Topside torpedoes

[John Pancoast]

Originally Posted by Aktungbby

the question intrigued me so I did some serious pervitin induced homework over breakfast. Nothing is particularly extant on torpedo storage other than it was dangerous, time consuming and only suited to calm waters; which the winter Atlantic was decidedly not! they key to the myriad aspects of the issue was the closing of the Mid-atlantic Gap. Only low maintenance G7a eels could be carried externally as every other type (G7e's ZaunK's, Foxers ) required high battery maintenance-new fact for me! I'll be more authentic in SH-V!! Also, torpedos in the external containers were susceptible to depth-charge attacks and were often damaged. No astute commander following such an attack would risk the amount of time 'hazarding his vessel' against the futility of a defunct eel lugged inside the pressure hull. For certain, the type XI's wouldn't have wasted the always precious fuel-consuming weight on its capacity for 10 eels stored topside As mid ocean Milch-cow resupply subs got scarcer

 

Ten boats of this type were commissioned:

• U-459, commissioned 15 November 1941, scuttled 24 July 1943
• U-460, commissioned 24 December 1941, sunk 4 October 1943
• U-461, commissioned 30 January 1942, sunk 30 July 1943
• U-462, commissioned 5 March 1942, sunk 30 July 1943
• U-463, commissioned 2 April 1942, sunk 15 May 1943
• U-464, commissioned 30 April 1942, scuttled 20 August 1942
• U-487, commissioned 21 December 1942, sunk 13 July 1943
• U-488, commissioned 1 February 1943, sunk 26 April 1944
• U-489, commissioned 8 March 1943, sunk 4 August 1943
• U-490, commissioned 27 March 1943, sunk 12 June 1944

• • Given the decisive 'Black May' of 1943: 18 Uboats lost w/o corresponding damage to allied merchant vessels in the Atlantic; with 43 total due to losses in other theatres, 14 (most from all powerful aircraft) causing loss of experienced crews: especially the junior officers also intended as the next generation of kaleuns, the 'jig was up' in the first semester of '43. Wanze, foxer, Zaunkönig, and radar vulnerable schnorkels could not undo May '43. Döenitz stopping the Uboat campaign pulled all his boats on the 24th of the 'merry' month of May....for the allies-FIDO, Johnny Walkers 'creeping attacks', Liberator B-24's, and escort carriers! von C's ON WAR Rule one: "In all things be 'very strong"; two:"whenever possible increase firepower(numeric superiority-not just technical superiority; three: " Never count on your opponent doing what your plan call for him to do...." for Germany all 3 rules met with: "war is simple but sometimes the simple thing is hard!" My bet is, externally stored U-boat eels began declining in June 1943 when Doenitz resumed his futile efforts...saving the Reich a few RieichsMarks for the Russian front ...pending further investigations of course!

I also seem to recall that pressures at depth messed with them too.

[Aktungbby]

Originally Posted by John Pancoast

I can't remember; what year did the u-boats stop carrying these ?

Originally Posted by John Pancoast

I also seem to recall that pressures at depth messed with them too.

I read
up on that too in the course of composing my post; but that had been solved-scandal notwithstanding- prior to the period involved with your question or Jimbuna's time frame. Essentially, I'm interested in finding any actual 'eel' manifest of a June '43 non-ace skippered U-boat outbound for the Gap....'twould shed much insight on the question.

[John Pancoast]

Originally Posted by Aktungbby

I read
up on that too in the course on comprising my post but that had been solved-scandal notwithstanding prior to the period involved with your question or Jimbuna's time frame. Essentially I'm interested in finding any actual 'eel' manifest of a June '43 non-ace skippered U-boat outbound for the Gap....'twould shed much insight on the question.

I think Blair mentioned some info. in his book, but my second volume fell apart recently.

[Aktungbby]

Originally Posted by John Pancoast

I think Blair mentioned some info. in his book, but my second volume fell apart recently.

You should see my dogeared, margin-notes crammed copy of Clausewitz ON WAR I've got Blair's two volume on kindle-saves wear, tear and space on my stressed out military-book shelves. Considering Germany's generals utilized this book :

 

On War is an unfinished work. Clausewitz had set about revising his accumulated manuscripts in 1827, but did not live to finish the task. His wife edited his collected works and published them between 1832 and 1835.(a little like Lucy Custer writing about George Armstrong C.; and perpetuating a myth to earn a living in widowhood ??!!) His 10-volume collected works contain most of his larger historical and theoretical writings, though not his shorter articles and papers or his extensive correspondence with important political, military, intellectual and cultural leaders in the Prussian state. On War is formed by the first three volumes and represents his theoretical explorations. It is one of the most important treatises on political-military analysis and strategy ever written, and remains both controversial and influential on strategic thinking. On War is a work rooted solely in the world of the nation state...It has been blamed for the level of destruction involved in the First and Second World Wars, but it seems rather that Clausewitz (who did not actually use the term "total war") had merely foreseen the inevitable development that started with the huge, patriotically motivated armies of the Napoleonic wars. These wars resulted (though war's evolution has not yet ended) in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with all the forces and capabilities of the state devoted to destroying forces and capabilities of the enemy state (thus "total war"). Conversely, Clausewitz has also been seen as "The preeminent military and political strategist of limited war in modern times." who knows, maybe von C.'s wife is the real culprit; and not der Kaiser Wilhelm....

[LGN1]

Hi,


it's interesting that the order to remove the deck torpedoes is based on the vulnerability of the canisters during depth-charge attacks and not on the danger of loading them.


Best, LGN1