Silent Victory - tactics discussion

[Platapus]

It is also important to keep in mind that at the start of the war, all the submarine captains were peace time captains.

How does a peace time captain keep his job or get promoted?

1. Not making mistakes
2. Making sure the boat passes all the inspections
3. Making sure that the crew does getin to trouble
4. Score high on exercises meaning do exactly what the exercise designers think you should do -- predictability.
5. Don't make organizational waves or take political chances.
6. Maintain your boat within the budget allotted to you

You can't blame the peace time captains from acting like peace time captains. That was how the Navy rewarded them. Those captains that did not act like peace time captains either never got promoted to captain or they were removed.

In peace time there are no ships to sink, no chances of heroism except for instances of accidents and then the captain would probably be fired anyway. Little chances to shine other than better inspection and exercise scores.

In peace time all you have is peace time bureaucracy. That was the "enemy" that our captains had to "fight". And our peace time captains did rather well operating in the hostile bureaucratic theater of operations.

7 Dec 41, a day which completely changed everything. Suddenly we needed a different kind of captain. Literally over night.

One who recognizes appropriate risks, ones who are aggressive. Perhaps even a little nuts helps. Probably not a captain that would have had a stellar peace time career.

It is only with a little hyperbole that I say that, in the context of 1940, a good war time sub captain is the exact opposite of a good peace time sub captain. But unfortunately, all we had were good peace time sub captains... who did the best they could.

Blair wrote of several good peace time captains who were so dedicated to their country that they voluntarily resigned their commend because they recognized that while they were good peace time captains they sucked at war time. That is a pretty heroic thing to do in my book.

[Torplexed]

In retrospect it's hardly surprising that things worked out as they did. Peacetime service requirements emphasizing drill and discipline did not necessarily select leaders best suited for the exacting conditions of real submarine warfare when lone COs could rationalize the need to withdraw, unhindered by the presence of higher brass who had their own periscope view of the situation. Not only did USN submariner training exaggerate caution, it also failed to instil the tenacity required simply to patrol for any length of time under war conditions. One CO returning from his failed attempt to penetrate the Gulf of Lingayen reported that his crew had been aboard under trying conditions since December 8th, "and an opportunity to rest and relax in the sunshine is rapidly becoming imperative for the maintenance of good health, morale and efficiency." His was a boat with air-conditioning, refrigerated food, separate messrooms and washing facilities and two bunk cabins called staterooms for officers and petty officers. Imagine him in command of a U-Boat!

Only actual combat can weed the passive commanders out, and in all navies the aces were a select group. It does appear however that US training and promotion methods, together with lack of previous submarine battle experience, and perhaps the American outlook on life, combined at the start of the war to cause a higher proportion of unsatisfactory submarine COs than were found in other major navies. But torpedo failure can't be omitted from the equation. Repeated misses and misfires were bound to lower morale, as they had among Donitz's U-boat COs in 1940.