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[Kapitän]

Originally Posted by Kapitän

Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...

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U 115
- KTB -
First War Patrol
(17th war patrol overall)

Friday, 23 April 1943 (Good Friday) - 12th U.-Flotilla Bordeaux (Korvkpt. Klaus Scholtz; ex U 108) -

Daily F.d.U. Briefing

O.K.W.-Report:
a) Our 17.Armee abandoned the attempt to dislodge the Soviet bridgehead at Novorossisk in southern Russia.

B.d.U.-Report:
a) Convoy No. 28 (HX.234):
Weather conditions in the convoy area were reported as wind W.N.W. 5, visibility 15 sea miles at 1700 on 23rd. A boat reported wind N.W. 2, seaway 1 at 0200.
U 306 (Kptlt. Claus von Trotha) reported the convoy on the 23rd at 0247 per F.T.0212/22/119 in AJ 3377, on northerly course and at 0807 per ßß-Signal in AJ 3361, course 60°, speed 8kn. Contact was reported throughout the day in such an exemplary fashion that 11 more boats were able to approach during the day and night owing to the good messages, e.g., beacon locator signal at 0909 which is heard by U 648 (Oblt.d.R. Peter Arthur Stahl) in 350°true, being positoned south of the convoy. At 1210, U-Stahl sights smoke plumes of 3-5 steamers and 2 masts, apparently in keel-line in, in 18°true, AK 1513, the ßß-Signals sent by U-Stahl and again at 1350 are not heard by command. At 1633, U-Stahl sends ßß-Signal: Enemy position AK 1533, 105°, which is immediately acknowledged by command. At 1928, U-Stahl has to crash-dive from a 4-engine land based A/C and has to evade an escort, ejecting a Bold. At 2120, U-Stahl surfaces but has lost its forward position to the convoy. At 2230, the weather rapidly starts to deteriorate. At 2346 in AK 1379, U-Stahl is at "Battle Stations", as the Commander wants to attack using the approaching rain and hail squalls from the West as cover. On 24 April, 0010, U-Stahl dismisses from Battle Stations as the hail squall is over and the boat losses its cover by the clouds lifting again for a surface attack and the distance is too great for a submerged attack. As the convoy cannot be seen, U-Stahl dives at 0138 for a listening check and obtains a good contact in 330°true, and surfaces again at 0153. U 306 reported the convoy in AK 2443 at 0700 on the morning of the 24th. Various boats again lost contact. In spite of this 7 boats were in the convoy area in the night. Not until 1900 was the convoy escorted by aircraft. The Command found it difficult to form a clear picture of the surface defence as only a few boats reported depth charge attacks. 4 boats were attacked with depth charges, one sustained considerable damage. One boat was attacked by aerial bombs. The mass attack on the convoy did not have the desired results. U 306 sank a steamer of 7,000 GRT at 1500 in an underwater attack. U 954 (Kptlt. Odo Loewe) also scored a hit in a daylight attack on a large steamer at 1600. U 610 Kptlt. Walter Freiherr von Freyberg-Eisenberg-Allmendingen) scored a "FAT" hit at 0635 on the 24th.
15 boats are now operating on the convoy, as 3 boats are attacking the recently intercepted S.W.-bound convoy.

B-Dienst Report:
a) Auxiliary Aircraft Carrier USS Bogue (CVE-9) and her task group departed Argentia, Newfoundland, bound for mid-Atlantic rendezvous with eastbound Convoy HX-235.

RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115

Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...

+++++++

U 115
- KTB -
First War Patrol
(17th war patrol overall)

Saturday, 24 April 1943 - 12th U.-Flotilla Bordeaux (Korvkpt. Klaus Scholtz; ex U 108) -

Taking boat out of dry dock and putting on charging station.

During the shipyard time in Bordeaux, the pressure hull, torpedo tube no.6 and the flak guns were repaired. Several crew members had to disembark and were replaced, due to injuries sustained in the air attacks during the outbound transit.

Beginning of pre-war patrol preparation.

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Daily F.d.U. Briefing

O.K.W.-Report:
a) In the Mediterranean Sea, British submarine HMS Sahib (P 212; Lieutenant J. H. Bromage) was scuttled and abandoned by her crew to avoid capture after being seriously damaged by the Italian torpedo boat Climene and Ju88 aircraft off Cape Milazzo. All her crew was saved except for one who was wounded and will die on 3 May 1943. Her loss will be officially announced by the Admiralty on 6 May 1943.

O.K.M.-Report:
a) U 180 (IXD1; Fregkpt. Werner Musenberg) reported: Met at 0620 on 23.4. Exchange has so far been impossible owing to weather conditions. Boat accompanying until improvement in weather. (U 180 and the Japanese U-boat I-29 were ordered to meet at 0600 on 23.4 in JA 2432. After execution of special duties - transfer of two Indian Nationalist agents, to be put ashore by I-29 at Sumatra - U 180 is to operate in the lower third of KP and KQ and the upper third of KZ and JA, with central point off Durban. E.W. traffic is presumed in the vicinity of this port).

B.d.U.-Report:
a) Convoy No. 28 (HX.234):
At 0200, U 648 (Oblt.d.R. Peter Arthur Stahl) is back o Battle Stations but is kept at bay by convoy escorts and is attacked with escort surface weapons at 0315 and has to crash-dive at 0328 and turns toward the convoy. At 130m, U-Stahl receives the first Wabos and dives deeper to 140-150m, and is now positioned right under the convoy; ASDIC pings continue until 0600 in Qu.AK 2336. At 0625 U-Stahl surfaces and has to crash-dive 5 times due to airplanes until 1912 (at 1000 U-Stahl briefly sights the convoy in 46°true and a VIIC type boat 2nm abeam to port). At 1953, U-Stahl surfaces in Qu. AK 3354, Wind and Sea have increased and the boat can not go faster than 2xH.F., as the sea is continually washing over the Conning Tower. At 2300, U 267 (Kptlt. Otto Tinschert) reports contact in AK 3493, and again at 2330. At 2342, the wolfpack receives F.T. 2325/24/131 from HQ: To Trotha-Convoy: If during the night no attack opportunity, operate in such a way that by daybreak boat is positioned in front of the convoy.
In spite of the fact that altogether 12 boats were operating on the convoy on the night of 24th, and that at dawn several boats were still in contact, this could not be maintained during the day. The reason for this was the appearance of strong air escort with the beginning of daylight.

B-Dienst Report:
a) In the Pacific, after repeated failures, Admiral Nimitz discontinues the use of magnetic pistols on torpedoes for his theater of operation. Submarines under General MacArthur's command, however, continue to use them.

RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115