Nine dead, 50 seriously injured after head-on train crash in Bavaria, Germany

[Oberon]

Originally Posted by kraznyi_oktjabr

Gentlemen, you seem to be making assumption which is not necesssarily true. That is that there was signal displaying danger aspect. In early 2000s in Savonia Railway in Finland between Kouvola and Mikkeli (don't remember exact spot) was incident where two passengers trains travelling in opposite directions had routes set and protected into same single tracked block with all main and distant signals displaying Proceed and Expect Proceed aspects.

Disaster was avoided only because one of train drivers remembered that there was supposed to be passing at loop and he should have had route set into loop track. Therefore distant signal should have had Expect 35 (proceed at maximum speed of 35 km/h, points ahead are set for diverging route) aspect instead of Expect Proceed.

This isn't very unlike scenario but still possible.

Originally Posted by Skybird

Media report that the investigating police now is very strongly focussed on human error made by a traffic regulator. All tracks seem to lead there.

I presume by traffic regulator you mean what we in English would call a signalman or dispatcher? This would correlate with what krazyni put as well in that both trains got a clear aspect. One would have thought in this day and age that there would be something in the computing system that would have picked this up and flashed up a warning to the signalman that he was about to clear a train onto an occupied block.
Of course, it's possible that the signal itself was at fault and showed a clear aspect when it should have shown a danger, this is what caused the train crash at Clapham Junction back in 1989 because of rushed engineering work an old wire had not been isolated and as a result 35 people died and nearly 500 were injured.

Human error in the signalling department wouldn't surprise me though, there are plenty of crashes in history which can be traced to that, the worst train crash in the UK was primarily down to signalling error, and it goes to show that despite all the computer back-ups we put into a system, it's still only as strong as its weakest point, which is invariably the fleshy thing operating it.

[kraznyi_oktjabr]

Originally Posted by Oberon

I presume by traffic regulator you mean what we in English would call a signalman or dispatcher? This would correlate with what krazyni put as well in that both trains got a clear aspect. One would have thought in this day and age that there would be something in the computing system that would have picked this up and flashed up a warning to the signalman that he was about to clear a train onto an occupied block.
Of course, it's possible that the signal itself was at fault and showed a clear aspect when it should have shown a danger, this is what caused the train crash at Clapham Junction back in 1989 because of rushed engineering work an old wire had not been isolated and as a result 35 people died and nearly 500 were injured.

In Savonia case such conflicting route assignment should have been impossible as computer system which controlled signals and points in that railway at the time should have prevented it from happening. I don't remember what turned out to be the problem here.

Originally Posted by Oberon

Human error in the signalling department wouldn't surprise me though, there are plenty of crashes in history which can be traced to that, the worst train crash in the UK was primarily down to signalling error, and it goes to show that despite all the computer back-ups we put into a system, it's still only as strong as its weakest point, which is invariably the fleshy thing operating it.

Unfortunately that is very true. In 1996 Jokela rail accident was caused by train driver missing signal and as result coming at excessive speed into junction and derailed. In 1998 Jyväskylä rail accident train approaching Jyväskylä railway station came at excessive speed to points most likely because (tired) train driver was driving by routine (based on reconstruction) and missed signals indicating changed routing. In normal routing train goes through 80 km/h points closer to station, but in changed route there was 35 km/h points farther away from station.

In 1998 Suonenjoki rail accident InterCIty train departing station passed signal at danger, drove through points and crashed head on with freight train. In this case driving through points (forcing them off their original position) triggered alarm in dispatchers panel but by then trains had already crashed.

Common nominator in all those accidents was lack of any onboard proteection system like your TPWS or PZB. Implementation of such systems was progressing slowly and only after two consecutive fatal accidents (Jokela and Jyväskylä) was program accelerated and considered urgent. This despite several near disasters, rear endings speeding incidents and so on over years. Implementation - albeit in more limited form - began slightly before 1956 Kuurila rail disaster

 

Steam locomotive hauled sleeper express train and diesel multiple unit operated express train crashed because of signalman's error. Heavy steam locomotive essentially drove through first two carriages of relatively light weigth DMU. Additionally as locomotive's tender derailed it crushed several wooden passenger cars behind it.

and was completed in main lines in early 21st century. Many secondary and branch lines (some with passenger service) still do not have any such system.

Writing this somewhat off topic post reminded me of another failure point. I don't know what is situation with German safety systems but until last year (any maybe still in some locomotives) ours is as standard turned off and must be turned on by train driver. This is done manually every time train is moved first time from that control position (cab in MU and box cab locos, control stand in hood units). That changed only after 2014 Hyvinkää incident where driver of commuter train forgot to turn system on and as result there was no protection from his second error of coming at excessive speed into points. Fortunately that didn't end into derailment.

[Aktungbby]

A small silver cloud it seems:

Due to Bavaria's Fasching version of this week's carnival celebrations, the train was initially believed to be carrying fewer passengers than would normally be expected during commuter hours. Many children would also have usually been travelling to school, but are currently on holiday.

"Tuesday morning was caused by "human error," anonymous sources close to the investigation told German media on Tuesday. Who exactly was responsible for the collision that left 10 people dead and dozens injured remained unknown, authorities said. Before the confirmation of human error, earlier theories as to the cause of the crash had circled around the system that forces trains to brake when they are on the wrong track in order to circumvent such tragedies. According to rail operator Deutsche Bahn, this computer system was enabled at the time of the crash and had just recently been tested for functionality."

[Skybird]

It is confirmed that it was human error committed by the "Fahrdienstleiter" (signal man, dispatcher, traffic regulator, however you call him in English). No alcohol and no intention, drug test results still missing, but most likely nothing there, too. He tried to radio both train via emergency calls and sent out warnings, but to no avail.

The man is 39 years old, and serves in his job since 20 years.

Just a terrible human mistake, like throwing a glass of water off the table with the ellbow. I cannot condemn him. I do not want to be in his skin now.

Charges are about "fahrlässige Tötung" - negligent homicide.

[Jimbuna]

A potential maximum sentence of five years in prison if found guilty.

[kraznyi_oktjabr]

Originally Posted by Skybird

It is confirmed that it was human error committed by the "Fahrdienstleiter" (signal man, dispatcher, traffic regulator, however you call him in English). No alcohol and no intention, drug test results still missing, but most likely nothing there, too. He tried to radio both train via emergency calls and sent out warnings, but to no avail.

The man is 39 years old, and serves in his job since 20 years.

Just a terrible human mistake, like throwing a glass of water off the table with the ellbow. I cannot condemn him. I do not want to be in his skin now.

Charges are about "fahrlässige Tötung" - negligent homicide.

How is that possible? Here we have (in mainlines and many branches) mechanical/electric safety checks which (in theory, see my preivous post) are intended to prevent setting conflicting routes. Is there not such safety systems in place in German railways or atleast in that accident route?

[Skybird]

The safeties all worked as they should. But one of the trains was late, and he used an override command to bypass a red signal for it to get it rolling/keep it rolling. When he realised his mistake, he tried to warn the trains, but it was too late.

No technical failure.

[I'mOnABoat]

Wow. That's sad. I think making a mistake like that would destroy me. I would never be the same again. I feel bad for him and for the families of everyone that was on either train. The whole thing is just really sad.