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#1 |
Fleet Admiral
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Well the debate on whether it was "good or bad" to drop the atomic weapons on Japan has been going on since 1945 and will probably continue.
One thing I do want to point out is the fallacy that there were only two exhaustive and exclusive options. 1. Use Atomic weapons 2. Invade Japan. There were other options being considered that warrant mentioning 1. Blockade and contain Japan. The islands of Japan were never "officially" blockaded. But through normal military anti-shipping operations, submarine and air forces effectively blockaded the islands of Japan. One option was to step up this blockade and contain the Japanese forces and influence until capitulation. 2. Invade Korea. This option would have been used in conjunction with the blockade option. Many of the heavy military industries, to include a nascent nuclear weapon program, were located in Korea. Invading and controlling Korea would paralyze what was left of the Japanese military industry and could have lead to capitulation. 3. Invasion and occupation of the island of Hokkaidō. Hokkaidō was less populated than the island of Honshū as well as less defended. An occupation of Hokkaidō would have allowed the US forces to post land based bombers and extensive fighter support for nonstop conventional bombing. It is quite correct that the Japanese were ready to "fight to the death" but that would only apply if we allowed the war to go in that direction. It is most difficult for Japanese military and citizens to "fight to the death" if we don't directly fight them (classic Sun Tzu). Invading the island of Honshū would have incensed the population and would have greatly boosted the influence of Prime Minister Tojo. It is worth noting that while Tojo enjoyed great popularity at the start of the war, by 1944 he had fallen out of disfavour with the government and the military. A war of isolation, containment, and starvation without the patriotic fever of defending the motherland from direct invasion might have lead to the Prime Minister stepping down or being removed. I won't get into whether it was good or bad to drop the atomic weapons on Japan. I just wanted to point out that there were other options other than 1. Invading Honshū 2. Dropping the Atomic weapons. However, from the United States standpoint, there was one good reason for using the Atomic weapons on Japan. People in the United States were getting real tired of the war. It was costing the US mucho money and lives and people were tired. FDR recognized that after almost five years, the citizens were losing patience with the government. If you review the newspapers of the time, it is surprising at how unpopular the war was in 1945. Things were not all that swell back home politically. The Democratic party, while willing an unprecedented fourth term, was garnering less and less popular votes every term. The use of the Atomic weapons were a viable way of bringing the war to a quick end. It is possible that the decision to use the Atomic bombs was more political vice military.
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abusus non tollit usum - A right should NOT be withheld from people on the basis that some tend to abuse that right. |
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#2 |
Silent Hunter
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One comment Platapus, Tojo was no longer PM in 1945 but an Admiral Suziki IIRC.
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#3 | |
Fleet Admiral
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#4 |
Eternal Patrol
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Not to belittle the discussion or make light of it, but when I saw the title I did a double-take. My first thought was "WHAT! Not again!"
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#5 | |
Fleet Admiral
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#6 |
Stowaway
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Not convinced that race had any significance in the decision to drop the bomb and am sure that there would have been no hesitation on Pres. Truman's part to use it on Nazi Germany had it been required. Playing the race card in retrospect ignores the huge cultural gulf between the American and Japanese ways of warfare in WW2. One can forgive the American's for having open disdane for Japanese civilians since the advent of the Special Attack forces was pretty graphic evidence that the Japanese had little regard for their own people's lives. The horrific mass suicide of civilians on Saipan was ample proof (at the time) that civilians and soldiers were one and the same as far as the Japanese were concerned.
Why should US planners ignore the junta in Tokyo openly threatening to meet any invasion with "100-Million Bayonets" and school girls being trained to fight with bamboo spears? Adm Halsey's 1942 injunction to "Kill Japs, Kill Japs and Kill More Japs" made solid military sense as did the dehumanizing propaganda practiced on both sides. When faced with an enemy that is culturally predisposed to fight to the death your choices become kill them or quit. By Summer 1945, quitting was not an option for the USA. There was ample bigotry on both sides but I do not think that it was a factor in the decision to use the Bomb. There were too many legitimate reasons for and few compelling arguments against employing it as they did. "I believe that we must use any means possible to end this terrible War. Then we can all be friends." attributed to MGen U.S. Grant, 1862 |
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#7 | |
Fleet Admiral
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If you follow the data trend back then, dropping the bomb was the only option to end the war quickly. The hindsight data is nice, bet the generals didn't know that till after the fact. Plus, there was a coup, where the hardcore Japanese generals were not going to surrender. The Germans were whipped, and their leaders knew it was pointess to go on. The japanese were still fighting like they were going to win the whole thing.
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#8 | |
Legend of the Sea
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By ending the war quickly the US and England could effectively keep Russia from claiming any of the "spoils of war".. which undoubtedly is a good thing. Look what the situation was in Germany after the war (West/East Berlin etc..), Imagine what the situation could have been like in Japan! The US knew that the Soviets were going to be one of the biggest problem in the post war world, and ending the war before the Russians were invested in the Pacific theater was a deliberate agenda. |
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#9 | ||
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#10 |
Stowaway
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Nikimcbee opens the door to an aspect of the atomic bombings that is almost entirely ignored when discussions about the 'rights' and 'wrongs' are conducted. I think that some major issues tend to be overlooked or merely given lip-service.
1. The stratigic bombing of cities was considered a legitimate military operation in a total war setting. The Allies placed the morality of the policy on the back-burner as it were, and I believe that at that time and place, they were entirely correct in doing so. By extension, the use of the Bomb on Hiroshima an Nagasaki constitued a more efficient application of firepower and was fully in accordance with the doctrine in effect at the time. The events should be considered in that light. 2. The awful examples from 1945 acted as a vivid reminder to leaders whenever a finger got itchy on the nuclear trigger throughout the Cold War. How much of a deterent would there have been at say Berlin or Korea or Cuba without the world having the images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki burned into it collective consciousness. What would have happened in subsequent crisis' without the lessons of the atomic bombing's placing a restraining hand on the decision makers? Employing the small and dirty Fat Man and Little Boy probably prevented first use from being later, thermonuclear and hundreds of times larger. No one nuclear test shot (and there were some 800+ surface tests) comes to mind when one thinks about using nuclear weapons but the images from Hiroshima and Nagasaki certainly do. 3. One of the great myths of the event was that there was no third bomb. Several Fat Man assemblies were at Tinian and the fissil material for the next bomb (target Kokura Arsenal for 15 August) remained in the United States when Pres. Truman forbid the next attack. This happened before the formal acceptance of Potsdam by the Japanese and is evidence that the nuclear weapons paradox has already started to kick in. The paradox is that this most powerful of weapons is essentially useless and employing them at all constitutes an excellent example of a zero-sum decision. Every year about this time the use of the Bombs comes under scrutiny using contemporary morals, rhetoric and 20/20 hindsite and this will likely continue until somebody nukes another city. I do believe however that the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were big, although greatly understated factors in the Cold War not turning hot. Good Hunting |
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#11 | |
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