F-22 - a plane you won't go to war with?

Yea but it looks cool. If there is no war it will be nice to look at it in air shows etc.

[Kazuaki Shimazaki II]

Originally Posted by Skybird

The article states that they have too many major malfunctions even in flight, so I doubt that those 30 hours maintenance is just about glue to dry.

To be exact:

Originally Posted by Article P.2

Over the four-year period, the F-22's average maintenance time per hour of flight grew from 20 hours to 34, with skin repairs accounting for more than half of that time -- and more than half the hourly flying costs -- last year, according to the test and evaluation office.

The positive way to look at this is that if they gave up skin repairs, they can cut the time by half. Obviously, if the stealth skin deteroriates, stealth would suffer, but materials are only half of stealth (around 20dB) worth with the rest being shaping.
Thus a wartime expedient might be to just give up maintaining the stealth coating. The F-22's "total stealth" is somewhere in the -30 to -40 region. Even if its effectiveness thus falls to zero, it would only be a 20dB deteoriation and it'll be a -10 to -20dBSM aircraft, which still makes it stealthier than a "prime condition" Typhoon.
The stealth skin would seem to be materials not living up to its promise, and thus it is doubtful a permanent fix can be found. As for the rest of the problems, they don't seem to be problems that can't be solved ... eventually.

with regard to that I called it economic inefficiency - not so much meaning the insditrial economy damage or the GOP and national budget, but workinging efficiency. In a big major confloict - the scenario that I argue is to be unliekly nowadays - compared to other planes, the F-22 spends too little time in the sky and too much on the ground.

See above.

The specifications for the F-22 roots back in the 70s.

Don't know what you are trying to say here. What I was trying to say is that tech has advanced since the mid-1990s, and not in a way particularly friendly to stealth aircraft, which means even if we assume DERA was 100% accurate in its estimate in 1990s, by now the estimate would have slewed to a much lesser advantage. It is not hard to guess where the advantage was for the EF and F-22, and not hard to see that the F-22 has broader (more multidimensional) and deeper (more superiority margin), which means it would have lost less of its estimated edge.

Not too mention that those kill ratios found in that SU-35 simulation are, like any military exercise and analysis, not beyond disucssion.

Of course, but frankly, I don't see a whole lot of possible arguments that would make things chummier for the Typhoon relative to the F-22 or the Su-35 int erms of performance.

As you said: against a first-rate power. the argument is that a conflict against a first rate power is extremely unlikely, and the kind of wars we have seen since WWII and in the present and will see in the forseeable future are no conflicts against firtst rate powers. The F-22 is a overpriced system for a type of war that will not be.

I don't disagree that the United States will do well to reduce its total military budget. GIVEN a particular budget, however, I don't see cutting the F-22 program as the way to go despite its travails, especially since the JSF program isn't going so swimmily itself.
As for retaining optimal ability for dealing with first-rate powers ... the average citizen and politician (and even some politically motivated general) might want to optimize their military so they can use it to kick ass against weak countries more often and get some "Return on Investment", even if it means sacrificing some ability on the high end. It must not be forgotten, however, that the military is ultimately an insurance policy against the unlikely, but dangerous threat of the "high-end war". Intervening against weak nation might be nice and probable but probably isn't quite vital to the nation's interest. A strong nation is much more likely to actually hold a vital interest. Is it wise to gamble away the ability to prevail here, however unlikely, to improve ability to kick ass in more probable but ultimately less dangerous "Low intensity" conflicts?
Less than optimal arrangements for LIC means some extra blood. Less than optimal arrangements for HIC might mean losing the war. America's choice...