Topside torpedoes

[John Pancoast]

Originally Posted by Jimbuna

Hi John if you'd asked me the other night on Discord I would have still had access to my reference materials but as is typical, I moved them into the loft this morning.

Sooooo iirc it was early to mid 44 when the Allies gained air supremacy which meant U-Boats could not stay surfaced long enough to charge their batteries, not to mention the long process of loading torpedoes.

For a more precise answer I'd suggest having a look over at https://uboat.net/

Thanks Jimbuna.

[Jimbuna]

Originally Posted by John Pancoast

Thanks Jimbuna.

No problem and iirc the TypeII, XXIII and XXI were the only boats designed not to carry externals.

[John Pancoast]

Originally Posted by Jimbuna

No problem and iirc the TypeII, XXIII and XXI were the only boats designed not to carry externals.

[Aktungbby]

the question intrigued me so I did some serious pervitin induced homework over breakfast. Nothing is particularly extant on torpedo storage other than it was dangerous, time consuming and only suited to calm waters; which the winter Atlantic was decidedly not! they key to the myriad aspects of the issue was the closing of the Mid-atlantic Gap. Only low maintenance G7a eels could be carried externally as every other type (G7e's ZaunK's, Foxers ) required high battery maintenance-new fact for me! I'll be more authentic in SH-V!! Also, torpedos in the external containers were susceptible to depth-charge attacks and were often damaged. No astute commander following such an attack would risk the amount of time 'hazarding his vessel' against the futility of a defunct eel lugged inside the pressure hull. For certain, the type XI's wouldn't have wasted the always precious fuel-consuming weight on its capacity for 10 eels stored topside As mid ocean Milch-cow resupply subs got scarcer

 

Ten boats of this type were commissioned:

• U-459, commissioned 15 November 1941, scuttled 24 July 1943
• U-460, commissioned 24 December 1941, sunk 4 October 1943
• U-461, commissioned 30 January 1942, sunk 30 July 1943
• U-462, commissioned 5 March 1942, sunk 30 July 1943
• U-463, commissioned 2 April 1942, sunk 15 May 1943
• U-464, commissioned 30 April 1942, scuttled 20 August 1942
• U-487, commissioned 21 December 1942, sunk 13 July 1943
• U-488, commissioned 1 February 1943, sunk 26 April 1944
• U-489, commissioned 8 March 1943, sunk 4 August 1943
• U-490, commissioned 27 March 1943, sunk 12 June 1944

The Mid-Atlantic Gap is a geographical term applied to an undefended area beyond the reach of land-based RAF Coastal Commandantisubmarine (A/S) aircraft during the Battle of the Atlantic in the Second World War. It is frequently known as The Black Pit, as well as the Atlantic Gap, Air Gap, Greenland Gap, or just "the Gap". This resulted in heavy merchant shipping losses to U-boats. The gap was eventually closed in May 1943, as growing numbers of VLR Liberators (Very Long Range models) and escort carriers became available, and as basing problems were addressed. Increasing availability of escort carriers reduced the hazard of the Gap. After a crisis in March which nearly had Churchill and the Admiralty abandon convoys altogether, the Mid-Atlantic Gap was finally closed in May 1943, when RCAF VLRs became operational in Newfoundland, by which time the Battle of the Atlantic was largely won.

• • Given the decisive 'Black May' of 1943: 18 Uboats lost w/o corresponding damage to allied merchant vessels in the Atlantic; with 43 total due to losses in other theatres, 14 (most from all powerful aircraft) causing loss of experienced crews: especially the junior officers also intended as the next generation of kaleuns, the 'jig was up' in the first semester of '43. Wanze, foxer, Zaunkönig, and radar vulnerable schnorkels could not undo May '43. Döenitz stopping the Uboat campaign pulled all his boats on the 24th of the 'merry' month of May....for the allies-FIDO, Johnny Walkers 'creeping attacks', Liberator B-24's, and escort carriers! von C's ON WAR Rule one: "In all things be 'very strong"; two:"whenever possible increase firepower(numeric superiority-not just technical superiority; three: " Never count on your opponent doing what your plan call for him to do...." for Germany all 3 rules met with: "war is simple but sometimes the simple thing is hard!" My bet is, externally stored U-boat eels began declining in June 1943 when Doenitz resumed his futile efforts...saving the Reich a few RieichsMarks for the Russian front ...pending further investigations of course!

[John Pancoast]

Originally Posted by Aktungbby

the question intrigued me so I did some serious pervitin induced homework over breakfast. Nothing is particularly extant on torpedo storage other than it was dangerous, time consuming and only suited to calm waters; which the winter Atlantic was decidedly not! they key to the myriad aspects of the issue was the closing of the Mid-atlantic Gap. Only low maintenance G7a eels could be carried externally as every other type (G7e's ZaunK's, Foxers ) required high battery maintenance-new fact for me! I'll be more authentic in SH-V!! Also, torpedos in the external containers were susceptible to depth-charge attacks and were often damaged. No astute commander following such an attack would risk the amount of time 'hazarding his vessel' against the futility of a defunct eel lugged inside the pressure hull. For certain, the type XI's wouldn't have wasted the always precious fuel-consuming weight on its capacity for 10 eels stored topside As mid ocean Milch-cow resupply subs got scarcer

 

Ten boats of this type were commissioned:

• U-459, commissioned 15 November 1941, scuttled 24 July 1943
• U-460, commissioned 24 December 1941, sunk 4 October 1943
• U-461, commissioned 30 January 1942, sunk 30 July 1943
• U-462, commissioned 5 March 1942, sunk 30 July 1943
• U-463, commissioned 2 April 1942, sunk 15 May 1943
• U-464, commissioned 30 April 1942, scuttled 20 August 1942
• U-487, commissioned 21 December 1942, sunk 13 July 1943
• U-488, commissioned 1 February 1943, sunk 26 April 1944
• U-489, commissioned 8 March 1943, sunk 4 August 1943
• U-490, commissioned 27 March 1943, sunk 12 June 1944

• • Given the decisive 'Black May' of 1943: 18 Uboats lost w/o corresponding damage to allied merchant vessels in the Atlantic; with 43 total due to losses in other theatres, 14 (most from all powerful aircraft) causing loss of experienced crews: especially the junior officers also intended as the next generation of kaleuns, the 'jig was up' in the first semester of '43. Wanze, foxer, Zaunkönig, and radar vulnerable schnorkels could not undo May '43. Döenitz stopping the Uboat campaign pulled all his boats on the 24th of the 'merry' month of May....for the allies-FIDO, Johnny Walkers 'creeping attacks', Liberator B-24's, and escort carriers! von C's ON WAR Rule one: "In all things be 'very strong"; two:"whenever possible increase firepower(numeric superiority-not just technical superiority; three: " Never count on your opponent doing what your plan call for him to do...." for Germany all 3 rules met with: "war is simple but sometimes the simple thing is hard!" My bet is, externally stored U-boat eels began declining in June 1943 when Doenitz resumed his futile efforts...saving the Reich a few RieichsMarks for the Russian front ...pending further investigations of course!

I also seem to recall that pressures at depth messed with them too.

[Aktungbby]

Originally Posted by John Pancoast

I can't remember; what year did the u-boats stop carrying these ?

Originally Posted by John Pancoast

I also seem to recall that pressures at depth messed with them too.

I read
up on that too in the course of composing my post; but that had been solved-scandal notwithstanding- prior to the period involved with your question or Jimbuna's time frame. Essentially, I'm interested in finding any actual 'eel' manifest of a June '43 non-ace skippered U-boat outbound for the Gap....'twould shed much insight on the question.

[John Pancoast]

Originally Posted by Aktungbby

I read
up on that too in the course on comprising my post but that had been solved-scandal notwithstanding prior to the period involved with your question or Jimbuna's time frame. Essentially I'm interested in finding any actual 'eel' manifest of a June '43 non-ace skippered U-boat outbound for the Gap....'twould shed much insight on the question.

I think Blair mentioned some info. in his book, but my second volume fell apart recently.

[Aktungbby]

Originally Posted by John Pancoast

I think Blair mentioned some info. in his book, but my second volume fell apart recently.

You should see my dogeared, margin-notes crammed copy of Clausewitz ON WAR I've got Blair's two volume on kindle-saves wear, tear and space on my stressed out military-book shelves. Considering Germany's generals utilized this book :

 

On War is an unfinished work. Clausewitz had set about revising his accumulated manuscripts in 1827, but did not live to finish the task. His wife edited his collected works and published them between 1832 and 1835.(a little like Lucy Custer writing about George Armstrong C.; and perpetuating a myth to earn a living in widowhood ??!!) His 10-volume collected works contain most of his larger historical and theoretical writings, though not his shorter articles and papers or his extensive correspondence with important political, military, intellectual and cultural leaders in the Prussian state. On War is formed by the first three volumes and represents his theoretical explorations. It is one of the most important treatises on political-military analysis and strategy ever written, and remains both controversial and influential on strategic thinking. On War is a work rooted solely in the world of the nation state...It has been blamed for the level of destruction involved in the First and Second World Wars, but it seems rather that Clausewitz (who did not actually use the term "total war") had merely foreseen the inevitable development that started with the huge, patriotically motivated armies of the Napoleonic wars. These wars resulted (though war's evolution has not yet ended) in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with all the forces and capabilities of the state devoted to destroying forces and capabilities of the enemy state (thus "total war"). Conversely, Clausewitz has also been seen as "The preeminent military and political strategist of limited war in modern times." who knows, maybe von C.'s wife is the real culprit; and not der Kaiser Wilhelm....

[FUBAR295]

Originally Posted by Aktungbby

My bet is, externally stored U-boat eels began declining in June 1943 when Doenitz resumed his futile efforts...saving the Reich a few RieichsMarks for the Russian front ...pending further investigations of course!

You were close on the date, and looks like 30 April 1943 is the time the orders went out and mentioned in Doenitz KTB on 7 May 1943. Gold star for you.

I always find reading Doenitz's KTB interesting as there are some gems of information in there if you care to look for them.

Good hunting,
FUBAR295

[Aktungbby]

I always find reading Doenitz's KTB interesting as there are some gems of information in there if you care to look for them.

The information is interesting but what strikes home is the consistent undertone of chaos and less than victory even in the daily reports. The Kreigsmarine is not winning at all; it is knee-jerk responding to the allied effort-particularly the air power- against which there is no solution.... In police work this is reactive not proactive. To win a global strategic war ya gotta be proactive and make the allies respond (knee-jerk) futilely to what you are doing to them. Minor tactical propaganda bright spots wll not carry the day. From may '43 of particular interest:

Originally Posted by May '43 ktb

The gaps caused by a rapid succession of convoy attacks in the North Atlantic during March had to be closed rapidly, as a large number of boats were needed to intercept the then widely scattered convoys. The IXc boats putting out in March and the steady stream of VIIc boats leaving port in April were able to make good this deficiency. b) Attacks on convoys during the past two months have definitely shown that Type IX boats are very vulnerable to bombing or depth charge attacks by reason of their more complicated structure. Comparative losses in the Atlantic give the following picture:

Losses:

Type IX Type VIIc March: 5 7 2 of these during attack on convoy 4 of these during attack on convoy - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - April: 7 and 1 boat that struck a mine 4 5 of these during attack on convoy 2 of these during attack on convoy - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The ratio of Type IX to Type VIIc boats is 1 - 3. Hence the losses of Type IXc boats are much heavier, now that enemy defences in the North Atlantic have been strengthened, and operations are only justifiable if chances of success are proportionally increased. c) The expectation of better opportunities in the North Atlantic which led to the order for operations there being issued on 6.4 has not been borne out by the final information reports for March and April made by boats in the Cape Town, Natal - Freetown and Caribbean area. Attacks made on convoys by U 510, 169, 515 showed that great successes are possible because of favorable anti-submarine conditions (few naval escorts with convoys and they lack experience). Thus despite less shipping in these areas chances are actually no less than in the North Atlantic. It has therefore been decided: Type IXc boats leaving French ports are to be detailed to remote western or southern operational areas. Boats of the same type from home ports will still make their first operational trip in the North Atlantic.

In short: the bigger badder IX types (with 33% more torprdoes??!!) are removed from the principle zone of conflict- the mid Atlantic convoy routes....and as in the post above only carrying 66% of their intended torpedo loads any way. (15 0f 22) Or as I pointed out with Hardigan (post#8) and his 15 eels as the prima facia example: 8 ships will not be sunk and he was an exceptionally proactive ace kaleun. Von C's rule 2: "whenever possible increase firepower" is kaput by '43; no victory at sea is feasible.

[John Pancoast]

Originally Posted by Aktungbby

[COLOR=palegreen]The information is interesting but what strikes home is the consistent undertone of chaos and less than victory even in the daily reports. The Kreigsmarine is not winning at all; it is knee-jerk responding to the allied effort-particularly the air power- against which there is no solution.... In police work this is reactive not proactive. To win a global strategic war ya gotta be proactive and make the allies respond (knee-jerk) futilely to what you are doing to them. Minor tactical propaganda bright spots wll not carry the day.

I agree completely with your thoughts; some of the ideas Doenitz et al came up with make one shake their head at their obvious silliness and no chance of success and that's not just from a hindsight point of view nor the usual "It was Hitler's fault, if he'd only listened to me" so common in memoirs.
"Chaos" is a perfect description for it. Always seems to be a "What should we do? ?" aspect, followed by a "I don't know" to many decisions.

Partly it's because Germany was so outclassed in manpower, industry, and technical areas but just as much because Doenitz was just plain "out Admiraled".

That's not meant to be braggadocio; more of what seems to be fact.