Map and chart for U.S and Canada cost,with nets and mines update!

[ryanglavin]

Originally Posted by jimbuna

It is a fine line trying to form a balance between historical accuracy, realism and gameplay immersion.

One area we believed was seriously unhistorical was the games inability to prevent harbour raiding anywhere the individual chose.

To this end we put nets and mines, not so much as to make them impossible to enter but to at least make the effort more challenging with a leaning toward what was more historically accurate (certainly in most ports).

Hey jim, you got a map for murmansk?

[Jimbuna]

Originally Posted by ryanglavin

Hey jim, you got a map for murmansk?

Here ya go....crap writing an all

[Gerald]

Originally Posted by ryanglavin

Yes, unprotected, but you really can't blame King. For a really good support argument, Clay Blair goes on on pretty much a 5 page rant supporting King. It actually makes sense, which is the cool part.

About historical argument,can you be more specific in your speech,I refer to your last part of Clay Blair and his title-role under the War.

[FIREWALL]

I think what we all forget sometimes is.

The GWX Team were not made priviy of the Hardcode in SH3 and did their best to work around it.

To those that don't think GWX NYGM are realistic enough.

Take a Year out of your life and show us what you can build.

[Gerald]

Originally Posted by FIREWALL

I think what we all forget sometimes is.

The GWX Team were not made priviy of the Hardcode in SH3 and did their best to work around it.

To those that don't think GWX NYGM are realistic enough.

Take a Year out of your life and show us what you can build.

GWX Dev Team,they implant the sharpness for the game.for me is this high priority and outstanding.

[nemchenk]

Originally Posted by FIREWALL

Take a Year out of your life and show us what you can build.

Indeed. However, the first step is to identify what a new mod is trying to "fix", which is why I asked my question. I'm sure I won't be able to "take a year out of my life", but there may very well be things which can be improved in GWX Gold, and I plan to contribute my efforts to making GWX the best it can be.

I apologise if my comments appear to be disparaging of the GWX team and their efforts -- that could not be further from what my intention is. However, if there are areas where GWX can be improved I don't see why we, the playerbase, should not explore ways of doing so.


Respectfully,

nemchenk

[ryanglavin]

Originally Posted by Vendor

About historical argument,can you be more specific in your speech,I refer to your last part of Clay Blair and his title-role under the War.

I'll find it in the book for you, but for a quick reference, its the last 1/4th of the first volume, which was drumbeat.
If I can recall correctly, Blair made the claim that, King wanted to build more escorts for coastal waters, but the British and convoys took priority.


Edit: great, can't find the book.

[Gerald]

Originally Posted by ryanglavin

I'll find it in the book for you, but for a quick reference, its the last 1/4th of the first volume, which was drumbeat.
If I can recall correctly, Blair made the claim that, King wanted to build more escorts for coastal waters, but the British and convoys took priority.


Edit: great, can't find the book.

If you find more about the book,let me be notify if there are some supplementary or link.....

[irish1958]

Originally Posted by ryanglavin

I'll find it in the book for you, but for a quick reference, its the last 1/4th of the first volume, which was drumbeat.
If I can recall correctly, Blair made the claim that, King wanted to build more escorts for coastal waters, but the British and convoys took priority.


Edit: great, can't find the book.

That is quite true; all admirals wanted more of everything and they had to make do with what was available. The war dept stripped the Pacific fleet of most of their destroyers and sent them to the British. Because of Republican resistance in the Congress, no effort to gear up for war occurred before 1942 and decisions to concentrate on building the Army (and Marines), the Pacific fleet, and the Manhattan project took precedence.
However, the Navy department did nothing to limit merchant losses until 1943.
No coastal blackouts, no air patrols, no arming of merchant vessels, no formation of convoys to make use of the limited resources, no effort to seek out and eliminate the milk cow supply subs, without which the patrols to the East and Gulf coasts of the USA would be severely limited or impossible.
Admiral King was responsible for all of the above omissions.

[Gerald]

Originally Posted by irish1958

That is quite true; all admirals wanted more of everything and they had to make do with what was available. The war dept stripped the Pacific fleet of most of their destroyers and sent them to the British. Because of Republican resistance in the Congress, no effort to gear up for war occurred before 1942 and decisions to concentrate on building the Army (and Marines), the Pacific fleet, and the Manhattan project took precedence.
However, the Navy department did nothing to limit merchant losses until 1943.
No coastal blackouts, no air patrols, no arming of merchant vessels, no formation of convoys to make use of the limited resources, no effort to seek out and eliminate the milk cow supply subs, without which the patrols to the East and Gulf coasts of the USA would be severely limited or impossible.
Admiral King was responsible for all of the above omissions.

what more can I ask for,true and hard info.
-Thank you!

[irish1958]

And Admiral King's greatest sin was to totally ignore the 2 and 1/2 years of British experience with anti-sub warfare (ASW).

[Gerald]

Originally Posted by irish1958

And Admiral King's greatest sin was to totally ignore the 2 and 1/2 years of British experience with anti-sub warfare (ASW).

He probable be hard controversial also.many people suffer with his denial of innovation in new technological,or was he despotic?

[Jimbuna]

Originally Posted by irish1958

That is quite true; all admirals wanted more of everything and they had to make do with what was available. The war dept stripped the Pacific fleet of most of their destroyers and sent them to the British. Because of Republican resistance in the Congress, no effort to gear up for war occurred before 1942 and decisions to concentrate on building the Army (and Marines), the Pacific fleet, and the Manhattan project took precedence.
However, the Navy department did nothing to limit merchant losses until 1943.
No coastal blackouts, no air patrols, no arming of merchant vessels, no formation of convoys to make use of the limited resources, no effort to seek out and eliminate the milk cow supply subs, without which the patrols to the East and Gulf coasts of the USA would be severely limited or impossible.
Admiral King was responsible for all of the above omissions.

Sadly, that was the case

[Gerald]

Now I`ts time to go South ,Gulf of Mexico,and see what they can offer me,but the trip is long and to have much torps i`ts good (IXC) but I need avoid convoy and only take singel ships,so after the relevant info from Mr jim,about the ports in the Gulf, I can sit and relaxing.

[ryanglavin]

King employed coastal convoying in May 1942, using small coastal vessels and private vessels.

Found this also: Professor Robert W. Love has stated that "Operation Drumbeat (or Paukenschlag) off the Atlantic Coast in early 1942 succeeded largely because the U.S. Navy was already committed to other tasks: transatlantic escort-of-convoy operations, defending troop transports, and maintaining powerful, forward-deployed Atlantic Fleet striking forces to prevent a breakout of heavy German surface forces. Navy leaders, especially Admiral King, were unwilling to risk troop shipping to provide escorts for coastal merchant shipping. Unscheduled, emergency deployments of Army units also created disruptions to navy plans, as did other occasional unexpected tasks. Contrary to the traditional historiography, neither Admiral King’s unproven yet widely alleged Anglophobia, an equally undocumented navy reluctance to accept British advice, nor a preference for another strategy caused the delay in the inauguration of costal escort-of-convoy operations. The delay was due to a shortage of escorts, and that resulted from understandably conflicting priorities, a state of affairs that dictated all Allied strategy until 1944."