Silent Victory - tactics discussion

nikimcbee · 02-20-12, 10:23 AM

A good example of how the US adapted and learned from the past was the "unrestricted submarine warfare" change in tactics.

Post WWI, everybody was outlawing the use of unrestricted submarine warfare, but the second the US was attacked, we dropped that law/rule. Atleast somebody in the naval college had paid attention to what Germany was almost able to achive with u-boats. The Japanese were married to the "subs-as-fleet-support" strategy.

Bilge_Rat · 02-20-12, 11:07 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by nikimcbee

A good example of how the US adapted and learned from the past was the "unrestricted submarine warfare" change in tactics.

Post WWI, everybody was outlawing the use of unrestricted submarine warfare, but the second the US was attacked, we dropped that law/rule. Atleast somebody in the naval college had paid attention to what Germany was almost able to achive with u-boats. The Japanese were married to the "subs-as-fleet-support" strategy.

An interesting bit of trivia is that the skipper of the first boat to make a patrol to Japan in dec. 41, Joe Grenfell in USS Gudgeon, carried a written order personally signed by his commander to carry out unrestricted submarine warfare. They were worried that they could technically be tried as pirates if they were captured by the Japanese.

02-20-12, 01:02 PM

I think that you guys are, in general being far too hard on the pre-war USN. If they were wedded to the false god of A.T. Mahan, they were certainly not alone and in many respects the USN proved to be doctrinally superior to everybody else where it mattered.

It was the belief that the submarine could act in concert with the Battle Fleet that lead directly to the design of the Fleet Boat. This resulted in the near perfect marriage of submarine design and unrestricted warfare doctrine that made the USN's operations in the Pacific the only truly successful submarine campaign to date. Without the extraordinary range, firepower and growth potential that was built into the Fleet Boat designs it is arguable that the submarine war against Japan would have been much different. Admiral Hart, himself a submariner who had studied German sub ops in the Great War, wanted smaller boats, S-Class sized but the Navy General Board insisted that only bigger boats would be compatible with fleet operations. Thus it was a happy coincidence that designs produced for a role they could never effectively fulfill were superbly adapted for duties that had been inconceivable before Pearl Harbor.

So, while it's easy to laugh at the Gun Club with 20/20 hindsight, it's important to recall that after 27-months of total war no battleship had been sunk by aircraft while at sea and only one sunk by submarine when under weigh, HMS Barham lost a month before Pearl Harbor.

Also one should not forget that the peacetime USN got it's air-sea doctrine pretty much on target. Seven months after Pearl, Midway, fought with pre-war aircraft using pre-war doctrine, training and commanders won perhaps the decisive naval battle of the war at Midway.

At Midway, submarines on both sides contributed to the outcome of the battle performing as adjuncts of the Fleet much as envisioned by the pre-war theorists. With I-168 scoring essentially the only Japanese success of the battle; sinking Yorktown and Hammann this tended to reinforce Japan's battlefleet oriented submarine doctrine. Meanwhile the Silent Service's lack of results in the battle provided the USN with further evidence that submarines were largely ineffective in the fleet support role and could serve best as commerce destroyers.

Platapus · 02-20-12, 03:12 PM

It is also interesting to note that up until the war, the primary target of the submarine was the combat ship.

Quote:

There had been no serious preparation for attacking merchant ships in prewar training; only one of thirty-six exercises conducted during 1940-1941 by the submarines of the Pacific Fleet had simulated an attack on a convoy of cargo ships. During the interwar period most naval officers assumed that in the event of war, submarines would be used for reconnaissance and attacking enemy battle fleets.

-- Struma, M., (2011) Surface and destroy. University Press of Kentucky p. 16.

I am working on a review of this book to be posted in the book forum.

nikimcbee · 02-21-12, 04:57 PM

Nevermind Silent Victory, bring on Roscoe's book:
http://books.google.com/books?id=5lT...attack&f=false

S38 vs the odds

. I just did this in my career. I sank 1 minesweeper, 1 transport 7000 tons, and 1 sub chaser.

Roger Dodger · 03-19-12, 07:04 PM

I found an interesting observation about the early use of SD RADAR in Blair's book, "Silent Victory": Pearl Harbor, December, 1941; First Patrols to Empire Waters":
". . . In addition to her Mark VI magnetic exploders, Plunger carried another secret weapon into combat: a primitive radar set known as the SD. The SD was new. It had extremely limited range, 6 to 10 miles. It was "nondirectional," useful primarily for detecting enemy aircraft. Its mast could be poked up before the boat surfaced.
Like many submarine skippers, (Dave) White was leery of the SD. In limited tests, he had found it temperamental and unreliable. It gave off a powerful signal which could be picked up by Japanese RDF stations. Unsparing use of the SD, White believed, was tantamount to breaking radio silence. It would make his presence known and reveal his exact location. The Japanese could send antisubmarine vessels or aircraft to attack him and route their shipping well clear of him. White preferred to depend on alert lookouts for spotting Japanese planes."

Now I know why those pesky patrol/float planes always seem to be vectored right at me - THEY ARE!

The SD RADAR is always on in the game while surfaced, and I regularly do a search for aircraft with extended antenna at periscope depth before surfacing.
If I spot a plane while submerged, I just lower the antenna and dive to around 150'. If I spot a plane on the surface, then I crash dive and make a 90 degree turn to right or left at 40' and continue down to 160' at flank speed, then slow to 1/3 ahead and continue down to below 200'. The planes do sometimes drop bombs or DCs, but I haven't been hit yet.

This is the first time I've seen the RDF triangulation problem noted anywhere.

Roger Dodger · 03-19-12, 08:32 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by nikimcbee

Nevermind Silent Victory, bring on Roscoe's book:
http://books.google.com/books?id=5lT...attack&f=false

S38 vs the odds

. I just did this in my career. I sank 1 minesweeper, 1 transport 7000 tons, and 1 sub chaser.

Thanks for the link. I got so jazzed after reading this that I ordered the book (Used - Good Condition) from one of the dealers on Amazon.com
United States Submarine Operations in World War II

by Theodore Roscoe
$32.95
Link to this title: http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listi...condition=used

More books are available at a similar price. Thanx again

02-20-12, 10:23 AM	#1
nikimcbee Fleet Admiral Join Date: Jul 2003 Location: Patroling the Slot. Posts: 17,952 Downloads: 90 Uploads: 0	A good example of how the US adapted and learned from the past was the "unrestricted submarine warfare" change in tactics. Post WWI, everybody was outlawing the use of unrestricted submarine warfare, but the second the US was attacked, we dropped that law/rule. Atleast somebody in the naval college had paid attention to what Germany was almost able to achive with u-boats. The Japanese were married to the "subs-as-fleet-support" strategy. __________________

02-21-12, 04:57 PM	#5
nikimcbee Fleet Admiral Join Date: Jul 2003 Location: Patroling the Slot. Posts: 17,952 Downloads: 90 Uploads: 0	Nevermind Silent Victory, bring on Roscoe's book: http://books.google.com/books?id=5lT...attack&f=false S38 vs the odds. I just did this in my career. I sank 1 minesweeper, 1 transport 7000 tons, and 1 sub chaser. __________________

03-19-12, 07:04 PM	#6
Roger Dodger Sonar Guy Join Date: Jul 2007 Location: Oregon, USA Posts: 384 Downloads: 74 Uploads: 0	The Dilemma of SD RADAR I found an interesting observation about the early use of SD RADAR in Blair's book, "Silent Victory": Pearl Harbor, December, 1941; First Patrols to Empire Waters": ". . . In addition to her Mark VI magnetic exploders, Plunger carried another secret weapon into combat: a primitive radar set known as the SD. The SD was new. It had extremely limited range, 6 to 10 miles. It was "nondirectional," useful primarily for detecting enemy aircraft. Its mast could be poked up before the boat surfaced. Like many submarine skippers, (Dave) White was leery of the SD. In limited tests, he had found it temperamental and unreliable. It gave off a powerful signal which could be picked up by Japanese RDF stations. Unsparing use of the SD, White believed, was tantamount to breaking radio silence. It would make his presence known and reveal his exact location. The Japanese could send antisubmarine vessels or aircraft to attack him and route their shipping well clear of him. White preferred to depend on alert lookouts for spotting Japanese planes." Now I know why those pesky patrol/float planes always seem to be vectored right at me - THEY ARE! The SD RADAR is always on in the game while surfaced, and I regularly do a search for aircraft with extended antenna at periscope depth before surfacing. If I spot a plane while submerged, I just lower the antenna and dive to around 150'. If I spot a plane on the surface, then I crash dive and make a 90 degree turn to right or left at 40' and continue down to 160' at flank speed, then slow to 1/3 ahead and continue down to below 200'. The planes do sometimes drop bombs or DCs, but I haven't been hit yet. This is the first time I've seen the RDF triangulation problem noted anywhere. __________________

02-20-12, 01:02 PM	#3
Randomizer Stowaway Posts: n/a Downloads: Uploads:	I think that you guys are, in general being far too hard on the pre-war USN. If they were wedded to the false god of A.T. Mahan, they were certainly not alone and in many respects the USN proved to be doctrinally superior to everybody else where it mattered. It was the belief that the submarine could act in concert with the Battle Fleet that lead directly to the design of the Fleet Boat. This resulted in the near perfect marriage of submarine design and unrestricted warfare doctrine that made the USN's operations in the Pacific the only truly successful submarine campaign to date. Without the extraordinary range, firepower and growth potential that was built into the Fleet Boat designs it is arguable that the submarine war against Japan would have been much different. Admiral Hart, himself a submariner who had studied German sub ops in the Great War, wanted smaller boats, S-Class sized but the Navy General Board insisted that only bigger boats would be compatible with fleet operations. Thus it was a happy coincidence that designs produced for a role they could never effectively fulfill were superbly adapted for duties that had been inconceivable before Pearl Harbor. So, while it's easy to laugh at the Gun Club with 20/20 hindsight, it's important to recall that after 27-months of total war no battleship had been sunk by aircraft while at sea and only one sunk by submarine when under weigh, HMS Barham lost a month before Pearl Harbor. Also one should not forget that the peacetime USN got it's air-sea doctrine pretty much on target. Seven months after Pearl, Midway, fought with pre-war aircraft using pre-war doctrine, training and commanders won perhaps the decisive naval battle of the war at Midway. At Midway, submarines on both sides contributed to the outcome of the battle performing as adjuncts of the Fleet much as envisioned by the pre-war theorists. With I-168 scoring essentially the only Japanese success of the battle; sinking Yorktown and Hammann this tended to reinforce Japan's battlefleet oriented submarine doctrine. Meanwhile the Silent Service's lack of results in the battle provided the USN with further evidence that submarines were largely ineffective in the fleet support role and could serve best as commerce destroyers.