USN ASuW Doctrin

MBot · 09-24-08, 03:16 AM

I posted this over in a thread in the Sub Command forum. But since this forum seems to have more traffic, I hope nobody minds if I open a new topic for it here:

What was the ASuW doctrin of the USN during the cold war? Let's keep the periode about the cold war for the moment, as surface engagements between larger warships are less likely today.

It seems the anti-ship capability of the USN surface fleet relied mostly on the Harpoon, which frankly I don't realy understand. The Harpoon is certainly a capable weapon against small crafts like missile boats and corvettes (used with great effect by the Iranian Navy in the Iran-Iraq war), but I wonder about its effectiveness against warships. How many Harpoons would be needed to take out a Sovremenny destroyer, or even larger ships suchs as a Kirov CGN or Kiev aviation cruiser?

The other anti-ship missile of the USN was the TASM. Was the TASM a sub-launched weapon only or was it also fielded on ships? Some USN ships had Tomahawk launch containers fitted during the cold war, but I don't know if they were for TLAM or TASM.

The third ASM on USN warships would be the Standard SAM used in anti-surface mode. Would this weapon have played a significant role in a larger surface battle?

Of course it can be argued that the primary offensive element of the USN are the carrier and its aircraft. But ironicaly, the primary anti-ship weapon of the aircraft would also be the Harpoon. While the Falklands war has shown that modern warships can be successfully attacked with bombs, I think that such a attack against a soviet warship would have been a lot harder.

It seems to me that the USN ASuW doctrine intended submarine launched torpedos to be the primary weapon to destroy the soviet surface fleet. Carrier launched aircraft would be the second option, either with a mass-attack of Harpoons or a very risky bombing raid. The USN cruisers and destroyers themselfe were not expected to enter combat with a simmilar force. Is this assessment correct or is there a flaw in my logic?

09-24-08, 03:16 AM	#1
MBot Loader Join Date: Apr 2002 Location: Switzerland Posts: 90 Downloads: 3 Uploads: 0	USN ASuW Doctrin I posted this over in a thread in the Sub Command forum. But since this forum seems to have more traffic, I hope nobody minds if I open a new topic for it here: What was the ASuW doctrin of the USN during the cold war? Let's keep the periode about the cold war for the moment, as surface engagements between larger warships are less likely today. It seems the anti-ship capability of the USN surface fleet relied mostly on the Harpoon, which frankly I don't realy understand. The Harpoon is certainly a capable weapon against small crafts like missile boats and corvettes (used with great effect by the Iranian Navy in the Iran-Iraq war), but I wonder about its effectiveness against warships. How many Harpoons would be needed to take out a Sovremenny destroyer, or even larger ships suchs as a Kirov CGN or Kiev aviation cruiser? The other anti-ship missile of the USN was the TASM. Was the TASM a sub-launched weapon only or was it also fielded on ships? Some USN ships had Tomahawk launch containers fitted during the cold war, but I don't know if they were for TLAM or TASM. The third ASM on USN warships would be the Standard SAM used in anti-surface mode. Would this weapon have played a significant role in a larger surface battle? Of course it can be argued that the primary offensive element of the USN are the carrier and its aircraft. But ironicaly, the primary anti-ship weapon of the aircraft would also be the Harpoon. While the Falklands war has shown that modern warships can be successfully attacked with bombs, I think that such a attack against a soviet warship would have been a lot harder. It seems to me that the USN ASuW doctrine intended submarine launched torpedos to be the primary weapon to destroy the soviet surface fleet. Carrier launched aircraft would be the second option, either with a mass-attack of Harpoons or a very risky bombing raid. The USN cruisers and destroyers themselfe were not expected to enter combat with a simmilar force. Is this assessment correct or is there a flaw in my logic?