result will be destruction of the happiness and liberties of the people of the Baltic Provinces. Then the independence of Finland would be threatened. If the Allies permit this plot to succeed, a series of murders and fighting and a state of tyranny will result, in the Baltic Provinces and perhaps in Russia. These peoples, instead of being given peace, will be given a sword. There was also a great danger that this Russo-German force would some day be used against the Allies themselves. It is not impossible, in view of the demobilization of the Allies, that the Russo-German forces will outnumber the Allied forces in a few years, and a very grave menace for Europe would consequently result. He believes that the Allied and Associated Governments will insist upon the immediate withdrawal of the German Military Government and of the German forces. It will next be necessary to establish order and to lend assistance to the Governments of the Baltic Provinces, not only in giving them money, but in lending money, to let them pay for the goods which they would need from the Allied and Associated Powers. In other words, commerce should be restored. The Baltic peoples are rich enough to pay. He adds that the peoples of the Baltic Provinces are well disposed toward the Allies. They differ very radically from the German and Russian population as well as from their own aristocracy, the Baltic barons, who are the descendants of the former German conquerors. The great middle class population is well disposed toward the Entente and had a cordial hatred of Germany. If the Allies assisted them in organizing, there will be a barrier, not only against Germany, but against Bolshevism as well. These people were radicals and democrats, but have no liking for Bolshevism. They will not accept Bolshevism, unless they are overrun by Germany or deserted by the Allies. In the latter event, they would undoubtedly prefer Bolshevism to German rule. If the Allied and Associated Powers establish peace and restore the prosperity of the Baltic peoples, it will be possible to give these peoples a free hand as regards Central Russia, and even to authorize them, if they wish it, to make peace. The Bolshevik danger is nowhere more threatening than in the interior of Russia, and the populations of these districts are desirous of resuming trade relations with the Baltic populations. Such relations will have a desirable effect.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the question before the Conference is to consider the best means of compelling the German Government to withdraw its troops from the Baltic Provinces. It had been said that the German authorities favored the enrollment of their demobilized soldiers in Russian units. He wishes to know what power the German Government had over the army of General von der Goltz, and its commander. He questions whether Germany has really disarmed. He asks whether, if the demobilization should take place on the spot, it will
not facilitate enlistments into Russian units.

General Gough replies that the army of General von der Goltz will obey the orders of its commander. It is not a fact that the German Government has no authority over these troops, nor that they had favored demobilization on the spot and filled the country with military workmen. The Letts will murder these workmen, if they are left alone. The Germans in Latvia are soldiers. They are not demobilized, and obey the orders of General von der Goltz. They can impose themselves on this region only by force. It had been intended to found colonies of these men in the Baltic Provinces, but this had not as yet been done.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether the orders of General von der Goltz will also be obeyed by isolated soldiers in Russian units.

General Gough says that he believes that they will. He holds this opinion on account of a similar case, which had occurred previously. When the Germans had evacuated Riga, they had provoked numerous conflicts. There existed at that time a Landwehr battalion composed of 9000 men, of whom 5000 were Germans. The Commander, Fletcher, was a German, as were most of his officers. In spite of protest from certain persons in the Baltic Provinces, it had been possible to send Fletcher, his officers and men, to Mitau, to join their army, and Fletcher himself had returned to East Prussia. Today this Landwehr battalion is commanded by a British officer, Colonel Young, and there is not a single German in it. There is nothing to be feared on that side. It will be enough if the Germans left the country and the Lettish Government were thoroughly installed, so as to be able to ward against any dangers. There is no doubt of the fact that no German civilian can remain in these regions after the German army has left. They will be massacred by the population immediately.

Mr Polk asks whether the situation in Estonia and Lithuania is different.

General Gough says that Lithuania has received more assistance from the Allies and is in a position to restore herself more rapidly. Estonia, on the other hand, had been abandoned to the Germans for many months.

Mr Polk asks General Gough what he thinks would be the effect if the Allies used Polish troops to force the Germans to evacuate the Baltic Provinces.

General Gough replies that the use of Polish troops would lead to great confusion in the country and there would be ceaseless fighting. In his opinion, it would be advisable to search for other means, for the Allies ran the risk of seeing the Poles defeated and Poland reconquered by Germany. It is necessary to seek means of establishing peace and not of provoking new wars.

Mr Polk asks General Gough whether he thinks that economic pressure could be brought to bear.

General Gough replies that he thinks this could be done, but both economic and moral pressure should be used at Berlin. If the German Government acts in good faith and really desires to withdraw these troops, there is nothing to prevent the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. At the moment, the German Government is really waiting to see which is the stronger, the Peace Conference at Paris, or General von der Goltz. There is no doubt that a plot exists and that the German Government were the masters of its fate, for the German Government is in a position to recall General von der Goltz, if they wish to do so.

Mr Matsui asks how large the German forces in question are.

General Gough replies that it is difficult to give the exact numbers. The Germans had organized a sort of military cordon which prevented contact with the populations of the regions which the Germans occupied. He believes that the army was composed of from 40,000 to 100,000 men. He believes that the latter figure is too high, but he is not sure. He calls attention to the fact that the German forces in the Baltic Provinces are supplied by a railway crossing East Prussia and terminating at Mitau. It would be a simple matter to stop this traffic and thereby endanger the rationing of the German forces. On the other hand, the evacuation of the German troops could be effected by way of Riga, although the Germans alleged that this was impossible. In the Libau district there were five German ships, which could be used for this purpose.

Mr Polk says that there are also at New York a number of German ships, which would be available.

Mr Matsui asks whether there would be a danger of Bolshevism in these regions after the Germans have withdrawn.

General Gough says that this danger would not exist, because the population was anti-Bolshevist, and, furthermore, because the Bolsheviks were anxious to conclude peace with the Baltic Provinces, and were to recognize their independence up to a certain point. In any event, the Baltic Provinces are able to defend themselves by force of arms.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that if the German troops were dependent upon East Prussia for their supplies, the situation would improve after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, which provided for the occupation of Memel and the neighboring districts by Allied troops. The Treaty also provides for Inter-Allied occupation of Allenstein. The army of General von der Goltz would consequently find itself isolated and without liaison with East Prussia, for it can communicate only with a small part of East Prussia, which would itself be isolated. He expected that the treaty would be ratified in about three weeks’ time and suggested that it might be advisable to await the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

General Gough says that this is the case, but that General von der Goltz is not a person who would ignore these facts, and it is quite likely that he has availed himself of the delay by organizing stocks of provisions and munitions which would enable him to maintain himself for several months. It would be preferable to act immediately, for delay gave the Germans two advantages:

In the first place, it constantly diminishes the moral influence of the Allied and Associated Governments in the country, by showing that the decisions of the Conference were not obeyed; in the second place, it gives the Germans time to prepare an offensive, if they intended to make one, and to accumulate all that is necessary for this operation.

(M Pichon thanks General Gough for his statements and General Gough then withdraws.)

M Pichon says that he had received the amendments prepared by M Berthelot based upon the observations of Mr. Polk.

M Berthelot says that the article concerning the Germans isolated in the Russian forces could be changed so as to read as follows:

“mais encore à tous les militaires allemands en groupe ou même isolés, qui sur la suggestion ou avec l’appui des autorités allemandes, ont nominalement pris du service …”

(“but also to all German military, in groups or isolated, who upon the suggestion or with the approval of the German authorities, have nominally taken service …”)

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether it was proposed that this text be adopted. He found himself in a somewhat delicate situation, for the original proposal concerning the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces had come from his Prime Minister. It was Mr Lloyd George who had proposed that Polish troops be utilized. After these proposals had been made, it had been decided that a note should be prepared in this sense. The information, which had been given that day, showed that it would not be advisable to utilize Polish troops. The situation therefore was now quite different. If the Allied and Associated Governments do not add a threat and are not prepared to carry it out, the ultimatum will not be effective. Under these circumstances, he hesitates to agree to its being dispatched. He asks whether it will not be more advisable to write a note to the German Government, saying that the Allied and Associated Powers do not believe the arguments which the German Government had used, that these Governments know that the German Government are in a position to insist upon the evacuation being effected, and that they are convinced that the German Government can carry it out. The German Government should be further informed that as they have not effected the evacuation nor paid any attention to the previous notes of the Council, the Allied and Associated Governments propose to sever all commercial relations with them and to decide upon other measures of a similar nature. In his opinion, it is advisable to make no further demands, but to put the German Government face to face with a fait accompli. Before deciding upon this course, it will be necessary for all the Governments to agree as to the steps which they were prepared to take. So far as he is concerned, he will be glad to consult his Government, for it was probable that there would be complications, so far as interrupting certain steps, which were already being taken, such as the repatriation of prisoners of war, was concerned, and he was not certain that the British Government would agree to the imposition of the blockade. If a decision were taken after forty-eight hours, the members of the Council would have an opportunity to consult their Governments and they could then decide upon the action to be taken.

Mr Polk said that in awaiting this decision, he will confer with members of the American Delegation and have it made known to Baron von Lersner at Versailles that the American Government would suspend all financial agreements.

(It is decided to postpone the decision concerning the dispatch of a Note to the German Government, relative to the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, for 48 hours, in order to permit the various Delegates to consult their Governments as to the various means of pressure which could be brought to bear.)

(At this point Marshal Foch and General Weygand withdraw.)

3
3. M Pichon said that the question had been raised on the preceding day and that Mr Polk had then asked that it be postponed until the following day.

M Tardieu reads the draft resolution which he had prepared, which is worded as follows:

“It is decided that the Bulgarian Government evacuate Western Thrace and the Strumitza Loop. General Franchet d’Esperey will give the necessary instructions for the evacuation and for the occupation of the evacuated territory by Greek troops, (in the region of Xanthi and Gumuldjina) and for the occupation of the remaining territory by Allied troops.”

Mr Polk says that he believes that the line goes too far. Xanthi and Gumuldjina are beyond the line. He cannot agree to have Greek troops occupy regions other than those which were to be attributed to them by the Peace Treaty.

M Tardieu says that he is of the same opinion.

Mr Polk said that General Bliss and the American Delegation believe that the proposal is a dangerous one and that it will lead to incidents similar to those which had occurred at Smyrna. He thinks that trouble in this region is bound to occur and that the Allied Governments do not have the troops at their disposal, which it will be necessary to send there. He objects to the entire proceeding and wishes to protest and he will take no responsibility for what might happen for there will be no American troops in that country. He proposes that in the first place the territory should be occupied by French troops and that the Greek occupation should take place after the French occupation.

M Tardieu says that General Franchet d’Esperey, whom he had consulted, does not believe that trouble would result. He thinks, however, that the text of the draft resolution should be altered so as to be satisfactory to Mr Polk.

Mr Polk says that General Chretien holds the same view that he does. So far as he is concerned he can only accept the proposal with the reserve already expressed and because of the fact that no American troops are to be sent. He asks whether it was proposed to maintain the local administration.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks it would be inadvisable for the Council to bind themselves, for the Bulgarians might refuse to take the responsibility.

Mr Polk suggests that the matter be referred to the Central Territorial Committee.

M Tardieu says that he proposes to suppress the last two lines of his proposition, from the words “by Greek troops”, and to add a second paragraph, which would be worded as follows:

“This occupation will be undertaken first by Allied troops, who will be replaced by Greek troops in the zone indicated on the map enclosed herewith. The local administration will be continued.”

Sir Eyre Crowe asks whether the words “by Allied troops” means that Greek troops would participate equally in the occupation of the other zone.

M Tardieu says that this is not meant and that he refers to troops of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

S Scialoja says that it should be clearly understood that occupation by Greek troops is to be limited to the zone in question, and that these troops would not participate with the troops of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in the occupation of the other zone.

Mr Polk says that it was important that the line should be definitely established before it is brought to the attention of the military authorities.

M Tardieu says that this matter could be left to the Committee.

(After a short discussion, in the course of which Mr Polk renews his reservation and declares that the proportion of Greek troops appears to him too great in proportion to that of the Allied troops, the following resolution is adopted:

1) It was decided that the Bulgarian Government should evacuate Western Thrace and the Strumitza Loop. General Franchet d’Esperey should give the necessary instructions for this evacuation and for the occupation of the evacuated territory.

2) The occupation should be effected by Allied troops.

3) These troops might be Greek in the zone indicated in the map, attached herewith, when the Commander in Chief should consider it possible; the rest of Western Thrace should be occupied by Allied troops, other than Greek troops.

4) The local administration will be continued.)

4. M Pichon says that the Conditions of Peace would be delivered to the Bulgarian Delegation on the following day at the Quai d’Orsay at 10:30.

Mr Polk says that representatives of the American Press had asked him whether they would be admitted to this ceremony.

M Pichon says that the meeting will be different from those which had taken place with the German and Austrian Delegates. It had not been anticipated that representatives of the Press would be present. It had been intended to transmit the conditions of peace to the Bulgarians through the medium of M Dutasta, the Secretary General of the Conference, without any ceremony of any kind. M. Stancioff, the Secretary of the Bulgarian Delegation, had said that he thought this procedure somewhat uncomplimentary to the Bulgarian Delegation. The Supreme Council had then decided that the delivery of the Conditions of Peace should take place at the Quai d’Orsay in the presence of the Council.

Mr Polk says that he is willing to accept the opinion of the majority, but he wishes to place himself upon record as saying that he believes that the Conference had throughout shown a tendency to ignore the presence of the other Delegations. He knows that the heads of some of these Delegations feel that they have been ignored. The Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and other Delegations particularly interested, feel that the matter is one which concerns them very closely and that they should be present at the ceremony.

M Pichon says that it will be possible to invite the Head of each of the Delegations.

(After a short discussion, it is decided to invite to the Ceremony of the Delivery of the Conditions of Peace to the Bulgarian Delegation:

Two Representatives of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and one Representative of each of the other Allied Powers who were signatories of the Treaty.

It is also decided that Representatives of the Press should be authorized to be present at the Meeting and that there should be five Representatives of each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and two of the other Powers.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

09-19-19, 09:48 AM

19th September 1919

General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, addressing U.S. Congress.
https://i.postimg.cc/NFffPk57/EE1-QRQVXk-AALF56.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

American aviator Roland Rohlfs breaks the flight altitude record by reaching 34,160 feet (10,411 meters)
https://i.postimg.cc/QN40YNzc/EE1-QRQVXk-AALF56.jpg (https://postimg.cc/kDSQBCq5)

Sailor Steve

09-19-19, 12:15 PM

Friday, September 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. Mr Polk asks whether any news has recently been received from the Military Mission in Hungary.

M Pichon says that he has received a telegram from sir George Clerk dated September 12–13. Several cipher telegrams had also arrived but had not yet been decoded. In view of this fact he proposed that the question be adjourned until the meeting of the Council on Monday.

Mr Polk says that he is in favor of M Pichon’s proposal because he had received word from General Bandholtz to the effect that the latter was in process of organizing a police force for Budapest and hoped to conclude the negotiations on that day. Undoubtedly information on this subject would be available by Monday.

(It is decided to adjourn the discussion on this question until Monday, September 22nd.)

(At this point M Tardieu enters the room.)

2. M Tardieu states that, in accordance with the resolution taken by the Council on the previous day,1 he had received from Messrs. Dulles and Nicolson a paper indicating a line of demarcation of the zones Western Thrace. This note, to which a map has been annexed, he is not able to accept, for he has understood that the region of Gumuldjina is to have been incorporated in the area in question.

Mr Polk says that he has no fundamental objection to the eventual attribution of this territory to Greece, but that he cannot consent to its occupation at the present time by Greek troops.

(After a short discussion it is decided to delay action on the resolution taken by the Council on September 18th and to further study the question of the occupation of Thrace by the Allied troops at a future meeting of the Council.)

(M Tardieu then withdraws.)

3. M Cambon reads from and comments upon Report No. 5, transmitted to the Council by the Commission on Polish Affairs, on the subject of the status of Eastern Galicia.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that in view of the fact that Poland, within its present boundaries, does not comprise all the territories which it possessed prior to its partition, he believed that it would be preferable to omit the second paragraph of the Preamble, which read as follows: (a) Preamble

“Seeing that Eastern Galicia formed part of the former Kingdom of Poland until the partition of the latter.’

(It is decided to delete the following paragraph from the text of the Preamble to the Treaty:

“Seeing that Eastern Galicia formed part of the former Kingdom of Poland until the partition of the latter.”)

M Cambon says that the Commission has been unanimous upon the draft of Articles 1 to 11 (inclusive) of the Treaty.

(It is decided to accept the first eleven articles as drafted by the Polish Commission for insertion in the proposed Treaty, regarding Eastern Galicia.)

M Cambon reads the text of Article 12 as proposed by the Polish Commission, together with the additional paragraph to this article proposed by the British delegation.

Mr Polk says that he wishes to ask M Cambon a question regarding this article. In the first phrase the following clause appears, “The Diet of Eastern Galicia shall legislate on the following matters.” He wants to know whether, in the opinion of the Commission, this gives the Galician Diet the exclusive power to legislate upon the subjects enumerated in the article in question.

M Cambon says that such is the intention of the Commission.

M Pichon adds that the Diet would have complete sovereignty for the questions involved.

M Cambon said that the Commission had been unanimous upon all the paragraphs in question. Nevertheless, the British delegation had asked that the following clause be added to the text: “Agrarian legislation passed by the Polish Diet shall only become applicable to Eastern Galicia if and when it is confirmed by the Eastern Galician Diet.”

He adds that agreement has not been reached upon this clause. The American, French, Italian and Japanese delegations had been opposed to inserting it and the British delegation had insisted upon its being put in. The Council is therefore obliged to decide the question.

On July 6th the Polish Diet had passed an agrarian reform law of extreme importance which marked the beginning of the social transformation in Poland. By the provisions of this law the State became the owner of all forests in Poland. The Agrarian organization of the Polish Republic was to be based primarily on the peasants’ farms, the creation of new farms by colonization and the enlarging of those actually in existence. The State was to decide upon the division of the land and in this process was to create large reserves by the following means:

(1) From lands of which it was the owner;

(2) Lands belonging to members of old reigning families or to branches of the latter;

(3) Domains of the Russian Peasants’ Bank and of the Prussian Colonization Commission;

(4) Domains of the Bishoprics, Congregations, Convents, Monasteries or other public institutions;

(5) Domains formerly belonging to congregations, but not yet partitioned;

(6) Lands acquired through speculation and belonging to persons who had been convicted of having participated therein.

The six categories of lands above mentioned are to furnish the basis upon which the distribution should first be made. Thereafter the distribution is to continue by withdrawing land from each large owner. Eight of ownership was to be limited, no one individual to be allowed to possess a farm larger than 180 hectares. In certain regions, however, where the interests of agriculture might make it necessary, this maximum area could be increased to 400 hectares.

He points out that these are the principles of reform which had been imposed upon the party of the Right, which represented the large landed proprietors. The latter do not appear to have accepted their defeat and were already preparing to contest viciously the passage of each of the organic laws necessary to effectuate this scheme. He adds, for the information of the Council, that the above law had only received a majority of two votes.

It appear that the above provisions, which are very broad and diametrically opposed to the ideas regarding private property which had been held up to the present time, were not considered liberal enough by the majority of the Galicians. However that may be, the question is to know whether these provisions can be applied “hic et nunc” to Galicia by the Polish administration or, whether, at the time a Diet shall be constituted in Galicia, the latter should give its opinion upon the application of this legislation or itself enact a special law. The British delegation believes that it is necessary for the Galician Diet to be called upon to give its opinion. The other delegations think that this Agrarian law gives sufficiently favorable terms and adequately upholds the rights of private property owners vis-a-vis the peasant class.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the question is in reality a larger one than the mere enforcement of a particular law, the merits of which he did not wish to pass upon at the present time.

The main idea which had guided the Council in all its discussions on the autonomy of Eastern Galicia had been that a people was being dealt with who had retained marked sympathy for certain of its neighbors, more particularly Russia. It had always been the desire of the Council to look to the future with the possibility that this people might wish to ally itself with a regenerated Russia or any Ukrainian state which might be formed. It had been desired to allow the separation to be made from Poland, if such state of affairs became possible, and consequently the autonomy of the country was preferable to a mandate over it entrusted to the Poles. He thinks that a line should be drawn between those matters on which uniformity of legislation could be obtained without difficulty and issues on which the people of Eastern Galicia should be permitted to legislate alone. Uniformity on agrarian questions is difficult to attain. No obstacle should be placed in the way of an ultimate union of Eastern Galicia with Russia, and it therefore should not be made impossible for this province to separate itself from Poland. He did not wish to argue in favor of such a separation, but believed that the door should be left open for a move in the direction of Russia. By so doing the Powers would give Galicia a free hand and would avoid creating difficulties, of which agrarian legislation might well be one.

He points out that the Council might be guided by England’s experience in relation to Ireland, in which country agrarian questions had always been the most difficult of solution. England had never imposed its agrarian legislation on Ireland and was thankful that the same had not been done, England could never be charged with having forced its own system of laws on the Irish. The United States furnished another example of a country for whose well being uniformity of laws was not necessary.

He does not wish to criticize the law in question, but points out that no guarantee exists against its repeal. The Poles might be tempted to enact legislative measures hostile to the interests of the Galician people, and it is for this reason that he believes all laws of an agrarian nature should be submitted to the approval of the Galician Diet. The most simple method to obtain this result would be to add agrarian questions to the list of matters within the jurisdiction of the Diet of Eastern Galicia, which are set out in Article 12. Great danger would be run through the imposition of legislation purely Polish in character because many of the large property holdings in Galicia were actually in the hands of Poles and the temptation to impose a system favorable to their interests would be very great.

M Cambon says that he would like to refer to Article 16 for discussion with Article 12, for the two stand together and a decision of the Council on one would have its effect on the other. He then reads the two texts proposed for Article 16 and points out that this Article in substance brought up the question as to whether or not Eastern Galicia is to be allowed representation in the Diet of Warsaw.

He is fundamentally opposed to the British proposal for the reason that, whether it is desirable or not, the fact that the government of the Galician state is entrusted to Poland placed in the hands of the Polish Government representation of Eastern Galicia abroad. All questions of general administration will be settled at Warsaw. It is therefore necessary that Eastern Galicia be permitted to take part in all questions of high policy in the Polish Diet. The Diet of Galicia could deal with the other matters as indicated in Article 12. It was therefore necessary not to state in the decision that representation of Galicia with Poland should be disregarded.

With reference to the agrarian legislation, he points out that this question is bound up with the decision which would be taken on Article 16, for if the Council granted Galicia representation in the Polish Diet her representatives in this body could make themselves heard to good effect.

S Scialoja says that, although the Italian representative on the Polish Commission has supported the majority opinion, he thinks it would be well to make a slight change. He does not favor the addition proposed by the British delegation however, but inclines to the second proposal made by Sir Eyre Crowe, namely, to insert agrarian legislation in the list of matters included in Article 12. If such a change is not made Eastern Galicia might be deprived of all rights of enactment of agrarian laws, should she refuse to accept the legislation of the Polish Diet. According to M Cambon’s statements, it is probable that the Galicians will go further in the matter than the Poles have already done. This means that they are not satisfied with matters as they stand and it would therefore do them an injury to crystallize the present situation and prevent them from improving it.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he agrees with M Cambon in believing that Articles 12 and 16 are closely allied. All the points raised by the British delegation are intimately connected one with another, and the same arguments as have been brought forward for agrarian questions prevail in regard to compulsory military service. He wishes, however, to further discuss the representation in the Polish Diet. Assuming that this representation exists, the danger might arise that certain Polish members of the Diet would wish to impose on the Galicians an agrarian scheme favorable to Polish interests. The Galician representatives, being in a minority, could not effectively block the measure. In cases where matters of general interest arise it was probable that Galicians and Poles might vote on the same side, but in cases of special legislation the Galician minority would be absolutely powerless. If this argument is true, the Commission is correct in saying that the question of representation had a direct bearing on Article 12. He further wishes to call attention to the meaning of Article 13, and the right of temporary veto accorded to the Governor therein. This article provided sufficient guarantees to prevent the legislation of the Galician Diet affecting Poland adversely.

M Pichon asks whether Mr Paderewski had not stated that Poland could not accept the Treaty under these conditions.

General Le Rond says that the Sub-Commission had heard the Polish delegation on the subject four times. In the first place, Mr Paderewski, later Mr Dmowski, and later Mr Dabsky, the author of the Polish agrarian law had appeared before it. Mr Daiko, representing the Ruthenians, had also appeared before the Commission. This body is therefore entirely alive to all the difficulties which Sir Eyre Crowe had brought up and to all the arguments in answer thereto.

The Agrarian reform is based on a general banking scheme which is to be uniform throughout the country. It appears difficult to organize a similar system within a country so limited as Galicia, and of such a small population. The reform was also based upon a system of local committees, giving guarantees to the people analogous to those existing in Posnania and other provinces. The points raised by the British delegation are irreconcilable with the solutions proposed by the majority. The representatives of the Polish Government had stated that they could not accept a Treaty in which their government would be deprived of the right to dictate agrarian reform.

Sir Eyre Crowe replies that there is much to be said for the arguments presented by General Le Bond, but he does not believe that they go to the root of the matter. He is fully alive to the difficulties from a practical point of view which would result from allowing Galicia to legislate independently, in the event that she should exercise her rights in a manner which does not meet with the approval of the Polish Diet. He believes that the people themselves would be competent to avoid all complications of this nature and they might even declare themselves favorable to uniformity of legislation. It does not devolve upon the Council, however, to force them to such uniformity. Furthermore, Galicia was not such a small country as General Le Bond had given the impression, for it contained practically four and one-half million inhabitants. There will, consequently, be no insurmountable difficulties in establishing an agrarian system for this country even though certain complications might arise from the banking point of view. The argument put forward by General Le Bond did not therefore seem to him of sufficient weight to overthrow his proposal of granting the Galicians a voice in the legislation.

Mr Polk says that he is greatly influenced by the arguments put forward by Sir Eyre Crowe. He wishes to submit a proposal which had just been made by Mr Gibson, which might help the situation to a certain degree. This would consist in adding the following clause to the addition proposed by the British delegation: “In case of a rejection of the Polish law by the Galician Diet, the latter will have the right to legislate on this question.” This solution would have the advantage of permitting the Galician Diet to adopt the Polish legislation should this body so desire.

M Cambon points out that it is perhaps unwise to anticipate a refusal and base the Galician right of legislation upon this. He suggests that it would be sufficient to provide: “The Galician Diet shall give its opinion on the possibility of applying Polish law.” In this way the body would of necessity be consulted.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that M Cambon’s proposal appears rather vague and will open the way to misunderstandings, while clearness in the matter is greatly to be desired. The danger might be that the Poles could say that they had asked the opinion of the Galician Diet, that the latter had not agreed, and nevertheless it made no difference to them.

M Pichon suggests that the agrarian laws might be settled by agreement between the two Diets.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the fact remains that Article 13 gives the Polish Governor an absolute right of veto.

Mr Polk says that he approves the second British solution, namely, the insertion of agrarian questions in Article 12. The difficulty can be covered by adding that, if the Galician Diet had not legislated on the matter within a given period, the Polish law would apply.

S Scialoja says that it might be also added to the laws of Article 13, which are subject to an absolute veto of the Governor.

M Cambon draws the attention of the Council to the fact that the agrarian law might lead to disturbances within the country, and that the Polish Government might charge the Allies with turning over to them the administration of a country without granting them the means of handling disturbances which might arise through the application of agrarian laws. The majority of large estates in Galicia are in the hands of the Poles. These estates are to be partitioned in favor of Ruthenes. This is a fruitful source of conflicts between different interests and of dangers which might easily lead to a revolution. He thinks, therefore, that the Polish Government should be left the means of exercising its authority. Too much importance should not be given to these details, however, as the system which was being inaugurated was only temporary.

M Pichon says that he has a proposal which he believes will settle the matter. This was to adopt the proposition presented by Sir Eyre Crowe, and add the following paragraph thereto:

“In case of persistent dispute between the two Diets, the question will be brought before the Council of the League of Nations.”

Sir Eyre Crowe said that this proposal will, in effect, permit the League of Nations to enact the agrarian laws.

M Pichon said that the Covenant of the League contemplates arbitration as one of the essential roles of that body.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the League of Nations will therefore be called upon to decide between two bodies of law. To bring this about it is necessary that the Galician Diet should be given a legislative power by the Treaty.

(After a short discussion, it is decided:

(1) That legislation on agrarian questions should be included within the competence of the Galician Diet, and inserted in Article 12 of the proposed Treaty;

(2) That agrarian legislation should be included among the laws over which the Polish Governor has the right of veto (Article 13), but that if the Governor’s veto be maintained for more than one year the question should be automatically brought before the Council of the League of Nations for decision.

It is further decided that the above resolution should be referred to the Commission on Polish Affairs for insertion of its provisions in the Treaty.
These two articles (14 and 16) are accepted without change.)

M Cambon reads and comments upon Article 16. He says that the organization provided for therein, which was to protect the rights of Galicia, will lack a proper foundation if Galicia is not represented in the body of the Polish Diet. It should be understood that the Galician representative will take no part in the matters which were exclusively Polish.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he recognizes the weight of the arguments put forward by M Cambon, but that he does not wish to express an opinion as to the root of the matter. He wishes particularly to remark that the question had been the object of much academic discussion up to the present time, and that the idea involved had rarely been applied from a practical point of view. Under the former German Constitution Bavaria was granted special rights, but in practice it had been found impossible to prevent the Bavarian representatives from taking part in the body of the Reichstag, in the discussion of matters which were entirely foreign to the special interests of Bavaria. The question of knowing whether States with partial autonomy could obtain representation in a larger Parliament was one of the most contentious which could be found, and had given rise to much discussion and often contradictory conclusions on the part of men of high intelligence in all countries of the world. Mr Balfour, who has special experience of Government in Ireland, has more than once called attention to the grave difficulty of finding a satisfactory solution of this question. Several bills proposed on the Home Rule question had broken down precisely on the point of the Irish representation in the British Parliament. It is, therefore, very natural that his Government should feel a certain hesitancy in imposing a fixed and definite scheme on another people in a matter which is so much a matter of controversy. The British Delegation feels that a solution along the lines proposed by Mr Cambon might perhaps be reached. He does not wish to criticize it, nor to exclude the possibility of its eventual adoption, but he does not wish to force it at the outset on the people concerned. It is within the province of these people to decide the question in the last analysis.

Mr Polk says that the British proposal contemplates the intervention of the League of Nations if desired by “both parties”. He wishes to suggest for consideration of the Council, a substitution of the words “either party” for the words “both parties”. He wishes also to propose for the consideration of the Council that Galicia be granted two or more representatives in the Polish Diet, until such time as a definite decision in the matter might be arrived at. These representatives might have a consultative voice, with the right to take part in the discussion of matters concerning Eastern Galicia but would not be accorded a vote. Representation of this kind would be similar to that enjoyed by the Territories in the United States, as distinguished from the active and voting representation of the States. This proposal is a temporary measure solely and he thinks the Council might deliberate profitably thereon.

The discussion of Article 16 was then adjourned.

(At this point M Loucheur enters the room.)

4. M Pichon says that a letter has been received from the Austrian Delegation with regard to the shortage of coal in Austria.

M Loucheur says that he wished to inform the Council at once that he had not waited for the ratification of the Treaty before giving orders to increase the coal supply in Austria as soon as possible. He had personally given orders in this matter but he could not guarantee that he would be completely successful, for the shortage of coal in Central Europe was so great that the industries of Czechoslovakia were likewise threatened. He suggests that he might draft a letter to the Austrian Delegation informing them of the steps which have been taken.

(It is decided that M Loucheur should submit to the Council a draft letter to the Austrian Delegation, informing the latter of the steps which have been taken to offset as far as possible the coal shortage existing in Austria.)

(M Loucheur then leaves the room.)

5. Mr Polk says that he is not ready to discuss this matter because there were certain differences of opinion existing thereon among the military representatives.

(It is decided to adjourn the discussion of this question until Monday, September 22.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

09-20-19, 06:32 AM

20th September 1919

Italian nationalists in Fiume (Rijeka, Croatia) listen to a speech by Gabriele D’Annunzio, who seeks to have the city annexed by Italy. The city is disputed between Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia).
https://i.postimg.cc/0ynQgKxy/EE5-Wf-L6-VUAAH0xl.png (https://postimages.org/)

President Wilson addressing 50,000 people in San Diego to promote public support for the ratification of the Versailles Treaty and joining the League of Nations.
https://i.postimg.cc/0NNN952d/EE163-LQXk-AEw-XJp.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Jimbuna

09-21-19, 07:00 AM

21st September 1919

Turkish officials, with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the center, at Sivas, discussing Turkish resistance against partition and Allied occupation.
https://i.postimg.cc/xCRN7c6v/EE-g-B50-Ww-Acrmg-X.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Amputees race on crutches at a race organized by the Red Cross in New York City.
https://i.postimg.cc/C5rBh9Td/EE-g-B50-Ww-Acrmg-X.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

09-21-19, 02:02 PM

Saturday, September 20, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Sailor Steve

09-21-19, 02:02 PM

Saturday, September 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

09-22-19, 06:56 AM

22nd September 1919

President Wilson suffers breakdown.

American Red Cross dentist providing care for a Serbian soldier.
https://i.postimg.cc/4ygvF7Z1/EFDw-Ych-XUAI-z-UJ.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

German prisoners of war and their dog wait for a train to take them home at Mons, Belgium.
https://i.postimg.cc/kg4QZdrL/EFDw-Ych-XUAI-z-UJ.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

09-22-19, 08:41 PM

Monday, September 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Tardieu reads the joint proposal of the British and American representatives upon the Central Territorial Committee, who had asked their French and Italian colleagues to agree to the line of demarcation of the zones of Western Thrace, which could be occupied by the Greek Army and by the other Allied Military Forces.

He proposes to alter the last paragraph in the following manner:

“The zones of occupation thus fixed do not prejudice in any degree attribution of territory either to Greece or to the International State.”

This proposition is accepted.

(It is decided to accept the text.)

2. M Cambon says that the Commissions for Polish and Czechoslovak affairs had submitted for the approval of the Council a plan for the organization of the plebiscite in the Districts of Teschen, Spisz and Orava. The Commissions are unanimous in proposing the addition to Article 4, first paragraph, of the following:

“and in any event within a maximum period of three months after modification of the present decision as foreseen by Article 9.”

He reads a letter which he has received from Dr Benes asking that the arrangements for the plebiscite include special provisions concerning the right of option of the populations in the territory where the plebiscite is to be held. The Commission in agreement with the Drafting Committee thought that the question raised by Dr Benes ought not to be dealt with in the draft which was submitted for the approval of the Council. It is for the Allied and Associated Powers to enter into such agreements with Poland and Czechoslovakia, after the plebiscite has taken place, as appears to them necessary, and to take such steps as they considered advisable as regards the right of option of the population. The Commission desired to call attention to the urgent need of sending an Inter-Allied Commission, and for Inter-Allied occupation of the country where the plebiscite was to take place.

Sir E Crowe says that he has no objection to the report of the Commission, but he desires to state that the British Military authorities disapprove of occupation by small forces from several of the Allied States. They believe that it would be far more advantageous if the powers divide the zones of occupation, and each Power is charged with the occupation of a particular zone. The question has been discussed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and by General Weygand. The French Military Representative thinks that the resolution already taken by the Supreme Council prevents a discussion of the problem as a whole. Under these circumstances he suggests that the Council reconsider its former decision and authorize the Military Representatives at Versailles to discuss the matter. It would be necessary to give the Military Authorities full latitude.

General Le Bond says that at the meeting of August 25 between General Weygand, representing Marshal Foch, Field Marshal Sir H. Wilson and General Bliss the subject of the organization of the Inter-Allied Armies of Occupation had been discussed. The occupation of the Klagenfurt Basin and of Thrace had been foreseen, but not the occupation of Teschen. Under these conditions they had estimated that five Divisions would be sufficient. The Army of Occupation could be Inter-Allied. The contingents of each of the Powers would be autonomous and the Supreme Command designated by the Supreme Council. General Weygand, acting for Marshal Foch, had maintained that the Allies had a collective responsibility. The occupation would be an Inter-Allied occupation everywhere. He had considered the political view. For reasons of a practical nature the British Representative on the other hand believes that the occupation of a fixed zone should be confided to a single power. England would occupy the Balkan territory, France, Upper Silesia, Italy, the Klagenfurt Basin and America, Dédéagatch. He wishes to add that, in view of the recent decisions of the Supreme Council, the occupation of Klagenfurt and of Dédéagatch no longer entered into the question. On the other hand, General Bliss, who was present at the Conference, had made no communication exposing the American point of view.

Sir E Crowe says that the British Military Authorities feel so strongly that they hesitate to send troops to any part of the world until this principle has been settled.

Mr Polk asks whether there was any provision in the Treaty on the subject of occupation.

Sir E Crowe replies that there is no such clause, insofar as Inter-Allied occupation is concerned.

Mr Polk asks whether the question has been considered by the Military Authorities at Versailles.

Sir E Crowe says that he believes that the question has not been considered. The Military Authorities were not in a position to examine the question in view of the previous decision of the Council.

Mr Polk says that the question could be referred to the Military Representatives again as an open question for report on the advantages of the two systems.

M Berthelot says that the Treaty with Germany provides for occupation by Inter-Allied Military Forces. There is an obvious necessity. It is evident, from what had taken place in Romania and Hungary, that a single power, which had been in fact only the mouthpiece of the decisions of the Council, could be given by public opinion the entire responsibility. It is the Conference which takes the responsibility and it is therefore absolutely necessary that the responsibility should be divided in the same manner as the authority.

Mr Polk says that he realized that the question had a political importance, but in certain cases, and the case of Teschen is one, there is no political difficulty to be feared. It was absurd from a practical point of view to send a mixed contingent from three different Powers. This entailed a special organization for provisioning each contingent and created a complicated situation. He asked whether it would not be possible for a single Power to represent in the District of Teschen. Danzig would be occupied by a naval Power, but on the other hand, the occupation in Silesia would be Inter-Allied.

M Berthelot says that he lays great weight on the moral side of the question and that to decide that the occupation of a certain territory should be entrusted to the troops of a single power was equivalent to creating a sphere of influence to the advantage of that Power. The equilibrium between the Powers would be far better maintained by a joint occupation. He thinks
that a formula can be found by which the great majority of the troops can be furnished by a single Power, and that the other Powers would be represented in the Inter-Allied forces by officers.

Mr Polk says a result of this nature could be reached. The Inter-Allied representation will be assured by delegates of the Powers in the Commissions for which the Treaty provided. These Commissions would each have an escort furnished by their countries; the main part of the forces of occupation will remain furnished by a single power.

General Le Bond says that there is no particular difficulty in the case of Teschen. It should be remembered that the District of Teschen is adjacent to Upper Silesia, which was to be occupied by two divisions. The troops sent to Teschen could easily be rationed from Upper Silesia.

Mr Polk says that he believes that Mr Balfour had never admitted the principle of the Inter-Allied occupation of Upper Silesia.

M Berthelot says that Mr Balfour had raised the question, but he had never formally pronounced himself against Inter-Allied occupation. He (M Berthelot) wishes to again emphasize the importance of not creating a sphere of influence or zones of action in which one Power is particularly interested.

Sir E Crowe says that he agrees on this point, but he wishes to add that the zones of occupation were under the authority of Inter-Allied Commissions. It is these Commissions which were responsible; the troops placed at their disposal are only police forces. The principle of joint responsibility is clearly safeguarded.

M Berthelot says that so far as Upper Silesia is concerned the treaty calls for Inter-Allied occupation. If this occupation is confided to the troops of a single Power, there was a danger that the Germans would have cause for complaint. In addition, the Supreme Council has taken a definite resolution on this subject on 8th August. It had specified at that time that Marshal Foch, in agreement with the Allied General Staffs should weigh, on the one hand, the advantage to be gained by representation by all the Allies in all the forces of occupation, and, on the other, the disadvantages which might result both from eventual differences between soldiers of Allied contingents as well as from difficulties in connection with the provisioning of each force. Marshal Foch is to present a report on the subject to the Supreme Council.

Mr Polk asks whether the report has been sent.

M Berthelot replies that it has been sent and distributed.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the date of the report is a matter of importance. He asks whether the force, whose organization had been discussed at that time, had not been intended, not for the mere occupation of Upper Silesia, but for the purpose of driving out the Germans.

M Berthelot says that it is a question of the Peace Treaty.

General Le Bond said that it was agreed that the total strength should be two divisions (four brigades), and that each of the Powers is to furnish a brigade. Each brigade will be assigned to a special sector. The practical difficulties which might arise would therefore be less difficult to deal with. In addition, the Allied and Associated Powers would be complying with the terms of the Treaty and the principle of joint responsibility would be safeguarded.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the Treaty with Germany provides for the occupation of Upper Silesia by troops of the Allied and Associated Powers, but that this does not necessarily mean by troops of all the Allied and Associated Powers. The troops of a single Power could in fact act as the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers.

M Berthelot says that to admit this would be to put the text of the treaty on the rack.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he does not agree, nor does he see why it would not be necessary to send Japanese troops as well.

General Le Bond says that Japan is not represented on the Commission for the occupation of Upper Silesia.

M Pichon said that the appendix to Article 88 of the Treaty of Peace provides that Japan should not be represented on this Commission. It might be possible to refer the question again to the military representatives at Versailles pointing out to them that they should take note both of the text of the Treaty, which cannot be changed, and of the views of the British delegation.

M Berthelot says that in the meeting of the Supreme Council of August 8th, Mr Balfour had not opposed the system of Inter-Allied occupation. He had merely pointed out the difficulties of provisioning an Inter-Allied force and proposed that the General Staffs study a system of compensation by which England, for example, could furnish a larger portion of the Inter-Allied contingent along the coast, and a smaller one in Upper Silesia. The total strength of the force furnished by each of the Allies would remain the same. It was only the redistribution in the zones of occupation which would change. He wished to repeat that it was most important not to put the material and political questions on the same footing and that the difficulties ought not be exaggerated. The political question was of extreme importance. It is necessary that the responsibility should be supported equally by all and that no spheres of influence, where one nation would benefit more than another, should be created. There were possibly districts, where the difficulties, as well as the possible advantages, were greater than in others, and it was not possible to admit the principle that a single nation should be in occupation there. As far as the material question was concerned, he thinks that it can be solved without much difficulty. As an example, where difficulties and responsibility had fallen upon a single Power he wishes to cite the example of Bulgaria. The French had acted as a police force of the Allies and they were the only ones who had incurred expense and burdens. England had expressed the intention of coming to the assistance of France, but France had received nothing beyond the offer of forty Hindu soldiers. He understands that so far as the United States is concerned, there were serious moral and material difficulties, but he believes strongly that it is advisable for the Great Powers to be together in the same zones.

M Cambon says that it was important to remember that in the eyes of the people the International Commissions did not count and that it was the military command, and that only which in their eyes was responsible. He wishes to recall to Sir Eyre Crowe’s mind, without any intention to criticize, an incident in history. In a certain century a distinguished prisoner had been placed under the surveillance of an Inter-Allied Commission, in which even France was represented, but it was England which was charged with the custody of the prisoner and it was England which bore the weight of the responsibility.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the two cases were not quite the same, for here the Council was dealing with a part of Germany. He understands in regard to the question before the Council that the military representatives at Versailles were limited by a decision of the Supreme Council. If the question were again referred to Versailles, no result would be reached unless the former resolution of the Council were modified. It was necessary to authorize the military representatives to study the matter as an open question and to ask them to make a report.

M Berthelot agreed, but said that the question of principle will first have to be regulated. The military representatives at Versailles were not in position to decide. It was for the Supreme Council to give instructions when a decision had been made as to whether or not the occupation was to be Inter-Allied, the contingents from the various powers being proportioned according to some system to be devised.

M Pichon says that the Versailles Council had never studied this question. The subject had been examined in a special conference between General Weygand, representing Marshal Foch, Field-Marshal H. Wilson and General Bliss. He suggested that no decision be taken until Sir Eyre Crowe had had an opportunity of consulting his Government and receiving new instructions.

It is decided:

(1) To accept the joint report of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions in regard to the plebiscite in the Duchy of Teschen, and in the districts of Spis and Orava;

(2) To add at the end of the first paragraph of article 4, respecting the plebiscite at Teschen, the following:
“(within the shortest possible time …) and, in any event, within a maximum period of three months after notification of the present decision as foreseen by Article 9”;

(3) That the members of the Inter-Allied Commission charged with organizing the plebiscite should not be chosen from among the members of the Inter-Allied Commission now at Teschen;

(4) That members of the Inter-Allied Commission be nominated as soon as possible, with the reservation that the American representatives would only participate unofficially until the Treaty was ratified by the United States Senate.

3. Colonel Rowe reads and comments upon the procès verbal of the meeting held on August 28th by the Inter-Allied Commission charged with fixing the rate of commutation to be allowed the officers serving on the Commission of Control at Berlin. Allowance for Inter-Allied Commission of Control Germany

S Scialoja said that he accepted the proposals of the Commission in regard to the amount of pay, but he wishes to see the principle established that officers of the same rank belonging to different armies should draw the same pay while serving on this mission, and not receive during this time the pay provided by the regulations of the army to which they belong.

Mr Polk says that the United States has no officers in this Commission and had therefore not taken a part in the discussion, but he desires to place himself on record as saying that he did not agree with the principle that Germany should pay the difference between the different rates of pay of officers of the same rank.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the question of principle was very important and that the Italian proposal raised great difficulties. In fixing the rates of pay it will be necessary to consider the customs and manner of living in different countries.

S Scialoja said that this is true, but that in this case it is a question only of officers who were called upon to live in the same country.

M Pichon said that he would find it difficult to accept the Italian proposal. There was another point which should be made definite. The rates of pay had been fixed in marks. He asked what would happen if the rate of the mark rose.

General Rote replies that the Commission had agreed that if the rate of the mark changed, the scale of pay would be revised.

M Pichon says that in view of this and because it was not a question of the gold mark, a fixed rate for the mark should be established.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that it was not a question of the rate, but of prices prevailing in Germany. It was these prices which should fix the amount of the rates of pay in question.

It was decided:

(1) That the proposals of the Inter-Allied Commission charged with fixing the rate of commutation to be allowed to the personnel serving on the Commissions of Control should be accepted, and

(2) That the scale of pay should be altered every three months according to the economic conditions of the cost of living in Berlin.

4. S Scialoja said that it had been announced that French troops would evacuate Koritza at the end of the month of September. There would be serious inconveniences, unless this city were occupied after the departure of the French troops. Evacuation of Koritza by French Troops

M Pichon said that the evacuation had been decided upon, but that no date had been fixed, and that for this reason it was not necessary for the Council to discuss the question.

5. M Berthelot says that Dr Benes is most anxious that the question of the repatriation of Czech troops in Siberia should be finally settled. He is leaving on that day. The question is an important one for if the things existing was allowed to continue Bolshevik propaganda would make headway among these troops. Public opinion in Czechoslovakia attached great importance to the repatriation of the troops in question. There are a number of difficulties, but if the repatriation could be begun it would have a very good effect. The Czechs were endeavoring to obtain the necessary tonnage from Japan, but they are in doubt as to whether they will be able to succeed. On the other hand, they did not have the means of making payment at Vladivostok to cover the cost of transportation of these troops. They had asked the British government to advance the amount necessary, just as France had advanced the cost of the maintenance of these troops in Siberia. It was for Great Britain and the United States to regulate the question of tonnage. Dr Benes does not ask for a definite reply. It will be sufficient if he could be told that the subject was being favorably considered by the two Governments. Repatriation of Czechoslovak Troops From Siberia

Mr Polk says that he is not able to give a definite reply on that day. He had suggested to Washington that the American Government undertake a third of the expenses of repatriation, the two thirds being paid by Great Britain and France. In regard to ships, there were the German ships which had been used for the repatriation of American troops. The use to which these ships could now be put would have to be decided by the Supreme Economic Council, or by the Maritime Transport Council at London. He feels that the United States has a great responsibility, and he would do everything on his part to secure a solution of the matter which would satisfy the Czechs.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the British Government will advance the money necessary for the cost of repatriation by sea. The British Government had accepted the principle and there were only questions of detail to be settled.

M Berthelot suggests that in view of the political importance of the question, Sir Eyre Crowe should point out to his Government the importance of bringing the matter to the attention of the Maritime Transport Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the question is somewhat delicate. The French and British Governments have not come to an agreement as to the use to which the ships which had become available should be put.

M Berthelot said that in view of the importance of the political interests at stake, he did not doubt but that the French Government would make every effort to reach a solution which would make it possible to give the Czechs satisfaction.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the British Government share this view.

Mr Polk says that he would not cease to emphasize the political importance of the question.

6. M Pichon said that the declaration by the Allied Associated Governments had required of the German Government in regard to Article 61 of the German Constitution would be signed that afternoon at Versailles, at four o’clock. German Reply in regard to Article 61 of the German Constitution

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Jimbuna

09-23-19, 01:31 PM

23rd September 1919

A piano class for wounded soldiers in London.
https://i.postimg.cc/6p27hYRN/EFI6-AGKX4-AAYj-OU.png (https://postimages.org/)

Steelworkers throughout the U.S. go on strike, shutting down half of the U.S. steel industry. Steelworkers listening to a labor organizer.
https://i.postimg.cc/wx2sxtHn/EFE1-Dwx-W4-AAk-Xem.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Mounted police attack a striking steelworker in Homestead, Pennsylvania.
https://i.postimg.cc/GmVD0Zr2/EFJ-t2b-X4-AEJLCi.png (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Belogor (Soviet Navy) Russian Civil War: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War: The minesweeper was mined and sunk in the Dvina River.

Sailor Steve

09-23-19, 09:54 PM

Tuesday, September 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. Mr Polk says that he wishes to draw the attention of the Council to a matter of extreme importance before the order of the day should be taken up.

At the time of the Armistice the German Government had been in possession of fourteen oil tank ships which had not been disposed of under the terms of the armistice. At a conference in Brussels in March, 1919, the Germans had asked to be allowed to retain these ships on account of the pressing need for oil existing in their country. It had been agreed that they should be allowed to keep them. Simultaneously the Supreme Council had agreed that Germany should be allowed to receive shipments of oil and for that purpose to retain the fourteen ships. Later, when the question of the reparations to be made for the scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow had arisen, the question of the fourteen ships had again been raised. At this time also the Germans were allowed to retain them. These ships had been prepared for use and were to be sent to the United States for transport of oil, the delivery of which had been contracted for and partly paid. On August 15th Admiral Charlton, President of the Inter-Allied Naval Armistice Commission, had directed that these ships be delivered to the Firth of Forth to be placed under the jurisdiction of the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council. Some time about September first the American representative on the Inter-Allied Naval Armistice Commission had protested against this delivery, and the question had been raised at a meeting of the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council. The American representative had urged that the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers was alone competent to deal with this question, but his protests had not been heeded. At the meeting of the Supreme Economic Council held at Brussels on September 20th the question of the disposition of these ships had been raised. He had sent a telegram to the Council, asking them to delay action on the matter, but this wire had not been received and presumably had been lost in transmission.

The Supreme Economic Council, on which the United States was not represented, had upheld the decision of the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council and had ordered the ships to be delivered to the Firth of Forth. The American Government believed that this constituted a breach of the agreement made with Germany and, furthermore, that neither the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council nor the Supreme Economic Council had jurisdiction in the matter. The Supreme Council alone was the body competent to decide on the disposition of the ships and he urged that instructions be given that the order of the Supreme Economic Council be held in abeyance pending the decision on the question by the Supreme Council.

M Berthelot said that he had been present on the previous evening at a meeting which had taken place at M Clemenceau’s room, at which M Berenger, who was one of the representatives of the French Government at the meeting in Brussels on September 20th, had made a report on the matters discussed at this meeting. In the light of M Berenger’s statements it was clear that he was not aware of the points which had been raised by Mr Polk. He had gathered the impression from the conversation that there was disagreement between the British and French Governments on the subject of the disposition of the tank ships, but he wished to add that he was not cognizant of the matter which Mr. Polk had presented to the Council.

Mr Polk says that it was necessary to stop delivery of these ships being made from Hamburg until the Council had arrived at a decision in the matter.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he was not familiar with all the aspects of the question, and that he would have to consult his government.

Mr Polk says that an order of the Supreme Economic Council had actually been given in the matter and that it would be necessary to suspend the execution of this order until a decision had been reached.

Mr Berthelot says that he believes the action would be taken in London, and it was therefore necessary to advise the authorities in that place.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the matter seemed to him slightly involved. There had been so many bodies which had dealt with this question that it was not exactly clear to which body the order should be sent.

Mr Polk says that to make sure the order should be sent to every body which had dealt with the question.

M Pichon said that he was in favor of having the order for the delivery of the ships held in suspense until the matter had been decided upon by the Supreme Council. He points out, however, that the holding up of this order does not affect the question of the final distribution of the ships.

Mr Polk says that this is also his understanding of the matter. The United States had not been represented on the Supreme Economic Council. The Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council had felt that it had no authority to order the delivery of the ships and had consequently referred the matter to the Supreme Economic Council, despite the protest made by the United States. The Economic Council had taken jurisdiction of the matter and had given the orders for the delivery of the ships to the Firth of Forth. It is to this body that the resolution of the Council should be sent without delay.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he will notify the authorities in London in any case.

(It is decided that the fourteen oil tank ships, which Germany had been allowed to retain at the time of the armistice, should not be delivered to the Allies until such time as the Supreme Council has agreed upon their ultimate disposition.)

(It is further decided that the Supreme Economic Council, which had given the orders for the delivery of the ships in question, should be instructed to take immediately the necessary steps to cancel these orders.)

2. Sir Eyre Crowe said that in paragraph three of the resolution, taken by the Supreme Council on the previous day, thinks that a slight error had occurred. This paragraph, which reads as follows:

“That the members of the Inter-Allied Commission, charged with organizing the plebiscite, should not be chosen from among the members of the Inter-Allied Commission now at Teschen.”

had appeared in the report submitted by the joint Czechoslovak-Polish Commission as a mere expression of opinion of that body.

He does not understand that the Commission had taken a definite resolution on this point and he did not wish to criticize it as a decision. He is not in a position to agree that it should be carried out, but would be obliged to refer to his government. It was possible that sufficient personnel might not be found to send a different British representation for the Plebiscite Commission than that of the Inter-Allied Commission now at Teschen. He thinks it will be well for each government to have free hand in the matter of this resolution.

Mr Laroche says that at the meeting of the Joint Czechoslovak and Polish Commission on September 10th Colonel Kisch, the British representative had suggested that the Inter-Allied Commission actually at Teschen should be reinforced with additional members for the purpose of supervising the plebiscite.

He (Mr Laroche) had answered that the Commission now at Teschen should be completely withdrawn and a new Commission sent there for the purpose of the plebiscite. His reasons in so urging were that the commission at present in Teschen had been there for such a long time, and had been so mixed up in local quarrels and difficulties that it was possible it would not have sufficient prestige to carry into effect its orders regarding the plebiscite. Colonel Kisch had agreed with this opinion. This agreement had enabled Mr Cambon to state that even though no decision had been taken by the Commission on the point, this body was strongly in favor of the paragraph referred to by Sir Eyre Crowe.

Mr Cambon says that he is all the more determined to maintain his recommendation of the previous day for the reason that two letters had been received in the interval; one was from Mr Paderewski and the other from Dr Benes. Dr Benes had said that the Czechoslovak Government cannot agree to the continuation in power of the present Commission at Teschen, because of the numerous complaints which had been received against that body, as well as the complaints which it had made against the local authorities. It is highly desirable that a new Commission should be installed for the purpose of the plebiscite. Mr Paderewski, in a letter written to M Clemenceau, had spoken of the warlike atmosphere which existed throughout Upper Silesia and which necessitated a military intervention. He earnestly requests the immediate organization of a commission to carry out the plebiscite in that region, and further states that such a body should send an appreciable number of officers ahead as an advance detachment. In this instance both the Czechoslovaks and Poles were in accord, and the Council should conform to their desires and send a new Commission there immediately.

M Pichon says he understands that Sir Eyre Crowe will recommend this proposition to his government.

Mr Polk says that, in order to spare the feelings of the present members of the Commission in Teschen, it would be as well that the matter should appear in the form of a recommendation of the Czechoslovak–Polish Commission, rather than a resolution of the Council.

(It is decided that the third paragraph of the resolution taken by the Council on the previous day be amended to read as follows:

“That it was preferable that the members of the Inter-Allied Commission charged with organizing the plebiscite should not be chosen from among the members of the Inter-Allied Commission now at Teschen.”)

3. M Pichon says that the Council had neglected at its last session to decide upon the entertainment allowances to be granted to the head of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control and to the heads of the Sub-commissions thereof.

Colonel Roye says that General Nollet proposes to grant an entertainment allowance of 5,000 marks per month to each of the general officers acting as presidents of the Sub-commissions. This would insure to these officers a financial situation slightly inferior to that enjoyed by General Dupont, who had been Chief of the French Military Mission in Berlin during the armistice. General Nollet had not made any proposal in regard his own remuneration.

M Pichon suggests that General Nollet should receive the same allowances as General Dupont had been granted.

Colonel Roye points out that this will not be feasible, as General Nollet would have four hundred officers under his orders as compared with twenty-five who had been under the command of General Dupont. He proposes 10,000 marks a month for General Nollet.

M Pichon suggests that these figures might be accepted, subject to a revision to be made every three months.

Mr Polk directs the attention of the Council to the fact that the United States is not voting in this matter, as it had no representation on the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control.

(It is decided:

(1) That the following monthly entertainment allowances be made to the President of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Germany and to the Presidents of the Subcommissions thereof, respectively:
For the President of the Commission, 10,000 marks
For the Presidents of the Subcommissions, 5,000 marks

(2) That these allowances, as well as those of the remainder of the personnel of the Commissions, should be revised every three months, according to the economic conditions of the cost of living in Germany.)

M Pichon says that each delegation has received copies of the telegrams sent by Sir George Clerk and that it might be well to await the return of the latter to Paris before discussing the information contained in his telegrams.

4. The Council had before it telegrams from Sir George Clerk, dated Sept. 16th and 19th.

M Berthelot says that he has been instructed by M Clemenceau to inform the Council that he, M Clemenceau, considered S Bratiano’s answer, as expressed in Sir George Clerk’s telegrams, as conciliatory. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that the Romanian Government has made several proposals seeking to conciliate their position with the demands made by the Council. Colonel Antonesco has arrived in Paris to settle the military questions with the Council. In addition, S Bratiano has stated that he is prepared to release the material for the reconstruction of the bridge across the Save River, which he had held up pending the return by the Serbians of the material which they had removed from the Banat. Furthermore, in order to avoid being charged with stirring up Bolshevism in Hungary, and for the purpose of assisting the Hungarians to form a police force, the Romanian Government was prepared, on withdrawing its forces from Hungary, to leave one division in Budapest under the command of the senior Allied General in that city. This measure will be for the purpose of maintaining order until the Hungarians are in a situation to guarantee it. Lastly, S Bratiano is prepared to furnish a list of the requisitions made by the Romanians in Hungary and agreed that these should be thrown into the general pool for the purpose of the reparations to all the Allies.

In view of the conciliatory nature of these proposals, M Clemenceau believes that the delivery of arms and munitions to the Romanian Government, agreed upon with the French in 1917, which had been temporarily held up, should be resumed. He has accordingly given orders that these shipments be resumed.

Mr Polk says that he is somewhat surprised that M Clemenceau has taken this responsibility alone, as the decision to stop all shipments of material to Romania had been taken by the Five Powers constituting the Council.

M Berthelot says that he has not understood that the Council has reached a decision on this matter. He believes that M Clemenceau has simply made an offer to suspend the French shipments, which were being made in execution of a contract entered into in 1917, and that this offer has been accepted by the Council. In addition, S Bratiano has given the impression that France alone had suspended its shipments, for the British Government is actually negotiating with the Romanians for the delivery of naval material and the transport of Roumanian material from Archangel. Italy is also in the process of establishing an economic agreement with Romania.

Mr Polk says that on August 25 the Council had taken a formal resolution to suspend shipments of material of all kind to the Romanian Government.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that Sir George Clerk had telegraphed to the effect that the shipments of British war material to Romania had been stopped by virtue of the resolution of the Council referred to by Mr Polk. The former had recommended, however, that, if the answer of the Romanian Government was considered satisfactory by the Council the embargo on the shipments should be raised.

Mr Berthelot admits that there had been a resolution which had slipped his memory for the time being, and that this placed a different aspect on the situation.

M Pichon suggested that the Council would do well to await the arrival of Sir George Clerk.

Mr Polk agrees with M Pichon, but draws attention again to the fact that the French Government had issued orders to recommence its shipments. He says that this places him in an embarrassing position as he had stopped all American shipments immediately after the resolution referred to had been passed. It was extremely necessary for all the Allies to act together in this matter. S Bratiano and his representatives had promised much, but up to the present had done nothing. In the communication made to Sir George Clerk on the subject of requisitions, the Romanians had distinctly reserved everything which they had taken during the fighting. This reservation might be extended to include everything which they had removed from Budapest. They also said that they would retain all material which had formerly belonged to them. The Allied Generals in Budapest were in an undignified position, and he cannot agree with his colleagues that the Romanian answer is conciliatory.

Sir Eyre Crowe says it would be well to adjourn the matter pending the return of Sir George Clerk. He has received information by telegram to the effect that the Romanians had made exorbitant requisitions in Hungary and that the actual situation in Budapest was very different from that which the Romanians themselves described.

M Berthelot says that it will not be difficult to suspend the order given by the French Government to continue the shipments to Romania.

Mr Polk says it will be better that this should be done.

(It is decided that the resolution of the Council of August 25 be upheld, and that no shipments of material to Romania should be authorized at the present time.

It is further decided to adjourn the discussion of the question of Romania until the arrival of Sir George Clerk from Bucharest.)

(At this point Mr Paderewski enters the room.)

5. Mr Paderewski says that the Polish Government has studied the question of Eastern Galicia, on which the Council had deliberated. In this matter it has been guided not only reasons of State, but also by the sincere desire to ascertain in what measure the provisions of the Polish Commission had carried out the wishes of the Supreme Council. He has consulted the Parliamentary Commissions of the Polish National Assembly, and numerous delegates from the people of all parts of the country, and also the Ruthenians, and he is sorry to inform the Council that the results have not been satisfactory. Galicia is one of the regions which has been greatly devastated, and more civilians had been killed therein than in any other country. Since the armistice a civil war had deluged Poland with blood and the Ukrainians, led by the Germans, had carried havoc into the country. At the moment when the Allies were silencing the German guns on the Western Front, the Germans had been in process of devastating Poland and Galicia.

Moved by the sufferings of these people the Peace Conference has endeavored to establish order, security, and justice in Galicia, and had therefore wished to grant autonomy to that country. He points out, however, that Poland itself had already granted autonomy to Galicia, by virtue of the Polish Diet. As this is the case, and the province in question has been completely restored to order Poland is at a loss to understand the decision taken by the Peace Conference.

It is not easy for him to translate the feelings of a multitude of people, but intense pain has been caused to Poland by the rigor of the Council’s decision to cut out of its body politic a province which had been a part of Poland since the 14th Century. He realizes that his country is too weak to enforce its historic rights. Poland once extended from the Baltic to the Danube, from the Elbe to the Dnieper, but it was not the wish of that country to claim Moravia and Slovakia from its good neighbors the Czechoslovaks.

Poland’s rights to Galicia are not based upon past history, but upon the present and future. It is not a correct statement that only the urban population in Eastern Galicia is Polish and that the rural population was Ruthene. The population of the rural districts is largely Polish and in certain regions the proportion was as high as 50 per cent. At the time of the Austrian domination, 85 per cent of the direct taxes in Eastern Galicia have been paid by Poles. Poland, while not basing its claims on the past, is obliged to insist upon the present, as its national existence is at stake.

The city of Danzig, and the railway line leading from Warsaw there, an essential outlet for the Polish State has been denied to Poland on the question of nationality because the population was largely German. On the other hand in Upper Silesia, on the request of the Germans a defeated enemy power, a plebiscite had been granted - in a region which is essentially Polish, as admitted by the Germans themselves. And now Poland is faced with the loss of Lemberg, the population of which was 85 per cent Polish, for the temporary regime proposed for Galicia meant a certain loss of that country.

This temporary regime proposed by the Council brings joy to the hearts of the Germans. Instead of law and order existing in the country, its results will be continual conflicts of all kinds. A permanent electoral campaign will be carried on. German Agents, the very men who had killed Polish women and children, will constitute the members of the Galician Diet. The temporary regime furthermore, from an economic point of view, will prevent the exploitation of Polish resources in Galicia, especially in the oil districts where much Allied capital had been invested. It will be Poland’s duty to furnish the help necessary for the reconstruction of the country. If at the end of the temporary period provided for Galicia be snatched from Poland, from what source will Poland draw its reimbursement?

He further points out that neither Admiral Kolchak, as representing Russia, nor General Petlioura, as representing the Ukraine, dispute Poland’s just claims to Eastern Galicia. He has only heard of the proposed Treaty by rumors as he had not seen the proposed text of the document. He believes, however, that it comprised three clauses which are extremely prejudicial to Polish Interests.

These are: First, the entrusting of the agrarian reform to the Galician diet; Second, the fact that Galicia was not to be represented in the Polish diet; and lastly that the inhabitants of Galicia were not to be submitted to the compulsory military service of Poland.

On the first point he says that the Polish Government alone should be entrusted with the agrarian reforms in Galicia, as otherwise the Galician diet, inspired by German influence, would only look to the despoiling of their Polish neighbors.

On the second point he feels that it is impossible that two million Poles living in Eastern Galicia should not have a voice in the Diet at Warsaw.

As regards military service it would not be just to accord the Galicians all the rights and privileges of the Polish government without subjecting them to its obligations.

The general scheme of the Treaty seems to him to be to detach Galicia from Poland at the earliest possible moment. The temporary regime provided for meant the loss of Lemberg and all Eastern Galicia, a loss which Poland could not endure and survive. Poland would never forgive its delegates to the Conference should it lose Eastern Galicia. It is obliged to defend this territory as it would defend its own body. Galicia had given poets, heroes and statesmen to Poland. He entreats the Council not to impose on Poland the temporary regime for Eastern Galicia provided by the Treaty. He asks that the treaty be not upheld, if the Council desired to see a firm allied state in Central Europe.

In conclusion he asks that Galicia be granted to Poland and promises that the latter would govern it in the interests of humanity and justice, and that no complaints except from the German interests would be heard.

6. Mr. Polk suggested that the Council was not making much progress with the agenda at each of its meetings. He therefore suggested that the meetings should take place earlier in the day, or twice a day, or that Committees may be made use of to a greater extent. In addition, he proposed that where unanimity had been reached upon a question in the discussions of any Commission, this matter be placed at the head of the agenda each day and the reading of the report of the Commission be omitted.

M Pichon says that he and M Clemenceau will be unable to attend meetings of the Council in the afternoon as they were both engaged at the French Chamber.

After some further discussion, it was decided:

(1) That the meetings of the Council should take place at 10:30 o’clock each morning.

(2) That matters upon which unanimous decisions have been reached at the Commission hearings should be placed at the head of the agenda for each day and the reading of the Commission’s report thereon be omitted.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

09-24-19, 10:14 AM

24th September 1919

U.S. sailors inside the torpedo room of the captured German submarine UB-88
https://i.postimg.cc/tTw5yrj9/EFPITfu-W4-AE-ve-N.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

British advisers demonstrating the use of British field guns to anti-Bolshevik Russian troops at Kostiantynivka.
https://i.postimg.cc/ZYNPpxmy/EFPITfu-W4-AE-ve-N.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Posylnyy (Soviet Navy) Russian Civil War: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War: The minesweeper was mined and sunk in the Dvina River.
Vdachayy (Soviet Navy) Russian Civil War: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War: The minesweeper was mined and sunk in the Dvina River.

Sailor Steve

09-24-19, 10:21 AM

Wednesday, September 24, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

09-25-19, 09:26 AM

25th September 1919

German prisoners of war doing work for the Red Cross in Thessalonica, Greece.
https://i.postimg.cc/C189s3hq/EFT3fk-AXk-AA5t-JB.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Germans internees at Hoboken loading for repatriation.
https://i.postimg.cc/VN0DFHB0/EFT3fk-AXk-AA5t-JB-1.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

An anti-Bolshevik child soldier in Murmansk, Russia.
https://i.postimg.cc/sx4nhQPn/EFT3fk-AXk-AA5t-JB.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

President Woodrow Wilson gives his final address in support of the League of Nations, known as the Pueblo Speech, delivered in Pueblo, Colorado. The exhausted Wilson then suffered either a mild stroke or a nervous breakdown, and his train went immediately back to Washington.
https://i.postimg.cc/0jPnP5g7/EFT3fk-AXk-AA5t-JB-1.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Marie (United States) The 43-gross register ton, 63-foot (19.2 m) fishing vessel was destroyed by fire at Sister Island (54°52′15″N 131°17′15″W) in Southeast Alaska. Her entire crew of six survived.

Sailor Steve

09-26-19, 12:53 AM

Thursday, September 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

Thursday, September 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

Thursday, September 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Tardieu says that M Pichon will be unable to be present on account of the session of the Chamber and had therefore asks him to make his excuses for him to the members of plenary Labor the Council and to act in his place.

The Secretariat of the American Delegation has transmitted to the Secretary-General of the Conference a note containing a telegram addressed by Mr Gompers to M Arthur Fontaine. He wishes to ask whether Mr Polk is in position to say for what reason this meeting had been called and whether the members of the Council had any objections to the meeting of the Commission.

Mr Polk says that he has no information as to the reasons of the meeting.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that it is unfortunate that the Council was without information as to the reasons for the meeting.

M Tardieu said that it will be possible to call the Commission together and to await further information as to the subjects to be discussed at the meeting.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he is ready to telegraph to Mr Barnes, but he has a further question to ask, and that is where the Commission is to meet. It will be difficult to take a decision on this point without knowing the reasons for the meeting.

Mr Polk says that he had received a telegram from Washington dated September 23rd, according to which Mr Gompers has stated that the Plenary Labor Commission would meet in Paris between September 25th and October 5th and that it was hoped that no decision to recommend postponing the Conference will be taken until further information in the premises was telegraphed. It will probably be possible to find a method to enable the United States to participate in the Conference, whether the Treaty was ratified in time by the Senate or not.

M Tardieu proposes that the Council summon a Representative of the Ministry of Labor and that the discussion of the question be postponed until his arrival.

(M Lazard then enters the room.)

M Lazard says that he is not fully acquainted with the object of the meeting and that M Fontaine, who will be in a position to inform the Council better than he, is at the moment in Rome. He is able to say, however, that the telegram from Mr Gompers did not come entirely as a surprise. In the unofficial meeting held by several of the members of the Commission on September 7th, a number of members of the Commission expressed a desire to hold a further meeting, but nothing was said which would indicate what the subject of discussion would be. The telegram came unexpectedly and as a surprise, because the situation was the same now as it was a fortnight ago.

Mr Polk says that he thinks the best plan will be for him to telegraph Mr Gompers in order to ascertain the nature of the subjects which will be discussed at the meeting.

M Tardieu agrees, but adds that he wishes to point out that the French Government is entirely disposed to call the Commission together.

M Lazard says that Mr Gompers asks that the meeting take place before the 29th. At present that appears impossible and it would seem better to meet early in October.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that that was his opinion, especially as the place of meeting had not been fixed.

M Tardieu says that the Council will wait for further information. He understands that Mr Polk will telegraph to Washington, and that Sir Eyre Crowe will communicate with Mr Barnes.

2. Mr Polk says that at the last meeting it had been decided that the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to take immediately the necessary steps to guarantee the delivery to the Allies of fourteen German oil tank ships.3 According to information which he had received no orders on the subject had been given in London.

M Tardieu says that he was informed that the Supreme Economic Council had been acquainted with the decision of the Council, but he is without information as to whether the order had been carried out or not.

Mr Polk says that it is necessary for the Supreme Economic Council to immediately carry out the measures which were asked of them, as in the meantime the ships would be delivered.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he telegraphed to London to arrange that an expert be sent to him to furnish information on the subject.

Mr Polk says that in any event Admiral Charlton should be directed to keep the ships where they were until further orders were received.

M Tardieu said that the situation appeared to be as follows: The Supreme Economic Council, which was in possession of the resolution of the Supreme Council, thought that there was something to be said in connection with the matter. The French Government held the same view. In 48 hours the Conference would be in possession of the Supreme Economic Council’s proposals.

Mr Polk says that in awaiting this decision it was most urgent that the ships should not be moved.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he had telegraphed to London in regard to the matter.

M Laroche says that only the Armistice Commission is in position to stop the delivery.

Mr Polk says that he considers it essential that the Supreme Council should act, for up to the moment it appeared to him that the only steps taken in the matter had been through the kindness of Sir Eyre Crowe.

M Tardieu says that if a resolution is taken in a sense of what Mr Polk asked, the Council will be doing exactly what had been done on the preceding day.

(M Tardieu then reads the resolution taken on September 23rd, HD 59.)

Mr Polk says that in any case it will be necessary for the Supreme Council to take steps which had been asked of it. If they have not done this, it is necessary to know the reasons. The Armistice Commission should be asked to suspend all action.

M Tardieu says that that had been decided at the previous meeting. He would ascertain in the afternoon just what the Supreme Economic Council had done and whether they had executed the order of the Conference and in what manner.

3. M Tardieu says that the question before the Council is the report of the Spitzberg Commission and a draft Treaty which had been revised by the Drafting Committee. The members of the Commission are unanimous, and, in view of the resolution taken by the Council at the last meeting, he does not believe that it will be necessary to open a discussion of the question.

S Scialoja says that it would not be necessary to read or to discuss the report, but that it will be necessary to take a vote.

M Laroche says that the conclusions of the report are as follows:

(1) The Commission submitted to the Council the text of a draft Treaty, which had been modified in form by the Drafting Committee in such a manner as to make the French and English texts agree;

(2) The Commission proposes that, as regards the signature of the Treaty, the Treaty be communicated, first to the Norwegian Government, which will state whether it agrees. The other contracting parties would then be invited to state within a space of six weeks time whether they were prepared to sign.

(It is decided to accept:

(1) The report addressed to the Supreme Council by the Spitzberg Commission, and

(2) To approve the draft Treaty as prepared by this Commission and revised by the Drafting Committee.)

4. M Tardieu reads an extract of a letter from Lord Milner to M Dutasta dated August 14th, 1919. The Special Commission on Mandates at its meeting in London on August 5th had unanimously proposed that the Portuguese claims to the triangle of Kionga should be recognized.

(This proposal is adopted.)

(It is decided to accept the proposal made by the Special Commission on Mandates at its meeting of August 5th, and to recognize Portugal as the original and legitimate proprietor of this part of the former German Colony of East Africa, situated south of the Kovuma and known as the “Kionga Triangle.”

5. M Tardieu reads a letter of September 14th, 1919, addressed by S Tittoni to the President of the Conference asking that the Military Representatives at Versailles should be directed to study the question of organization of a military, naval and air control for Austria.

(The proposal is adopted.)

(It is decided that the permanent Military representatives at Versailles should be directed to prepare, together with the Naval and Air representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, a detailed proposal, in view of the constitution of Inter-Allied Commissions of Military, Naval and Air Control, which should be charged to see to the execution by Austria of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

6. Sir Eyre Crowe says that he has received a telegram from Sir George Clerk who proposes returning to Paris unless the Supreme Council directs him to remain. He has telegraphed to Sir George Clerk that the Supreme Council will undoubtedly desire to discuss the matter. Upon receiving this telegram Sir George Clerk decided to remain. He finally telegraphed him to come to Budapest and from there to Paris. He thought that this telegram had not reached him.

M Tardieu says that he is grateful for this information, but he cannot see that anyone is to blame for the delay.

Mr Polk says that the Relief Administration has a telegraph line to Budapest and that he will be glad to place this wire at Sir Eyre Crowe’s disposal for any telegrams which he might desire to send to Sir George Clerk.

7. Sir Eyre Crowe says that Mr Lloyd George is more than ever convinced that firm action should be taken to force the Germans to evacuate the Baltic Provinces. Mr Lloyd George wishes, but he would not press the point, that Polish troops should be utilized. He is now charged by the British Government to make a new proposal. The Allies have pledged themselves in previous conversations with the Germans to facilitate the importation into Germany of foodstuffs of which Germany was in great need, and they had authorized the Germans to communicate to the Supreme Economic Council a list of articles which they particularly needed. He proposes that the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to stop the shipment of food-stuffs and other necessities to Germany and that the German Government be notified accordingly. Mr Lloyd George thinks that this will have a very good effect. He thinks also that the American Government is prepared to stop all financial transactions with Germany. If these measures are insufficient it will be necessary to take whatever further steps seemed advisable. Mr Lloyd George has always advocated the utilization of the Polish Army and he now proposes that the head of the British Naval Mission in France place himself at the disposal of Marshal Foch to study with him the question of what military and naval measures might be advantageous at a future date. He has prepared the draft of a note, the first three paragraphs repeating the words of the note prepared by General Weygand, which has already been discussed. It will be necessary to change the end of the third paragraph in such a way as to take into account the remarks which Mr Polk had made at the last meeting. The end of the note will be drafted in the manner which he had pointed out. If the American Delegation consents, it will be possible to insert a supplementary paragraph respecting the suppression of financial transactions.

M Tardieu says that if he understands the British proposal correctly, it calls for immediate action, first, the refusal of the German demands for the furnishing of food for Germany; second, the refusal of credits. If these measures are insufficient the British Government are willing to consider the question of military action. He agreed with this proposal, but wished to make two remarks, one as to form, and the other as to substance. In regard to form, the British Delegation proposes that the Allies reserve the right to take further steps. This is the fourth time that the question has been raised, and, in view of this fact it seems to him that the least which can be done, if the Allied and Associated Governments wished to make a real threat, is to take actual steps. He proposed, therefore, that the note should say that, if the Allied and Associated Governments do not receive satisfaction they will take other steps.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he would accept this modification.

M Tardieu remembers that Mr Polk had said that it might be advisable to stop the repatriation of German prisoners of war. He asked whether Sir Eyre Crowe has referred this matter to the British Government, and whether he had received any instructions.

Sir Eyre Crowe replies that he has received no instructions from his Government on this point.

Mr Polk says that he is convinced that something ought to be done. He prefers action to a threat. In a conversation which had recently taken place at Versailles between Colonel Logan and Baron von Lersner, Colonel Logan had not failed to call attention to the bad impression which the attitude of the German Government had made upon the American Government. Colonel Logan had pointed out that it was most important that Germany should take action, and had let him understand that if the action is delayed America will take definite steps. Baron von Lersner had replied that it is a political question and that the Army which was in the hands of the reactionaries would not obey the Government which was powerless. Colonel Logan then said that this explanation is not satisfactory and that if the German Government had no power it had better withdraw. It is necessary that that Government should take immediate measures to prove its good faith. He adds that Colonel Logan had not spoken in the name of the Council, but the Germans had learned unofficially the view of the United States.

M Tardieu asks whether the Council are in agreement as to the first three paragraphs.

Mr Polk says that there remained the question of the alteration of the last phrase and that he would propose a draft.

M Tardieu said that he thought that it would not serve a useful purpose to fix a delay and to say at the soonest possible moment for from the present moment the Allied and Associated Governments proposed to take action.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he would ask his Government whether it will be possible to make any statement in the note regarding the holding-up of the repatriation of the German prisoners of war, but he wishes to ask if the repatriation of the prisoners of war were stopped it would necessarily apply to all the Allied Powers and whether it would not be possible to speak of a total or partial holding-up of the repatriation. He does not think that the British Government are prepared, so far as they are concerned, to stop the repatriation completely for the work of repatriation was in operation and it is difficult to stop it.

M. Tardieu says that this will nevertheless be a most efficacious method of action.

S Scialoja said that he agrees that this method could be most usefully employed.

M Tardieu says that for the sake of their own peace it is most necessary for the German Government that the repatriation be continued. If the repatriation is stopped pressure will be brought upon the German Government by the German people themselves. It is, therefore, highly important that an expression of this threat be made in the note.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that if the proposal is accepted he thinks it would be advisable that the decision of the Council be made known to the public through the press. He wishes to ask, however, what Powers have consented to the proposed repatriation of the German prisoners of war in their custody.

Mr Matsui says that Japan is in a difficult situation. The repatriation had begun. He asks whether the prisoners’ transports should be held up en route, for instance at Singapore. That would be difficult. He thought that it would be preferable to adopt the formula: “total or partial suspension of repatriation.”

M Tardieu says that the American, British and Japanese Governments have consented to the repatriation, but that the German Government has received a communication in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers. He wishes to recall the terms of the note which had been addressed to the German Delegation and which had been prepared by Mr Balfour.

(M Tardieu then reads the text of the declaration of the Allied and Associated Powers relative to the repatriation of prisoners of war.)

He says that it will be possible to insert in the reply the following phrase: “at the same time the Allied and Associated Powers, with reference to Paragraph of their declaration of August 28th last, points out that the benevolent measures respecting the anticipated repatriation of German prisoners of war is to take place either for all the prisoners or for part of them.”

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he wishes to make it quite clear that if the British Government does not interrupt the repatriation of prisoners of war they are not acting counter to the resolution of the Council.

M Tardieu says that he wishes to point out that if the British Government continues to repatriate the prisoners, the threat of the Council would be in vain, and, in that event, he thinks it would be better to make no threat. It will be necessary to ascertain from Sir Crowe and Mr Polk whether Great Britain and America are prepared to interrupt the repatriation of prisoners.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he wishes to point out that the interruption of the repatriation would be far more prejudicial to Great Britain than to Germany.

M Tardieu asks whether Mr Polk is in a position to furnish a paragraph in regard to the refusal of credits.

Mr Polk says that he will take up the matter on that day.

M Tardieu says that in any event it will be possible to refer the draft reply to the Drafting Committee in order that the Committee could agree upon a reply which would include Mr Polk’s draft paragraph and the proposal of the British Delegation.

Mr Polk says that he wishes to point out that it will not be possible for him to receive a reply by the following day.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Drafting Committee should prepare a note to the German Delegation concerning the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by Germany;

(2) That the Drafting Committee should take as a basis for its work the note prepared by General Weygand and modified by the British Delegation (Appendix F) with the changes in text approved by the Council;

(3) That the text prepared by Mr Polk should be noted; and,

(4) That in case the American and British Governments agree to an interruption of the repatriation of prisoners of war, an additional paragraph should be prepared to notify the total or partial interruption of the repatriation of German prisoners of war.)

8. M Tardieu says that the Council has received new proposals from the Blockade Commission.

Mr Polk reads and comments upon the annex to this Proposal.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that his experts do not consider the American proposal sufficient. They think that the following text should be adopted.

“On account of the military operations which are taking place in the Gulf of Finland, mariners are warned against the dangers to themselves of going there.

“With a view to avoid accidents, for which they cannot be responsible, the Commanders of the Allied and Associated Forces in the Baltic, will direct all merchant ships, which are found proceeding up the Gulf of Finland, to stop and turn back.”

The British experts thinks that this proposal would resolve a number of difficulties. There would be no blockade. There would be no capturing of ships. Vessels would be instructed to turn back. They would be informed that there was danger ahead. If they still persisted they would be made to turn back.

Mr Polk asks what would happen if the ships refused to obey the orders given them.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that they will not refuse.

Mr Matsui said that he thinks that it is quite probable that they will refuse.

Commandant Levavasseur says that the British proposal is a make-shift. If a ship wishes to pass there was no method of stopping it. He desires to point out that from the day when peace was signed with Germany no warship had any longer the right to stop a merchant ship. If a merchant ship wishes to pass in spite of the injunctions of the Allied warships there is nothing that can be done. The former proposals make it possible to avoid these dangers. He asks what will happen if a cruiser should meet a German convoy escorted by destroyers which insisted upon passing. He thinks that this is a question which ought to be carefully studied.

M Tardieu said that it is most important to avoid taking decisions which cannot be applied. The British proposal undoubtedly presents serious inconveniences. He thinks that so far as the American proposal is concerned it will be inconvenient to permit the Commander of each warship to judge as to the action which he chose to exercise. In both cases there was no impression of an operation well conceived and likely to be pressed to a successful conclusion.

Commandant Levavasseur said that in the proposals formerly presented the Commanders of ships of war were vested with the authority of all the Powers.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that that would also apply to the British proposal. It will be communicated by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the neutral Governments.

M Tardieu agrees, but says that in the British proposal it is the means of execution which are inadequate.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he could not agree, for the British proposal gives vessels of war the right of turning back merchant ships.

S Scialoja said that the proposal will not foreshadow any possible action in the event that merchant ships refused to obey the order.

Commandant Levavasseur says that he thinks that in preparing the proposal for which he acted as spokesman, provision was made for the right of turning back ships.

M Tardieu says that in fact there was a blockade without the right of capturing cargoes.

Mr Polk says that he thinks that there is danger of creating a new kind of blockade which would not be recognized in International Law. In view of the fact that the Allied and Associated Governments are not at war with Soviet Russia, they will be creating a dangerous precedent. The United States will not give clearance to vessels desiring to leave American ports for Russia. The danger lay in the case of leaving Scandinavia or Germany.

M Tardieu asks Mrs Polk whether the reserve contained in the American proposal is sufficient to satisfy him.

Mr Polk replies that it is. He adds that if a neutral ship is stopped in its course, for example a Danish ship, the Allied and Associated Governments expose themselves to the payment of damages.

Commandant Levavasseur says that the note of the Allied and Associated Governments would be addressed to the neutral Governments. If these Governments accept the contents no difficulty will arise.

M Tardieu says that the agreement of these Governments will serve as the basis for this new form of blockade.

Mr Polk asked what the situation would be if the neutral Governments does not accept. The notification would not bind them or protect the Allies against claims for damages.

Commandant Levavasseur says that in one case as in the other the situation will be the same. It is a question of a blockade which is not a blockade.

Mr Polk says that he will be equally frank and that if they want a blockade, the best means would be to declare war against Russia.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that it should be remembered that the warships are carrying on hostile operations in the Baltic against the Bolsheviks according to the orders of the Allies. It is necessary to give them means of fulfilling their mission.

M Tardieu agrees.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the difficulty should not be exaggerated. A few ships will be stopped, they would learn that they could not pass and soon no ships would appear.

Mr Polk says that the United States hesitates to create precedents. In the present war they had had difficulties with the precedents of the American Civil War.

M Tardieu says that he wishes to call Mr Polk’s attention to the observation of Sir Eyre Crowe with which he entirely agrees. The Allied fleets in the Baltic are in fact playing the role of war vessels on war service. That being the case, he cannot see how it is less serious to stop merchant ships than to bombard Cronstadt. A difficult question of form ought not to be sufficient to prevent a solution of the question. In view of these facts, he agrees with Sir Eyre Crowe, that even if the Allied and Associated Powers run the risk of having to pay damages, they should be willing to take the risk in view of the present situation. There are many examples in history of pacific blockades, for example the case of Greece and of China. The pacific blockade has a recognized place in International Law.

Mr Polk says that it is not a question of a pacific blockade.

M Tardieu says that he does not agree. The blockade in question was a means of coercion.

S Scialoja said that in order to conform to the regulations of International Law, it would be necessary to communicate the state of blockade to the Soviet Government, but in view of the fact that that Government is not recognized, he does not see that strictly speaking it is a question of blockade. He thinks that it is rather a question of International police and that the precedents in this sense should be examined.

M Tardieu says that the Council agrees as to the practical utility of the measures proposed. But Mr Polk objects to the precedents which would be created. He suggests that the legal advisors be asked to study the precedents and find a formula to which all can agree. So far as the execution of the blockade is concerned the proposals of the Naval representatives will be adopted. He does not wish to delay the solution of a question which had already been too much delayed, but what he proposes appears necessary.

M Cambon says that he wishes to recall precedents which exist. Great Britain and France had often used the pacific blockade as a means of coercion. The examples of Greece and of China had recently been mentioned. The difficulty in the present case is that there is no Government in Russia to which a notification of the blockade can be communicated.

M Laroche says that the very fact of there being no Government will justify a measure of International police.

M Tardieu says that he wishes to sum up the situation as he sees it. It will be possible to impose a pacific blockade if a Government exists to which a notification of the blockade could be made. No such Government exists. It is therefore necessary to trust to the ingenuity of the legal advisors to find a means of justifying a measure of International police.

Mr Polk agrees that the question should be referred to the Drafting Committee.

(It is decided:

(1) To request the Drafting Committee to immediately examine the arguments in International Law upon which the blockade of Soviet Russia could be based; and,

(2) To call to the attention of the Drafting Committee the fact that the absence of a Government in Soviet Russia recognised by the Powers prevented the Powers from notifying that Government in the regular way of a state of blockade.

9. M Cambon reads and comments upon the proposal of the Commission on Polish Affairs which it is hoped will be consistent with the opinion formerly expressed by the Supreme Council on the subject of agrarian legislation in Eastern Galicia.

Mr Polk says he has no objection to make to this text.

M Tardieu recalls the declarations which Mr Paderewski had made before the Supreme Council. Mr Paderewski had stated that he could not admit that the agrarian question was not one for the National Assembly at Warsaw to decide.

M Cambon says that he wishes to add that in a private conversation, M Paderewski had told him that he was in favor of the League of Nations scheme. M Paderewski had insisted that the attribution of Eastern Galicia be made in a definite way. If he (M Cambon) might express a personal view, he wishes to add that the Council are going beyond their rights in entrusting the fate of an entirely agricultural district to a population the majority of which is not Polish.

Mr Polk says that Mr Paderewski had opposed, above everything else, the provisional character of the statute. He (Mr Polk) thinks that it would be possible to satisfy Mr Paderewski in suppressing the provisional character and in altering certain points of the proposal. With this end in view he had prepared a memorandum. He feels that in establishing a provisional regime the Council are allowing the existence of a region in the Central Europe which will become a dangerous center of discord.

M Cambon says that he shares this view, but that he thinks there is still another reason for giving Galicia more complete autonomy. Poland will be much more disposed to accept a more complete autonomy for Galicia if she knows that there is a question of definite organization. The question cannot be solved on that day and it will be necessary to send the American memorandum to the Commission, but on this point it will be necessary for the Council to express an opinion by which the Commission could be guided. They should give their view as to whether East Galicia should be definitely attributed to Poland. He wishes to point out that the American memorandum deals with this subject.

S Scialoja says that in effect Eastern Galacia will be placed under a Polish mandate.

M Tardieu said that this would not be altogether the case for this mandate would not have a temporary character.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he cannot agree to the Council’s suppressing the temporary character of the statute. He recalls the fact that the British Government had originally opposed the union of Eastern Galicia with Poland. He had accepted a compromise because a plebiscite had been promised. Now the idea of the plebiscite had been given up. He cannot, without instructions, accept this solution in view of the fact that it completely alters the principles which had been previously raised.

Mr Polk proposed that the American memorandum be simply referred to the Commission.

M Tardieu says that he wishes to hold to what he had previously said, purely as his own opinion.

S Scialoja says that it conforms to the proposal previously made by Baron Sonnino.

(It is decided to refer to the Committee on Polish Affairs the memorandum presented by the American Delegation.)

10. General Le Bond reads and commented upon Report No. 6 of the Commission on Polish Affairs (on the eastern frontiers of Poland).

Mr Polk says he approves the proposals of the Commission.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he also approves of these proposals, but he wishes to ask in what form the Council intends to communicate the decisions which they had taken to the Polish Government. He thinks that the question of form is most important.

M Laroche says that it would be sufficient to inform the Polish Government that the territories lying west of the line traced by the Commission will be definitely attributed to Poland.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks whether it will not be necessary to include a Treaty.

M Laroche says that in any case it is not a question of a Treaty defining the eastern frontiers of Poland but a Treaty according certain territories to Poland.

Mr Polk says that it will be possible to give Poland her choice between two solutions:

(a) The acceptance of the minimum line proposed in the Committee’s reports, with the assurance that this line would not prejudice any future negotiations regarding this frontier after the reestablishment of Russia or the obtaining of satisfactory information regarding the desires of the people to the east of this frontier; or,

(b) Leaving the determination of this eastern frontier entirely open until such time as Russia and Poland consider it possible to make a definite settlement.
M Laroche proposes that the Drafting Committee be requested to find a formula, taking the Report of the Commission as a basis.

(It is decided:

(1) To accept the conclusions of Report No. 6 of the Committee on Polish Affairs; and,

(2) To request the Drafting Committee to study, in taking the report as a basis, the means by which these decisions should be communicated to the Polish Government.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

09-26-19, 07:51 AM

26th September 1919

Charles Lang Freer, American industrialist and patron who donated his extensive collections on East Asian art to the Smithsonian (Freer Gallery of Art), has passed away.
https://i.postimg.cc/ZnmRyT1V/EFUgs-Wf-Xk-AATrn-A.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

09-26-19, 02:02 PM

Friday, September 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Tardieu reads the following memorandum of the Secretariat-General with regard to the action taken on the resolution of the Supreme Council of September 23rd:

“The resolution of the Supreme Council dated September 23rd in regard to the German oil steamers was transmitted on the 23rd to the Supreme Economic Council by the Secretariat-General.

The Supreme Economic Council forwarded the resolution on the morning of September 24th to its permanent Committee in London.

The latter body immediately brought the matter to the attention of the Allied Naval Armistice Commission which functions likewise in London. This body gave the necessary orders at once to suspend the departure of the ships in question.”

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he has received a telegram from Lord Curzon dated September 25th He points out that the important portion of this telegram was that the Allied Maritime Transport Executive believes that the question of the disposition of the ships was one for the Supreme Council. The A M T E had recommended that the tank steamers be allocated to Allied management along with other vessels to which claim had been put forward under the terms of the Armistice. The first voyage, however, would be for the transport of oil to Germany. He adds that in the event that the steamers had already left for the Firth of Forth they would be diverted and allowed to proceed to the United States for their cargo of oil.

Mr Polk says that he is happy to hear of the measures which have been taken.

M Tardieu says that he will at once communicate Lord Curzon’s telegram to the French members of the Supreme Economic Council.

2. The Council has before it the proposed Treaty with New States prepared by the Commission on Political Clauses, together with the report of that Commission accompanying the Treaty.

M Laroche in commenting upon the Treaty and the report, says that the Commission is unanimous in the text of the clauses of the Treaty. It has not been unanimous on the question of what Powers should be parties to, and signatories of, the Treaty. The majority of the Commission had thought that all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign the document, but the United States had formulated an objection to its participation in the signature. The United States Delegation feels that the matters embraced in the proposed Treaty are not broad questions resulting from the breaking up of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and therefore of direct concern to all the Allied and Associated Powers, but are rather questions of local interest concerning only the new States and the States possessing ceded territory. If the Treaty comes into force it would impose a specific legal obligation only on the directly interested Powers. The United States feels therefore that it is neither desirable nor advisable that all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should be signatories to the Treaty, although representatives of these Powers, in participating in the framing of the proposed articles, might be able to assist in facilitating the negotiations among the Powers directly interested.

As opposed to this point of view, the majority of the Commission feels that it will be necessary for all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to sign, for otherwise the Treaty would be deprived of its authority in the eyes of the New States. Although the Commission feels that the interests of the New States have been carefully safeguarded by the Treaty and that the clauses are for the common good of all, the latter might distrust a Treaty which does not carry the signatures of all the Allied and Associated Powers. Should the United States refuse to sign, the important point arises as to what steps the other Principal Allied and Associated Powers should take. It is possible for the Four Principal Allied and Associated Powers to sign, even though the United States does not do so. The second method of procedure would be to make a united presentation of the Treaty by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the New States and jointly recommend that the same be signed by them.

Mr Polk says that this is a matter which Secretary Lansing had had before him prior to his departure for the United States. Mr Lansing had felt that the Treaty was one between friendly Powers and involved no enemy states. He had taken the position that it was not necessary for the American signature to appear, as he felt that it was difficult to justify the interests which United States might have in signing.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that, following out the reasons advanced by M Laroche, he believes that all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign the Treaty. The British Empire has no immediate interests in the matter but he believes that it should be a signatory power. He thinks that, even in the absence of a United States signature, all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign. A joint action of this kind would give the smaller States the impression that all the large Powers were interested in the matter, because the Treaty forms a portion of the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He is willing, however, to be guided by the wishes of the majority of his colleagues.

S Scialoja says that he believes a refusal of the United States to sign the Treaty is a pure matter of internal interest. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers have taken part in Treaties in which they had no direct interest, as for example, in the case of Spitzbergen. He points out that the United States has been represented on the Commission on Political Clauses, has taken an active part in the framing of the Treaty, and presumably had therefore felt that matters of general interest were being settled. He is unable to urge Mr Polk to sign the Treaty against the wishes of his Government. He would like to ask Mr Polk, however, whether he would agree to a joint presentation of the Treaty by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the small States urging the latter to sign the same. In this way the Treaty would be given moral force.

Mr Polk says that he has no objection to this method of procedure.

Mr Matsui says that the Japanese Empire has no particular interest involved, but as the Treaty concerned the general liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign. In view of the United States’ objection, and by taking advantage of the period of twenty days proposed between the presentation of the Treaty and the signature, he would obtain the instructions of his Government in the matter. He would recommend that the Japanese Empire be a signatory party. Should S Scialoja’s proposition be accepted, however, he would have no difficulty in joining on behalf of Japan in the common presentation by the five Principal Powers.

M Laroche says that he gathers from the discussion that the Council agrees to approve the text of the Treaty and that the Treaty itself should be presented to the new States by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers jointly with a recommendation that it be signed by the former. Furthermore a period of twenty days is to be accorded the New States between the time of presentation and the signature of the Treaty. He adds that it is extremely necessary to decide upon a fixed period in order to prevent the matter being drawn out and any of the New States taking advantage of this to avoid signing.

M Tardieu says that as it is better for all the great Powers to take the same attitude on the question, he proposes that M Laroche’s solution of the matter be adopted.

(It is decided:

(1) That the text of the proposed Treaty with the New States (Clauses Relating to Reciprocal Relations in Transferred Territories) prepared by the Commission on Political Clauses should be accepted.

(2) That the proposed Treaty should be presented to the Delegations of the interested states by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers jointly. The latter should impress upon the Delegations of the New States the necessity for the signature of the Treaty in question, and should request them to obtain the consent of their Governments as soon as possible, but in any case within a period of twenty days, at the expiration of which the Treaty should be signed in Paris by the plenipotentiaries of the interested States.)

(At this point M Tardieu leaves the room and M Cambon takes the chair.)

3. Repatriation of Czecho-Slovak Troops in Siberia

4. Distribution of Allied Troops in the Plebiscite Areas.

5. Report of the Commission on Baltic Affairs on the Occupation of Memel

(The above questions are all adjourned.)

6. The Council had=s before it a note from Marshal Foch, dated August 21st, 1919.

Mr Polk says that there is no objection to the proposals contained in this note from the point of view of the United States.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the British representatives agrees with Marshal Foch’s proposals.

S Scialoja said he has no objections to formulate.

Mr Matsui says that he is not entirely familiar with the question.

General Weygand comments and explained briefly the note in question.

Mr Matsui says that he has no objections to present.

(It is agreed that:

The Conference of Military Experts of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers provided tor by Article 163 of the Peace Treaty to determine the reduction of effectives to be imposed on Germany for each period of 3 months following the coming into force of the Treaty, should be composed of the presidents and of the most important members of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control constituted in conformity with articles 203–210, and chosen in such a way that all the Allied and Associated Powers be represented in the said Conferences.

The President of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control should be charged with deciding the composition of this Conference and the dates of its sessions in agreement with the precedents of the Naval and Aerial Commissions.)

7. Communication to German Government Relative to the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces:

(This question is adjourned.)

8. The Council has before it a note from the Commission on Execution of the Treaty Clauses, asking that the German Government be requested to notify the Allied and Associated Powers of the Government property in German territory to be ceded to Poland.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he is prepared to accept the proposals contained in the note.

Mr Polk says that he is likewise prepared to accept the same, but wishes to reserve his final decision until he has consulted the United States expert in the matter. (Mr Polk later notified the Secretariat-General that he has no objections to formulate.)

(It is decided to accept the proposals in the note of the Commission on Execution of the Treaty Clauses.

It is further decided to request the German Government to furnish the Allied and Associated Powers all information relative to all Government property, which is required to be turned over to Poland within the territory to be ceded to the latter, under the terms of the Treaty with Germany.)

9. The Council had before it two notes of The German Delegation dated respectively August 1st and August 5th, together with a proposed reply thereto submitted by the Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the German Treaty.

Mr Polk says that he has a slight change to propose in the text of the reply. In the 3rd paragraph (English text) the expression, “with the sole reservation that the League of Nations might later order the return to Germany of the whole or part of these territories,” appears. He believes that the use of the word “might” in this connection is not strictly in accordance with Article 34 of the Peace Treaty and the covering letter sent to the German Delegation on June 16th, 1919. As the text now stands the proposed reply stated in substance that the League of Nations might disregard the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of Eupen and Malmedy, whereas the covering letter referred to had said that, in the cases of the territories which it was proposed to transfer from Germany to Denmark and Belgium, this transfer would only take place as the result of a decision of the inhabitants themselves taken under conditions which would insure complete freedom of vote.

He proposes that the word “might” should be changed to read “will”.

M Laroche says that Article 34 of the Treaty with Germany does not impose a fixed obligation upon the League of Nations to return the territory in question to Germany, should the majority of the population express its wish in that direction. He thinks that a moral obligation is imposed upon the League of Nations but not an absolute one. The text of the reply as it stands seems to him to clearly express the obligation created by the article in question.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he agreed with M Laroche’s interpretation of the matter.

M Laroche adds that the change proposed by Mr Polk might result in adding something to the Treaty which is not included therein.

(After some further discussion on the matter Mr Polk withdraws his proposal for the change in question, and it is decided that the reply to the German notes on Malmedy and Eupen, as submitted by the Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the German Treaty, be accepted.)

10. The Council had before it a letter from the British Delegation dated August 26th.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the matter in question is of small importance but that he wishes to obtain the decision of the Council before taking any action thereon. It had been originally agreed that the final text Germany German Treaty should alone be made public, and that the preliminary conditions of peace as handed to the Germans should be kept secret. However, the different notes which had been exchanged between the German Delegation and the Allies had appeared in the newspapers of several countries. Some of the passages in these notes are rendered unintelligible by the fact that they refer to clauses which had been proposed for the Treaty and later modified or withdrawn. These clauses had not been made public coincidentally with the notes. The British Government wishes to publish the clauses referred to in the notes as Annexes to the latter, but before so doing is anxious to obtain the approval of the Supreme Council.

M Cambon asks whether it is desired to publish all the clauses which had been omitted from the final Treaty or only those to which reference had been made in the notes in question.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that only those referred to in the notes are contemplated.

Mr Polk asks whether the Treaty as originally presented to the German Delegation had not been published in the Allied countries, as it had been made public in Germany.

Sir Eyre Crowe answers that it has not been possible to publish it in the British Empire because by so doing the Houses of Parliament would have been entitled to have the Treaty before them and to discuss the same even before it was known whether or not Germany would accept it. The mere fact that the preliminary Treaty had appeared in Germany does render its presentation to the British Parliament necessary.

M Cambon asks that the decisions might be adjourned until he has had an opportunity to consult M Clemenceau.

S Scialoja points out that this is a mere question of form in view of the fact that publication had actually been made in many countries.

M Cambon says that there is a difference between official and unofficial publication.

(It is decided to adjourn the decision of this question until the following day.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

09-27-19, 09:07 AM

27th September 1919

Aftermath of War

British troops withdrawn from Archangel.

Russian Civil War: North Russia intervention – last British troops leave Archangel, leaving fighting to the Russians. (From 'Braemar Castle' off Solombala, leaving Archangel.)
https://i.postimg.cc/BQYgPNqd/EFd-L3n-VVUAALymj.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

British and Australian battlecruiser squadron composed of the HMAS Australia, HMS New Zealand, and HMS Indomitable.
https://i.postimg.cc/15HdCpyH/EFd-L3n-VVUAALymj.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Remains of an armored train destroyed in the Russian Civil War at Murmansk.
https://i.postimg.cc/XYYzTpJ0/EFd-L3n-VVUAALymj.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Romanian Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu resigns as the Allied Powers refused to recognize Romanian claims on disputed territory with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
https://i.postimg.cc/fb3gRpm2/EFd-L3n-VVUAALymj.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

General James Harbord, General George Moseley, unidentified U.S. Army officer, and Lieutenant Harootiun Khachadoorian being welcomed entering the courtyard at Etchmiadzin in Armenia.
https://i.postimg.cc/90cpZnwj/EFd-L3n-VVUAALymj.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

09-27-19, 09:43 PM

Saturday, September 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a note from the French Delegation of September 24th.

M Loucheur says that he wishes to make a brief summary of what had taken place. The Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council had taken decisions in regard to the distribution of the German Oil Tank Ships which had, in accordance with the Brussels decision, been left temporarily to Germany. At a meeting which had taken place in London, it had been decided upon request of the American Delegate that the question should be referred for a definite decision to the Supreme Economic Council. The Council had met at Brussels on the 20th September. Unfortunately an incident had occurred which was the cause of the present discussion. A telegram sent to Brussels by the American Delegation had arrived in a mutilated condition. It was necessary to ask for a repetition which had arrived too late. When the Supreme Economic Council confirmed the resolution of the A M T E it believed that it was acting in full accord with the views of the American Delegation. He wishes to call the attention of the Council to the following points:

(1) The German Oil Tank Ships had been left to Germany only temporarily and the Inter-Allied Council at London was alone competent to decide as to their allocation. It was not a matter for the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission. It was a question of a distribution made by virtue of the Armistice. The American Delegation held that it had been decided to leave these ships to Germany to assure the transport of oil. There was a disagreement on this point. The Ships had not been left indefinitely to Germany and the proof of this lay in the fact that, far from protesting against giving up the ships, the German Government had given orders for their delivery.

(2) That the Standard Oil Company claimed that the ships belonged to it because the Company owned all the stock of the German Company which owned the ships in question. He wishes to say with reference to this point that that is a question which could not be dealt with at the moment and was a matter for the Reparations Commission.

Mr Polk says that he agrees that the question should not be discussed at present.

M Loucheur says that his next point is:

(3) That the ships ought not to lie idle. There is a shortage of tonnage from which all the world, including Germany, suffers. There is no doubt but that Germany needs oil and it is necessary to furnish it. The Standard Oil Company is prepared to furnish credit to Germany for oil and asked that the ships in question be placed at its disposal for the purpose of effecting the delivery. He wishes to suggest, as his own opinion, the following:

The German ships in question will be turned over to the Powers in accordance with the decision of the A M T E They should immediately undertake a voyage to transport oil furnished by the Standard Oil Company to Germany with the understanding that the Standard Oil Company should open a credit of sufficient length of time to make it unnecessary to ask Germany at an early date to use part of its gold supply to pay for the oil.

Mr Polk says that he would like to ask whether the decision taken in London provided for a definite or only temporary allocation of these ships.

M Loucheur replies that it is only a question of temporary allocation.

Mr Henry Berenger said that the distribution had been made in the following manner and that with the exception of the American Delegate there had been a unanimous opinion. The percentage of losses during the war had been taken into consideration and on this basis France had received 50 percent of the tonnage (30,000 tons dead weight and 23,000 tons gross weight), Italy 10,000 tons and Belgium 12,000 tons. It had been decided that Great Britain should receive three-quarters of the remainder, and America one-quarter. The reasons for this decision were as follows. Of the 47 German Oil Tank Ships existing at the outbreak of the war, 17 had taken refuge in American ports; 5 had been destroyed; 14 were discovered at Hamburg and 7 had not been found. The Shipping Board had opened an investigation to ascertain where these ships were. They were the ships which were to be divided between Great Britain and the United States and their value was considerable. The distribution had been made in accordance with the terms of the Armistice and were effective until the moment when, after the Treaty of Peace became effective, the Separations Commission should take definite steps as to the final division of the ships in question. Of the 14 ships found at Hamburg, only 11 were available. Of these 7 belonged to the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft, two to the Deutsche Erdoel Gesellschaft, and two to Messrs. Albrecht.

Mr Polk asks whether the 11 ships would be used for a voyage to Germany.

M Loucheur replies that they would, and that, if the question of making a second voyage should arise, it would be necessary for the Supreme Council to re-examine the question.

Mr Henry Berenger says that M. Loucheur’s proposal is in conformity with the resolution taken by the A M T E He wishes to make certain points clear, and to ask whether it was the Standard Oil Company alone which should furnish Germany with the oil which was needed. There are other American Companies. He asks whether a contract exists and whether part of the price had already been paid. Mr Polk had said so a few days before and the New York Herald had published his statement. He also wishes to ask whether the Standard Oil Company is prepared to make a long term credit. The representatives of that company, who had called upon him on the preceding day, had made no definite statement on that subject.

M Loucheur said that he wishes to point out that Germany cannot dispose of her funds without the authorization of the Financial Commission. It is proposed to notify Germany that she should make contracts with whatever American company she wishes to and it was the duty of the Financial Commission to examine the conditions of payment. It is there that the question of a long term credit would be passed upon.

Mr Polk says that he is certain that no money had passed but he would ask for complete information and would be glad to furnish such information to the Council. He wishes to ask under what conditions the ships would be navigated and by what crews they would be manned.

M Loucheur replies that the ships would fly the flag of the nation to which they had been allocated temporarily and also the Inter-Allied flag.

Mr Henry Berenger says that, so far as the officers and crews of these ships are concerned, it had been decided, and Germany had made no objections, that they should be manned by officers and crews of the Allied nations in question.

Mr Polk says that, if he understands correctly, there is no question of the ships being allocated to the United States. The suggestion had been made that the United States guarantee their return. He was willing, if the Naval Armistice Commission desired it, to give an assurance on this subject. It is understood that the Standard Oil Company cannot keep these ships which they claim as their property.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he considers it important that the Armistice Commission should be notified without delay and that a telegram should be transmitted to them on that day.

(It is decided:

(1) That the provisional exemption of tankers granted at Brussels on the 14th March, 1919, should be cancelled. This cancellation should be without prejudice to any previous action taken by the A N A C;

(2) That the vessels should be delivered for temporary management to the Allied and Associated Governments according to the decision decided on by the A M T E on the 17th September, 1919, under the usual armistice terms which should in no way prejudice the final decision to be made by the Reparations Commission provided for by the Treaty of Versailles;

(3) That, should the German Government so desire, the said ships should be employed under the above terms for one voyage for the conveyance of oil to Germany; should a second voyage be asked for by the German Government, the matter would be again referred to the Supreme Council;

(4) That in consequence the said vessels should be sent forthwith to the Firth of Forth in compliance with the instructions of the A N A C.

The Council also takes note of Mr Polk’s declaration to the effect that he is prepared

(1) To give assurance that no payment had as yet been made by Germany for the delivery of the oil in question and

(2) To furnish to the Naval Armistice Commission, if they should desire it, an assurance that the vessels in question would not be retained by the United States.)

2. The Council has before it a note from the French Delegation of the 26th of September.

(M Laroche reads and explains the note presented by the French Delegation. The proposals contained in this note were adopted.)

(It was decided:

(1) That the German ships authorized by the Permanent Allied Naval Armistice Commission to proceed in Turkish waters and in the Black Sea cannot make any movements other than those for which provision would be made in the laissez-passer:

(2) That upon approaching Turkish waters and in the Black Sea each of these ships should carry at least one representative of the Allied and Associated Powers;

(3) That they should in addition fly the Inter-Allied, blue, white and blue, flag;

It is also decided:

That this resolution should be communicated for action to the Permanent Allied Armistice Commission at London.

3. Mr Polk brings to the attention of the Council the résumé of certain conversations which had taken place at Versailles between an American Representative and Baron von Lersner. He wishes to add that Baron von Lersner desires to emphasize the point that the Allied and Associated Governments should make a distinction between the German Government and the German people. They should make the threat to the German people in such a form as to make them understand the harm which their Government was doing in supporting the military party. Baron von Lersner said that the movement in the Baltic Provinces was clearly reactionary in character. He (Mr Polk) desires to make it clear that the American Delegation does not agree with what Baron von Lersner had said. He (Mr Polk) feels strongly that it is entirely possible for the German Government to stop rationing the army of General von der Goltz by closing the East Prussian frontier.

M Berthelot says that there are serious grounds for doubting the good faith of the German Government in this matter.

M Pichon says that on that very morning the newspapers had published a telegram from Berlin which contained a report from the German Conservative Press in regard to an exchange of letters between the British General Burt and General von der Goltz. General von der Goltz had used most insolent language to General Burt. He had threatened to break all relations with him and to expel British subjects from the territories under German occupation. He expressed the hope that the German Government would reply to the “injurious pretensions” which the Entente Mission thought themselves able to address to a German General in a foreign country, in a befitting manner.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that this letter only strengthens the opinion of his Government that it is necessary to take action as quickly as possible.

M Fromageot reads the draft note to the German Delegation prepared by the Drafting Committee in accordance with the resolution taken by the Council on the 25th of September. He says that in the first paragraph on the 2nd page the Drafting Committee had substituted the words, “all troops” for the words, “these troops”, which appeared in the draft previously prepared by the British Delegation. The Committee had desired in this manner to refer to all German troops, no matter under what authority they were. They desired also to omit the last sentence of the third paragraph on the 2nd page, which actually dealt with a matter of interior arrangement. It was hardly necessary to notify the Germans of the instructions given to the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr Polk says that America is not represented on the Supreme Economic Council and for this reason he wishes to ask if the German demands in question were pending before the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission.

M Fromageot said that if there was any question the words “Supreme Economic Council” could be removed wherever they appeared.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that it had been decided to act immediately. The use of the future tense as in the words, “they will be forced”, tend to weaken the weight of the action.

M Fromageot says that the Committee had had a scruple upon the subject. They remembered that the Allied and Associated Powers had promised Germany in July that the blockade would be raised after Germany had ratified the Treaty. The Committee had wished to use an expression which would show that they were not unmindful of the former engagement which had been taken and that they took recourse to these measures only because Germany had failed to live up to her obligations. It would be simpler to say, “they will take into consideration”, at the end of the paragraph; they would suppress the words “Supreme Economic Council” wherever they occur.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the Council had just decided to furnish oil if the supply of foodstuffs under discussion was to be stopped. It should be understood that the Supreme Council were in a position, if they considered it advisable, to cancel the decision which they had just taken.

M Pichon says that the Council are in agreement on this point, but that he does not consider it advisable to notify the Armistice Commission of this reservation.

M Fromageot says that in case the Council decides to hold up the repatriation of the German prisoners of war, the Committee has prepared a formula which could be inserted before the last paragraph on page two and which states that the repatriation of German prisoners of war would be stopped from that day.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he thinks this formula is too definite. In spite of his repeated telegrams, he had so far not received instructions from his Government. When the subject had been previously discussed, the Council had spoken of a total or partial suspension of repatriation.

M Pichon says that he thinks it would be better to make no mention of prisoners of war.

M Berthelot says that it is an efficacious means of pressure, even though it is somewhat objectionable.

Mr Polk says that he thinks it would be advisable to make some intimation on the subject through the Press.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that at the meeting at which Mr Lloyd George had been present, it had been decided to send the ultimatum through the intermediary of Marshal Foch. Later they had thought of addressing the German Delegation. Now they had returned to the formula of the ultimatum. He thought it would produce a stronger effect if it was communicated to the German Government through the intermediary of Marshal Foch. From a technical point of view, he wishes to say that all questions concerning the Armistice had been taken up with the German Government through the intermediary of Marshal Foch and in this particular case the question is one relating to the terms of the Armistice.

M Fromageot says that the note of September 3rd had been addressed to Marshal Foch.

Mr Polk says that he has no objections to this procedure.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he suggests the advisability of making the note public.

M Pichon says that the Press can be informed of the note on that day, and the terms could be published on the following Monday.

(It is decided:

(1) To accept the draft note to the German Government respecting the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces prepared by the Drafting Committee with the modifications in text approved by the Council.

(2) To transmit this note to the German Government through the intermediary of the Marshal, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies;

(3) To notify the press of the transmission of this note and to make public the text on the 29th of September.

It is also decided that the Council, in conformity with the spirit of this note, should reserve the right to stop, if they should consider it advisable, the cargoes of oil, the delivery of which to Germany had been authorized by the Council.)

4. M Fromageot reads and explains a note of the 18th of September addressed by the Drafting Committee to the Supreme Council on the subject of the Air Convention which had been adopted by the Supreme Council at its meeting of September 10th.

(The Proposals of the Committee are adopted except in regard to Article 18 respecting which the following discussion takes place:

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the Article raises very delicate questions. If the Article is entirely suppressed the result might be that aircraft might, upon landing in a foreign country, be prevented from flying for an indefinite period, on the ground that some breach of patent had taken place. He wishes to have it stated definitely that in a case of this kind the aircraft would not be detained.)

M Fromageot says that the same question had arisen in the Automobile Convention and at that time it was considered advisable to omit the Article. In point of fact there is no danger that aircraft would be detained for months. It would be sufficient to avoid detention to deposit a bond. It is possible to maintain the article under discussion, but there is no doubt that certain of the Powers will make reservations.

Captain Roper says that the French Delegation had made a reservation in respect of this Article for the purpose of protecting industrial property. They cannot agree that a foreigner knowingly committing a breach of patent should land in France and leave without being disturbed. The detention of the aircraft in question appeared to be the only method of dealing with the situation, but in view of the fact that the Legal Advisers of the Conference are of the opinion that industrial property would be equally well protected if after their detention the deposit of a bond is called for, the French Delegation will withdraw their reservation against Article 18 upon condition that the last sentence, concerning suits to be brought in the country of origin against the aircraft, be eliminated.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he is willing to accept the suppression of such a statement. He suggests that the Article be referred to the Drafting Committee which should endeavor to modify it, so that the right of detention or seizure should be limited by the right to set the aircraft free upon the deposit of a bond.

M Pichon says that he would agree to this.

Mr Matsui says that he is obliged to make a reservation. His Government is not yet in possession of the text of the Convention. A period of six months had been allowed in which each Power might say whether or not it agrees.

Mr Polk says that the United States had also made a reservation and understands that they will be given a period of six months in which to communicate their reply.

(It was decided:

(1) That the Drafting Committee should be called upon to modify the text of Article 18 of the Convention Relative to Air Navigation in such a manner as to make it possible for aircraft to avoid detention for violation of patent by depositing a security.

(2) To accept, with reference to Articles 15, 22, 24, 34, and 36 the proposals of the Drafting Committee.

5. M Berthelot said that he was directed by M Clemenceau to say that he considers it inadvisable to publish portions of the Conditions of Peace in their original text. He is not opposed to the publication of all of the text and of the notes which had been exchanged in the premises with the German Government.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he agrees in principle, but the publication of the whole of the text might be somewhat expensive. He will refer the matter to his Government.

(The question is adjourned)

6. Sir Eyre Crowe reads and comments upon a note from the British delegation, dated September 24th, proposing that an article be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary identical with Article 310 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria. This article provides for an understanding with the parties interested to enable a state to use sources of electric and hydraulic energy, which, by reason of the formation of new frontiers, are situated in the territory of another state.

(The British proposal is accepted.)

(It was decided to request the Drafting Committee to insert an article in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary identical with Article 310 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria.)

7. The Council had before it a memorandum from Mr Hoover asking that a Committee be formed to make arrangements for and undertake the repatriation of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia.

M Berthelot says that the Council will, without question, be unanimous in approving Mr Hoover’s proposal. It is a question of humanity, but he feels that it should be understood that, before repatriating the Germans and others, it will be necessary to repatriate the fifty thousand Czechoslovak troops who are at present in Siberia.

Mr Polk says he agrees with M Berthelot. There are a number of difficult questions in connection with the repatriation of these prisoners, just as there are in the case of the Czechoslovak troops, but as the question of the repatriation of the latter is being considered at the present time, it would be possible to study at the same time the questions relating to the Germans and Austrians.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he feels some doubt as to whether the nomination of a Commission will bring about practical results.

M Pichon thinks that there might be favorable results and that they will lead to a means of repatriating the Czechoslovak troops.

(It is decided that a Commission composed of one American, British, French, Italian and Japanese officer should be created to deal with the repatriation of German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia.

It is also decided that the repatriation of the Czechoslovak troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners.)

8. (The signature then took place of the decision previously taken by the Council for the organization of a plebiscite in the Duchy of Teschen and in the districts of Spisz and Orava.

The decision is signed by Mr Polk, Sir Eyre Crowe, M Pichon, S Scialoja and Mr Matsui.)

(The meeting then adjourns)

Jimbuna

09-28-19, 06:27 AM

28th September 1919

Aftermath of War

Referendum taken in Luxemburg.

Majority of Luxembourg voters choose in a referendum to retain Grand Duchess Charlotte (pictured) as head of state and for an economic union with France.
https://i.postimg.cc/bYR0Zpgd/EFij-I35-Ww-AAfq-NL.png (https://postimages.org/)

Allied troops withdraw from northern Russia as anti-Bolshevik troops in the region begin to collapse. 526 British troops and 83 U.S. troops were killed in the intervention in northern Russia.

Sailor Steve

09-28-19, 07:37 PM

Sunday, September 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

09-29-19, 06:49 AM

29th September 1919

Women driving ammunition on horse-drawn carts for anti-Bolshevik Russian forces.
https://i.postimg.cc/t4w3qFw3/EFnst-W9-X0-AAEyt-G.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

ML-18 (Royal Navy) The motor launch presumably was lost in the North Sea while on passage to the United Kingdom from Norway.
ML-62 (Royal Navy) The motor launch presumably was lost in the North Sea while on passage to the United Kingdom from Norway.
ML-191 (Royal Navy) The motor launch presumably was lost in the North Sea while on passage to the United Kingdom from Norway.
Ossifrage (Canada) The barge struck a shoal and foundered in Northumberland Strait while being towed from Wallace, Nova Scotia, Canada, to Souris, Prince Edward Island, Canada.

Sailor Steve

09-29-19, 10:37 PM

Monday, September 29, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it the subject of German Ships Sold During the War to Dutch Navigation Companies.

(The discussion on the British memorandum on this subject is postponed to enable Sir Eyre Crowe to receive instructions from his Government. Mr Polk also wishes to consult his Government before the matter is brought before the Council.)

2. Captain Roper says that Article 202 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany specifies that war material should be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers after the Treaty comes into force. In order that this article might be carried out after the Treaty comes into force, it is important that this war material should not be alienated in any way or exported from Germany. The Allied and Associated Governments have addressed two notes to the German Government on the subject. The German Government has replied by a letter dated September 8th, sent through the Armistice Commission, declining to agree to the obligations placed upon the article by the Allied and Associated Governments. As information is constantly received to show new breaches by Germany, Marshal Foch proposes to the Supreme Council that a resolution be taken that all air material in Germany should be considered as war material and should be stored as war material until such time as the Inter-Allied Air Control Commission has decided as to its nature.

Captain Roper then reads and comments upon a letter from Marshal Foch of September 25th.

Mr Polk asks whether the question is one of the Armistice.

Captain Roper replies that it deals with Article 202 of the Treaty of Peace.

Mr Polk asks whether what is now said is not broader than the statements of the resolution of August 6th. The words used were, “destroyed and used.” He questions whether the use of the word “used” is not beyond the powers of the Council.

Captain Roper says that if the Germans used the material in question they would take occasion to destroy it, if they could, on the ground of accidents, or they would be able to use the material for other purposes. If they are given a free hand they will undoubtedly transform the material. There have been examples of repeated infractions by the Germans, and in order to avoid these it was essential that the material should be stocked.

Mr Polk asks whether the Commission of Control would have the power to decide as to what material is civil and what military.

Captain Roper replies that the Commission will have this power.

S Scialoja says that it is important that the position of the Council should be founded on firm ground. It is not possible to apply the Treaty before it is ratified. He suggests that a Provisional Commission of Control might permit the Germans to use aircraft which are not military. He thinks that the Council are asking for more than under the Treaty they are entitled to ask.

Mr Polk asks whether the Commission has arrived in Germany.

Captain Roper replies that the advance party has arrived. The Germans are anxious to postpone the discussion of the subject until the Treaty comes into force. Under these circumstances the procedure proposed by S Scialoja would not be applicable. In its resolution of August 6th the Supreme Council had declared its right of property over this material; they therefore had legal rights. During the last month the Germans had several times violated their engagements and Marshal Foch had declared that, unless the Supreme Council takes firm and determined action, he is not in a position to obtain any results.

S Scialoja asks whether it is proposed to stock all the aircraft in question.

Captain Roper replies that the Technical Experts who had discussed the subject in the Commission on Aerial Clauses had unanimously declared that there are no civil aircraft in Germany, if by that aeroplanes constructed since the Armistice and upon new plans are meant. Today the Germans had requested permission to use seven hundred aeroplanes for the Postal Air Service and this request is undoubtedly made to conceal their real purpose in endeavoring to keep back from the Allies a large number of aeroplanes.

Mr Polk asks whether S Scialoja was satisfied as to the legal right.

S Scialoja replies that he will withdraw the reservation he had previously made.

Mr Polk asks Captain Roper if he referred to aeroplanes built since the Armistice.

Captain Roper says that he referred to aeroplanes built before the Armistice.

Mr Polk asks whether the Commission will have the power to discriminate between aeroplanes built before or since the Armistice. He also asks whether General Weygand had any objection to the German Postal Air Service.

Captain Roper replies that he has no such objection after the Treaty becomes effective, but he wishes to point out that at present it is only a maneuver on the part of the Germans to avoid fulfilling their obligations under the terms of the Treaty. In the opinion of the Technical Experts, there is no defense for the scale upon which the German Postal Air Service is being planned.

Mr Polk says that there is no legal obstacle of prohibiting the Germans building and exporting aeroplanes which had been built since the time of the Armistice upon new plans.

Captain Roper says that in the first place it would be necessary for the Commission to examine these plans and that pending the ratification of the Treaty the material in question should be stocked.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the Supreme Council had decided on August 6th that the price of all material sold from the supplies which, according to the terms of the Treaty of Peace, are to be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers, should be refunded to the Allied and Associated Powers. He thinks that it is time to apply this resolution.

Capt Roper explains that in a telegram of Aug 23rd sent to the German Authorities by Marshal Foch through the medium of General Nudant there is no mention of refunding this sum because the telegram contained a special authorization for the delivery of certain material to General Yudenitch and to the Czechoslovak Government. Marshal Foch had been desirous of assuring the delivery of this material in view of the fact that he had no other means at the moment and it seemed at the time advisable to make no mention of the amount of the sum collected. He thinks that the moment has now arrived and that Germany should be required to refund the money.

(It is decided:

(1) That all air material now in Germany should be considered as war material and as such could neither be exported, sold, loaned, utilized or destroyed, but should be stocked until such time as the Inter-Allied Air Commission of Control should have taken a decision to determine its nature;

(2) That the German Government should pay to the Allied and Associated Governments the amount of the sales already made.)

(It is also decided that Marshal Foch should be charged with communicating this decision to the German Government.)

3. The Council has before it a report from the Supreme War Council of September 5th regarding the principles which should govern the distribution of the aeronautical material to be given up by Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Peace.

M Pichon asks whether the Council are unanimous.

General Belin says that the American Military Representative had objected to the exclusion, with the exception of Belgium, of the smaller Powers. He says that in a report of May 21st to the Supreme Council the Military Representatives had given a list of the articles of war material which each of the Allied Powers should be entitled to possess. In this list there is no mention of air material. In view of the fact that air material had not been included, the Military Representatives did not consider that a distribution should be made among the smaller states.

M Pichon asks Mr Polk whether he insists upon this reservation.

Mr Polk replies that he does not.

Mr Matsui says that it is stated in the report that dirigibles which are in a fit state to fly are to be allotted as far as possible to those Allied countries which on account of their situation are in a position to remove them without dismantling them. In order to avoid any misunderstanding which might arise, he desires that the Conference take note that in accordance with the view of the Japanese Delegation, this statement should not modify the principle of distribution which had been announced elsewhere. The exchange of dirigibles, mentioned in the statement above, should only be made in cases where it was impossible to transport the dirigibles without dismantling them and where the dirigibles could be exchanged against other dirigibles, which if they are not in a fit state to fly, nevertheless possess the mechanism which would render them equal in value. The Japanese representative on the Commission had informed the President of the Commission of the desire he had just expressed.

M Pichon asks whether there are any other objections.

Mr Polk calls attention to the fact that the American Military Representative had stated that he is not prepared to recommend that the United States be included as a recipient of any air material which was the property of a country with which she had not been at war.

General Belin says that there will be, of course, no objection to accepting this reservation.

(It is decided to accept the report of the Supreme War Council of the 5th of September regarding the principles which should govern the distribution of the aeronautical material given up or to be given up by Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Peace.

4. General Belin reads and comments upon a report from the American, British and French Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles of the 12th September regarding the eventual restitution to the Allies of the rolling stock removed beyond the armistice frontier in violation of the Treaty of Villa Giusti.

(He then proceeds to read a note by the Italian military representative setting forth the Italian view.)

He wishes to reply briefly to the point which the Italian Military Representative had raised.

With reference to the first point, he wishes to remark that the observations of the Italian Representative had been made after the signature of the Treaty had taken place. The Armistice was binding, but the signature of the Treaty of peace will bring about a new set of conditions. It appears advisable to leave to a commission the right of deciding as to the distribution to be made of the rolling stock in question. It is necessary that measures taken for carrying out the terms of the Armistice should not conflict with the carrying out of the terms of the Treaty of Peace. In the Treaty of Peace there are clauses which call for the cession of railway lines with a fixed amount of railway material. It will be regrettable to remove the material by virtue of the terms of the Armistice, when it would be necessary to return it a short time later in view of the Treaty of Peace.

With reference to the second point, he thinks that it is chiefly a question of form.

With regard to the third point, the Italian Delegate says that the term “Allies” applies to those who are entitled to be so described at the date of the signature of the Armistice. He replies that he has followed the terms of the resolution of the Supreme Council. It is the prerogative of the Commission to make the distribution among the Allies. There was no doubt that Yugoslavia will not be entitled to a share, but Serbia was an Ally at the time of the Armistice and will be entitled to participate in the distribution in question. It is not for the Council at Versailles to give more details as to the distribution.

With regard to the fourth point, he says that there is no inconvenience in principle, but he desires to maintain the reserve without prejudice to the clauses of the Treaty of Peace. He questions whether it is advisable to hand over material to Italy which will later be attributed to another Power.

General Cavallero said that he cannot agree with the view of his American, British and French colleagues. He thinks that the question is a purely military one. The questions in regard to the Armistice are quite separate from questions in regard to the Treaty of Peace. He does not think that the repatriation of rolling stock has anything to do with the Treaty of Peace. It is still an Armistice question. It is the duty of the military representatives to study the question as an Armistice question, and it is for the Supreme Council to take into consideration the political aspect. With regard to the first two points in his note he has nothing to add.

With reference to the third point, as he considers that the question is of a purely military nature and as that the Armistice concerns only the Powers who are Allied at the moment, he thinks that it is necessary to apply the Armistice clauses in regard to rolling stock in the manner in which they had originally been conceived.

With reference to the fourth point, he wishes to say that as the terms of the Armistice had given Italy the right to receive, in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers, all the material belonging to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, he can see no reason why an exception should be made in the case of rolling stock.

General Cavallero replies that the Italian army had been designated to receive all the Austro-Hungarian war material in the name of the Allied Powers and the United States of America.

M Pichon says that the position of General Diaz in this matter is exactly the same as that of Marshal Foch. General Diaz acts in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks if there had not been a further Armistice with Hungary.

General Belin said that there had been an armistice concluded by General Franchet d’Esperey, but that it had not been recognized by Italy.

S Scialoja says that there are two questions to be considered. One is a question of form and the other of substance. He does not see how, particularly as the Treaty has not been ratified, it is possible to leave the firm ground of the Armistice for the Treaty; for the Treaty had not entered into force. The position of General Diaz, with reference to the Armistice of Villa Giusti, was the same as that of Marshal Foch, with reference to the Armistice with Germany. He thinks that it might be possible, instead of constituting a Commission in the place of General Diaz, to establish certain rules of execution. He agrees that there is rolling stock now in the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and that it would be complicated and unnecessary to return it to Italy to be again returned to Serbia, but this should not disturb the juridical basis. It would be possible to give the railway material to General Diaz, who can charge someone on the spot to receive it in his name.

General Belin says that it had not been the purpose of the Military Representatives to propose that someone be substituted to act for in the place of General Diaz. What they had desired was that the question, which is very complicated, should be studied by a Commission. Mr Hoover had suggested that the Inter-Allied experts, who were on the spot, could examine the question and communicate in due course the result of their study to the Supreme Council. It would then be the duty of the Supreme Council to express their opinion, but it was necessary first for the question to be thoroughly studied. He considers that the Commission should be given authority to examine the question and to propose to the Supreme Council a new partition. All that he asks is a study of the question. In his opinion there are no persons better qualified to do this than the Inter-Allied Technical Commission. He thinks that if this plan were adopted at the present time, it would avoid trouble in the future.

S Scialoja proposes that the Commission communicate its findings to General Diaz. He thinks that General Diaz would probably agree. He does not think that it is possible for the Supreme Council to apply the terms of a Treaty which was not yet in existence; for, at the moment, only the armistice was in existence. If the proposals are acceptable to General Diaz, he will find the means of carrying them out.

M Pichon proposes that the Italian Delegation be requested to take up the matter with General Diaz. He adds that he considers it important that if General Diaz accepted, the Powers act in conformity.

Mr Polk asks whether the question is not also raised by the terms of the Armistice with Hungary.

General Cavallero said that in the present case, it is only a question of rolling stock within the lines of the Armistice of Villa Giusti.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that General Cavallero, who is the direct representative of General Diaz, had said that General Diaz would be unwilling to accept.

S Scialoja says that General Diaz would not be willing to accept the substitution of a Commission in place of himself, for it is he who is responsible for the application of the Armistice.

Mr Polk says there is no question of substituting any authority for that of General Diaz. So far as he understands it, it is purely a question of investigation and report. At the time that the report was received the Council could take a decision as to what States were entitled to receive the railway material in question. He does not see how that question could be left to General Diaz alone, or in fact to any military representative alone.

S Scialoja said that in this case General Diaz is not acting as an Italian General, but as the representative of the Allied and Associated Powers. His position is similar to that of Marshal Foch.

Mr Polk says that he has no doubt that cases must have arisen where Marshal Foch was not in a position to take action until information which the Supreme Council desired had been obtained and a decision taken by the Council.

S Scialoja says that if the Commission were brought into communication with General Diaz he would have no objection.

Mr Polk said that the information is for the Supreme Council. If the report shows that the Armistice has been violated it would be the duty of the Supreme Council to take a decision and for General Diaz to see that it was carried out. The Powers could not authorize any military representative to act until the necessary information had been obtained by the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that it is necessary to decide whether the Inter-Allied Commission of experts should be taken from the Transportation Section of the Supreme Economic Council or the Reparations Commission.

General Belin says that he agrees that it will be necessary to make such a choice. Mr Hoover had written to M Clemenceau on September 3rd and had proposed that the subject be entrusted to the Transportation Section of the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr Polk points out that Mr Hoover has left Paris, and that there is no longer an American Representative on the Supreme Economic Council. He suggests, therefore, that the matter should be left to the Reparations Commission.

(It is decided:

(1) That the rolling stock, which had in violation of the Armistice been removed beyond the Armistice line of the 3rd November, 1918, should be delivered to the Allies and the United States of America;

(2) That the Reparations Commission should investigate on the spot all matters relating to the breaches of the Armistice above referred to and propose as quickly as possible to the Supreme Council such measures as might be necessary to insure in this respect the execution of the clauses of the Armistice on the understanding that these measures should not in any way prevent an execution at a later date of the clauses of the Treaty of Peace.)

5. The Council has before it a report from the Inter-Allied Naval Advisers of the 13th September in regard to submarine engines and motors surrendered by Germany in place of certain submarines which were broken up in German yards or sunk on passage to England.

M Pichon asks whether the Naval Representatives are unanimous in their opinion.

Mr Polk says that they are unanimous, but that the United States Representative wishes to add a clause worded as follows: “An appraisal and inventory of this material shall be made by a Naval Committee from the five principal Allied and Associated Powers.”

(It is decided to accept the report of the Naval Advisers of the 13th September on this subject of submarine engines and motors surrendered by Germany in place of certain submarines which were broken up in German yards or sunk on passage to England, and to add the following clause, “An appraisal and inventory of this material shall be made by a Naval Committee from the five principal Allied and Associated Powers.”)

6. M Fromageot reads and comments upon a memorandum with reference to the draft note previously prepared in regard to the blockade of Soviet Russia. He proposes to add in the third paragraph the words “in conformity with the measures contemplated by Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.”

Mr Polk says that before the United States Government will be in a position to take action it will be necessary for internal action to be taken in the United States.

M Fromageot says that Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant was framed to meet a situation like that which existed at present. It provides for the rupture of commercial and economic relations. In cases where the League of Nations does not wish to resort to war the Covenant of the League of Nations foresaw the use of economic pressure when war was not to be employed. He feels that the difficulties in regard to the question of blockade will be removed in this way.

Mr Polk says that M Fromageot’s suggestion raises difficulties in his mind. The League of Nations does not yet exist, and the machinery for which the Covenant of the League provided, could not become effective until the League of Nations is actually in force. He does not see how the United States can adopt the policy proposed at the present time as the United States had never agreed to a pacific blockade. The Council are endeavoring to meet the situation by the establishment of a pacific blockade. In his opinion it is a declaration of war which is really needed.

M Pichon said that the Council find themselves in the same position as at the time of the last discussion. They will have no commercial relations with Soviet Russia themselves and they do nothing to ask the neutral countries to adopt the same policy.

Mr Polk says that he thinks that the best plan would be to wait until after the winter, and see how the situation was by that time.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that it is necessary to give some instructions to the Allied Naval Officers in the Baltic Sea. He asks what action these officers can take with ships which they were stopping.

The report of the Drafting Committee does not cover the question of instructions. The Naval Officers are acting upon their own authority. He recalls that it had been previously proposed to make a collective request to the neutral Governments. He wished to ask his United States Colleague whether he would have any objection to such a note being sent. He thinks that a step would be taken if a collective representation were made to the Swedish Government. He has a suggestion to make, but at the moment he has no authority for committing his Government. He wishes to ask whether the British and French Governments are willing to authorize their Naval Commanders to turn ships back. If, for example, a Swedish ship were stopped, the Naval Commander would be in a position to state that the subject had been formally communicated to the Swedish Government by the Allied and Associated Governments, who were awaiting a favorable reply.

Mr Polk says that he is willing to accept the draft if the last paragraph were omitted. He had suggested a substitute for the paragraph.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he cannot answer for the decision of the British Admiralty, but he would refer the subject to them.

M Pichon suggests that the Drafting Committee be directed to prepare a note to the Neutral Governments.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the Council are already in possession of a draft of such a note.

M Pichon says that the note could be transmitted with the omission of the proposed paragraph respecting the League of Nations, and the last paragraph.

M Seydoux reads to the Council two communications received from the French Legation at Stockholm. After reading these communications, M Seydoux says that he thinks that they contained matters of great interest. It is evident that the Swedish Government not only considers that a blockade exists, but that they had notified their own nationals that navigation is prohibited in the Gulf of Finland.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that these communications tended all the more to show that the reply of the Swedish Government to the note of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would be favorable.

M Pichon says that, pending a decision, the British and French warships in the Baltic should turn back ships bound for Soviet Russia.

M Seydoux says that it would be possible, either by adding a paragraph to the note or by making a verbal communication to the neutral Governments, to say that British and French war vessels will continue to act in respect to ships entering the Gulf of Finland as they had been acting up to the present.

(It is decided:

(1) That the attached note should be transmitted to the neutral Governments in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers;

(2) That the neutral Governments should, at the same time, be notified verbally that the British and French warships in the Gulf of Finland would continue to turn back ships bound for seaports in Soviet Russia.)

7. M Fromageot reads and comments upon a memorandum of the 29th of September prepared by the Drafting Committee. He adds that the formation of a Commission to delimit the frontiers between Austria and Hungary is all the more necessary because Article 27 specifies that the new frontier between Austria and Hungary should be fixed upon the spot. It was also necessary to arrange for changes of nationality of persons residing in territory transferred from Hungary to Austria.

S Scialoja says that he agrees with what M Fromageot had said. He wishes to point out, however, that there still remains a large number of articles in the Treaty of Peace with Austria which had not as yet found counterparts in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. He reserves the right to present drafts of the articles in question.

(It is decided:

(1) To request the Drafting Committee, in view of the delimitation of the frontier between Austria and Hungary, to insert in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, clauses providing for the constitution of a Commission to delimit the frontier between Austria and Hungary;

(2) To request the Drafting Committee to insert in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary articles relative to the nationality of the inhabitants of Hungarian territory ceded to Austria.)

8. Mr Polk reads a telegram dated September 24th from General Bandholtz, American Representative on the Inter-Allied Military Commission at Budapest, in regard to Romanian seizures. He says that the information contained in this telegram showed only too clearly that the Romanians were not willing to obey the wishes of the Allied Powers. The Romanian Representative told one thing to one Allied Representative and another thing to another. They are apparently entirely unwilling to obey the orders of the Allied Generals who represent the Council.

M Pichon says that it was most important to await Sir George Clerk’s arrival before taking any action in regard to Romania.

Mr Polk says that, while waiting, statements made by the Romanians themselves should not be entitled to much consideration.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the Romanian Government is trying to stir up trouble between the Allies. There is a serious situation between Romania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

M Pichon says that according to information which he had recently received from Belgrade the situation between Romania and Serbia was better and might improve.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

09-30-19, 10:27 AM

30th September 1919

The anti-Bolshevik West Russian Volunteer Army marching near Jelgava, Latvia.
https://i.postimg.cc/NfsZ9HJW/EFs2-ZQ4-Xo-AA3ss-V.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

American Red Cross nurses serving in war-torn Serbia.
https://i.postimg.cc/nh6dkj2V/EFs2-ZQ4-Xo-AA3ss-V.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

August Helmerich (Germany) The cargo ship was on a voyage from Kotka, Finland. to Hamburg, Germany, when she sank in the Baltic Sea after a collision with the ocean liner Normandie ( France) off Dalarö, Sweden, on the east coast of Öland.

Sailor Steve

09-30-19, 09:11 PM

Tuesday, September 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a report of the Supreme War Council dated April 22nd, 1919, on the subject of cost of maintenance of the troops of occupation in Rhenish territory.

M Loucheur explained that the question under discussion was the cost of the armies of occupation from the signing of the Armistice until the ratification of the Peace Treaty. He then reads and comments upon the report of April 22nd, summarizing the present status of the matter.

An Allied Sub-commission which had met at Spa had undertaken to define the phrase “expenses of maintenance of the troops of occupation” (“dépenses d’entretien des troupes d’occupation”). This body had decided upon the following definition for this phrase:

“During the present Armistice, which includes war occupation, by expenditures for the upkeep of the troops of occupation of the Ehenish territories, are meant all the expenditures imposed upon the Allied Governments for the daily life of the occupying troops as well as all those brought about by the obligation of maintaining constantly the fixed effective of these troops and to keep them in such a state as to allow them at any time to resist an aggression or to resume hostilities immediately.”

Upon the basis of this definition, the expenses of maintenance had been determined upon at the following rates per man per day:

For the French Army, Fes 16.60
For the Belgian Army, Fes 16.13
For the British Army, Fes 17.06
For the American Army, Fes. 31.14 (The dollar figured at Fes 5.70).

During the course of the discussions the Belgian and later, the British delegates had agreed upon the adoption of an average uniform figure for all the occupying armies, and which would be the cost of maintenance of one man per day for the French Army. The American delegate had inclined to adopt this solution, but General Pershing subsequently rigorously opposed the same. The Conferences at Spa, therefore, had resulted in a disagreement.

The question thereafter came before the Reparations Commission, but the same differences of opinion arose in this body. In his capacity as president of the Committee for the Organization of the Reparations Commission, he now wishes to bring the matter before the Council for decision.

The opinion of the French delegation is based on the following arguments: In the first place, when the Council created the Commission for the Left Bank of the Rhine, in which the United States is represented by General Bliss and Mr J W Davis, the British Empire by Lord Robert-Cecil and Field-Marshal Wilson, France by Marshal Foch and M Loucheur, the question of the cost of maintenance of the armies of occupation had arisen. At various times during the discussion the Commission had thought that it would be well to adopt the French price as an average figure. Marshal Foch had even suggested that it would be well to adopt a lower figure for the cost of maintenance of the armies of occupation after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, and only include within the phrase “expenses of maintenance to be borne by Germany”, the cost of food and billeting. It had been upon this basis that the calculations had been made to reach the sum of 240,000,000 marks gold yearly, as the maximum cost of maintenance of the armies of occupation after the ratification of the Peace Treaty. This figure had been agreed upon in a proclamation which had been signed on June 16th, 1919 by President Wilson, M Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd-George. Mr. Lloyd-George had even expressed the opinion that it would be well to reduce the cost of this maintenance to the minimum.

These arguments appear to him to be sound, and he adds that wherever the question of reaching an average figure had arisen in the Peace Treaty, the French figure had been adopted, as, for example, in the matter of pensions and allowances. He therefore strongly urges that the French rate be adopted in this instance, and that it be taken as a basis for calculating the cost of maintaining the armies, not only before the ratification of the Treaty (total maintenance), but also after such ratification (partial maintenance).

Mr Polk asks whether the figures agreed upon by President Wilson apply to the cost of upkeep of the armies after the ratification of the Treaty.

M Loucheur answers that this is the case, and he adds that it applies more especially from the moment at which Germany carried out the military obligations incumbent upon her by the Treaty.

Mr Polk says that he has always believed that the question at issue is the same during the entire period of occupation; namely, that each occupying country should be paid its expenses of occupation by Germany. The cost of maintenance of the American Army during the armistice had amounted to a certain figure, and this Germany was called upon to repay. M Loucheur’s suggestion appears to him to place a new interpretation upon the matter, as he had always believed up to the present time that the total cost of maintenance was under discussion, and not merely the cost of food and billets.

M Loucheur says that a slight misunderstanding is apparent. The French proposition has been that it is necessary to make a distinction between the maintenance prior to the ratification of the Treaty and that subsequent thereto. The difficulty of the situation lay in another direction. The fact exists that the American soldier cost his Government Fes 31.14, while the French soldier cost only Fes 16.60. What he asks is that, in order to make a calculation as to what Germany should pay each occupying Power, the same figure should be taken as a basis for each of the Allied Armies. He remarks further that when the same question had arisen regarding the pensions called for as part of the reparations, it had been agreed that the calculation should be made on the basis of the French rate.

Mr Polk says that the matter resolves itself into ascertaining how much the American Armies cost the United States. The question is not one between the United States and its Allies, but rather between the United States and Germany. The situation will not be helped by the fact that the French and Belgian Governments are reimbursed in full for their expenses, while the United States was but partially repaid. The result would be that the American Treasury Department would be obliged to pay the difference, with the consequent danger that further burdens might be placed upon the American taxpayer. The moment the latter discovered that they would be obliged to pay a portion of the expenses of maintaining an army of occupation, they would demand the recall of this force.

M Loucheur says that the matter is one which interests all the Allies in general, for it was Germany who was called upon to pay. The more money which Germany is obliged to use in paying for the armies of occupation, the less she would have for the reparations claims.

Mr Polk answers that he believes the United States will consent to accept reimbursement for the time being upon the basis of the average figure determined upon (French Rate). The difference between the sum thus reimbursed and the actual cost of maintenance might be included in the sums due the United States by way of reparations.

M. Loucheur called attention to the fact that, as the Treaty imposes an absolute priority for the sums representing the costs of maintaining the armies of occupation, the difficulty will not be done away with.

Mr Polk replies that he will be willing to waive the priority for that portion of the expenses of maintenance which would be included in the reparations figure. The all important point is that the American Treasury Department should not have to defray any of the expenses of the armies of occupation.

M Loucheur says that in view of the propositions which Mr Polk had put forward, he would like to study the matter somewhat more fully. His only wish in that question had been not to prejudice the reparations account.

M Pichon draws the attention of the Council to the fact that, at the time the rate of allowance for the officers of the Commission of Control had been determined upon, it had been expressly stated that Germany would be called upon to pay the same, but not the salaries of the officers.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the British delegate on the sub-commission at Spa had stated that he would accept the compromise figure if the same were accepted by all the Governments involved, but that no definite decision had been given in the matter. He thinks that in view of the attitude of the United States, the British Government will stand by its first proposal, as it is not favorably disposed to sustaining a burden for the maintenance of its armies of occupation. The question at issue is very complicated and raises many technical points. He wishes to know to what competent body the Council thinks of referring the matter.

M Loucheur says that there is a body already in existence; namely, the Sub-commission for the Cost of the Armies of Occupation, which is attached to the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission.

(It is decided that the question of the cost of the armies of occupation should be referred to the special sub-commission of the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission for further examination and report.)

2. General Weygand reads and comments upon a memorandum from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, dated September 24th.

The Lithuanians had asked for permission to receive 50,000 liters of fuel oil which Germany was in a position to turn over to them. From a military point of view, Marshal Foch had raised no objections to this request, but a political question is involved therein; namely, that of trading with the enemy, and this was beyond the Marshal’s jurisdiction. Should the delivery be sanctioned, it is necessary that adequate steps should be taken to insure the fact that the Germans themselves should not be benefited by this fuel oil.

Mr Polk asks whether any guarantee actually exists that a military organization under German control would not profit by the delivery.

M Clemenceau suggests that the matter can await the ratification of the Peace Treaty, at which time the Allies would be in a position to supervise the delivery.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the British Military Authorities agree with General Weygand, but that there are two difficulties in the situation. In the first place, the Council would be deciding to authorize a delivery of fuel oil at the same moment that it had resolved upon the exercise of economic pressure on Germany; and in the second place, no information is at hand as to whether an actual guarantee could be had that the oil would not benefit Germans in the Baltic Provinces. He proposes that Allied Representatives in these provinces should be asked whether, if the Council is to authorize the delivery, they could guarantee that it would not benefit the Germans.

(It is decided to request the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies to ascertain from the Allied Military Authorities in the Baltic States whether the latter are able to guarantee that such oil as the Allied and Associated Governments might authorize to be delivered to the Lithuanians, should not fall into the hands of German organizations.)

3. The Council has before it a memorandum of the Supreme Economic Council dated September 29th, 1919.

M Clementel says that the Supreme Economic Council has created a Supply Committee whose function was to insure that the Allies should not become competitors in the world markets for the purchase of articles of prime necessity. At the time when the Germans and Austrians are to be allowed to make purchases on their own account the Supreme Economic Council believed that it would be advantageous to prevent the former enemies from competing with the Allies in the markets, and thus contributing to a rise in the prices of indispensable articles. For this reason the Supreme Economic Council believes that the Committee of Supply should be consulted regarding the German requests. The problem had already arisen in matters of finance and shipping, at which time it was decided that the competent Commissions should be responsible to the Supreme Economic Council with regard to the requests of the Allies, and to the Reparations Commission relative to the applications made by the Germans, because it is to the latter Commission that the German requests will be made. The United States of America is not represented at the present time on the Supreme Economic Council, a most regrettable fact, but they are represented on the Committee for the Organization of the Reparations Commission. They might, therefore, be represented on the Supply Committee on behalf of the Reparations Commission. The other Allies might be represented both from the point of view of the Reparations Commission and of the Supreme Economic Council. In this manner one single Commission, on which all the Allies were represented, would be competent to deal with the situation.

Mr Polk says that he regrets his inability to accept at the present time the proposal put forward by M Clementel. He had talked with Mr Hoover prior to the departure of the latter and they had both been of the opinion that the United States should not be represented on the Supreme Economic Council. On the other hand, they should be represented for all questions of reparations. The matters within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Economic Council, such as division of foodstuffs and coal, were questions which were of vital importance to Europe but not of interest to the United States. Consequently, the latter had no need of representation in this body. It is only on the Reparations Commission that the American Representatives could advantageously function. Therefore, in view of Mr Hoover’s opinion, and also that of the American Treasury Department, he is unable to agree with M Clementel at the present time.

M Clementel replies that it is not a question of asking the United States to take part in the work of the Supreme Economic Council, however greatly this might be desired. The matter is simply to know whether the buyers of the Supreme Economic Council were to ignore the German and Austrian purchasers, and whether or not these two groups were to become competitors.

Mr Polk says that he had realized that the question would come up for discussion in the Council and had therefore telegraphed his Government for instructions in advance. These had not yet been received, and until they should be he is unable to take any decision in the matter. He therefore requests that the discussion be adjourned, but says that in the interval Mr Dresel and Colonel Logan might discuss the matter with M Clementel.

(The discussion of the proposal of the Supreme Economic Council regarding the procedure to be followed for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany and Austria is adjourned.)

4. The Council has before it a note of the Supreme Economic Council dated September 20th, 1919.

(At the request of Mr Polk the detailed examination of this note is adjourned until such time as the proposal of the Supreme Economic Council for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany and Austria should be considered.)

5. The Council has before it a note of the Supreme Economic Council requesting the appointment by the United States of America of an arbitrator for the distribution of shipping on the Danube.

Mr Clementel says that article 300 of the Peace Treaty with Austria provides for the appointment by the United States of America of one or several arbitrators, whose duties will be to distribute among the interested parties the tugs and other vessels forming part of the commercial fleet of the Danube River. In a telegram from Budapest, Admiral Troubridge urgently requests that the American Arbitrator provided for in the Treaty should begin his work as quickly as possible. The Supreme Economic Council therefore asked that the United States hasten the appointment of its arbitrators.

Mr Polk says that the Austrian Treaty has not yet been ratified by any Government. He will take the responsibility of naming an arbitrator but he does not believe that such an appointment will result to any good effect in view of the fact that Austria itself had not yet ratified the Treaty. Sir Eyre Crowe had called his attention to the fact that a similar article exists in the German Treaty and that, following the ratification of this document by Germany, a special arrangement has been made and an arbitrator nominated. The same procedure might be followed in this instance with regard to Austria without waiting for the ratification by the American Senate. Colonel Logan can take up the question with Mr Clementel.

(It is decided that Colonel Logan should confer with Mr Clementel with regard to the nomination of the American Arbitrators provided for by article 300 of the Austrian Peace Treaty (Distribution and Control of shipping on the Danube).

6. The Council has before it two letters from Mr Venizelos dated August 22nd and September 28th respectively.

Mr Berthelot read and comments upon the letter of September 28th.

Mr Polk remarks that the question was raised, while Mr Balfour was sitting in the Council, as to the exact powers of the Greek Officer who had been authorized to follow the labors of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that a resolution in this matter had been taken by the Council on August 14th should be explained to the High Commissioner at Constantinople in the sense that the Greek Representative should not be present at the meetings of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna. All necessary data should be communicated to him, however, and similar facilities should be given to a Turkish Representative, if subsequently appointed.”

M Berthelot answered that Mr. Venizelos maintained that the Allied Commissioners had kept Colonel Mazarakis completely in ignorance of their labors and have not even furnished him with the minutes of their meetings.

Mr Clemenceau says that this appears excessive. A telegram should be sent at once to Constantinople instructing that the minutes should be communicated to the Greek Representative and, should the latter have any complaints to make thereon, he should present the same to the Commission. The attention of the representatives should also again be drawn to the former resolutions of the Council in the matter.

(It is decided:

(1) That the minutes of the meetings of the Commission on Inquiry at Smyrna, including the testimony of witnesses, should be communicated to the Greek Representative attached to this Commission;

(2) That said Representative should be asked and permitted to notify the Commission of any criticisms which he desired to formulate regarding the matters in question.)

7. The Council has before it a memorandum from the British Delegation dated August 11th, 1919.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the events at Smyrna had indisputably called forth a certain number of complaints against the Greek and Turkish Governments. The Commission of Inquiry which had been appointed might form a sub-commission on the ground to deal with these protests. It might be, however, that such a proposal was now too late as a telegram had been received from the British High Commissioner at Constantinople, dated September 8th, stating that the Greeks had already formed such a Commission. In view of this fact he asked that the Council permit him to telegraph Constantinople for further information and to await the receipt of this before formally presenting his proposal. British Proposal for the Investigation of Complaints Arising Through the Incidents at Smyrna

(The study of the British proposal is adjourned until such time as Sir Eyre Crowe should receive additional information.)

8. Mr. Polk says that it will be as well to adjourn this matter pending the receipt of an answer from the Swedish Government on the subject of the Blockade of Soviet Russia.

(The question is adjourned.)

9. The Council has before it a report of the Baltic Commission dated August 25th, 1919.

M Kammerer reads from and comments upon the report in question and said that the Commission has not made any proposal to the Council. They ask merely whether, despite the absence of a responsible Russian Government and regardless of the fact that Petchenga was situated in Russian territory, they might be allowed to study the means of giving satisfaction to the desires of Finland.

M Clemenceau answers that he was prepared to authorize the Commission to make such a study, but that neither he nor any of his colleagues at the present time recognize their right to dispose of Russian territory.

M Kammerer remarks that in 1862 a discussion had taken place between the Governments of Finland and of Imperial Russia for the cession of the port of Petchenga to Finland. An agreement had been reached but had not been executed and its validity was even open to doubt.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Council might later have to discuss the question with the Finns and it would be well to have a solution ready at that time.

(It is decided that the Baltic Commission should be authorized to make a study of the ways and means by which the claims of Finland for a modification of its frontiers in Karelia and the district of Petchenga might receive satisfaction.)

(The meeting then adjourns)

Jimbuna

10-01-19, 01:02 PM

1st October 1919

Princess Charlotte of Prussia, the eldest daughter of German Kaiser Frederick III, has passed away.
https://i.postimg.cc/8c0877N8/EFxke-9-XYAE9v-G8.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Armenian soldiers bringing in a bunch of prisoners, these men were deserters from the Armenian army--Erivan, Armenia.
https://i.postimg.cc/RZfr0CY8/EFxke-9-XYAE9v-G8.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Homer (United States) The 34-gross register ton motor vessel was destroyed in Security Bay (56°53′N 134°21′W) in Southeast Alaska by a fire that started in her engine room. All three crew members transferred to the motor vessel Milleville ( United States), which was lying alongside when the fire broke out, and survived.

Sailor Steve

10-01-19, 05:13 PM

Wednesday, October 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

10-02-19, 07:43 AM

2nd October 1919

President Wilson suffers a debilitating stroke that incapacitates him for the rest of his life. His wife Edith Wilson (pictured) and physician Cary T. Grayson hide his condition from the public.
https://i.postimg.cc/brGmfbp5/EF3l-LQn-Xk-AI3oik.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Woodrow Wilson suffers a stroke which leaves him bedridden and paralyzed. His wife, Edith Wilson, secretly attends to his duties while he is ill.
https://i.postimg.cc/3RqZ1RmF/EF3l-LQn-Xk-AI3oik.jpg (https://postimg.cc/cgQY4dDv)

Ship Losses:

Dobrovolets (Russian Navy White Movement) Russian Civil War: Battle of Pechek: The gunboat ran aground during the battle on the Dnieper River. She was then shelled and machine gunned by Geroyskiy ( Soviet Navy) causing her crew to abandon ship. The ship was captured, and refloated a few hours later. Repaired and put in service as Gubitelnyy ( Soviet Navy).

Sailor Steve

10-02-19, 08:53 PM

Thursday, October 2, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a letter from the Legation of the Netherlands dated August 9th, together with a note from the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission, dated August 20th.

M. Tirman, in explanation of the matter in question, says that Article 354 of the German Peace Treaty upheld the Convention of Mannheim of 1868, with certain modifications. The first of these deals with the composition of a Commission charged with supervising the control of the traffic on the Rhine, and the second with technical matters regarding the navigation. Following the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871 the Convention of Mannheim had remained in force but the French representative on the Commission had been replaced by a delegate from Alsace-Lorraine. It is clear that in order to modify the Convention at the present time Holland should consent thereto, as it is a signatory power. The question before the Council is to determine in what manner the Government of the Netherlands should be invited to participate in the negotiations for a further modification of the Convention of Mannheim. He feels that the Council itself is the proper body to address the invitation in question.

Mr Polk says that he is not familiar with the details of the question but that he believes it to be one which interests France and the British Empire especially. He therefore suggests that it would be well to convoke a Commission composed of representatives of these two countries to consider the question.

M Tirman replies that it is a question of execution of a clause of the German Peace Treaty and that the Council itself, which is the proper body to supervise such execution, should issue the invitation to the Dutch Government.

Mr Polk asks what procedure M Tirman suggests in the matter.

M Tirman says that the President of the Council might address a formal invitation to the Government of the Netherlands.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks that there are two phases of the matter. In the first place, it is necessary to obtain the agreement of the Dutch Government to a further modification of the Mannheim Convention. In the second place, the question might arise of the eventual participation of the Netherlands in the General Convention provided for by Article 338 of the German Peace Treaty, regarding the rivers which were to be internationalized.

M Tirman agrees that two questions are involved. In the first place there is a necessity of executing a clause of the German Peace Treaty at once. On the other hand, Article 354 gives a temporary character to the organization set up in the Peace Treaty. A general Convention is provided for for the international rivers, and the Treaty further stipulated that if the general Convention should not agree with the Convention for the Rhine the latter should be modified. It is known that the Netherlands are desirous of taking part in the General Convention, and it appears that the Treaty gives them all the guarantees in this matter which they might wish.

At all events, the Treaty provides that the General Convention should not become absolute until it has been approved by the League of Nations. Holland had already asked to be admitted to the League of Nations. Furthermore, the Treaty provides that if a General Convention is not agreed upon, the Central Commission of the Ehine (in which The Netherlands are represented) will be charged with drawing up a definite convention for that river. In any case, the Dutch Government will receive satisfaction.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks to what Conference the Dutch Government is to be invited, whether it was to be one between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or a meeting of the delegates of the Governments composing the Central Rhine Commission. If the invitation was to a Conference of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers the United States of America would be represented therein, while Switzerland, a state vitally interested in the question, would not. On the second hypothesis, the United States will not be represented while Switzerland will be.

M Tirman said that he believed the conference should be between representatives of all the Powers who were to be members of the Central Rhine Commission, but that the meeting should take place under the auspices of the Council in order not to exclude the Great Powers which are not represented on the former body. The conference should take place in two phases. The Dutch Government should first be invited to agree to the modification of the Convention of Mannheim, of which it is a part. One of the modifications would be the admission of Switzerland, which was not at the present time a party to the Convention. Thereafter the Swiss Government should be invited to participate in the remainder of the negotiations.

(It is decided:

(1) That the President of the Peace Conference should invite The Netherlands Government to take part in the negotiations provided for by Article 354 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, relative to the modification of the Convention of Mannheim of 1868;

(2) That the negotiations in question should take place under the auspices of the Supreme Council, between the interested Allied Powers (who are represented on the Central Rhine Commission, in accordance with Article 355 of the German Peace Treaty), and The Netherlands Government;

(3) That the Swiss Government should later be invited to take part in the negotiations.

2. The Council has before it a note from Marshal Foch dated September 29th, 1919.

General Weygand in explanation of the note in question said that the Polish Authorities had addressed a request for supplies to Marshal Foch in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Forces. This request appeared to Marshal Foch in all respects worthy of satisfaction, for according to the statements of General Henrys and other officers of the Inter-Allied Staff who had been in Poland the Polish Army was in great need of the supplies asked for. With the exception of General Haller’s troops, the army was insufficiently equipped. For example, in one regiment there were only two overcoats per company. A continuation of this state of affairs, in view of the approaching winter, would lead to an exceedingly critical situation from the point of view of the morale of the Polish Army and might cause a retreat of this force from the line of the Beresina. Marshal Foch, believing that it was to the interest of the Allies to maintain the Polish Army intact, wished to support the request which had been formulated. In the letter to the Council he had included only such requests as he believed to be of prime importance and which should be granted at once if the situation were to be saved. Note From Marshal Foch Supporting a Request for Military Supplies From the Polish Government

M Clemenceau asks how it was planned to transport this material to Poland, assuming that it was available.

General Weygand says that the Allied Headquarters has already studied this problem. The transportation question was indeed a difficult one. The Port of Danzig was only available for the supply of food for the civilian population. Germany, of course, would not be prepared to permit supplies for the Polish Army to cross its frontiers. It had, therefore, been necessary to search out other routes. At the present time one regular train was running daily to Poland via Italy, which might be made use of. In addition the Italian Government was prepared to permit four trains per week to pass by way of the Brenner. Furthermore by using the route through Switzerland, Austria and Czechoslovakia it is possible to obtain two trains per day. For the latter transport, however, Austria and Czechoslovakia has asked that France should guarantee the expenses and furnish the coal. It is impossible for France to do this alone and it would consequently be necessary to add this charge, in addition to the expenses for the supply of material, to the account of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The total transport under this scheme would be twenty-five trains per week or about one hundred monthly. He had figured that the 600,000 uniforms requested would take approximately ninety-five trains or, in other words, that the shipment of these could be completed in somewhat less than a month’s time.

S Scialoja asked whether the four trains proceeding by the Brenner route would interfere with the shipments of material which were now being made to Poland under contract between that country and Italy. Should the arrangements as outlined by General Weygand be put into effect he would like to have it understood that they should not prejudice the shipments which Italy was now making.

General Weygand says that there would be no difficulty in continuing the shipments referred to by S Scialoja, and that the four trains which he had mentioned would be in addition to those shipments. It is first necessary that Marshal Foch’s Staff should agree with the Headquarters of the other Allied Armies as to what material could be shipped to Poland. Unquestionably this material would not all be concentrated at one point. He was anxious to obtain the authorization of the Council to consult the other Allied Headquarters in this matter.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he has not yet been able to take this question up with his Government. He believed that the best method of procedure would be to instruct the Council of Military Experts at Versailles to study the question. This body had already formulated a general scheme for the supply of material to troops fighting the Bolshevists, and it was therefore probable that they could quickly arrive at a solution in the matter. In the meantime he would consult his Government.

General Weygand says that he fears much time will be lost by referring the matter to Military Experts at Versailles.

M Clemenceau says that the difficulty might be overcome by instructing the Versailles Council to act without delay.

Mr Polk says that the question from his point of view was largely a financial one. He agrees in the main with General Weygand’s remarks.

M Clemenceau said that during such time as Mr Polk and Sir Eyre Crowe are discussing the matter with their Governments the Military Experts at Versailles could be studying the practical means of executing the matter. The Polish Army was of great importance to the Allies as it constituted one of the best means of coercing Germany. It is very necessary to maintain this army in the field owing to the fact that Great Britain, the United States and France had so largely demobilized their troops.

General Weygand says that the Council at Versailles should be instructed to turn over the matter to Marshal Foch’s Headquarters for execution. He would collaborate with General Belin throughout the examination of the question.

(It is decided to refer the request for material received from the Polish Ministry of War and approved by Marshal Foch, to the Allied Military Experts at Versailles and to instruct the latter to make an examination of the question with the least possible delay and report thereon to the Council.)

(It was further decided that the carrying out of the recommendations of the Allied Military Experts, if and when approved by the Supreme Council, should be entrusted to the Headquarters of Marshal Foch.

3. Sir Eyre Crowe says that as it had already been decided that the Commission for the repatriation of German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war from Siberia should function in Paris and not in Siberia, the only question before the Council was that of nominations for this Commission.
(After a short discussion it is decided that the Commission for the repatriation of German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war from Siberia should be composed as follows:

America, United States of: Colonel James A. Logan.
British Empire: Lt.-Colonel Black.
France: Lt.-Commander Fabre.
Italy: (Not yet designated.)
Japan: Major Katsuki.)

(It is further decided that the said Commission should function in Paris.)

4. The Council has before it a note from General Weygand relative to the repatriation of Czechoslovak, Polish, Yugoslav and Romanian troops in Siberia.

M Clemenceau says that the note in question suggests a modification of the second paragraph of the resolution passed by the Council on September 27th in this matter.

(“It is also decided: that the repatriation of the Czechoslovak troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia.”)

As there re a considerable number of the troops of other Allied Nations in Siberia in addition to the Czechoslovak forces, it is proposed to substitute the following paragraph for that quoted above:

“It is also decided that the repatriation of the Czechoslovak, Polish, Yugoslav and Romanian troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners.”

He was of the opinion that this procedure should be adopted.

Mr Polk says that he has just received word from Washington that the German Government had been negotiating for the repatriation of its prisoners of war from Siberia, and had arranged with a Japanese steamship company for the chartering of six vessels for this purpose.

M Berthelot suggests that Mr Matsui ascertain the truth of this information, and if the facts were exact, the six vessels in question should be turned over for the use of the Allied Governments.

Mr Matsui says that he has no information on the subject but that the repatriation of German prisoners in the hands of the Japanese was going on, and the negotiations referred to by Mr Polk might conceivably be for this matter.

(It is decided to modify the second paragraph of the resolution taken by the Council on September 27th, so that the same should read as follows:

“It is also decided: that the repatriation of the Czechoslovak, Polish, Yugoslav and Romanian troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners.”)

5. The Council has before it a proposal submitted by the British Delegation, dated September 30th, 1919, asking that the Russian Battleship Volya be transferred to General Denekin.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that this matter had been brought up before the Council on account of the fact that the Russian Battleship involved had been turned over to the Allied and Associated Powers under Article 29 of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918. The consent of the Council to its transfer to General Denekin was therefore necessary.

M Clemenceau says that he personally has no objection to this transfer taking place.

Mr Polk says that he personally has no objection to formulate, but that he will consult the American Naval experts and notify the Secretary-General of his decision in the matter later in the day.

(Mr Polk later states that the American Delegation has no objection to the procedure proposed.)

(It is decided that the Russian Battleship Volya, handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers under Article 29 of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918, should be transferred by the British Admiralty to General Denekin.)

6. The Council has before it a note from the Secretary-General of the International Labor Commission, relative to applications made by Finland, Norway and The Netherlands for admission to the Labor Congress at Washington.

Mr Polk says that the matters raised by the note in question should be left to the Labor Congress for decision.

M Clemenceau agrees with Mr Polk and asks merely that the United States Government should permit the representatives of the countries in question to go to the United States, by issuing them the necessary passports.

Mr Polk says that he would have the same letter addressed to the representatives of Finland, Norway and The Netherlands as had been sent to the German and Austrian Labor Delegates.

(It is decided that the questions raised by the note of the Secretary-General of the International Labor Commission relative to the admission of delegates from Finland, Norway and The Netherlands to the forthcoming Labor Congress at Washington, should be left to the decision of that Congress.)

(It was further decided that the American Delegation should notify the Secretary-General of the International Labor Commission that no obstacles would be placed in the way of Finnish, Norwegian or Dutch delegates desirous of proceeding to Washington in anticipation of a decision in their favor by the Congress.)

7. Sir Eyre Crowe says that there are two possible ways by which the Neutral Governments might be informed of the decision of the Council regarding the Blockade of Soviet Russia. First, a joint notification might be made in each of the neutral capitals by the diplomatic representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Secondly, a note might be sent by M Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, to the Diplomatic Representatives of the Neutral countries in Paris.

Mr Polk says that the second solution proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe seems to him to be the more practical one.

(After a short discussion, it is decided that M Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, should address a note to the Diplomatic Representatives of the Neutral Powers at Paris informing them of the decision of the Council regarding economic pressure to be exercised upon Soviet Russia.)

8. The Council has before it a note from the Austrian Delegation dated September 17th, regarding the disturbances that had occurred in the Comitats of Western Hungary.

M Berthelot said that the Austrian Government asked that Allied Officers be sent to Western Hungary to protect the population from the disturbances which were occurring there at the present time. They further ask that an Inter-Allied Commission might be sent to Oldenburg to prevent a repetition of the acts of violence which had occurred there, and to supervise the conduct of the Hungarian troops at the time of the evacuation of the territory in question.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that it was a question of enforcing certain terms of the Austrian Treaty.

M Berthelot suggests that officers might be detached for this duty from the Allied Military Missions at Vienna.

S Scialoja said that there are still Hungarian troops in this territory because the new boundary between Austria and Hungary had not yet been officially notified to the Hungarian Government.

M Pichon admits that this is the case, and stated that the reason therefor is that no recognized Government had as yet been set up in Hungary.

Mr Polk suggested that the Allied Generals in Budapest should be informed officially as to the frontier between Austria and Hungary and should be instructed to convey this information to the Hungarian authorities.

(It is decided:

(1) That an Inter-Allied Military Commission, composed of officers to be drawn from the Allied Military Representatives at Vienna or Budapest, should be sent to the Comitats of Western Hungary to assist in the maintenance of order in the territories granted to Austria by the Treaty of Saint Germain;

(2) That this Mission should be under the orders of the Allied General Officers at Budapest;

(3) That the Allied Generals at Budapest should be officially informed of the frontier between Austria and Hungary, as defined in the Peace Treaty of Saint Germain.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Jimbuna

10-03-19, 06:50 AM

3rd October 1919

Belgian officers receiving British military decorations at Place Poelaert, Brussels.
https://i.postimg.cc/yYDYSGr4/EF8-Fb9-EXk-AAHG5r.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Edward, Prince of Wales, visiting a baseball game in Calgary, Canada.
https://i.postimg.cc/GpqZKLHM/EF8-Fb9-EXk-AAHG5r.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Frank O'Connor (United States) The bulk carrier caught fire and sank in Lake Michigan.
Sesnon #15 (United States) With a crew of six and a cargo of 25 tons of general merchandise aboard, the 40-ton scow was wrecked without loss of life in Golovnin Bay on the coast of the Territory of Alaska during a gale.

Sailor Steve

10-03-19, 02:24 PM

Friday, October 3, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

10-04-19, 06:56 AM

4th October 1919

U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau Sr. releases a report denying pogroms against Polish Jews took place in postwar Poland, but notes “isolated excesses” resulted in about 300 Jewish deaths.
https://i.postimg.cc/cH9W8g9s/EF9lzn-TX0-AAGDov.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Mackensen (Imperial German Navy) The Mackensen-class Vorpostenboot was sunk by mines on the Dogger Bank.

Sailor Steve

10-04-19, 02:21 PM

Saturday, October 4, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

10-05-19, 07:18 AM

5th October 1919

Wen Qimei, mother of Mao Zedong, has passed away.
https://i.postimg.cc/6pC7XJwf/EGGr5vw-Wk-AYXs-Hi.png (https://postimages.org/)

Margaret Foster (March 4, 1895 –November 5, 1970) was an American chemist. She was the first female chemist to work for the United States Geological Survey, and was recruited to work on the Manhattan Project. She is pictured in her USGS laboratory.
https://i.postimg.cc/d1VDrhC5/zd2w74rixgq31.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Milton (United States) The cargo ship caught fire and sank near Lisboain.
Nadezhda (Russian Navy White Movement) Russian Civil War: The gunboat was sunk off Lagan Island by mines.

Sailor Steve

10-05-19, 11:04 AM

Sunday, October 5, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

10-06-19, 07:33 AM

6th October 1919

Ivan Kalmykov, Ataman of the Ussuri Cossacks and Anti-Bolshevik General, with a troop train in Siberia.
https://i.postimg.cc/xjpxT5cZ/EGL1f-Nr-Wo-AEXDQf.png (https://postimages.org/)

Italian battleship Leonardo da Vinci undergoing repairs in drydock. The ship sunk in 1916 due to a magazine explosion.
https://i.postimg.cc/7YCBCzzZ/EGL1f-Nr-Wo-AEXDQf.png (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

10-06-19, 01:24 PM

Monday, October 6, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

10-07-19, 07:41 AM

7th October 1919

Aftermath of War

King of Italy signs and ratifies Peace Treaty.

61.6% of Norwegians vote in a referendum to approve the prohibition of alcohol in the country.

Alfred Deakin, the 2nd Prime Minister of Australia known for being the chief architects of the White Australia policy, has passed away.
https://i.postimg.cc/HWXC652L/EGQ5fcp-Ws-AALRz-N.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

A group of men inspecting a tank parked at Lincoln's Inn, London, during an inquiry.
https://i.postimg.cc/ncxfgzRG/EGQ5fcp-Ws-AALRz-N.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

The first purpose built civil airliner, BAT FK26, enters service and flies from Hendon (London) to Amsterdam.
https://i.postimg.cc/BnYWjCqm/EGQ5fcp-Ws-AALRz-N.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Sizergh Castle (United Kingdom) The cargo ship foundered due to a water leakage in the North Atlantic while she was travelling from Galveston, Texas, United States to Antwerp, Belgium.

Sailor Steve

10-07-19, 03:15 PM

Tuesday, October 7, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

...

Jimbuna

10-08-19, 01:18 PM

8th October 1919

The first aerial transcontinental race is held across the U.S. with 63 planes. When the race ends on October 31, half of the planes fail to complete, with 54 accidents and crashes and 7 deaths. Lieutenant Belvin Maynard winning the race.
https://i.postimg.cc/yx7THY1g/EGXIIrg-Ws-AQOQi-D.png (https://postimages.org/)

Polish farmers harvest their crops as barbed wire fencing from the war still cross their fields in the background.
https://i.postimg.cc/c1TR3W1h/EGWDH0l-Xo-AAm-Nw4.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

The airline KLM is founded in the Netherlands with Robert Plesman as its first director.
https://i.postimg.cc/DZ6X1Qh0/EGWDH0l-Xo-AAm-Nw4.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

LZ 120 Bodensee completes the only landing of a zeppelin in Sweden. (LZ 120 Bodensee lands at Gärdet, Stockholm, on October 8, 1919)
https://i.postimg.cc/zfSb1wV7/EGWDH0l-Xo-AAm-Nw4.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Hettie B (United States) During a voyage from the Lost River to Nome, Territory of Alaska, the 15-gross register ton motor vessel was wrecked without loss of life during a gale on a shoal approximately 0.5 nautical miles (0.9 km; 0.6 mi) southeast of the mouth of Safety Lagoon (64°29′N 164°45′W) on Alaska′s Norton Sound coast. A motorboat from shore rescued her seven passengers and crew of three. Her gasoline engine later was salvaged, after which her wreck was abandoned in place.
Sesnon #4 (United States) While anchored off Nome, Territory of Alaska, with no cargo or crew aboard, the 23-ton barge broke loose from her moorings during a gale, was driven ashore, and was broken apart by waves.
Sesnon #10 (United States) With no cargo or crew aboard, the 20-ton barge broke loose from her moorings at Nome, Territory of Alaska, during a gale, was driven ashore on a beach about 2 nautical miles (3.7 km; 2.3 mi) east of Nome, and was broken apart by waves.

Sailor Steve

10-08-19, 01:27 PM

Wednesday, October 8, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

10-09-19, 09:31 AM

9th October 1919

Ship Losses:

Daram (United States) The cargo ship ran aground and sank on Long Bar Reef off Bermuda during a voyage from Pensacola, Florida, United States, to Marseille, France.
Flyer (United States) With no one and no cargo aboard, the 6-ton scow was blown from her moorings at the mouth of the Kiwalik River on the coast of the Territory of Alaska and onto the shore, where ice and the surf broke her up. She was declared a total loss.

Sailor Steve

10-09-19, 12:59 PM

Thursday, October 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

10-10-19, 07:22 AM

10th October 1919

Aftermath of War

King George V signs and ratifies Peace Treaty.

British troops withdrawn from Murmansk region.

Result of Luxemburg Referendum published: for Grand Duchy.

Chinese revolutionary leader Sun Yat-Sen reforms the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) political party for the eventual goal of reuniting China.
https://i.postimg.cc/vZ29zDzX/EGg-WSyd-Wk-AAYd-Fm.png (https://postimages.org/)

Cabin of a Junkers F 13 (the world's first all-metal transport aircraft)
https://i.postimg.cc/DyBbvmtF/Mn3z-Rypy-CHo-COPs-BWa-Hvx-E2v-JSn-Uxx4lf-SNLi-RRJ8-TM.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

10-10-19, 05:39 PM

Friday, October 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. Mr. Polk says that the question of making a communication to the German Government relative to granting permission to German and Austrian representatives to proceed to Washington to attend the International Labor Conference has been referred to the American Delegation, which has been asked to assume the responsibility of providing arrangements to enable the German representatives to proceed to Washington. He has informed Baron von Lersner in accordance with the Supreme Council’s instructions and has now received a reply which he wishes to place before the Council.

Mr Polk then reads a note from Baron von Lersner of the 4th October.

Mr Polk says that he has prepared a draft of a note in reply to Baron von Lersner which, in his opinion, expresses the views of the British, French and American labor representatives. He wishes to submit this note to the Council and to ask that, if there should be any objections to its contents, they might be brought up at the next meeting.

2. The Council has before it a note from the Bulgarian Delegation of the 7th October requesting an extension of ten days to the time limit for the transmission of the reply to the Conditions of Peace.

M Clemenceau says that in view of the circumstances he does not feel that the Council can refuse the request of the Bulgarian Delegation.

(It is decided to accede to the request of the Bulgarian Delegation for the prolongation by ten days of the time allowed for the presentation of its observations on the Conditions of Peace.)

3. The Council has before it a note of the 29th September addressed to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission by the American Delegation.

M Loucheur briefly comments upon the note in question. He says that, in his opinion, no action could be taken until the Treaty of Peace has come into force. The matter has been discussed by the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, which is of the opinion that they have authority under the Treaty of Peace to create a tribunal competent to deal with the question and consider the case in question. He urges that if this view should be accepted, all the Allied and Associated Governments should make the same reply to the Spanish Government in the event of a request being made to these Governments by the Spanish Government.

Mr Polk asks whether it is proposed to take the same course in regard to Norway.

M Loucheur replies in the negative. He says that the Norwegian claims for reparations from Germany for Norwegian ships lost during the war have been referred by the Conference to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission. The Commission is of the opinion that the matter is one affecting only Norway and Germany, and should consequently be settled between them, as Norway is not one of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr Polk said that he agrees, as in the case of Spain it is a question of ships now in Spanish ports.

(It is decided:

(1) To accept the principles contained in the note of the American Delegation to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission as a basis for a reply from the Government of the United States to the Spanish Government in regard to the final disposition of German and Austro-Hungarian ships in Spanish ports;

(2) That each of the Allied and Associated Governments, in communicating a reply to the Spanish Government on the subject, if occasion should arise, should address that Government in the same sense.)

4. The Council has before it the draft of a note addressed to the German Government relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, prepared by Marshal Foch, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council of October 7th, 1919.

General Weygand reads and comments upon the draft of the note in question. He adds that, in view of the fact that information had just been received to show that German troops are conducting active operations in Latvia, he proposes that a sentence be added to the end of the third paragraph pointing out that information has just been received to show that the German troops had attacked the army of the Letts.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he agrees with the terms of the note prepared by Marshal Foch. There is one point, however, which he wishes to raise. The German Government will undoubtedly publish the note and cause public opinion in Germany to feel that the Allied and Associated Governments are acting in a brutal manner towards Germany. He considers it of equal importance that the note should be published by the Allied and Associated Governments, and that a paragraph should be inserted to make the reasons clear why these Governments consider the German reply to be unsatisfactory. He proposes that a paragraph in this sense should be inserted after the second paragraph of Marshal Foch’s draft. Sir Eyre Crowe then reads the draft of the paragraph in question.

M Clemenceau says that he will have no objection to the insertion of Sir Eyre Crowe’s paragraph in the reply to the German Government.

Mr Polk says that he has referred the matter to General Bliss and that he cannot express his final opinion at the moment. He will, however, communicate his reply at the first opportunity.

M Clemenceau says that it will be also necessary to name a General to act as head of the mixed Commission mentioned in the note.

Marshal Foch says that the General can be named after a reply to the note has been received from the German Government.

(It is decided:

(1) To accept the draft note prepared by Marshal Foch relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces with the addition to the text proposed by Marshal Foch, and with the addition of the draft paragraph submitted by Sir Eyre Crowe.

(2) To publish the text of the note.)

5. The Council has before it the draft of a resolution on the subject of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany prepared by Marshal Foch in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Council of the 7th October, 1919.

General Weygand reads and comments upon the draft resolution.

Sir Eyre Crowe said

ys that he cannot help but feel that the Council are going back on their previous decision. In the first instance they had decided to wash their hands of the Russian Prisoners in Germany, and they had later decided that an International Commission should be appointed upon which there should be both German and Russian Representatives. If the present draft is accepted, the Council will be going still further, for they will be again assuming responsibility. He points out that in the second paragraph of the note, there is a clear expression of the acceptance of responsibility and that in the paragraph numbered 1, the Allied and Associated Governments speak of re-establishing an Inter-Allied Commission for the control of Russian prisoners. He thinks that it is important to avoid the use of the word “re-establishment”. Paragraph No. 2, Section B, speaks of regulating the ways and means for the repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War. This paragraph also is a clear expression of the re-establishment of responsibility, and he considers it necessary that the responsibility of the Allied and Associated Governments should not be re-established in regard to Russian Prisoners of war in Germany.

General Weygand says that he thinks it possible that the expressions which have been used in the draft resolution go somewhat too far, but the question is one of the intention of the Allied and Associated Governments. The Russian Political Conference at Paris had been informed by General Denikin that it was necessary to avoid at all costs the repatriation to Bolshevist Russia of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany, who came from those parts of Russia, which were under the control of the Soviet Government. He cannot help but feel that the Allied and Associated Governments have an important interest in this matter, and he does not believe that they can wash their hands of the affair and leave the matter entirely to the Germans. He feels that the Council should not be willing to consider themselves bound by the resolution in regard to Russian Prisoners of War which was taken on the 2nd August.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that, at the present time, the German Government are not in a position to repatriate the Russian Prisoners of War by way of Poland and the Ukraine.

(It is decided to request General Weygand and General Sackville-West to modify the draft resolution relative to Russian Prisoners of War in Germany taking into consideration the views expressed by Sir Eyre Crowe.)

6. General Weygand says that he has just received a telegram from General Dupont according to which the situation in the Baltic Provinces is regarded by the War Office at Berlin as being very grave. General von der Goltz is unable, or rather unwilling, to return. A new Government has been formed at Mitau, at the head of which was Count Palen.

M Berthelot says that this information is similar to that which he had received, and, according to which, a Russo-German reactionary Government has been established.

7. Sir George Clerk says that he has little to add to the written report which he had made to the Council.

He ventures to express the hope that his report will be kept wholly to the Council as he has expressed a number of opinions. He has endeavored to ascertain in Romania the real meaning for the attitude of the Romanian Government on the Hungarian question, and the result had been to convince him that S Bratiano had thought that by playing for time the Allied waters would become sufficiently troubled for him to catch many excellent fish. He therefore considers it essential to make the Romanian Government understand that the Allied and Associated Governments are both absolutely united and absolutely definite in their decisions in regard to Romania. He considers it advisable to point out to the Romanian Government that the decisions taken in regard to Romania, both as regards the line of the frontier and the principle of the minorities treaty, are definite. He considers that this would put an end to the Romanian hopes, which are founded on delay in settling with Turkey, arranging the Adriatic question and other difficult points upon which S Bratiano is counting. In regard to Hungary, he considers that the first step necessary is a provisional recognition of a Hungarian Government which can maintain order, hold elections and negotiate peace. As soon as such a Government exists the Romanian troops can be asked to evacuate, and this alone could definitely put an end to the requisitions about which there has been so much discussion. He proposes that the Hungarians should be told the conditions upon which a Hungarian Government would be satisfactory to the Allied and Associated Governments. He thinks that Herr Friedrich should be told what he must do, that his present Government no more corresponded to the views of the Allied and Associated Governments than the Government of Archduke Joseph. He thinks that Herr Friedrich should be invited to broaden the bases of his Government. It is necessary to have some solvent to loosen the crystals concerned in Hungarian affairs. For instance an Allied Commission of a political character, holding direct, and locally supreme authority from the Allies, should negotiate with the various Hungarian political parties. He thinks that upon such a condition Romania should be represented at least in a consultative character.

M Clemenceau suggests that Sir George Clerk prepare draft notes to the Romanian and Hungarian Governments.

Mr Polk asked whether the Supreme Council had received a reply to the message decided upon by the Supreme Council at its meeting of the 22nd August instructing the French Minister at Bucharest in the name of the Supreme Council to ask for further information on the intentions of the Romanian Government with regard to the Banat, and directing him to inform the Romanian Government that the frontiers laid down by the Council in the Banat and elsewhere are final.

M Berthelot says that no reply has been received from the Romanian Government.

M Laroche says that, as the first telegram did not appear to have reached its destination, a second telegram in the same sense had been dispatched about a month before the present date. The French Minister at Bucharest had acknowledged the receipt of this second telegram and had stated that he had brought it to the attention of the Romanian Government. Up to the present, however, the Romanian Government had made no reply.

Mr Polk says that the American Chargé d’ Affaires at Bucharest had been unable to discover whether the communication in the sense of the telegram in question had been received at the Romanian Foreign Office. He thinks that S Bratiano appears convinced that he can improve his position by waiting.

Sir Eyre Crowe says, with reference to Sir George Clerk’s first memorandum, that on the 20th September, S Bratiano had stated that the Romanian Government claims new frontiers.

M Clemenceau says that at the present time the Romanians and the Serbs are in agreement as to the Banat.

M Berthelot adds that the question deals with the evacuation of the Banat and that both the Romanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments are withdrawing their troops.

Mr Polk asks Sir George Clerk whether he has had a copy of the telegram based upon the resolution of the 22nd of August.

Sir George Clerk replies that he has not had a copy of this telegram.

M Clemenceau proposes that Sir George Clerk and M Berthelot be directed to draft notes to the Romanian and Hungarian Governments.

Mr Polk asks for information as to the attitude of the Romanian Government on the subject of the requisitions which had taken place.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks whether the note to the Hungarian Government should be addressed to Herr Friedrich.

M Clemenceau says that he thought that it should.

Mr Polk says that he feels considerable doubt on the subject.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the relations between the Inter-Allied Generals at Budapest and the Romanian authorities had become very strained, and that for this reason he believes there is a great deal to be said for the appointment of a civil Commission, which should be authorized to speak in the name of the Council.

Mr Polk says that he has grave doubts as to the advisability of recalling the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest. The Mission were in a most unenviable position, and there was no question of the fact that the Romanian authorities at Budapest have lied to them continually.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he agrees with Mr. Polk as to the unenviable position of the Inter-Allied Military Mission. He had not intended to recall that Mission, but considered that to send a Mission of higher rank would have many advantages.

Mr Polk says that he thinks this proposal is worthy of serious consideration.

M Berthelot says that it will be necessary to tell Herr Friedrich that the Allied and Associated Governments consider that he is acting as a mask for the Archduke Joseph, and that they consider it impossible for him to remain.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he thinks that Her Friedrich might be asked to resign or else to broaden the basis of his Government.

M Berthelot said that he thinks it would be preferable to have Herr Friedrich retire. The Governments of the States bordering upon Hungary have no confidence in him and he thinks that they consider him reactionary and Anti-Semitic and that in occupying his present position it is to act as a mask for the Archduke Joseph. He thinks that Herr Friedrich should consequently retire as the head of the Government, but this does not mean that he should not occupy a position in the Government.

Sir George Clerk says that he feels that he ought to point out that in the opinion of the Allied Generals at Budapest, Herr Friedrich is the best person.

M Berthelot says that he has no objection to Herr Friedrich as a man but considered him, however, merely as a symbol. If the Conference adopted the course of treating with him, they would give the appearance of treating with the Archduke Joseph. He thinks that Herr Heinrich is a person with whom the Allied and Associated Governments could enter into negotiations. He is undoubtedly a man of the same sort as Friedrich but there was a difference. His Government might be more democratic, and in entering into negotiations with him, the Allied and Associated Governments could not be charged with entering into negotiations with the Archduke as he does not think Herr Heinrich represents the Archduke.

Sir George Clerk says he agrees but there is a question of form to be considered. He proposed that the Conference inform Herr Friedrich that they are not satisfied with the Government as constituted under him. He suggests that Herr Friedrich be asked whether he is prepared to broaden the basis of his Government in such a form as to be satisfactory to the Allied and Associated Governments. If he were not prepared to do this he should be informed that he must go. It would then be a question of a Government under Heinrich or Peidl.

M Berthelot says that he feels that there is danger in treating with Herr Friedrich in any form whatsoever.

Mr Polk says that he is confident that M Berthelot and Sir George Clerk could prepare a text which would be satisfactory to the Council. He then asked Sir George Clerk where the difficulty in arming the police of Budapest lay.

Sir George Clerk replies that the Romanian Government says that if the police at Budapest were armed, there was danger of a White Terror. M Diamante had said that at the time when the Romanians should evacuate Budapest it would be necessary for them to arm the police.

Mr Polk says that he thinks they have no intention of arming the police.

Sir George Clerk says that in his opinion the only means of improving the situation lay in appointing a Commission or in dispatching a note. He wishes to add, confidentially, that Herr Friedrich had informed him, but asked him in no event to let the Romanians become aware of the fact, that if the Romanians should leave, he had sufficient police and arms. He thinks that Herr Friedrich undoubtedly has some scheme in view.

Mr Polk said that Colonel Antonesco, a Romanian officer, who had recently been in Paris, had assured him in a conversation which had taken place a few days before that the police at Budapest would be armed upon the following day. In point of fact nothing had occurred. He thinks that it was most important that the blockade preventing the shipment of arms to Hungary should not be removed. He also wished to say that the conduct of the Romanians in Bessarabia had called forth strong adverse comment. He was informed that the Romanian authorities are holding elections and enforcing conscription. He thinks that the action of the Romanian Government in Bessarabia should be considered by the Council.

M Clemenceau says that he agrees and that the matter should be discussed at the next meeting.

8. The Council has before it a memorandum of 23rd September prepared by the American Representatives on the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.

M Loucheur says that the American Delegation proposes that a sub-committee be sent to Budapest to ascertain what material had been requisitioned and what could be placed to the account of the Allies. Sir George Clerk was informed in regard to the matter, and, in his report, he had expressed the opinion that Romanians would be inadvisable to put the Romanians before a Tribunal. If this were done Romanian opinion would be unnecessarily offended and it was important to treat the Romanians as Allies. He proposes that the Romanians should be admitted to representation on the sub-committee in a deliberative capacity. He adds that in taking this action the Allied and Associated Governments would only be giving to Romania what was due her, because, according to the regulations of the Treaty of Peace in regard to the Reparations Commission, the Allied States interested, and Romania is one, are to be admitted to the meetings of the Reparations Commission in the discussion of the questions affecting them. The sub-committee could also study the food question in Hungary, but the immediate question before the Council is that of appointing a sub-committee with a Romanian member.

Sir George Clerk says that he would suggest that the sub-committee be placed under the orders of the Reparations Commission rather than of the Allied Generals at Budapest.

Mr Polk say that he agrees. He wishes to submit an amended proposal which he thinks would meet the objections which had been raised.

M Loucheur says that he agreed in principle to the proposed resolution submitted by Mr. Polk, but desired time to examine it carefully.

(It is decided:

(1) To send to Budapest a Sub-Committee to determine the reparation value of material removed from Hungary by the Romanians;

(2) That this Sub-Committee should be composed of representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers and to which should be added a Romanian Representative, who should sit in a deliberative capacity;

(3) That the Sub-Committee should be under the orders of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.

It is further decided to refer to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission the proposed resolution relative to the constitution and functions of the Sub-Committee submitted by Mr Polk.

9. Marshal Foch says that it is of urgent importance to decide as to the composition of the Armies of Occupation, which should be furnished by the Allied and Associated Governments in the plebiscite and other areas. Composition of Inter-Allied Forces of Occupation

M Clemenceau says that he has just sent Sir Eyre Crowe a communication in regard to the matter.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

10-11-19, 06:08 AM

11th October 1919

Numerically superior Red Army, led by Alexander Yegorov (far left in picture), launch an offensive against anti-Bolshevik troops in the Orel, Kursk, and Tula governorates.
https://i.postimg.cc/xjGtqs1Q/EGl-SJj-ZX0-AA-7r0.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Marshal Ferdinand Foch, a French general and military theorist who served as the Supreme Allied Commander during the First World War, listening to the mayor's speech in front of his father's house in Valentine, Haute-Garonne, France. L'Illustration, No 3997, October 11, 1919
https://i.postimg.cc/0QYdMQxn/EGl-SJj-ZX0-AA-7r0.jpg (https://postimg.cc/5YtFDfXQ)

Women play baseball in the shadow of the Washington Monument.
https://i.postimg.cc/cLCm90M1/EGl-SJj-ZX0-AA-7r0.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

10-11-19, 08:47 PM

Saturday, October 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a draft of a reply to the letter of Baron von Lersner prepared by Mr Polk.

M Clemenceau says that, if he understands Mr Polk’s proposition correctly, it is a question of saying to the Germans that everyone will have full rights at the Conference.

Mr Polk says that this is not what he meant.

The proposal, which he submitted for the approval of the Council, states that the question will be decided by the Congress itself. His letter contains no promise whatever.

M Clemenceau says that the Council are in agreement in regard to the matter.

(It is decided to accept the draft of a letter prepared by Mr. Polk in reply to the letter of Baron von Lersner of 4th October.

2. The Council has before it a draft of a telegram for transmission to the French Minister at Bucharest and for communication to the Romanian Government, as well as a draft of a telegram to H Friedrich.

Mr Polk says that he wishes to raise a question in regard to the draft telegram to H Friedrich. He questions whether it is advisable to send a written communication expressing the views of the Entente. He does not think that the Allied and Associated Governments should dictate to Hungary as to her internal policies. It is true that the Council had taken such action at the time the Archduke Joseph had assumed power, but in that case they were dealing with a Hapsburg. Today the situation was not quite the same; they were dealing with Hungarian political parties. He thinks that it would be preferable to send to Budapest a representative who should be charged to communicate with the various parties. He fears that the action proposed would create an unfavorable impression in the United States. He wishes to ask whether it would not be possible to send Sir George Clerk to Budapest.

M Clemenceau suggests that the telegram should be addressed to the Allied Generals at Budapest and that they should be directed to take the necessary action.

Mr Polk points out that the Generals will not be in the same position as a special representative. Up to the present time they have played a somewhat different role.

M Clemenceau says that the situation would be the same whether the communication were in writing or were communicated in person by a special representative; all the world would know of it just the same.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he thinks all the world should know of it. It is important that the note should be published in all the Hungarian newspapers.

Sir George Clerk said that H Friedrich is the man who had called the Archduke to power. What the Allied and Associated Governments had criticized in his Government was the fact that it was a continuation of the Government of the Archduke. It is that which the Council opposes. There is no desire to interfere with the internal affairs of Hungary.

(It is decided to postpone the discussion of this question until the following Monday. Mr Polk reserves the right to propose certain modifications to the draft telegram before the Council.)

Mr Polk says that so far as the note to be transmitted to the Romanian Government is concerned, he approved of the contents. He wishes, however, to make two remarks. He asks what the Council proposes to do in the event of a refusal by the Romanian Government. It is most important that the Allies should be in entire accord.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks the question cannot be discussed at the present time, but that he agrees with Mr Polk that it is necessary for the Allies to stand together. He wishes to ask S Scialoja if he shares this view.

S Scialoja replied that he is in entire agreement.

Mr Polk says that in the first paragraph of the second page of the draft telegram he thinks that it would be better to say instead of, “the Supreme Council regret that they are unable to consent to any change in their original decision” to “the Supreme Council regret that they are unable to modify in favor of Romania their original decision.”

M Berthelot asks whether the note to the Romanian Government should be published.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks it should not be until it has reached its destination.

Mr Polk asks whether the note should be transmitted to the Romanian Government by the four Allied Ministers at Bucharest.

M Clemenceau says that he is entirely in favor of common action in order that every means should be taken to assure the note reaching its destination.

M Berthelot says that the note can also be transmitted to the Romanian Delegation at Paris.

(It is decided:

(1) To accept the draft telegram to the French Minister at Bucharest prepared by Sir George Clerk and M Berthelot;

(2) To substitute in the text of the telegram for the words “unable to consent to any change in their original decision”, the words “unable to modify in favor of Romania their original decision”;

(3) That the note of the Supreme Council should be transmitted to the Roumanian Prime Minister by the four Allied Ministers at Bucharest.)

(It is further decided to publish the text of the note after it had been transmitted to the Roumanian Government.)

3. The Council has before it a note addressed to the President of the Peace Conference by two Bessarabian Delegates.

M Berthelot says the question has been placed on the agenda by the American delegation.

Mr Polk said that Mr Misu had informed him on the previous day that the Roumanian Government are about to hold elections in Bessarabia.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the Bessarabian question has not yet been settled. He thinks that the note of the Bessarabian delegates could be examined at the time that the question of Bessarabia is discussed.

Mr Polk points out that the question is somewhat important in view of the fact that according to the information which he had received, the Romanians are holding elections, applying conscription and confiscating large properties.

M Laroche says that the Bessarabian question is somewhat peculiar. It is at the request of the Russian General Tcherbatcheff that the Romanians have been asked, at the beginning of the Russian debacle, to occupy the country. In order to stop the development of Bolshevism, it appears to be the simplest method to favor the autonomist element in Bessarabia. Soon afterwards Bessarabia had declared herself independent. Later the National Assembly pronounced itself in favor of a union with Romania. The Council are now faced with the wish expressed by the population. The Conference has not yet decided the Bessarabian question, but it should take account of all that has occurred, for there is no doubt that “the journey which M de Martonne recently made in Bessarabia has brought new proofs” to show that the country was really a Romanian land. As far as the agrarian question is concerned, the matter is most important. The distribution of landed property is particularly unequal in Bessarabia, and the majority of the population is in favor of a necessary reform. The persons who protested were Russified landowners, whose interests were menaced.

Mr Polk say that he doe not intend to ask the Council to take a decision. He simply wishes to bring to the attention of the Council the fact that the Romanians are exercising rights of sovereignty in Bessarabia, and that the silence of the Conference in regard to this matter might give the Romanians grounds for believing that the Council consented to their assuming this sovereignty. In a conversation which he had had with Mr Misu on the preceding day, he had pointed out the possible danger to Romania, if Romania tried to make a fait accompli. He had asked him what would happen when Russia was reconstituted and when she claimed Bessarabia. Romania would have to rely upon a position of fact. In order to retain Bessarabia, Romania depends upon the good will of the League of Nations and of the Conference. Romania should be discouraged from making any attempt, apart from the decisions of the Conference, to annex Bessarabia definitely. He thinks that Mr Misu would, in all probability, transmit a communication to the Conference on this subject.

4. General Weygand presents to the Council the text of the resolution which he had prepared with General Sackville-West in accordance with a resolution taken by the Supreme Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he approves of the text as a whole. He desires, however, to point out that in the second paragraph the International Commission at Berlin is to be directed to make all necessary proposals to the Supreme Council. On the other hand, it is said that the Special Inter-Allied Commission sitting at Paris should be charged “with bringing matters to the attention of the Supreme Council”. He thinks that it is unnecessary to make the Supreme Council intervene throughout. It would be enough to say that the Commission at Berlin should be charged with making “all necessary proposals”. The Commission can bring matters to the attention of the Special Commission at Paris and not to the Supreme Council. At the same time, as regarded the Commission at Paris, the text can be modified by saying that the Commission could “request a decision of the Supreme Council when necessary”. These changes in the text would give the Commission greater freedom of action.

Mr Polk asks how the Council proposes to regulate the question of funds.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that, so far as he knows, there is no question but that the German Government will be obliged to furnish the money.

General Weygand says that there are difficulties as regards the past arising from the time when the Allied and Associated Governments had assumed charge of the prisoners.

S Scialoja says that he wishes to recall that Italy had borne heavy expenses in respect of several thousand Russian Prisoners of War. He wishes to ask that this observation be referred for examination to the Financial Commission.

M Clemenceau says that the Council are in agreement.

Mr Polk says that so far as the Financial question is concerned, he is not in a position to make a definite engagement. He does not know whether his Government has funds to pay for the deficit. Only the American Congress can vote new credits and he cannot bind his Government.

(It is decided:

(1) To approve the draft resolution prepared by General Weygand and General Sackville-West on the subject of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany;

(2) To substitute for the words, “d’adresser au Conseil Suprême” paragraph II, Section C, the words, “de faire” and for the words, “de préparer la décision”, paragraph III, last line the words, “de provoquer au besoin la décision”.)

The American Representative in approving this resolution remarked that so far as a question of a deficit was concerned, he could make no engagement without instructions from his Government.

5. The Council has before it a report from the Military, Naval and Air Representatives at Versailles of the 6th October, 1919.

(In view of the fact that the Supreme War Council are unanimous, It is decided to approve the report presented by the Military Naval and Air Representatives at Versailles respecting the organization of Commissions of Control for Austria.)

6. The Council has before it a note transmitted by the Russian Political Conference dated Paris, 6th October, 1919.

M Clemenceau says that in view of the fact that the Allied and Associated Governments are sending war Material to Russia, it seems only logical not to refuse their request for war material which had formerly belonged to them.

S Scialoja thinks that a difficulty might arise on account of Article 169 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the question is not one of German war material which the Allies are to divide, but concerns Russian war material taken by the Germans.

M Berthelot says that according to the article 169 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, German war material is to be delivered to the Principal Allied and Associated Governments to be distributed or destroyed. So far as war material coming from a foreign country is concerned, it is to be delivered to these Governments, who should decide as to what is to be done with it. The Russians ask that the war material should not be destroyed, but given to them.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the Commissions of Control could be directed to settle this question.

(It is decided That the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control created by articles 203 to 210 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany should direct, if they found it possible, that Russian arms, munitions and war material retained by Germany should be delivered to the Russian Armies recognized by the Allied and Associated Governments.)

7. The Council has before it a note from the Italian Delegation of the 8th October, 1919.

S Scialoja reads and comments upon the note from the Italian Delegation.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks whether Hungary is to cede territory to Italy.

S Scialoja replies that this is not the case, but Hungary has had certain claims to Austrian territory. His proposal is intended to regulate the situation of Hungarian citizens residing in the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ceded to Italy, in the same manner as the situation of Austrian citizens residing in these territories had been regulated. So far as cessions of territory are concerned, the only question at the moment between Italy and Hungary was the Cession of the Palais de Venise at Rome. The question can be referred to the Drafting Committee.

(It is decided to refer to the Drafting Committee for report the note from the Italian Delegation, asking for the insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary of articles equivalent to articles 36 to 45 of the Treaty of St. Germain. The Drafting Committee is to be directed to submit to the Supreme Council a draft article in this sense.)

8. The Council has before it a note from the French Delegation of the 9th October, 1919.

M Laroche says that the question raised here is one of secondary importance, which has been asked by the Legal Advisers, who have pointed out that no arrangement has been made as to the disposal of Western Galicia. The question can be settled at the same time as that of Eastern Galicia. The best method will be to refer the question to the Commission on Polish Affairs.

(It is decided to refer to the Commission on Polish Affairs for examination and report the note from the French Delegation of the 9th October, 1919 concerning the attribution to Poland of Western Galicia.

9. Mr Polk says that the United States has no Representatives on the Commissions of Control, and, for this reason, he is not voting. He desires, therefore, to withdraw the reservation which he had made at a former meeting of the Council.

(It is decided that the Presidents of the Naval and Air Commissions of Control in Germany, as well as the Presidents of the Sub-Commissions should receive the same allowances as the President of the Military Commission of Control in Germany and the Presidents of the Military Sub-Commissions of Control in Germany.)

10. Mr. Polk says that Mr Misu has informed him on the preceding day that, at the request of the British and French Governments, the Romanian Government had dispatched large quantities of Russian war material, which are in Romania, to General Denikin.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he is without information as to any such action on the part of the British Government, but he will inquire of his Government.

M Clemenceau says that Marshal Foch should be consulted.

M Berthelot says that S Bratiano has always refused to give arms to General Denikin, because he (S Bratiano) is supporting the Ukrainians. It is therefore, possible that several months before and through the intermediary of the French Military Mission in Romania a small part of the Russian war material deposited in Romania, amounting to about 60,000 rifles, had been sent to Russia. But since that time no action of this kind has been taken, as S Bratiano had refused to make any deliveries whatsoever.

Mr Polk says that the Romanians have informed him that the British and French have asked them to send 60,000 rifles to General Denikin, but they had said quite the opposite to the American Minister at Bucharest, who is in Paris at the moment. He has raised the question simply to ascertain what had actually occurred.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

10-12-19, 07:56 AM

12th October 1919

Former soldiers and refugee families return home to Poland in crowded freight trains.
https://i.postimg.cc/D0JWqBb7/EGmk2m4-Wo-AAJZEy.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Yamash!ta Takeshi founds a company specializing in microscopes and thermometers (the company later becomes the camera manufacturer Olympus).
https://i.postimg.cc/LX0YYr5y/EGqpac-ZWk-AAwi3-N.png (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

10-12-19, 08:56 AM

Sunday, October 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

10-13-19, 08:01 AM

13th October 1919

Aftermath of War

Lord Beatty succeeds Admiral Sir R. Wemyss as First Sea Lord.

President Poincare signs and ratifies Peace Treaty.

Trenches dug in the streets of Riga, Latvia by Latvian and Estonian forces to defend against the German-backed West Russian Volunteer Army.
https://i.postimg.cc/ZYrccd5J/EGru-R7p-W4-AE1-Xnr.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Map showing dislocation of Red and White Armies and plans of White Army to conquest Moscow - so called "Moscow Offensive". Russian Civil War. Summer 1919.
https://i.postimg.cc/qq02Y1v4/1024px-Denikin-s-Moscow-Offensive-svg.png (https://postimages.org/)

Jimbuna

10-14-19, 01:05 PM

14th October 1919

Aftermath of War

Ali Riza Pasha appointed Grand Vizier, Ottoman Empire.

German airship Bodensee making passenger service between Berlin and Friedrichshafen (it will be handed over to Italy in 1921 as part of war reparations)
https://i.postimg.cc/X7rXjP72/9-2649956-scn190115ringer2-t1880.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Armed German outpost in Silesia. The region has seen instability as ethnic Poles in Silesia seek to break away from Germany and join the newly established republic of Poland.
https://i.postimg.cc/6pR3RGZn/9-2649956-scn190115ringer2-t1880.jpg (https://postimg.cc/75HwrhmZ)

Sailor Steve

10-14-19, 05:37 PM

Monday, October 13, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

...

Sailor Steve

10-14-19, 05:39 PM

Tuesday, October 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

10-15-19, 09:05 AM

15th October 1919

Russian Civil War: General Pyotr Wrangel in Tsaritsyn, 15 October 1919
https://i.postimg.cc/L6fjY1QF/nwvap9wekns31.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

A Curtis NC-4, which completed the first transatlantic aerial voyage earlier this year, arrives in Washington D.C.
https://i.postimg.cc/ydBmsYyC/EG7-LHbf-Wo-AAs-Vt3.png (https://postimages.org/)

Prince Of Wales: The Duke of Windsor, (1894 - 1972), then Edward, Prince of Wales, wearing an Indian headdress, attends an Indian display at Banff during his royal tour. He succeeded his father as King Edward VIII in January 1936 but abdicated in December of the same year.
https://i.postimg.cc/7hjbPKrJ/nwvap9wekns31.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

10-16-19, 12:22 AM

Wednesday, October 15, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

...

Jimbuna

10-16-19, 11:19 AM

16th October 1919

Adolf Hitler gives his first political speech for the German Workers’ Party in Munich. His skills as an orator quickly makes him the leading spokesman for the small far-right party.

Sailor Steve

10-16-19, 09:02 PM

Thursday, October 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. Mr Polk says that a telegram has just been received from the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest dated the 14th October. He desires that the telegram should be placed before the Council and be considered before the question of Sir George Clerk’s mission was discussed.

M Mantoux then reads the text of the telegram.

Mr Polk says that he wishes to call attention to the fact that the telegram expresses the opinion of the four Generals at Budapest. He thinks that the question of the reply should be considered at once. The telegram is addressed, not to the American delegation, but to the Supreme Council. If the telegram requires an answer, as he thinks it does, the question is to decide as to the nature of the answer.

M Pichon agrees that the telegram cannot be left unanswered. It is important that the demand of the Inter-Allied Military Mission should be fulfilled. He considers that the Generals should be given entire satisfaction.

Mr Polk says that at the same time that the telegram has been received his attention had been called to a press dispatch from Budapest, which states that it is rumored in both Austria and Hungary that the members of the Inter-Allied Military Mission are on the point of resigning, because they feel that they have not received adequate support from the Supreme Council.

M Pichon says he does not see how this demand can be made. In any event, it is important to beware of rumors. In point of fact, the Supreme Council has replied to the previous telegrams of the Inter-Allied Military Mission and has taken the views of the Mission into full consideration. Up to the present time the Inter-Allied Military Mission has never transmitted to the Council a telegram so precise in its statements and so far reaching in its consequences. He considers it essential to accede to the wishes of the Inter-Allied Military Mission, namely, that the Romanian Government should be asked to evacuate Hungary forthwith. He wishes to point out, however, the grave situation which will be almost certain to result in Hungary following the retirement of the Romanian army of occupation. The question of arming a police force of sufficient size to enforce order is not mentioned in the telegram, and the Military Mission has made no suggestions in regard to this matter. He asks whether the Military Mission has made any proposals relative to the organizing of a police force before the evacuation should take place.

Mr Polk pointed out that the Military Mission has already asked for 10,000 rifles for the purpose of organizing a police force.

M Pichon says that he had not been present at the last meeting of the Council where the subject had been discussed. He understands, however, that Sir George Clerk has already proposed the immediate evacuation of Hungary by the Romanian forces.

M de Saint Quentin says that Sir George Clerk has proposed the evacuation of Hungary by the Romanians, but that he had also insisted upon the necessity of the establishment of a Government which can maintain order and be recognized by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr Polk says that he does not understand that the report advocates that the Romanians should remain in Hungary until a stable Government is established.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the Allied and Associated Governments have already addressed the Romanian Government on the subject of the evacuation of Hungary.

Mr Polk says that he thinks that the Council has already insisted that the Romanian military authorities form the police of Hungary and then withdraw. It is most important that the Romanians should not await the establishment of a suitable Government.

M Pichon asks who should give orders to the police.

Mr Polk says that the Inter-Allied Military Mission has already reported that the Government of Herr Friedrich are prepared to organize a police force.

M Pichon points out that the Council has already considered the draft of a telegram to H Friedrich telling him that he should withdraw and permit someone else to form a government.

Mr Polk says that he thinks it is important not to mix the two questions. So far as he is concerned, he is not in a position to accept a form of action which will enable the Roumanian forces to remain until a satisfactory Government had been established.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the Allied and Associated Governments had already told the Romanian Government that they must withdraw their military forces from Hungary.

(He then reads an extract from the Note to the Romanian Government, in which a definite demand upon the Romanians to withdraw their military forces from Hungary is made.)

He says that he considers that it is most important to inform the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest that this demand has been made of the Romanian Government.

M Pichon says that it is of equal importance to see that the Romanian Government carries out the measures in question.

Mr Polk says that he hopes that the matter could be cleared up. He wishes to ask whether the rifles are to be delivered to the Hungarian police at the present time, and whether the Romanian forces are to withdraw at the present time, whatever the Government in Hungary might be.

M Pichon replies in the affirmative.

S Scialoja asks whether the Inter-Allied Military Mission has been informed of the telegram sent to Bucharest.

M Pichon replies that they have not been informed, but that they ought to be informed immediately.

Mr Polk said that he understands that a decision has been taken at the meeting of the Council on the 11th October to inform the Inter-Allied Military Mission of the Note to the Romanian Government.

M Pichon says that the resolution has not been drafted in this sense, but that the decision should be communicated to the Inter-Allied Military Mission, as it would be the best reply to their telegram.

Mr Polk said that he wishes to express the hope that the Supreme Council would not forget that possibly six weeks ago, certainly four, the Romanian military authorities had been told to deliver the necessary rifles to the police. The Council are aware that the Romanians had never done this. Mr Misu had informed him that the Hungarians had plenty of rifles from Field Marshal Mackensen’s supply. In point of fact this was not the case. The Romanians are unwilling to carry out the wishes of the Supreme Council.

M Pichon says that Marshal Foch has been informed on the 10th October by Colonel Dimitrescu that the Romanian High Command had some time before placed at the disposal of Colonel Yates for the Hungarian gendarmerie 10,000 rifles and 40 machine guns. 1,000 rifles have already been delivered and the rest are guarded by Romanian troops until such time as they should be delivered. Colonel Dimitrescu adds that Colonel Yates, the United States Military Attaché at Bucharest, had been charged by the Inter-Allied Military Mission with the creation of a Hungarian gendarmerie. The Romanian troops have begun their withdrawal from Hungary.

Mr Polk said that in his opinion it was delightfully typical of the Romanians that of 10,000 rifles, 9,000 had not been delivered.

Sir George Clerk says that on the 20th September M. Diamandi and General Mardarescu had promised to turn over the rifles and machine guns for the use of the Hungarian gendarmerie. As far as he is aware they have not delivered a single rifle or machine gun.

Mr Polk says that they had delivered 1,000 rifles which might be useful for parade purposes, but which could not shoot.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that substantially there was no additional information in the telegram now before the Supreme Council. The point is that the Supreme Council has not communicated to the Generals the Note to the Romanian Government; that the Generals therefore are unaware when they sent this telegram of the steps that the Supreme Council had already taken. He has no desire to doubt the evidence of the Inter-Allied Mission, but the evidence is largely collected from Hungarian sources. For this reason he does not consider that their report is altogether satisfactory since the Romanians might have some explanation to make. In their telegram the Inter-Allied Military Mission mentioned the names of several towns as lying in territory which is to be ceded to Romania under the terms of the Treaty of Peace. As a matter of fact some of the towns in question would remain in Hungarian territory. He does not think that the report should be accepted as gospel.

Sir George Clerk says that he wishes to add that on the night before he left for Bucharest Mr Misu had come to see him. He had pointed out to Mr Misu how impossible the conduct of the Romanian authorities had been, as for example, in the case of the Museum at Budapest. Mr Misu then turned to Mr Vaida and asked him for the official explanation. Mr Vaida had then produced a telegram from his Government stating that the Romanian Government only wished to recover archives belonging to them which had been carried off to Budapest. He does not vouch for the truth of this explanation, which has not been investigated: it simply went to show that such incidents might have satisfactory explanations.

Mr Polk says that the explanation which the Romanians had made to the Inter-Allied Military Mission was that the material in question was Transylvanian property, and they wished to take it as they expected to acquire Transylvania. He wished to emphasize the point, however, that as the four Powers had sent four representatives to Budapest, there is no reason why the Romanians should not make their explanations to them. He feels that the Council should either accept the statements of the Generals or else recall them. Personally he had great faith in General Bandholtz. The fact that the Romanian Officials made their explanations outside of Budapest was decidedly unjust to the Inter-Allied Military Mission and placed them in an impossible position.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he agrees. He says further that the Council should insist that the explanation of the Romanian authorities should be made to the Inter-Allied Military Mission. The point which he had wished to raise was this: a note had been dispatched to the Romanian Government and the Council had not yet heard their side. He wishes to emphasize the necessity of waiting until a reply from the Romanian Government had been received, as he does not believe that conditions are any worse than the Council already knows them to be.

M Pichon says that the Council agrees as to the necessity of informing the Inter-Allied Military Mission of the note to the Romanian Government.

(It is decided to communicate to the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest the text of the note from the Principal Allied and Associated Governments to the Romanian Government approved by the Supreme Council on the 11th October.

2. M Pichon says that Mr Polk has not considered it advisable to transmit a telegram to H Friedrich but to send a representative of the Council to Budapest. The instructions to be given to Sir George Clerk are contained in the draft telegram to H Friedrich which had been previously discussed by the Council.

Mr Polk says that he wishes to suggest two changes in the text. In the first paragraph it is stated that the Allies have waited in the hope that the Government of H Friedrich, recognizing its inability to meet the conditions required by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, would either include representatives of all parties in Hungary or withdraw from office. He thinks that instead of speaking of “all parties” it would be better to substitute the words, “the several parties”. In the second paragraph he wishes to suggest that the words “in the view of the Allied and Associated Powers” be omitted.

M Pichon says that it has been agreed to inform the Inter-Allied Military Mission in regard to Sir George Clerk’s departure for Budapest. He thinks that Sir George Clerk should be charged to inform the Generals as to the discussion which had taken place in the Council on that day and to inform them that the Council are resolved to do all that is necessary to make the Romanian Government follow the line of action which had been decided upon.

(At this point Sir George Clerk leaves the meeting.)

Mr Polk says that he wishes to raise a question which he had hesitated to mention in Sir George Clerk’s presence. He understands that as Sir George Clerk is proceeding to Budapest as a representative of the principal Allied and Associated Powers the necessary expenses in connection with his mission, amounting to whatever sum Sir George Clerk in his discretion might consider necessary and proper, would be paid by the Allied and Associated Powers.

M Pichon says that he thinks that the British Government should pay the necessary expenses and that the amount in question should then be divided between the Powers interested.

Mr Polk said that Sir George Clerk is going to Budapest as the representative of the Supreme Council and it would be unfortunate if the impression should obtain in Romania or Hungary that the Council are dissatisfied with the Inter-Allied Military Mission. He thinks that a formal statement should be made to the four Generals which should contain the reasons why Sir George Clerk is going to Budapest.

M Pichon says that the Council has already decided to notify the four Generals at Budapest of Sir George Clerk’s mission.

Mr Polk points out that Sir George Clerk’s mission will be known to the press.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that Sir George Clerk is being sent to Budapest because it has been thought inadvisable by sending a telegram to give the appearance of mixing in the internal affairs of Hungary.

M Pichon said that he does not approve of giving any statement to the press. In any mention of Sir George Clerk’s mission, he will only be referred to as being charged with a special mission to Budapest on behalf of the Supreme Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks that Sir George Clerk’s date of departure might be fixed for the following Saturday.

(It was decided:

(1) That Sir George Clerk should proceed to Budapest as the special representative of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers;

(2) That Sir George Clerk should be directed to communicate with the several Hungarian political parties and that in his mission he should be guided by the spirit of the views of the Allied and Associated Powers as expressed in the draft telegram to H Friedrich, with the following alterations in the text: for the words “all parties” (Line 12) the words “the several parties” should be substituted, and in lines 17 and 18 “in the view of the Allied and Associated Powers” should be omitted;

(3) That Sir George Clerk should inform the four Generals at Budapest of the Discussion which had taken place in the Supreme Council on that day and that the Council are resolved to do all that was necessary to make the Romanian Government follow the line of action required of them;

(4) That such funds as Sir George Clerk might, in his discretion, consider necessary and proper for the expenses of the mission should be paid by the British Government and subsequently shared by the Principal Allied and Associated Governments;

(5) That the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest should be notified by telegraph of Sir George Clerk’s mission;

(6) That the only statement which should be made with regard to Sir George Clerk’s mission is that he has been dispatched to fulfill a special mission at Budapest on behalf of the Supreme Council.)

3. The Council has before it a Note of the 10th October from M Politis to M Clemenceau.

M de Saint Quentin reads and comments upon the note in question.

M Pichon says that he thinks it is a difficult matter for the Council to give instructions from Paris. If witnesses had given testimony under a promise of secrecy, he did not see how the Council could absolve the commission from the promises which they might have made.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the Council had made an engagement to Mr Venizelos.

S Scialoja says that when the Council had given the undertaking to Mr Venizelos they were not aware that the Commission had promised certain witnesses that their testimony would be held as secret.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he has just received a telegram from the British High Commissioner at Constantinople on the subject. The telegram confirms the fact that the Commission had decided to take certain evidence in private for the purpose of obtaining reliable information and avoiding reprisals. A definite promise had been made to certain witnesses. On the other hand, the Council had given an undertaking to the Greek Government.

M Pichon says that the Council are not to blame for what had occurred. He thinks the only possible compromise is to inform the Greek Delegation that the testimony taken after the instructions of the Supreme Council had been received would be placed at the disposal of the Greek Government. The Supreme Council are not in a position to give an undertaking as to previous promises made by the Commission of Inquiry.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees that this compromise would seem the best means of solving the difficulty.

Mr Polk asks as to the nature of the promise made by the Supreme Council.

M de Saint Quentin said that the undertaking in question was contained in a resolution of the Supreme Council.

(It is decided: that, owing to pledges of secrecy given by the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna to certain witnesses, the Commission be not obliged to communicate to the representative of the Greek Government, in its entirety, the evidence given by these witnesses before the receipt of the terms of the resolution of the 30th September.

4. The Council has before it a Note from the British Delegation of the 15th October.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the question is not one great importance. The Austrian Delegation had asked that the Austrian Prisoners of war held in Great Britain should be repatriated. There were only 36 officers and 135 others in Great Britain and the British Government saw no reason for refusing the request of the Austrian Delegation. It would probably be possible to repatriate the prisons in question with German prisoners. There was also a small number of Hungarian prisoners in Great Britain and the British Military Authorities were anxious that these should be repatriated at the present time. Repatriation of Austrian and Hungarian Prisoners in Great Britain and Japan

Mr Matsui asks whether the Council has any objections to the Japanese Government repatriating the small number of Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in their hands.

(It is decided that there is no objection to the immediate repatriation of the Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war in Great Britain and Japan.)

5. Sir Eyre Crowe says that the Council has just addressed a stiff note to the Romanian Government which asked them, in effect, whether or not they are prepared to accept the guidance of the Supreme Council. He desires to call attention to the fact that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had not signed the Treaty of Peace with Austria or the Minorities Treaty. At the present time there is a ministerial crisis at Belgrade. He had hoped that the moderate element would come into power, but at the moment it looks as if the intransigent element are about to come into power. If the matter were brought to a head at the present time the effect would be to strengthen the hands of the elements in Yugoslavia who are most anxious to cooperate with the Allied and Associated Powers. He suggests that at an early date a communication be addressed to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government inquiring whether or not they are prepared to sign the Treaties.

M Pichon says that he agrees with the opinion of Sir Eyre Crowe and thinks that action should be taken at once.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he has prepared a rough draft of a note to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. He does not mean that the draft should be accepted as final but he simply wishes to refer it to his colleagues for their consideration as a possible basis of discussion.

6. Mr Polk says that at the meeting of the Council of the 11th October Marshal Foch had raised the question of two Commissions to deal with subjects relating to Russian prisoners of war Germany. With reference to the resolution in the Minutes of the meeting in question he desires to make it quite clear that the United States cannot be committed to incur any expense. No American representative on the Commissions in question, or on any other Commission, can commit his Government to a financial obligation. The matter would first have to be brought before the Council and receive his approval.

The Council takes note of Mr Polk’s remarks with reference to Resolution No 4, to the effect that the American representative on the Commissions dealing with questions relating to Russian prisoners of war, and American representatives on all Commissions, cannot bind their Government to financial obligations unless the subjects in question had been brought before the Supreme Council and received Mr Polk’s approval.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

10-17-19, 08:33 AM

17th October 1919

Tokyo: The Japanese government says it will spend around £30 million on aviation development.

HMS Dragon (D46) hit by shore battery while participating in action against Germans in Riga.
https://i.postimg.cc/vT1LZnsK/EHEZY9v-X0-AUka-SU.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Former Austro-Hungarian cruiser SMS Kaiser Franz Joseph I sinks in the Bay of Kotor due to strong gales. The ship was in French control as reparations.
https://i.postimg.cc/2yJGQwGm/EHEZY9v-X0-AUka-SU.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

SMS Kaiser Franz Joseph I (Austro-Hungarian Navy) Awarded to France as a war reparation in the aftermath of World War I and overloaded with dismantled machinery, the protected cruiser foundered in a gale in Cattaro Bay off Kumbor on the coast of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes during her delivery voyage.

Sailor Steve

10-17-19, 12:07 PM

Friday, October 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

10-18-19, 11:56 AM

18th October 1919

Aftermath of War

Austrian Government ratifies Peace Treaty.

Lord Allenby appointed High Commissioner in Egypt.

Baron Feofil Egorovich Meyendorf, former Russian general who fought in the Russo-Turkish War and the Russo-Japanese War, has passed away.
https://i.postimg.cc/QN0vR2Bf/EHKn-4j-Xk-AAh-6p.png (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

HMS H41 (Royal Navy) The H-class submarine sank after a collision with HMS Vulcan ( Royal Navy) in the North Sea off Blyth, Northumberland.

Sailor Steve

10-19-19, 02:24 AM

Saturday, October 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a report presented by the Special Commission charged with determining the Composition of Inter-Allied Forces of Occupation.

General Weygand reads and comments upon the report. He calls the attention of the Council to the reservations formulated by the Italian Military Representative and by the British Delegation. The Italian Military Representative feels that he ought to affirm again that his Government ha only authorized the participation of three battalions destined for Upper Silesia. In the table prepared by the Commission the provision had been made for the employment of seven Italian battalions. He feels that he should add that in former Conferences the Italian Military Delegate has always expressed the same opinion on this point.

S Tittoni points out that in fact he has always stated that his Government can only send three battalions.

M Clemenceau observes that this decision means imposing a heavy burden on the French. He takes the liberty of insisting that S Tittoni should reconsider the matter. It seems to him that Italy, not being threatened on any frontier, could do at least something more. If she should persist in her refusal she would put the French in a most unfair situation.

S Tittoni reserves the right to reconsider the question.

General Weygand adds that the British Delegation has made two reservations: it had first been decided that Memel should be occupied by a British battalion and an American battalion; according to the revised table which the Council had before it the American battalion is to be sent to Upper Silesia to reinforce the United States forces there and was replaced at Memel by a French battalion. The British Delegate accepts this change on condition that the command should be held by a British officer.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that this request was based on the same reasons which the British had always advanced. It is purely a question of organization and administration.

M Clemenceau says that France has no objection to the command at Memel being held by a British Officer.

General Weygand explains that the British Delegation also asks that all British troops forming part of the forces of occupation at Danzig, Marienwerder, Allenstein and Memel, should be treated as a single unit from an administrative point of view, although they were placed under different commands.

M Clemenceau says that he cannot see anything unreasonable in this request.

General Weygand states that no formal reservation has been made with respect to the American troops: but according to his conversations with General Bliss it seems to him that one point still remains to be settled, namely, would the American Government authorize to the use of its troops before the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate?

Mr Polk observes that a cable has been sent on this subject and a reply is expected. All he can say for the moment is that the troops are on the way and are first to be sent to Coblenz. He wishes to draw the Council’s attention to another point. The Commission expresses the desire that in each zone of occupation the Presidency of the Inter-Allied Commission and the command of the troops of occupation should be invested in individuals of the same nationality. Would it not be preferable with respect to the Interallied Commission that the Presidency would not be permanent but should rather be held in rotation by each nation represented.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that this is scarcely practicable.

General Weygand observes that some Commissions, such as the one in Upper Silesia, would have a rather long life - perhaps from eight to twenty months - while others would only exist for from three to six months. Under these conditions he does not think a system of alternation is feasible.

M Clemenceau says that as far as he is concerned he attaches so much importance to good feeling between Allies that he is quite willing to accede to Mr Polk’s suggestion.

Mr Polk says that he in no way insists upon this, he is merely making a suggestion.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that each Inter-Allied Forces Commission might be left free to elect its own President.

General Weygand points out that this question is distinct from that of the command of the military forces, which would be determined before the departure of the troops in conformity with the Commission’s recommendations. He wishes finally to call the Council’s attention to a desire expressed by the Commission: It wishes the departure of the Inter-Allied Forces Commissions and of the forces of occupation to be determined in such a way, and the date of the coming into force of the Treaty to be settled in such a fashion, that the Commissions and forces of occupation would arrive at their appointed destinations at the moment of the coming into force of the Treaty. The Commission also wishes the German Government to be advised beforehand of the date determined for the entry into force of the Treaty and its coincidence with the arrival of the Commissions and troops of occupation so that the German Government might take the necessary measures.

M Clemenceau agrees.

General Weygand states that the Allied General Staffs should therefore agree on the date when the troops could arrive at their appointed destinations That would be a date upon which, as far as military questions were concerned, the Treaty could come into force. He would inform the Council of this date.

(It is decided:

(1) To accept the recommendations of the special Commission relative to the composition of Interallied forces of occupation, with the reservation that the definite approval of the Italian Government should be obtained;

(2) That the command of the various forces of occupation should be exercised according to the recommendations of the Commission, and that, at Memel, a British officer should be in command;

(3) That although the British troops forming part of the forces of occupation at Danzig, Marienwerder, Allenstein and Memel will be placed under different commands, they should, from an administrative point of view, be treated as a single unit;

(4) That the departure of the Commissions and of the forces of occupation should be regulated in such a way, and that the date of the entrance into force of the Treaty should be fixed in such a manner, that both the Commissions and the forces of occupation should arrive at their appointed destinations at the moment of the entrance into force of the treaty of Peace;

(5) That Marshal Foch, after agreeing with the Allied General Staffs, should inform the Supreme Council of the date from which they consider it possible for the Treaty to enter into force;

(6) That the German Government should be notified in advance of the date fixed for the entry into force of the Treaty and of its coincidence with the arrival of the Commissions and the forces of occupation, so that it might take all necessary measures within the proper time, and, especially to fix the date of evacuation of the districts in question by its own forces;

(7) That the Inter-Allied Forces Commissions sent into the zones of occupation should choose their own presidents, without it being necessary for them to be of the same nationality as the Commanding Officers in the corresponding zones of occupation.)

2. (The examination of this draft note is adjourned to the following session.)

3. M Berthelot says that a telegram has just been received from the Inter-Allied Mission at Budapest, stating that the Mission ha learned by a private telegram of the sending of Sir George Clerk to Budapest. The Mission asks that it receive official confirmation thereof and that Sir George Clerk’s Mission might be defined. He submits a draft telegram which would officially notify the Generals of Sir George Clerk’s arrival and would define the Mission with which he was entrusted.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that in order to make the matter even more definite there should be added at the end of the first paragraph a sentence specifying that Sir George Clerk represents the Supreme Council in all political questions.

S Tittoni says that he has no objection to this draft on the condition that it is well understood that the Generals are in no way superseded; it should be clear that Sir George Clerk has a special mission and the Generals should retain jurisdiction over all military questions.

M Berthelot proposes that the following sentence should be added at the end of the first paragraph, “He will represent the Supreme Council in all political questions, the Generals retaining jurisdiction over military questions.”

(It is decided:

(1) To approve the draft telegram to be sent to the Allied Generals at Budapest;

(2) To add to the end of the first paragraph of this draft telegram the following sentence;

“He will represent the Supreme Council in all political questions, the Military Mission retaining jurisdiction over military questions.”

4. The Council has before it a note from the drafting Committee dated October 16th, 1919.

M Fromageot reads and comments on the note of the Drafting Committee. With respect to page 3, Section C in this report:

Mr Polk raises the following questions: he asks if the question of restoration to Italy of rolling stock belonging to Italian Railroads is not within the jurisdiction of the Reparation Commission.

M Fromageot says this is not a question of reparations for war damages: it concerns in fact rolling stock which was on Austro-Hungarian territory at the outbreak of war and had been seized there.

Mr Polk, as a matter of information, asks if any disposition of this nature was provided for in the Treaty with respect to Austrian or Hungarian rolling stock which at the outbreak of war might have been on Italian territory.

M Fromageot states that there was not.

(It is decided that in conformity with the recommendations of the Drafting Committee to insert in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary the following articles:

“Article A. - Hungary renounces, in all that concerns her, in favor of Italy, all rights and titles to which she might lay claim over territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy recognized as forming part of Italy according to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Peace concluded September 10th, 1919 between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria.

Article B. - No payment is due on the part of Italy by reason of her taking possession of the Palazzo Venezia at Rome.

Article C. - Hungary will restore to Italy, within three months, all the rolling stock belonging to Italian railroads which, prior to the outbreak of war, has been transported into Austria and are at present in Hungary.

Article D. - In derogation of Article 269, Part X, (Economic Clauses), persons having their customary residence in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy now transferred to Italy pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, and who, during the war, were without the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or had been imprisoned, interned or evacuated, will benefit fully by the provisions of Articles 252 and 253, Part X, (Economic Clauses).

Article E.— Judgments rendered in civil and commercial causes since August 4th, 1914, by courts of territories transferred to Italy, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, between inhabitants of the said territories and nationals of the former kingdom of Hungary, will only become executory after an exequatur rendered by the new corresponding court of the territories in question.
All judgments rendered since August 4th, 1914, by the judicial authorities of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy against Italian nationals or against those who shall acquire Italian nationality, pursuant to the Treaty of Peace with Austria, for political crimes or misdemeanors, will be deemed null and void.”

5. The Council has before it a note of the Drafting Committee dated October 17th, 1919.

M Fromageot reads and comments on the note of the Drafting Committee. With respect to the eventual convocation of the Council of the League of Nations the following questions are raised:

Mr Polk asks if all the Powers which, when they should have ratified the Treaty of Peace, will be represented in the Council of the League of Nations, would have to be represented at the first meeting of the Council? President Wilson had made it known that he was prepared to call a meeting of the Council for the three Powers which had ratified the Treaty, and he wishes to know if the other powers had now to designate their representatives.

M Fromageot explain that they do not have to, but that they could do so. This obligation would only arise for those Powers after they had ratified the Treaty. Nothing in the Treaty made the coming into force or the ratification thereof a condition precedent to these designations.

Mr Polk wishes to know if this applies, for instance to Spain.

M Fromageot answered that Spain can designate its representative; that it is known, moreover, that she was ready to do so.

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to know if the Treaty specifies any quorum necessary to validate the meetings of the League of Nations. Would the absence of one of the members invalidate the Council’s decision?

Mr Polk says that he does not think so.

M Tardieu says that there is no such provision in the Treaty.

Mr Polk asked if the Drafting Committee could prepare for Monday’s meeting a draft form of convocation to be sent out by President Wilson to call the meeting of the Council.

M Fromageot resumes his commentaries on the note of the Drafting Committee.

M Tardieu explains that the second part of the Drafting Committee’s note has to some extent duplicated the work of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty. This latter Committee, pursuant to the instructions it had received from the Supreme Council, had drawn up a list of the Commissions to be formed, and had indicated what Powers had designated their representatives on these Commissions and what Powers had not yet done so.

M Clemenceau states that this latter report should be distributed and examined prior to the meeting of Thursday, October 23rd: at this time each Power should designate the Commissioners which it had not yet named.

(It is decided that the Drafting Committee should submit to the Supreme Council at its next meeting:

(1) The draft of a letter by which President Wilson should convoke the Council of the League of Nations for the day of the entry into force of the Treaty;

(2) The draft of a letter from the Supreme Council to each of the Powers represented in the Council of the League of Nations inviting them to designate forthwith their representatives on this Council, as France and Italy is already done.

6. The Council has before it two draft protocols prepared by the Drafting Committee concerning, first, the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace signed between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, of the Protocols signed on the same day by the said Powers, and of the arrangement of the same date between the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, France and Germany relative to the occupation of the Rhineland secondly, the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty signed June 28th, 1919, between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland.

M Fromageot points out that it is necessary to make a separate procès-verbal for each group of ratifications. It had likewise seemed important to the Committee that the hour of the signature should appear on the Procès-Verbaux. Indeed, that is an important point for the agents who would then be on the spot and who should be informed in advance or, at least, by telegram, of the hour the Treaty would come into force. In these protocols Germany for the last time signed in the last place: once this act had been accomplished she would sign in her alphabetical order. He draws the Council’s attention to the great importance of having Czechoslovakia ratify the Treaty of Versailles before it should come into force. Czechoslovakia would be the only non-ratifying country having a common frontier with Germany. A situation might thus arise which might create difficulties with respect to the operation of the Delimitation Commission provided for by Article 83 of the Treaty.

(It is decided to approve the draft procès-verbaux of Deposits of Ratifications prepared by the Drafting Committee with respect, first, to the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, as well as of the Protocol signed on the same day by the said Powers, and of the Arrangement of the same date between the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, France and Germany, concerning the Rhineland; secondly, to the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty with Poland.

7. The Council has before it a note from the French Delegation and a note of the Drafting Committee dated October 16th, 1919.

M Fromageot reads and commented upon the note of the Drafting Committee. He explains that the question raised by Herr Von Lersner only concerns the Delimitation and Plebiscite Commissions, but it is insidious, because the same argument might apply to far more important Commissions such as the Reparation Commission. If Germany might maintain that the Reparation Commission could only operate if a given power were represented thereon, a very dangerous situation would arise. Consequently the Drafting Committee recommends that all Commissions should be considered regularly constituted as soon as the Powers which had ratified the Treaty - and which consequently would then be obliged to be represented on these Commissions and the Powers which had agreed to send representatives before having ratified, should be represented. The latter Powers would be in a situation analogous to that of the Powers which were not parties to the Treaty but which, nevertheless, were by the Treaty accorded the right of designating representatives on different Commissions, such, for instance, as Holland and the Scandinavian States.

Mr Polk says that he has no objection to make to this solution but he wonders if the Germans could raise any.

M Fromageot replies that they will have no valid ground for contesting the vote of a member of a Commission designated by a Power which has not yet ratified the Treaty; when once the Treaty had come into force, the Commissions are composed of the representatives of the Powers specified in the Treaty. The Treaty nowhere provides that the representatives on the Commissions should be the representatives of Powers which had ratified.

S Tittoni inquires if ratification and the right of being represented on Commissions should be considered in law as two distinct matters? He wishes to know if the right of representation exists even in the absence of ratification, or was the foregoing only a provisional solution?

M Fromageot replies that the Drafting Committee considers the right of representation to be in law independent of ratification: The right of representation exists irrespective of ratification, whereas, on the other hand, the duty of being represented arises from ratification. But there is a second delicate point: What will happen if the Powers which have not ratified do not designate representatives? It seems to the Drafting Committee that even in this case the decisions of the Commissions would be valid; if, in that event, the votes should be equal, the vote of the President of the Commission would be controlling as provided for in article 437 of the Treaty.

M Clemenceau thinks that the question has not been raised and wonders if the Germans would seek to raise trouble on this point.

S Tittoni thinks that if M Fromageot’s argument are legally sound, the reply to his question was implied to be contained therein: with regard to the Powers which had ratified, and which thereby came under the obligation of naming representatives on the Commissions, there is no doubt that they must send representatives in order to validate the decisions of these Commissions; on the other hand, if the Powers which merely have the option of naming representatives do not make use thereof, that fact would in no wise affect the validity of the decisions of the Commissions, and the latter could operate legally.

M Clemenceau inquires whether Germany should be informed of the foregoing point of view before she had raised any question with respect thereto.

M Fromageot sees no necessity of replying and thinks that there is nothing to be gained by divulging these arguments.

S Tittoni expresses the desire that M Fromageot should give the Council a confidential report containing the legal development of this argument.

M Clemenceau thinks that this would be a purely academic document, but he has no objection to M Fromageot giving it to S Tittoni.

M Fromageot inquires whether his Committee should reply on the first point to H Von Lersner.

M Clemenceau says that it should send a note to M Dutasta.

M Dutasta remarks that H Von Lersner makes no secret of the fact that public opinion in Germany will be greatly disturbed if America is not represented on the different Commissions until the Senate had ratified the Treaty.

Mr Polk doubts whether, under M Fromageot’s plan, America will be represented.

M Clemenceau states that he recalls distinctly that President Wilson, after some hesitation, had agreed that the United States would be represented on the Reparation Commission.

Mr Polk points out that this is only unofficial. Prior to ratification the United States is not authorized to be officially represented; he very much doubts whether, in view of the political situation, the United States will insist as a matter of right on having official representation on these Commissions prior to ratification. If Mr Wilson spoke of American representation on the Reparation Commission he only meant representation after ratification.

M Clemenceau agrees.

(It is decided:

(1) To approve the principles contained in the note of the Drafting Committee relative to the question put by Baron von Lersner;

(2) That the Drafting Committee should send to the Secretary General of the Conference a note refuting the argument presented by Baron von Lersner in the course of his interview with M Dutasta.)

8. M Tardieu reads the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on October 15th. The reply to the first two paragraphs of this resolution is contained in M Fromageot’s report; there remains the last question: what is the value of the means of action placed at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers by the Treaty of Peace compared with those available by virtue of the Armistice?

Under the Armistice the available means were:

Measures To Be Taken Immediately Upon the Coming Into Force of the Treaty

(1) The occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads;

(2) The right of occupying that portion of the neutral zone from north of Cologne to the Dutch frontier;

(3) The occupation of the bridgehead at Kehl (measures to that effect had been taken);

(4) Resumption of hostilities after forty-eight hours notice;

(5) The maintenance of the blockade;

(6) The retention of prisoners of war.

The coming into force of the Treaty will deprive us of the possibility of resuming hostilities; it deprives us of the weapon of blockade insofar as general measures were concerned, since the American Government does not seem disposed to admit the principle of a pacific blockade; finally, we lost the right of occupying the neutral zone to the north of Cologne. With the Treaty in force, if Germany commits hostile acts, the Covenant of the League of Nations will come into play. If, on the other hand, Germany limits itself to acts of passive resistance, Articles 12 to 18 of the Covenant will come into operation and the Council of the League of Nations would take such measures as it deems fit. Finally, the occupation of the bridgeheads gives us another means of action. The Treaty of Peace likewise allows us, which was not true of the Armistice, to disarm Germany and to stop the manufactures and the recruiting which she is carrying on at the present moment. He adds that whatever judgment might be passed on the reply of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty, its value was only relative, for the period of decision is necessarily a very short one.

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to know what the attitude will be with respect to the clauses of the Armistice which had not been fulfilled. Can their fulfillment be exacted?

M Tardieu replies that the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty had not considered this question. He, personally, is of the opinion that if the Treaty should be put into force without previously demanding the fulfillment of these clauses there will be no ground for such a demand after the Treaty’s coming into force. If it were desired that certain clauses should be fulfilled by Germany a demand to that effect should be made before the Treaty came into force.

M Clemenceau inquires what causes Sir Eyre Crowe had in mind.

Sir Eyre Crowe replied that he is thinking of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.

M Tardieu says that if the fulfillment of the Armistice clauses which have not been carried out is desired, the only efficacious means of action should be used, namely, an advance into Germany.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that this would be rather difficult after the Treaty has been ratified.

M Clemenceau asked the Drafting Committee to submit at the next meeting of the Council a report on this question, having especially in mind the situation in the Baltic Provinces.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Drafting Committee should present to the Supreme Council at its next meeting a report as to whether, after the coming into force of the Treaty, the Allied and Associated Powers would have the right to demand the fulfillment of Clauses of the Armistice which have not been executed, in particular, the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces;

(2) That the Drafting Committee should point out in its report the affirmative means of action of which the Allied and Associated Governments might avail themselves in order to insure the fulfillment of these clauses after the coming into force of the Treaty.)

9. M Tardieu said that at its meeting of July 28th the Council had approved a recommendation of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty and had decided to create a Committee to coordinate questions relative to the interpretation and the execution of the clauses of the Treaty with Germany. Up to present moment the British Empire and Japan had alone designated their representatives on this Committee. It would be well for the United States, France and Italy to designate their representatives on this Committee.

S Tittoni proposes that the Powers should have the right to designate an alternate delegate in case their principal delegate should not be able to sit.

(It is decided:

(1) That the United States, France and Italy should as soon as possible designate their representatives on the Committee for the coordination of questions concerning the interpretation and execution of the clauses of the Treaty with Germany;

(2) That the Principal Allied and Associated Powers might designate alternate delegates who, if necessary, should replace their delegates on this Committee.)

10. Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the allowance for members of the Commissions of Control and of Delimitation had been fixed, but that nothing had been decided for the members of the Plebiscite Commissions. He suggested that the question should be referred to a special Committee. Allowances for Members of the Plebiscite Commissions

(It is decided that a subcommittee of the Committee on the execution of the Treaty should determine the allowances to be granted to the personnel of the Plebiscite Commissions, after having consulted representatives of these Commissions.)

11. Marshal Foch states that the reply of the German Government to the last Note of the Allied and Associated Powers relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces had just reached him, and that it would be sent that day to the various delegations. The German Government accepts the sending of an Allied General Officer as had been proposed in the Note of the Allied and Associated Powers. In view of the great importance of hastening in every way the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, he recommended that the Council should at once designate this General Officer, and he proposed the name of General Mangin.

(It is decided that General Mangin should be charged by the Allied and Associated Powers with the duty,

(1) Of ascertaining from the German Government the measures taken by it with a view to regulating the conditions of evacuation, and of proposing to that Government the measures which he himself should deem proper;

(2) Of exercising on the spot an effective control over the execution of these measures.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

10-19-19, 05:56 AM

19th October 1919

[October 19th, 1919] "Ferdinand Foch, Marshal of France" (New York Tribune)
https://i.postimg.cc/QNfBhf1x/0gd8obaw3gt31.jpg (https://postimg.cc/MXjZYb9h)

Ship Losses:

Constanza (Sweden) The cargo ship, en route from Bougie to Gothenburg, Sweden, sank after striking a mine in Kattegat. Two crew members were killed.

Sailor Steve

10-19-19, 05:13 PM

Sunday, October 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

10-20-19, 08:50 AM

20th October 1919

Albert I of Belgium: The King and the Queen during their visit to Isleta pueblo in New Mexico, with the Governor of New Mexico and Anton Docher.
https://i.postimg.cc/gkY2vWWK/k-La21-Hi0-S6-yu-HJ-Rqqs-SPNDl-Ij-Rz-WXTTxrz-E-4p-Tw0.jpg (https://postimg.cc/Sjv4hHjX)

Refugee children from Petrograd (St. Petersburg) in Siberia to escape the Russian Civil War.
https://i.postimg.cc/cCGrqgPq/EHPx-Zh-OW4-AAPRbs.png (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Gavril (Soviet Navy) Russian Civil War: British campaign in the Baltic: The Gavril-class destroyer was sunk by mines in Koporsky Bay in the Gulf of Finland.
Hollandia (Sweden) The combined cargo and passenger ship, en route from Gothenburg to Antwerp, sank after striking a mine in the North Sea. Only four crew survived. The master and seventeen crew, and two passengers, perished.
Konstantin (Soviet Navy) Russian Civil War: British campaign in the Baltic: The Gavril-class destroyer was sunk by mines in Koporsky Bay in the Gulf of Finland.
Svoboda (Soviet Navy) Russian Civil War: British campaign in the Baltic: The Gavril-class destroyer was sunk by mines in Koporsky Bay in the Gulf of Finland.

sublynx

10-20-19, 09:30 AM

Quite a picture about those children. One can't help but wonder how their lives turned out to be after the taking of that picture

Jimbuna

10-20-19, 12:05 PM

Quite a picture about those children. One can't help but wonder how their lives turned out to be after the taking of that picture

True that and I think I'd rather be in the dark tbh.

Sailor Steve

10-20-19, 06:08 PM

Monday, October 20, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Pichon desires to refer to the minutes of the meeting of the Council of October 16th and reads the following, question of Mr. Polk.

“Mr. Polk said that he hoped that the matter could be cleared up. He wished to ask whether the rifles were to be delivered to the Hungarian police at the present time and whether the Romanian forces were to withdraw at the present time, whatever the Government in Hungary might be.

Pichon replied in the affirmative.”

He states that he wishes to make his position clear in this respect. He means that he agreed that the rifles in question are to be delivered to the Hungarian gendarmerie at the present time, but with reference to the withdrawal of the Romanians he feels that this matter should wait upon the receipt of a reply to the Council’s note to the Romanian Government and upon the report to be made by Sir George Clerk. He feels that this is the sense of the whole discussion.

Mr Polk says that he understands that the Council and the Allied Generals had already directed the Romanians to withdraw and that, therefore, there is no reason to have their withdrawal wait upon the receipt of a reply to the Council’s note to the Romanian Government, or upon a report from Sir George Clerk.

M Pichon says that he only wants to make his own opinion clear.

Mr Polk desires to ascertain the Council’s opinion. The Allied Generals have directed the Romanians to withdraw and they had been supported in this action by the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that a demand for withdrawal is contained in the note sent to the Romanian Government and that the Council are awaiting an answer thereto.

M Pichon replies that this is so, but thinks that it is important to receive the reply of the Romanian Government in order to know what it would be most practical to do.

Mr Polk points out that the Romanians have been directed to withdraw prior to the sending of the note. He reads from the minutes of the meeting the question asked by him, above referred to, and explains that what he means was that it was the duty of the Romanians to withdraw at once without waiting for any conference with Sir George Clerk.

2. The Council has before it a draft communication of the Supreme Council to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government relative to the signature of Peace with Austria.

Mr Polk states that he wishes to read the draft note to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government in order satisfy himself as to questions of form only, and the he will communicate his conclusions thereupon to Sir Eyre Crowe later in the day. Communication to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government Relative to the Signature of Peace With Austria

It is decided to approve the draft communication from the Supreme Council to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government relative to the signature of peace with Austria subject to the reservation that Mr Polk will examine this draft further with reference to questions of form and would communicate his conclusions to Sir Eyre Crowe.

3. Sir Eyre Crowe says that it has been reported to him that as a result of the situation at Kiga the Allied Naval Armistice Commission has decided temporarily to stop the movement of all German ships in the Baltic. Formerly it was necessary to obtain the Commission’s permission for German ships to navigate but the Commission now proposes to suspend the granting of all such permissions. He wishes to know if the Supreme Council agrees to this action.

M Pichon says that the Council will take note of it.

Mr Polk inquires whether this will apply to all German ships in the Baltic regardless of where they might be.

Sir Eyre Crowe replies that this is the case, the reason being that if ships are allowed to go out of the harbors where they now were there is no telling what their destination might be.

Mr Polk feels that if the Armistice Commission have taken such action it is quite all right.

Sir Eyre Crowe adds that a British ship had been fired on by the Germans and twice hit.

(The council notes with approval the action of the Allied Naval Armistice Commission.)

4. The Council has before it a report from the Supreme War Council relative to supplies to be furnished the Polish Army.

General Belin states that the Council had agreed on all the points embraced in this report, with the reservation by the American Representative to the effect that his Government could at the present moment not participate in any way in furnishing supplies to Poland.

S Tittoni observes that a Polish Committee for the purchase of war material had been in contact with his Government and he hopes that the participation by Italy in the furnishing of supplies recommended under the terms of the War Council’s report would not interrupt the activities of this Polish Purchasing Committee in Italy.

General Belin observes that the same situation exists in France. General Le Rond calls attention to the deficiency which would exist even if the recommendations contained in the report of the Supreme War Council were fully carried out. Marshal Foch had made it clear that 600,000 sets of warm clothing were urgently necessary for the Polish Army. The Marshal had shown that it was a political as well as a military necessity to furnish this clothing immediately to the Polish Army but it now appeared that only 200,000 sets of warm clothing could possibly be sent to the Polish Army; likewise, it is evident that no Power can supply sufficient rolling stock to Poland in accordance with the recommendations of the report. Anything that any Power might be able to do over and above the contribution allotted to it by this report would be of the greatest possible benefit. The gravest problem necessarily is that of clothing; if the Polish Army does not receive partially adequate clothing before the setting in of a rigorous winter it was extremely liable to become imbued with the dangerous revolutionary doctrines by which they were surrounded.

Mr Polk desires to ask the officers present if they think that an army of the present size is a necessity to Poland.

General Le Rond agrees with Mr Polk’s underlying idea that the Polish army should be reduced to such a size as would be consistent with military necessity, but a question of fact was presented in that the Polish Government was obliged to clothe even those men who were now under arms and who might later be demobilized.

S Tittoni feels that a reduction in the size of the Polish army is inevitable. He recalls that when Mr Paderewski was last heard before the Council he had made it very clear that it would be impossible for Poland to continue to pay an army of that size. The Council feels that no Power or Powers can undertake the financial burden necessary for the maintenance of the Polish army, and the examination of the question had been postponed. His immediate concern, however, is not Bolshevism, for he feels that this is rapidly tending to become less dangerous.

General Le Rond thinks that it is somewhat premature to dismiss the question of the danger of Bolshevism thus lightly.

S Tittoni reiterates that the size of the Polish army must be reduced as there is no way of paying it.

Mr Polk calls attention to the fact that according to a prior report on this question 100,000 new men were being called to the colors in November and 75,000 additional men would be called up in January and March.

General Le Rond inquires whether the number of men demobilized is also shown in this report. It is a fact that the Poles have released a considerable number of the older classes.

M Pichon points out that in a recent debate in the Polish Diet the Minister of War had promised that a substantial number of men would shortly be demobilized: this, however, is dependent upon the situation in Russia, and according to latest advice, the end of the Soviet regime can hardly be predicted as likely to occur prior to the month of March. It will be highly imprudent therefore to cease taking serious precautions. Certainly every effort must be made to clothe the Polish army at once.

Mr Polk says there is no doubt of that.

General Belin points out that the report of the Supreme War Council has taken account of the fact that an additional effort relative to the supply of the Polish army might have to be made; it was for this reason that the report had specified that the general basis of its recommendations was a momentary one.

Sir Eyre Crowe desires to point out that if the British are to be asked to make a further effort with respect to supplying the Polish army it should be remembered what had already been done by them; for instance, the British practically alone had undertaken the complete supply of the forces in southern Russia.

(It is decided to accept the report submitted by the Supreme War Council relative to aid to be given to the Polish army and to transmit this report to Marshal Foch for execution.)

5. The Council has before it a draft proclamation of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission.

M Tirarp explained that this proclamation would be published on the day the Treaty entered into force. He points out that in the first and second paragraphs of this proclamation mention was made only of the Allied Powers; if the United States should decide to designate a representative on this Commission the words “and Associated” could be added to the words “the Allied Powers” at the last moment.

Mr Polk said that the point could not be answered on that day. He would immediately transmit the draft of this document to his Government for its approval.

(It is decided to adopt the draft proclamation of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, with the reservations that Mr. Polk would submit this document to his Government for approval, and that in case the United States Government should communicate a decision to designate a representative on the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, the words “and Associated” should be added in the first and second paragraphs to the words “The Allied Powers”.)

6. The Council has before it a draft form of letter to be signed by the President of the United States calling the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, a draft letter from the President of the Conference to the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, and a draft letter from the President of the Conference to the chief delegate of the United States of America, the British Empire, Japan, Belgium, Brazil and Greece.

M Fromageot reads and comments on these three draft letters and points out that it is most important to have the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations take place at the very hour when the Treaty comes into effect and in the same place. Taking up the question of the Sarre territory, as an example, he shows that there is no obligation under the Treaty to appoint a Sarre Commission within any given time, but that if this is not done this district would be without any Government whatsoever, inasmuch as all German authority ceases the moment the Treaty comes into force.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks that the same thing applied to Danzig.

M Fromageot says that this is not quite so in form, although substantially it is so.

Mr Polk states that he has already cabled the draft of the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations to Washington.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees to the necessity of having the first meeting take place at the moment the Treaty comes into effect, but he is not so convinced of the necessity of having the first meeting in Paris. The essential machinery actually existed and is in London.

S Tittoni states that he has just received from the Secretary General at London the agenda for the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. There are two alternative agenda possible: if the United States were not represented at the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations this meeting should take place in Paris and could only concern itself with the nomination of members of the Commission of Delimitation of the Sarre Territory; whereas, if the United States should be represented at this meeting it should take place in London and the agenda would then comprise numerous questions which would necessitate protracted action.

M Pichon points out that the agenda received by S Tittoni can only be a draft. The question of the place where the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations should take place can only be decided here by the Supreme Council because Sir Eric Drummond cannot act officially as General Secretary of the League of Nations before the Treaty came into force. Up to the present time all official meetings with reference to the organization of the League of Nations have taken place in Paris. M Clemenceau and Colonel House had agreed that the first meeting should be in Paris.

Sir Eyre Crowe states that he is not aware of any such agreement.

M Fromageot points out that it would be most unfortunate to have nothing but the question of the Sarre Delimitation Commission on the agenda of the first meeting.

M Pichon says that President Wilson has agreed to call the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations at Paris.

Mr Polk says that he is not objecting, but that he had never known that there was such an agreement. He thought, in fact, that it was better to have the first meeting here in Paris, but that he was quite unaware that there had been an agreement to that effect. He could recall nothing further than that at a meeting between MM. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Tittoni and the Japanese Ambassador the matter had been discussed. He had never seen the letter in question from Colonel House to M Clemenceau, except insofar as he had seen press reports thereof, and he did not think that President Wilson was committed by this letter.

M Pichon remarks that if Mr Polk has already cabled to Washington, there is nothing to do but to await a reply.

(It is decided:

(1) To adopt the draft form of letter, to be signed by President Wilson, convoking the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations;

(2) To adjourn the consideration of the question of an unofficial meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

7. Mr. Polk summarizes a letter from the Commanding General of the American Forces in Germany recommending that the cost of transportation to and maintenance in the United States of German subjects convicted of serious offences, entailing a sentence of confinement of five years or more, against members of the American Forces or against the property or authority of the American Forces in Germany, be deemed a proper charge against the German Government as an item in the cost of maintenance of troops of occupation. Cost of Transportation to and Maintenance in the United States of German Subjects Convicted of Serious Offences Against Members of the American Forces or Against the Property or Authority of American Forces in Germany

(It is decided to refer this question to the Drafting Committee.)

8. The Council has before it a report from the Drafting Committee relative to the enforcement of unfulfilled armistice clauses after the entrance into force of the Treaty and to affirmative means of action available to the Allied and Associated Powers.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon this report.

Mr Polk asks whether a pacific blockade could be imposed by any other body than the League of Nations.

M Fromageot says that the Covenant does provide means of pressure but his Committee is considering the question independently of the provisions with respect to the League of Nations and rather from the point of view of action to be taken by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr Polk queries whether economic pressure could not be exerted by the Separation Commission? What he chiefly desires to ascertain is what is the quickest means of bringing pressure to bear on Germany?

M Fromageot said that apart from a blockade there could be effective interdiction of commerce as well as financial measures. Furthermore there are additional means of bringing pressure to bear, for instance, it might be provided that German goods and German freights should be subjected to a severe surtax which could go towards the payment of Germany’s debt for reparations. He adds that if certain Powers have objections to a pacific blockade these objections could only be valid in so far as they emanate from Powers that had ratified the Treaty. Powers who had not ratified could declare a blockade and could take measures amounting to interdiction of commerce while requesting that the Powers which had ratified the Treaty should coordinate with them.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks that Mr Polk’s question is not as to what measures might be taken but as to who might take them.

M Fromageot replies that the principal Allied and Associated Powers can do so. He adds that an additional means of exerting pressure is the occupation of German territory, for which there are clear precedents, for instance, the occupation of the Duchy of Schleswig and of Mitylene. Finally there remains the possibility of retaining prisoners until the Germans should fulfill all of their obligations arising out of the armistice.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that there are a good many practical questions remaining to be settled. Certainly the various Commissions charged with the supervision of the execution of the terms of the armistice should report on the terms of the Armistice which still remained unfulfilled and submit these reports to the Council. He says that he knows offhand several unfulfilled clauses, for instance, the naval clauses.

M Berthelot suggests that each Committee charged with the supervision of execution of the Armistice clauses should be asked to report within four days on any unfulfilled clauses coming within their jurisdiction.

(It is decided:

(1) That Marshal Foch and the competent Commissions (The Allied Armistice Commission at Cologne, the Allied Naval Armistice Commission at London, the Financial Commission) should report to the Council within four days all clauses of the Armistice still remaining unfulfilled;

(2) That Sir Eyre Crowe should take the necessary measures to secure this report from the Allied Naval Armistice Commission.

9. The Council has before it a letter from General Nollet to President Clemenceau, dated Berlin, October 9th, 1919.

Colonel Roye states the substance of this letter to the council.

M Pichon asks if there are any objections to the recommendations contained in this letter.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Council already has certain officers fulfilling certain functions, and that according to these functions their allowances had been regulated. Now another principle was being introduced; that of payment according to military rank.

Colonel Rote states that General Nollet recommended these allowances because he intends to use these two Generals on special missions.

M Pichon thinks that it was not a question of rank, as Sir Eyre Crowe had indicated. These two officers are to be given these allowances not because they are Generals but because they are heads of delegations.

Mr Polk says that the whole theory of allowances is being brought up in this question and that the Council is not really competent now to decide this question. It should be referred to Versailles.

S Tittoni asked if there are any other officers in this situation.

M Pichon says that there probably are not.

S Tittoni thinks that in that case no precedent will be created.

Mr Polk points out that anything done now will surely constitute a precedent with respect to Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

M Pichon thinks that under the circumstances the best thing to do is to refer the matter back to General Nollet asking him for further information and recommendations, having in mind all the consequences that might result from the granting of allowances in these particular cases.

(It is decided to refer the question of monthly allowances to be assigned to General Officers, members of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control in Germany, who were Chairmen of neither Commissions nor Sub-Commissions to General Nollet for further information and recommendations.)

10. The Council has before it a note of protest from the Greek Delegation against the decision taken by the British Command to transport to Constantinople Turkish heavy artillery and munitions left in the Greek zone of occupation in Asia Minor.

M Berthelot, in commenting on the Greek protest, points out that the Greeks have no right to the matériel in question; they have only obtained the same by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Council which allowed them to occupy the Smyrna district to maintain order there. On the other hand, as the Turks are being disarmed, they should not have this matériel either. It belongs to the reparation fund. He thinks it might be best to approve the decision of the British Command, with the understanding that this matériel should be received and held in the name of the Allied Powers.

(It is decided to approve the decision of the British Command to transport to Constantinople Turkish heavy artillery and munitions left in the Greek zone of occupation in Asia Minor, on the understanding that this materiel be received and held in the name of the Allied Powers.)

11. The Council has before it a note from the French Delegation on the repatriation of troops from Siberia.

Mr Polk asks if it is settled as to who should pay the expenses of repatriation.

S Tittoni observes that this is a different question; the only thing now to be decided is the order in which the troops were to be repatriated.

Mr Polk thinks he has no objection as to the order in which the troops were to be repatriated, but he did not wish the question to be decided on that day. He recalls that he had heard that local conditions in Siberia made it inadvisable, for instance, to repatriate all the Czechoslovak troops first.

M Berthelot wishes to add, for the information of the Council, that it is understood that the French will bear the expenses of repatriation arising in Siberia, and that the British would bear the expense of sea transportation; afterwards a division of expenses would be made. He adds that after considerable discussion Dr Benes promised him that the Czechoslovak Government will pay at least half of the expenses of the repatriation of the Czechoslovak troops, and, if possible, will do even better. There remains still unsettled the question of whether the United States will pay a part of the expenses.

Mr Polk says that the difficulty now is that his Government is prepared to pay a lump sum, but there is a question whether France and England can contribute.

(It is decided to adjourn the discussion and decision of this question.)

(The meeting then adjourns)

Jimbuna

10-21-19, 09:36 AM

21st October 1919

Two men of the Australian Flying Corps attempt to make the first aerial trip from Britain to Australia on a Sopwith Wallaby (the attempt fails when they crash land in Bali on 17 April 1920)
https://i.postimg.cc/0jg32C0N/EHa-Epy-XXUAc-Xq-Z1.png (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

10-21-19, 07:42 PM

Tuesday, October 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

10-22-19, 08:37 AM

22nd October 1919

John Cyril Porte, a British pioneer in developing flying boats, dies at the age of 35 due to tuberculosis.
https://i.postimg.cc/MT6cY9Xc/EHe-JVg-CWo-AEdaf0.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

10-22-19, 04:59 PM

Wednesday, October 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. Sir Eyre Crowe says that he wishes to bring to the attention of the Council a telegram which has just been received, according to which a German aeroplane had made a forced landing in the neighborhood of Kovno. This aeroplane carried German civilian pilots and three passengers, one of whom was Russian and the other two Turkish; this aeroplane was travelling from Berlin to Moscow and was being held until further orders.

2. Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to bring to the notice of the Council the fact that the British Government, called upon by a number of Delegates, is making every effort to secure berths for Delegates who wanted to proceed to Washington in connection with the Labor Congress, but is not absolutely sure of securing same. He would make every effort for this purpose; perhaps the Council can give direct orders to the Allied Maritime Transport Executive.

Mr Polk says that he feels the same way, and has already cabled to Washington asking whether it would be possible to take care of these Delegates on transports which are sailing from Brest within the next few days; he doubts, however, whether this can be done, considering that every available berth has been taken. An answer is expected the following day.

M Pichon says that it would be wise to settle the question at the meeting of the Council to be held on the following day, and meanwhile to instruct the Allied Maritime Transport Executive in the way suggested by Sir Eyre Crowe.

Mr Polk fears that the Allied Maritime Transport Executive will reply that all available tonnage which it controls had been allotted to commerce.

3. S Tittoni wished to announce that Italy has appointed Count Bonin-Langare, Italian Ambassador in Paris, as its Delegate on the permanent Committee charged with the execution of the Treaty, and Professor Pagliano as second Delegate.

M Pichon says that France will be represented on the Committee by himself, and by M Berthelot as second Delegate.

4. The Council had before it a note from the Finance Commission dated October 15th, 1919, relative to a telegram from the French High Commissioner at Constantinople dated September 23rd, 1919, and a draft telegram to be sent by the Government of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople.

M Cheysson reads and comments upon the note from the Finance Commission.

Sir Eyre Crowe stated that he has consulted the Legal Advisers of the British Delegation on the subject, and that the latter felt that two points had to be distinguished, liquidation and control. With regard to liquidation, the Legal Advisers approve of the proposals of the Finance Commission. With regard to control, they have remarked that two questions were to be considered, not only the Treaty with Germany about also the Armistice conditions with Turkey; the Armistice conditions prohibited the Turks from allowing Germans to resume their position in Turkey. He thinks the question had better be referred back to the Drafting Committee which would be able to furnish a report in short time.

S Tittoni thinks that the question should certainly be submitted to the Legal Advisers. The question was important: were the Armistice conditions with Turkey, or rather, as he thought, the provisions in the Treaty of Peace with Germany to govern the situation of German and Austrian banks in Turkey.

(It is decided to refer to the Drafting Committee for examination and report the note of October 15th, 1919 from the Finance Commission, relative to the situation of German and Austrian banks in Turkey, as well as the draft telegram to the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople prepared by this Commission.

5. The Council has before it a note from the Greek Delegation to the Peace Conference dated October 15th, 1919.

S Tittoni says that the Economic Commission is competent to examine this note. The Draft Treaty with Hungary contains, in Section 4, Part 10, clauses which are pertinent to the above case in the protest of the Greek Delegation.

(It is decided to refer to the Economic Commission for examination and report the protest of the Greek Delegation relative to the sequestration of property belonging to the Greek Orthodox Community of Budapest.

6. The Council has before it a telegram from the High Commissioner of the French Republic in the Near East, transmitting a telegram from the Grand Vizier to the Chargé d’Affaires of Turkey, at Vienna.

(After a short discussion it is decided to authorize the repatriation of the Turkish Embassy Staff at Vienna in accordance with the request made by the Grand Vizier to the French High Commissioner, also to authorize the transmission to the Turkish Chargé d’Affaires at Vienna of the telegram prepared by the Turkish Government.)

7. The Council has before it a note from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, dated Paris, October 7th, 1919, requesting that authority be given by the Supreme Council to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to exploit the coal mines situated in the basin of Pecs (Petchoui) for a period of five years beginning with the coming into force of the Treaty.

Commandant Aron said that M Loucheur wishes to have this question postponed.

S Tittoni does not think that a postponement is necessary: the Reparation Commission had examined this question and was unanimous in proposing that the Serbian request be rejected.

Commandant Aron then said that the Reparation Commission had decided that the question was not one which came within its province.

Mr Polk wishes to ask whether this application had been referred to the Coal Commission.

Sir Eyre Crowe replies that he does not know. He considered the question a local one because the competent local Commission had already refused to accede to the Serbian request that the mine district of Pecs should be included within the frontiers of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. On account of this refusal, the Serbs had formulated their new demand.

S Tittoni says that if the mines of Pecs are taken away from Hungary, that country will have no coal at all. The Coal Commission is not competent, and in his opinion, it was only the Economic Commission which was qualified to deal with this question.

M Pichon remarks that M Loucheur wishes to be heard by this Commission.

(It is decided to refer to the Economic Commission for examination and report the note from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation dated October 7th, 1919, requesting for the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government the exclusive right of exploitation of the coal mines situated in the Petchoui (Pecs) Basin for a period of five years after the entrance into force of the Treaty of Peace.)

8. The Council has before it a revised draft of a note addressed to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government dated October 20th, 1919, which has been prepared by the American delegation.

Mr Polk says that he had asked for certain modifications of form in the draft which the Council had examined at last Monday’s meeting; the text which he has prepared had been distributed to the various Delegations.

M Berthelot says that the Serbian delegation has refused to sign the Treaty of Peace with Austria on account of the Minorities Treaty: This had not been done without hesitation on its part. The only reason that the Serbs gave for not signing immediately was that they are without a cabinet at the time. Now, however, after a long crisis, a cabinet had been formed. Mr. Trumbić had left Belgrade and he and Mr. Patehitch had instructions to sign. Under these circumstances it was a question whether the proposed step was a necessary one. In a conversation which he had had with Mr. Vesnitch, the latter had insisted upon his demand that if the Minorities Treaty be modified to give satisfaction to the Greeks or Romanians, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government should also benefit by these modifications.

Mr Polk says he has received a telegram from the United States Minister at Belgrade announcing the departure of Mr Trumbić who had received instructions to sign the Treaty: under these conditions it was perhaps not necessary to send a note.

M Pichon is of the same opinion.

S Tittoni inquires whether the Serbs mean to sign the Treaty only after it had been modified.

M Berthelot states that no modifications had been made to the Treaty since the Council had last heard Mr Vesnitch, at which meeting S Tittoni was present.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the situation is not the same for the Treaty with Serbia as regards Minorities as for Treaties with Greece and Romania. The Principal Allied Powers had already signed the Treaty with the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government.

M Berthelot says that the question had already been brought up in connection with Poland: Poland has asked that if on any important point a more favorable situation was granted to the Romanians, concerning the Jewish question for instance, the same advantages should be granted to Poland.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarked that it was important that no promise should be given.

M Berthelot says there is no question of giving a promise, for should it be given, such a promise would not amount to very much. The modifications requested by the Romanians, as a matter of fact, either concerned the very essence of the Treaty, and therefore could not be accepted, or questions such as the Jewish question did not concern the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. Under these conditions the Serbs would have difficulty in availing themselves of the Treaty with Romania in order to ask for a more favorable regime. Should it be necessary to introduce certain modifications in the Serbian Treaty, the fact that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have already signed will not be an obstacle thereto.

M Pichon said that for the moment it was only a question of finding out whether we could tell the Serbs that if the other Treaties concerning Minorities were modified, they should benefit by the same modifications. As far as he was concerned he thought it advisable to ask the Serbs to sign purely and simply. Mr Trumbic had left Belgrade with instructions to sign the Treaty of Peace with Austria, therefore, it would be better to await his arrival.

Sir Eyre Crowe is of the same opinion.

(It is decided to adjourn until a further meeting of the Council the sending of a note inviting the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to sign the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty.

9. The Council has before it a note from the German Delegation dated Paris, October 17th, 1919.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that a certain latitude has always been given to the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces in the Baltic, and the Council had always avoided giving a decision on the measures taken by him. We are bound to recognize the decisions by virtue of which the German shipping in the Baltic had been stopped. Perhaps these decisions have been executed too strictly; in fact, he is informed that their execution sometimes entails unnecessary inconvenience not only for the Germans but also for Neutrals, and for this reason sailings of German ships which are carrying food-stuffs from Denmark to the plebiscite zone of Schleswig had been held up. It was therefore necessary to direct the Naval Commanders to act with great discretion and to carry out their measures in such a way as not to affect without good cause navigation in the Baltic; we should instruct the Admirals to interfere as little as possible with traffic between neutral ports, and even, in certain cases, to authorize traffic between German ports.

S Tittoni remarks that it was the intention of the Council to prevent in an effective way commerce with ports of Bolshevik Russia: Its object is not to interfere with traffic in the Baltic.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that it is not only a question of the blockade of Russia; he also had in mind the situation brought about by the action of the Germans in Courland. The Naval experts should be requested to prepare the draft of an answer to the German note.

Mr Polk asks that the draft of this answer be submitted to the Council.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Allied Naval Armistice Commission should be asked to execute the measures prescribed by it with regard to the situation in the Baltic Provinces in such a way as to take into account the legitimate interests of neutral commerce and certain urgent needs with respect to supplies for German ports;

(2) That the Naval Experts should present to the Council as soon as possible a draft answer to the German note of October 17th, 1919.

10. The Council had before it a note from the Romanian Delegation dated October 18th, 1919, requesting representation on the Commissions charged with the recovery of material, which were functioning in Germany in the interests of France and Belgium in execution of the Armistice Clauses.

M Berthelot says that it is difficult to accept the Romanian demand. As a matter of fact the right which the Romanian Delegation is demanding had been recognized by the Armistice in favor of France and Belgium alone; on the other hand, the Romanians had not hesitated to go ahead and recover alone material in Hungary. It is therefore difficult to grant them this favor. He therefore proposes that this note should be referred back to the Reparation Commission with a request that it should examine and advise in what measure it is possible to grant it.

S Tittoni does not think that this was a question of application of the Treaty. The Armistice only stipulated a recovery of material taken away by German troops in favor of France and Belgium. Once the Treaty comes into force, the situation will be different, and recovery of this kind will be made in favor of all the Allies. He thinks, however, that the Reparation Commission is best qualified to examine the Romanian request.

(It was decided to refer to the Committee on the Organization of the Reparation Commission for examination and report the note of the Roumanian Delegation dated October 19th, 1919, requesting representation on the Commissions charged with the recovery of stolen material which are operating in Germany under the clauses of the Armistice.

11. M Pichon says that Mr. Henry Simon asked whether the Council would adjourn the examination of this question.

Mr Polk says that he has only received instructions to submit the document in question to the Council but that he had not been asked to press with any special force its conclusions: the opinion of the Council was only asked for.

(The examination of this question is therefore adjourned.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

10-23-19, 07:28 AM

23rd October 1919

Anti-Bolshevik Cossack soldiers fighting in the South Russia front.
https://i.postimg.cc/gjD8Qgn6/EHfb3b-XUAAd24s.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

10-23-19, 10:06 PM

Thursday, October 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a communication from the President of the German Peace Delegation, dated Paris, October 22, 1919, addressed to Mr. Polk.

Mr Polk calls the attention of the Council to the second paragraph of the communication from the President of the German Peace Delegation, which states that,

“The Austrian Government will probably likewise appoint delegates who will travel together with the Germans, and whose number and names will likewise be communicated at a very early date.”

He thinks that it is most surprising that the German Peace Delegation should undertake to answer with respect to the attendance of Austrian Delegates to the International Labor Congress. He states that a liaison officer of the American Delegation has been instructed to call Baron von Lersner’s attention to this matter and that Baron Rochoff would likewise be asked by what authority the German Delegation assumed to speak for the Austrian Government in this matter. These inquiries would be made orally and he would communicate the result thereof.

M Pichon says that the Council approves of the action of the United States Delegation; it cannot be admitted that the German Peace Delegation should assume this authority.

2. The Council has before it a report of the Sub-Committee on the Execution of the Treaty with Germany, dated October 21, 1919.

General Le Rond reads and comments upon this report. He points out that the British maintain their exception with respect to members of Plebiscite Commissions being paid by their respective Governments.

Sir Eyre Crowe replies that, pursuant to a resolution of the Council adopted October 15, 1919, he has referred the question of payment of members of Commissions of Delimitation by their respective Governments to his Government, which had replied that it accepted the principle that “ordinary army pay” of these members should be defrayed by their respective Governments.

General Le Rond observes that these words are the English equivalent of the “solde” mentioned in the Committee’s report.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he is not sure of the exact definition of “ordinary army pay”, inasmuch as officers in the British Army are entitled, over and above such pay, to ordinary and special allowances. He would refer the question to his Government for an exact definition, but he feels confident that his Government will admit the same principle relative to the payment of members of Plebiscite Commissions. He wishes, however, to now raise a somewhat more important question: strictly speaking, the cases of Danzig and Memel are not exactly similar: the Treaty had not provided specifically for troops of occupation in these two districts, and therefore there is no provision that the: payment of such troops as might be used as troops of occupation should be a charge on local revenues. The Council, however, had decided that troops of occupation might be used in these two districts; it is therefore necessary to decide in principle as to the method of payment of such troops, should they be used as troops of occupation. He thinks that on the principle laid down in the Treaty with respect to other troops of occupation the payment of such troops should be a charge upon local revenues.

M Pichon sees no objection to this.

Mr Polk suggests that, although no formal occupation of Danzig has been decided upon, it had, nevertheless, been designated as a base. Should not the payment of these base troops, therefore, be deemed part of the expenses of the occupation of Upper Silesia?

General Le Rond adds that, in accordance with this suggestion, the payment of these troops should rather be deemed part of the expenses of the occupation of Allenstein and Marienwerder, inasmuch as Danzig is to serve as a base for these two districts.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that the base troops, however, might be used as troops of occupation of the city of Danzig upon the demand of the High Commissioner, in which case Danzig should bear the expense of the maintenance of such troops.

General Le Rond desires to point out to the Council the situation which his Committee has considered. In determining whether or not troops of occupation should at once be sent to Danzig, it had thought that inasmuch as the present situation in Danzig was a provisional one there was no basis in right, at the present time, for sending troops of occupation to Danzig. The troops which would be sent there could at present only be used as base troops, but could not be used as troops of occupation before the appointment of the High Commissioner; thereafter they could only be so used upon the demand of the High Commissioner.

(It was decided:

(1) To approve the recommendations of the report of the Sub-Committee on the Execution of the Treaty with Germany relative to the organization of Plebiscite Commissions in Silesia, Allenstein and Marienwerder, with the reservation that Sir Eyre Crowe should request the agreement of the British Government to the opinion, expressed by the other Delegations, that the members of such Commissions should be paid by their respective Governments;

(2) That the principle that the payment of troops of occupation should be a charge upon the local revenues of the territories occupied should apply to such troops as might be used as troops of occupation in Danzig and Memel.)

3. The Council has before it a report of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty with Germany on the Commissions to be named during the first weeks following the entry into force of the Treaty.

The report of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty is read, and in the course of its reading the following remarks are made:

Mr Polk reminds the Council that the United States cannot be represented on any Commissions prior to the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks that although he has a complete list of British appointments to the Commissions in question, he thinks it inadvisable to present these piecemeal during the reading of this report and suggests that each Delegation present to the Secretary-General of the Conference its nominations for the Commissions mentioned in the Committee’s report. This suggestion is approved.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that with respect to the Delimitation Commission for Danzig, the Treaty provided that three Nations should be represented on this Commission, but it had not yet been decided which three nations were to be so represented.

General Le Rond pointed out that the Council had already approved the recommendations of a prior report of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty that the members of the Delimitation Commission for Danzig should be drawn from the German-Polish Delimitation Commission and that the presidency of these two Commissions should be held by the same person, in this case General Dupont. Therefore, only two members of this Commission still remained to be named.

M Pichon thinks it would be well that one of these members should be British.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees.

M Pichon adds that since the United States cannot be represented the choice lay between Italy and Japan.

General Le Rond thinks it is more suitable for Italy to be represented, since Japan had fewer representatives on the German-Polish Delimitation Commission.

S Scialoja said that although Italy did not ask to be represented it did not object to being represented.

General Le Rond points out that the Treaty provided that German-Polish Delimitation Commission should be constituted 15 days after the entry into force of the Treaty, but that the Supreme Council on July 16th had decided that this Commission should be on the spot and enter into operation on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty. The same was true of the Danzig Delimitation Commission by virtue of the Supreme Council’s decision of October 15.

M Berthelot observes that this brings up again the whole question of what was the proper day for putting the Treaty into force: he remarks that it has also been decided that the troops of occupation are to be on the spot on the day in question.

General Weygand points out that there are three questions to be considered; first, the Delimitation Commissions, second, the Plebiscite Commissions, third, the troops of occupation. Does the Council fully intend to have the troops ready to be at their appointed destinations on the day the Treaty comes into force?

M Pichon said that this is the Council’s opinion and he wishes to know what date the troops will be ready to start.

General Weygand replies that the French troops could entrain on November 5th, and he thinks the British troops are now ready. The question of the number of battalions to be furnished by Italy is still unsettled: the three battalions that Italy had agreed to furnish for service in Upper Silesia were now ready to start, but the question of whether Italy would furnish the remaining four battalions designated as her share in the report of the Special Commission, is still undetermined. He has been informed by General Bliss that, although American troops cannot be used as troops of occupation prior to the ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate, troops are now on their way to Coblenz and would be held there until such time as this ratification might take place. They would then at once be ordered to proceed to zones of occupation. He points out that the question of transportation still remains to be solved. This question is most serious with respect to troops destined to occupy Upper Silesia. It is extremely difficult to ask the Germans for more transportation than they had been asked for upon the occasion of the passage of General Haller’s troops. Having in mind the transport of supplies, as well as of troops, at the rate of six trains per day the movement will require fifteen days.

M Berthelot calculates that on this basis the 11th of November might be a suitable date for putting the Treaty into operation.

General Weygand says that this date was satisfactory as far as the troops are concerned but it should be remembered that very little time was left in which to take various other necessary measures. The various Commissions have to arrive at their destinations prior to the entry into force of the Treaty and likewise the Germans should be informed of that date as far ahead as possible in order that they might take all necessary measures of evacuation.

Mr Polk asks, for information, whether the troops of occupation were to be at their appointed destination on the day of ratification or within fifteen days thereafter.

General Weygand replied that the troops were to be in place within fifteen days after ratification but that in order to effect this result it would be necessary for the troops of occupation to begin to arrive in their respective zones on the day the Treaty came into force: clearly these zones could not be occupied prior to the ratification of the Treaty.

M. Pichon asked again if the Council desired to decide on the 11th November as the day of putting the Treaty, into operation.

General Weygand repeated that this would be satisfactory from a military point of view, except that the question of the contingent to be furnished by the Italians must be settled before a definite decision could be arrived at. He wishes to add that the Italian Military Representative has always maintained a reservation on this point.

M Pichon says that the distribution of forces decided upon by the Supreme Council must be followed out, and he desired to insist most pressingly upon Italy furnishing the full contingent demanded of her by the Special Commission’s report, especially since, prior to the ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate, the four American battalions destined for Upper Silesia will not be sent there.

Sir Eyre Crowe inquires if the absence of American troops of occupation prior to the ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate will not adversely affect the distribution of troops of occupation provided for by the report of the Special Commission.

M Pichon says that the eventual use of United States troops is to be considered, and adds that he does not wish an attitude to be adopted which would appear to exclude United States troops from eventually participating in occupation.

Mr Polk remarks that everything depends upon the ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate. He wishes to repeat that United States troops are en route and would be held at Coblenz ready to be sent to zones of occupation.

M Pichon asks Marshal Foch whether, in the present absence of United States troops destined eventually for participation in the occupation of Upper Silesia, he had enough troops to maintain order there.

Marshal Foch says that he must first know if he was going to have at his disposal the remaining fourteen battalions, all ready to move on November 5th.

S Scialoja says he will try to obtain a satisfactory reply from his Government immediately.

General Le Rond points out that the Plebiscite Commissions, for instance in Silesia, being essentially Government Commissions, they should arrive at their destination in plenty of time to confer with the outgoing German officials, so as to be able on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty to take up the Government of these districts without any hitch.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that as soon as the date of the entry into force of the Treaty is definitely determined upon, someone should be designated to settle all such matters with the German Government.

M Pichon said that Marshal Foch is the best person to do this.

S Scialoja objects that plebiscite Commissions are not of a military nature.

M Berthelot replies that they are closely concerned with military affairs. Until the Armistice comes to an end Marshal Foch is the properly qualified person to treat with the German Government on all such matters.

Mr Polk asks with reference to the Committee’s report respecting “Persons to be delivered by Germany”, when the demand for such individuals would be made.

Sir Eyre Crowe replied that, for many reasons which had already been discussed, the day of the entrance into force of the Treaty would be the appropriate date for making such a demand.

M Berthelot, in pointing out the provision in the Committee’s report with reference to the Government of Memel, says that in view of the small size of the Memel district there is no objection to the British Commander exercising both civil and military functions.

M Pichon suggests that the whole question could be settled by agreeing to take all necessary measures for putting the Treaty into force on November 11th, 1919. Mr Dutasta had informed him that he was going to see Baron von Lersner on that night, and he wished to inquire whether M. Dutasta should tell Baron von Lersner that the Treaty would be put into force on November 11th.

Mr Polk observes that if Baron von Lersner is told this he would undoubtedly publish it immediately.

Marshal Foch says that it would be better to simply inform Baron von Lersner that his Government will be notified of the date of entrance into force of the Treaty in sufficient time for it to take all measures necessary to be taken by it prior to that date.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Delegations of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should immediately submit to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference the list of the representatives they desired to name upon the Commissions which, under the terms of the Treaty with Germany, must begin to operate during the first weeks following the entry into force of said Treaty;

(2) That the 11th day of November, 1919, should provisionally be considered the date of the entry into force of the Treaty with Germany;

(3) That everything should be done to insure the completion prior to that date of all measures constituting conditions precedent to the proper and effective entry into force of said Treaty, and to effectually dispose of all reservations hindering or preventing such entry into force;

(4) That the German Peace Delegation should not yet be informed of the tentative date of the entry into force of the Treaty, but that in reply to this Delegation’s inquiry as to such date it should be informed that the German Government would be informed of the date of the entry into force of the Treaty in ample time to enable it to take all measures necessary to be taken by it prior to such date.)

4. The Council has before it a report of the Drafting Committee on the cost of transportation to and maintenance in foreign countries of German subjects convicted of serious offenses against members of the forces of occupation or against the property or authority of forces of occupation in Germany.

Mr Polk states that he is entirely satisfied with the report of the Drafting Committee. He wished to add that he had already recommended to the military authorities that the procedure in question should only be followed in very serious cases and he hoped there would be very few more of these.

(It was decided to adopt the report of the Drafting Committee on cost of transportation to and maintenance in foreign countries of German subjects convicted of serious offenses against members of the forces of occupation or against the property or authority of forces of occupation in Germany.

5. The Council had before it a note from the Bulgarian Delegation dated Neuilly-sur-Seine, October 12th, 1919, and another note from the Bulgarian Delegation dated Neuilly-sur-Seine, October 21st, 1919.

M Berthelot reads the two notes of protest. He points out that a fait accompli now exists and that the question raised by the Bulgarian Delegation has become purely academic. He adds that the occupation of the district in question by the Greek troops had taken place without any disturbance, and he thinks that as the Bulgarians will deliver their answer to the Peace terms on the following day there is nothing further to be done until this answer has been received.

Mr Polk submits a draft of the following questions to be addressed to General Franchet D’Esperey and requested that General D’Esperey should be asked to report immediately by telegraph on the following points:

(a) Whether the Bulgarians are actually evacuating Thrace.

(b) What troops are proceeding to the evacuated territory.

(c) Whether other Allied troops than Greek were taking part in the preliminary occupation.

(d) Whether satisfactory precautions are being taken to prevent a possible Greek occupation of territory outside of their zone of occupation.
General Weygand replied that Marshal Foch is in possession of the information requested and that he will reply to all these questions.

Mr Polk states that if all the information was here he would merely ask Marshal Foch to give him the answers to these questions.

(It is decided:

(1) That there is no necessity at the present time of replying to the Bulgarian protest against the evacuation of Thrace;

(2) That Marshal Foch should supply the Council with all pertinent information relative to the conditions of the evacuation of Thrace and its occupation by Allied troops.

6. M Berthelot refers to the decision of the Supreme Council, October 18th, 1919 “that the Inter-Allied Commissions sent into the zones of occupation should choose their own Presidents, without it being necessary for them to be of the nationality as the Commanding Officers in the corresponding zones of occupation.” He states that M Clemenceau thinks it better for the Council to designate the Presidents of these Commissions after the lists of appointees to these various Commissions had been transmitted to the Secretary General of the Conference by the various Delegations.

M. Pichon says that when the lists are submitted to the Secretary General, this question can be taken up again.

(The meeting then adjourns)

Jimbuna

10-24-19, 10:34 AM

24th October 1919

An emaciated Russian prisoner held at Nikolsk, Russia.
https://i.postimg.cc/pXSxYnHJ/EHk-KKi8-X0-AEokx-L.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

The Capitol Theater, the world’s largest movie theater with 4000 seats, opens in New York City.
https://i.postimg.cc/K8gb9vcS/EHk-KKi8-X0-AEokx-L.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

R01 (Royal Navy) The Schastlivy-class destroyer foundered off in a storm off Mudros.

Sailor Steve

10-24-19, 02:36 PM

Friday, October 24, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

10-25-19, 06:45 AM

25th October 1919

Armenian soldiers escorting deserters in Yerevan, Armenia. Armenia is currently fighting Azerbaijan.
https://i.postimg.cc/fbZzNpMy/EHtm-Hfu-X0-AAw-Vw-N.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

10-25-19, 08:10 PM

Saturday, October 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

...

Jimbuna

10-26-19, 07:12 AM

26th October 1919

Akashi Motojiro, former general of the Imperial Japanese Army and governor-general of Taiwan, has passed away.
https://i.postimg.cc/qv1TtgG2/EHyvq-UWk-AI-55-P.png (https://postimages.org/)

Improvised Red Cross hospital made out of boxcars in Siberia for treating refugees and anti-Bolshevik forces.
https://i.postimg.cc/KY4ytF9w/EHu41br-XUAAuhr-H.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

10-26-19, 07:18 PM

Sunday, October 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

10-27-19, 06:46 AM

27th October 1919

Former Canadian soldier James M. Smith blames murdering his wife on the blood lust he developed while fighting in the trenches of WWI. He went to his wife's house at 3534 Hudson St, Seattle shot her, his mother-in-law and turned the gun on himself. Mother-in-law and Smith survived.

Magazines are distributed to American soldiers in Siberia who are part of the Allied intervention against the Bolsheviks.
https://i.postimg.cc/GtnXTYzm/EH4-HBJQWw-AA7-Vk3.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Luxembourg holds its first elections since German occupation with women also voting for the first time. Marguerite Thomas-Clement is elected as the country’s first female parliamentarian.
https://i.postimg.cc/QNc4G4x9/EHzmx-Qq-Wk-AAw-Vk3.png (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

10-27-19, 01:02 PM

Monday, October 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

10-28-19, 09:00 AM

28th October 1919

Ruins of chateaus destroyed by Bolshevik forces in Poland.
https://i.postimg.cc/FH6HfXwK/EH9-Qp-Tt-Ws-AEn-Vgb.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

10-28-19, 08:05 PM

Tuesday, October 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

...

Jimbuna

10-29-19, 09:14 AM

29th October 1919

U.S. Congress passes the Volstead Act, which establishes the prohibition of alcohol. The bill was vetoed by President Wilson, but Congress overrode the veto with a two-thirds majority.
https://i.postimg.cc/8cm5kXh1/EH-w4-WIXYAAA0-Ho.png (https://postimg.cc/rRzcQJnb)

Shaku Sōen, Japanese Buddhist monk who was the first Zen Buddhist master to teach in the U.S. and raise awareness of Zen Buddhism in the country, has passed away.
https://i.postimg.cc/SQ6jGRHw/EICa-O7p-X0-AAWMr-P.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Frej (Sweden) The wooden schooner, en route from Åbo to Malmö, sank after striking a mine in the Baltic, west of Gotland. The crew survived.

Sailor Steve

10-29-19, 09:20 PM

Wednesday, October 29, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a report from the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, dated October 23, 1919, a note in three parts from the British Delegation dated October 23, 24 and 25, 1919 and a letter from the Minister of Finance to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

General Weygand reads and comments upon the report dealing with the violations of the clauses of the Armistice, the preparation of which had been entrusted to the Armistice Commission at Cologne.

Captain Fuller reads and comments upon the notes from the British Delegation dealing with violations of the Naval Clauses of the Armistice.

M de Celle reads and comments upon the letter from the Minister of Finance to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, and adds thereto the following observations:

The Germans were to have supplied a complete list of the plunder and thefts committed by them; there were numerous omissions in the lists supplied. It had been indicated clearly to the Germans that in matters of specie and personal property omission might occur only in exceptional cases and that they should be made known within twenty-four hours of their discovery. The despatch of a new truckload of property had just been made known to them. They had to acknowledge that the German delegates in Paris are actually doing their best to give satisfaction.

Similarly, the documents which Clause 13 of the Protocol of Spa, dated December 1st, 1918, had in mind, concerning notes issued by towns during the German occupation (list of printed notes, lists of notes whose issue had been authorized, list of notes actually issued, list of water-marked paper stocks, etc.,) had not so far been supplied, notwithstanding the formal promise made by Germany to send them before December 10th, 1918. Those lists were of extreme importance in order to discover and suppress possible forgery.

Lastly, as for the recovery of objets d’art, if those that belonged to public museums had been restored this was not the case with objets d’art or furniture taken from private houses. The Germans profess that there has been no official storage of these objects: they know, however, that the experts who had superintended their collection had worked publicly and that furniture and pictures had been carefully packed for transport. It was impossible to admit, as the Germans pretended, that the vanished furniture had been used merely for furnishing posts of command or dugouts.

M Clemenceau asks whether a member of the Council wishes to make any remark.

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes for the moment to leave aside the two most serious violations of the Armistice, namely, the question of the Baltic Provinces and the Scapa Flow incident, to which he intends to return. As for the other violations it is important to adhere to this: that obligations incurred by the terms of the Armistice be retained when the Treaty comes into force. Guarantees to this effect are necessary. If their legal advisors are of the opinion that the stipulations of the Armistice will no longer subsist with the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, it is absolutely necessary to oblige the Germans to sign a special Protocol assuring to the Powers every possible guarantee corresponding to the guarantees of the Armistice.

Mr Polk agrees with Sir Eyre Crowe that the legal advisers should be consulted.

S Scialoja finds the difficulty to arise out of the fact that the conventions of the Armistice, while constituting a veritable treaty, has been imposed in military form. He thinks there are grounds for preparing a Protocol enumerating all the obligations still to be fulfilled, but what sanctions would the Council still wield since the coming into force of the Treaty would deprive it of the sanctions which the Armistice afforded? It is necessary that the Protocol itself incorporate sanctions.

Sir Eyre Crowe maintains that for the very reason adduced by S Scialoja, he has drawn the distinction between the more important and the less important violations of the Armistice: is not such sanction necessary for the less important violations?

M Clemenceau thinks that they do not wish to commit themselves to a perfectly futile manifestation; a definite date has to be fixed. As a matter of form it would be well to say that unless the obligations undertaken were fulfilled they would have to demand sanctions which, as it seemed to him, ought to be of a military nature for in reality there are no others. Therefore, in the Protocol a list of all the so-called secondary violations of the Armistice had to be prepared. He thinks it hardly possible to say to the Germans that they will not have the Treaty come into force until after the execution of those clauses: it would be sufficient to say that if the clauses are not fulfilled, sanctions of military nature would be imposed. The questions of Scapa Flow and of the Baltic Provinces remain. In the former matter they had done nothing; on the latter they had decided upon a course of action the preceding day. Would it not be necessary to know what sanctions they would employ if the mission of General Niessel arrived at no success?

Mr. Polk asks whether it is intended to tell the Germans what sanctions will ultimately be applied.

M Clemenceau says there certainly is no such intention. It would be sufficient to say that there would be some sanction: but of course the Germans would have to sign the Protocol before the Treaty would come into force.

Mr Polk remarks that the Protocol should be submitted first to the Council, which would then have to discuss the question of sanctions.

M Clemenceau agrees.

Mr Polk inquires whether the Council has communicated to the Dutch Government the note sent to Germany relative to the delivery of ships she had sold to Holland.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Dutch Government has been informed of such a note having been sent and told that if it claimed property rights in the ships in question, it would have to justify its claims before the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe reverts to the violation of the Armistice committed in the Scapa Flow incident. The Council had been apprised some time ago of a British proposal on the subject. The sinking of the ships could be considered either the individual act of the officers and crews, or an act for which the German government is responsible. The British Delegation believes that there are grounds for holding the government responsible. In the latter case reparation was due for the value of the sunken ships, cost of salvage of the ships, cost of surveying the anchorage, buoying the wrecks and any subsequent expenses incurred, e.g, in clearing the anchorage of wrecks, etc. It is proposed further that reparation should be in kind, for example in the surrender of the five light cruisers that Germany still possessed and of floating docks, cranes, harbor craft, etc.; that the Germans should be asked further to supply to the Armistice Commission a complete list of this material, delivery of which the Armistice Commission would be authorized to accept.

M Clemenceau says that they are agreed in considering the German Government responsible.

Mr Polk states that he does not yet have the report of his naval experts on the question and asks that it be adjourned.

Sir Eyre Crowe maintains that if they hold the German Government responsible, they can, as the British Delegation believes, repatriate the German officers and seamen of the crews which had been taken prisoner on the destruction of the fleet.

M Clemenceau proposes to discuss that question on the following day.

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to remark further that in the matter of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces the terms of the Armistice are repeated in the body of the Treaty. In that respect, therefore, they do have guarantees.

(It is decided:

(1) To ask the Drafting Committee to prepare a Protocol to be signed by the Representative of the German government before the Treaty comes into force and to contain, along with the list of the unfulfilled clauses of the Armistice, an undertaking by Germany to fulfill those clauses within a prescribed time under penalty of such measures which the Allied and Associated Powers would reserve to themselves in the event of noncompliance;

(2) That the question whether the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces and the Scapa Flow incident were to be explicitly mentioned in this Protocol be provisionally reserved.)

2. General Niessel wishes to point out to the Council that it would be difficult for his Mission to leave the Monday or Wednesday following; his Italian colleague has not yet arrived and General Turner’s officers will not be in Paris before the end of the week. Lastly there will be difficulties from the point of view of railroad transportation.

M Clemenceau says that General Niessel will leave on Wednesday at the latest.

M Clemenceau thinks that they might agree provisionally that the expenses of the Mission will be divided between the Allies.

M Berthelot explains that for the moment it was only a question of the immediate expenses of maintenance and voyage.

Mr Polk says that it would be best that each Power supply the expenses of its own representatives.

(It is decided that, subject to later examination of the question by the Supreme Council, each Power should pay the expenses of its representatives on the Inter-Allied Baltic Provinces Military Commission.

3. The Council has before it a note from the New States Commission asking the Supreme Council for instructions.

M Kammerer reads and comments upon the first part of the note.

S Scialoja thinks it preferable to insert in the Bulgarian Treaty a clause by which Serbia and Romania would incur the same obligations as those of article 46 of the Treaty with Greece.

M Kammerer suggests that if, in the Treaty with Bulgaria, the same terms are inserted which had prevented Serbia from signing the Treaty with Austria, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would not sign the Bulgarian Treaty; the result would correspond to the second procedure suggested by the Commission.

Mr Polk wonders whether, if they make it possible to sign the Bulgarian Treaty without inserting therein the same terms as in the Austrian Treaty, they might not leave it optional to certain powers to sign one Treaty and not the other. It is most important, he thinks, to tell the Romanians and the Serbs that if they do not sign the Austrian Treaty neither will they sign the Bulgarian Treaty.

M Kammerer agrees that the insertion of a new article might be possible; he thinks, however, that it would be disagreeable to the states concerned for the Council to tell them that they could not sign the Bulgarian Treaty before signing the Austrian Treaty.

Mr Polk does not see that they have to modify a treaty so as to satisfy a power that refuses to sign.

M Pichon considers the second method preferable; they will inform the Romanians and Serbs that they cannot sign the Bulgarian Treaty unless they signed the Austrian Treaty. The Council will thus be in possession of a further means of bringing pressure to bear upon them.

Sir Eyre Crowe considers that there should be on the agenda of an early sitting of the Council, the question of the signature of the Austrian Treaty by the Romanians and Serbs.

M Pichon said Mr Trumbic has arrived and that General Coanda has left Bucharest the previous day. According to a telegram he had received that morning, he thinks the signature probable.

Sir Eyre Crowe’s information does not give him the same impression.

Mr Polk is in a similar situation. He has the feeling that the Romanians wish simply to gain time.

M Kammerer reads and comments upon the second part of the report of the New States Commission.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks what right Bulgaria has to set up as champion of the Turkish cause.

M Kammerer explains that it is not Turks properly speaking, but Turkish subjects who had taken refuge in Bulgarian territory. The Italian Delegation is afraid that Serbia is preventing their exercising that right of option which the 1913 treaty gives them, but which the outbreak of war had made impossible. There is no doubt that the insertion of special clauses in the Treaty would be unpleasant enough for Serbia.

Sir Eyre Crowe maintains that it is always dangerous to modify a treaty once it has been signed, and that the Allied and Associated Powers had already signed the Minorities Treaty.

M Kammerer explains that it is the Italian Delegation that insists upon that solution.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks if there is any evidence to show the Turks intend returning into Serbian territory?

Mr Polk explains that it is a question of Macedonian refugees.

M Pichon asks whether, instead of changing the text of the Treaty, a procedure which as Sir Eyre Crowe had pointed out, presents serious disadvantages, they could not demand of Serbia written declarations on the point?

M Kammerer is of the opinion that Serbia would prefer that solution.

S Scialoja points out that in the Bulgarian Treaty a clause could be inserted analogous to that in which Greece was placed by Article IV of the proposed Greek Treaty.

M Kammerer says that the Commission has judged that this involves difficulties and that there is no point in concealing the fact that the insertion of a clause of such nature in the Bulgarian Treaty would be extremely disagreeable to the Serbs.

S Scialoja maintains that Serbia would have to restore to its refugees the right of option which the outbreak of war had prevented them from exercising in the prescribed time.

M Pichon believes that Serbia should make the declaration in a letter.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should make known to the Roumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegations that these latter countries will not be allowed to sign the Treaty with Bulgaria before having signed the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty;

(2) That the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government be asked to make known by written declaration that it would authorize its Ottoman subjects who, owing to the war, had not been able to avail themselves in the prescribed time of the right of option envisaged by the Treaty of 1913, to take advantage of that right.)

4. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation dated October 27th.

(After a short discussion it is decided to refer to the military representatives at Versailles, for examination and report, the request for instructions addressed to the Supreme Council by the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany.

5. The Council has before it a draft note to the German Government, prepared by the Polish Commission.

(It is decided to approve the draft note to the German Government on the question of municipal elections in Upper Silesia as prepared by the Polish Commission.)

6. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation dated October 27th.

M Pichon considers it logical to adopt the proposal, which conforms to previous decisions of the Supreme Council.

Mr Polk asks who will fix the salaries.

M Pichon says it will be a matter for deciding as in analogous cases.

(It is decided:

(1) That the salaries and allowances of the temporary Administrator of the Free City of Danzig and his staff, and of the Administrative Staff of Memel should be a charge upon local revenues;

(2) That the rate of these salaries and allowances should be fixed by the Sub-Committee on the Execution of the Treaty with Germany.)

7. The Council has before it a report of the Commission entrusted with examining the question of the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners from Siberia.

Captain de Corvette Fabre reads and comments upon the report of the Commission.

Mr Polk thinks that the order of repatriation could be modified by financial considerations. As regarded the Czechs, an agreement had been arrived at, which placed the immediate expenses of repatriation on Great Britain, the United States and France. No account has been taken so far of the Poles, the Romanians and the Serbs. Perhaps the United States will be led to assume responsibility for this repatriation. In any case, he is obliged to remark that the financial rulings of the United States Treasury Department forbid his government from participating in expenses of a provisional nature that might be subject to a later readjustment among the Powers; the United States could only make direct advances to the small nations concerned.

M Pichon holds that the thing to do at the moment is for each Power to appoint a financial expert and a political representative to be attached to the Commission actually existing.

Captain de Corvette Fabre remarks that the Commission is qualified to deal only with prisoners. It is therefore asking the Council to decide whether it will be competent to deal likewise with the volunteers of friendly nationalities who ought to be repatriated.

M Kammerer insists on the necessity of the Commission being empowered to deal with volunteers as well as prisoners. The two questions are bound together from the point of view both of transport and of finance.

Sir Eyre Crowe does not think his Government inclined to participate in the expenses of repatriating 250,000 German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners; they had the repatriation of their Allies to consider.

M Berthelot holds that distinction must be made between repatriation of their Allies and of prisoners belonging to one of the enemy powers: from the humane point of view these were alike; politically, there are raised questions of quite different kinds. The Council has already decided that the repatriation of enemy prisoners should wait until after that of Allied volunteers. They are informed that the Germans have already been trying to conclude private contracts with Japanese ship owners. If they are to let Japanese shipping companies repatriate enemies who are ready to pay a very high price, the effect would be disastrous, and it is important that Mr Matsui should draw the attention of his government to the question.

Mr Matsui states that his government has informed him that the statement that ships have been chartered on behalf of Germany is incorrect. The Japanese government has no ships at its disposal; and private ship owners have concluded agreements to charter ships for the purpose of repatriating Czechs. Once the Treaty comes into force it would be for each government to get into direct touch with the ship owners. He had already acquainted Tokyo with that decision of the Supreme Council, which had in mind giving priority to the repatriation of the Allies.

M Kammerer holds that they can and, indeed, ought to leave to the Germans the care of arranging the repatriation of their prisoners. It is for the Commission only to make sure that that repatriation should not precede the repatriation of volunteers of friendly nationalities.

Captain de Corvette Fabre points out that it is exactly for that reason that the Commission had asked enlargement of its powers. It had been formed originally to organize the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners of war, but had found itself confronted by a resolution of the Supreme Council which specified that the repatriation of those prisoners should not take place until after the repatriation of volunteers of friendly nationalities. So long as the repatriation of those volunteers had not yet begun, the Commission could not work to any purpose.

Mr Polk thinks that the Commission could confine itself to examining the repatriation of prisoners without taking any executive steps.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks why the Commission should have to concern itself with German and Austrian prisoners of war at all. Article 215 of the German Treaty envisages the setting up of a special commission, for the repatriation of prisoners. This question was its peculiar concern, and he understands that it was forming a Sub-Commission to take care of this particular case.

Captain de Corvette Fabre states that the Commission refers to in article 215 had to deal exclusively with enemy prisoners taken by the Allied and Associated Powers; the repatriation of prisoners from Siberia taken by the Russians did not concern it. Indeed practically all the prisoners in Siberia had been taken by the Russians, and it would be impossible to repatriate them without authorization of the Government of Omsk which might wish to retain them as hostages.

M Pichon acknowledges that they have no legal obligation towards enemy prisoners who had been retained in Siberia.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Commission entrusted by the Supreme Council with studying the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners from Siberia should examine at the same time the question of repatriating the volunteers of friendly nationalities;

(2) That, in view of the consequent extension of their powers and because of the complexity of the problems raised by the question of repatriation, each of the Allied and Associated Powers should nominate to the Commission representatives for political and financial questions.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

10-30-19, 06:54 AM

30th October 1919

The International Labour Organization holds its first conference in Washington D.C., with French socialist politician Albert Thomas as its first director.

Anti-Bolshevik cavalry under General Denikin marching in Kharkov.
https://i.postimg.cc/02F3TvQY/EIHj2sr-Ws-AA5-Tdy.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Pilot and navigator of the Alliance plane that attempted a London to Australia flight.
https://i.postimg.cc/m2j39yxt/EIHj2sr-Ws-AA5-Tdy.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

10-30-19, 06:49 PM

Thursday, October 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a draft note of the Drafting Committee on the notification to the German Government of the coming into force of the Treaty.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon this note.

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to raise a point of mere form relative to the second paragraph of this draft note. He desires that this paragraph be changed to read as follows:

“The President of the Peace Conference has the honor to inform the German Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely, the British Empire, France and Italy, have ratified the Treaty, and Germany, on the other hand, having likewise ratified it, the above mentioned condition is fulfilled.”

This change is merely designed to prevent the note being drafted in such form as to notify the German Government that it had ratified the Treaty.

M Pichon says that the question of the date to be fixed for the coming into force of the Treaty should not be discussed at the present time.

M Fromageot concludes his commentaries on the draft note by saying that, as a result of the decision taken the preceding day by the Council relative to the unexecuted Armistice clauses and to the drafting of a Protocol, he thinks that a paragraph should be added at the end of the draft note to the effect that the German Government should send a representative to Paris prior to the ratification of the Treaty, with power to sign a Protocol relative to the unexecuted Armistice clauses.

(This was agreed to.)

The Drafting Committee thinks that a large majority of the unexecuted Armistice Clauses are covered by provisions in the Treaty itself: in most cases the Treaty in terms imposes upon the German Government the same obligations as did the Armistice, and a large number of these Treaty provisions likewise specified the penalty for non-fulfillment of these obligations.

M Pichon observes that for such violations of the Armistice clauses as the Scapa Flow incident no penalties are provided.

M Fromageot says that this is true, and that likewise no penalties were provided for the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, although in this case the Treaty does take care of this obligation (Article 433). With respect to most of the remaining unexecuted clauses of the Armistice the Treaty provides penalties. He thinks it might be well to give a brief summary of the unexecuted clauses. There is nothing in the Treaty with respect to the delivery by the German Government of rolling stock. With respect to the Financial Clauses, the Treaty in Article 238 not only reiterated the obligations incumbent upon the German Government, but explicitly provides penalties. This is likewise true with respect to the handing over of agricultural and industrial implements. The Penalties provided for Germany’s non-fulfillment of her obligations in general are laid down in Article 430 and paragraphs 17 and 18 of the second annex to Part VIII (Reparations). The question of works of art is likewise fully covered. The question of aeronautic material is not so well covered. Articles 170, 202 and 210 of the Treaty prohibited the exportation of such material but no penalties were provided. The Committee does not feel that it quite understands the argument of the Minister for Finance relative to the payment by the German Government of maintenance expenses of the troops of occupation. The question of the German mercantile marine, which at present resolved itself into a matter of the tank steamers, the five vessels alleged to be sold to Holland and some undelivered vessels in neutral ports, was also fully covered by the Treaty. The foregoing summary seems to indicate that in general the Treaty takes into account the probability of the German Government not having fulfilled all its obligations under the Armistice prior to the entry into force of the Treaty.

M Pichon asks if there are any remarks.

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to know if this note is to be sent to the German Government without at the same time informing it what it was proposed to include in the Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses. He thinks that if the German Government is directed to send a representative to sign such Protocol without knowing what it is to contain, further delay would ensue.

M Berthelot remarks that there was no need at the present time to arrive at a decision as to the date of deposit of ratifications. The Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses will be ready on the following Saturday; the point is to agree upon the form of the note which should be sent at the proper time.

M Pichon says it is only necessary to agree on the principle of this note.

Marshal Foch says that he agrees in principle with the foregoing remarks, but he feels that it is important to let the German Government know what has to be done. He thinks that the following arrangement would be most advisable: without letting the German Government know the exact date of the deposit of ratifications it should be informed that the Treaty will be put into force at an early but undetermined date which could be designated as “D” day. The German Government can be informed at once that on “D” minus 8 day for instance, it would be notified of the date of deposits of ratifications and that on “D” minus 6 day, for instance, its representative must be in Paris. He thinks that an arrangement of the note on such a basis would solve all difficulties.

M Berthelot inquires if it is intended that the representatives of the German Government should all be in Paris and not in the various regions where Allied Commissions and troops of occupation are to arrive.

General Weygand said that the German representatives must be here and come to an agreement before the Treaty could be put into force.

M Berthelot brings up the example of Silesia. Should it be decided here in Paris what German officials would remain there in order to effectuate a transfer of authority in that territory without a hitch?

General Le Rond replies that German representatives should be here in Paris to settle the general principles involved, and that officials should likewise remain in Silesia and other territories where the same situation was presented in order to effect the necessary arrangements with the incoming Allied Commissions and troops of occupation. The procedure to be adopted consists of two phases.

General Weygand thinks it would be better not to put these details in the draft note, as confusion would certainly be caused thereby. It is most important that the summoning to Paris of the German representatives should not be bound up with the question of settling the date of deposits of ratifications.

M Pichon agrees that pourparlers should certainly start in Paris before the date of deposit of ratifications is necessarily fixed.

M Polk, referring to Marshal Foch’s idea as to rearrangement of the draft note on a time-table basis, inquired whether this is to include the unfulfilled Armistice clauses. He supposes that it is only meant to refer to movement of troops, evacuation, and similar points.

M Pichon says that this is so.

S Scialoja thinks that the draft note should be modified so that the invitation to the German Government to participate in the deposit of ratifications should be eliminated so long as that date remains unsettled. It will be enough to merely inform the German Government that as the time for deposit was approaching, it became necessary for it to fulfill the conditions precedent thereto.

M Berthelot thinks that the German Government should be informed why the deposit of ratifications had not yet taken place.

S Scialoja thought that representatives of the German Government should be summoned to Paris immediately to discuss the matters still remaining unsettled prior to the fixing of a date for the deposit of ratifications.

M Fromageot still thinks it would be better to retain the framework of the draft note to the extent of acquainting the German Government with the proposed procedure, this in order to avoid any argument on their part that the Treaty should now automatically be put into force.

M Pichon sums up by suggesting that the draft note should be changed so as to accord with the views above expressed by Marshal Foch, S Scialoja, Sir Eyre Crowe and M Fromageot, and that as so modified, it should be submitted to the Council on the following Saturday, together with the Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses.

(This is agreed to.)

(It is decided:

(1) To accept in principle the note of the Drafting Committee on the notification to the German Government of the coming into force of the Treaty, with the following modifications:

(a) In the first part of said draft the German Government should be invited to participate in the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty at a date specified as not yet being determined.

(b) That the German Government, at the same time, should be informed that the date of the coming into force of the Treaty will later be communicated to it in ample time but that without awaiting the notification of said date it should immediately send representatives to Paris to discuss the settlement of the matters constituting conditions precedent to the putting into force of the Treaty.

(c) To add at the end of said draft a paragraph to the effect that the German Government, prior to the date of deposit of ratifications, should send representatives to Paris with power to sign a Protocol dealing with the unexecuted clauses of the Armistice.

It is further decided:

(1) To change the form of the second paragraph of said draft so that it should read as follows: “The president of the Peace Conference has the honor to inform the German Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely: the British Empire, France and Italy, have ratified the Treaty, and Germany, on the other hand, having likewise ratified it, the above mentioned condition has been fulfilled.”

(2) That the draft note of the Drafting Committee should be modified as above indicated and submitted to the Council on the following Saturday, together with the Protocol relative to the unexecuted Armistice Clauses.

2. Captain Fuller RN explains to the Council that the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers met on the preceding day; no report had been made by them to the Council, but the report which he was now going to read had been agreed to by the British, French, Italian and Japanese representatives, and in great part had been agreed to by the United States representative, who, however, wishes to submit a minority report. He then reads the majority report. He adds that it is understood that in the event of the surface vessels being broken up and sunk, the same procedure should not be adopted in the case of floating docks.

Mr Polk asks if Rear Admiral McCully might read his minority report.

Rear Admiral McCully then reads his minority report.

Mr Polk says that the point of view of the minority report is this: although it had already been decided that the German Government should give up certain ships, their disposition had never been definitely determined. At one time there had been some question of sinking them. Now the ships in question had actually been sunk. The majority report proposed to take mercantile material, which of course could not be destroyed, in reparation for the vessels sunk. This mercantile material would be useful to the Reparation Commission. It seemed to him better, by way of reparation for the vessels sunk, to take from the German Government naval material which could be destroyed if so desired. The point he wished to emphasize was that he thought that the proposal to take over mercantile material, raised a question which distinctly affected the Reparation Commission.

M Pichon remarks that the French Government had never agreed to the sinking of these ships.

Mr Polk replies that such is not his contention. That is not the point now at issue. His question is whether it is not better to leave this mercantile material to be devoted to such purposes that it would become useful to the operations of the Reparation Commission, rather than, by taking it away, to diminish Germany’s power of making adequate reparation.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks that several questions are now being confused. He points out that the British Government has been willing to make a big concession; it is willing to bear all the loss resulting from the Scapa Flow incident, therefore, it seems to him that the opinion of his Government should now bear some weight. To him it seems pointless to take over from the German Government ships which are useless to them and are equally useless to the Allied and Associated Powers. He thinks that such an action might indeed be pleasing to the German Government. Likewise the docks which it proposes to take over are so large that they are only useful for large sized ships of which the Germans now have none, and certainly it is not desired to encourage them to build any.

M Berthelot thinks that Mr Polk’s observations have shown that the argument of the United States is entirely based upon the sinking of the ships. The question has now, however, reached a further stage. Neither the French nor the Italian Governments had ever agreed to the sinking of the ships and they had demanded their distribution. Certainly there is no point in distributing the ships if they are thereafter to be sunk. He recognizes the force of Sir Eyre Crowe’s argument and he wishes to point out that the British Government has even made another concession: although the British Government is prepared to have the ships sunk and thinks that the American Government will agree, nevertheless, it is ready to admit the right of France and Italy to dispose of their share of the ships as they see fit. He thinks it is important to settle now the question whether or not the ships are to be sunk.

Mr Polk inquires if M Berthelot means to say that naval material ought not to be replaced by naval material. However the Council is not now discussing the disposition of ships; he merely wishes to repeat that he thinks the question now under discussion is one that interests the Reparation Commission. The action proposed by the majority is, to give a priority, on account of reparation, for the ships sunk. To his mind three points are involved: there is no question at the present time of the disposition of the ships; he understands and appreciates the attitude of the British Government; he thinks that this is a question for the Reparation Commission. He points out that his position is purely a matter of principle inasmuch as the United States will not get any ships.

M Pichon thinks that this presents a new phase of the question.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that this will make it impossible to settle the Scapa Flow incident prior to the drafting of the Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses and will indefinitely postpone the entry into force of the Treaty.

M Pichon agrees, and observes that Marshal Foch had pointed out to him that as this is a question of a violation of the Armistice the Reparation Commission could not yet be interested therein. The American argument can equally be applied to all material to be handed over by virtue of the Armistice clauses.

Mr Polk asks if the Financial experts have not been consulted with respect to the delivery of locomotives and similar questions?

Marshal Foch said that they have not, for the reason that the Reparation Commission has not yet existed and does not yet exist.

Mr Polk thinks that on that basis it will be easy for the Armistice Commissions to seriously embarrass the Reparation Commission.

M Pichon remarks that all matters heretofore adjusted had been controlled by the Supreme Council.

S Scialoja adds that the conception of reparation only existed by virtue of the coming into force of the Treaty.

Mr Polk says that he is surprised to learn that the Financial experts had not been consulted. He thinks that the American Financial experts had at least given an opinion on these matters.

M Pichon says that the French Government cannot yield on this point.

Mr Polk remarks that if the docks and similar material now proposed to be demanded are received, the United States would get something, otherwise they would not.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the principle of demanding floating docks and similar material should be maintained, at the same time giving instructions that only the large ones and those belonging to the German Government or in which it had a predominating interest should be taken.

Mr Polk thinks that the Naval Representatives can easily agree on that basis.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the Naval representatives should immediately meet and settle this question.

M Pichon remarks that the question is a very urgent one inasmuch as it has to be settled before the Protocol, which is to be submitted the following Saturday, can be drafted. The Naval representatives should come to a conclusion by the following day at the latest and communicate the same to M Berthelot and M Fromageot.

Captain Fuller, RN, said he understands then that the Committee of Naval Experts might call upon the German Government to make over by way of reparation: (1) Government docks; (2) docks, cranes, etc., in which the German Government had a predominating interest; and, (3) docks, cranes, etc., the removal of which would not affect the working of ports in which they were situated either from the Allied or from the German point of view.

(It is decided:

(1) To accept the principle of the responsibility of the German Government for the sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow.

(2) That the Committee of Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should meet immediately and agree as to the reparation to be exacted from the German Government for the sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow, being guided by the principle that docks and similar material belonging to the German Government or in which it had a predominating interest, or too large to be suitable for present German maritime uses, should be taken by way of reparation.)

3. The Council has before it a report of the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers relative to the dispatch of naval vessels to Flensburg.

M Pichon suggests that the recommendations contained in this report be adopted.

(This is agreed to.)

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he only wishes to recall the fact that although it had been intended to send three battalions to Schleswig, only two battalions would go there. It is worth considering, in view of the adoption of the Naval Representatives’ recommendation not to send Allied warships to Flensburg, whether this force is sufficient.

(It was decided to accept the report of the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers relative to dispatching naval vessels to Flensburg.

4. M Pichon thinks that, as the Central Territorial Committee is not unanimous, the best procedure is for it to submit majority and minority reports which would be discussed and settled by the Council at its meeting on the following Saturday.

M Laroche observes that certain delegations have stated that the opinion held by them relative to the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier might be influenced by the Council’s solution of the Dobrudja question; certain other delegations had stated that their opinion would not be changed by such a solution.

Mr Polk inquires if the question of Dobrudja is not a short one susceptible of being settled immediately.

M Pichon remarks that he can only say that the opinion of the French Government is that Dobrudja, a province belonging to an Allied Government, should not be taken away from it and given over to Bulgaria, an enemy.

Mr Polk points out that he is not insisting on that matter being settled now. The only point before the Council is what kind of an answer should be sent to Bulgaria? He quite understands that in this answer there would be nothing relative to transferring Dobrudja to Bulgaria.

M Laroche says that the settlement of the Dobrudja question is intimately connected with that of Bessarabia.

Mr Polk replies that in his opinion the question of Bessarabia should not be discussed at the present moment particularly on account of the situation in Russia.

M Pichon agrees.

M Laroche says that if the question of Bessarabia is not to be raised he thinks the question of Dobrudja should likewise not be raised.

Mr Polk thinks that at some other time or in some other form, by the medium of another Treaty or action on the part of the League of Nations, the question of Dobrudja could be brought up.

M Pichon says the French Government absolutely does not agree to any solution contemplating the transfer of Dobrudja to Bulgaria.

M Laroche thinks that if the matter is left for future action in the manner intimated, with the implication that Dobrudja will eventually be transferred to Bulgaria, it was equivalent to certainly depriving Romania of this province.

Mr Polk remarks that the chief trouble is that Romania has been given everything she wanted in a territorial way without any equivalent being demanded. The time to bargain would have been when Romania’s territorial requests had been freely granted.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests that it will be sufficient to say in the answer to the Bulgarian counter-proposals that in a Treaty with Bulgaria the question of Dobrudja cannot be raised.

M Berthelot agrees. He thinks that it would be inadvisable to mention anything further, particularly in regard to the League of Nations.

(The suggestion of Sir Eyre Crowe meets with approval and the discussion of the questions of Dobrudja and the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier is fixed for the meeting of Saturday, November 1st, 1919.)

5. M Berthelot, referring to the draft instructions to the Inter-Allied Commission charged with examining into the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, calls attention to Section X thereof.

In the first paragraph of that Section it is provided that: “In order to accomplish its mission, the Allied Commission shall have at its disposal the personnel of the British and French Allied Missions now operating in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with a view to preventing any isolated initiative or divergence of action.” He observes that no mention has been made of Italian and American Commissions. He thinks that the paragraph should be redrafted so as to include the personnel of the Military Mission of all the Allied and Associated Powers. He understands that there is no Italian Military Mission in that region but that there is an American one.

Mr Polk states that there is no American Military Mission in that region, but that he had no objection to the change proposed.

(It was decided to modify Section X of the draft instructions to the Inter-Allied Commission charged with the examining into the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, so that the first paragraph thereof should read as follows:

“In order to accomplish its mission, the Inter-Allied Commission shall have at its disposal the personnel of the Military Missions of all the Allied and Associated Powers now operating in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with a view to preventing any isolated initiative or divergence of action”.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

10-31-19, 07:00 AM

31st October 1919

U.S. transport ships in Trebizond Harbour, Ottoman Empire (Turkey)
https://i.postimg.cc/xCFjFbpL/EIMter-CWk-AA3x-RF.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Barbed wire barricade protecting the home of German War Minister Noske in Berlin due to unrest in the city.
https://i.postimg.cc/nhtF5x2S/EIINYQLXUAEETE3.png (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Fazilka (United Kingdom) The cargo liner was wrecked on Great Nicobar Island, India.

Sailor Steve

10-31-19, 06:11 PM

Friday, October 31, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

11-01-19, 08:23 AM

1st November 1919

A train crash at Vigerslev, Denmark results in the deaths of 40 people.
https://i.postimg.cc/B6FvYRHS/EIR3-APKWo-AEzsn3.jpg (https://postimages.org/)upload images for free (https://postimages.org/)

Damaged streets in Riga after fighting occurred between Latvian and Estonian troops against the German-backed West Russian Volunteer Army.
https://i.postimg.cc/PrxgdYVZ/EIR3-APKWo-AEzsn3.jpg (https://postimg.cc/Dm9jgJTy)

A padre placing a wreath on a fallen soldier's grave in a cemetery near Cologne, Germany following World War One on 1st November 1919.
https://i.postimg.cc/W4jS1PpK/EIR3-APKWo-AEzsn3.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Volturnus (United Kingdom) The coastal cargo class ship was sunk in the Kattegat 5 miles Southeast of the Skaw light vessel by mines.

Sailor Steve

11-01-19, 08:17 PM

Saturday, November 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

Saturday, November 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation dated October 28, 1919.

Sir Eyre Crowe states that the question is a very simple one, and is summarized in the note from the British Delegation which had been circulated among in the members of the Council. The Council had appointed, at some prior time, General Milne as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in Asia Minor: It seems that neither the French nor the Italian authorities had been informed of the decision of the Council.

M Pichon thinks indeed that the question cannot raise any difficulty so long as the beginning of the note, as submitted to the Council, is altered slightly: The British Delegation had said that the General Officer commanding the British troops at Constantinople and in Asia Minor (Syria excepted) had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in those regions. This assertion was correct, as far as Turkey in Asia was concerned, but the question of the command at Constantinople was the object of negotiations between the British and French Governments.

Sir Eyre Crowe agreed with this remark, but asked, above all, that the French and Italian military authorities be informed of the decisions of the Supreme Council, which had recognized the authority of General Milne.

M Berthelot thought that there could be no doubt whatsoever on this question, and added he could not understand the misunderstanding which had taken place, for the necessary information had been given at the same time to M de France and to General Franchet d’Esperey.

S Scialoja asked that the same instructions be repeated to the Italian military authorities.

M Pichon agreed that this information should be reiterated.

(It is decided that the French and Italian Delegations take the necessary steps to inform their representatives in Turkey that the Supreme Council had appointed General Milne as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Asia Minor, Syria excepted.

2. The Council has before it a draft note prepared by the Drafting Committee.

M Fromageot comments upon this draft note and remarked that the Drafting Committee has taken account of the observations made at the preceding meeting of the Supreme Council, and also that the new draft was presented by all the members of the Committee.

General Weygand says that the draft, as prepared by the Drafting Committee, invites the German Government to send representatives to Paris on November 6th. He would like to know whether on the 6th of November they could profitably discuss with the German delegates: would the Commissions be ready on that date?

M Berthelot said that he had proposed November 6th to take into account the wish expressed by General Weygand himself that the conference should take place as soon as possible, but could easily be put off for a few days.

General Weygand thinks that from a military standpoint they would certainly be ready on November 6th, but that perhaps that date might be a little early for the Commissions.

M Pichon proposes the 10th instead of the 6th.

(This proposal is adopted)

(It is decided that the draft note to the German Government, prepared by the Drafting Committee, relative to putting the Treaty into force, be approved, and that the German Government be asked to send representatives to be in Paris on the 10th, and not on the 6th, of November, 1919.

3. The Council ha before it a draft Protocol, prepared by the Drafting Committee.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon the draft prepared by the Drafting Committee, and remarked that there was occasion to modify the draft on the following points:

(1) Page 1, point 3: Eliminate in the second line the word “immediately” and add after the words, “in Russian Territory” the words, “as soon as the Allies judge opportune.”

(2) Page 1, point 4: Substitute the word, “coercive” for the word, “consecutive.”

(3) Page 1, point 5: Substitute the word “fiduciary” for the word, “judicial.”

(4) Page 2, point 6: Add to the end of the paragraph, “destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over.”

(5) Page 3, point 11: Add to the end of the paragraph, “and various other merchant vessels.”

(6) Page 4: Add to the end of the second paragraph, “and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over.”

(7) Page 4, point 2: Add to the end of the paragraph “also the three submarine engines of U–146, which still remained to be delivered in reparation for submarines destroyed in the North Sea.”

He explains that in point 1 of Page 1 they had mentioned an interval of thirty-one days expiring December 11th, 1918. Was this exact?

Marshal Foch says it is not quite right; the time limit had been exceeded by mutual consent and in consequence of various agreements. There is no need to mention it. On the other hand, he considered that as regarded handing over of rolling stock, the Germans had not, properly speaking, committed any real violation of the Armistice. There had been certain slowness of execution. It would be a mistake therefore to treat as equally serious the non-fulfillment of that clause and specific violations of the Armistice like the Scapa Flow incident and the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. It would perhaps be better to mention in the beginning of the note the more important questions, and to consider secondary violations in a final paragraph.

M Fromageot says that they had followed the order of the clauses of the Armistice conventions; obviously that might be modified. From a legal point of view, on the other hand, he feels obliged to remark that the fact of an obligation being in course of fulfillment did not prevent their considering it unexecuted.

Marshal Foch thinks that it would be sufficient to say that, on that point, the Allied and Associated Powers had not received full satisfaction. He wishes to repeat, in that case, that there is no formal violation of the Armistice, and that it would be well not to confuse in the same category formal violations and incomplete execution.

M Berthelot says it had seemed advantageous to make a complete enumeration, but he wishes to remark that, in the last part, they had to take into account the arguments the Marshal had in mind, and that, doubtless, it would be sufficient to omit in that last part, paragraphs Nos. 4 and 5 of page 4.

M Pichon sums up that they are agreed to modify the first paragraph of page 1 in the following manner: “The obligations, etc., have not been carried out, or have not received full satisfaction.”

(This suggestion is adopted)

Marshal Foch wishes to remark that as for point 2, they cannot reproach the Germans with not having made the reimbursement of the upkeep expenses of the troops of occupation, for the simple reason that they had not yet told them the total amount of these expenses. It would therefore be better to omit the paragraph.

M Berthelot thinks it is all the easier, as the obligation is covered by the Treaty.

M Pichon concludes that the Council decided to omit this paragraph.

M Fromageot stated that with regard to Germany’s obligation to deliver documents, specie, valuables carried away by her troops, they had not felt in a position to mention the valuables removed from the prisoners’ camps, as the Minister of Finance had demanded, because the Armistice did not speak of it.

Mr Polk thinks that, although he does not suppose that his Naval Experts would raise objections on the point, he wishes to make a reservation on point 6 of the Committee’s draft. Similarly, he feels he must make a reservation on point 11 of the draft, concerning the handing over of the fourteen tank vessels which had been demanded. He believed, further, that on this point it might be possible to find a text which would satisfy at once the American Delegation on the one hand, and the British and the French on the other.

M Berthelot states they have already taken care to avoid a text which appeared to imply a decision by the American Government on property in these vessels.

Mr Polk adds that the American Government does not consider that the demand for the handing over of those tank vessels can be maintained.

M Berthelot wishes to remark that the Supreme Council had taken a decision on the subject,5 namely that a German obligation existed although, as between the Allies, the question might be examined anew.

Mr Polk does not wish to raise, at that time, the question in its entirety, but could not help remarking that if the decision which M Berthelot recalls, has not been taken, there would not have been a violation of the Armistice, in that case, on the part of the Germans. He is hoping that the Drafting Committee will prepare a text which would permit of an agreement.

M Henry Berenger states that they do not at that time have to examine the question of real property in the tank ships, nor what is the legal position of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft. That is a question which belongs to the Reparations Commission; for the moment the question is: why have the ships which had been demanded in virtue of certain clauses of the Armistice, not been delivered, especially at a time when tonnage and fuel are everywhere the universal need. He thinks the British Delegation believes, as he does, that there is there a real obstruction on the part of Germany.

Mr Polk thinks that the question before this meeting was to revise the protocol and not to discuss in its entirety the question of the tank ships which, however, he was ready to discuss. He simply wishes to make a reservation, and he is convinced that the Drafting Committee would manage to agree on a text which would not bring up the whole question.

Mr Berthelot says that a distinction should be made between the two points: 1st, the attitude of the Allies towards the Germans: the Germans have been asked to deliver the ships, they ought to do it. 2nd, if the Supreme Council had several times decided that the tank ships are to be sent to the Firth of Forth it is no longer a matter of settling the question in substance; and discussion remains possible as between the Allies and America. But it is important to introduce in the protocol a clause! If they were not to do so they would unintentionally be deciding the question in substance and to the advantage of Germany.

Mr Polk thinks that the remarks of M Berthelot are probably true, but as time is short, he would for the moment confine himself to making a reservation.

M Clemenceau concluded that it is understood, then, that the protocol will contain a clause on that subject, but for the moment the Council decides to reserve the text.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks with regard to point No. 12 of the Committee’s draft whether it would not be advisable to examine it at the same time as the draft reply to the German note of October 12th on the sale of Aeronautical materiel which figured on the agenda of that morning.

M Fromageot thinks that the question will present itself more profitably a little later. He will have some observations to make which will satisfy the technical experts; and at that time could also be examined the draft reply which Sir Eyre Crowe mentioned. He adds that, following point No. 12, it would be right to alter the text of the paragraph beginning with the words, “A certain number of stipulations, etc”; it should read: “Unexecuted or incompletely executed stipulations” so as to take into account the observations offered some time before by Marshal Foch. M Clemenceau says that they then have to decide what reparations they are going to exact for the Scapa Flow incident.

Captain Fuller points out that the Naval Experts have not been able to come to an agreement. The Representative of the United States had made a reservation on the subject of floating docks that ought to be exacted.

Commandant Le Vavasseur states that he has submitted - and his British, Italian and Japanese colleagues are of the same opinion - that it is inadvisable to specify the percentage of large and small docks that ought to be demanded for the tonnage that is to be replaced. They think it sufficient to fix only the total, leaving it to the Commission of Naval Control to make the choice. The American Delegate alone is of a different opinion.

Commandant Le Vavasseur repeats that they all agree upon the principle that the handing over of Naval materiel ought to be demanded and agreed also upon the amount of tonnage that should be claimed as reparation. Their difference exists in the proportion as between large and small docks.

Captain Fuller agrees that is the situation.

Mr Polk wishes to ask for what reason they cannot specify at this time the proportion of great docks and small docks to be delivered.

Captain Fuller replies that it is because this raises the question of the docks at Danzig, for it is at Danzig that two of the biggest docks Germany possesses are situated.

Mr Polk says that, in the absence of his naval experts, it is difficult for him to take a decision. He feels, however, as he has already stated to the Council, that this question brings up the problem of the extent of Germany’s ability to make reparation, and for that reason comes within the province of the Reparations Commission; he confines himself to making a reservation and proposes that the discussion be resumed that afternoon.

(This proposal is adopted.)

M Fromageot wishes to draw the attention of the Council to the third obligation which the protocol imposes on Germany, to take into account the remarks which has been presented to the Committee by technical experts. They, therefore, proposed to alter the text which the Council had before it in the following manner:

"Third - to make over to the Allied and Associated Governments the value of the Aeronautical materiel which had been exported, according to the decision that would be given, and the estimate made or notified by the President of the Commission on Aeronautical Control, as provided in article 210 of the Treaty of Peace, before the 31st January, 1920."

It is the President of the Commission who will decide whether the exported materiel is civil or military, and who as a result of that decision, will determine the sum that Germany ought to pay.

S Scialoja remarked that the notification to Germany would be made by the President, but that the decision would have to be taken by the Commission itself.

M Fromageot explains that the technical experts have agreed that the President be trusted with the power of deciding whether the materiel in question is civil or military.

Captain Roper states that the Supreme Council has had to make a decision on this point on the 29th September on the point being raised by the British Delegation. In the text prepared by the British Delegation the President had been mentioned, but in their minds it was clear that the President was merely the interpreter of the Commission.

M Berthelot adds that this means the decision of the Commission as notified by the President.

M Clemenceau explains that of course the Commission could always delegate its powers to the President.

M Fromageot made the comment that the two following paragraphs, Nos. 4 and 5 on page 4, ought to be omitted in the light of the explanations just offered by Marshal Foch, but that the Drafting Committee thought that there was still ground for adding to the final paragraph the following phrase which was dictated by the analogous terms of paragraph 18 of the annex to part VIII of the Treaty; “Germany pledges itself not to consider these measures as acts of war.”

M Clemenceau does not think this a very happy addition. What are they going to do if Germany should refuse to sign that phrase.

Marshal Foch announces himself quite hostile to that phrase.

S Scialoja wishes to raise another question. In his opinion it will be well to ask the Germans to come armed with full powers to sign the Protocol, but expressly on the understanding that that Protocol would not be still subject to ratification by the National Assembly. We

Are they not to take this precaution they would expose themselves to the anomaly that the Treaty would have come into force while the protocol was in the air; for certain articles of the German Constitution left it an open question whether the document that they wished to have the German representative sign would be valid without ratification by the legislative authorities.

M Fromageot wishes to point out that in their draft note it is stated on Page 28 that the German representative who is to sign the protocol must be armed with full powers.

S Scialoja explains that this means full powers to sign, but it is necessary that this signature should hold Germany without ratification.

M Fromageot thinks it would be sufficient to modify the first paragraph on Page 2 of the draft note in the following manner:

“The German Government is therefore asked to give to the German representatives, authorized to sign the procès-verbal for the deposit of ratifications, full powers to sign at the same time the protocol of which a copy is hereto attached and which provides without further delay for this settlement.”

(It is decided to approve the draft Protocol prepared by the Drafting Committee to be signed by a representative of the German Government upon the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace, with the following modifications:

(1) Page 1, paragraph 1: “The obligations have not been executed or have not been entirely fulfilled.”

(2) Page 1, paragraph 2: Eliminate the words, “within a period of thirty-one days ending on December 11, 1919."

(3) Page 1, paragraph 3: This paragraph to be entirely eliminated.

(4) Page 1, paragraph 4: Eliminate in the second line the word, “immediately” and add to the fourth line the words, “as soon as the Allies judge opportune.”

(5) Page 1, paragraph 6: In the third line substitute the word, “coercive” for “consecutive”.

(6) Page 1, paragraph 7: In the third line substitute the word, “fiduciary” for the word, “judicial”.

(7) Page 2, paragraph 2: Add at the end of this paragraph the words, “and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over”.

(8) Page 2, paragraph 3: This clause is provisionally reserved.

(9) Page 2, paragraph 4: line 1, substitute for, “Clauses of the Armistice, “Armistice Convention”.

(10) Page 3, paragraph 3: The first part of this paragraph is reserved, and at the end thereof are to be added the words, “and various other merchant vessels”.

(11) Page 3, paragraph 5: Between the words, “unexecuted” and “stipulations” insert the words, “or incompletely executed”.

(12)
Page 4, paragraph 2: Add at the end of this paragraph, “and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over”.

(13) The next paragraph is reserved provisionally.

(14) Page 4, paragraph 4: This paragraph to be modified so as to read: “To deliver within a period of ten days, from the date of the signature of the present Protocol, the machinery and engines of submarines U–137, U–138, and U–150 by way of reparation for the destruction of submarine UC–48, as well as of the three engines of submarine U–46, which still remained to be delivered in reparation for the submarines destroyed in the North Sea.”

(15) Change paragraph 5 on Page 4, to read: “. … according to the decision that will be taken, the estimate made and modified [notified] by the Aeronautic Control Commission as provided for in Article 210 of the Treaty of Peace and before January 31, 1920.”

(16) To omit the two last paragraphs of the same page.

It is further decided that on account of the changes made in the Protocol, the first paragraph on page 2 of the draft note to the German Government should be modified in the following manner:

“The German Government is therefore asked to give to the German representatives authorized to sign the procès-verbal for the deposit of ratifications, full powers to sign at the same time the Protocol of which a copy is hereto attached and which provides without further delay for this settlement.”)

4. The Council has before it a draft reply prepared by the French Delegation Draft Reply to the German Note Upon the Sale of Aeronautical Matériel

Sir Eyre Crowe proposes to refer this draft back to the Drafting Committee for examination, and also to state whether the text thereof agrees with the resolutions which have just been taken.

(This proposition is adopted)

(It was decided:

(1) To refer back to the Drafting Committee the draft reply to the note from the German Government dated October 12th.9 (See Appendix “D”.)

(2) That the Drafting Committee will decide whether the note and the protocol which the Allied and Associated Powers have decided to send did not render superfluous the sending of that specific reply.)

5. The Council has before it the report from the Central Territorial Committee concerning the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier, and a draft reply from the same Committee to the Bulgarian note concerning Thrace.

M Laroche explains that the Committee has not been able to agree. Although it is unanimous, as far Thrace is concerned, in refusing the Bulgarian claims, on the contrary, a disagreement exists on two other points. Two delegations, the American and the Italian, are of the opinion that there should be a modification of the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier line as it is defined in the conditions of Peace, in two places, namely in the region of Tsaribrod and in the region of Bossiligrad. On the contrary, the three other Delegations are of the opinion that the original conditions should remain. With regard to the Dobrudja, the Committee is equally divided. On September 5, the Supreme Council had decided to examine the question of the Dobrudja when it would reply to the Bulgarian propositions. At the preceding meeting, Sir Eyre Crowe had proposed that they should confine themselves to answering the Bulgarians that the question should not come up in a Treaty between Bulgaria and the Allied and Associated Powers, but the American and Italian Delegations insisted that the question should be examined anew: As far as they were concerned, the question was bound up with that of the Serbian frontier. That was the opinion of the majority of the Commission. In justification of the changes which they proposed to make in the conditions of Peace, the American and Italian Delegations laid stress on arguments which were already known, and they also emphasized the feeling which was being shown in Bulgaria, they were afraid that the decision of the Conference would leave behind them lasting marks of resentment. These arguments were not of sufficient value for the majority. The Majority as a matter of fact, pointed out that the Serbian Delegation was familiar with the Peace conditions: Should the Council change them at the last minute, the Serbian Allies would be the ones to experience that feeling referred to by the minority Delegations. The majority was of the opinion that the reasons which had modified the line of the former Serbo-Bulgarian frontier were still good: they had wished to protect in the Vranje region the Belgrade–Salonika railroad from a Bulgarian aggression; indeed, it should not be forgotten that it was in that region, and by reason of the proximity of the railroad to the former frontier, the Bulgarian attack had begun in 1915.

Mr Polk wishes to remark that as far as the Dobrudja was concerned, he thinks it might be sufficient to insert a phrase on the subject in the covering letter; that the Allied and Associated Powers would declare, for instance, that the time had not come to discuss the question. Should the majority insist, he would not oppose himself to that decision, but he wished to state that he would have to make a formal reservation in the name of the American Government. The Dobrudja might become a cause of future war in the Balkans, and America would have some difficulty in interfering in a conflict which might be brought about by that question. He therefore wished to ask that this reservation be set forth upon the record: that the American Delegation would prefer the insertion in the covering letter of a line stating that the matter would be taken up with Romania. Was the Supreme Council hostile to this solution? He does not wish to hide the fact that it seems to him a great pity, at a time when they were guaranteeing the protection of Minorities, to go against the rights of these Minorities in the Dobrudja.

M Pichon remarks that the Treaty of 1913 which had decided the future of the Dobrudja was prior to the war; there is no reason why they should change it as far as Romania is concerned.

S Scialoja does not wish to insist that the question of the Dobrudja should be taken up, but he, however, thinks that it could very well be said that it does not concern the Treaty with Bulgaria.

Mr Polk reiterates the fact that he does not ask for the insertion of a disposition to that effect in the Treaty itself, nor even for the addition of a phrase in their reply to the Bulgarian counter-propositions; he is only asking that some words to that effect might be put in the covering letter.

M Clemenceau thinks this amounts to the same thing; such a phrase would be offering a pretext for war.

M Laroche continues his comment, and says that in the region of Tsaribrod, the Serbians had asked for a rectification of frontiers as far as the Dragoman Pass which protects Sofia. The Conference does not wish to go so far, but they have to point out that there is a series of mountain railways which in that region converge on Pirot and which consequently are the roads leading to Nisch; that was the traditional road of the Bulgarian invasions. It had appeared to them that there was reason for giving to the Serbians the strategic key of that road: indeed Serbia does not have any more claims to set up against Bulgaria, and therefore it was right to believe that there would be no further ambition to satisfy in that direction. On the contrary, Bulgaria will not cease to claim Serbian territories and on that side, the reasons for aggression subsisted. As a matter of fact the rectification of frontiers in question would only have the effect of passing approximately 20,000 inhabitants under Serbian authority.

M Laroche states that the report of the Minority had been distributed and that he was ready to read it.

Mr Polk wishes to bring out certain points: first, should they consider the text of their first Peace conditions as intangible? Secondly, when the question had come up for the first time, M Tardieu had told them that it was only a matter of 7,000 Bulgarians being turned over to Serbian authority. On verifying these figures, it was found that as a matter of fact, it was a total of nearly 42,000 Bulgarians being turned over as against 93 Serbian inhabitants. The only possible justification for this proposed change was to give the Serbians the means to attack Sofia without being stopped by any intermediary obstacles. He, therefore urges the Supreme Council to think over the consequences entailed in a decision which meant the handing over of 40,000 Bulgarians to the Serbians, so as to facilitate a Serbian attack upon Sofia. Even in Serbia the wisest people had seen that this would be a mistake which would make more difficult their mission of conciliation. He did not wish, however, to retard in any way the hour of Peace, but he felt it was his duty to express a very definite protest on this question.

M Laroche wishes to answer Mr Polk’s arguments by stating briefly that 40,000 Bulgarians in a total population of 4,000,000 inhabitants does not represent a very large figure. They had not left Sofia without protection since they had let the Bulgarians keep the Dragoman Pass which formed a defensive strategic position of the greatest value; and should it be found correct that they had ensured advantages to the Serbians, the reason was that they were convinced it was the Bulgarians who would attack. A concession at Tsaribrod would not make the Bulgarians forget either Stroumitza or Monastir.

S Scialoja agrees with the American thesis. The arguments of the majority, as a matter of fact, do not seem convincing in the least. The ethnographic question is a clear one: This is a question of a population purely Bulgarian, of a territory which was Bulgarian by its nature and history. The only argument which had been invoked was that of the railway; on this point, he wished to bring their attention to the fact that there were other points on which the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier came nearer thereto than in the Bossiligrad region. Why then base upon the existence of a railroad the determination of a frontier? From the military standpoint, they could no more give Serbia the means of invading Bulgaria than give Bulgaria the means of invading Serbia. If Serbia had legitimate fears, one might, to allay these impose on Bulgaria the disarmament of the entrenched camp of Slivnitza. The truth is that Serbia wishes to have an open door on Sofia. They ought to be working to insure equilibrium; they should not admit the violation of those very principles of peace which they are striving to establish. There will always be causes for war, it was not for them to try and bring them about. It is clear that Bulgaria will never admit that the Serbs get an open road to Sofia. Lastly, he wished to remark that the text which they had communicated to the Serbs was only a draft, and that they had a perfect right to change it.

M Laroche states that at the present time, from a strategic point of view, the Serbs were in a position of clear inferiority. It the line of the present frontier which had allowed in 1915 the Bulgarian invasion. The Peace conditions which they had handed to Bulgaria, at the same time as to all their Allies, were more than a simple draft. They would be taking a very serious responsibility should they modify these conditions. As for the disarmament of Slivnitza, which S Scialoja proposes, this will appear to the Bulgarians as much more serious than the loss of Tsaribrod.

Mr Bowman resumes the arguments of the minority as follows: First, he thinks it is useless to reinforce the feelings of reciprocal hostility between the Bulgarians and the Serbs; secondly, the minority does not consider that reasons existed to foresee an invasion of Serbia by the Bulgarians. Bulgaria was vanquished, and the Treaty disarms her as well on land as on sea. Precautions had been taken to prevent her reorganizing an army; under these conditions she could not think of starting a new war for a long time. It is correct that in the Bossiligrad region, the railroad was at a distance of about ten miles from the frontier. It is proposed to withdraw this frontier to twice this distance, although the population was entirely Bulgarian; the minority would consent to accept this modification, but the case of Tsaribrod was entirely different. The frontier on that point formed a salient which protected the railroad, and on the other hand, in the southwest, on a point where they had been asked to rectify the line, the frontier came much nearer to the railroad. The American and Italian Delegations were aware of the fact that if one wished to modify the frontier line, the new line as proposed was a good one, but the question was whether such modification was necessary. They still thought that no sufficient reasons were adduced to justify such a change; and when, on the other hand, they pointed out that this was the question of greatest interest to Bulgarian opinion, that it would likewise in itself be sufficient to prevent a rapprochement between Serbia and Bulgaria; that further the draft proposed to them was even opposed by influential men in Serbia, they deem it their duty to maintain their conclusions.

Sir Eyre Crowe stated that Mr. Polk was perfectly right in saying that the Peace conditions which they had handed to the Bulgarians were not unalterable. Any modification was difficult when it bore upon a question which had been discussed for many months and which had been the result of compromise. As a matter of fact the only new point brought up at this meeting was more complete statistical information. All the other arguments had already been discussed, and he admitted that in the first Commission, all the military experts had agreed that the proposed frontier did not give the Serbians offensive military advantages, but only defensive. They were now told that the idea of protecting a railroad had no sense, and that a strategical argument could never be adduced as against an ethnical one; he would point out that the Yugo-Slavs had said the same thing about the line proposed for the new Italo-Slav frontier. In preparing the treaties, they had had to make compromises on all points. Why maintain that in this question particularly principles were sacred? Would it not be wiser to stand by the clauses on which they had agreed? They were as a matter of fact assured that the Bulgarian Delegation would sign the Treaty in any event: on the contrary the conversations he had had with the Serbs had convinced him that if they were to make concessions to Bulgaria so as to facilitate in Sofia a signature which appeared certain, they were running the risk of having the whole treaty jeopardised at Belgrade. The Serbian Delegation which had arrived in Paris was in a difficult situation: it was ready to sign the Treaty with Austria. If this new sacrifice were imposed on Serbia, would the delegation still be able to sign? Their common desire was to sign Peace as soon as possible. They were sure to have the Bulgarian signature; ought they to jeopardise the Serbian signature?

M Pichon wishes only to add one word to Sir Eyre Crowe’s statement. The Serbian Delegates had told him that a concession would mean for certain political men a decisive argument in favor of the refusal of Serbia’s signature. On the other hand, the intentions of Mr. Trumbic were conciliatory. Had the Bulgarians deserved that the Allies should bully the Serbs? He does not think so.

Mr Polk wishes to rectify on one point the statements of Sir Eyre Crowe: the American and Italian experts had never accepted the new line of frontier, they had always pointed out its dangers. The new line was not the work of the Commission, the Supreme Council alone had decided in its favor.13 He does not wish to complicate a difficult situation and he accepted that the Council should maintain its former decision, but in that case he felt it his duty to protest, to point out once more the dangers of such a decision, and to repeat that this decision was made against the advice of the American Delegation. The American Delegation did not wish to assume any responsibility whatsoever in the event of future conflicts which this decision might bring about.

S Scialoja wishes to associate himself with Mr Polk’s declaration.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

11-01-19, 08:19 PM

Saturday, November 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

...

Jimbuna

11-02-19, 07:17 AM

2nd November 1919

United Mine Workers led by John L. Lewis (pictured) announce a strike involving 400,000 miners in the U.S.
https://i.postimg.cc/PxvmJxwt/EIS7ydm-XUAAM8ku.png (https://postimages.org/)

Stable lads on strike at Epsom.
https://i.postimg.cc/nVw6NwHB/aj6ru6eg68w31.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

11-02-19, 12:25 PM

Saturday, November 2, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

11-03-19, 09:21 AM

3rd November 1919

Aftermath of War

Sir R. Wemyss created Baron.

Latvian War of Independence: The Latvian Army, supported by Estonian armored trains and the British Royal Navy, launches its counterattack.

Jimbuna

11-04-19, 11:19 AM

4th November 1919

Count Terauchi Masatake, Marshal of the Japanese Imperial Army, 1st Governor-General of Korea, and 9th Prime Minister of Japan, has passed away.
https://i.postimg.cc/sxW8gWZ9/EId-O5-O1-Xs-AIWG-m.png (https://postimages.org/)

Sophia Tolstaya, wife of Russian author Leo Tolstoy, has passed away.
https://i.postimg.cc/66CYTtm0/nat-geo-wild-auto-edition.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Lady Astor, pictured when a candidate in the by-election in Plymouth in 1919, Lady Astor won the election and became the first woman to serve as an MP, in the House of Commons, as a Unionist.
https://i.postimg.cc/wTvyZkLm/nat-geo-wild-auto-edition.jpg (https://postimg.cc/JtfzBZTr)

Ship Losses:

Lesbos (Belgium) The cargo ship ran aground on Cross Sands, in the North Sea off Great Yarmouth, Norfolk, United Kingdom and was wrecked.

Sailor Steve

11-04-19, 04:06 PM

Monday, November 3, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a report from the Military Representatives at Versailles relative to the occupation of Memel prior to ratification of the Treaty.

General Desticker reads and comments upon the report.

(After a short discussion it was decided to approve the report as prepared by the Military Representatives at Versailles, and that no troops should be sent to Memel before the entry into force of the Treaty.)

2. The Council has before it the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles relative to the suppression of the Inter-Allied Transport Commission.

General Desticker reads and comments upon the report.

(It is decided to suppress the Inter-Allied Transport Commission, as proposed by the Military Representatives at Versailles in their report.)

3. The Council has before it a note from the French Delegation on the Hungarian situation.

M Berthelot reads and comments upon the note prepared by the French Delegation. He wishes to bring to the attention of the Council that in paragraph 2 of Page 4, the phrase relative to the Inter-Allied force under discussion should be understood in the sense that the force includes only Serbian, Romanian and Czecho-Slovak troops, under an Inter-Allied command.

Mr Polk states that he has not yet seen a final report from Sir George Clerk and he thinks it might be advisable to await this information before discussing the question. He should, however, inquire how the Council intends to treat the Inter-Allied Commission of Generals; if this Inter-Allied Commission has not succeeded, it is because the Supreme Council has not backed it up sufficiently.

M Berthelot thinks that they have not carried out with sufficient authority the instructions given them by the Supreme Council, and on the other hand they have not shown initiative, and do not seem to have had a consistent policy. As for Sir George Clerk, he does not seem to have succeeded in his mission with Herr Friedrich. The affair seems to be dragging along; H Friedrich has not yet retired and the Democratic Government has not been formed as was expected by the Council. He adds that the French proposition is not to belittle the mission of Sir George Clerk in any fashion, but it is important to clear up the situation and settle this vexatious question.

M Pichon thinks it is extremely important to solve this question as soon as possible.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Romanian and Hungarian questions of course involve each other. Sir George Clerk has insisted on the importance of getting the Romanians out of the country, and a stable government cannot be formed until this has been settled. The information from Sir George Clerk says there might be disadvantages, but the balance of advantage is that the Romanians should be gotten out. The Romanians are defying the Council. S Bratiano was dragging on negotiations with no intention of following the instructions of the Council. He certainly thinks that they should insist on getting an answer from Romania and he thinks that the Council should publish the note which has been sent to Romania. S Bratiano was spreading false versions of the note, sent in the course of the electioneering campaign which is going on in Romania, and is pretending that there is no disagreement as between the Allies and Romania.

M Berthelot states it is quite evident that the Romanian troops should first get out but there is great danger if the Romanian troops are to leave the country before other troops are sent to replace them. In that case, the Allies will find before them at Budapest only a Friedrich Government which has in its hands a force of police; outside of Budapest is Admiral Horthy with an army of 20,000 men or so; at any rate he is reactionary and is a symbol of the Hapsburgs. In conclusion: first, the Romanians should get out; secondly, the Romanian troops should be replaced in such a way that the Allies will be in a position to impose their policy at Budapest; but the departure of the Romanians will be dangerous if the Allies do not have other means of controlling the situation. As far as the Romanians are concerned, there is no doubt whatever they should be obliged to answer the note which has been sent them, and it might become advisable to publish this note, although this might not be of very great practical value, as elections were being held at this time. S Bratiano Is pretending that this note had never been delivered to the Romanian Government by the Conference. According to his theory, only three out of the four Principal Allied and Associated Powers had presented the note, and the Italian representative had not associated himself with this step. General Coanda, who has just arrived in Paris, claims that there is no need to reply to a note which has not been received.

Mr Polk has noticed in the French note a reference to the American General which he does not approve. He thinks the American General has been doing his best to follow his instructions. His only contention is that Romania is not on trial, but that the Supreme Council should be obeyed. The impression is going abroad in Romania that the orders which are being executed by the Commission do not correspond to the real orders of the Supreme Council and also that if the text of the note does not sound quite French, it is because it stands for an Anglo-American translation. On the whole the impression is that America was against Romania; that is not so, it is only a question, as he has said before, of the orders of the Supreme Council being followed. If there is so little coordination of action between the Allies in this case, it augured badly for the future.

M Pichon says they are all agreed that the Inter-Allied cohesion should be maintained.

Mr Polk asks how it is possible after they had ordered the Romanians to leave Hungary, to think of leaving them in the Inter-Allied forces referred to in the latter part of the French note.

Sir Eyre Crowe said M. Berthelot’s remark - that the Supreme Council’s note had not been received, - is a surprise. If that is so then they cannot insist upon its being carried out. That lack of cooperation in Bucharest is very serious.

S Scialoja remarks that he has no information on the non-presentation of the note by the Italian representative; he will, however, get more information on the subject.

M Pichon states that according to a telegram from the French Chargé d’Affaires at Bucharest there has been delay in presentation of the note to the Romanian Government for the reason that the Italian representative has not received his instructions. A second telegram has informed him that the note has been delivered by three out of four representatives of the Allies without awaiting any longer the instructions of the Italian representative. He does not know whether the Italian representative has now received these instructions, but he wishes to point out that the Romanians are still maintaining that they have not received the note.

Sir Eyre Crowe mentions that S Bratiano is spreading the report that this was an Anglo-American intrigue.

M Pichon is of the opinion that the note should be published so as to put a stop to these rumors, and also a further note, should the Council so decide.

Mr Polk wishes to point out that the Council can only repeat the conclusions it has adopted at its meeting of August 5th or thereabouts.

M Berthelot wishes to point out that one cannot reproach the French Government with having opposed itself to any of the orders sent to Bucharest. The French representative has always delivered the notes either in the name of the Allies or in the name of the French Government. Should S Bratiano wish to try and cause disagreement between the Allies this should carefully be avoided. He repeats that two points are to be distinguished; on the Romanian question there is no discussion possible as to the attitude to be taken, but the Hungarian question remains. The departure of the Romanians from Budapest runs the risk of bringing about a state of anarchy or the reappearance of the Hapsburg monarchy.

Mr Polk thinks that early in September the Council had ordered the Romanians to turn over 10,000 rifles to the Hungarian police which was to be organized, and he understands that only 1,000 rifles had been delivered up to this time without bayonets, without sufficient ammunition, and that the machine guns had been delivered without tripods. He thinks there would be no use sending another Mission to Budapest if there was to be no compliance with the orders already sent out by the Council. If the present Mission had not done its work, it would then be advisable to recall it.

M Pichon agrees that this might be exact, but there remains the danger of an armed force under the orders of Admiral Horthy, with the shadow of a Hapsburg reaction. The Romanians might be lying, but they again affirmed that they had given up these arms; it would be easy to verify this through the Mission and the orders should then be carried out. He again pointed out how dangerous it would be to recall Romanian troops without being able to oppose an Inter-Allied force to the Horthy force. It is important to organize a democratic Government at Budapest or it will be impossible to sign peace with Hungary.

Mr Polk wishes to remark that four of the Powers had sent representatives to report on conditions in Hungary - he personally had great confidence in General Bandholtz, - and if the Council did not have confidence in these representatives it was for it to recall them. Later the Council had sent Sir George Clerk, in whom also he had the greatest confidence. He thinks the Council should have confidence in the men they send on these Missions, and he considers it had been well represented so far.

M Berthelot says that if the police force at Budapest is armed, that does not inspire great confidence, for it is in the hands of the Friedrich government. It is quite clear that the Council got its information from representatives wherever sent; it had also the advantage of a general view of all the problems. The important question is that there should not remain a dangerous and ridiculous center of disorganization in central Europe; a negative policy was not sufficient. They should have a positive policy.

M Pichon asks what is to be done about Hungary. Are they going to deliver it to the Friedrich government or to the Archduke? As the Allies will not have forces available to send there, it seems that the best solution would be to have the occupation force composed of Serbian, Romanian and Czechoslovak troops under an Inter-Allied command. If the Council had in mind a better solution, this was the time to put it forward.

Mr Polk asks whether the question should not also be examined by the Financial experts.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests that Sir George Clerk should be informed by telegram of the discussion, and asks for an opinion on the possibility of employing Romanian, Serbian and Czechoslovak troops.

Mr Polk agrees with Sir Eyre Crowe, that the Council should not think of acting without Sir George Clerk’s opinion.

M Pichon remarks that Sir George Clerk could also consult the Generals.

Sir Eyre Crowe inquired whether, in the existence of the disturbed state of the country, it would be expedient to use Romanian troops, and whether a force containing Roumanian and Serbian troops would work well.

M Berthelot thinks that this was simply a question of command. He thinks, however, that the Romanians might be excluded, especially if this exclusion might be used to show them how little confidence was put in them by the Supreme Council. But it was most important that they should have the symbol of an Inter-Allied force, so as to disarm Horthy. Telegrams would not be sufficient to do this. This occupation would not be very long, and with an efficient high command it would be easy to await the formation of a democratic Government.

M Pichon sums up, stating that the Council is agreed to send immediately a telegram to Bucharest, insisting that the Romanian Government should answer the last note sent by the Council. M Berthelot will now prepare the text of this telegram.

M Berthelot submits to the Council a draft telegram which is approved. He thinks it advisable to give the text of this telegram to the Romanian Delegation that same afternoon, and to publish the new and the former note the next day.

Sir Eyre Crowe informs the Council he has at that moment received a telegram from Sir George Clerk, which he proceeds to read to the Council.

(The Council unanimously agrees to adjourn the examination of the draft telegram to be sent until the next meeting of the Council)

(It was decided:

(1) To send a note to the Romanian Government insisting on a prompt answer to the note which had already been sent by the Council on October 12th;

(2) That this note should be immediately delivered to the Romanian Government at Bucharest by the four representatives of the Powers without waiting for further instructions from their respective Governments;

(3) To give the Romanian Delegation at Paris a copy of this note that same afternoon;

(4) That the present note, and also the original note, should be published the following day.)

4. The Council has before it a report from the New States Commission and a draft Treaty with Greece.

M Kammerer reads and comments upon the report of the New States Commission and the draft Treaty with Greece. He adds that the proposed Treaty concerns European territory only and should any Asiatic territory be attributed to Greece at a later time, a new treaty will be necessary. Greece should also be informed that the Treaty would be communicated to her at this time, but that the signature would only follow upon the final attribution to her of certain territories.

(After a short discussion it is decided:

(1) To approve the draft Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Greece, prepared by the New States Commission;

(2) That in communicating the text of this treaty to the Greek Delegation the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference should inform the Delegation that it only applies to territories situated in Europe, and that Greece will not be asked to sign the Treaty before the territories to be attributed to her had been determined.)

5. M Fromageot wishes to inquire which Powers should figure in the preamble of the Treaty with Bulgaria, and also which Powers are to sign. America and Japan were not at war with Bulgaria, but it seemed anomalous that they should not sign, taking into account the different dispositions of the Treaty.

Mr Polk understands that the question has already been settled and that it was agreed that all the Principal Powers sign.

M Fromageot says that as for the other Allied and Associated Powers, a certain number had not declared war against Bulgaria, but their full powers had already been presented to the Bulgarian Delegation; under those circumstances they have a right to sign. He proposes that a circular letter should be sent them asking whether they intended to sign, and he thinks this would not delay the delivery of the reply to the Bulgarian counter-proposals.

(It was decided:

(1) That all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign the Treaty with Bulgaria;

(2) That a circular letter should be addressed to the other Allied Powers which had not declared war against Bulgaria, to inquire whether it was their intention to sign the Treaty.)

6. The Council has before it the note from the Dutch Government and the draft reply prepared by the Drafting Committee to this note.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon both documents. He wishes to add that the note sent by the Supreme Council on October 15th to Germany conformed to the declarations made in March at the Conference in Brussels concerning the question of ships in course of construction. He wishes to point out that the decision was formerly that all ships in course of construction were to be delivered to the Allies.

S Scialoja remarks that, in the reply to the Dutch Government, paragraph 7, Annex 3, to Part VIII of the Treaty with Germany should be had in mind. A possible objection from the Dutch Government should be foreseen: the Treaty states that Germany agrees to take any measures that might be necessary for obtaining the full title to the property in all ships which might have been transferred during the war to neutral flags. It therefore follows that Holland might very well tell the Allies that they should address their demands to Germany and not to her. He would like the Drafting Committee to take into consideration the possibility of that objection in the note to be sent to Holland.

Mr Polk states that apparently the said paragraph ties the hands of the Supreme Council; but as a matter of principle, this would not be in accord with the American view of International Law. Should not this note be sent back to the Drafting Committee to prepare a text which would satisfy all the members of the Council?

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to remark that if an argument is begun with the Dutch Government it will be difficult to foresee how long this discussion might last.

(It is decided to refer back to the Drafting Committee the draft reply to the note from the Dutch Government for further examination.)

7. The Council has before it a report from the Allied Railways Commission in Poland relative to the opening for commercial traffic of the three railroads crossing the German-Polish frontier north of Warsaw.

Colonel Kisch reads and comments upon this report. He brings up the personal suggestion that the Armistice Commission was not the proper authority, but that the question should be referred to the Allied Representatives in Berlin.

(After a short discussion it is decided to approve the conclusions of the report as presented by the Allied Railways Commission in Poland, with this modification: that the Allied Military Representatives charged with the Polish-German Affairs acquaint the German Government with the agreements if any, concluded at Warsaw.)

8. The Council has before it a request of the European Danube Request of the Commission on the International Conference to establish the regime of the Danube, as provided for in Article 349 of the German Treaty.

(After a short discussion it is decided to refer this request to the Drafting Committee for examination and report as to points of law.)

9. The Council has before it the request of the European Danube Commission for the attribution of two tugs to that Commission.

(It is decided to attribute two tugs belonging to the Enemy Powers to the European Danube Commission for an indemnity to be fixed by the arbitrators.)

10. The Council has before it the note from the German Delegation to the Reparations Commission regarding the transport by sea of potatoes purchased by Germany in Denmark.

(It is decided to refer back to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission this question for examination and report.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve

11-04-19, 11:50 PM

Tuesday, November 4, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. Marshal Foch states that the President of the Armistice Commission has informed him that at a meeting at Treves of the Railways Commission the German delegates informed the Allied representatives that the German Government had decided to stop all passenger train service from the 5th to the 15th of November, both in the occupied and unoccupied parts of Germany. After the 15th of November passenger traffic would be restored but all express trains would be suppressed. He wishes to be authorized by the Council to reply that the suspension of railway service in the occupied territories could not be admitted and that if a reduction of railway service in these territories is consented to, it will only be on condition that rapid communication with the large centers of unoccupied Germany, with respect both to passenger traffic and postal service, should continue to exist.

(It is decided to approve the communication to be sent by Marshal Foch to the German Government notifying it that the Allied and Associated Powers cannot permit a substantial curtailment of service on railroads in the occupied territories.

2. The Council has before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council dated November 1st, 1919.

M Berthelot says that it is evident from reading Sir George Clerk’s telegram that everyone in Hungary desired the departure of the Romanian troops; they are an embarrassment both to the Friedrich Government and to the Allied Generals, whose authority is compromised by their presence. But, in spite of this fact, it remains necessary to have an Inter-Allied force on the spot. This seems to him all the more essential as he notes that the only Allied representative having a real influence in Hungary is Admiral Troubridge, and he supposes that this is because of the vessels under the Admiral’s command. So the Romanians should leave, but on the other hand, it is necessary to have an Inter-Allied force which will be more than a moral force. Sir George Clerk’s telegram also indicates that the Friedrich Government will retire as soon as the Romanian troops have left. Under these conditions it seems to him that the order of events should be as follows:

(1) Formation of an Inter-Allied force, if it is decided to form one;

(2) Departure of the Romanian troops, as soon as this Inter-Allied force can reach its destination;

(3) Withdrawal of the Friedrich cabinet; and,

(4) Formation of a Democratic government which will take charge of elections. Sir George Clerk, as a perfect gentleman, seems to feel confidence in Admiral Horthy, in whom he has found a pleasing personality. As far as he is concerned, it seems to him that the word of an Hungarian Admiral, however likeable he might be, and whose intentions moreover are known, is not sufficient.

S de Martino says that the Italian Delegation is of the opinion that the occupation of Hungary by an Inter-Allied force composed of Yugoslavs and Czechs will result in trouble; these troops, particularly the Yugoslav troops, have shown in the past that they are not averse to pillaging. Moreover, there exists a profound hatred between Hungarians and Serbs. The Italian Delegation therefore thinks that the troops which it is proposed to send to Hungary will only increase disorder. The Italian representative at Budapest has proposed an alternative plan of charging the Inter-Allied Military Mission with supervising the organization of the Hungarian army and of ensuring that it did not fall into the hands of the reactionaries. Such a mission for the Generals could be considered as falling within the terms of the Armistice and will not constitute an illegal interference in the Internal affairs of Hungary. In any case it will be well to know what kind of government it is desired to establish in Hungary. Sir George Clerk’s report seems to place confidence in Friedrich and Horthy, while, on the other hand, the French Delegation has characterized them as tools of Archduke Joseph; a definite policy should be adopted.

M Berthelot replies that if the Serbs and Czechs are to be commanded by Serb and Czech officers it will evidently be impossible to use them, but it is proposed to place these troops under Allied command. Moreover, whatever bitterness might exist in Hungary against the Serbs, he thinks that Hungarian public opinion is resigned to the loss of certain territories. In the next place, it seems scarcely possible that Admiral Horthy’s army can be controlled by a Commission which has no material force at its disposition: to follow any such line of action would be tantamount to insisting on a policy of impotence. Finally, as to the question of knowing what government should be supported, he thinks that there is no difference of opinion, and that S De Martino himself has no doubts concerning the true aims of Friedrich. This point of paramount importance remains: as long as the Romanians are there, the Hungarian Government has been able to do nothing. The day the Romanians left and nothing remained but the moral force of the Allied Generals, the country will be delivered over to reaction and monarchical restoration. It is vital to have a real force in Hungary; the question is to know what this force should be.

Mr Polk asks who will pay the Czechoslovak and Serbian troops placed under Allied Command. It was evident that it will not be their governments.

M Berthelot observes that the financial question will have to be examined but that it is less important than the question of principle which should be decided first.

M Pichon points out that it is necessary to know if it is agreed to organize an Inter-Allied force. For his part he thinks it indispensable. As long as Friedrich is there the establishment of a democratic form of government cannot be counted upon. Friedrich had proved that he was either unable or unwilling to establish one.

Mr Polk says that his difficulty is that the plan now proposed has not been suggested either by Sir George Clerk or by the Allied Generals; it is being discussed at long range. Moreover, he thinks that there will be difficulties in obtaining the necessary cooperation of the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs; it will also be difficult to persuade the Romanians to withdraw completely, and the Council will find it hard to maintain control of the situation. Finally, he doubts if an Allied command will suffice to prevent the pillaging and disorders that S De Martino mentioned.

M Pichon says that evidently no decision can now be taken and that Sir George Clerk and the Allied Generals should be consulted.

M Berthelot observes that it will certainly be preferable to send Allied troops into Hungary, but that none are available. It is also clear that it will be difficult to eliminate the Romanians, and that if the three countries bordering on Hungary participate in that operation the difficulties will be less. On both sides there are adverse considerations between which a choice will have to be made.

S de Martino requests that his proposal be submitted also to Sir George Clerk. He is, moreover, greatly impressed by the fact that Sir George Clerk thinks that Horthy can be persuaded to keep his promises.

M Pichon thinks it is extraordinary that Admiral Horthy, who has raised an army with certain well known intentions, should suddenly renounce his designs.

S de Martino points out that Sir George Clerk has also indicated the possibility of trusting Friedrich and has spoken of private negotiations relative to the formation of a Ministry, whereas M Berthelot has said that the Council had already pronounced against Friedrich.

M Berthelot says that it should be recalled that after Sir George Clerk’s first trip, the Council had agreed that Friedrich must be eliminated. A draft to this effect has been prepared. In order not to seem to intervene in the internal affairs of Hungary this telegram has not been sent and it has been decided to entrust Sir George Clerk with a new mission, but Sir George Clerk’s instructions are contained in the draft telegram. This draft has been prepared by Sir George Clerk and himself. Sir George has pointed out to him that it would be best not to give Friedrich an order to withdraw and to only tell him that for the last time he was asked to form a democratic government - a thing which they judge it impossible for him to do. He recalls also that the Council has thought of publishing the telegram in order to strengthen the hands of the Hungarian Democratic elements. It is clear that if Friedrich had been able to form a democratic government he would long since have done so. Sir George Clerk, moreover, does not seem to have any doubt of his withdrawal. It seemed to him that the Friedrich Government, like any monarchical Government which attempts to establish itself in Hungary, should withdraw.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he entirely agrees that Sir George Clerk should be consulted; he himself had suggested it at the preceding meeting of the Council. There is first of all a point which has to be clarified, namely: what is being asked of Hungary? It is to have a stable Government which will preside over the elections and with which Peace can be concluded. The occupation, which M Berthelot thinks will be a short one, is therefore bound up with the question of elections, and might well be prolonged. Furthermore, Sir George Clerk thinks that Friedrich will withdraw after the departure of the Romanians and he manifests a great deal of confidence in Admiral Horthy’s assurance that he will recognize a Government resulting from the elections. Sir George must have serious reasons for this opinion and he, himself, attaches great weight to it. Moreover, it is well known that the majority of the Hungarian population favor the establishment of a conservative form of Government; if the elections take place without mismanagement it is almost certain that the resulting Government will not be democratic. However, there exists no right to prevent the Hungarian people from forming a Government corresponding to its own tendencies, provided there is no question of restoring the Hapsburgs. He thinks indeed, that Admiral Horthy is counting on the elections to bring about in Hungary a Government satisfactory to himself and that doubtless explains his attitude and the assurance he had given to Sir George Clerk. Ought military intervention be resorted to, in order to prevent such elections? The whole question lay there. In the meantime, elections are impossible in Hungary until the Romanians have retired beyond the Theiss. The intervention of the Czechs and Serbs might likewise create difficulties. He doubts whether that intervention could be obtained since the Czechs are probably not inclined to favor the formation of a Government whose tendencies will cause them anxiety. Moreover, if the intervention of the Yugoslavs is requested they might ask to be guaranteed against an Italian attack; what would be done then? He thinks, for his part, that Sir George Clerk ought first of all to be asked if he thinks it expedient to form the Inter-Allied force which had been suggested. Why not be satisfied with the departure of Friedrich and the formation of another Government? That is what had been desired by the Council. There had been no thought of military occupation and no new fact had occurred to justify that occupation.

M Berthelot thinks that there is a new fact, namely; the organization of Horthy’s army. He is very nearly in agreement with the essential part of Sir Eyre Crowe’s statements. It is indeed probable that the elections will be favorable to politicians of the same shade of opinion as Friedrich, but the principle should be agreed to that the return of the Hapsburgs cannot be tolerated. It is impossible to intervene in opposition to the opinion of the country, nevertheless this opinion cannot be allowed to do what it pleases. Moreover, he does not think that the Czechs will create any difficulty over giving the assistance which would be asked of them, for Dr Benes has been the first to point out the danger. There is no doubt that the police of Friedrich and the army of Horthy will, at the time of the elections, act favorably to the reactionary elements.

Sir Eyre Crowe adds that Sir George Clerk should be asked if he is sure of the good faith of Friedrich and Horthy.

S de Martino says that Sir Eyre Crowe has alluded to a question which the Yugoslavs will doubtless raise if they are asked to send troops into Hungary. He cannot better reply than by reiterating the opposition of the Italian Delegation to the sending of Serbian troops into Hungary.

M Berthelot asks the reasons for this opposition?

S de Martino said the reasons are those that he has already pointed out; he is willing, however, for Sir George Clerk to be consulted on this point provided that his (S De Martino’s) suggestions are also submitted to him.

M Pichon points out that Sir George Clerk had made another recommendation, namely sending an Inter-Allied Mission to Transylvania. For his part he approves of this recommendation.

M Polk asks if the members of this proposed Mission could not be taken from the Allied officers at Budapest.

Sir Eyre Crowe recalls that Transylvania was to be given to Romania, and inquires whether such a Mission could be sent without previous negotiations with Romania.

Mr Polk suggests that Sir George Clerk be asked what part of Transylvania is referred to in his telegram.

M Pichon adds that he might also be asked to specify the accusations made against the Romanians.

M Berthelot reads a draft telegram which he has prepared in conformity with the views expressed in the course of the discussion.

Mr Polk asks if the sense of the Council is that the Romanians should eventually be represented in the Inter-Allied force?

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he, just as did the American Delegation, sees difficulties in such a course.

M Pichon says that he is not desirous to have the Romanians included in this force but he thinks that their exclusion will create additional difficulties.

Mr Polk remarks that he had only said that it seemed to him difficult for the Romanians to accept exclusion from the Inter-Allied force.

Sir Eyre Crowe calls attention to the fact that Sir George Clerk had asked if he was authorized to state that the Allies would recognize a Government, acceptable to him, which did not include Friedrich. A reply on this point should be sent to him.

Mr Polk says he takes it as understood that the telegram would be submitted to the Council before being dispatched.

(It was decided that at its next meeting the Council will examine a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk to be prepared by M Berthelot in conformity with the discussion of this question at the meeting of November 4th.)

3. The Council has before it a note from the French Delegation dated November 3, 1919.

General Le Rond said that there has already been preliminary conferences between the British and French delegates on the various Plebiscite Commissions. It will be very advisable for the Italian delegates to participate as soon as possible in these conferences. The Council should not forget that these Commissions are important bodies, that each country has to organize numerous personnel and that such organization will necessarily entail a long delay. In these preliminary conferences it will be necessary to agree on the personnel to be furnished by each Allied country and to prepare the negotiations with the Germans.

S de Martino thinks that November 7th is somewhat early. The 8th or 9th would be better.

General Le Rond observes that there is no obligation to commence negotiations with the Germans exactly on the 10th.

M Pichon wishes to draw the attention of the Italian Delegation to the question of the contingent to be supplied by Italy for the forces of occupation; the Council does not yet know if Italy has withdrawn her reservation.

General Cavallero says that the instructions he has just received authorizes him to withdraw that reservation. The Italian contingent will consist of five battalions and two batteries of Field Artillery, that is to say, three battalions and two batteries of Field Artillery will be sent to Upper Silesia, one battalion to Marienwerder and one to Teschen. He will come to an agreement with Marshal Foch’s Staff to have the strength of the three battalions destined for Upper Silesia sufficiently reinforced to equal approximately the five battalions demanded.

Marshal Foch says that this plan ought to be examined more closely but in principle it seems admissible.

M Pichon says that the Presidents of the Commissions should be named. The Council had decided on the 18th October that the Presidents should be elected by the Commissions themselves, but it later seemed preferable to have the Council appoint them directly. Ought it to wait until the Commissions had been formed?

General Le Rond thinks that it is important to make these appointments as soon as possible. Indeed the Presidency carries with it certain obligations; the nations furnishing the Presidents will also have to furnish a larger personnel. They, therefore, should be settled upon as soon as possible. If it is decided that the Presidency of each Commission should be given to the Nation to which has been entrusted the command of the troops in the same zone, he wishes to recall that at Allenstein the military command will be British, at Marienwerder Italian, in Upper Silesia French, and at Teschen American; but as for Teschen the American participation is awaiting the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate, and the question is all the more urgent inasmuch as only two months are left in which to hold the plebiscite.

M Pichon says that the Council feels that it is fitting that the military command in each territory to be occupied, and the Presidency of the plebiscite Commission in the same territory, should pertain to the same Nation.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests that while waiting for America to assume the Presidency of the Teschen Commission it should be held by France, which already administers the neighboring territory of Upper Silesia.

Mr Polk agrees.

General Weygand says that a telegram has just been received from General Henrys containing information of the agreements concluded between the Germans and Poles with respect to regulating the taking over by Poland of territories to be immediately ceded to it by virtue of the Treaty of Peace. The application of these agreements, moreover, raise certain difficulties; for instance, it involves the passage over part of the territory of the free city of Danzig of German troops. Under these circumstances he thinks it important to notify the Poles to send representatives qualified to continue their negotiations with the Germans under the auspices of the Conference.

(This recommendation is approved.)

(It is decided:

(1) That the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on Plebiscite or Administrative Commissions, to the extent of at least one Delegate from each Power on each Commission, should assemble at the Quai d’Orsay as soon as practicable - November 7th if possible;

(2) That the Polish Government should be invited to send to Paris representatives empowered to conduct with the German Government - under the auspices of the Conference - the negotiations rendered necessary by the cession to Poland of German territory, at the same time as the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers discussed with the German Delegates questions raised by the putting into force of the Treaty of Peace.)

(It is further decided:

(1) That the Presidency of the Plebiscite Commissions should at Allenstein be held by the British Representative, at Marienwerder by the Italian, in Upper Silesia by the French, and at Teschen by the Americans; although provisionally it should be held at Teschen by the French Representative;

(2) That the question of the strength of the Italian troops of occupation should be settled by Marshal Foch and the Italian Military Representative.)

4. The Council has before it a note from the Belgian Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference dated October 25th, 1919.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the question is decided by the former decisions of the Council. The best course would be to transmit this note to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission stating that the Council is of the opinion that the instructions previously given by it to this Commission involved the granting of the Belgian Delegation’s request.

(It is decided to transmit to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission the note from the Belgian Delegation relative to German vessels laden with wood destined for Belgium, and to inform that Commission that the Supreme Council is of the opinion that the instructions previously given by it involve the granting of the Belgian request.

5. General Weygand states that with respect to their railway system the Baltic Provinces are in a peculiar situation. During the war the Germans changed the tracks to normal gauge with the result that at present only German material and transformed Russian material could circulate on the Baltic system. It is evident that in order to assure the continuance of the economic life of the country part of the German material should be retained on the spot. Neither the Armistice nor the treaty accorded the right to demand this. He proposes that the German Government be informed that, by reason of Germany’s deliberate transformation of the railways of the Baltic Provinces, General Niessel should be empowered to determine the amount of German material to be retained in those territories.

(It is decided that the German Government should be informed by Marshal Foch that, in consequence of the transformation of the railways of the Baltic Provinces effected by the Germans during the war, General Niessel will be empowered to determine the amount of German rolling stock which should be left in those regions.)

6. The Council has before it the draft letter to the Chargé d’Affaires of the Dutch Government relative to the vessels sold by Germany during the war to Dutch Navigation Companies.

(It is decided to approve the text of the note to the Chargé d’Affaires of the Dutch Government relative to German ships sold during the war to Dutch Navigation Companies.)

7. The Council has before it a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 3rd, 1919.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that the only thing to do is to approve the recommendations of the note. The Council at that moment agrees that the Secretary-General of the European Danube Commission, that is to say, Colonel Rey, should be Secretary-General of Conference provided for by Article 349 of the Treaty of Versailles. Representation of the European Danube Commission Conference Provided for by Article 349 of the Treaty of Versailles

(It is decided:

(1) To approve the recommendations of the note prepared by the Drafting Committee relative to representation of the European-Danube Commission in the Conference provided for by Article 349 of the Treaty of Versailles;

(2) That the Secretary-General of the European-Danube Commission should act as Secretary-General of the said Conference.)

8. M Fromageot says that the Drafting Committee wonders whether it would not be expedient to have Bulgaria sign a Protocol similar to those signed by the German and Austrian Delegations at Versailles and at St. Germain. It is difficult to take the Versailles Protocol as a guide for the Protocol in question. On the other hand, the St. Germain Protocol contains provisions which it would be advantageous to have Bulgaria sign.

For instance, it provides, in Section 1, that the list of persons to be handed over to the Allied and Associated Governments by Austria pursuant to Article 173, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, should be sent to the Austrian Government within a month of the coming into force of the Treaty.

A similar clause could be inserted in the Bulgarian Protocol. The provisions contained in Section 2 seem inapplicable to Bulgaria.

The same is not true of the provisions of Section 3; but as the Bulgarian Treaty, with respect to reparations, differs greatly from the Austrian Treaty, he thinks that the opinion of the Reparation Commission should be asked on that point.

Finally, Section 4 could be advantageously reproduced. Austria had also signed at St. Germain a declaration by which it undertook to communicate to the Allied and Associated Governments all the information at its disposal relative to vessels sunk or damaged by Austrian naval forces during the war. It might not be very beneficial to have Bulgaria sign a corresponding declaration, but at least it could not be prejudicial.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Drafting Committee should prepare, to be signed at the same time as the Bulgarian Treaty, a draft protocol similar to the protocol signed September 10, 1919, at Saint Germain, by the Austrian Delegation, subject to the decision of the Reparation Commission as to the expediency of repeating in the said protocol the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of the protocol of Saint Germain;

(2) That the Drafting Committee should prepare, to be signed by the Bulgarian Delegation at the same time as the Treaty of Peace, a declaration similar to the one signed on September 10, 1919, by the Austrian Delegation.)

9. Mr Matsui states that he has been telegraphically informed that the Emperor of Japan, on October 30th, had ratified the Treaty of Versailles. Under the final clauses of the Treaty of Peace it becomes his duty to make a formal notification of this ratification. Should he do so at once or await the signature of the procès-verbal relative to the deposit of ratifications? It seems to him that he might await this latter date.

M Pichon says that the Conference will approve the procedure prescribed by the Drafting Committee.

M Fromageot says that that Committee has provided for this contingency in the draft procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications which had been approved by the Council. This draft had spoken of “deposit of ratifications or of notifications of ratifications.”

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

11-05-19, 10:26 AM

5th November 1919

American soldier attached to the Red Cross distributes shoes to Russian prisoners of war still stuck in Germany due to the Russian Civil War.
https://i.postimg.cc/50DvFKwQ/EImd-XIZX0-AAd-RQN.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

Audrey P. Brown (Canada) The schooner ran aground in Liverpool Bay, Nova Scotia.
Silny (Russian Navy White Movement) Russian Civil War: Medvezhyegorsk Operation: The gunboat was scuttled to prevent capture in Lake Onega.

Sailor Steve

11-05-19, 09:06 PM

Wednesday, November 5, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk.

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to remark that he proposes to replace paragraph 2 on page 1 by the following paragraph: “The Romanian troops shall evacuate Hungary completely and shall withdraw to the other side of the frontier as fixed by the Conference: It is indispensable that they should allow full liberty to the Hungarian elections.” In the following paragraph he suggests that the words, “immediately thereafter” should be omitted. He wishes to give Sir George Clerk discretion on the question of the time when the Friedrich cabinet should withdraw. If he were to await the complete evacuation by the Romanian troops, this might be found too long.

S de Martino asks that a change be made in paragraph 1 of page 2, so as to follow the suggestion made by the Italian representative at Budapest.

(The text is agreed to read as follows: “Another suggestion had been made which charged the Inter-Allied Military Mission with the supervision of the organization … etc.”

Mr Polk suggests that the beginning of paragraph 3 on page 2 be changed to read as follows: “The Council would like to know whether, after having consulted the Inter-Allied Mission, and after … etc.”

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to add to paragraph 3 of page 2, after the words, “by the Hungarian gendarmerie” the following words, “which might be placed under the Control, direct or indirect, of the Inter-Allied Military Mission.”

(This change is adopted, and it is agreed to put after paragraph 3 of page 2, the paragraph suggested by S De Martino)

(It is decided:

(1) That Sir Eyre Crowe should send to Sir George Clerk, in the name of the Supreme Council, the telegram.

(2) That the telegram sent by the Supreme Council to the Romanian Government at its meeting of November 3rd, 1919, should be communicated to Sir George Clerk.)

2. M Pichon inquires whether Mr Polk has received an answer on the subject from President Wilson.

Mr Polk says that the President will surely issue the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations; the only question is the form of thee letter which the President should write. This is still open and he expected an answer within a short time.

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to state that the British Government has agreed upon Paris as the place of the first meeting of the Council.

M Berthelot states it is understood between Sir Eric Drummond, Colonel House and the French Representative that this meeting should only nominate the Commission charged with fixing the boundaries of the Sarre district. There still remains the appointment of the Commission for the Government of the Sarre district. As soon as the Treaty is put into force, the German Government might ask, to whom should the sovereignty over this territory be transferred. The difficulty might of course be solved by prolonging the military occupation regime until the Commission for the Government of the Sarre had been appointed; but it is important that the Allies should agree on this intermediary solution. From the French standpoint, however, it is quite certain that it would be wiser to appoint the Government Commission at once and that it is to especially please the American and British Governments that this solution might be accepted.

Mr Polk remarks that he understands that this is the view of his Government.

Sir Eyre Crowe fears that the Germans might cause trouble, if this is not fixed; Sir Eric Drummond however having agreed with his French and American colleagues, he (Sir Eyre Crowe) concludes that M Berthelot’s solution is correct.

M Berthelot remarks that of course Germany will be very likely to send notes to the Allies on the subject but as it is only a question of a few weeks at the most, he thinks it will be easy to gain the necessary time.

(It is decided:

(1) That Paris should be the place of the first meeting of the Council of League of Nations;

(2) That on the agenda of the first meeting of the Council the only matter taken up will be the appointment of the Commission charged with fixing the boundaries of the Sarre territory;

(3) That the present military occupation of the Sarre territory should continue until the Commission charged with the government of the Sarre district had been appointed.)

3. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation.

(After a short discussion it is decided that Sir Eyre Crowe should notify the Delegates of the provisional Government at Memel that the permission requested could not be granted but that as soon as the Treaty of Peace was put into force the Allied and Associated Powers would welcome the cooperation of the local Officials who are natives of the country.)

4. The Council has before it instructions to General Niessel, President of the Commission charged with the control of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the last phrase of instructions paragraph 1, Section 5 entitled, “Action of the Allied Navy in the Baltic,” beginning with the words, “the Commission will serve as an intermediary” be removed.

(This is agreed to.)

Sir Eyre Crowe also wishes to remark that as far as transportation is concerned, the British Government would do all in its power, but cannot guarantee transportation.

M Berthelot states that General Niessel had already insisted before the Council on his Commission getting the necessary credits; it had adjourned the examination of this question, but General Niessel called the attention of the Council to a case which needed its immediate decision. From the information at hand, it seemed that Colonel Bermondt’s troops will probably be dissolved, and it is important to know what will happen to the Russian troops which make up his forces. Of course every effort will be made to have these troops put under General Yudenitch’s command, but a certain period might elapse before this can take place, and meanwhile it will be necessary to supply them if one does not want to throw them into the hands of the Bolshevists. He thinks it necessary to allot a certain amount of money to General Niessel which would be shared between the three Allies.

Mr Polk wishes to state that, as far as America is concerned, it can provide no funds for that purpose.

Sir Eyre Crowe also remarks that he questions the likelihood of his Government’s participation.

M Berthelot states that it is already well understood that each power should stand the expenses of its representatives; but there surely are bound to be common expenses, and it seems impossible to send this mission without a credit: France might decide to advance the sum for this purpose, it being well understood of course that the other Governments would reimburse it later.

Mr Polk remarks that the appropriations of the United States Government were so made that it can only pay the share of expenses for its own mission, and for a determined purpose.

M Berthelot explains that this is the reason he suggested a fixed amount. He thinks the Council should recognize the importance of the solution.

Sir Eyre Crowe inquires why they should not adopt M Berthelot’s solution, which is on the same lines as the procedure in the missions of Sir George Clerk and General Gough, where the British Government paid at first and the expenses were later shared.

M Berthelot agrees that France is ready to follow this procedure, if it is understood that the other Allies would reimburse her for their share.

Mr Polk states that his Government cannot give a penny towards a Mission of a political nature.

Sir Eyre Crowe emphasizes that his Government understands the mission to be a reply to the German demand for some body to supervise the German evacuation, and therefore it cannot countenance its becoming involved in political activities.

M Berthelot thinks the question is a more complex one.

Mr Polk says he is quite sure that General Niessel understands that the American representative has strict instructions not to become involved in questions of a political nature.

S de Martino thinks that it might be very difficult to make a difference between political questions and purely military questions; the one might involve the other; and he thinks it important that the Generals should get definite instructions in advance on political questions which might come up, so that the action they took should be covered by a common agreement.

M Pichon answers that it will be for the General to ask the Council for instructions. He sums up that the Commission will be the best judge of what measures it should take, and should they include or involve questions of a political nature, then the Council should be informed immediately and a decision given.

(It is decided:

(1) That in the section of instructions to General Niessel, entitled “Action of the Inter-Allied Navy in the Baltic” the phrase which reads, “The Commission will serve as intermediary between the Supreme Council and the Inter-Allied Military Mission,” should be omitted;

(2) That the Commission should keep strictly to the wording of their instructions and should refer to the Supreme Council any questions of a political nature involved in the carrying out of these instructions.

5. The Council has before it a list of questions prepared by the French Delegation.

M Berthelot reads and comments upon this list. He wishes to remark that on the list submitted, certain questions might not belong to the Supreme Council and can be treated through ordinary diplomatic channels. He suggested that each delegation prepare a revised list on these lines, and the Secretary-General will coordinate all the lists handed in.

(It is decided that each Delegation should prepare a list of all questions which still remain to be taken up by the Supreme Council, and that the Secretary-General of the Conference should collate these lists for the Council’s examination.)

6. Mr Polk states that the Supreme Council has made a decision on the question of the tank ships on September 27th; this decision stands, but he personally has decided without knowledge of the full facts, wished to have the question raised at a later date when he had all available information. He simply wished this set upon the record.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

11-06-19, 08:37 AM

6th November 1919

British soldiers occupying Cologne, Germany have their last dinner before demobilization and heading home.
https://i.postimg.cc/2yq1K2GF/EInv-u-MWk-AM5f1o.png (https://postimages.org/)

19-year-old female Montenegrin guerilla fighter who fought the Austro-Hungarians when her country was occupied. She is wearing an Austrian Colonel’s uniform.
https://i.postimg.cc/nV5jDfVd/EIrm-JEXk-AAn-IH8.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Von Due

11-06-19, 04:39 PM

On 6 November 1919 a joint meeting of the Royal Astronomical Society and the Royal Society heard the results of expeditions led by the British scientists Arthur Eddington, Frank Dyson and Andrew Crommelin who observed a total solar eclipse and tested and confirmed Einstein’s general theory of relativity.

Sailor Steve

11-06-19, 11:43 PM

Thursday, November 6, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council had before it two telegrams from Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council dated November 4th and November 5th, a telegram from situation in the Interallied Military Mission dated November 5th, and another telegram from the same sources dated November 3rd, all concerning the situation in Hungary.

M Pichon points out that the telegram sent by the Council to Sir George Clerk on the preceding day satisfied in great measure the requests contained in his two telegrams. Both Sir George Clerk and the Inter-Allied Military Mission are opposed to the despatch of Yugoslav and Czech troops. As the suggestion of the French Delegation has not met with approval the point will not be insisted upon.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that Sir George Clerk had asked authority to recognize at once the coalition government which he hoped would be formed. It would be well to give him this authority. The telegram of the preceding day gave him, as a matter of fact, an answer on this point. Sir George Clerk likewise desires not to be obliged to insist on the immediate withdrawal of Friedrich. On this point also the Council should meet his views.

M Pichon says that a telegram should be sent to Sir George Clerk confirming the previous instructions of the Council and stating, moreover, that the Council relies on his tact. But the question still remained: What will happen after the departure of the Romanian troops? Would not the presence of an Inter-Allied force be necessary? Would the Inter-Allied Mission suffice for the maintenance of order?

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that this question had already been raised in the telegram sent on the preceding day, which had crossed Sir George Clerk’s telegrams. He wishes to call attention to another point: Would it not be well to request the Yugoslavs and the Czechs to retire immediately within their frontiers as laid down by the Council? According to the telegram of November 3rd, from the Inter-Allied Military Mission, the Czechs are raising difficulties with respect to the evacuation of the mines of Salgo-Tarjan: they were demanding as a condition precedent, reimbursement for their expenses relative to the supply of the Hungarian population. Would it not be well to request the Czechs to withdraw, at the same time assuring them that the Council would take into consideration the question of reimbursement for their expenses? Likewise, in the south, the Yugoslavs were still occupying the mines at Pecs, whereas, according to the decisions of the Council, that territory was to remain in the possession of Hungary.

S de Martino thinks that this is the time to insist upon all States bordering on Hungary recognizing the frontiers of the Hungarian State.

Mr Polk observes that the Governments concerned had been notified of the lines laid down as the northern and eastern frontiers of Hungary; he wishes to inquire whether there has been a similar notification with respect to the frontier between Hungary and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

M de Saint Quentin explains that at the time the Council had disallowed the Yugoslav claims in Baranya and Batchka, the Serbian Delegation had been notified of its decision. As a result of this notification the Serbs had formulated new proposals: They had, in particular, asked the right of exploiting the mines of Pecs for five years. The Serbian request had been referred to the Reparation Commission and the Economic Commission but both of these considered themselves without jurisdiction, as the question, to their minds, was essentially a political one; however, the Serbian request had neither been examined by the Central Territorial Committee nor the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Romania and Yugoslavia.

M Pichon says that the Serbs must be informed that the territorial question had been settled, but that this decision would not prejudice the decision to be taken by the Council with respect to the exploitation of the mines of Pecs. He suggests that the latter question should be referred to the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Romania and Yugoslavia.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that a new fact had occurred; on October 25th the Serbian Delegation had asked that the evacuation of the territories actually held by the Yugo-Slav troops should be deferred until the question of the exploitation of the mines had been settled.

M Berthelot thinks the Yugo-Slav request inadmissible from the territorial point of view.

M Pichon says it was agreed that the Czechoslovaks and the Yugoslavs, as well as the Romanians, should be asked to evacuate. Moreover, M Berthelot will prepare a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk.

M Berthelot reads a draft telegram prepared in accordance with the views expressed by the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels it useless, since it had been decided not to send Czech and Yugoslav contingents into Hungary, to ask Sir George Clerk if he deems it expedient to send an Interallied force.

M Berthelot thinks that the question should nevertheless be raised, because if Sir George Clerk should say that such a force is necessary it will be worthwhile studying the plan anew. In view of Sir George’s report as to the attitude of Friedrich it might be well to reflect on what would happen when Friedrich, with 30,000 men, found himself opposed to the Supreme Council and a mission of Generals without any troops.

Sir Eyre Crowe wonders what would happen if Sir George Clerk indicates that the sending of an Inter-Allied force is essential or even desirable. The only possible reply would be that no one could be sent.

M Berthelot acknowledges that the situation will be difficult but he thinks that it will not present an absolute impossibility.

S de Martino remarks that Italy will certainly not send any troops.

M Pichon agrees that the French also would find great difficulty in sending any.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the question is purely an academic one. The wording proposed by M Berthelot presents the difficulty that Sir George Clerk might well think that he was being offered something which the Council could not give him.

M Pichon agrees that the telegram should be modified in the light of Sir Eyre Crowe’s remarks and should state that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would find it very difficult to send any troops if the need should arise.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that Sir George Clerk should also be asked if he deems the Hungarian Police force adequate to cope with the situation.

S de Martino desires a further addition to the effect that the Police force could be placed under the control of the Interallied Military Mission.

(It is decided:

(1) That Sir Eyre Crowe should send to Sir George Clerk, in the name of the Supreme Council, the telegram prepared by M. Berthelot;

(2) That the Czech and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments should be requested to withdraw their troops immediately beyond the frontiers of Hungary as laid down by the Council;

(3) That the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government should be informed that the decisions taken by the Council with respect to territorial questions are final, but that the evacuation requested will not prejudice the solution of the question of the exploitation of the mines of Pecs;

(4) That the request of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation proposing the grant to that Government for five years of the exploitation of the mines of Pecs, should be referred to the Committee for the study of Territorial Questions relating to Romania and Yugoslavia.

2. M Berthelot informs the Council that the Germans have given to the Press a fairly complete summary of the note and annexed Publication of protocol sent to them by the Council. He inquires if, under the circumstances, it would not be advisable to publish the complete text of that note.

(After a short discussion it is decided to publish the text of the note addressed to the German Government relative to the putting into force of the Treaty of Peace as well as the draft protocol annexed to that note.

3. The Council has before it a letter from General Nollet dated October 21, 1919, a note from the Drafting Committee dated October 29th 1919, and a letter from Marshal Foch dated November 3, 1919, concerning the Salaries of the Personnel of Commissions of Control in Germany.

General Walch reads and comments upon Marshal Foch’s letter.

Mr Polk, with respect to the organization of the personnel of the Commissions of Control, asks why it is necessary to call upon civilian engineers?

General Walch explains that the military technical personnel are inadequate to control the manufacture of war material. It is necessary to call upon competent specialists who cannot be found in the regular army.

General Nollet has called upon about 10 engineers and about 40 university graduates. In so doing he has only followed the example furnished by the British Commission of Control.

(It is decided that the payment of the salaries of the personnel of the Military Commissions of Control in Germany not belonging to regular military forces, should be assumed by Germany.)

4. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation dated November 3, 1919, concerning the Publication of the Correspondence With the Austrian Delegation.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the note of the British Delegation specifies that extreme care should be exercised with respect to the publication of the Austrian Notes marked “Confidential”.

Mr Polk says that evidently such notes cannot be published without the consent of Chancellor Renner.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests that Dr Renner could be asked if he still objects to the publication of those Notes.

S de Martino observes that the publication of the notes raises some questions which are delicate from an Italian point of view, and he asks that a decision on this point be postponed.

(The question is adjourned)

5. The Council has before it a letter from Marshal Foch to the President of the Peace Conference dated October 30th, 1919, and a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 5th, 1919, concerning the Demobilization of the Men of Haller’s Army.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon these documents.

(After a short discussion it was decided to approve the recommendations of the note of the Drafting Committee relative to demobilized Poles who had borne arms against Germany.)

6. The Council has before it a note from the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission dated October 31st, 1919, concerning Financial Measures of Coercion Taken Against Germany on Account of the Non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon this note. He observes that it is not correct to speak of the annulment of authorizations which might have been given: The question is one of revocation of said authorization. Germany cannot now create new pledges by availing itself of authorizations previously given, inasmuch as any such authorizations are now revoked.

(It is decided that the Drafting Committee should prepare a reply to M Loucheur’s letter dated October 31st, 1919, relative to the interpretation of the financial measures of coercion taken against Germany on account of the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.

7. The Council has before it a note from the Drafting Committee concerning the Liquidation of the Property of Inhabitants of Schleswig.

M Fromageot states that the Danish Government has pointed out that after the plebiscite the inhabitants of Schleswig would become Danish citizens. What would become of the interests of those newly-made Danish subjects whose property in the meantime might have been liquidated by one of the Allied and Associated Powers as belonging to enemy subjects? The Drafting Committee has considered this contingency in the note which the Council had before it. It appears that answer might be made to the Danish Government along the lines of the last paragraph of the said note; the Allied and Associated Powers, however, would always be at liberty to avail themselves of their rights of liquidation with respect to such new Danish subjects as did not seem to merit the consideration therein contemplated. Moreover, if the Principal Allied and Associated Powers arrive at such a decision, they should notify the other Allied Powers who, doubtless, will raise no difficulty over adopting the same procedure.

M Pichon suggests that the Drafting Committee should come to an agreement with the Economic Commission, which has the question in hand, on the draft of a resolution to be communicated to the other Allied Powers.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the Danish Government will have to be approached.

Mr Polk takes it as understood that the draft resolution will be submitted to the Council. He points out that he will have to refer the matter to his Government.

8. M Berthelot reminds the Council that at a previous meeting the question of an American Military Mission reported to be at Riga had been brought up. According to his present information there appears to be at Riga, besides a mission of relief and supply and a Red Cross mission, a mission under Colonel Holliday, who was reported to have arrived at Riga on October 15th. The Colonel was reported to have stated that he did not desire to collaborate with the Anglo-French Mission.

Mr Polk explains that Colonel Holliday is there alone. His duties are purely to collect information, and he has no political role to play. Moreover, General Cheney will see that he does not exceed his powers.

9. S de Martino informed the Council that the Italian delegates to the Plebiscite and Delimitation Commissions will arrive at Paris on November 10th. They will be ready from that day on to confer with their Allied colleagues.

M Pichon says that Marshal Foch will be informed of this.

10. S de Martino says that he has been informed from Vienna that Serbian and Romanian representatives wish to participate in the work of the Commission, presided over by Sir Francis Dent, which is charged with the distribution of rolling stock. This claim seems inadmissible, inasmuch as neither Serbia nor Romania had signed the Austrian Treaty.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the Commission in question is only a provisional one.

M de Saint Quentin explains that it has been decided to send to Vienna a provisional Commission which would become a permanent Commission when the Treaty comes into force. The character of the Commission is apparent from the fact that Hungary, an enemy country, is represented on it; it will therefore be difficult to deny representation to the Serbs and Romanians.

S de Martino says that he will examine the question anew.

11. Mr Polk says that his Government wishes to know if the question of the recognition of Luxembourg is to be decided by the Council.

M Berthelot summarizes the history of the question: When the question first arose five or six months ago the French Government declared that, from a political point of view, it would refrain from active participation in the Luxembourg question, and that it thought that the Belgian Government should be the first to make a decision. Belgium had told the French Government that it was opposed to recognizing the Grand Duchess. The French Government had transmitted this information to Rome, Washington and London and the Principal Powers abstained from recognizing the Grand Duchess. Eventually, and after at first refusing, Belgium consented that the fiancé of the Grand Duchess should be allowed to go to Luxembourg. The marriage was taking place that very day. Two days previously the Belgian Government had asked the French Government if it intended to recognize the Grand Duchess and to be represented at the marriage ceremony. He himself had replied by putting the same question to the Belgian Ambassador, since France had decided that Belgium should have the first word in political questions concerning Luxembourg. The Belgian Government had not yet replied. The French Government had been informed from other sources that the British Government intended to recognize the Grand Duchess and to be represented at the marriage ceremony. The French Government had then acquainted the British Government with the exact situation, at the same time informing the Italian Government.

M Pichon says that the Council will arrive at a decision on the Luxembourg question.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

11-07-19, 08:09 AM

7th November 1919

Inspired by Cape Town's daily Noon Gun Three Minute Pause, King George V institutes the Two Minute Silence, following a suggestion by Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, to be observed annually at the Eleventh Hour of the Eleventh Day of the Eleventh Month.

Hugo Haase, German socialist politician who co-chaired the Council of People’s Deputies after the German Revolution, dies due to severe injuries a month after he was shot by Johan Voss.
https://i.postimg.cc/zvF8bYXf/EIw5hw6-Wk-AAf-G5z.png (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

11-07-19, 09:11 PM

Friday, November 7, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. Sir Eyre Crowe states he cannot nominate the British Representatives as the experts of the British Delegation on that subject were in London.

S de Martino wished to remark that there already was a Commission of Responsibilities.

M Escoffier says the Commission of Responsibilities has finished its work; this was a question for a special Commission charged with the preparation of the execution of Articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty with Germany.

M Pichon says that the Council agrees that the nomination of this Commission should be adjourned, but it is important that this should be settled in as short a time as possible.

M de Martino thinks an adjournment necessary as he would have to get in touch with his Government.

(It is decided:

(1) That a Commission will be nominated,
(a) To compare the lists of individuals charged with crimes to be delivered by the German Government;
(b) To decide the composition, procedure and seat of the mixed tribunals to be set up under Article 229 of the Treaty with Germany;

(2) That the Principal Allied and Associated Powers nominate as soon as possible their representatives on this Commission.)

2. The Council has before it a report of the Military Representatives at Versailles on the subject.

(After a short discussion,

It is decided to approve the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles dated November 5th, in answer to the request for instructions received from the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany.)

3. Sir Eyre Crowe regrets that this declaration has been delayed by numerous communications with his Government. The present proposal results from the proposition which had already been made by the American Delegation and also by the Polish Commission; in a few words, this proposition tends to eliminate anything in the nature of a temporary arrangement. The British Government is opposed to anything leading to a final union of Eastern Galicia and Poland. It has also discussed the question with Mr Paderewski and has pointed out to the latter that Poland would be acting in a sense diametrically opposed to the claims made by Poland for the district of Teschen. A large majority of the population in Eastern Galicia is not Polish. The British Government thinks that they ought not to shut the door to the real aims of Eastern Galicia which would allow its population to join other nationalities. It wishes, therefore, to adopt the following suggestion, namely: Poland will get a Mandate for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations for a determined period, such as 15 years; the League of Nations can then consider whether Eastern Galicia should be joined to Poland or make some other political arrangement. The British point of view insists that the settlement should be provisional. He personally had done his best to conciliate the views of the Council with those of the British Cabinet.

Mr Polk regrets that they are unable to reach an agreement on this subject; but he adds that he has not given up hope of finding a satisfactory solution. What impresses the American Delegation is that if a date is fixed for a Mandate, it would mean that Galicia would be in a state of ferment, and Poland remain in uncertainty over this grave question. This case is not the same as that of other countries where a Plebiscite was asked for; it would be difficult to see where Eastern Galicia would go, if not to Poland. The problem is all the more difficult for Eastern Galicia on account of fighting taking place between Ukrainia and the Bolshevists on one side and Denikin on the other side. He wishes to ask Sir Eyre Crowe the difference he makes between the position of the British Government at this time and the position that it had taken before.

Sir Eyre Crowe answers that it is no longer a question of a plebiscite, but of giving a Mandate to Poland for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations.

Mr Polk suggests that the views of the British Delegation should be referred to the Polish Commission for examination and report for Monday, November 10th.

M Pichon agrees.

(It is decided to refer to the Polish Commission for examination and report to the Supreme Council on November 10th, 1919, the proposal made by the British Delegation tending to give Poland a Mandate for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations for a determined period.

4. The Council has before it a note from the German Delegation dated October 3rd, 1919, on the organization of the plebiscite in Eupen and Malmedy, and the observations presented by the Belgian Delegation in its letter of October 14th, 1919.

Mr Polk says this matter has been brought to his attention and he understands the good faith of the Council is involved. He would suggest that this be referred to the Belgian Committee for examination.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the Belgian Commission should prepare a draft answer to the German Note which the Council would have before it on Monday.

(It is decided:

(1) To refer back to the Commission on Belgian Affairs for examination the Note from the German Delegation dated October 3rd, on the organization of the plebiscite in Eupen and Malmedy, as well as the observations of the Belgian Delegation dated October 14th, 1919.

(2) That the Commission on Belgian Affairs should present to the Supreme Council at its meeting on November 10th, 1919, a draft reply to the German note.)

5. The Council has before it a report from the American representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Mission relative to the removal by German authorities of the material belonging to the German Government at Danzig.

Mr Polk suggests that this question be referred back to the Drafting Committee for examination and report.

(It is decided to refer back to the Drafting Committee for examination and report the note of the American representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Commission in Poland, with regard to the removal of German Government property from Danzig.

6. Mr Polk repeats what he said at a preceding meeting: The President will be very glad to call the first meeting of the Council, but the question has been raised in Washington as to his power under Article V of the Covenant to call the meeting before the Treaty had come into force: under Article V his power exists only from the date of the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty; his suggestion is that the meeting should take place on the following day, but he has no objection to the procedure adopted by the Drafting Committee and in turn adopted by the other members of the Council. The real trouble is that the letter will be issued at a time when the pact had not yet come into force.

M Pichon thinks in that case that the convocation of the first meeting might be issued on the day when the ratifications are exchanged, and then that the meeting could take place the following day.

Mr Polk makes it clear that he does not wish to insist on this, if the other members of the Council preferred the other solution.

M Berthelot pointed out that the difficulty lay in the period which would elapse between the deposit of ratifications and the first meeting of the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests that the President of the United States can now advise the Powers represented on the Council of the League of Nations that as soon as the treaty had been put into force by the deposit of ratifications, the President, acting under Article V of the Covenant, will send a telegram calling the first meeting, and it will be advisable to take all the necessary measures in provision of this convocation.

Mr Polk thinks that Sir Eyre Crowe’s suggestion is already covered by M Clemenceau’s letter. He also suggests that the State Department in Washington, on being advised of the exact hour of the deposit of ratifications, can notify the representatives at Washington of the Powers which are to be represented on the Council of the League of Nations, the first meeting of the Council; on the other hand, all the necessary measures will have been taken for the first meeting to take place.

M Fromageot says he understands the American argument, but thinks there is great analogy between this case and the convocation of the Labor Conference at Washington.

Mr Polk says that everyone in America is attacking the legality of this convocation.

M Fromageot thinks that if the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations considers only the question of nominating the Commission charged with the delimitation of the boundaries of the Sarre district, the Council of the League of Nations would then have fifteen days within which to nominate the Commission.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests there is the possibility of a ratification by the United States, in which case the first meeting might have a longer agenda: It is therefore important that the convocation of the first meeting should be considered immediately.

M Pichon proposes that the question be referred to the Drafting Committee to examine whether it was possible to take into consideration the remarks made by Mr Polk.

It is decided to refer back to the Drafting Committee for examination and report the question of procedure to be followed for the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, taking into account remarks of a legal character made by the American Delegation.

7. M. Berthelot says that they have reasons to think that the Germans were going to answer their last Note by proposing that the conferences which were made necessary by the execution of the Treaty, should take place in Berlin on account of the great number of experts the German Government wished to send; and only the final conferences would take place in Paris.

General le Rond thinks that all the questions which cannot be considered in Paris should be taken up on the spot, and that it is not necessary to have conferences in Berlin. He also wishes to add that, as the conferences between the Allies could not begin before November 10th, it would not be possible to meet the German representatives before November 15th.

8. M Pichon states that Mr Venizelos would ask to be heard by the Council on the day that the report of the Inquiry Commission on Smyrna comes under discussion.

9. Mr Polk asks whether the question of the temporary regime of Western Thrace should not be studied by a competent Commission. He suggests that it might be referred to the Central Territorial Committee.

(This is agreed to.)

It is decided to refer back to the Central Territorial Committee for examination and report the question of the temporary regime of Western Thrace.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Mr Quatro

11-07-19, 09:35 PM

What a great job you have done Steve and Jim :up:

I wish I had time to read it all interesting history :yep:

Looking forward to Monday November 11th ... Will that be a big day to report?

Jimbuna

11-08-19, 07:21 AM

Appreciated but I'm not sure what will occur on the 11th until my source updates itself (daily).

I'd like to think so though.

Jimbuna

11-08-19, 07:26 AM

8th November 1919

Coinciding on the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, the first Palmer Raids (named after Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer) are carried out in the U.S. against members of the Union of Russian Workers.
https://i.postimg.cc/Gh9nsN7p/EIy-L7mi-Xs-AAMp-E4.png (https://postimages.org/)

King George releases a statement supporting a 2-minute silence on November 11
https://i.postimg.cc/TYBF5P5k/EIxiur-CXk-AM2yq-X.png (https://postimg.cc/mtN80BwM)

Sailor Steve

11-09-19, 12:27 AM

Saturday, November 8, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. Sir Eyre Crowe states that in the next to the last meeting the Council had had to pass upon a proposal made by General Walch on behalf of General Nollet. He had understood that it was a question of laying upon Germany the payment of the salaries of all the personnel of Military Commissions of Control in Germany. That proposition conformed to the point of view maintained by the British Government. He read, however, in the procès-verbal, that Germany was only being charged with the payment of the salaries of personnel not belonging to the regular military forces, that is to say, the civilian personnel. There were no civilian personnel in these Commissions, or at least among the military members there were many who were civilian technical experts put on the footing of officers.

M Clemenceau thinks that Sir Eyre Crowe’s rectification calls for no objection.

(It is decided to modify resolution No. 3 of H. D. 85, so as to read as follows: “It was decided that the payment of the salaries of the personnel of the Military Commissions of Control in Germany should be assumed by Germany.”)

2. M Clemenceau points out that the agenda brings up the discussion of the report of the Commission of Investigation in Smyrna. Mr Venizelos had asked to be heard. It seems to him that there were two questions in to be asked of Mr Venizelos. First, he should explain the massacres of which the Greek troops are accused. Moreover, he himself is much struck by reading in the Commission’s report that the Greeks would not be able to maintain themselves in Smyrna by their own efforts. The Greeks had been sent to Smyrna on the clear understanding that their occupation should not be taken as equivalent to a definite attribution of territory to them. He noted that the Greeks had gone beyond the limits of the Sandjak of Smyrna without the permission of the Council and had done so upon a telegram from Mr Venizelos. He thinks that it is necessary to remind them that the Turkish question is not settled and to ask them to state definitely if they could maintain themselves at Smyrna by their own efforts. The information received indicated that in many respects the conduct of the Greeks had been abominable, and that Turkey would never accept, unless obliged to by force, Greek occupation, or, to a certain extent, Italian occupation. As far as the Greeks are concerned, he thinks this information is correct. The question would not have arisen if the Greek occupation had not given rise to certain incidents. It was not the Council’s fault if the question had to be raised. The Turkish problem was not settled. He feels that the Council would be more and more led to respecting the integrity of Turkish territory; under these circumstances it would be well to warn the Greeks that they should not behave as conquerors of Asia Minor.

S de Martino wishes to associate himself with what M Clemenceau had just said: the military occupations in Asia Minor were clearly only provisional and should in no way prejudice the final settlement of the Turkish question. This question could not be divorced from the more general question of the fate of the territories of the former Ottoman Empire which is of interest to all Mediterranean powers. Italian opinion is clearly favorable to the principle of respecting the integrity of these territories. Moreover, he wishes to point out that the relations between the Italian troops and the Turkish population in Anatolia are excellent and that no conflicts have taken place between them; on the contrary, on many occasions the local populations and authorities had indulged in manifestations of gratitude.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that the Council is entering upon a basic discussion of Greek occupation. He thinks that the conclusions of the Commission go beyond the instructions received by it. The Commission had been formed, at the request of Mr Venizelos himself, to investigate the massacres. Its report treats, in general terms, the whole problem of Greek occupation, and also questioned the decisions of the Supreme Council. What would happen if the Council, as the report suggested, asked the Greeks to leave Smyrna? Would they be replaced by Turks or was an Inter-Allied occupation contemplated? The affair of the Vilayet of Aidin had just shown how difficult of realization such an occupation was: The French Government had felt it impossible to send a battalion and, under these conditions, the British Government had not felt that it could assume this burden. If Inter-Allied occupation was impossible could the Council really think of allowing the Greeks to retire when there was no one to replace them. Could it possibly think of evacuating the country before peace had even been concluded?

M Clemenceau thinks it clearly could not. He feels, with Sir Eyre Crowe, that it is impossible at the moment to ask the Greeks to retire but it would perhaps be well to have some officers on the spot who could inform the Council as to the situation at Smyrna.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the Greeks unfortunately claim that many of the difficulties arose from the fact that they did not have complete authority in that region. In any case it seems impossible to agree with the conclusions of the Commission which proposes a regime under which the Greeks might perhaps occupy but the Turks would govern. Rather than create an organ of supervision it would be better to give the Greeks greater liberty of action and at the same time a larger and more definite share of responsibility.

M Clemenceau observes that the danger is that the Greeks will take too much latitude.

Mr Polk wishes to know what the attitude of the Council is? It seems to him that there is some thought of rejecting the conclusions of the report now before it. He is not so inclined. The Commission had thought its mission was to establish the responsibility for the events at Smyrna; it had pointed out these responsibilities as it saw them and had not hesitated to question the acts of the Council itself. The report contained serious matters. Did the Council intend or not to take them into consideration? For instance, paragraph 37 of the report pointed out that Mr Venizelos himself had ordered the reoccupation of Aidin without taking the Entente into consideration. He feels that it is impossible not to repose confidence in the investigators whom the Council had chosen, or else another Commission should be sent.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the order given by Mr Venizelos had already been discussed by the Council of Four.

S de Martino feels that it is impossible not to discuss the report inasmuch as it emanated from a Commission set up by the Supreme Council.

M Clemenceau says that the report would be discussed after Mr Venizelos had been heard.

(At this point Mr Venizelos enters the room.)

M. Venizelos hopes that the Council will permit him to give a brief historical summary of the conditions under which the investigation had been conducted; he feels that this recapitulation would show that he had good reason to ask that this investigation should be considered null and void and that another investigation should take place. On the 18th of July, after he had asked the British Government, as a result of a question which had been put in the House of Commons, to send an investigating officer to Smyrna, the Supreme Council had decided to create a Commission of Investigation. No Greek officer sat on that Commission. He had protested to the President of the Conference and had received the reply that a Greek Representative should follow the work of the Commission. On August 22nd he had been obliged to inform the Supreme Council that his representative, Colonel Mazarakis, was not allowed to be present at the taking of testimony, under the pretext that his presence might intimidate certain witnesses. The Commission had declared that it would confine itself to communicating the depositions to him. He, Mr Venizelos, had protested against that decision, which was contrary to elementary rules of justice. Later on the Commission had made it known that the Greek representative would be put upon the same footing as the Turkish representative who was permitted to follow its work. Such similar treatment, offensive to an Allied people, forced him to protest. On the 14th of September he had again been obliged to protest because the Commission had refused to call the witnesses which the Greek Delegate had proposed should be heard, and because it had refused to communicate to Colonel Mazarakis the testimony which had been taken. The President of the Conference had replied to him that the Greek Delegate was not entitled to insist on being present at all deliberations of the Commission, but that the minutes, including the hearings of witnesses, would be delivered to Colonel Mazarakis who could then present his observations thereon to the Commission before the latter reached its conclusions. Nevertheless the Commission had not wished to communicate to the Greek Delegate the depositions made before it on the pretext that secrecy had been promised certain witnesses. In so acting it had violated the most elementary principles of justice and it put, unintentionally doubtless, a positive premium upon false testimony. He had addressed himself to the Conference which had answered that it could not go behind a promise given by the Commission. He wishes to press this point upon the Council; an investigation conducted under such conditions could not be trustworthy. It was impossible thus to pass judgment upon the honor of an army without having given that army the means of defending itself. He felt that he was entitled to satisfaction, since it was a question of a State which had always been faithful to its alliances and friendships, and since this request was formulated by a representative of that State who had always borne himself loyally towards the Conference.

M Clemenceau asked if General Bunoust had any remarks to make as to the materiality of the facts in question.

General Bunoust said that he did have some remarks to make. The Commission had never decided to communicate the depositions taken; it had unanimously decided that the depositions would lack sincerity if the Greek representatives had to be informed of them. The Turks would not have opened their mouths in the presence of a Greek officer. In spite of that precaution the Commission had sometimes had difficulty in finding witnesses; thus at Aidin no Turkish witnesses had been found. When the Supreme Council’s telegram of September 30th reached the Commission it had not yet ended its labors; it had only concluded the summary of the established facts and it had transmitted this in full to Colonel Mazarakis. Colonel Mazarakis had presented observations on this subject which the Commission had taken into account on one point.

M Clemenceau asks whether, after the Commission had received the telegram of September 30th, it had taken depositions which it had not communicated to Mr Venizelos’ representative.

General Bunoust thinks that the Commission might, after that date, have taken the second deposition of Colonel Smith.

Mr Venizelos does not wish to insist upon that point. He feels, however, that he might say, without offending anyone, that civil investigators would have been more anxious not to violate cardinal principles of justice, and that they would not, for instance, have allowed witnesses to be heard without being sworn. At Aidin the Commission might well have taken non-Turkish testimony and have been satisfied therewith. He feels finally that he might remark that the procedure adopted inevitably exposed the investigators to the danger of being carried away by false depositions and reaching unjust or inaccurate conclusions. The animosity between Turks and Greeks was an incontestable fact; moreover, it was certain that many Europeans in Smyrna preferred the continuance of the Turkish regime which, with respect to strangers, was a regime of special privileges, rather than the establishment of the Greek regime, which was a regime of equality.

M Clemenceau asks if Me Venizelos did not intend to discuss the facts brought out in the report.

M Venizelos says that he does not want to discuss conclusions based on testimony which had not been brought to the knowledge of the Greek representative.

M Clemenceau observed that it was a serious matter to make such a reply. The Council had expected from Mr Venizelos precise answers on questions of fact. As head of the Government he must know if the alleged facts had really happened. He was astonished that Mr Venizelos did not wish to discuss them.

Mr Venizelos recognizes that there have been excesses but he thinks that they are readily explained. He admits equally that the conditions under which the debarkation took place created an administrative responsibility of the Greek Command. The Greek Government moreover had inflicted heavy penalties. But the Council could not forget that the day before the occupation the Turkish population had assembled, and that protests against the occupation had been posted up.

General Bunoust says that these posters are not appeals to resistance. The Turks are only asked to assemble in order to prove that the Turkish element was in the majority; the crowd of Turks, moreover, was not armed.

Mr Venizelos observes that in any event there was a tendency to resistance, inasmuch as the day before civil prisoners had been released.

General Bunoust explained that they had only been released during the night preceding the debarkation. The Commission’s report, moreover, had recognized the responsibility of the Turkish Governor in these circumstances.

M Venizelos adds that stores of arms have been looted by the crowd. Under these conditions the debarkation took place. The officer commanding the Greek troops had been guilty of imprudence. The Council knows how gunshots, coming from parts unknown, had provoked a reply on the part of the Greek troops. A panic followed and that was the beginning of the excesses. He thought he ought to point out that the next day or the day after a Court-Martial had been organized, that in the first five days of its sitting this Court-Martial had condemned three Greeks to death, one of them being a looting soldier, and that it had totaled seventy-four convictions, of which forty-eight were of Greeks. Nothing more could be asked of the most civilized country. As for the massacre of the prisoners who were being led on board vessels in the harbor, Colonel Mazarakis’ investigation, which had resulted in severe condemnation of the Lieutenant commanding the escort, had established that the excesses of which the prisoners had been the victims were largely due to the crowd, and that only about twenty prisoners had been killed. In any event, forty-eight hours after the debarkation of the troops, order had been reestablished. He wished to ask General Bunoust if since that time the city had not been perfectly calm.

General Bunoust replied that such is the case.

Mr Venizelos states that Colonel Mazarakis does not agree with the Commission on the affair of Menemem. According to the Colonel, a Greek battalion which had evacuated Pergamum, after having suffered serious losses, while entering Menemem had been attacked by Turkish fanatics. This attack had provoked excesses. The Commission, which did not consider that Turkish aggression had been established as a fact, had certainly been led into error by the witnesses which it had heard; it spoke of three hundred Turks killed; according to his information, only twenty had been killed. It was evident that on this point an investigation in the nature of a cross-examination would have been suitable.

General Bunoust observed that the Commission had attached very little importance to the figures furnished it; it was perfectly aware of their inexactness. In any event it had not based its conclusions on a Turkish report, according to which one thousand were killed, but on an investigation made the day after the uprising by a French officer.

Mr Venizelos states that in the affair of Nazilli the fault lay with the Greek officer who, threatened with attack, thought he could evacuate the town prior to the time ordered by the English Admiral. In any event, in that affair, it was the Greeks who had suffered most. As for Aidin, he maintained that twenty-five hundred Greeks perished and that the number of Turkish victims was far less.

General Bunoust explained that the Commission had relied upon a French investigation, according to which there were reported to be about twenty-five hundred Greek victims and fifteen hundred Turkish. The estimation of the number of Turkish dead was moreover difficult on account of the exodus of the population.

Mr Venizelos acknowledges that Aidin, occupied by the Greeks and then evacuated, had been re-occupied on an order given by him, which order had had unfortunate results. He wishes to give the reasons which had caused him to issue that order. The Greeks are in a state of war with the Turks. If the Turks could boast of having expelled the Greeks from Aidin, their situation at Smyrna would have become impossible; therefore he had given the order to re-occupy the town. Moreover, he had informed the Council of what he was doing. Already, prior to that time, he had instructed the Greek military authorities not to hesitate, in the event of attack by Turkish bands, to go beyond the limits of the zone of occupation in order to break up centers of hostile resistance. In any event these incontestable facts remained: the Greek section of Aidin was entirely destroyed, twenty-five hundred out of eight thousand Greeks had perished, the Greek element formed the richest and most civilized part of the population; and it was the Greeks who had suffered most. He regrets that the procedure adopted by the Commission had not allowed the Turkish losses to be ascertained. Finally, he feels obliged to protest against the passage of the Commission’s report which repeated an accusation of the Sheik-ul-Islam to the effect that the Greek Red Cross had introduced arms into Smyrna.

General Bunoust observes that the Commission had not considered this accusation well founded.

Mr Venizelos says that it is true that prior to the Greek occupation the Greek Sanitary Officer had insisted that the boxes of the Red Cross which were unloaded at the customs be not inspected, and that the Turkish Governor had consented thereto; but he could not allow the Greek Red Cross to remain under the shadow of suspicion. The Sheik-ul-Islam also pretended that the Greeks had taken advantage of their occupation to bring about an influx of Grecian population in those regions. This is entirely false: since the events of May, 1914, there had been in Greece 300,000 refugees from Asia Minor. He had ordered them to be repatriated, but it had been pointed out to him that the dwellings they had left were being inhabited by Turks whose lodging would have to be insured, and that the question was a delicate one. Under those circumstances the repatriation had been postponed. There had only been isolated cases of repatriation and he did not think that there were more than 5,000 or 6,000 who had returned. He felt sure that the excesses, which he deplored, had not gone beyond what should have been expected under analogous circumstances on the part of any army. The affair had certainly been exaggerated; moreover General Bunoust did not deny that severe punishment had been meted out to those found guilty. The Greek army had not deserved ill of its Allies and the Greeks had ensured the maintenance of order. If certain fugitive Turks had not returned to Smyrna that fact could be attributed to the pressure brought to bear on them by the Turks in the interior.

General Bunoust remarks that it is quite possible.

M Clemenceau asks what was the importance of the Turkish bands with whom the Greeks had to deal?

General Bunoust says that the Commissioners had spent a day with these bands; and they did not seem to have great cohesion and they had no offensive capacity. The Nationalist movement, however, was a serious matter and it could arrest all military progress in Asia Minor unless an operation on a large scale should be decided upon.

Mr Venizelos says that there is no question of that.

M Clemenceau observes that that, however, was just what Mr Venizelos had done. Greece had had a Mandate from the Conference and had not kept within the limits of that Mandate. Some members of the Council were wondering what would happen if the Turkish attacks should increase in severity. Could Greece, without the support of her Allies, make the necessary military and financial effort until such a time as the country should be completely pacified? That was the troublesome point.

Mr Venizelos replies that certainly the longer the question was dragged out the more financial difficulties would increase for a small country such as Greece. She had an army of 12 divisions of 325,000 men; an army stronger than it was at the time of the Armistice. He feels assured that if the Conference should charge Greece with the task of defeating Turkey she would be able to do so.

M Clemenceau says that he had put the question the other way.

Mr Venizelos said that with 12 divisions he had nothing to fear. Mustapha Kemal only had 70,000 men. It was evident that if the present situation was unduly prolonged Greece would have financial difficulties, but he hoped that would not be the case.

M Clemenceau thanks Mr Venizelos in the name of the Council for his presentation of the case.

(At this point Mr Venizelos leaves the room.)

M Clemenceau suggests that the discussion be postponed until the following Monday.

(This is agreed to.)

(The meeting then adjourns).

Jimbuna

11-09-19, 10:07 AM

9th November 1919

From yesterday.
https://i.postimg.cc/JnwM2brw/EI2-DQ0-W4-AEi-o0.png (https://postimg.cc/yJTMJ33n)

Romania holds its general elections, with the Romanian National Party, led by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, winning the most seats.
https://i.postimg.cc/43HXP8Tb/EI2-DQ0-W4-AEi-o0.png (https://postimages.org/)

Arabs meeting US General James Guthrie Harbord at Ras el Ain (Now in NE Syria) during an American fact-finding mission to the Middle East.
https://i.postimg.cc/Df63rVX3/5g42znepklx31.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

11-09-19, 12:36 PM

Sunday, November 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

The Great Council does not meet today.

Jimbuna

11-10-19, 09:18 AM

10th November 1919

Aftermath of War

President and Madame Poincare arrive in England.

Latvian soldiers fighting against German-backed West Russian Volunteer Army in Riga.
https://i.postimg.cc/d0sTBTWs/EJANN6-Wo-AEge-Il.png (https://postimages.org/)

Birth of Mikhail Kalashnikov, arms designer.
https://i.postimg.cc/Ss5V2p6p/Michael-Kalashikov.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

11-10-19, 10:47 PM

Monday, November 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. S de Martino asks if he might deliver a message from S Tittoni, who wishes to express his great regret at not being able to be present at that meeting; he is obliged to leave on the following day and is still ill in bed. He had particularly hoped to be able to come to that meeting to bid farewell to his colleagues. At the same time he had asked S De Martino to submit to the Council a consideration which had occurred to him with respect to its work. The Supreme Council had organized a Committee for the execution of the Treaty and that Committee, called the Committee of Ambassadors, although other than Ambassadors might sit upon it, is to be entrusted with everything concerning the execution of the treaties; the Supreme Council, on the other hand, is entrusted with all work preparatory to the same treaties. In order to facilitate this division of labor and inasmuch as the large questions were at the moment not ready for settlement - such as the Treaty with Hungary, the question of the former Ottoman Empire and the Adriatic question - S Tittoni wishes to ask the Council to consider the possibility of adjourning, after the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty, until one of those questions should be ready for settlement. In the meanwhile all remaining unfinished work relative to the execution of the treaties can be entrusted to the Committee of Ambassadors.

M Clemenceau replies that this question cannot be raised without the consent of the Governments concerned. Of course three questions are raised by this suggestion: he thinks that the Hungarian question will be satisfactorily settled. The question of Turkey is a difficult one, but he is willing, and thinks it necessary to take it up, and he feels that the British and American Governments will agree with his views. The question of the Adriatic is a most delicate one but it must be admitted that the Council is not at fault. The responsibility lies entirely with Italy. The Italian Government has been incapable of executing the orders given by the Council. The Council had formally decided that only one Italian battalion should remain at Fiume, but this order had been flagrantly violated in such a manner that it seemed clear that the Italian Government had no control over its army and navy. The Command at Fiume had passed to D’Annunzio. He is not hostile to Italy but he is obliged to point out that the Italian Government has not been able to make its orders respected. He had supported the Italian point of view in a long telegram that he had sent to President Wilson, but he was very much embarrassed as to what he should further say, since he had received a courteous but emphatic reply from President Wilson to the effect that it was useless to make agreements with a Government which assumed obligations that it could not fulfill. French soldiers had been killed at Fiume and the French Government had taken no action; but such a situation could not be prolonged indefinitely.

S de Martino wishes to be allowed to remark that a Government exists in Italy as well as in any other country. As to the point of being obeyed or not by the army at Fiume, it is in agreement with the Allied Governments that Italy abstain from attacking Fiume. If Italy is confronted with difficulties, of which the Council is well aware, that does not mean that the Italian Government has not taken up the question of Fiume with the very best intentions of settling it properly. The Italian Government has shown a spirit of conciliation which he thought M Clemenceau would appreciate.

M Clemenceau points out that nevertheless the fact remained that the Italian Government was not obeyed by its Navy. The greatest spirit of good will had been shown. For this reason no action had been taken as a result of the incidents at Fiume, but that situation must be put an end to. The postponement of the work of the Council cannot be agreed to as long as that will result in the consolidation of the existing situation at Fiume.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees with M Clemenceau, but feels that the points at issue with Germany and the Bulgarian question must first be settled before there can be any thought of postponement. He thinks that these questions might be settled before the end of the month, by which time he hopes that all other questions, except the Turkish one, will also be out of the way. He therefore feels that there is no great difficulty in practice; the object aimed at by S De Martino can be met without necessarily adopting his plea for an adjournment of the Conference now.

Mr Polk also agrees with M Clemenceau and observes that there are two or three questions which have to be settled before an adjournment can be thought of. He is of the opinion that those questions can be settled before December 1st. He also feels that it would not be fair to turn such questions over to the Committee of Ambassadors, which is only supposed to coordinate questions relating to the interpretation and execution of the Treaties.

M Clemenceau appreciates the troubles the Italian Government has had to encounter. However, that Government must settle the question of Fiume and get its army and navy under control.

S de Martino repeats that the Italian Government has the army and navy under control and is obeyed by them. If it had not wished to take military action against Fiume, it was because the Allied and Associated Powers had likewise not wished it. They had not wished to attack Fiume and a fortiori Italy had not wished to either. The situation there did not prevent his declaring that there is a Government in Italy and that the army and navy are under control of the Italian Government.

M Clemenceau declares that he must formally state that S Tittoni had said, not once but many times, that the Italian Government could not take Fiume because the army and navy would not obey the Government. He thought S Tittoni could not contest this, and he wished this to be formally put on record. The fact that the Italian Government had to contend with a very delicate question was no reason for attempting to place the responsibility on the other Allied and Associated Powers, who clearly could not be burdened therewith.

S de Martino says that such is not his intention, and that the sole question raised was one of expediting the work of the Council. S Tittoni, who had to leave for Italy on account of the political situation, had hoped to return to take up the discussion of the important questions alluded to.

M Clemenceau observes that such a solution would greatly embarrass him in any reply to President Wilson.

S de Martino says that he has transmitted the suggestion, but that if it is going to occasion great inconveniences he does not wish to insist upon it.

(It is decided to take no action on the Italian suggestion relative to the prolongation or postponement of the work of the Supreme Council.)

2. The Council has before it a note from the President of the German Delegation dated November 7th, 1919 relative to municipal elections in Upper Silesia.

M Clemenceau points out that the proposed action of the German Government is in utter defiance of the decisions of the Supreme Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that strictly speaking the Council cannot prevent such action on the part of the German Government before the Treaty comes into force, but it can say that it has already warned that Government that such elections will not be recognized.

M Clemenceau agrees.

Mr Polk also agrees. He presumes that the Council is sure of its legal ground when sending such an answer.

(It is decided that the Allied and Associated Powers should again inform the German Government that the municipal elections proposed to be held by it in Upper Silesia, prior to the coming into force of the Treaty, will not be recognized as valid.)

3. M Berthelot comments upon the note from the Swiss Legation.

M Clemenceau observes that as such clauses are already contained in the Treaties with Germany and Austria there seems no good reason for not inserting them in all the Treaties.

(It was decided to act favorably upon the request of the Swiss Legation relative to insertion in Treaties still to be drafted and signed of clauses relative to Swiss neutrality, analogous to Article 435 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and Article 375 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria.)

4. Mr Polk informs the Council that he has just received a telegram from Admiral Bristol to the effect that fighting between Greeks and Turks had taken place near Soma because the Greeks had not obeyed the orders of General Milne not to advance the line of occupation until the 15th of November and to wait until the Turkish army obeyed the orders given it to retire on November 12th, and that the Greeks had acted on the orders of their own Government.

Sir Eyre Crowe inquires if this point has not already been raised by Mr Venizelos at the preceding meeting of the Council.

M Clemenceau thinks it had not.

General Bunoust is sure that it had not. The point Sir Eyre Crowe had in mind was the incident at Nazilli.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that Mr Venizelos should be asked to explain the incident referred to in the telegram read by Mr Polk.

M Clemenceau suggests that the information contained in the telegram be sent to Mr Venizelos and that he be asked for explanations.

(This is agreed to.)

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Investigation at Smyrna dealt with two questions. The Commission had been appointed to investigate the complaints made by the Sheik-ul-Islam. The Council might unwittingly have given the Commission too large a mandate but it had never contemplated that the Commission should go so far as to advise it whether or not there should have been a Greek occupation. He proposes to separate the report into its two component parts. The question raised by the second part of the report has already been presented in an acute form as a result of Mr Venizelos ordering Greek troops beyond the zone of occupation laid down by the Council without consulting it. He thinks that there is a good deal to be said for Mr Venizelos in this connection inasmuch as he has sent many pressing communications to the Council which, owing to the great pressure of work, had not been promptly answered. The Council had ordered General Milne to determine the Greek zone of occupation; he had done so and on the other hand the Greek and Italian Governments, after satisfactory negotiations, had agreed to a line of demarcation between their zones. He feels that the other conclusions of the report might be accepted; but he is struck by the fact that a great deal of pertinent testimony had not been heard by the Commission, therefore it was difficult for the conclusions of the report to be accepted unreservedly, although he might have been inclined to do so if he had not heard Mr Venizelos’ explanations at the preceding meeting. For instance, with respect to the affair at Menemem, Mr Venizelos had pointed out that the Greek authorities had made an accurate count of the victims and found that only 20 had been killed, identifying them by name, whereas the number fixed by the Commission as a result of an investigation made by a French officer had placed the number at several hundred. He does not feel qualified to state that a different procedure could have been adopted, but he feels that if the Greek side of the case could have been heard the conclusions of the report might have been different. In his opinion this was the one reservation to be made when accepting the report.

General Bunoust observes that some question has been raised as to the Commission going beyond the mandate given it. He wishes to point out that the report submitted consists of three parts: a summary of the facts, the fixing of the responsibilities, and the conclusions. This conforms not only to the spirit but to the letter of the Council’s mandate contained in its telegram to the Commission of July 26, 1919. It had been suggested that the Commission was not justified in taking up the question of the expediency of the Greek occupation. He wishes to reply that the complaint of the Sheik-ul-Islam to the Supreme Council had formed the basis of the investigation, and this complaint had pretended that the Greek occupation was unjustified. The Commission had therefore necessarily examined that question. To take up a question of detail, in an affair such as that at Menemem it is impossible for anyone to make an accurate estimate. The Commission did not insist upon the exactness of its figures but it was convinced that figures submitted by the Greeks could not be any more accurate. With respect to contradictory testimony he wishes again to cite the affair at Menemem, where all the Turks had testified in one way and all the Greeks in another. The Commission had therefore tried to take the testimony of the witnesses who seemed to be the most reliable and it had taken a great deal of testimony from French, English and Italian witnesses. The testimony of M. Laplanche, a French employee of the railroad, had established that the day before the massacre in question the Turks had claimed that they feared a massacre and the Greeks had been informed of this but had taken no precautionary measures. The Greek battalion retreating from Pergamum had indeed been subjected to outrages, but when it once reached Menemem not a single shot had been fired at it. Many Greek witnesses claimed to have heard and seen shots but not one of them had been able to substantiate his evidently false statements. The Commission does not insist that the Greeks had prepared this massacre, but it is convinced that they had done absolutely nothing to prevent it and that the Greek authorities were obviously incompetent.

Sir Eyre Crowe has never doubted that the Commission had proceeded in the most sincere and honorable way, but, as Mr Venizelos had pointed out, the principal accused parties had not been heard. He had felt that although it had possibly been well not to acquaint the Greek representative with the names of the witnesses, it might have been possible to give him the depositions without giving him the names of the witnesses. But even this had not been done. He could not say that the conclusions of the report would have been different had such procedure been adopted, but it is evident that they might have been; therefore these conclusions were not entirely satisfactory. When the procedure adopted by the Commission had been brought to the attention of the Council it had not approved thereof; but it had then been too late to make an effective change. However, he does not wish to insist unduly upon this point for on the whole Mr Venizelos had accepted the substance of the report, inasmuch as he recognized that abuses had been committed and had meted out punishment therefor. Furthermore, calm now reigned in and around Smyrna, and in fact everywhere except those points where Greeks were in armed contact with Turks. He felt that the Greeks had done their best and that on the whole they had succeeded rather well.

M Clemenceau wishes to ask General Bunoust if he feels that calm did in fact reign in the occupied territories.

General Bunoust says that it does in the town of Smyrna, but that elsewhere the calm was only apparent and might well cease to exist at any moment. Furthermore, the town of Smyrna is nothing in comparison with the entirety of the occupied territories. There certainly is no calm at Aidin.

M Clemenceau inquires if the Greeks have withdrawn again within the Sandjak of Smyrna.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that General Milne has established a line beyond which the Greeks are to retire, and they have done so. There is, however, a small triangle in the region of Aidin where General Milne had proposed the following alternative: either the Greeks should be permitted to advance beyond the line of occupation previously laid down, or they should withdraw to a line behind the one at present held by them. In the latter event, General Milne had recommended an Inter-Allied occupation - i. e. Greek, French and English - of the triangle comprised between the present line of Greek occupation and that to which they would be forced to withdraw. This solution, including the exclusion of Italian troops from the proposed Inter-Allied force of occupation, had been discussed and approved by the Supreme Council, although he himself has found it difficult to agree with that conclusion. He feels that an Inter-Allied occupation would be the best solution possible, but it has not proven feasible. He is convinced of the impossibility of telling the Greeks to evacuate and of letting the Turks in.

Mr Polk inquires if the town of Soma is in the vicinity of Aidin.

S de Martino explains that it was to the north of Smyrna. He wishes to point out the following facts with respect to the region of Aidin. When the question was submitted to the Council as a result of General Milne’s report three solutions became possible: to leave the Greeks where they were, to let the Turks occupy this territory, or else to effect an Inter-Allied occupation, necessarily including the Greeks in such a force since they were already there. Turkish occupation had not been considered. But when the point of Inter-Allied occupation was raised there was no longer a question of a line of demarcation between Greek and Italian zones of occupation; it was a question, on the one hand, of Italian occupation, and on the other hand, of Inter-Allied occupation. He felt that when the word “Inter-Allied” was used Italy could not be excluded. What had been decided upon is, he thinks, contrary to the view of the French Government, because M Pichon had told him before the meeting that M Clemenceau’s point of view favored Inter-Allied occupation with Italian troops. He does not intend to resuscitate that question, which has already been decided, but he does wish to say that according to information he has received from Constantinople the solution which had been adopted had produced a very bad impression, inasmuch as it had been interpreted as a proof of discord between the Great Powers. He feels that if the Allies, all of whom had interests in Moslem countries, do not give evidence of solidarity towards the Moslem world they will expose themselves to the greatest danger in the future. He has spent eleven years in Moslem countries and could affirm that within ten or fifteen years the Allies would have the greatest difficulty in maintaining their Moslem colonies. The exclusion of Italian troops had made the Turks think that something queer was happening. When he had read the minutes of the meeting, at which he had not been present, he had seen that the reason given for exclusion of Italian troops from Aidin was the fear of disagreement and conflict with the Greeks. He wishes to insist that these fears had no foundation. The Italian Government had come to two agreements with Greece. One of lesser importance, relative to the provisional line of demarcation between Greek and Italian troops, the other a more general agreement. He knows that the Allies are pleased that this latter agreement has been reached. In view of the terms of this latter agreement, which laid down a common line of action with a view to avoiding any cause of disagreement or conflict, he feels sure that if the Italian troops had encountered the Greek troops at Aidin no conflict would have taken place between them. He would like to have Mr Venizelos himself questioned on this point. He wishes to bring all this to the attention of the Council as a matter of record, although he does not intend at that time to reopen the question of Aidin.

Mr Polk inquires if the agreements referred to have been put on record.

S de Martino replies that the agreement respecting the line of demarcation has been put on record and that the other had not.

Mr Polk presumes that there is no objection to it being put on record.

S de Martino thinks not, and says that he would speak to S Tittoni on the matter.

M Clemenceau remarks that General Milne had proposed three solutions: as two of them are impossible, he suggests the other be adopted.

Sir Eyre Crowe states that he has asked Mr Venizelos if the Greeks are certainly able to hold the territory in question and had been told that they could.

M Clemenceau thinks that the Greeks should then be allowed to remain at Aidin.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees.

M Clemenceau points out that it should not be forgotten that all those questions of occupation are purely provisional.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees.

S de Martino agrees.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that General Milne had asked that the Greeks, if they alone are to supply the occupying forces, be allowed to advance beyond the present line of occupation, as that is a necessary condition of their being able to hold the Aidin region.

Mr Polk asks if General Milne has not made it clear that this proposed advance would necessarily mean further fighting between the Greeks and Turks.

Sir Eyre Crowe replies in the affirmative.

Mr Polk states that he will have to make a reservation on this point. His Government has no troops to send, therefore although he cannot unconditionally object to this solution, his Government does not wish to assent thereto, and feels that it must decline all responsibility.

Sir Eyre Crowe says it has been found impossible to find French or British troops to occupy this territory, but he hoped the point might again be raised and that M Clemenceau might once more examine the possibility of sending French troops.

M Clemenceau says that he will again raise the question and will let Sir Eyre Crowe know on the following day, but he feels that he will not be successful inasmuch as France has no troops to spare. He thinks it is no use for the Council to shut its eyes to the fact that the Turks will continue to harass the Greeks. If troops were sent to this region it will result in protecting the Greeks from attacks which they had brought upon themselves.

Mr Polk says that he hesitates to express an opinion inasmuch as his Government can do nothing to help the situation by sending troops. But he wishes to put himself on record as insisting that any further difficulties or fighting in Asia Minor would certainly make the ultimate settlement of the Turkish question more difficult. The Turks and Greeks will always fight each other; therefore, he feels that any decision which will necessarily bring them into closer and further armed contact was bad in principle.

M Clemenceau observes that even if it is found possible to send an Inter-Allied force, that would not solve the question of conflicts between the Greeks and Turks. The fact of having the troops at Aidin would not have prevented fighting in Soma. Mr Venizelos had rather taken the Council to task and it cannot leave unanswered some of the points raised by him. It is perhaps true that the procedure adopted had not always been the best. He suggests that an answer be sent to Mr Venizelos stating in substance that, although Mr Venizelos’ complaints as to the procedure adopted might have been justified in certain particulars, nevertheless he himself (Mr Venizelos) had recognized that abuses have been committed, and further recommending to Mr Venizelos the use of extreme caution in the future. In the same letter Mr Venizelos should be informed of the decision taken with respect to maintaining Greek troops in Aidin and he should be forcibly reminded that all occupation is purely provisional.

General Bunoust wishes to point out that the Council proposes to tell Mr Venizelos in effect that the Commission has not proceeded in the way it should have. He wishes to warn the Council that any such action would be an impeachment of its own decisions. The Council in its instructions of July 26th had marked out the exact lines of action which had since been followed by the Commission, and subsequently had decided that Colonel Mazarakis should not be present at the meetings of the Commission. He wishes to add that the Commission, in recommending an Inter-Allied occupation, had desired to test the sincerity of the Turks who had repeatedly proclaimed that they only objected to an occupation by the Greeks.

M Clemenceau replies that the Council has no wish to blame the Commission in any way. The question is whether the instructions had been well worded. He suggests that M Berthelot prepare an answer to Mr Venizelos, to be submitted to the Council, taking into account the views expressed at that meeting.

(It is decided:

(1) To ask Mr Venizelos for explanations relative to the conflict between Greeks and Turks near Soma, reported in a despatch from Constantinople dated November 8, 1919;

(2) That M Berthelot should prepare, for submission to the Council, a reply to Mr Venizelos, taking into account the views expressed by the Council at that meeting.)

5. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation regarding the exportation to Russia of German munitions and war material.

Sir Eyre Crowe summarizes the note from the British Delegation. He thinks there is a good deal to be said in favor of helping General Denikin but he wishes to point out that his Government is already heavily committed in supplying the northern Russian forces.

M Clemenceau thinks that the manufacture and exportation in question could be stopped as soon as the Treaty has been put into force.

Mr Polk asks if it is proposed to do anything at that moment.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the manufacture and exportation could be stopped at once.

Mr Polk wonders if this is wise. He inquires if any right exists to stop this manufacture and exportation at the present time.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that this right existed even under the Armistice. This was clear from the fact that the Germans themselves, in asking permission for this manufacture and exportation, recognized that the right to prohibit it existed under the Armistice.

Mr Polk wishes to know what the reason is for prohibiting this manufacture and exportation; is the idea that ammunition factories should not be put into operation or was it in order not to help General Denikin?

M Clemenceau suggests that the Germans be told that they cannot manufacture and export the munitions and material in question.

Mr Polk says that he objects to these supplies being furnished by Germans but he does approve sending such supplies to General Denikin. If anyone else could supply him with the material in question he would be in favor of it. He wishes to know who is going to pay for this material and how the payment would be made?

Sir Eyre Crowe replies that he is not sure. He thinks that perhaps Bolshevist money will be used in payment.

M Berthelot observes that the trouble is that there is no way of controlling the destination of this material.

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that the same group of manufacturers and exporters also supplied Colonel Bermondt.

M Clemenceau suggests that a reply be sent that inasmuch as the Council has no control over the use and destination of the munitions and war material in question, and cannot even be sure that part thereof would not find its way into the hands of elements hostile to the Allied and Associated Powers, the Council cannot sanction the manufacture and dispatch of the munitions and war material in question. He asks who would convey this information and to whom the communication would be sent.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he will send this answer to the British Military Representative in Berlin, in the name of the Council, for transmission by him to the proper parties.

(It is decided that Sir Eyre Crowe, in the name of the Council, should inform the British Military Representative at Berlin, for transmission by him to the proper parties, that inasmuch as the Council has no control over the use and destination of the munitions and war material in question, and cannot even be sure that part thereof would not find its way into the hands of elements hostile to the Allied and Associated Powers, the Council cannot sanction the manufacture and dispatch of the munitions and war material in question.

6. The Council has before it a note from the Drafting Committee relative to the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon the note of the Drafting Committee and explains that what is proposed therein is not a formal convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations prior to the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty with Germany but only informal warning information.

Mr Polk asks whether, assuming that the only thing the Council will do at its first meeting will be to nominate the Commission of Delimitation for the Sarre District, it will not be sufficient to call the meeting for the day after the deposit of ratifications.

M Fromageot replies that if it is sure that nothing further has to be done it will be sufficient. It is possible, however, that many and serious questions will have to be taken up especially in the event of the United States ratifying the Treaty prior to the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. It is therefore better to take all preliminary precautions even if they should eventually prove useless.

Mr Polk thinks that he will have to ask for an adjournment. He does not see the necessity for all these various notices. The question had once been very simple but it is now becoming very complicated. The only question he wishes to raise is: Does the President of the United States have the power to call the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations before the deposit of ratifications. If not, he thinks the President could issue such a call on the day of the deposit of ratifications and that the meeting could be held the following day.

M Fromageot says that the solution proposed by the Drafting Committee involved no convocation which might be deemed premature.

Sir Eyre Crowe adds that a further point had been raised: The United States might or might not ratify the Treaty prior to the date of the deposit of ratifications. Mr Polk’s point is only based on the United States not having ratified. The proposal of the Drafting Committee covers both contingencies.

Mr Polk says that he would refer the matter to his Government although he feels confident that there will be no objection.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he would have to make a small reservation with respect to the place of the first meeting. There have been some previous discussion on this point of whether the meeting should be in Paris, or in London where the machinery of the League of Nations already exists. When the point had come up before the Council the British Delegation had not agreed that the meeting should be held in Paris. Since that time he has obtained his Government’s consent to holding the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in Paris if no other business was to come before the Council than the nomination of the members of the Commission of Delimitation for the Sarre District. That is all that he can agree to at the present time but he will try to obtain further consent for the first meeting of the Council to be held in Paris irrespective of the business to be transacted at that meeting.

M Clemenceau observed that he of course cannot make any statement as to what will be on the agenda at the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

Mr Polk thinks that there is a great deal of unnecessary trouble in connection with this question. It is proposed to be entirely prepared for an important meeting of the Council on the day of the deposit of ratifications. Apparently that day will be somewhere in the neighborhood of November 25th. If that is so his Government’s Delegate could not reach Paris in time, even if the United States had already ratified the Treaty.

M Berthelot thinks that the deposit of ratifications can be effected on or about November 27th, as far as the Allied and Associated Powers are concerned. It has become evident from various sources that the Germans will not sign the protocol without raising various difficulties. If the deposit of ratifications is delayed it will be on account of the German attitude.

(It was decided to approve the recommendations of the Drafting Committee relative to the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations with the following reservations:

(1) That Mr. Polk will refer the matter to his Government.

(2) That Sir Eyre Crowe will refer to his Government the question of holding the first meeting of the Council in Paris irrespective of the business to be transacted at said first meeting.

7. The Council had before it a draft answer, prepared by the Commission on Belgian Affairs, to the note of the German Delegation of October 3rd, relative to the organization of the plebiscites at Eupen and Malmedy.

(It was decided to approve the draft answer, prepared by the Commission on Belgian Affairs, to the note of the German Delegation of October 3rd, relative to the organization of the Plebiscites at Eupen and Malmedy.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

11-11-19, 09:20 AM

11th November 1919

The first two-minute silence of Remembrance Day is held in the British Empire to commemorate the first anniversary of the end of the Great War.
https://i.postimg.cc/50vJJT6s/EJFW5-GEXUAEIe-K.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Overhead view of Paddington station platforms with passengers and staff observing two minutes' silence on the first anniversary of the Armistice.
https://i.postimg.cc/tJyKjT0g/EJFW5-GEXUAEIe-K.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Prince of Wales at White House.
https://i.postimg.cc/kXgHFLqL/EJFW5-GEXUAEIe-K.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Mr Quatro

11-11-19, 08:09 PM

https://www.horseandhound.co.uk/news/lest-forget-campaign-honours-eight-million-horses-killed-first-world-war-637304?fbclid=IwAR3i_1sYwXRlFp5E92nssS4woldDaCg8K6 HdIX4zEVb_8ZJFoZ5ICQm2q-s

One hundred years after the First World War, charity Brooke has launched a campaign called Every Horse Remembered to commemorate the eight million equines killed in the conflict.

In Britain, one million equines were conscripted — including donkeys and mules — and only 62,000 returned after the armistice.

Sailor Steve

11-11-19, 10:37 PM

Tuesday, November 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Berthelot says that the members of the Council have received the draft reply to Mr Venizelos which he had been asked to prepare. He calls the attention of the Council to the fact that two questions on the subject of Smyrna had not been discussed the day before: Mr Venizelos, on one hand, complained of the conditions which had governed the censorship, and expressed his intention of establishing a Greek censorship at Smyrna; on the other hand, the Inter-Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople had sent them on November 3rd a note in which they criticized the attitude of the Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna; the latter tended more and more to substitute his action as well to that of the High Commissioners as to that of the Turkish officials. In the draft reply which he had prepared he had taken those two points into consideration.

Sir Eyre Crowe is of opinion that the question should be examined at the next meeting, but he wishes to state immediately that he does not entirely agree with M Berthelot: Is it possible for the Allies to supervise the Greek authorities at Smyrna from Constantinople? Besides, perhaps the draft letter points out too clearly to Venizelos that he is wrong.

M Clemenceau agrees to adjourn the examination of the draft prepared by M Berthelot.

(The examination of the draft reply to Mr Venizelos is adjourned.)

2. Mr Polk wishes to read a telegram addressed to the Supreme Council by the Secretary of Labor of the United States in his capacity as President of the International Labor Conference. He explains that the American Delegation will not assume the responsibility for the terms of this communication. On the other hand, from the information he had received from Baron von Lersner, most of the German delegates have reserved berths which were leaving between November 15th and 20th. He would know the next day whether all the delegates had been able to secure berths.

M Clemenceau does not see what they can do for the time being.

3. The Council has before it a letter from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation and a report from the New States Commission, dated November 8th, 1919.

M Kammerer reads and comments upon the report of the Commission, and upon the draft letter to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation appended to said report. He wishes to call the attention of the Council to the fact that the Commission had been unanimous in thinking that it was satisfactory to send to the Serb Delegation a reply which would interpret the Treaty. The only disagreement was on one point. The drafting of Article II in the Serbian Treaty was different from the corresponding article in the other Minorities Treaty. Following S Tittoni’s suggestion, the Supreme Council had indeed decided on September 1st to replace in the article in question, for the Serbian Treaty, the words “proceder de telle manière” by the words “prendre telles mesures.” On the other hand, the corresponding English text was the same in all the Treaties, viz: “take such action.” The majority was of the opinion that this difference in the drafting of the French text did not alter the sense and that nothing opposed itself to their informing the Serbs thereof. On the contrary, the Italian Delegation was of the opinion that it would be wiser to abide, without further explanation, with the decision of the Supreme Council. On the whole, they believed that their reply was of such a nature as to satisfy the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, except with regard to the Macedonian question. However, one difficulty still remained: it is likely that the Serbian Delegation might feel it hard to accept the decision of the Council which asks that it should recognize the right of option under the conditions provided in Article 4, for persons of Turkish nationality. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation will perhaps put forward objections on this point.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks whether there are any reasons to believe that the Serbs would make difficulties on this point.

M Kammerer says that in a private conversation, at a time when the question of a special clause on the subject had come up in the Minorities Treaty, Mr Trumbic had expressed some doubt. He thought that the Belgrade government would find it easier to make a simple declaration.

Mr Polk says he approves the report of the Commission; but asks whether it would not be easier to obtain the assent of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation if they were to give Mr Trumbic the satisfaction of being heard by the Council? This would facilitate his task in his own country, for it could not then be said that the Conference had refused to hear the Serb Delegation.

M Kammerer says that from the very beginning the New States Commission had decided to hear no one.

Mr Polk remarks that one of the grievances of the Romanians, which was unjustified, was that they had not been heard by the Council. He did not wish to insist, but they might give them such satisfaction if they were heard; this might be the best way of obtaining their signature.

M Clemenceau asks whether this might not be the source of further delays.

Mr Polk asks whether the Commission felt sure that the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation would be content purely and simply with the letter which was going to be sent.

M Kammerer answers that except with regard to Article 4, they have every reason to think the Serbs will sign. It might perhaps be wise to send them immediately the letter which the Commission had prepared: If they have any objections to make, the Council might hear them.

M Clemenceau asks whether the Italian Delegation maintains its reservations regarding Article 11.

S de Martino states that they did not insist for the sake of conciliation, but it was understood that the two expressions were of the same value; one could not conceive an intervention of the League of Nations if the League could not take such measures as might be opportune.

(It is decided:

(1) To approve the report presented by the New States Commission with regard to the observations of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the Minorities Treaty;

(2) That the President of the Conference should send to that Delegation the draft reply as prepared by the New States Commission.

4. M Clemenceau says that the question should be adjourned as the Reparations Commission is not ready to discuss it.

Mr Polk asks whether they could not inform the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation that the Separations Commission had instructions to hear its representatives. The Reparations Commission might be further informed that the Supreme Council desired that the request of the Yugoslavs be considered with the utmost care with a view of meeting the situation as far as compatible with the Treaty and the declarations of May last in the Council of Four.

Sir Eyre Crowe has no objections to make.

M Clemenceau does not have any either. He asks whether the Italian Delegation has any to offer.

S de Martino answers that he has none, if it is understood that the hearing of the Yugoslav Delegates by the Reparations Commission does not affect in any way or prejudice the decisions of this Commission.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Reparations Commission should be requested to hear a representative of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation regarding the distribution of shipping which belongs to the erstwhile Austro-Hungarian Empire, between Italy and the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State;

(2) That the Separations Commission be informed that it is the desire of the Supreme Council that the Yugoslav request be considered with the utmost care with a view to meeting the situation as far as compatible with the clauses of the Treaty and the declarations of May last in the Council of Four, it being understood that the Reparations Commission be given power of appreciation and decision;

(3) That the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation be informed that the Reparations Commission has been instructed to hear its representatives.

5. The Council has before it a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 7th, 1919.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon the note of the Drafting Committee.

M Clemenceau wishes to ask who would make the distinction between German Government property and private property.

M Fromageot answers that this distinction should not be very difficult to make.

Mr Polk inquires whether they could not await the arrival of the German Delegates to solve this question?

M Clemenceau asks whether they will have the necessary powers.

Mr Polk says it is a violation of the Treaty: He thinks that it would be saving time to follow his suggestion rather than send a new note.

Sir Eyre Crowe says they are confronted by a difficulty of form. They have before them a question which had been brought up only by an American report which stated, besides, that the Germans had ceased to remove, at least partly, the materiel in question. They did not know whether the materiel which was being removed did or did not belong to the state. Perhaps it would be sufficient to warn the German Government that they would not permit the removal of government-owned materiel.

M Fromageot says that the first thing to do is to verify on the spot to whom belonged the materiel which had been removed.

Mr Polk says that there were at Danzig representatives of the Inter-Allied Railway Mission in Poland.

M Clemenceau said it is for them to give the necessary information.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Inter-Allied Railway Mission in Poland be requested to advise immediately whether materiel removed by the Germans from Danzig is State or private property;

(2) That the Drafting Committee prepare a draft note warning the German Government that the Allied and Associated Powers will not allow removal or sale by German authorities of naval materiel at Danzig, which belonged to the Reich, to the German States, or had been requisitioned by them.

6. The Council has before it a note from the Secretary-General of the Conference dated November 8, 1919.

(After a short discussion,

It is decided that the Allied and Associated Powers, having drawn up a list of individuals charged with crimes to be delivered by the German Government, should have a representative on the Commission whose appointment had been decided on November 7th, and who is charged with the organization of mixed tribunals set up under Article 229 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

7. The Council has before it a note from the Commission on Polish Affairs dated November 10th, 1919 and a letter from the Secretary General of the Polish Delegation status of Eastern dated November 9th, 1919.

M Cambon said that before commenting upon the report of the Commission he wishes to call the attention of the Council to the letter from the Secretary-General of the Polish Delegation. The American, Italian and Japanese Delegations are of the opinion that the request addressed to the Council should be granted. The British and French Delegations, on the other hand, think that it is time to solve this irritating question.

M Berthelot says that Mr Paderewski had already explained to the Council the Polish point of view. They do not see the use of hearing another Polish representative.

S de Martino says if it only means a few days delay it might be courteous to grant it.

Sir Eyre Crowe asked whether Mr Patek would be informed of the new conclusions arrived at by the Commission. In that case he will discuss them before the Council. Or will the conclusions be kept secret?

M Cambon said that they are not to be transmitted, but as usual there will be some leakage.

Sir Eyre Crowe states that if at each step they were to hear the Poles, they would never finish. They had come with great difficulty to an agreement. It would be imprudent to reopen the compromise which had been arrived at. However, he himself does not wish to oppose the granting of a short delay of three days for instance. In that case it should be taken into account that Mr Patek would make objections and that he would ask for time to receive instructions from Warsaw.

(The American, Italian and Japanese Delegates stated that they did not insist.)

Mr Polk thinks they might discuss the report and take a decision, with the reservation that they would give Mr Patek a further hearing.

M Clemenceau agreed.

M Cambon reads and commented upon the report of the Commission. He says that no disagreement exists between the members of the Commission except in regard to Article 16 which concerns the representation of Eastern Galicia in the Polish Diet. While the text of the majority provided for a representation of Eastern Galicia in the Diet and defined the attributions of its representatives, the minority on the other hand (the British Delegation), wishes to have the question of Eastern Galicia’s representation in the Polish Diet discussed between Galicians and Poles. The majority is afraid that such a procedure will result in endless and violent conflict between Poland and Galicia.

Sir Eyre Crowe states with satisfaction that the majority has made an effort to meet the minority half way. On his side the minority feels obliged to make some concessions. Three points would have to be discussed:

(1) With regard to the duration of the Mandate which the League of Nations would give to Poland in Eastern Galicia, he has received instructions from Mr Lloyd George to see that the duration of this Mandate should be limited to 10 years. He himself (Sir Eyre Crowe) proposed 15 years, the Commission had proposed 30 years, and finally 25 years had been agreed upon. He would be prepared to take the responsibility to accept this figure. If they did not agree on this point the American Delegation would come back to its former proposition and the question would be reopened.

(2) With regard to the Military service, he had already had occasion to express the reluctance of his Government to accept the principle of conscription in the territories placed under the control of the League of Nations. He accepts, however, in a spirit of conciliation, the proposed arrangement.

(3) Lastly, with regard to article 16, he wishes to say that the British Government is in no way opposed to a representation of Galicia at Warsaw. He only thinks that the problem is of so complex a nature that it would be better to let the interested parties solve it themselves. He undoubtedly could accept the text proposed by the majority, but they should take into account the case where Poles and Galicians would agree upon another system; would they be bound by article 16, as proposed by the majority? The British Delegation cannot accept the majority’s text except with the following addition, “this arrangement shall be subject to revision by common agreement between the Polish Government and the Ministry of Eastern Galicia.”

S de Martino accepts the British Amendment.

M Clemenceau states that all the Delegations accept the same.

M Cambon says that the changes which the Council has approved might necessitate some alteration of the articles originally adopted. He asks that the Council give the Commission on Polish Affairs the mandate to effect in accord with the Drafting Committee such changes of texts which would appear necessary.

Mr Polk says they are agreed not to publish anything concerning the decisions that had just been taken until the text of the Treaty had been definitely agreed upon.

(It is decided:

(1) To approve the report prepared by the Commission on Polish Affairs or its majority, with regard to the text of the preamble and Articles 2 and 38;

(2) That Article 16, as proposed by the majority, be adopted with the following addition, “This arrangement shall be considered as subject to revision by common agreement between the Polish Government and the Ministry of Eastern Galicia.

(3) That the Commission on Polish Affairs in agreement with the Drafting Committee should modify the articles concerning the status of Eastern Galicia, which had already been adopted, so as to conform with the two preceding decisions;

(4) That said decisions should not be final until a representative of the Polish Delegation had been heard by the Council;

(5) That the decisions of the Council with regard to the status of Eastern Galicia should remain secret until further order.)

8. The Council has before it a list prepared by the French Delegation of the questions still to be decided by the Supreme Council.

Mr Polk thinks that the Russian and Baltic questions cannot be settled by the Council. Would it not be better to agree now that they should be dealt with by the respective Foreign Offices?

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the question of Bessarabia should, however, come before the Council.

Mr Polk says the American Delegation is of the opinion that the Bessarabian question could not be settled at that time.

Sir Eyre Crowe states they are clearly of the opinion that Bessarabia should go to Romania.

Mr Polk says he is willing to discuss the question, but that this is not the time to make this cession.

M Berthelot says that the question of the Aaland Islands had already been put before the Council and that it had been decided to adjourn the settlement of same until it knew what attitude Sweden would take in regard to the blockade of Russia. In the same way, the problem of repatriation of Allied contingents and of enemy prisoners from Siberia, belonged to the Council.

M Clemenceau says that the Committee of Ambassadors might deal with the settlement of these three questions: They are questions of execution of the Treaty. It is understood that the Delegations will send in to the Secretariat-General the additional lists which they had been asked to prepare.

Mr Polk asks whether the Dutch-Belgian Treaty will be ready in time for examination by the Council.

M Berthelot thinks so. An agreement seems imminent.

Mr Polk asks whether the distribution of merchant ships is to be settled by the Supreme Council or the Reparation Commission.

M Clemenceau states that the Council will discuss it and refer it back to the Reparation Commission if it is deemed necessary.

9. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation.

Sir Eyre Crowe says the question had been put by the British Treasury, who wished to know from what date the allowances of members of the Boundary Commissions would be drawn.

M Berthelot thinks that the proposals made by the British Delegation offered certain difficulties. It does not seem just to begin the payment of allowances on the day when the nomination was notified to the Secretary-General of the Conference, for these notifications do not all take place at the same date. On the other hand, the date when the Treaty would be put into force is perhaps too late. It would be better to say that the allowances will become due from the constitution of the Commissions, leaving it to the Subcommittee of the Commission on the Execution of the Treaty to determine the application of that decision.

(It is decided:

(1) That the allowances laid down in the “Instructions regarding Boundary Commissions,” should begin to be payable to members of such Commissions, and be recoverable from the interested States, from the date of constitution of each Boundary Commission;

(2) That the Subcommittee of the Commission on the Execution of the Treaty settle all details with regard to the application of this decision.)

(The meeting then adjourns)

Jimbuna

11-12-19, 07:49 AM

12th November 1919

General Baron Pyotr Wrangel, commander of the anti-Bolshevik Caucasus Volunteer Army.
https://i.postimg.cc/wM5qCzML/EJKgf-Jb-XUAI19y3.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Cargo ship SS Nile being launched in Seattle.
https://i.postimg.cc/MKxKyn3D/EJGpiwg-XUAAan-BN.png (https://postimages.org/)

From left to right, Sergeant Walter Henry Shiers (Wally Shiers), Lieutenant Keith Macpherson Smith, Captain Sir Ross Macpherson Smith and Sergeant Jim Bennett at Hounslow Heath Aerodrome in London, just before setting off for Darwin in Australia in a Vickers Vimy biplane.
https://i.postimg.cc/VN3z5vbX/qexdfd9sn7y31.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

11-12-19, 08:49 PM

Wednesday, November 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a draft note to Mr Venizelos relative to the report of the Commission of Inquiry, prepared by the British Delegation, a telegram from the French High Commissioner at Constantinople, dated November 3, and a letter from the Greek Delegation, dated November 4.

M Berthelot reads the draft note prepared by the British Delegation.

M Clemenceau raises the following point of form: On page 2 he thinks the word “observed” should be changed to read “felt” in the sentence reading: “It hopes that the dangerous tension which at the present time does not seem to have ceased to make itself felt along the limits of the Greek occupation.”

Sir Eyre Crowe explains that in drawing up this note the British Delegation had wished to avoid mixing up two questions; he realizes, however, that other questions, referred to on the previous day by M Berthelot but not touched upon in this draft note, still remained to be settled. The question of the administration of Smyrna is a rather complex one and it might be well to turn it over to a Commission. A Commission on Greek Territorial Claims is already in existence. He understands that Mr Venizelos has a good deal to say on this question and it would perhaps be better for him to be heard by that Commission.

S de Martino agrees, particularly as he thinks it is time that a decision should be reached relative to the relations between the Greek army of occupation and the local authorities on the one hand, and the central Government of Constantinople on the other. It would be well to be guided by the principles of The Hague Convention. On the other hand, it would be well to show consideration to Mr Venizelos, who throughout the war had shown qualities of the highest value and whose difficulties were well known.

M Clemenceau suggests that the question be referred to the Commission on Greek Territorial Claims which, if necessary, can solicit the advice of the military experts.

M Berthelot points out that as General Bunoust, who is entirely familiar with the situation, is present he might give the Commission valuable advice.

Mr Polk calls the attention of the Council to a paragraph of the draft note authorizing the Greeks to advance from Aidin up to the river Kochak Chai. That clause is a very important one. It should be remembered that any further advance meant fighting between the Greeks and Turks. General Milne himself has recognized that fact. He therefore wishes to ask if the Council deemed it advisable to assume the responsibility for such further conflict.

M Clemenceau again points out that he can send no troops; he feels that possibly the best solution would be to have Mr Venizelos withdraw his troops from the region of Aidin where they had gone without the consent of the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that this means letting the Turks occupy this region.

M Clemenceau inquires if the Italians are far distant from the Greeks in this region.

S de Martino explains that they are not; that the Italian forces are within six hundred meters of the line of the River Meander and the parallel railroad. The Greek line was along the north bank of the river.

Sir Eyre Crowe explains that if the Greeks retire a triangle will be left between the river, the railroad and the Greek line, which includes Aidin. To the south the line had been fixed by agreement between Mr Venizelos and the Italian Government. He thinks that it would not be advisable to withdraw the Greeks from the triangle in question and turn it over to Italian occupation.

S de Martino points out that he has not made any such suggestion.

M Clemenceau then suggests that the Greeks could be left at Aidin, but that they should not be allowed to advance.

Mr Polk asked if General Milne himself had not said that a further advance by the Greeks would inevitably result in serious trouble.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that General Milne had rather said that he would be willing to authorize a further advance if the Council was prepared for the fact that such an advance would mean encountering armed opposition. General Milne had favored that advance on strategic grounds.

M Clemenceau observes that as Mr Venizelos feels capable of conquering Asia, the Greek troops certainly should be able to maintain their ground at Aidin. He agrees with Mr Polk that if the Council orders a further advance it will be in a position of creating further trouble.

Mr Polk says that he cannot agree to a letter authorizing the Greeks to advance in view of the fact that the authorities on the spot had said that trouble would certainly ensue. He thinks that this would be tantamount to authorizing the Greeks to advance and conquer additional territory.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the only alternative is to let in the Turks who will then unquestionably start to massacre the Greeks.

Mr Polk asks if Sir Eyre Crowe feels convinced of this?

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he does.

Mr Polk says that his personal view is that if this line of action is followed all Asia Minor will eventually have to be occupied.

M Clemenceau suggested that the Greeks be left at Aidin but that they not be authorized to advance further.

(This was agreed to.)

S de Martino wishes to ask Sir Eyre Crowe if he could give him some information on the intentions of the British Government relative to the occupation of Aidin. According to a telegram which he had received from Italian Authorities on the spot, English troops were reported to be ready to advance on Aidin. General Montague Bates, commanding the 83rd Infantry Brigade, was said to be in command of those forces. On November 4th more than 70 cars were reported to have left for Afium Karahissar in order to transport the British Troops.

Sir Eyre Crowe replies that the British arrangement had been made in contemplation of Inter-Allied occupation. As no French troops could be sent he thought that the British troops would likewise not approach Aidin.

(It is decided to approve the draft note to Mr Venizelos relative to the report of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna prepared by the British Delegation after making the following modifications therein:

(1) On the second page of this draft note the sentence: “It hopes that the dangerous tension which at the present time does not seem to have ceased to make itself observed along the limits of the Greek zone of occupation”, should be changed to read, “It hopes that the dangerous tension which at the present time does not seem to have ceased to make itself felt along the limits of the Greek zone of occupation”;

(2) The clause: “In the meanwhile allowing the Greek troops to advance from Aidin up to the river Kochak Chai, according to General Milne’s recommendation” should be eliminated.

It is further decided to refer to the Commission on Greek Territorial Claims the questions pertaining to the administration of Smyrna, and that the Commission should be at liberty to take the advice of Military Experts, in particular that of General Bunoust.)

2. The Council has before it a reply from the Romanian Government transmitted by the Chargé d’Affaires of France, dated November 2nd, to the note of the Allied and Associated Powers dated October 12th.

M Clemenceau observes that the answer is very unsatisfactory and is even of a nature to cause anxiety.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees. He feels that the answer is practically a refusal of all the demands presented by the Supreme Council. The only point upon which the Romanians had even partially agreed was the evacuation of Hungary, and even on that point the Romanian Government had made a most formidable reservation with respect to the extent of the Hungarian territory to be evacuated. The Romanian answer gave no satisfaction to the Council’s demand relative to the evacuation in so far as concerned the withdrawal beyond the river Theiss. On all other points the answer is evasive and defiant. The Council should carefully examine the present situation in Romania. Its authority must be respected. Mr Bratiano is merely dilly-dallying and playing for time, and the measures adopted by him had resulted in deluding the majority of his countrymen into thinking him a great patriot. He (Sir Eyre Crowe) feels that if the King and the majority of the Romanians are made clearly to see that a persistence in their present attitude will necessarily mean a breach with the Allied and Associated Powers and Romania’s exclusion from the Alliance, then Romania would adopt a more compliant attitude. He thinks that in such an event the present Government would be forced to retire and that a Ministry would be constituted which would see the wisdom of meeting the Council’s just demands and would act accordingly. He thinks the above considerations should be put very plainly to Romania and that it should be told that if its reply to the communication proposed to be sent by the Council is not satisfactory it will mean the breaking off of relations between Romania and the Allied and Associated Powers. The Romanians cannot be driven out of Hungary by force as the Council has no force to dispose of, and it seems to him that the only alternative is the line of action he had proposed.

Mr Polk says he welcomes any strong action.

M Clemenceau thinks that the action proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe is strong enough to meet the requirements of the situation.

S de Martino inquires if it would be wise to adopt in its entirety Sir Eyre Crowe’s suggestion, which involves threatening Romania. The resulting situation if the Romanians should refuse to agree to the action proposed should be examined. If the Romanians refuse the situation would be worse than it was before.

M Clemenceau thinks that the terms of the communication to be sent to Romania were reasonably clear. They could be plainly told that they will be no longer in the Alliance.

M Berthelot reminds the Council that at the time of signing the Austrian Treaty it had considered telling Romania that Bukovina would not be attributed to it, but that in the Austrian Treaty it would be given to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. This had not been done as it had seemed too severe a measure to be judicious at that time. However, as it is now proposed to exert pressure on Romania, it is well to examine the means of bringing this pressure to bear and a similar plan might now be considered. Romania might be told that her claims to Transylvania will not be recognized and that the question of Bessarabia will not be discussed until it can be taken up with a reconstituted Russia. He points out that the Romanian reply is satisfactory in so far as it announces the imminent withdrawal of the Romanian forces to the Theiss; the result had been to facilitate negotiations with the Hungarians. What he was now suggesting was primarily theoretical. The question of the advisability of taking such measures must still be decided, for when considering the question of punishing a Government it would be well not to lose sight of the fact that the population should not be wholly antagonized.

Sir Eyre Crowe reminds the Council that Sir George Clerk had referred in a former telegram to Romanian atrocities in Transylvania and the Council had inquired what part of Transylvania was meant. This question had not yet been answered but he had that day received a mass of documents relative to outrages in Transylvania, an examination of which might lead to the conclusion that the inhabitants of Transylvania were not as favorable to Romania as might have been thought.

M Clemenceau observed that two distinct questions are raised. First, is there a basis of right for taking away from Romania the Hungarian territories in question? The second question relates to the outrages committed by the Romanians in Transylvania.

Mr Polk says that he has always felt that if Romania refused to accede to the very reasonable demands of the Council she should not have Transylvania given to her. He thinks that such action is entirely too generous.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that the difficulty is that if Transylvania is withheld from Romania that would involve an occupation by Allied troops, which is obviously impossible.

Mr Polk observes that if these territories are withheld from Romania she would at least be in a position of never having been given them. Although occupation by the Allies is out of the question, he thinks that such action would at least have a great moral effect.

S de Martino thinks that the point of prime importance is to rehabilitate the prestige of the Council. The action proposed by M Berthelot was certainly rather severe. He would have to consult his Government on that point. In the meantime he thinks that the Ministers at Bucharest might be instructed to take further action.

M Clemenceau does not think this advisable in as much as the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Bucharest had already done all they could do.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that in his personal opinion a communication should be sent to Romania in the nature of a real ultimatum. He will, however, have to consult his government before agreeing to send such a communication.

Mr Polk inquires if it is necessary to send a communication of that nature. Could not an answer be sent to Romania pointing out that her latest communication to the Council is no answer at all, and demanding a satisfactory answer from her.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that the time for such action has gone by and that the present is the time to act firmly and decisively.

M Clemenceau agrees.

Mr Polk also agrees.

M Clemenceau suggests that Romania should be informed that the Allied and Associated Powers will withdraw their representatives from Romania and that the Romanian representatives in the various capitals, as well as her representatives at the Peace Conference, must also be withdrawn. He further suggests that M Berthelot should draft a note, taking into account the views expressed at that meeting, this note to be submitted to the Council as soon as the Heads of Delegations have been able to consult their respective Governments.

M Berthelot points out that a diplomatic rupture is a serious matter and inquires if it is to be resorted to at once.

M Clemenceau says that his patience is utterly exhausted. He has been long suffering with the Romanian Government and has even been reproached for that attitude. The Romanians always try to prolong pourparlers indefinitely, and this must be put an end to.

Mr Matsui agrees to the action proposed. He, of course, will have to consult his Government, which he thinks will not raise any objections. He wishes to point out that his Government has no diplomatic representation in Romania. In the meantime, in as much as he might not be able to receive an answer from his Government until some time after the other members of the Council have heard from their respective Governments, he is willing to agree with the view which would be adopted.

M Berthelot summarized the contents of the communication to be prepared by him. He will recall to Romania all that has been done for her and in her behalf by the Allied and Associated Powers and will point out the refractory attitude consistently maintained by Romania with respect to the just demands of the Supreme Council.

S de Martino calls attention to one paragraph of the Romanian note which seemed to him to have some merit. That is the paragraph dealing with the granting of authority to the Sub-Committee of the Reparations Commission to receive complaints relative to unauthorized requisitions. Romania had pointed out that in this respect she had been treated worse than the Yugoslav State had been in the matter of its requisitions in the Banat.

M Berthelot explains that the situations are not at all analogous. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had never been in opposition to the Council on this question.

General Weygand states that he has lately received a visit from Colonel Dimitrescu. He did not know the Colonel and was unaware how much importance should be attached to his statements. By way of information, however, he wished to tell the Council that Colonel Dimitrescu had complained of the Council’s attitude towards Romania and had pointed out that the present Government in Romania, mainly composed of Generals, was only able to attend to internal affairs; he therefore hoped that the Council would have patience with Romania until elections had been held and a government constituted which was qualified to deal adequately with foreign affairs as well as internal matters.

M Clemenceau thinks that no importance should be attached to these remarks of Colonel Dimitrescu; Mr Bratiano was behind the whole matter.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that the Ministry of Generals had been put in power so that precisely that argument could be advanced.

(It is decided that M Berthelot should draft a note to the Romanian Government, for submission to the Council, taking into account the views expressed by the Council at that meeting.)

3. The Council has before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk dated November 9th and a telegram from the Inter-Allied Military Mission dated November 10th.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks that the situation in Hungary seems to have greatly improved. He calls attention to Sir George Clerk’s request that about 20 officers be sent to Hungary to be attached to various army and police units.

S de Martino says that he is in favor of sending these officers if the other members of the Council are also.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the question of their payment would surely be raised. It seemed to him that they might well be paid by the Hungarian army.

M Clemenceau agrees and says that he also favors sending these officers.

Mr Polk says that at present Colonel Yates, he believes, is in charge of the reorganization of the Hungarian Gendarmerie. He thinks that his Government would have no objection to sending a few officers to Hungary temporarily but he will of course have to consult his Government.

M Clemenceau suggests that it might be well in replying to Sir George Clerk to warn him to be on his guard against a restoration of the Hapsburgs under any guise.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks that this might be unnecessary in as much as Sir George Clerk had indicated that Friedrich’s departure is imminent.

M Clemenceau points out that his retirement in many ways resembles that of Mr Bratiano. Although nominally retiring he will still remain in power. He thinks it would be well to include a general phrase of the tenor above suggested by him.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees.

(It is decided:

(1) That Sir Eyre Crowe should prepare, for submission to the Council at its next meeting, a telegram to Sir George Clerk in answer to the telegram, dated November 9th, received from him, and taking into account the telegram received from the Inter-Allied Military Mission dated November 10th;

(2) That the Heads of Delegation should examine the question of sending a total of about 20 Allied officers to Hungary.)

4. The Council has before it a note relative to the expenses of transportation of the Inter-Allied troops of occupation for Plebiscite Areas.

General Weygand reads and comments upon this note and points out that the German Government will certainly raise the question of the payment of expenses of transportation.

M Clemenceau observes that the work to be done by these troops would be for the account of various interested countries. He thinks that those countries might well bear the expenses.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that is the proper solution, but wishes to point out that in the case of Danzig and Memel the Council had decided that those expenses should be borne by the local authorities.

Mr Polk suggests that the matter be referred to the Drafting Committee.

(This was agreed to.)

S de Martino wishes to bring up a question closely related to the foregoing one. In the plebiscite areas the expenses of maintenance of the Inter-Allied troops and Commissions would entail expenses which had not yet been estimated with exactness. These expenses, however, will be considerable. According to the terms of the Treaty these expenses are to be met by the local revenues of each plebiscite area. In the case of Allenstein, Eastern Prussia might be called upon for partial payment in case the local revenues were not sufficient. In the remaining areas the local revenues should suffice. Under these conditions it seems necessary that a more or less accurate estimate of the expenses of maintenance of those troops and Commissions should at once be made by a Committee of Financial and Economic experts who would be charged with determining whether or not the whole of those expenses should be apportioned to the local revenues of the plebiscite zones.

General Weygand observes that he only raised the question of the expenses of transportation. The question of the expenses of maintenance was a far larger one. There has as yet been no means of arriving at a very accurate estimate of the transportation expenses but from some figures at hand it seemed that they would amount to two or three million francs. The amount of the expenses of maintenance he thought could easily be calculated.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that this latter amount cannot be estimated with great accuracy because it is impossible at this time to know how long the various areas will be occupied.

M Berthelot points out that the occupation will not be effected by a large number of troops and would not last for a long time, except possibly in the case of Upper Silesia where the local revenues would be amply sufficient.

S de Martino suggested that the Drafting Committee also examine this question at the same time as the question of the expenses of transportation.

General Weygand states that he will be able, with the aid of the Allied Military Representatives, to estimate the expenses of maintenance, and he will communicate that estimate to the Drafting Committee.

(It was decided:

(1) That the note relative to the expenses of transportation of the Inter-Allied troops of occupation for plebiscite areas should be referred to the Drafting Committee for examination and report;

(2) That at the same time the Drafting Committee, after receiving from Marshal Foch an estimate of the expenses of maintenance of the Inter-Allied troops and Commissions in the plebiscite areas, should determine by whom such expenses should be borne in case the local revenues were not in all cases sufficient.)

5. M Berthelot informs the Council that a telegram has been received from Sofia saying that the Bulgarians are prepared to sign the Treaty without any conditions whatever. Mr Stambouliski is anxious to be present at the signature of the Treaty, but as he is just leaving Sofia he will not reach Paris for several days. He (M Berthelot) thinks there would be no harm in awaiting M. Stambouliski’s arrival before proceeding to the signature of the Treaty, all the more so as there were several details still to be settled. For instance the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government which had to sign the Austrian treaty before signing the Bulgarian treaty, is prepared to sign the former when the question of the distribution of tonnage had been adjusted. The Council had also decided that certain clauses were to be inserted in the Bulgarian Treaty relative to the neutrality of Switzerland.

(It is agreed that there is no objection to awaiting the arrival of Mr Stambouliski before proceeding to the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty.)

6. M Berthelot informs the Council that according to a telegram from Prague the Czechoslovak troops have already been ordered to evacuate the mining district of Salgo Tarjan without awaiting a prior reimbursement of the Czechoslovak Government for expenses incurred by it on behalf of Hungary. Dr Benes had desired to remain in occupation of two points in the neutral zone by way of guarantee, but if the Council does not agree with him he is not prepared to insist.

7. General Weygand reminds the Council that at its meeting of November 4th it had approved the communication sent by Marshal Foch to the German Government relative to the interruption of railroad traffic in the occupied regions of Germany. The German Government had complied with the terms of this communication. Therefore, the day before Marshal Foch had consented to allow certain reductions in railroad traffic in the occupied territories. The matter was at that time settled satisfactorily to both sides.

8. M Berthelot informs the Council that a telegram from Belgrade has announced that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government is ready to sign the Austrian Treaty as soon as the distribution of Austrian commercial tonnage had been adjusted.

S de Martino states that he has been informed the previous day that his Government and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had reached a complete agreement on this point.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

11-13-19, 07:49 AM

13th November 1919

Speeches given by Adolf Hitler: Munich, Eberlbrau - Hitler's second public speech - hecklers were violently ejected. 130 attended.

Vickers Vimy Heavy bomber about to embark on the first aerial trip from Britain to Australia (the journey takes 28 days): © IWM (Q 73244)
https://i.postimg.cc/j5XZfXTY/EJLl-WOQWk-AAe-Ka-U.png (https://postimages.org/)

Prince of Wales at George Washington's tomb.
https://i.postimg.cc/bwk0bT0V/7-IKDPIk-Xe-Wxib-Qw-Mc-C6ov2-TYrcbhmf5-Zvvh-Em-KPHjp0.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

11-13-19, 11:03 PM

Thursday, November 13, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

M Pichon states that M Clemenceau had asked him to apologize for being unable to be present at the opening of the meeting. He proposes to start with the second item on the agenda, viz; the draft telegram to Sir George Clerk.

1. The Council ha before it a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk prepared by Sir Eyre Crowe.

Sir Eyre Crowe calls the attention of the Council to the last paragraph of the draft telegram. He had thought it necessary to call the attention of the Hungarian Government very specially to the necessity of its troops evacuating the Comitadjes of Western Hungary, which had been given to Austria by the Treaty of Saint-Germain.

(It is decided to approve the draft telegram to Sir George Clerk.

2. The Council has before it a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 3rd and a note from the British Delegation dated November 11th.

Sir Eyre Crowe states that the Supreme Council at its meeting of November 1st had decided to obtain the advice of the Drafting Committee on the draft note prepared by the Aeronautical Representatives in answer to a communication of the German Government dated October 12th. The Drafting Committee, having alluded to the fact that the question was already covered by a paragraph of the protocol to be signed by the German Plenipotentiaries, had concluded that it was useless to send that note. Since then, the question had again been discussed by the Aeronautical experts and the Drafting Committee. They had come to the conclusion that the protocol did not cover all the violations which the Germans had committed under that heading. Under these conditions it appeared advisable to reply to the German note of October 12th, and he thinks that it will be necessary to put the question once more before the Drafting Committee.

S de Martino agrees that Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposal is very opportune. It is a most important point which they should not leave in the air, and he insists that the proposal of the British representative be taken into consideration.

Captain Roper says it is indeed extremely advisable that the views of the Supreme Council on that point should be made clear. There are, however, two ways of proceeding: they can either reply directly to the German Armistice Commission, or confine themselves to sending instructions to General Masterman. The draft instructions can be sent immediately, but the Drafting Committee is of the opinion that it would be advisable to await the coming into force of the Treaty before answering the Germans.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the Drafting Committee might prepare at the same time draft instructions for General Masterman and a reply to the German Armistice Commission, which will be sent at a later date.

Mr Polk wishes to ask to what extent the Germans can dispose of their aeronautical materiel, balloons, Zeppelins, etc.

General Groves states that the Germans cannot dispose of anything which might be considered military or naval aeronautical materiel.

Mr Polk inquires who is the court of appeal on the military or naval character of that materiel?

General Groves answers that it is the Aeronautical Commission of Control.

(It is decided to entrust the Drafting Committee to prepare in agreement with the technical experts.

(1) Draft instructions for General Masterman;

(2) A reply to the German note of October 12th, concerning German aeronautical materiel.)

3. The Council has before it a draft letter to the German Delegation regarding elections in Upper Silesia.

Mr Polk says that the elections which have just taken place in Upper Silesia are partly favorable to the Poles. Would it not be inadvisable under these circumstances, to oblige the Plebiscite Commission to hold these elections in all cases null and void?

M Laroche says he has asked himself the same question. The Polish Press considers those elections a great success for the Polish cause. The German papers, however, bring out the fact that the Poles had not obtained half the votes recorded. From a legal point of view it seems difficult to annul the elections only in part; he thinks it better to stick to the principle of declaring all elections void. The Plebiscite Commission might take on the spot all necessary administrative measures to maintain, in extraordinary cases the election in certain municipalities.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that Mr Polk’s observation might be satisfied by changing the last paragraph. They might use instead of saying, “That the Powers will consider as null and void”, the words, “That they will hold themselves entitled to consider null and void, etc.” On the other hand, the Powers wished this note to put an end to the exchange of correspondence with the Germans on that question. He therefore thinks it more advisable to omit the paragraph beginning with the words, “in this connection the observations, etc.”; as a matter of fact that paragraph contains allegations of fact which the Germans will be tempted to answer. If this omission is approved, the fifth paragraph beginning with the words, “It is, however, a matter of surprise, etc.” might well be placed at the end of paragraph 2 which begins with the words, “if the Versailles Treaty, etc.”

(It was decided to approve the draft letter to the German Delegation concerning municipal elections in Upper Silesia, with the following changes:

(1) Omission of paragraph 4, beginning with the words, “In this connection, etc.”

(2) Paragraph 5, beginning with the words, “It is, however, a matter of surprise, etc.” should be placed at the end of paragraph 2, which begins with the words, “If the Versailles Treaty, etc.”

(3) In the last paragraph replace the words, “that they will consider as null and void” by the words, “That they will hold themselves entitled to consider null and void, etc.”

4. The Council has before it a letter from General Nollet to the President of the Conference, dated November 1st.

Colonel Rote reads and comments upon the letter from General Nollet.

Sir Eyre Crowe says this is an important question, and he wishes to know if the proposal made by General Nollet had the approval of the French Government.

M Pichon said that the French Government had confined itself to communicating the letter of General Nollet to the Council without taking any position in the matter.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the questions with reference to the organization of these Commissions had been discussed very thoroughly and the draft which had been finally arrived at was the result of a compromise. It had been decided that the allowances would only be given in virtue of the function exercised by the officers, without taking into account their rank or situation. This question was an important one because its solution affected the problem of Reparations. If they now decided to give special allowances to officers on the ground that they were General Officers or because they were the senior representatives of their country, they would be departing entirely from the principles followed up to this time. He would very much like to have the opinion of the French Government on that point, on the one hand because the French element was very strongly represented on the Commissions of Control operating in Germany, and because, on the other hand, it had seemed to him that the French Government is opposed in principle to any measure calculated to diminish the Separations fund. Should the Council be of the opinion that the request of General Nollet should be answered, he personally would not oppose it, but he wishes to point out that they would be committing themselves to a new principle on a question which affected the problem of Reparations.

(At this point M Clemenceau enters the room.)

M Clemenceau agrees with Sir Eyre Crowe that it is advisable to adhere to the ruling which they had previously fixed. The arguments given by General Nollet do not seem very convincing. They had decided to remunerate, not the rank or situation, but the function, and he does not believe that there is any reason to change their attitude on that point.

Colonel Roye said that it was to be feared that, on account of the existing high cost of living in Germany, the allowances to officers mentioned in the letter of General Nollet might not be sufficient.

S de Martino says it is understood that no negative conclusion will be arrived at on this day, and that the question should be referred back to General Nollet for further information.

M Clemenceau said General Nollet’s proposal does not seem to him to have sufficient grounds; but if he gave the Council some better arguments in a further note, he personally would not object to examining the question anew.

(It is decided to adjourn the question raised by the letter of General Nollet dated November 1st, pending further information to be furnished by him.

5. The Council has before it a draft note to the Romanian Government prepared by M. Berthelot.

M Berthelot reads the draft note.

M Clemenceau wishes to inform the Council that he has been asked to receive General Coanda and Mr Antonescu; he will receive them that afternoon, and he intends to confine himself to advising them to accept without further delay all the demands which were formulated by the Conference.

Mr Polk asks whether, in making reference in the second last paragraph of the letter to: “arrangements to be concluded with Hungary, Bulgaria and Russia” they did not seem to commit themselves to giving Bessarabia to Romania, in the event of the latter country complying with the Council’s demands.

M Berthelot does not think so; the question certainly had been discussed by a Commission which had come to the unanimous decision to give the whole of Bessarabia to Romania, but the Council had not taken any decision to that effect, and its liberty of action remained unimpaired.

M Clemenceau states they will wait before taking a final resolution until all the delegates have received their instructions.

Sir Eyre Crowe states he has already received his.

Mr. Polk thought that the instructions he already had gave him sufficient authority to accept the draft under discussion. He would, however, let the Council know his decision at the next meeting.

S de Martino says that, as far as he is concerned, he expects to receive his instructions that very evening. He feels the greatest confidence in the outcome of the interview which M Clemenceau would have that afternoon with General Coanda and Mr Antonescu. He expresses the hope that M Clemenceau will speak to them with the firmness which he so well knows how to employ, and feels certain that he will obtain the results the Council desires. General Coanda is very intimate with Mr Bratiano and capable of having a good influence upon him. He wonders whether it is wise to discuss, as they are doing in the draft before them, the behavior of Romania during the war. They are running the risk of starting a polemic, for Romania will certainly be sure to answer that she had herself been abandoned by Russia.

M Clemenceau remarks that they also had been abandoned by Russia, which had not prevented their carrying on the war to an end. Three months before the Bucharest Peace he had warned Mr Bratiano that he was committing his country to a disastrous policy. Mr Bratiano had protested that he would never conclude a separate peace, a protest which had not prevented his doing so.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks whether a period of six days is not a little short.

M Clemenceau replies he thinks there was a point in giving the Romanians a rather short period; they will thus bring them to ask for a prolongation which the Council would grant. But the very fact of their having asked for a prolongation would, as a matter of fact, commit the Romanians to an answer.

S de Martino thinks it will be necessary to impose upon the Romanians a definite time for the evacuation of the Hungarian territory to the east of the Theiss.

M Clemenceau wishes to know whether the Council would give him authority to acquaint unofficially the Romanian delegates he is to see that afternoon with the draft under discussion.

Mr Polk says he will very willingly give this authority, especially as this document seems to him remarkably well drafted.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks what their attitude will be should the Romanian delegates, after having been unofficially acquainted with the draft note, ask for a postponement of the official communication of the note.

M Clemenceau thinks that they should in any case send the note as soon as it has been definitely approved.

(It is decided to authorize M Clemenceau to communicate unofficially to the Romanian delegates the substance of the draft note to the Romanian Government.)

6. Mr Polk wishes to ask, as a matter of information, whether the situation has been modified since the Luxemburg question had been discussed in the Council. He had been informed that the British Government had recognized the Government of the Grand Duchess.

M. Clemenceau has not heard that there had been any such recognition on the part of the British Government. Great Britain had only sent a representative to the wedding of the Grand Duchess. He would, however, be glad if Sir Eyre Crowe would acquaint himself with the exact situation. The situation as between France and Luxemburg was as follows: The majority of the Luxemburgers was favorable to a “rapproachement” with France, but the French did not wish to commit themselves to a policy which might involve them in difficulties with Belgium. As for the present Government of Luxemburg, the Grand Duchess is German by birth, and he believes, by sympathy. She is, however, obliged at this time to appear very Francophile. There are no present difficulties between France and Belgium on the general question. The only question in dispute is a certain railroad administered by the Alsace-Lorraine Railroads, which Bismarck had taken away from France in 1871. The Belgians are claiming this railroad, which the French cannot give them. This is a very small difficulty, which furthermore, is on the point of being settled. It is essential that the Principal Powers should act in accord concerning the recognition of the present Luxemburg Government.

M Berthelot says the Belgians have asked the French whether they intend to recognize the Grand Ducal Government. They had answered it is for the Belgians first to take a decision on that point. The Belgians then said they preferred to abstain provisionally from recognizing the Government of the Grand Duchess, and the French have based their attitude upon the Belgian. The sending of a representative by the British Government to the wedding of the Grand Duchess had been a mere act of courtesy. Nevertheless from information they had received, it would appear that there had been at the same time recognition of the Luxemburg Government by Great Britain.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he will get information on the subject and communicate it to the Council.

(The question is then adjourned.)

7. Mr Polk wishes to say a few words to the Council on the question of German oil tank ships. On September 27th, the Supreme Council by a vote to which he was a party, had decided to ask the Germans to deliver the 14 German oil tank ships which were lying at Hamburg. Since that date he had several times discussed the question with Sir Eyre Crowe and Mr Henry Berenger. There was a good deal of feeling in America on the question: for that reason he earnestly wishes that, pending the outcome of negotiations, the ships under discussion should stay where they are. He thinks his proposal will not raise any difficulties, as he hopes to arrive at a solution within three or four days.

M Clemenceau asks what are his objections to these ships being taken to an Allied port?

Mr Polk says that certain declarations Mr Hoover had made had given the impression in America that the fate of these ships was already settled. Out of that arose the question which was the object of the negotiations then in progress.

Sir Eyre Crowe states that in the protocol submitted for the German signature the Council had confirmed the decision of September 27th by asking the delivery of all these ships, without specifying them by name. It does not seem possible to ask the Germans now to keep these ships; that would be to publish a difference of views between the Allies. It is to be hoped, however, that the Germans have not yet delivered the ships in question. If by chance they had already done so it would be sufficient to instruct the Naval Armistice Commission to retain these ships without doing anything with them for the moment. He hoped Mr Polk would not see any objection to this procedure.

Mr Polk says that the record of the meeting of September 27th shows that those ships were to be delivered to the Allies, but did not specify under what conditions the temporary operation of these ships should be regulated. He fears that if these ships are to be delivered by the Germans in the Firth of Forth a wrong interpretation of this measure would spread in America.

M Clemenceau asks that the discussion be adjourned to the following day.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

11-14-19, 10:15 AM

14th November 1919

Aftermath of War

Romanian troops evacuate Budapest.

Admiral Kolchak’s Siberian Army begins to retreat form Omsk to Chita in the face of advancing Bolshevik troops, starting the Great Siberian Ice March. Thousands die during the march due to attacks and the cold.
https://i.postimg.cc/mZMBy0nS/EJV4i-Sa-Xk-Acs9zp.jpg (https://postimg.cc/t7XKXmp1)

The Prince of Wales, Secty Daniels, Asst. Secty. of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Rear Adml. Scales Commandant [i.e., Commandant] of the Naval Academy reviewing Naval Cadets at Annapolis.
https://i.postimg.cc/28zMLMNy/EJV4i-Sa-Xk-Acs9zp.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Ship Losses:

No. 4 (Soviet Navy Red Movement) Russian Civil War: The armed pontoon had to be beached to prevent sinking in the Volga Estuary after a torpedo launched from a White Navy coastal motor boat exploded on the river bottom beneath it.
No. 7 (Soviet Navy) Russian Civil War: Medvezhyegorsk Operation: The gunboat was shelled and damaged by White artillery in Lake Onega and beached, scuttled by retiring Soviet troops to prevent capture.

Sailor Steve

11-14-19, 12:27 PM

Friday, November 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. M Clemenceau reports his conversation of the previous day with General Coanda and Mr Antonescu. They had asked that the period for a reply be extended from six to eight days inasmuch as they declared that they were able to assure him that within that time the Supreme Council would receive a favorable answer without qualifications, from the Romanian Government. They had also asked that the sentence dealing with the conclusion of peace, while a Romanian army of 400,000 men was still in the field, be expunged. His impression is that the Romanians are really ready at last to give satisfaction on all points. He thinks that when so doing they might try to discuss the question of the Minorities Treaty, but he does not think that they will offer serious resistance on this point and that any such discussion will really amount to nothing.

S de Martino reminds M Clemenceau that at the previous meeting he had expressed the greatest confidence in the outcome of the interview between M Clemenceau and General Coanda and Mr Antonescu, and he is glad to see that his confidence has in every way been justified.

M Clemenceau replies that it was as a result of his association with his Italian colleagues that he had acquired diplomatic skill. He suggests that a decision as to sending the draft note to the Romanian Government be postponed until all the delegates had received the instructions of their Governments.

(This suggestion is agreed to.)

2. Mr Polk desires briefly to summarize the present status of the question of oil tank ships. On September 27th, after the matter had been discussed at several prior meetings, the Supreme Council had decided to allocate the tankers in accord with the plan of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive. At that time he had accepted and joined in the decision without being fully aware of the purport of the prior discussions and of the attitude of his Government. The position taken by the United States is that behind this question the ultimate and beneficial ownership of the tankers was a question for the Reparation Commission. The remaining question, which is the troublesome one, is as to the temporary allocation of these tankers. Messrs Davis and Hoover had thought that this latter question had already been decided in a sense contrary to that of the decision of September 27th, which had temporarily allocated these vessels between Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium. When that decision had been communicated to his Government it had protested against it because it felt that this was contrary to a decision already taken. He now wishes to suggest that pending a final decision, which he hoped would very shortly be arrived at, nine of the fourteen tankers in question be allowed to remain where they were so that there would be no change in the situation. He wishes to explain the reasons for this suggestion. There is a great deal of feeling in the United States, and if the temporary allocation decided upon by the AMTE were to be put into effect it would cause his Government great embarrassment. If the decision of September 27th could be rescinded, and the tankers could be held where they then were pending a final decision, the shipping question he thinks will become very simple.

M Clemenceau asks why only nine of the tankers are spoken of. How many are there?

M Berenger replies that there are fourteen.

M Clemenceau inquires why Mr Polk had raised the point with respect to only nine of them.

Mr Polk explains that nine of these tankers are claimed by a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company.

M Clemenceau says that he understands that no question was raised as to the temporary allocation of the other five tankers.

Mr Polk says that that is the case.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that a formal demand had been made upon the Germans to deliver these tankers. Furthermore, in the protocol drawn up for their signature, the point of the undelivered tankers had been specifically brought up. With respect to the attitude to be taken towards the German Government it seems to him quite impossible to modify this demand which had already been formally made. The Germans had been playing for time and counting on dissension between the Allied and Associated Powers. If the Germans have not yet delivered these tankers, and do not do so within a week or two, Mr Polk’s views will be partially met and the situation will be facilitated. If the ships have been delivered he is willing in deference to Mr Polk’s urgent representations to agree that the decision of September 27th be modified, but only to the following extent: if the tankers have been delivered to the Armistice Commission they should remain in the hands of the Armistice Commission instead of being temporarily allocated in the manner theretofore decided upon by the AMTE.

M Berenger reads the decision of September 27th. This decision had been arrived at unanimously after a long and careful study of the question.

Mr Polk says that is not so as far as he was concerned.

M Berenger mentions several instances showing that the United States Representatives on various Committees had been thoroughly familiar with the question in all its phases. Mr Polk himself had had the questions put on the agenda on September 23rd. Previously there had been a full discussion at a meeting at which Mr Dulles and others had been present. Telegrams had been exchanged and certainly the question was one of such importance that the United States Government must have been fully aware of it. As soon as the decision had been made known great pressure had been brought to bear both in New York and Berlin. The first effect of that pressure was that the Shipping Board had committed an act of violence in holding up the steamer Imperator and other passenger ships in contravention of the decision of the Supreme Council. Furthermore pressure had been exerted in Berlin to keep the tankers in Hamburg and not have them go to the Firth of Forth. This pressure had been brought by the Standard Oil Company which claimed the ownership of the stock of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft. In October 1914 the tanker Leda had been taken by the British as a prize of war and condemned by a Prize Court, but thereafter, as a result of American representations, this ship had been given up by England to the American Government for the Standard Oil Company. The Leda had been given up by the British Government as a result of the Standard Oil Company’s claim of ownership of the stock of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft. Twenty-seven other ships of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft in United States ports had been recognized as belonging to the Standard Oil Company, and judgments of competent courts had affirmed the Standard Oil Company’s ownership of the stock in question prior to the time the United States entered the war; but the contention of the United States that the tankers now at Hamburg were in the same situation could not be sustained. He had heard rumors from well informed sources, that before the United States entered the war, i.e. in 1916, the Standard Oil Company had alienated its stock-holdings to a German concern. He agrees with Mr Polk that the question of final ownership of the tankers can only properly be settled by the Reparation Commission. He wishes to emphasize the fact that the solution of this question was most pressing; in fact it was vital inasmuch as some 50 thousand tons are involved and the scarcity of petroleum is world wide. On the other hand he agrees entirely with Sir Eyre Crowe with respect to the present disposition of these tankers. It will obviously not do to let the Germans see that there is still dissension on this point between the Allied and Associated Powers, dissension resulting from a question of private ownership and interests. The German need for petroleum had been recognized and that difficulty had been settled. The Germans had only begun to emphasize their lack of petroleum in July and they had requested the use of ships to remedy the existing scarcity. The Supreme Council had decided that these tankers could circulate under the Inter-Allied flag for one voyage; it had been thought that this would supply the German needs. He takes note of what Mr Polk had said regarding the feeling of the United States but he wishes to point out that before any concession can be made to the views of the United States Government the Shipping Board will certainly have to release the Imperator and the other passenger steamers which are being illegally retained in United States ports. The questions are closely connected. If the Shipping Board releases the ships referred to the nine tankers in question might go to the Firth of Forth and be held there until a final decision on this question is reached. In the meanwhile, the other five tankers should be disposed of pursuant to the decision of the AMTE relative to their temporary allocation.

Mr Polk does not wish to take up the Council’s time by replying separately to all the points raised by M Berenger, but he feels obliged to make a few remarks. Of course he also feels that it is advisable not to show that there is any lack of solidarity between the Allied and Associated Powers but he feels that as far as this question was concerned the Germans are well aware that there is a division of opinion. The question of the ultimate ownership of the tankers is a technical and an involved one, which should be decided by competent courts and the Reparation Commission. With regard to the rumored sale by the Standard Oil Company of the stock of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft that was far more than a rumor; in fact it had been referred to by the United States representatives in reports submitted by them to their colleagues on Commissions. The question to be settled is what the legal effect of that sale is.

M Berenger says that that is the first time he has known definitely about that sale.

Mr Polk says that he means the sale of the shares of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft, and he wishes to point out that said sale had not been recognized by the Alien Property Custodian who had seized the German securities. This had been set forth in a note presented by the United States representatives. It is not within his province to discuss the propriety of the action of the Shipping Board; what he wishes to point out is that his Government feels, rightly or wrongly, that the question of title had been discussed long ago and that because such a question existed, the ownership of these tankers had not been settled, nor had the allocation thereof been settled at Brussels. The matter had been brought up at London where the United States was only informally represented; then it had been referred to the Supreme Economic Council at Brussels, where the United States is not represented at all. At that time it had been unknown to him that an agreement existed covering the division of passenger ships and tankers between Great Britain and France, and that the allocation made depended thereon.

M Berenger says that he had not heard of any such arrangement between Great Britain and France.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he would have something to say on that point.

Mr Polk says that this agreement contemplated the delivery of passenger ships to Great Britain and tankers to France; he understands that a French company had been formed to enter the oil carrying trade. He is not stating these facts with any desire to engage in a controversy. He merely wishes to show the feeling which exists in the United States. He had not been fully informed of all the points of discussion in this controversy, although as to that he is not seeking to present any excuses, but he could not help feeling that the other countries concerned had been fully aware of the delicate nature of the questions under discussion. The question had arisen in the French Chamber and a modification of the temporary allocation decided upon had been discussed. Public opinion in America had looked upon this as a permanent change in the allocation, contrary to the understanding which Mr Hoover thought had been reached. He repeated that the Germans knew that there was a division of opinion on this question. He himself had done his utmost to see that the Protocol to be signed by Germany should not specifically mention these tankers. He only asks that the tankers should remain where they re. He wishes to inquire if M Berenger means to say that if the Imperator and other passenger ships are not released by the Shipping Board the tankers should be allocated according to the decision of September 27th.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks that it is a notorious fact that whenever the question of oil is touched upon, great difficulties result. With reference to the German knowledge of the division of opinion between the Allies, he thinks he cannot agree with Mr Polk’s point of view. A first decision had been taken and formally notified to the Germans. They had then received information from Standard Oil Company sources that no attention need be paid to this decision.

Mr Polk says that this is something that he did not know.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that from the information in his possession, he feels sure that it is so. There had then been further discussion in the Supreme Council and the Germans had been a second time instructed to deliver the tank ships. The Germans had been aware that there had been disagreement prior to that final decision, but they did not know that such disagreement had continued thereafter. The situation is not now as Mr Polk thinks, and the question has become one of the honor and prestige of the Allied and Associated Powers in the eyes of the Germans. Mr Polk had made two statements which it seems to him might be interpreted as raising a question of the good faith of the British Government and to these, of course, he must object. The first statement is Mr Polk’s reference to a decision taken at a meeting of the AMTE in London where the United States was only informally represented, and the subsequent reference of the question to the Supreme Economic Council at Brussels where it is known the United States is not represented. He wishes to point out that the decision to hand over the ships was taken at a meeting at which a representative of the United States was present. The matter was then referred to the Supreme Economic Council. The suggestion therefore was that the decision had been arrived at over the heads of the Americans. He would emphasize that the proposal to refer the matter to the Supreme Economic Council was made by the United States representative himself with the implication that the United States would accept. He does not wish any possible impression to remain that the decision at Brussels was the result of taking advantage of the United States not being represented there.

Mr Polk says that of course he had meant to imply nothing of the kind.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the second point referred to by him is the alleged secret agreement between the French and British Governments.

(He then reads from a letter received from the Ministry of Shipping on the subject).

There is no such agreement in existence. There is an agreement between Mr Kemball Cooke and M Loucheur in regard to allocation of passenger steamers which is perfectly plain and above-board. In fact, Mr Cooke had announced it himself to the AMTE and had it circulated to all the Delegates with the Minutes. The following wording occurred in that agreement: “in consideration of the allocation to France of the tank steamers as decided by the AMTE.” Sir Eyre Crowe presumes that Mr Polk is referring to that clause. If so it is a mare’s nest, as that simply refers to the withdrawal of Great Britain’s claim to certain tank steamers which was disclosed by the first examination of the percentage due to her on a rigid ton for ton basis in comparison to losses. As a matter of fact no bargain is possible with the French as neither are they in a position to make one nor are the British in a position to guarantee the delivery of the tank steamers. All the British had said was that they would not claim what they considered their just proportion of the tank steamers. The French Oil Shipping Companies were, of course, preparing for the management of these tankers. As it is now five weeks since the Supreme Council had allocated a considerable proportion of the steamers to France it does not seem unreasonable that the French should have been making preparations to take them over.

M Berenger points out that the agreement is dated November 10th and can therefore have had no effect on the decision taken by the Supreme Council on September 27th.

Mr Polk says that he had not claimed that the agreement was a secret one but had merely said that he had not known of it.

Sir Eyre Crowe says the whole trouble is that the United States claimants would not admit that the allocation is purely temporary; they wish to mix it up with the question of permanent ownership. He now finds himself in a difficult position. The question had been raised of the 10 passenger steamers illegally held by the Shipping Board in the United States. He wishes to remark that though there might be considerable feeling in the United States the indignation in England was even greater. He has just received peremptory instructions from his Government to submit the following decision to the Supreme Council: that the Supreme Council should now address a formal demand to the United States Government that the 10 passenger steamers illegally retained by the Shipping Board in United States ports should be immediately released. He had not wished to present this question at that session, but as the matter of the retention by the Shipping Board of 10 passenger steamers had been raised, he feels obliged to inform the Council of the instructions he has received.

M Clemenceau points out that public opinion in France is also greatly aroused over this question.

Mr Polk says that Sir Eyre Crowe had felt that he had laid great stress on his statements with respect to the fact that the decision reached by the Supreme Economic Council at Brussels was taken in the absence of American representation, and with respect to the formation of French Oil Shipping Companies. He wishes to remind the Council that he was only stating the case as it was seen in the United States, whether rightly or wrongly. It was, of course, not his intention to make imputations of any kind; he merely wished to show that public opinion in America felt that a decision had been taken at Brussels when the United States had not been represented there.

M Clemenceau asks why the United States had not been represented on the Supreme Economic Council at Brussels?

Mr Polk explains that since Mr Hoover had left American representation on the Supreme Economic Council had ceased. With respect to the formation of French Oil Shipping Companies the impression existed in the United States that these Companies were being formed to use ships to which United States interests had a valid claim.

M Berenger says that as far as he knows no French oil shipping companies had been formed.

Mr Polk says that their formation had been reported in the French press.

M Berenger replies that that was no more accurate than a great deal of other information appearing in the press.

S de Martino says that he does not wish to go into detail, but he desires to make a general observation. A good deal has been said about the impression that the Germans would have as to dissension among the Allied and Associated Powers on this question. He feels that on this occasion not only will the Germans receive such an impression but they will, for the first time, profit by it, and the prestige of the Council will be very badly affected. There is no country which does not have a very great interest in this question. Oil is badly needed everywhere and it is most injudicious to keep these tank steamers in idleness. He thinks that public indignation will surely be aroused if the impression is created that these ships are not being used as a result of a theoretical discussion. He fully agrees with M Berenger with respect to the nine tankers; that is to say, that they should go to the Firth of Forth and remain there until a final decision can be reached; while the other five tankers should be allocated according to the decision of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive.

Mr Polk says he will cable his Government with respect to this point.

M Clemenceau points out that the only point of agreement is that the ownership of the tankers in question should eventually be determined by the Reparation Commission. He agrees with Sir Eyre Crowe that the question raised by the action of the Shipping Board in the United States should not be taken up at this meeting. He thinks it would be better to have the nine tankers go to the Firth of Forth until a final decision is had on the question. He appreciates the difficulties of the United States Government and wishes to be of assistance to it as far as possible, because he thinks it was not ultimately responsible for what had happened. He wishes to point out, however, that with respect to the United States, the question is fundamentally one of private interests, whereas in France and England the question was one of general interest which affected everybody. Under these conditions he feels that private interests should give way. He trusts that when Mr Polk, as he had said he would, sends a telegram to his Government relative to the suggestion that the nine tankers should go to the Firth of Forth and stay there until a final decision had been reached on the matter, he would at the same time take into consideration the view he (M Clemenceau) had just expressed, and that feeling in France and England was as fully aroused as it was in the United States.

Mr Polk wishes to make it clear that his Government’s solicitude is not for the Standard Oil Company; his Government feels that a matter of principle is involved. He thinks that the Standard Oil Company did not consider that the present administration was in its favor.

3. The Council has before it three joint notes from the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions relative to the plebiscite in Teschen.

M Laroche reads and comments upon the joint report of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions consisting of these three joint notes.

(It was decided to accept the recommendations of the joint report of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions relative to the plebiscite in Teschen, contained in the three joint notes.

4. Mr Polk explains that Colonel Haskell, Inter-Allied High Commissioner for Armenia, is leaving Paris that night and that prior to his departure he thought it would be well for him to give the Council a brief summary of the conditions in Armenia. Situation in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan

Colonel Haskell informs the Council that the three republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are at daggers drawn with each other on almost all points. Georgia and Azerbaijan have perhaps some slight degree of good feeling towards each other, evidenced by a loose defensive alliance concluded between them as a protection against a possible advance southward of General Denikin’s army. Armenia refused to join this alliance. Political and economic conditions in each of the three countries are in as bad a condition as can be imagined. He wishes to point out that these three countries have been arbitrarily carved out and delimited. The only railway system from the Black Sea through to Persia traverses all three of these republics and any one of them has it in its power, under present conditions, to paralyze traffic. Aside from the animosity existing between these states, further material difficulties have resulted from their arbitrary delimitation: for instance, all the railway repair shops are in Georgia and all the fuel for the operation of the railway system comes from Baku in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, between these three republics there are various contested districts, and neutral zones which have been marked out by the British, which it had not been possible to change because they gave rise to such burning questions that no change can be adopted until all three republics are consolidated under one administration. He has been entrusted by the Supreme Council with representing it in Armenia, but he cannot efficiently carry out the necessary work as long as Georgia and Azerbaijan remain without his jurisdiction. Moreover, owing to the fact that these two latter republics do remain without his jurisdiction, an anomalous situation is presented. Thousands of inhabitants of Azerbaijan are receiving relief in Baku and other localities, and the same is true of many Georgians at Tiflis and other points; though those destitute people are entirely dependent on the relief they receive, the Relief Administration has no control whatever over the local administration. If all three republics were put under one administration the neutral zones referred to could be eliminated, and a definite frontier temporarily fixed. Such a solution would preclude the existence of a situation such as now exists, where a large number of Armenians find themselves within the political limits of Georgia. The Georgians will not feed them because they were of Armenian nationality, and on the other hand, the Armenians refuse to give them any assistance inasmuch as they were living within the territorial limits of Georgia. There are no foodstuffs available anywhere, and all three of the republics are virtually living on the salvage of the Russian collapse. Economic life was at a standstill. Practically nothing can be imported inasmuch as the money of all three of the republics have no purchasing value. The Caucasian ruble, which should be worth 51 cents was now only worth about 1 cent, and it had actually been found impracticable to issue paper money in smaller denominations than 10 rubles because the value of the paper was greater than the money. Foreign merchandise shipped on the railroad through to Persia is liable to be requisitioned by any one of the three Republics, as their need for everything is so great. The most essential need perhaps, is to control the system of through railway transportation. In Armenia alone some 800,000 destitute are being relieved and about 15,000,000 francs per month is being spent on this relief work. Armenians in foreign countries do indeed attempt to send some relief to their starving countrymen. Although those supplies get through the ports of Batum and its surrounding territory, where the British have an efficient administration, they are held up at various points in the interior by the Georgian authorities, and the same situation applies to all railway traffic.

Mr Polk explains that the Council has sent Colonel Haskell as its representative for relief work in Armenia and Colonel Haskell feels that it is necessary for him to have the same functions in Georgia and Azerbaijan in order to efficiently accomplish his mission. That matter can be settled later when the experts have been heard. As Colonel Haskell is leaving Paris this night, he (Mr Polk) thinks that it might be of interest to the Council to hear his views.

M Clemenceau thanks Colonel Haskell for his presentation of the question.

(At this point Colonel Haskell leaves the room.)

5. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation relative to measures to be taken to remedy the dearth of rolling stock in Austria.

M Pichon suggests that the British note be referred to the Committee on Organization of the Separation Commission.

(It was decided to refer to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission the British note relative to measures to be taken to remedy the dearth of rolling stock in Austria.)

6. The Council has before it a proposal from the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Upper Silesian Coal.

Major Aron reads and comments upon this proposal.

General Le Rond suggests that paragraph 2 of the proposal of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Upper Silesian coal be modified so as to provide that the requirements of Upper Silesia should first be satisfied.

(It is decided to adopt the draft decision submitted by the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Upper Silesian coal, after modifying it so that the end of paragraph 2 should read as follows:

“A - To Upper Silesia: The tonnage which the Commission shall judge suitable to attribute to it.
- to Austria: 200,000 tons per month.
- to Poland: 250,000 tons per month.

B - To Germany: The surplus.”)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

11-15-19, 07:27 AM

15th November 1919

Rail transport: The golden spike is driven and construction of the San Diego and Arizona Railway is completed at a cost of $18 million. (J.D. Spreckels drives the "golden spike" on the San Diego & Arizona Railway)
https://i.postimg.cc/4N3hJb2h/Mx-VFUvy-A6-Q4ndwvh59-Yn-Flj-FZXeos-Ik-Z6h-FXk-xupp8.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

11-15-19, 09:47 PM

Saturday, November 15, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. Sir Eyre Crowe states that the drafting of the resolution of November 11th concerning the status of Eastern Galicia does not seem to him to agree entirely with the decision which had been actually taken by the Council. He had understood that their decision was an absolutely final one and the Polish Delegates would be heard, not by the Council, but by the Commission.

M Clemenceau does not agree with Sir Eyre Crowe on that point; if his recollection is correct, the text of the resolution quite agreed with what they had decided. It was understood, however, that the hearing of the Polish Delegates would only be an act of courtesy on the part of the Council. Their declarations would have no influence on the Council’s decisions, and should not take more than one-half to three-quarters of an hour.

M de Saint Quentin stated that in accordance with the resolution of November 11th, the Secretary General had informed the Polish Delegation that Mr Patek would be heard by the Council as soon as he arrived in Paris, and had insisted on the extreme urgency presented by the question of Eastern Galicia.

2. The Council had before it the draft note to the Romanian Government, inserted in the minutes of November 13th.

M Berthelot reads the draft note.

Mr Polk asks whether it would not be advisable to refer, at the end of the third paragraph, to Sir George Clerk’s Mission at Bucharest.

M Berthelot says that, so as to take into account Mr Polk’s remark, which appears to him quite justified, one might insert at the end of the third paragraph the following phrase: “in order to show the importance which the Conference attached to obtaining the reply of Romania, it had even entrusted a special delegate, Sir George Clerk, to go to Bucharest.”

M Clemenceau states that in recognition of the good-will shown by General Coanda and Mr Antonescu in the interview he had with them two days previous, he proposed to omit in paragraph seven the words: “the time when Romania still had under arms an army of over four hundred thousand men.” He also suggested granting to Romania a period of eight days to make its answer known instead of six days which they had proposed to give them in their original draft.

Mr Polk suggests adding in Section 3 (on top of page 4) the following words: “under the conditions shown by the note from the Supreme Council, dated October 12th.”

Sir Eyre Crowe proposes a change of form in the second last paragraph of the draft which he thinks would read better as follows: “As far as the fixing of frontiers yet to be effected is concerned, Romania will thus, by its own conduct, forfeit all title to the support of the Powers, as well as the recognition of its rights by the Conference.”

S de Martino says that he finds himself in a rather embarrassing situation. He had received his instructions, but these were not quite clear. He was told on one hand, not to oppose the Allies in the question of sending the note to Romania, and on the other, not to subscribe to expressions which were too strong, and which would lend it a character of violence or of threat. As a matter of fact this draft threatened the Romanians with a diplomatic rupture. Under these circumstances he had asked Rome for new instructions which he hoped to receive that day. He would like to know if Mr. Polk had already received his instructions.

Mr Polk says he is ready to accept the draft which was then before them.

M Clemenceau says it is extremely important that they should vote that very day. The immediate dispatch of the note is necessary all the more because they are sure, according to the declarations made to him by the Romanian Delegates that their demands would be accepted.

S de Martino states he had also received the Romanian Delegates. The latter had come away with the very best impression of their interview with M Clemenceau and of the manner in which he had explained the situation to them. They had also told him that a misunderstanding had arisen between Sir George Clerk and Mr Diamandi on the question of the evacuation. The Romanians consider their retreat to the Theiss only as a first step towards the evacuation of Hungarian territory, and do not intend in any way to stop short on that river for a protracted period. They had also expressed themselves as ready to sign the Austrian Treaty. As for the rectifications of frontiers which were asked for by the Romanians, they were of very secondary importance, and concerned chiefly the Commissions of Delimitation on the spot. He wondered whether, taking into account the good-will which the Romanians seemed to show, they might not subdue some of the expressions which were used in the draft note under discussion.

M Clemenceau feels obliged to remark that he had read the draft note to General Coanda and Mr Antonescu. It therefore seems to him, under the circumstances, extremely unfortunate to change in the draft anything at all except the phrases concerning first, the Romanian forces still under arms at the time of the Armistice, and second, concerning the period within which they demanded an answer - a period which they had agreed to extend from six to eight days. He had himself let the Romanian Delegates hope for the granting of these two concessions. He does not think that they ought to make any further concessions, especially as General Coanda had already left for Bucharest to report on the situation with reference to the communication which he (M Clemenceau) had read to him.

S de Martino hopes his instructions would arrive in the course of that afternoon and that he could make known his final answer between 16:00 and 17:00. He feels certain, moreover, that he will receive authority to accept the note which was before them.

Mr Polk feels that a new delay in the dispatch of the note would be extremely unfortunate.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the note should be sent as it had been read to the Romanian Delegates. S de Martino might let his Government know that there is, properly speaking, no threat towards Romania as they were virtually certain that the Romanians will accept their demands. Should the note not be sent immediately, the Council will be giving the Romanians the impression that the Allies are hesitating.

Mr Polk maintains that the Council has already used towards the Romanians language quite as severe.

S de Martino points out that the acceptance of the note by General Coanda and Mr Antonescu commit only themselves. The Council does not know for certain what will be the attitude at Bucharest.

M Berthelot remarks that the same thing had taken place concerning the Council’s note of November 7th. The Italian Minister at Bucharest, alleging that he had not received direct instructions from S Tittoni, had refused to join in the step taken in concert by his colleagues.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the British Delegation had received similar information from its representative at Bucharest.

S de Martino says that the Italian Delegation had, as a matter of fact, telegraphed to its representative at Bucharest to associate himself with his colleagues.

M Clemenceau proposes to dispatch the note to Romania immediately. If the Italian Delegate cannot accept that note, it would suffice to send a telegram to the Italian Representative at Bucharest advising him to abstain from joining his colleagues.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks what decision would be taken with regard to publishing the note.

M Clemenceau says he had promised in the course of his interview of November 13 with the Romanian Delegates to support in the Council the non-publication of the note. The Romanians had made a formal promise. He thought that they should take their good-will into account and not crush them under the blow of a publication, the effect of which in Romania would certainly be very serious.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks they are not sure that Mr Bratiano will appear as conciliatory as General Coanda.

M Clemenceau states that if Bucharest offers any difficulties the Council will then be free to publish the letter, and that, even without the toning down upon which they had decided that day. It should not be forgotten that General Coanda had answered for the King of Romania.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he is quite ready to associate himself with the views the President had just expressed. They ought, however, to take care that the Romanian Government should not take advantage of their silence to present the facts to Romanian public opinion in a false light.

S de Martino remarked that the telegram to which he had referred previously and which directed the Italian Minister at Bucharest to join in the step taken by his colleagues was dated November 10th, 00:47.

M. Berthelot says that as the note of the Allies was dated November 7th, the slight misunderstanding which had taken place was easily explained by the interval of three days which occurred between the note and the telegram.

(It is decided to adopt the draft note to the Roumanian Government.)

S de Martino makes the reservation that his final approval of the note will be made known in the course of the afternoon. If the instructions received by the Italian representative should not allow him to adopt the note, the Italian Minister at Bucharest will receive telegraphic instructions to abstain from associating himself with the step taken by his colleagues.

(It is further decided not to publish, for the present, the note addressed to the Romanian Government.)

3. Mr Polk reads the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council on July 5th on the subject of Colonel Haskell’s mission. He proposes to add after the word “Armenia” the words, “Georgia and Azerbaijan”. The Council had heard at the preceding meeting Colonel Colonel Haskell’s declarations. He simply wished to submit this proposal to the Council without insisting that it should be accepted.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he has submitted this question to his Government. He thinks he can already say that they would not object to the extension of Colonel Haskell’s mission for the organization of relief in Georgia and Azerbaijan. He would, however, call to the attention of the Council the fact that in the resolution which had just been read Colonel Haskell is entitled High Commissioner. He wishes to make his reservations on that title all the more so as he did not think that it corresponds with the functions with which Colonel Haskell has been entrusted.

Mr Polk says as the British are already represented in those regions, he proposes that Sir Eyre Crowe be good enough to submit a draft resolution at a later meeting.

S de Martino says that the Italians also have officers in the Caucasus. He will therefore consult his military experts, but he can already say that he is in favor of the American proposition.

(It was decided that Sir Eyre Crowe, after consultation with the competent experts, will put before the Council a draft resolution extending the powers already conferred upon Colonel Haskell for Armenia to include Georgia and Azerbaijan in matters concerning relief work.)

4. M Clemenceau says that it is advisable to take up as soon as possible the important questions which still remain to be decided by the Council. He wishes to ask whether they should not examine the list of questions on the agenda of the Council which had been drawn up by M Berthelot.

5. Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to call attention to the urgency of taking a decision concerning the provisioning of Vienna. Their information depicts the situation of the Austrian capital in a terrible light. To enable the Austrians to buy food, it seems necessary to grant them a loan. But he thinks the guarantee for this loan should be a charge upon the Reparations Fund. That is an important question which the Reparation Commission ought to deal with immediately.

M Clemenceau asks whether it does not rather concern a financial commission.

Mr Polk says the Reparation Commission is already acquainted with the question. Mr Rathbone had cabled Washington to explain the situation and to ask how far the American Government would consent to be committed.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that if immediate measures are not taken, it is to be feared that there will be from 300,000 to 400,000 dead that winter in the streets of Vienna. The Austrians realize the situation and are resorting to every possible means to get money. They are at the moment engaged in selling their art collections, pictures, jewels, etc, a procedure which is, as a matter of fact, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty.

M Berthelot says it is correct that the Austrians have tried to sell their “objets d’art”, but in fact they have not managed to sell anything with the exception perhaps of a few isolated objects. He had, moreover, seen Dr Benes, who had also depicted the situation at Vienna as tragic. He had stated that if the Powers were willing to help him, he would be in a position to send coal and food to Vienna.

M Clemenceau says that Dr Benes might be asked to discuss the question in agreement with the Reparation Commission.

(It is decided:

(1) To refer to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission for examination and report the problem of means to be adopted to ensure the provisioning of Vienna;

(2) That Dr Benes be asked to make known to the Committee his views on the subject.)

6. M Berthelot summarizes Sir George Clerk’s telegram, dated November 13th. He says that the information conveyed in this telegram is not very reassuring, and it seems that the formation of a coalition cabinet is making the situation more uncertain than ever.

M Clemenceau wishes, in that connection, to say a few words concerning the attitude of Admiral Troubridge. No one contests the fact that the Admiral is a distinguished and capable man, but he is a partisan of Archduke Joseph. He has a right to be, but he wonders whether the Admiral is not going a little far in following his preferences, which apparently are not those of his Government. The information he is giving on Admiral Troubridge’s attitude comes from an excellent source and he wonders if it is not advisable for the British Government to take this situation into account, all the more so because the Admiral’s influence throughout Hungary is considerable.

Sir Eyre Crowe says the Admiral has received instructions to comply with the policy of Sir George Clerk. He will not fail, however, to take up the question raised by M Clemenceau.

7. Mr Polk says he would have an important statement to add to the declarations he had made at the preceding meeting on the oil tank ships, but as the French and British experts are not present, he proposes to adjourn this question to the next meeting.

8. M Berthelot says that in the question of distribution of enemy ships, the naval experts have not yet succeeded in arriving at a complete agreement. He thinks that an understanding will be made easier if the Council hears the question, inasmuch as the differences of views which existed seemed to him of slight importance.

M Clemenceau says that they can put the question on Monday’s agenda.

9. M Berthelot says that they have informed the Serbs that they will not be authorized to sign the Bulgarian Treaty until they had signed the Austrian Treaty. The Serbs have answered they cannot sign the Austrian Treaty before the question of the distribution of Austro-Hungarian tonnage has been solved. That question can be discussed on Tuesday, for the British expert will then have received his instructions.

M Clemenceau thinks that if that question is settled on Tuesday, the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty can be set for Wednesday or Thursday.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna

11-16-19, 09:27 AM

16th November 1919

Elections are held for the first Belgian Parliament since the Great War. The Socialist and Catholic Parties each hold 70 seats in the Chamber of Representatives but the Catholic Party holds the edge in the Senate.

Hungarian Republic (1919–20): Admiral Miklós Horthy entering Budapest as the head of the National Army on 16 November 1919. He is being greeted by city officials in front of the Hotel Gellért.
https://i.postimg.cc/DzfMWJtD/EJf-Gx-Ov-Ww-AEc98w.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Alfred Werner, Swiss Chemist who won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1913, has passed away.
https://i.postimg.cc/bNHgQYHj/EJb-CMNYWw-AEBSgd.png (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

11-16-19, 10:34 AM

Sunday, November 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna

11-17-19, 07:48 AM

17th November 1919

A Renault tank converted to be used as a snowplow in Paris.
https://i.postimg.cc/zGrjQjRs/EJk-QW8-WWw-AABSHr.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

General elections are held in Italy, with the Sociality Party led by Nicola Bombacci receiving the most votes and seats.
https://i.postimg.cc/FKFxrHpG/EJk-QW8-WWw-AABSHr.jpg (https://postimages.org/)

Sailor Steve

11-17-19, 07:01 PM

Monday, November 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a note from the French Delegation, a historical résumé of the question by Captain Fuller and a new British proposal dated November 14th, 1919.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he has asked the British naval representative to summarize the proposals made by the British Admiralty, which he hopes will be approved by the Council.

Captain Fuller reads and comments upon the Historical Summary on the distribution of enemy war-ships, and upon the new British Proposal.

M Clemenceau wishes to ask whether this proposition which had just been read is an entirely new one?

Sir Eyre Crowe replies that it is. The American and French Delegations had discussed this proposition but had not read the new text. The Italian naval expert had read the proposition and agreed with it.

M Clemenceau says it is impossible for him to make up his mind on a proposition which is quite new to him; he should first have to discuss the proposition with his naval experts.

Mr Polk asks Captain Fuller with reference to paragraph 3 what could prevent any country breaking up ships allotted.

Captain Fuller explains it is a question of labor and of shipyard facilities.

Mr Polk also asks why battleships, etc., should be loaned for one year.

Captain Fuller replies this is for experimental and propaganda purposes. The percentages laid out in the proposition are based only on information in their hands; other countries can furnish their own figures and it will be possible to come to an agreement.

M Clemenceau asks that the further examination of this question be postponed until the next day as he wishes to examine the question closely with his naval experts.

(The question is adjourned until the next day).

2. Mr Polk states that in the discussion which had taken place at the meeting of November 14th he had omitted to bring out an important point and wished to make the record complete. He had omitted in his discussion to go into the history of the question. Originally it had been agreed that all the German ships should be turned over to the Allies, who were to use them to furnish to Germany food which she needed, the charges to be attributed to the Reparation fund. At a meeting which had taken place at Brussels it had been voted that the 14 German oil tank ships should not be delivered. The Germans had asked to use these. At that time Messrs Hoover and Davis had talked with their colleagues about the question of letting the Germans get oil; no record was made of these conversations, but the resolution read that temporarily the ships should be exempted from allocation. Since that time the American contention was that the Germans could operate the vessels under the Inter-Allied Flag and with an Inter-Allied representative on board, but it had been said that this could not be done. According to his information their records showed that exceptions had been made and that the Germans had operated certain ships with German crews on board, for instance: The Fritz von Straus from Hamburg to Hull, the Kehrweider and the Paul from Hamburg to New York, to obtain oil, also a number of other ships in the Baltic Sea, also certain ships used in the Mediterranean to repatriate German prisoners. In the discussion which followed the Scapa Flow sinking the question again came up; they maintained that it was not contrary to the Allies’ views to let the Germans operate these ships to bring oil to Germany. On July 13th the question was again discussed in the Reparation Commission; but on August 15th the President of the ANAC had cancelled the exemption without giving notice to the United States representative until the following day. The United States had always questioned that decision. The difficulty arose in this way: their understanding was, first, that the ships should be exempted to get oil and secondly that the ships could be operated by German crews under the Inter-Allied flag and with an Inter-Allied Representative on board. They held further that other German ships had been given a free sailing to Constantinople and other ports. They had taken this to constitute a precedent.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that it seems to be a question of whether or not German crews should be used on these steamers. He confesses it puzzles him very much why the American Government insists upon the use of German crews. He asks what inspired that policy.

Mr Polk says that was the original American view and that contracts for transporting oil to Germany should be carried out.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that oil could reach Germany without using German crews; there must be another reason.

Mr Polk says there is no mystery about this. It is simply the question of the disposal of the ships: they wanted to let the Germans have a temporary use of the ships until the permanent title was decided upon.

Sir Eyre Crowe maintains that the United States’ position amounted to ignoring the unanimous decision of the Supreme Council which had attributed the temporary management to the Allies.

Mr Polk repeated the view of his Government that the question had been discussed and agreed upon at Brussels.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that he must insist that at the time of the decision the Germans had made no demand for oil. The Allies did not take these ships simply because they had no need of them.

Mr Polk regrets the unfortunate situation created by the lack of minutes; there were the recollections of Mr Hoover on the one hand and those of his colleagues on the other.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that with regard to the precedents which Mr Polk had cited, he wishes to make the following remarks. First, in the Baltic, the Germans had long been allowed to navigate. As for the particular case of the Fritz von Straus, this is a ship of only 800 tons: There is very little interest to the Reparation Commission in this boat on account of its small tonnage. As to the other ships mentioned, it would be easy to ascertain the reason for their operation, and probably their small tonnage was again the reason. As for the German ships in the Mediterranean, that is a different question; the crews are Turkish and not German. The Supreme Council, as a matter of fact, had decided that the Allied Naval Armistice Commission was wrong and insisted on taking those crews off and putting on the Inter-Allied flag in place of the German. Under these conditions it appears that the precedents cited by Mr Polk do not carry much weight. He emphasizes the fact that he had received formal instructions from his Government that these ships should not sail with a German crew. No other position could be taken by the British Government.

S de Martino states that he has no objection to the first trip being taken, even with German crews on board, provided that the final distribution of these ships should not be prejudiced by this trip, and as a matter of fact, the final distribution belongs to the Reparation Commission.

M Clemenceau then reads a telegram from Admiral Goette to ANAC, dated November 15th, from which it appears that the Germans had informed the Allies that steps were being taken for the delivery of these steamers. That appeared to him to be a decisive fact which did not leave them any choice. What impression would the Council give to the whole world if it were to let the Germans keep these ships at that time? There seems to him to be two questions. First, there is the question of final ownership which the Council had agreed should be settled by the Reparation Commission. There remains the question of operating the ships. He does not quite understand the position of the United States. What objection do the Americans have to an Allied rather than a German crew? He personally sees a very grave political and moral objection to German crews being used which he thinks is even more important than the economic objection. There have just occurred at Berlin demonstrations in favor of Hindenburg which are of a disquieting nature and had given a great deal of trouble to the German Government. These seem to bear the marks of a Nationalist uprising. Therefore would it be opportune to let those ships sail with German crews and under the German flag? For himself, he had the greatest objections. There is no doubt whatsoever that the Principal Powers had pledged themselves to stand by the decisions of the Reparation Commission; that was full security for America. He therefore earnestly requests Mr. Polk to accept Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposal so as to not make the situation more difficult. It seems to him all the more important to come to an agreement on this question as there are a number of vital matters to be settled with the Germans, such as the delivery of guilty individuals. Should the Germans be allowed to operate these ships there would be general stupefaction in France. He has often shown readiness to make concessions, but always on one condition that public opinion should understand them. This would not be the case in the present instance. He understands there might be some American emotion on the subject, but he feels sure that America would understand France’s position in the matter and he hopes that secondary considerations which moved American opinions would give way to the stronger, and, to his mind, more justified feeling of public opinion in France.

S de Martino states that in view of the strong case presented by M Clemenceau he is ready to agree with his views.

Mr Polk remarks that M Clemenceau’s declarations carry much weight and he also sees that the use of the German flag at this time might be misconstrued in France. They maintained however, that an arrangement had been made which had not been carried out. He also wishes to point out that his position with his Government made it difficult for him to give his entire approval to the Chairman’s views. As he understands the proposal which Sir Eyre Crowe had made at a preceding meeting, the 14 oil tank ships were to go to the Firth of Forth; 5 were to be operated, and 9 were to remain there until a compromise had been reached. He would recommend that proposal to his Government. He wishes, however, to have the Council take note of the feeling in the United States on the question of the allocation of these vessels. He had not put up an imaginary case; they did not agree and had not accepted the present system of distribution. He refers to the last sentence of the telegram from the British Ministry of Shipping to the British Delegation and he wishes to ask Sir Eyre Crowe whether this phrase does not sound like a threat.

Sir Eyre Crowe explains that the phrase occurred in an Interdepartmental telegram and represented simply the attitude of the Shipping Controller which was uncompromising.

Mr Polk asks whether it is not advisable to instruct the Naval Armistice Commission that no disposition of these 9 oil tank ships be made at this time.

S de Martino wishes to ask what is to be done with the other 5?

M Berenger replies that according to his information only 11 ships remained which therefore would leave only two for the Allies.

S de Martino adds that should this information be correct it would be very serious for Italy, as she had counted absolutely on sharing the 5 ships with France and Belgium to remedy the scarcity of oil fuel.

M Berenger wishes to point out how important it is to prevent a further waste of these tank ships considering the shortage of oil fuel in Europe. Mr. Dulles, an American representative on the Committee of Organization of the Reparation Commission, had written to M Loucheur on August 28th protesting that such a waste of fuel oil should not be permitted. Since that time these ships which could carry 60,000 tons could have made two trips and thus been able to bring 120,000 tons of fuel oil which had been lost to the Allies and Germany as well. If Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposal were to be sustained by the Council, that would mean a continuation of this waste for three months or more as the Reparation Commission would not be taking a decision in the matter until then. The explanation of the Brussels meeting given by Mr. Polk could not be accepted. If Mr Hoover had promised the Germans to give them exemption in favor of certain ships in order to get them oil, this was something that the Allies had never heard of and it did not figure in a single Allied record. On March 29th M Clementel had written, as President of the Supreme Economic Council, a letter which clearly showed that the Germans at that time were not in need of fuel oil, and he was not aware that an agreement had been reached between Mr Hoover and the Germans. The Germans had emphasized on July 30th for the first time their need for fuel oil, and the real reason for exempting those tank ships had been that at that time there was sufficient tonnage in the way of tank ships. He could not tell whether the rumor were true that there had been an agreement between Messrs Hoover and Davis and the Germans, and that a part of the payment had been made by the latter without any knowledge of the Reparation Commission.

Mr Polk states that there had been no secret agreement between Mr Hoover and the Germans. He could assure the Council of that.

M Clemenceau asks how it comes that there should be at this time such a need for oil tonnage when a few months previous that tonnage had been sufficient?

M Berenger explains that the use of fuel oil had been authorized recently by a law which had been passed by the French Parliament. This law had resulted in a great demand for fuel oil all the more as there was a great shortage of coal, and oil was needed for lighting, heating and transportation. He had asked the Standard Oil Company for tank ships and had been told that not a single one could be spared.

M Clemenceau asks M Berenger to let him have the exact figures of the needs of France and Italy in fuel oil.

M Berenger says he will.

M Clemenceau hopes that in the cable which Mr Polk will send his Government submitting Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposal, he will also point out the needs of France and Italy, and ask it to take into consideration this aspect of the question.

Mr Polk says he hopes they can reach a compromise on the distribution of those ships.

M Berenger says that they have considered the question of using a part of these German oil tank ships after a first trip by the Standard Oil Company.

M Clemenceau says he trusts Mr Polk would explain the whole question to his Government with his customary liberality.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks he had based his proposal on Mr. Polk’s hope of arriving early at an arrangement.

Mr Polk agrees.

S de Martino says he had just been informed that there actually were fourteen tank ships in German ports which would therefore leave five ships instead of the two which M Berenger had previously spoken of.

M Berenger says there are nine oil ships claimed by an American corporation. There were two boats according to his information at the disposition of the Allies.

M Clemenceau says they will await the result of Mr Polk’s cable for instructions.

Sir Eyre Crowe summed up that meanwhile they would instruct the Allied Naval Armistice Commission in the sense of his proposal.

(It is decided:

(1) To instruct the Allied Naval Armistice Commission to take delivery of the German oil tank steamers for the Firth of Forth;

(2) To retain the nine oil tank steamers claimed by American interests without using them pending a further decision by the Council;

(3) That the remaining ships be delivered for temporary management to the Allied and Associated Governments according to the decision taken by the Allied Maritime Transport Executive September 7th, 1919;

(4) That Mr. Polk, while agreeing to the three above points, reserves to himself the right of again raising the question in the event of not obtaining his Government’s approval;

(5) That Mr. Polk should call his Government’s attention to the very urgent needs of oil by France and Italy, which make necessary an immediate decision on the temporary allotment of the German oil tank ships.)

3. The Council has before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk dated November 13th.

Sir Eyre Crowe reads and comments upon Sir George Clerk’s telegram. This telegram shows that Friedrich is very obstinate and that the formation of a coalition cabinet met with great difficulties. Sir George Clerk had felt it necessary to inform Friedrich that his mission would come to an end if the present situation continued. He, Sir Eyre Crowe, had also read a telegram in the Morning Post that a coalition government had been formed at Budapest and would assume office. However, he had only seen this in the newspaper; and it seems that Mr Polk had received a telegram from General Bandholtz stating that the situation is still very acute at Budapest, and that Sir George Clerk has declared he would have to leave.

M Berthelot alludes to declarations which the Hungarian War Minister had made on the entry of the National Hungarian Army in Budapest. These declarations are of a purely monarchist tendency and are clearly in favor of the return of Archduke Joseph.

Mr Polk says that from a telegram he has just received from General Bandholtz, Admiral Horthy is making a number of arrests and that Sir George Clerk and the Inter-Allied Military Mission threaten to withdraw if these arrests are continued.

M Clemenceau thinks it advisable to await further information before doing anything.

(The question is then adjourned.)

4. M Clemenceau states that Mr Venizelos had made a protest against the declaration in the letter which the Supreme Council had recently sent to him to the effect that the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks should have a temporary character. He would like the question brought up at the next meeting as he did not wish such a statement to go unchallenged.

5. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation dated November 14, 1919 on the subject of Detention in the United States of Ex-German Passenger Vessels Allocated to Great Britain for Management.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he feels all the more embarrassed at raising a subject which he knows is likewise embarrassing to his American colleague especially after the conciliatory spirit just shown by Mr Polk; he is obliged, however, to bring it up according to the instructions he had received. He believes it was not claimed by anybody that the Shipping Board had any right to retain the ships in question, but unfortunately, perhaps on account of the President’s illness which gave opportunities of administrative independence, nobody seemed to be in a position to give the Shipping Board the necessary instructions. Possibly also the Board was confusing this question with that of the oil tank-ships and was adopting an attitude which seemed to him one of mere retaliation. The need for these ships is very acute. A very large number of passengers are awaiting transportation. Civilians, including business men, could not go to the East this year owing to the lack of passenger vessels. The vessels in question have enormous tonnage and include the Imperator, a ship of over 50,000 tons. These vessels had been temporarily allocated to the United States for the repatriation of its army. As it had been unanimously decided at a meeting of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive in July 1919 that all the Steamers under discussion should be allocated to Great Britain for management, British crews had been sent to New York to bring them back but the Shipping Board had refused to give them up. The State Department agreed with the British Government but said it had no authority over the Shipping Board. The British Government had instructed him to present this memorandum to the Supreme Council believing that a resolution of the Council would oblige the Shipping Board to deliver the vessels and that it might help the American Government to get over the difficulty.

Mr Polk says that he cannot quite agree with all Sir Eyre Crowe had said on the subject. It seems impossible for the Council to arrive at a resolution, which requires a unanimous vote, as he can hardly be expected to join in a formal request to his own government. He will, however, cable to Washington Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposal and state that such a resolution is before the Council.

(It was decided that the American Delegation will cable to Washington the resolution proposed by the British Delegation to the effect that the Supreme Council address a formal request to the United States Government to hand over without delay, to properly appointed agents of the British Government, the passenger vessels illegally detained in United States ports.)

6. The Council had before it the report of the Special Committee.

M Laroche reads and comments upon the report. He adds that the paragraph on page 56 of the report relating to the credentials of the Ambassador should be modified in accordance with the present attitude of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers toward Germany.

Mr Polk states that the United States is not now in a position to send representatives, but he will make no objection to the report.

(It is decided to accept the report as presented by the Special Committee, it being understood that the credentials of the Ambassador should be modified to agree with the attitude of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers toward Germany.)

7. The Council has before it a note of the Drafting Committee on the question of Instructions to General Masterman Regarding the Disposal by Germany of Aeronautical Material.

M Berthelot reads and comments upon the proposed instructions.

(After a short discussion it is decided to accept the report of the Drafting Committee relative to instructions to be sent to General Masterman on the disposal by Germany of Aeronautical material.

8. The Council has before it a note of the Drafting Committee on the subject of a signature by the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Romania of the Financial Arrangements of St. Germain.

M Berthelot reads and comments upon this note.

(After a short discussion it is decided to invite Romania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State to sign the two financial arrangements along with the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty.)

9. The Council has before it a note from the Austrian Delegation dated October 31st, 1919.

(After a short discussion it is decided to approve the request made by the Austrian Delegation regarding the return of Austrian prisoners from Serbia.)

(The meeting then adjourns)