The T-34 in WWII: the Legend vs. the Performance

Skybird · 02-19-13, 12:40 PM

The German had reasons why they built their tanks the way they did. Improved fire control systems. Better situational awareness and visibility for the commander. Leads to better teamwork, faster reaction, better coordination of tanks in teams. The article that Feuer Frei! posted, tells a grim story on what it costed it the Russian that their tanks lacked in these regards, and how badly groups of T34 apparently were interacting, and could not react to threats that they even were not able to identify.

Granted, from a certain point on, the relation between "few but good platforms" versus "many but inferior platforms" decides it in favour of the latter. Technological advantage can compensate numerical inferiority to a certain degree, and not beyond.

In the late cold war, manby NATO fighter pilots seemed to have doubts that the technologically superior NATO air forces would be able to stop the Russian airforce, due to the numbers of fighters that were expected to be flying for both sides at a given time. Better technology, shorter maintenance times, all nice and well - still, there were doubts. Mike Spick, author of several books on airplanes from that era, also somewhere expressed such an opinion . It again is true today I think when considering the high tech toys the US is fielding: F-22 - are they still grounded?

- and F-35 in so small numbers that even if technologically superior they represent a force prohibiting them to be everywhere. In principle, the US has a force that is designed to take on inferior, smaller enemies, not the real big players like China or Russia. If you loose a bomber costing 150 million, that is one thing. If you loose a bomber costing 2.5 billion and you only have 40 or so, the loss is significantly more costly to your finances, your economy, and your military doctrine. Same is true for the shrinking sizes of submarine fleets (US) and surface vessels (Britain). Yes, I know financially our nations cannot afford these military budgets at all anymore. But we should realise that this means not that we "assume the next war will be like the previous one", but that we just massively lose in military potency, and every loss we suffer in numbers in peace or war as well weighs much heavier than ten and 20 and 30 years ago.

I do not believe in this doctrine of "the maximum best even in minimal quantities", I think the total end number of a force also needs to go into the formula, to some degree. That's why a F-22 or F-35 would never have been built, if I would have had a word. I would have build slightly cheaper and slightly less sophisticated planes - but these in a significantly greater number. At least as long as Russia and especially China also do not not sacrifice numbers for maximum hightech standards, like the US today.

A balance between expensive, slow-producing quality and numerical quantity is of the essence.

02-19-13, 12:40 PM	#5
Skybird Soaring Join Date: Sep 2001 Location: the mental asylum named Germany Posts: 42,625 Downloads: 10 Uploads: 0	The German had reasons why they built their tanks the way they did. Improved fire control systems. Better situational awareness and visibility for the commander. Leads to better teamwork, faster reaction, better coordination of tanks in teams. The article that Feuer Frei! posted, tells a grim story on what it costed it the Russian that their tanks lacked in these regards, and how badly groups of T34 apparently were interacting, and could not react to threats that they even were not able to identify. Granted, from a certain point on, the relation between "few but good platforms" versus "many but inferior platforms" decides it in favour of the latter. Technological advantage can compensate numerical inferiority to a certain degree, and not beyond. In the late cold war, manby NATO fighter pilots seemed to have doubts that the technologically superior NATO air forces would be able to stop the Russian airforce, due to the numbers of fighters that were expected to be flying for both sides at a given time. Better technology, shorter maintenance times, all nice and well - still, there were doubts. Mike Spick, author of several books on airplanes from that era, also somewhere expressed such an opinion . It again is true today I think when considering the high tech toys the US is fielding: F-22 - are they still grounded? - and F-35 in so small numbers that even if technologically superior they represent a force prohibiting them to be everywhere. In principle, the US has a force that is designed to take on inferior, smaller enemies, not the real big players like China or Russia. If you loose a bomber costing 150 million, that is one thing. If you loose a bomber costing 2.5 billion and you only have 40 or so, the loss is significantly more costly to your finances, your economy, and your military doctrine. Same is true for the shrinking sizes of submarine fleets (US) and surface vessels (Britain). Yes, I know financially our nations cannot afford these military budgets at all anymore. But we should realise that this means not that we "assume the next war will be like the previous one", but that we just massively lose in military potency, and every loss we suffer in numbers in peace or war as well weighs much heavier than ten and 20 and 30 years ago. I do not believe in this doctrine of "the maximum best even in minimal quantities", I think the total end number of a force also needs to go into the formula, to some degree. That's why a F-22 or F-35 would never have been built, if I would have had a word. I would have build slightly cheaper and slightly less sophisticated planes - but these in a significantly greater number. At least as long as Russia and especially China also do not not sacrifice numbers for maximum hightech standards, like the US today. A balance between expensive, slow-producing quality and numerical quantity is of the essence. __________________ If you feel nuts, consult an expert.