New independant study opposes US candidate's views on Afghanistan

[Skybird]

Originally Posted by UnderseaLcpl

I give it 10 submerged nonrates out of 10.

Submerged nonrates...? Are these dangerous?

[UnderseaLcpl]

Only if you think Undersealcpls are dangerous. Which they aren't. They're more likely to harm themselves than anyone else.

[Skybird]

Think I get an axolotl for selfprotection, just in case.

[JoeCorrado]

This report is not one that "opposes a candidates view on Afghanistan" - that "interpretation is one of opinion and spin" ~ likely inserted only as an editorial comment in an attempt to satisfy the seeming bias of the thread starter. There is no basis for that editorial and not once through the entire report is such a position stated or insinuated.

It is also a less than helpful introduction to an otherwise enlightening read. Having made that point clear at at the outset, lets take a closer look:

The decision to invade Afghanistan was one that carried overwhelming support in the U.S. and around the world. The time for that debate has long since passed.

The question for today is one of focus and providing the needed assets for the military to get the job done. And in that regard we really have no choice- we must take whatever steps are necessary for our miltary's success.

Terrorist groups from upper-income countries are much more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and much less likely to be motivated by religion.

Obviously al Qaeda defies the neat set of Rand Rules from the very start.

Most terrorist groups that end because of politics seek narrow policy goals. The narrower the goals of a terrorist organization, the more likely it can achieve them without violent action—and the more likely the government and terrorist group may be able to reach a negotiated settlement.

al Qaeda does not seek a louder voice in politics. Had this been an attempt to form or influence a government that would agree to their every demand and operate as they wished, they would have been happy with the Taliban Government in Afghanistan and that would have been that.

Against terrorist groups that cannot or will not make a transition to nonviolence, policing is likely to be the most effective strategy (40 percent). Police and intelligence services have better training and information to penetrate and disrupt terrorist organizations than do such institutions as the military. They are the primary arm of the government focused on internal security matters.

The idea of a police force that could end the groups existence also is less than applicable in this case since we are talking "international" terrorism, not that of a local or national variety.

Since the "preferred" methods, or the traditionally more effective methods will not be affective in this case- we are left asking the question; What is the most effective means of putting an end to al Qaeda? The answer is provided early on in the report:

Militaries tended to be most effective when used against terrorist groups engaged in an insurgency in which the groups were large, well armed, and well organized. Insurgent groups have been among the most capable and lethal terrorist groups, and military force has usually been a necessary component in such cases.

We are not talking Red Brigade, or even PLO here- we are talking al-quada. And for a realistic solution to that threat- I suggest that the option selected is the correct one. However, any military action requires a true commitment and a sustained focus to carry it through to it's desired conclusion.

The report then rambles on about how it believes the war on terror should be brought to a successful end... hypothetically and in a perfect world with unlimited resources that could be scattered one would assume, "cohesively and effectively" throughout the world:

Since al Qa’ida’s goal remains the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate, there is little reason to expect that a negotiated settlement with governments in the Middle East is possible. A more effective approach would be adopting a two front strategy.

First, policing and intelligence should be the backbone of U.S. efforts. In Europe, North America, North Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, al Qa’ida consists of a network of individuals who need to be tracked and arrested. This would require careful work abroad from such organizations as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as their cooperation with
foreign police and intelligence agencies.

Or, we could track down the leaders, kill them and in effect cut off the head of the snake. The remnants would then be left as so many separate groups that would lend themselves much better to the mop up operations that would better be handled in more traditional ways- ie; the local police wherever these disorganized and leaderless groups may, or may not choose to continue their efforts.

The fact that we are in Afghanistan now is evident and cannot be changed. The only question is whether we give it the focus and commit the resources to achieve the mission. Sounds like the report agrees 100 percent:

Our analysis concludes that al Qa’ida’s probability of success in actually overthrowing any government is close to zero.

And the reason for the above analysis is because of the U.S. Military presence in Afghanistan. That is a fact and we all should understand that.

Al Qa’ida’s resurgence should trigger a fundamental rethinking of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Based on our analysis of how terrorist groups and, a political solution is not possible.

I don't mind a suggestion that we "re-think our strategies", but having read through all of this only to come full circle was a bit disappointing.

[Skybird]

I think you must understand that Al Quaeda and the Taleban are two different things.

Al Quaeda is before everything else an ideology today, a way of thinking, from which people derive their motivation. It is organised in self-emerging and independant cells, which form and act independently but can as well get support and input from what people seem to perceive as the real terrorist hierarchy or structure. There is a core element of key personnell, but it is not vital, and losses can be easily replaced we have learned in the past 7 years.

The Taleban, on the other hand, are a local problem stationed in Pakistan and Afghanistan, founded by the ISI and the CIA 30 years ago to battle the Soviets in Afghanistan, and also meant as an option for Pakistan's clashes with India over Kashmir.

You seem to imply that Afghanistan could be militarily controlled against the tribes', drug barons' and warlords' will. you are not the first believing that, and you are not the first being wrong in that.for a "military victory", or controlling the country, you would need 7-8 times as many troops as you have now, and we talk of dedicated combat troops without restrictions in their ROE like many european contingnts are operating by right now. What is the probability you ever get that many? I tell you: it is Zero. And even with so many troops I tell you that it is not a givent hat you would control the country. you would only control local strongholds - like the Russians. When russian air dominance was neutralized by giving Stingers to the Mujaheddin, the Russian's happy days were over, and they became a besieged army that could not freely move.

Battling Al Quaeda is an issue for the intel community. Preventing local bombings by small groups, would be an issue for an established police with a good network of informants, and classival counterterrorism operations. Battling the Taleban is an issue for the military. But the Taleban time and again reach save haven in Pakistan - and every Western politican is unwilling to wage war against Pakistan although it is actively engaged in fighting against NATO troops in Afghanistan. Next, there are the fighting factions of Afghans themselves, separated by ethnicities, sometimes having short-living alliances, sometimes fighting againstt here former allies over power, influence, and controlling drug traficking. They pick up a gun, and fight, and then they put it aside, and disappear in the local population, and are farmers again. And finally there are the standing warbands of local warlords. Some of these are so well armed and tough that NATO with its limited firepower does not evade them for no reason, and usually doesnot touch or even threaten the poppy cultivations. These are the groups that drove out the Russians and mostly were responsible for killing hundreds of their tanks. the fights in the Pandjir valley are a recommended item for research. There are literally hundreds of burned Soviet tanks and APCs.

at the same time, drug trafficking goes on, Karzai milks the West for more money (of which more of the half disappears) and enjoys his local - though limited - power in Kabul, corruption is as high as ever, and poppy is the logical choice for farmers to plant for other options they do not have if they want to survive. You say that is a scenario that can be "won" (define "win", please), I say it is a mess where we have nothing to win and always will do the wrong thing. we are sitting in the wrong movie, that simple.

Like Enigma before, you also give me the impression you mix up the empirical description of terror in the past 30 years with the desirable tactic and strategy of how to beat Al Quaeda.

You have to realise that the kind of political structure and government that you want to impose onto Afghanistan is what most people there do not want, and they use heir weapons to make that clear to you. A western democratic model in Afghanistan - I cant express adequately how absurd and off reality I find this conception. Everything - sociology, history, ideology, religion, mentality - speaks against that, nothing speaks for it. It is like speaking about parliamentary democracy in the war-torn Europe of the early medieval. the clash between civilisations, between West and islam, last but not least is a clash between two totally different historic ages, with Islam lagging behind more than 1000 years. and you want Afghanistan, a deeply corrupted and patriarchalic tribal society, to adapt to the standards of a nation that is just 2 centuries and some peanuts old? Can't you see how off reality that is? You want to shortcut 1000 years of social and cultural evolution - by sending more troops to a place whose people are deeply xenophobic and hostile towartds strangers?

I certainly will not convince you, that I have already understood by your past comments. Both McCain and Obama likely will press on for more military in Afghanistan. In ten years we speak again about the mess it has turned out to be, a grave to billions of Western Euros and Dollars and many hundreds if not thousands of western soldiers - and Afghan society still being where it was ten years ago. Only some drug barons and corrupt officials will have made a fortune - at our costs and that of our children.
The initial motivation for attacking Afghanistan could be understood, but after the first battle won, it was a victory that was given away again by focussing oin Iraq and forgetting afghanistan. Now the situation is more messed up than it was after 9/11. there was a chance, and one blew it. Simply that, and nothing more.

[JoeCorrado]

The initial motivation for attacking Afghanistan could be understood, but after the first battle won, it was a victory that was given away again by focussing oin Iraq and forgetting afghanistan. Now the situation is more messed up than it was after 9/11. there was a chance, and one blew it. Simply that, and nothing more.

Afghanistan was botched up because we (The Americans through George Bush and his "personal" project of attacking Iraq) lost focus, withdrew troops, and diverted resources before the mission was completed.

In Afghanistan we had the perfect scenario for an otherwise useless concept- that of NATION BUILDING. We won the war- if war you can call it against the "government" of Afghanistan in short order- but that should have been viewed as the necessary BEGINNING of the mission, and not the mission itself.

You seem to imply that Afghanistan could be militarily controlled against the tribes', drug barons' and warlords' will.

Militarily? No. But the PEOPLE could be given a choice. A real choice by seeding an economy nurturing it through till it can sustain itself. There are possibilities for success, a success that creates alternatives- creates and shares wealth. Even if that wealth, is just the means to survive without turning to "benefactors" like the barons, the taliban or al-quada. - The "ttribes" you mention were in actuality really people just banding together for mutual defense and support- these "tribes" could be the first step in healing the country if the effort were spent in a wise manner. Think in terms of "The Awakening" in Iraq.

The problem with Afghanistan is that no real economy exists- no real choice is available. People will do what they must to survive. We need to provide them with that choice. al-quada depends on hoplessness. When people have no real hope and groups like the taliban through force, or al-quada becuase of hoplessness are able to become an answer for the people then there are deeper issues than war lords and corruption.

I know that the simplified version is just that- simplified- but the "root cause" and the "solution" are both defined.

We could have spent just a portion of the resources, a portion of the military presence and a like amount of true focus in recreating an Afghanistan that could sustain itself free of groups like the taliban, or al-quada. We should have been well down the road to success by now- but no.

You and I likely agree on most of the issues related to the topic- and we certainly agree on America's failure to follow up on the opportunities to have done great good for the people of Afghanistan- where we may differ is that I believe that Afghanistan is still worth doing. Even though we have made the job harder for everybody.

The fools errand that was (is) Iraq notwithstanding.

[Frame57]

Look here! Surely you must know that you fight fire with fire. OK, so we know that these urviles like to live in the mountainous caves. My solution would be to have genetically altered mountain goats rigged to explode. They seem to prefer goats over women, so I think this plan would work. The only problem is that PETA would get their panties in a wedgie over this one too.

[Skybird]

Originally Posted by JoeCorrado

In Afghanistan we had the perfect scenario for an otherwise useless concept- that of NATION BUILDING. We won the war- if war you can call it against the "government" of Afghanistan in short order- but that should have been viewed as the necessary BEGINNING of the mission, and not the mission itself.

Disagree. despite the fact that - what often is forgotten - america pumps more civilian effort in Afghanoistan than any other nation inclduing Germany, germany in the first time was the Afghan-on-the-street's darling - because the Germans focussed on nation building in Afghnaistan earlier than any other. until two or three days ago, the German strategy wa suspeiror to what the more militarily oriented American approach acchieved. But the Taleban came back and started to bring NATO into the defensive. the reuslting ensharpening of the conflict since a long time has ruined the results created by the Germans as well. Which even was not cried about by america an Canada when they demanded the Germans should not focus on thata lone, but instead focus on fighting a war. however, the best preventive thing agfai8mnst the restrengthening of the Taleban would have been to have been successful to form m national mstructures strong enough to convbince afghans that it is worth it to defend them. Becaue nation building failed - today a war needs to be fought again, with no military solution in sight, against an enemy masisvely supported by Pakistan.

germ,any was naive to think that nation building alone is enough. Ameirca was naive to first forget Afghanistan, and next to think that nation-building is not as important as is the military fight. You nee dnation building to cionvince the people to fight for their land, and you need the military to defend the new nation's material structures against the enemy. Once the motivational spark jumps onto the Afghans, you wouild have been able to call back the troops. But this chance has been lost, the window of opportunity is closed now, and since long. pakistan is forbidden target, troops never will be sufficient in levels, the enemy enjoys suppoort by locals as well as he enjoys ideological and motivational superiority. Ba dcards to win a war. I rate it as a lost war since years. The politcal illusions-chasing in Europe and the US does not help to improve the situation.

Militarily? No. But the PEOPLE could be given a choice. A real choice by seeding an economy nurturing it through till it can sustain itself. There are possibilities for success, a success that creates alternatives- creates and shares wealth. Even if that wealth, is just the means to survive without turning to "benefactors" like the barons, the taliban or al-quada. - The "ttribes" you mention were in actuality really people just banding together for mutual defense and support- these "tribes" could be the first step in healing the country if the effort were spent in a wise manner. Think in terms of "The Awakening" in Iraq.

The problem with Afghanistan is that no real economy exists- no real choice is available.

Haven't you just complained about theis museless nation-building above? Now you defend it.

People will do what they must to survive. We need to provide them with that choice.

we neitzher have the moral obligation to do that, nor is it given to us to acchieve that. lats but not least it is a socio-evolutionary thing you talk aboiut: developement of a society that liek you desciobre it so far has not existed in afghnaisatn, in your description. I stoirngly beliefve evolution is more than an intentionally planned procedure. It is more basic, and beyond intention and knowledge. It needs to be experienced, lived and suffered through. so far, Afghanistan is not willing to start for that. They take the Wetsern attention as an opportunity to take from it what is in there for them - and stay like they are. your ambitions are well-meant, but will fail for that reason. you not only fight agai9nst Al Quaeda groups, and the Taleban - you also fight against growing parts of the Afghan population, and slwoly growing hnumbers of their clans and warlords who have different intentions than taklijng over the political plan you want them to submit too. Imn other word - that country and it's people still is not ready for the modern present.

al-quada depends on hoplessness. When people have no real hope and groups like the taliban through force, or al-quada becuase of hoplessness are able to become an answer for the people then there are deeper issues than war lords and corruption.

you ignore the simple fact that the Taleban has been embraced again by parts of the people. they are perceived as enemies by those in the corrupt establishement who are threatend in their corruptness and self-interest by their fioght, namely the government of Karzai that instead prfers to be left alone so that it continue to mil western aid moneys that then disappear for the better part into orivate pockets. that seems queer and absurd, consiedering how much the Taleban were disliked in 2001. But laready late 2002 they were welcome dback in some cities, becasue the few wetsenr tropps were disliked even more, and nthe Taleban ha dlearned to behave more friendly. Bush was talking abiut hearst and minds ö- the Taleban löeanred their lesson and not talked baout it, but won them in many places. that the West failed in improving Afghan's situation, and that many Afghans even suffered and died becasue of the incompetent dilltanticsm of wetsenr policies, did it's own share top drive more Afghans froma ll ethnicities into the arms of the Taleban.

In case you have read my essay, you remember that I stressed that alliances in Afghnaistan are short-living only. This cannot be underlined enough. Never trust in your "aliies" in Afghanistan, it is only a temporary affair, always. And we Westerners will never be truly accepted anyway, we will always be foreigners.

I know that the simplified version is just that- simplified- but the "root cause" and the "solution" are both defined.

We could have spent just a portion of the resources, a portion of the military presence and a like amount of true focus in recreating an Afghanistan that could sustain itself free of groups like the taliban, or al-quada. We should have been well down the road to success by now- but no.

Not even half of the money that was promised in 2002 had reached Afghnaistan on 2006, or 2005, I'm not sure. and the majhorfity ofnthe money that reached thgere, ended up in highly dubious and questionable channels. the little that went to the intended purposes, often was misused for wrong planned, mislead purposes (the grain imprts for example that helped not to strengthen but to ruin the farmers so that they turned to poppy again). If you would have saved even more money being spend, what good would have thta been? and if now you spend more money for this corrupt system, more money owuld disappear in private pockets. you are doomed, no matter what you do, it will be wrong.

the manipulation of the firts Loya Jirga should not have been conducted by then americans. The afghans should have undertstood that this was their nfirst and only chnace to launch into a modenr time. but who should they have known that if there evoltion was lagging behind many centuries? assuming they knew nevertheless, and Afghans had put their heart into it, and ameerica and western financial powers wpould have played it fair and straight - then a very massive, lasting financial investement honstely focussing on what is best for Afghnaistan and not what is best for wetsern powers combined with a boost of troop levels and not a decline but an increase in troop presence could have done the trick. but exactly hte opposite of all these Ifs has been done, and the result is what you have today - a mess.

And pakistan always would jhave been a hostile power, if not for direct selfish interest to influence Afghnaistan then for reason of rpeventing the Indians getting influence there.

Welcome to Absurdistan.