Soviet SSBN strategy

ikalugin · 01-16-18, 06:02 AM

Long story cut short - SSBNs were viewed as a deep second strike option.

As such the deployment of those submarines would depend on the ranges of their weapons. Due to this consideration the SSBN force would be split between bastion deployment (Deltas, Typhoons) and forward deployement (Yankees and older).

Another point to make is the nature of this deployment, because Soviets (and present day Russia) prefers surge deployment over constant at sea patrol. The reason behind this was simple - the principles of mass and concentration of effort (in time and space), but was based around the capability of Soviet leadership to detect the approaching crisis and shift the forces to the "threatened/special period" stance (which is why Able Archer was such a big no-no).

As Atrina shows, in 1980s NATO had a very limited capability to track then modern Soviet submarines, should those submarines employ wartime tactics.

p.s.
surge deployment is not done only for the SSBNs, but for the mobile launchers too, both during threatened period and training, for example the recent exercise of the SNRFs:
https://function.mil.ru/news_page/co...2157781@egNews

01-16-18, 06:02 AM	#8
ikalugin Ocean Warrior Join Date: Aug 2014 Location: Moscow, Russia Posts: 3,212 Downloads: 8 Uploads: 0	Long story cut short - SSBNs were viewed as a deep second strike option. As such the deployment of those submarines would depend on the ranges of their weapons. Due to this consideration the SSBN force would be split between bastion deployment (Deltas, Typhoons) and forward deployement (Yankees and older). Another point to make is the nature of this deployment, because Soviets (and present day Russia) prefers surge deployment over constant at sea patrol. The reason behind this was simple - the principles of mass and concentration of effort (in time and space), but was based around the capability of Soviet leadership to detect the approaching crisis and shift the forces to the "threatened/special period" stance (which is why Able Archer was such a big no-no). As Atrina shows, in 1980s NATO had a very limited capability to track then modern Soviet submarines, should those submarines employ wartime tactics. p.s. surge deployment is not done only for the SSBNs, but for the mobile launchers too, both during threatened period and training, for example the recent exercise of the SNRFs: https://function.mil.ru/news_page/co...2157781@egNews __________________ Grumpy as always. Last edited by ikalugin; 01-16-18 at 06:19 AM.