Why did the IJN lose most all sea battles?

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by CCIP

One of the things that often gets cited in the context of Japan's overconfidence in the IJN is:

"It takes the Navy three years to build a ship. It will take three hundred years to build a new tradition." -Adm. of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham

One of the most succinct statements that came from the Japanese naval authorities after the war was that they lost by "battling " instead of "warring" --"We conceived the war with America on a far smaller scale, studied it as a battle. We never became aware of this mistake, much less outgrew it."

The misapplied and probably out of date doctrines of Alfred Thayer Mahan and the concept of the "Decisive Battle"certainly came back to haunt them. They kept chasing for that decisive battle until they had no fleet left.

[CCIP]

Originally Posted by Torplexed

One of the most succinct statements that came from the Japanese naval authorities after the war was that they lost by "battling " instead of "warring" --"We conceived the war with America on a far smaller scale, studied it as a battle. We never became aware of this mistake, much less outgrew it."

The misapplied and probably out of date doctrines of Alfred Thayer Mahan and the concept of the "Decisive Battle"certainly came back to haunt them. They kept chasing for that decisive battle until they had no fleet left.

Yup! IJN's thinking, of course, was shaped in a lot of ways by their experience of the Russo-Japanese War and the quasi-Mahanian victory at Tsushima. The IJN certainly took to heart the reasons for their own triumph, but failed to grasp the real reasons for Russia's humiliating defeat. To them, it was an example of a European empire falling to tactical brilliance and superior morale, all under the command of a genius admiral and his ultra-disciplined subordinates. In that, they totally disregarded the fact that Tsushima had virtually no impact on the war's outcome, or that Russia's war effort collapsed from the inside, for systemic reasons unique to Russia.

So their myth of the decisive battle was born, and built on layer upon layer of flawed assumptions that were held up as doctrine for the next 40 years.

[Kazuaki Shimazaki II]

The Russo-Japanese War played a part, but I suspect that a rarely discussed factor is the warpage caused by Washington Naval Treaty. I won't call the "Fleet Faction" unrealistic - they knew well enough they can't really get parity, so they were trying for 70%, which as I understand it is actually defensible by then contemporary naval theory as the approximate minimum mark they need to win.

The 70% is roughly adequate for (according to then naval theory):
1) Mutual annihilation with the Americans, should it gather up its entire force and move across the Pacific, since they are expected to lose 30% combat power while swimming over.
2) The defeat of the American Navy, should it commit its Pacific Fleet first, then the Atlantic in-turn.
3) The defeat of a theoretical British/American allied force if the issue is such that they'd only commit their Pacific Fleets.

Overall, these aren't extremely unreasonable goals or "excessive sufficiency."

The Americans and Brits crow about their "Two ocean theory" but let's fact it, the Brits are only defending their colonies and America is more or less self-sufficient even without oceanic trade at that time, so their justification is, in objective terms, much weaker than Japan's whose trade relates to the very survival of their core nation. There's also the fact that American and British national power is in the long run much stronger and so the Japanese will have to think really hard before getting too cocky, even if they did get an edge in the Pacific.

The Fleet Faction even read America properly that they would be reasonable and concede to 70%. Well, that is, until the moronic Japanese Foreign Ministry decided to send messages suggesting that 60% would be acceptable to the Japanese government. The Americans decoded the message and failed to consider the real consequences of forcing a treaty that's just below what they needed. The fact the decoding tends to be dominant factor in American accounts would suggest that really, the 60% was a nice to have rather than a critical necessity as far as the Americans are concerned.

Because of the idiocy of the Japanese Treaty Faction (yes, the idea of some kind of treaty is definitely a good one for Japan, but the Fleet Faction actually read America's limits better that time) and America's "Take When You Can" policy, the rest of Japanese naval construction and tactics throughout the 20s and 30s are a desperate attempt to make up for that "missing" 10%. You can tell how a navy feels about its position by how overloaded its ships are :-)

In a sense, it may actually have been better for the Japanese Navy had a deal where they are limited to say 30 or 40% of the American Navy was shoved down their throats. With the gap so great, the goal to beat the American Navy (on a tactical level) would be completely off the table, and a different development can take place. It also gives them a firmer ground to demand decisively different terms for the next treaty.

It didn't help when in the next Treaty, the Americans and Brits came up with the brilliant tactic of banning the "Special Type" destroyers, which really are a defensive measure. Sigh...

[Bilge_Rat]

I have not seen the history program, but it is not accurate to say the IJN lost most battles.

You can break it down into time periods:

-phase I: dec. 41-april 42. In phase I, the IJN won almost every battle, scored some spectacular successes, including the Java Sea battles, destroyed most of the ABDA/Asiatic fleet and captured SE Asia. This was the peak of the IJN in terms of leadership and competence;

-phase 2: may-november 42, the carrier battles. Much maneuvering, 4 actual CV vs CV battles: Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz. Midway was a IJN loss, but the other three were tactical draws. At the end, the loss table was the same, 4 CVs lost by both sides. In this phase, due to losses, the quality of IJN pilots detoriorates quickly;

-phase 3: aug. 42-nov. 43, Guadalcanal/Solomons Islands. Almost exclusively surface night fighting. At the beginning, the IJN is excellent, good tactics, equipment, optics. They score a spectacular success at Savo Island, sinking 4 Allied CAs. At that time, the U.S. is only average, poor radar equipment and over reliance on it, poor night fighting techniques.

The USN improves its tactics in the next 3 battles: Cape Esperance, and Guadalcanal I and II, which are all U.S. tactical victories.

At Tassafaronga, the U.S. suffers a defeat when 3 CAs are heavily damaged and 1 sunk, all by torpedoes.

However, the U.S.N. kept improving its equipment, by mid-43, the U.S. radar was generally better that IJN optics, they keep improving their leadership/planning, radar fire control, damage control, torpedo evasion and attack tactics. The IJN does not however, and its skill level declines over this period. IMHO, this has more to do with the fact that the IJN is badly overstretched and running out of competent personnel.

The IJN does score some occasional successes such as Kolombangara in july 43, where 3 U.S. CLs are heavily damaged by "Long Lance" torps.

The last major battle is Empress Augusta Bay in Nov.43 where the tables are completely turned from Savo. A scratch IJN force of 2 CAs, 2 CLs and 6 DDs try to intercept the Bougainville invasion fleet. Rear adm. Merrill only has 4 CLs and 8 DDs to stop them(much weaker than the allied force at Savo), but his group is intensely trained, knows exactly the battle plan and are all combat veterans. His radar picks up the enemy quickly, firing is started quickly and kept up at a frenetic pace (the IJN admiral thought he faced a much bigger force because of the firing, which totalled 10,000 6" shells) and Merrill keeps his force constantly going through 180 turns to throw off IJN torpedoes. At the end, the IJN loses 1 CL, 1 DD and are driven off, Merrill does not lose any ships.

-phase 4: jan. 44 on. Not much to say, "Turkey shoot".

[mapuc]

I have like most of you read many books or seen documentary about WWII and the war in the pacific.

Each book or author had his or her view on why Japan lost the war

Even the documentary had their view on why...

I guess it was due to many factors..You can not point at only one thing.

That what I think.

Markus

[Armistead]

Often they had the battle won, but lacking resources and other capital ships, they often retreated to protect what they had..

It was much the same with the South vs. the North in our US Civil War, the South had it's ways until numbers, industry and technology caught up.

[Oberon]

Originally Posted by Armistead

Often they had the battle won, but lacking resources and other capital ships, they often retreated to protect what they had..

I know that feeling...