The Nature of a Predator

[Berinhardt]

I think there is merit to both approaches, but in "real life" there are some trade offs to consider:

1 - Attacking lone ships presents less risks to the sub and crew - while subs can be replaced (given time and resources), experienced crews are invaluable. Given the choice of losing subs and crews for high value (?)targets, and consistently sinking unescorted supply ships and merchants at little risk, the admirality will eventually a) choke the supply lines b) force the enemy to expend resources building escorts, training crews, and expending 3 times the fuel on each supply run. Within a short time, the US should have a significant numerical advantage and can run German style "wolfpacks" against larger protected convoys.

2. From a torpedo effeciency standpoint, you can sink freighters and tankers with a single torp and a few rounds from the deck gun. Expending 2 torpedos (or more) to sink escorted freighters or 4-6 for combat targets (battleships/carriers/cruisers) cuts your time on station and results in less total tonnage sunk.

3 - Attacking convoys and large capital ships can change the tide of the war, and can give the US advantages, (less carriers, battleships, and cruisers to fight later) but if you lose even 25% of subs you attempt it, you will always be at a disadvantage. Better to have the sub call in the contact, and coordinate an attack with aircraft and surface units, or even another sub. Hitting a convoy on the front and back simultaneously could be very demoralizing for the enemy.

4) Sinking freighters and tankers limits production on the mainland and makes it more difficult for Japan to build more warships.

While sinking large escorted convoys is more fun (who doesn't love sinking a carrier of battleship!) the risk/reward equation is off balance. And tactically it makes more sense to go after the oil tankers and supply ships. Battleships and Carriers are useless without fuel.

Oil was the reason Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in the first place - in 1940, the United States imposed an oil embargo on Japan during its war with China. Destroying the 7th Fleet at Pearl was supposed to cripple the ability of the U.S. to enforce the embargo. As an interesting twist of fate, if the attack at Pearl had sent an additional wave to take out the oil tanks at Hickam Field, all of our subs (and carriers) would have been useless for 6 months or more.

Historically, the advantages the U.S. had over Japan is that the Imperial Navy was stuck in the Mahanian doctrine and the lure of "decisive battle", and didn't prioritize the protection of its supply lines "The desire for a quick, decisive victory led Tokyo to neglect unglamorous but vital dimensions of operations such as logistics and personnel policy. Because its leadership assumed that a war with America would be decided by a few decisive battles, the Japanese ignored such capabilities as commerce protection and antisubmarine warfare, deficiencies which became crippling vulnerabilities in a long war of attrition" http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/ijn.htm

It would be interesting if the game actually limited the ships instead iof respawing during a campaign, and modeled your effectiveness in the overall war effort. At the opening of the Pacific War in 1941, the Japanese Combined Fleet comprised 10 battleships; 10 aircraft carriers; 38 cruisers, heavy and light; 112 destroyers; 65 submarines; and numerous auxiliary warships of lesser size. I would love to play scenarios both ways: Hunt the carriers and battleships, or hunt tankers and supply ships.

As a side note, if you want to hunt unescorted freighters all day long, just park your sub a few miles south of Tokyo harbor just east of Izu Oshima (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Izu_%C5%8Cshima). For escorted battle groups, go west of Izu Oshima between the island the mainland. ;-)