Effective use of the Mk27 Cutie

[Anthony W.]

Originally Posted by Daniel Prates

An regarding the 'different reasults' which motivated my quote above, it should be pointed out that, at the end of the day, what would happen in real life is that there were no rule of thumb in most cases...

USS Yorktown - long live the ship that sank once for the Americans, and twice for the Japanese

Does anybody know about when they found out about having NOT sank two carriers, only one?

[magic452]

I would guess about the time planes from the second one sank their last carrier.

Magic

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by Anthony W.

USS Yorktown - long live the ship that sank once for the Americans, and twice for the Japanese

Does anybody know about when they found out about having NOT sank two carriers, only one?

Frankly, they may have never figured it out. If they did, it probably wasn't ever officially admitted. Japanese intelligence and recon became so muddled during the Battle of Midway that as night fell with the last Japanese carrier out of action, Nagumo was convinced he was still facing four intact US carriers. Two of the Yorktown class, and two of an unidentified class. It was at that point that Yamamoto with his surface forces too far from the scene of the battle and no fleet carriers left, decided to throw in the towel and cancel the invasion of Midway.

Afterwards, Japan claimed officially to it's people, that they won a victory sinking two US carriers, while losing only one. Incredibly, Tojo wasn't told of the defeat until a month after the battle. Even in the dark days of 1944, when anyone could see the war was lost, Japan's military never had the moral fortitude to revise it's inflated claims of enemy ships sunk, or to admit that it had lost a single battle to date.

[Stealhead]

The Japanese where not the only ones that mistook sinkings.We at first in the Coral Sea thought that we had sunk a full size carrier which was not the case.This is the nature of the fog of war no nation during war is willing to let its capacity be known so you have to rely on what you intel you have and what see or think you see sometimes pilots can get over excited in the heat of battle and think they attacked something other than what they in fact did or over estimate the damage they did.Hell a Japanese pilot got confused during the Coral Sea battle and attempted to land on the Yorktown!! the Yorktown's crew also thought it was a friendly plane that was about to land until it very close I assume that pilot got rather surprised when he saw AA fire come up at him.

We got very lucky at Midway to be honest the Japanese had damaged the Yorktown pretty well at Coral Sea and rightly expected it to be out of action for some time they underestimated our need for aircraft carriers.It turns out that we did major repairs on her in a short time(24 hours I think) not enough to be like new but enough to operate at the battle of Midway.Many people in hindsight forget that a wars out come is unknown until it actually happens.WE defeated the Japanese Navy soundly in WWII but had done very little to the majority of its ground forces and the Japanese showed at Iwo Jima and Okinawa that each battle was going to be more and more costly for the US so it is good that the war ended without having to invade the main Japanese islands the outcome may have been different.(it might not have been an unconditional surrender)

The Battle of Leyte Gulf is another battle that we got lucky with as well maybe even more so than at Midway.

Few people know that the US government did not make public the full extent of the damage incurred during Pearl Harbor because they where concerned that the truth would cause panic.During WWII few nations where fully truthful about certain events because of the need to maintain public support.This is why sinking reports of US subs where not publicly known for several months mainly because enemy agents could have fond this data useful if it was known to be very fresh which is another reason for media control.

[Torplexed]

Indeed. While Spruance and his staff were convinced the day after the battle that the Japanese carriers Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu had been dispatched, they thought perhaps the carrier Hiryu only crippled. And no one could discount the possibility of a fifth carrier out there. Like the Yorktown, the Japanese carrier Zuikakau could have been present at the battle. She was unscathed except for her heavy loss in pilots at the Coral Sea. Had she combined her decimated air group with that of the damaged Shokakau she would have only been a few planes short of her nominal establishment. But the Japanese were evidently convinced enough of another impending victory that working Zuikaku into the mix wasn't deemed worth the effort.

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by Stealhead

The Battle of Leyte Gulf is another battle that we got lucky with as well maybe even more so than at Midway.

I don't think Japan ever had a prayer at Leyte Gulf. Despite Admiral Halseys' blunders and arrogance, had Admiral Kurita broken through to MacArthur's anchorage, there were sufficient supplies and munitions unloaded ashore already to ensure that the loss of shipping need not threaten Sixth Army. Even if the Japanese had destroyed Taffy 3, or all three Taffys, the US would have suffered embarrassment rather than a disaster, as we had almost a hundred carriers in commission at that point in the war. The shocking double loss of the Japanese heavy cruisers Atago and Maya to submarine torpedoes before action was even joined showed a tactical carelessness amounting to recklessness as no ASW precautions were taken even though the Japanese knew via intercepted transmissions that US subs were in the area. The Japanese behavior throughout the battle suggest a resignation to death and a going through of the motions, more than a will to fight.

[WernherVonTrapp]

I wouldn't exactly say that we did very little to the majority of it's ground forces. The Japanese culture was imbued with the philosophy of death before surrender. This made them fierce in battle and yes, little was (or could be) accomplished in changing that aspect among their ranks. Though fierce as the later battles proved, they also proved that despite altering their tactics away from the early Banzai charges, little could be done to change the casualty ratio between them and their U.S. counterparts. Even in the battle of Iwo Jima, a unique landscape with every possible advantage to the defenders and where U.S. casualties outnumbered the Japanese (casualty lists included number of wounded), the Japanese deaths were three times higher than the U.S..

Even Peleliu, American deaths were about 1,200 compared to about 10,000 for the Japanese. By the time Okinawa was over, these contrasts in numbers killed would grow even larger. About 12,500 (U.S.) to about 95,000 Japanese. In my opinion, we rendered their ground forces ineffective. This, by no means, trivializes American casualties or the sacrifices our armed services made. If the Kamikaze was self-evident of anything, it was proof of the desperate measures needed to offset the ineffectiveness of their naval and ground forces.

We destroyed their ability for troop deployments and resupply. During some of the battles, the Japanese reverted back to the useless Banzai charges with nothing more than spears or bayonets affixed to poles. These are not the actions of an effective fighting force. It was their mere Bushido Code that not only kept them fighting, despite the futility, but also caused the catastrophic differences in the actual number of those killed. Wounded would consequently not be a standard of their casualty lists.
Yes they had the men, but I don't believe they had the means. Our tradition of holding life sacred, which I believe is superlative, causes us to count the casualties (rightfully so), that much more valuable.

[Stealhead]

Honestly I am basing my opinion more books written men on the ground not just general history books alone(though you can find many with differing views on this) a great book is With the Old Breed by Eugene Sledge a US Marine who fought with the Marines this is the view of a man in combat nothing more nothing less.Also do not forget that even Eisenhower was concerned about the war going on much longer and having to invade Japan he and others where concerned about war weary troops would refuse to fight that someone as wise as Eisenhower had this concern should not be taken lightly.At Okinawa 14,000 troops listed as "combat stress reactions" the highest rate for this in the entire war.

Also if you look at total casualties we lost 9804 which is pretty close to the Japanese estimated losses.(wounded men in most cases are no longer combatants)
add to Okinawa 38916 wounded and you have lost some for good others for less time 131571 American fighters.By listing only deaths you are ignoring much of the picture because you
ignore other losses that have an effect on a military force.Now clearly this trend would have been the same(or higher) upon invading main Japanese islands and likely would have been worse and god only knows how many indoctrinated Japanese would have been killed or killed them selves.Some US units on Iwo,Peielu,and Okinawa suffered 60% casualties that is a very high loss rate for an enemy that supposedly lacks the means and most cases was out numbered by the US and they had the intent to die so of course more of the Japanese died but that did much damage on the way down.Also they never count the troops that died of their wounds months or a few years later.I am not sure where your idea that they where inflicting less total casualties against us when in fact in each battle they where inflicting more is coming from.

Hitler chose to commit to the Battle of the Bulge because he felt that a major blow when they appeared beaten would have a negative effect on public opinion about the war in the Allied nations allowing him to sue for peace and this may have been possible we will never know because he failed to reach Antwerp.

The fact remains that there was still a large number of Japanese troops able to fight and taking into consideration the level of indoctrination they where still a very dangerous enemy any force willing to fight at the fanatical level is very dangerous.The loss rates suffered at Iwo Jima and Okinawa where not received well by public opinion one should not under estimate the effect of public opinion during war in a democratic nation like the US.

This is my opinion based years of studying the subject of the Pacific War and I wont change this view if your is different there is not much point on us tit for tatting each other seeing as our views are not the same.

[Anthony W.]

Originally Posted by Stealhead

one should not under estimate the effect of public opinion during war in a democratic nation like the US.

The US - during WWII - a democracy? Hardly. Roosevelt was running this country like some sort of moderate dictatorship.

[Stealhead]

Well I could say what I feel about that post but I wont.Though I will say that in any nation no matter the government public opinion has an effect this is why the Nazis had Herr Goebbels.

To be honest we are going way out of topic the last few posts here so If you want discus this a thread in general topics is much more appropriate but wont work out well such a topic relating to governments/actions in WWII will go down hill before you can say "jumping Jehovah" because there are so many folks with differing views about the whole thing and often feel very strongly what ever they think one reason I try to avoid such topics except among friends who have the same general view that I have.
It is much easier to discuss WWII with those who are like minded other wise you go from talking about WWII to acting out WWII in a thread and then it gets nasty and somebody gets put in the brig or keelhauled trust me it has happened before on subsim.And believe it or not once in a British enlisted club at an airbase in Germany I saw a brawl over such a topic it was Americans and Brits vs. other Americans and Brits disagreeing about WWII one of the enlisted club employees was German though she did not get involved well I think she called the MPs


I know I am saying this after posting my opinion but this can be hard to resist on something that I feel so strongly about I have had an interest in all things WWII since I was 8 years old.

[WernherVonTrapp]

I think my previous post was misinterpreted and/or misunderstood. I've read and can suggest more books than I care to remember but that is not the point. I was merely trying to make a point about, what I perceived as, a gross understatement concerning our armed forces actual effect on the Japanese ground forces during WWII.
I only digressed to the reference of casualties because I anticipated it as a potential point of distraction in a future reply. Incidentally, a Casualty is that which causes a soldier to become "combat ineffective". It doesn't necessarily mean that the soldier cannot return to fight another day, obviously depending on the type of illness or injury. A casualty can last merely the duration of a battle/campaign or it can last the entire war. Therefore, wounded men are not necessarily "in most cases no longer combatants".

Some may takes days, others weeks and other still, months to recover, but for the immediate necessity, they are considered casualties because they can no longer fight effectively in the battle at hand. As far as ignoring other losses, I'm not sure what you mean by that; Trench Foot, Dysentery, Malaria perhaps? The same things that effect the enemy troops fighting in the same area?

Anyway, back to my original subject which opened and closed my previous post. One of the best indicators that an engaged enemy is combat effective, is that his army/troops go on the offense and advance. One of the first indicators that his army is becoming less combat effective is that he is forced to withdraw or go into a defensive mode. I'm not talking a tactical defense, which can sometimes be implemented to sustain an advance, I'm talking strategically, on a grander scale involving all of the enemy's resources, including his ground forces.
I think it was Bull Halsey who quoted, "Before Guadalcanal the enemy advanced at his pleasure -- after Guadalcanal he retreated at ours."

Retreating is an act by an enemy who has lost, or is losing, his combat effectiveness. This should be self-evident, unless of course, it is used as a ploy or in a tactical manner to maintain a position pending reinforcements. This however, was not the case concerning the Japanese Army.
I didn't tender my perspective in order to change yours. I don't need to list my own study references in order to try and sway your opinion. I was simply expressing some facts that I believe are self-evident. Some things just don't need any further explanation. Like, if a car veers off the road and strikes a tree, the tree cannot be blamed for the driver failing to maintain control of his vehicle.
I'm not upset in the least bit and I apologize if I upset you with my different perspective. I was only addressing the issue of "doing little to affect their ground forces".

[Daniel Prates]

Originally Posted by Stealhead

Hitler chose to commit to the Battle of the Bulge because he felt that a major blow when they appeared beaten would have a negative effect on public opinion about the war in the Allied nations allowing him to sue for peace and this may have been possible we will never know because he failed to reach Antwerp.

It is hard to say that he was doing rational choices by this period.

[Anthony W.]

Originally Posted by Daniel Prates

It is hard to say that he was doing rational choices by this period.

Hitler's generals wanted peace. He was still insane enough to think he had a chance.

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by WernherVonTrapp

I wouldn't exactly say that we did very little to the majority of it's ground forces. The Japanese culture was imbued with the philosophy of death before surrender. This made them fierce in battle and yes, little was (or could be) accomplished in changing that aspect among their ranks. Though fierce as the later battles proved, they also proved that despite altering their tactics away from the early Banzai charges, little could be done to change the casualty ratio between them and their U.S. counterparts.

I think my favorite quote regarding Japanese soldiers was made by a British officer in Burma who called them "first-class soldiers in a third class army." They showed an incredible capacity for enduring hunger, privation, brutality by their higher-ups and sustaining staggering losses among their ranks. It became quite normal for them to fight in a condition of semi-starvation and non-existent medical services. But were often indifferently equipped with virtually obsolescent weapons, and often poorly led by militant junior officers of a violently aggressive stripe who loathed ever being on the defensive for long.

[Thrair]

Once upon a time, this was a thread about a torpedo.