I never understand why Krigersmarine don't request they terms from France

[gord96]

crazy stuff. every interesting and mind boggeling at the same time

[moscowexile]

Pablo:

"Without the invasion of Belgium, I think it's pretty likely Britain would not have intervened in August 1914, just as it had not intervened in the Franco-Prussian War, when Bismarck specifically assured Prime Minister Disraeli that Germany would not attack Belgium. The German General Staff knew attacking Belgium would bring Britain into the war, but they just didn't care since they felt its army's contribution would be minimal at best. Oops."

I agree: a major miscalculation.

The much modified German General Staff's Schlieffen plan, a sweeping "right hook" through Belgium of the German 1st and 2nd armies in their march on Paris whilst the majority of French divisions, chasing after revengeful glory in their lust to regain those territories, Alsace and Lorraine, lost to the German Empire in 1871, hurtled headlong into the wrong direction necessary to counter this sweep, took little or no account of those French divisions that would oppose them on the Franco-Belgium border and treated with disdain any contribution that any paltry British expeditionary force could contribute to resisting the invasion of France through Belgium . Hence Kaiser Bill's alleged comment at the the time about Britain's "contemptible little army".

There is no German record of the Kaiser describing the British Expeditionary Force 1914 as "contemptible", though he did say that it was "a contemptibly small" army. Whatever, the name stuck and veterans of the 1914 BEF to France and Belgium called themselves with pride: The Old Contemptibles.

They were so "comtemptible" that although greatly outnumbered, in August 1914 they dug themselves in along the Albert canal at Mons, Belgium, where they waited for the leading divisions of Kluck's 1st army:

"Kluck determined to take on the BEF and they first engaged the British in battle on August 23rd, 1914. French [BEF commanding general] had deployed his men across a 40 kilometre front. The BEF was heavily outnumbered. The BEF had 70,000 men and 300 artillery guns whereas the Germans had 160,000 men and 600 artillery guns.

Despite such overwhelming numbers, the Germans did not do well at the start of the battle. The BEF may have been referred to as a bunch of “contemptibles” by Kaiser William II, but they were professional soldiers. The Germans believed that they were facing many British machine guns at Mons. In fact, they were infantry men firing their Lee Enfield rifles, but at such a combined speed that they gave the Germans that impression. German intelligence later estimated that the BEF had 28 machine guns per battalion at Mons - whereas each battalion only had two. After his experiences of the BEF at the Battle of Mons, Kluck, after the war had finished, described the BEF as an 'incomparable army'."

The fact was that the British had learnt the hard way during the Boer War what rapid, accurate rifle fire from entrenched positions could do to advancing columns. Nevertheless, Mons was not a victory and the British had to retreat because of the overwhelming numbers of German infantry.


My great granddad was one of those BEF riflemen.

[Catfish]

Hello,
sorry for being OT, WW1 and such, but this is really interesting - while i always thought to know why WW2 began, the First world war and its beginnings is somehow foggy to me. Sarajevo, yes, but I realized that some historical background was never taught in school here in Germany after WW2, maybe due to the reeducation project, or because the good post war germans wanted some distance to their/our predecessors. And then there was the cold war ...

Kaiser Bill may not have been too intelligent, or witty, but he was also let down by his own advisors - and he himself certainly had let go Bismarck, what was described as "the pilot leaving the ship", which was even translated and printed in the british "Punch".
But after all it was obvious Germany would have had no chance in fighting a two-front war against Russia AND France, so the Schlieffen-plan seemed the only solution - fight France and win as soon as possible, and hold the lines in the east until men from the west become available. It did not turn out that way as we all know.

The British Expeditional Forces were tough, and even if a prussian general (Clausewitz?) had said any army needs a ratio of 3 to 1 to attack anyone successfully, the even much bigger german army did not succeed instantly, and got the first impression of what was to come. Moscowexile, please accept my utmost respect for your great grandfather having fought in this war.

As Moscowexile wrote even before the first battles in the north there was already the french armies who tried to get back the Alsace region they had lost in the prussian-french war of 1871, but they failed here, and left a big gap in the north.
Regarding the Royal Empire it had an uprising rival in Germany, which needed a fleet to support and control its own colonies in Africa, and Asia. There was a real conflict trade-wise, with the invented "Made in England" sign that should represent quality and such, but the products "Made in Germany" suddenly surpassed those products, maybe because Germany had a technological advantage with dynamoes and other technical products back then.

Additionally Germany was building the Baghdad - railway, which would have connected Germany directly to its african colonies, and which the British tried to interrupt, not without success if you think of "Lawrence of Arabia". With a functional railway the Suez canal would have been almost useless.

Anyway Germany's cannon-boat politics were not so successful as what the British Empire or the US did - certainly lack of experience in running overseas countries politically. My personal theory is that our Kaiser was angry for he was not wanted becoming a member of the British Royal Yacht Club - hence his own huge fleet

Greetings,
Catfish

[moscowexile]

Off topic maybe, but this thread has progressed from a question posed about the Kriegsmarine in WWII after the fall of France...

Old Kaiser Bill was really an English gentleman in Prussian uniform!

What always intrigued me about him was that when revolution hit Germany in 1918, like the majority of the German aristocracy, he just packed his bags and left the Fatherland. Wilhelm II spent the rest of his life in Doorn, the Netherlands, where he died on June 4th 1941, just 18 days before Barbarossa, the attack on the USSR, was launched, which attack spelt doom for the Third Reich.

See:

http://pierreswesternfront.punt.nl/i...&tbl_archief=0

The old Kaiser died when the born-again Reich was at its most successful and powerful. I often wonder what he thought about all of this when he was breathing his last. Needless to say, he despised the Nazis, who, as national socialists,held the old order in contempt, but I reckon the old man could not have been more than a little proud when looking objectively at the success of the Wehrmacht.

I still think that it was a disaster for the United Kingdom, a disaster for Germany, a disaster for Europe and a disaster for the world when the British government, after several days of hesitation, decided to throw in its lot with the Entente powers.

The world situation as we see it now all stems from that fateful decision made on August 3rd 1914.

[Catfish]

Hello,

thank you for the link, never saw this page before.

I also wonder why the Kaiser left Germany, but times were different. Anyway a lost war does not mean an instant danger for a government (not even today hrrm). But apart from fear maybe the aristocrates did not want to live in a Germany now ruled by a democratic or socialist force, even if there was no real revolution, as had been in France long before, and Russia. And the years after the war were hard for aristocrates in Germany, but especially for the former soldiers, who were looked down upon, and despised, some even killed by the mob. The situation in Germany after the war, with the Freikorps etc. battling in the streets against the socialists and communists was a mess. And maybe Wilhelm felt indeed responsible - and maybe he did not want to be accused for it, hence his exile (?).

I also never understood why England did not intervene when the plan for the Versailles treaty became apparent, heaping all the guilt of the war alone on Germany. This had been the idea of the french politician Clémenceau, and it was not as widely accepted as it is told to us today. Maybe the British Empire was satisfied to have won the war, and established trade supremacy again (?).

Anyway this treaty and its results were felt as inquitous even by the german socialists, but their comfortable scapegoat for the situation certainly was Kaiser Wilhelm, and they blamed him alone. The politicial right force (nationalist/monarch) instantly invented the legend of the stab in the back, done by german socialists and communists, and blamed them for the outcome of the war.

"I still think that it was a disaster for the United Kingdom, a disaster for Germany, a disaster for Europe and a disaster for the world when the British government, after several days of hesitation, decided to throw in its lot with the Entente powers. The world situation as we see it now all stems from that fateful decision made on August 3rd 1914."

Well said, but maybe the British Government could have still helped defusing the situation right after the war, in refusing or denying Clémenceau's plan of the Versailles treaty, but however they did not. Maybe they had become a victim of their own propaganda.
Since Germany's unconditional surrender it was not in a position to intervene. It was definitely WW1 and its fortthcomings that laid the foundation for Hitler's dictatorship and the second world war. I wonder what will shop up in the british archives after 2018, when the locked-up archive files will be made available.

Thanks and greetings,
Catfish

[Pablo]

Originally Posted by moscowexile

I still think that it was a disaster for the United Kingdom, a disaster for Germany, a disaster for Europe and a disaster for the world when the British government, after several days of hesitation, decided to throw in its lot with the Entente powers.

The world situation as we see it now all stems from that fateful decision made on August 3rd 1914.

Hi!

I think they knew they were in for a disaster. The only choice was whether the disaster would be the creation of a continental hegemon, which Britain had fought to prevent any nation from doing for 350 years, or a war fought with 20th century weapons using 18th century tactics.

Pablo

[moscowexile]

But surely, with the benefit of hindsight one can say that the British opposition to German hegomony in Europe was a failed and possibly mistaken policy; can it not be said that there exists now a European hegemon in the shape of the European Union and, furthermore, that that hegemon has as its economic powerhouse, its control centre as it were, the economic clout of the Federal Republic of Germany, which state also is the most populous in the EU?

Indeed, the defeated Germany of 1918 was in a far stronger position than any of its "victorious" wartime adversaries: Britain was near bankrupt and eventually had to default on its war debts to the USA; France had not only been "bled white" because of the carnage that had taken place on its territory, but the major battles fought in France, having also largely taken place in the industrial regions of the French Republic, had laid those regions waste; the Russian Empire no longer existed and was being torn apart by civil war; the Austro-Hungarian Empire, that state, that should surely be judged the most guilty of all, should one wish to label any World War I belligerent as being responsible for the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, or at least its Foreign Minister should have been so judged, had fragmented into its ethnically differentiated regions, the result of national self-determination, that very thing that Austria-Hungary had most feared in its multi-ethnic empire and which had caused the spark at Sarajevo that had ignited Europe.

Defeated Germany was still, more or less, in one piece in 1918, apart from the Danzig corridor and bits of Silesia ceded to Poland and the Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia. Germany throughout the war had - apart from the sudden incursion of the Russians into East Prussia in 1914, whence they had promptly been despatched after their defeats at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes - never had its territories invaded and occupied by foreign armies, had not had its industrial regions reduced to ruins and had a population that, despite the hunger caused by the Royal Navy blockade that continued from the armistice of November 1918 until the signing of the Versailles Treaty the following year, was still growing and rapidly outnumbering that of France, proud claims of French fecundity notwithstanding.

True, British policy for 300 years or more had been to prevent the existence of a European hegemon: the threat usually came from France. So the UK did an about face in 1914 and allied itself with France in a struggle against the potential "threat" of German domination of Europe. But is that not what has, in the end, eventually happened? Germany has at last found its "place in the sun" that it had yearned for in the first flush of its successes during the last quarter of the 19th century; Gemany's place in the sun has, however, not turned out to be an overseas empire that would challenge those of the British and French: Germany is now boss of the European Union, a union that that self-styled emperor of the French, Buonaparte, would have been proud of.

In the meantime, along that route towards that German hegemony that we now witness, there have been two world wars fought to prevent its occurence; there has been the destruction of most of old Europe, the loss of millions of lives, the collapse of empires and the rise of Bolshevism and its counterpoint, Fascism, Stalinism and subsequent wars both hot and cold.

When British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey supposedly said on the eve of the outbreak of World War I, apparently as he watched lamplighters lighting the gas lamps in the street below his Westminster Foreign Office window: "The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit gain in our lifetime" he could certainly have added that he had been one the parties that had helped put them out.

Sir Edward had by that time realised that he had failed to clearly communicate to Germany that a breach of the treaty not merely to respect but to protect the neutrality of Belgium - of which both Britain and Germany were signatories - would cause Britain to declare war against Germany. When he finally did make such communication, German forces were already massed at the Belgian border and the German High Command convinced the Kaiser that it was too late to change the plan of attack.

So the United Kingdom declared war on the German Empire because of "a scrap of paper" as the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg had labelled the broken treaty.

As regards Sir Edward Grey's speech to parliament concerning the necessity for a declaration of war against the German Empire, in 1915 Bethmann-Hollweg described to an American newspaper journalist his final meeting in Berlin on August 4th 1918 with the departing British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen: "The day before my conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Grey had delivered his well-known speech in Parliament, wherein, while he did not state expressly that England would take part in the war, he left the matter in little doubt. One needs only to read this speech through carefully to learn the reason of England's intervention in the war. Amid all his beautiful phrases about England's honour and England's obligations we find it over and over again expressed that England's interests - its own interests - called for participation in war, for it was not in England's interests that a victorious, and therefore stronger, Germany should emerge from the war...England drew the sword only because she believed her own interests demanded it. Just for Belgian neutrality she would never have entered the war. That is what I meant when I told Sir E. Goschen, in that last interview when we sat down to talk the matter over privately man to man, that among the reasons which had impelled England into war the Belgian neutrality treaty had for her only the value of a scrap of paper."

So "England" went to war over a point of principle? John Keegan, in his book The First World War (published on the 80th anniversary of the outbreak of WWI), concluded: "...principle...scarcely merited the price eventually paid for its protection." One could, for sure, retort to Keegan's opinion concerning principles: What do principles represent if they are not worth fighting for? However, the "fight" in question involved the deaths of millions.

And I still say that the real reason why the UK declared war on Germany was to protect British economic interests: a German Weltmacht supported by a powerful fleet and German domination of Europe were definitely not in the best economic interests of the United Kingdom and the British Empire.

As they say: It's the economy, stupid!

And as Groucho Marx once said: These are my principles: if you don't like them, I have others!

The idea that British participation in the Great War was a bad idea has also been mooted by Scottish economics professor Nial Ferguson in his book The Pity of War. One mentioned earlier on this thread that it would be interesting when the foriegn office and MOD files are released in 2018 but there is a some pretty solid evidence (see Winter Haig's Command and Gordon Rules of the Game) that large quantities of WW1 documents were purposely destroyed in the twenties. Ferguson also discovered that, as early as 1912 the British War Office in the event of war with Germany, planned to invade Belgium if the latter refused to grant free passage to British arms. Assuming the the Germans knew this already, then Bethmann's surprise at Grey's speech is really justified.

Any of this sound familier? Also there is evidence that elements of the Belgian General Staff had conducted secret official talks with their British counterparts in violation of the multi-national neutrality treaty. If accurate, it places much of what "moscowexile" writes on pretty firm ground.

Putting a modern perspective on the Great War, Serbia of the day was a defacto terrorist state, ruled by a regicide royal house with a very aggressive military that often operated outside of national juristiction. Twice in the preceding years they had had wars of conquest (both Balkan wars 1912-13) and they supported and exported terrorists and assassins to their nieghbour, Austria-Hungry. That British political spin turned them into poor innocent victims of Austrian aggression is a pretty good indicator of how much Britain wanted to prevent German domination of continental Europe.

English language accounts of WW1 tend to portray the Kaiser as some sort of proto-Hitler and of course German militerism is constantly played up as a factor. None of this survives close scrutiny, though: Wilhelm was a constitutional monarch and may have been many things but never a ruthless dictator totally lacking in morals. Likewise in 1914 France spent more on her military in relative and per capita terms than Germany and actually had a larger peace time army. So who was really more militerized? Britain's per capita defence spending was almost as great as that of Germany and when the Empire is included, total defence spending was greater in absolute terms.

The Great War has been called the greatest tragedy of the 20th Century, so many of the international issues effecting us today can be traced directly to 1914-18. It is a facinating subject, even though it has drifted so far off topic. Hope the mods don't shut it down.
Good Hunting

[Sailor Steve]

I see I'm running behind the curve again.

Originally Posted by moscowexile

Indeed, the defeated Germany of 1918 was in a far stronger position than any of its "victorious" wartime adversaries...

Were they? I'm going strictly on memory, but I thought that part of Germany's "punishment" was to have to "repay" all the war debts Britain and France claimed they owed. One of the results was that for Germany the Great Depression started a full ten years before it affected the rest of the world. Britain may have been near bankruptcy, but Germany was already far over that line.

[PsFr]

Originally Posted by moscowexile

Indeed, the defeated Germany of 1918 was in a far stronger position than any of its "victorious" wartime adversaries: Britain was near bankrupt and eventually had to default on its war debts to the USA; France had not only been "bled white" because of the carnage that had taken place on its territory, but the major battles fought in France, having also largely taken place in the industrial regions of the French Republic, had laid those regions waste; the Russian Empire no longer existed and was being torn apart by civil war;

That's what Hitler and NSDAP was spreading after the war along some German military supporting his political ideas or very conservatives ones who could not accept the outcome of this war , but it is world widely recognized by historians today as a legend (the theory claiming they never lost the war ) , including the German historians themselves , though you've made some quality posts with lots of good points in this thread so i'd like to kindly add few things on this if you don't mind

Of course , Most European countries involved in the Great War were heavily debted , and in the case of France , the northern region of France had been partly destroyed , villages burnt , lot of deaths ( killed , diseases , lack of food etc ) , lot of rapes (esp in Belgium and northern France ) etc... however the industry was still perfectly functionnal for the simple reason that it's the one who could handle the war effort (planes , light tanks , engines , rifles , canons , ammos etc..) for France , Canadians and US pilots etc.. during 4 years and was not located in the north of France (only a small part , north of France was mostly mines/coal region )

But from a military perspective , and there is a couple of books written about it (best and most famous being the one of J.P Jardin ) , Imperial German army was completely on its knees in 1918 , after repeated failed (desperate for some ) offensives prior to March 1918 that cost a lot of lives .. not only physically , but the moral of its front troops was Extremely low (lower than Allies by very Far ) and the front lines were deeply affected , the defeat was inevitable at that point for many German officers , the French wanted to continue the offensive and invade Germany in 1918 which was refused categorically by Britain who wanted a Germany strong enough to rival France in the future but not strong enough to be a threat to Britain (this has always been an important aspect of British policy since 18th century ) and also because the British had no direct interest in doing that , they also had lost many men and money in this war and were contempt with an armistice where Germany would be disarmed , weakened economically (in order to not dominate Britain ) and reshaped politically

In this war , Germany had also suffered a lot casualties ,( about 8 millions victims and deaths like Russia , France more than 6.5 millions , Austria-Hungary a bit more than 4 millions , Britain about 3 millions etc..) and was in very bad shape in 1918 , the Allies in 1918 were on streak victories ( Second Battle of the Somme named "blackest day" by Ludendorff in Spring 1918 by British/Australians/Canadians , then France's Army after the victory at second Battle of La Marne in Summer 1918 , then the offensive in Picardie made by the Allies in general including US troops left the Germans retreating in August , the September offensive being the most effective with Germans lines completely collapsing and going back to defend German borders , the morale of Allies was higher , the industry was producing more and more materials etc.. , the exhaustion of the population was compensated by the signs of victory and Germans retreating which gave a lot of energy and determination to the people to work harder , support their suffering and believe .

for example at the same period , France's democratic republic vote in October a law for budget (Borrow for Victory /Emprunt de la victoire ) , the country was ready to fight for at least 1 more year , but then that revolution in the German Empire that started the 3 november 1918 which culminated the 9th November at Berlin and lead to the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II, this changed the situation in the eyes of the Allies as Imperial Germany was no more and its aggressive leader no more a threat , thus armistice was signed the 11th of November 1918 to the relief of European civilians , in the case of France people were relieved but the Military were definitely not satisfied as leaving the German territory untouched and suddenly stopping the war at the border after all the destructions , deaths , rapes and mayhem caused by German troops in France for 4 years was a major mistake to make and difficult to accept , especially since they had the definite upper hand (first time of the war one side had such a big advantage on another ) and felt the job had to be finished until Berlin , and history proved them right in 1940 (and hence why the controversial articles Treaty of Versailles in 1919 should be looked upon through this scope , the German people suffered no direct consequences on their territory after invading , killing millions of people etc. ) as if Germany would have been invaded we can speculate that WWII could not have happened

At the time a couple of German military officers do not want to accept the obvious reality of defeat until the army and country is completely destroyed and Germany invaded which is understandable but something that would have 100% surely happened had the Allies continued the war , the NSDAP is going to use that argument in the 20's claiming they never lost that war as Germany wasn't invaded and conqueered , which is a "mistake" the Soviet Union and Western Allies did not do in 1945 (and it costed lots of German civilians lives sadly ) as they had the good "lesson" of 1918 when Allies stopped fighting at the German border .

NSDAP will use this theory against Weimar Republic and democratic parties in the 20's to disqualify the new Republic , telling them that the revolution , the civilian (society) and Weimar are responsible of the defeat and betrayed the troops , that the German democratic government had been born in the defeat , labelling people supporting a democratic Germany "traitors" to the country , for them social-democracy was doomed and born in failure and only national-socialism could restore their pride (they were somewhat right since a military dictature and totalitarian regime devoting all of its material and human ressources to waging war is always going to be stronger militarily or more suited in times of war than a democracy , a war that happened later on) , NSDAP blamed the civilians and democrats (Jews too ) for causing the defeat , for them , German army could still fight on and win the war and it's because of the civilians looking for "compromises" that Imperial Germany was defeated , but today it is proven wrong completely by historians and no longer credible at all with the archives and books about the subject , it was a good theory to promote his political project though , very effective as at the time , as no one could verify that and most Germans believed him later on .

It's correct to say though that the industrial heart of Germany and territorial integrity was left untouched thanks the fact that the Allies decided stop at the German borders for political and economical reason , so Germany was in relatively better shape than some of his former ennemies to get over the losses and disasters that has been WWI and bounce again in the future , as even after WWI , German population is still 20 millions of people more than France and still retained a formidable industry and more human ressources after the armistice of 1918 and never paid the so-called unfair debts of Versailles treaty afterwards . I apologize for my English mistakes

To answer briefly the topic , it's cause many ships were scuttled , some others were used to join the British , some others were destroyed at Mers-el -Kebir , then many stayed loyal to the hierarchy , and the main reason was because it would have took lot of money and time to train and form sailors on new equipment or reequip the ships with German materials etc.. and also because KM was not in position to do anything in the Med with surfaced ships and prior to late 1941 and 1942 , KM based its strategy on U-Boats (Bismarck sunk in 41 etc..)