USN ASuW Doctrin
 

I posted this over in a thread in the Sub Command forum. But since this forum seems to have more traffic, I hope nobody minds if I open a new topic for it here:


What was the ASuW doctrin of the USN during the cold war? Let's keep the periode about the cold war for the moment, as surface engagements between larger warships are less likely today.

It seems the anti-ship capability of the USN surface fleet relied mostly on the Harpoon, which frankly I don't realy understand. The Harpoon is certainly a capable weapon against small crafts like missile boats and corvettes (used with great effect by the Iranian Navy in the Iran-Iraq war), but I wonder about its effectiveness against warships. How many Harpoons would be needed to take out a Sovremenny destroyer, or even larger ships suchs as a Kirov CGN or Kiev aviation cruiser?

The other anti-ship missile of the USN was the TASM. Was the TASM a sub-launched weapon only or was it also fielded on ships? Some USN ships had Tomahawk launch containers fitted during the cold war, but I don't know if they were for TLAM or TASM.

The third ASM on USN warships would be the Standard SAM used in anti-surface mode. Would this weapon have played a significant role in a larger surface battle?


Of course it can be argued that the primary offensive element of the USN are the carrier and its aircraft. But ironicaly, the primary anti-ship weapon of the aircraft would also be the Harpoon. While the Falklands war has shown that modern warships can be successfully attacked with bombs, I think that such a attack against a soviet warship would have been a lot harder.

It seems to me that the USN ASuW doctrine intended submarine launched torpedos to be the primary weapon to destroy the soviet surface fleet. Carrier launched aircraft would be the second option, either with a mass-attack of Harpoons or a very risky bombing raid. The USN cruisers and destroyers themselfe were not expected to enter combat with a simmilar force. Is this assessment correct or is there a flaw in my logic?

I'd look at it this way. The Exocet has a 165kg warhead, and we know that 1-2 Exocets is enough to kill or mission kill warships up to 4000 tons. The Harpoon has a 282kg warhead. The Sovremmenyy is on the large side for a Russian surface combattant at 7900 tons. You'd want multiple hits for a mission kill, but the Harpoon would certainly be effective.

Once you start going after the huge guys, you're going to want a bigger missile (TASM), although the secondary effects (fire, flooding) of a smaller weapon shouldn't be underestimated (especially on an aircraft carrier).

TASM was for skimmers too.

Not in a blue water conflict. It's highly doubtful that US and Russian forces would have come within sight of each other; over-the-horizon missile systems would get the job done before then. But, if you put the opposing fleets in range before it goes hot, then there would be an ASuW role for the Standard.

Penetrating a Russian area-defense SAM envelope would have been risky, and not favored as long as enough Harpoons were on hand. But, the reason why bombs were as effective as they were in the Falklands was because the British area-defense SAMs couldn't get low enough; many Russian systems of the Cold War also have this limitation. Also, the Navy deployed glide-bombs like the Skipper that could be lofted from out of range of medium-range SAMs, so the bomb can still be a standoff weapon.

While I am by no means an expert on this, I disagree with this assessment. We just didn't have enough submarines, in my estimation, to give them the primary ASuW tasking. Our subs would be tasked to screen CVBGs from enemy subs, to hunt boomers, and to perform ASW barrier patrols around the GIUK gap. And, when called upon to perform ASuW, the sub's primary weapon would likely have been the TASM rather than the Mk48. Russian ASW assets can't be underestimated; so we'd be unlikely to be willing to hazzard many boats to get in close for a torpedo shot. And there's also the problem of the intercept geometry and time required; on an operational level, it's a lot easier to get an Alpha strike on target than it is to maneuver a sub for a successful intercept (unless you have subs all over the damn place).

I think our primary ASuW asset was, and is, the carrier based strike aircraft, which were/are supported by electronic jamming to reduce the effectiveness of Russian radars, increasing the pK of the Harpoons.

Well expanding beyond the US Doctrine the NATO doctrine would have included SSs and SSKs near the choke points (GIUK, Katterik?, Gibralter) that would have been used against Soviet surface forces. Exspecialy in the Baltic since Denmark, West Germany and Norway operated quite a few small SSs suited for those waters. Italy, Turkey, Greece and France were the primary operators in the Med (Spain and Denmark also send subs there too and probaly Portugal as well). Norway and the UK (back when they had smoke boats) would have operated in the North Sea and GIUK.

[quote=Molon Labe]Yes, I agree that strike a/c were the primary ASUW capability. In case of an alpha strike against an enemy SAM-equipped taskforce, the Harpoons would have been preceeded by HARMs and 'decoy' drones. The intent was that the enemy's surface-to-air capability would be close to nil by the time the 'poons and bombers arrived.

Interesting points. Especially that there wouldn't have been enough SSN to hunt down the soviet surface groups.

Regarding the alpha strike against a surface group. I wonder how effective such a attack would have been. The USN thinking of aircraft vs. ship has been influenced very much by WWII, where ships were extremely vulnerable against air attack. It is hard to tell how true that remains today with a lot of technology passed by and few actual examples to draw conclusions from. The Falklands war presents some interesting lessions, at least for the western navies (at that point most soviet warships were already equiped with various short range SAM systems and multiple CIWS). Still the conclusion from the Falklands can go both ways. To ships sunk with single ASM each vs. over half of the ASM were decoyed, air-defense destroyer sunk by bomb run vs. air raid shattered by Seawolve equiped frigate.

Of course a USN strike would be hitting a lot harder than the Argentines ever could. On the other hand the soviet ships were equiped to exactly fend of such a strike. The S-300 SAM system employed on the Slava and Kirov cruisers for example is considered by the USAF as no-fly zone (in its land based version). I think the critical point would be wether the SEAD component of such a strike would be successful. It is an interesting question, considering in the Yugoslavian campaign several hundert HARMs were spend against a relative small number of second line SAM system (mostly Kub/SA-6 I think). One could also wonder how effective the HARM would be against a radar system that is moving at 30 knots.

It is also interesting that no one commented yet on the ASuW capabilities of the USN ships themselfe. Would you agree that those ships were never meant to engage vessels of simmilar size themselfe? I always thought USN ships are extremly underarmed in that regard, a Virginia CGN or Tico CG have basically the same ASuW capabilities as the old Pegasus PHM. The only ships that realy stood out in that regard were the modernised Iowa BBs (16 Harpoon, 32 Thomahawks and the guns).

Don't confuse SEAD with DEAD. The SA-6 is a survivable system because the StraightFlush FCR is highly mobile. But, if it turns off and repositions, it is still suppressed. The same goes for shipboard systems turned off to shank a HARM shot, or which are overwhelmed by jamming from the Prowlers. Whether suppressed or destroyed, the air defenses will not be shooting down the 'poons and skippers.

Ticos and Sprucans are about the size of Sov's and easily carry enough firepower to bring them down, between the 2 quad 'poons and the VLS cells. Prior to the VLS. Even before the VLS, 8 ASCMs in the 70s 80s was a pretty big deal. Again, we already know it only takes 1-2 of them to get a mission kill on a 4000 tonner.

I think there is plenty of room to fault the USN today for neglecting ASuW, but during the Cold War it was very much a design requirement.

The SA-6 might be mobile, but when operating it is always stationary. The radar systems on ships on the other hand are operating while moving. I guess moving search radars would be very hard to hit with HARM (aussuming a radar scans at 15 rpm then the dish moves 16 m every scan on a 30 kt ship). The fire controll radars might be even harder to get, since modern ones only illuminate in the final phase. The success of HARM in suppressing (and sometimes destroy) air defenses has a lot to do that it can "remember" target positions, something that wont work with ships. I am not saying that the AD of ships can not be suppressed, but I guess it is harder to to than against fixed AD.

Tough the question is if 8 Harpoons would have been enough to score the 1-2 hits that put a ship out of action. In the Falklands, 3 of 5 air launched Exocet were decoyed and none of the attacked ships was equipped with CIWS. The only weapons used against the Exocet were Sea Dart from Invincible and 114mm guns. Altough this were ineffective weapons againt ASM, it show there was time to use them (I think Invincible launched 3 or 4 Sea Dart). A supersonic seakimming ASM would have cut down time to take actions considerably.

Edit: Actualy one could argue that 4 of 5 air launched Exocet were decoyed, the one that hit Atlantic Conveyor was supposedly targeting Hermes first. Anyone got some data from the first gulf war?

That's why the AARGM for the HARM system is being deployed. There is no adequate defense against it. Not even shutting down the radar will help. Yes, the USN can and will suppress enemy ship radars successfully.

I misunderstood your argument. Since you referenced the SA-6, which does not fire on the move, I thought you were saying the HARM wouldn't be successful because the radar could be turned off and repositioned. Apparently you meant the HARM cannot hit a moving target so the air defenses could remain online during a HARM attack, although if this is what you meant I don't know why you'd mention the SA-6.

I don't have any reason to believe the HARM can't hit a moving target. The Maverick can certainly handle it, and it is a heavier, slower, shorter range missile. It only takes slight course corrections for a missile traveling at several hundred plus knots (depending on the range it was fired from) to maintain an intercept on a 30-knot target.

Of course it's possible that 8 missiles can malfunction/get spoofed/get shot down. Does that mean those our warships weren't meant to destroy warships? If so, I suppose Vietnam-era fighters weren't really "fighters" either, since the pK of their 6-8 missiles was in the single digits and they often had to use guns or fight to a draw.

I guess at this point I don't understand the relevance of this side-debate. The two-person "consensus" that we have is that the mission is given to aircraft, which take out the targets long before they're in Harpoon range of the surface fleet. Maybe each ship in a SAG/CVBG doesn't have enough missiles to take out an equal sized ship--I dont agree with this, but I'll admit it's possible. But so what? How does that change the doctrine?

Well I don't try to change the doctrin, it was how it was. Actualy I try to get a better picture of the USN ASuW doctrin and how effective it possibly was. Since I don't have first hand experience on the subject, I take my limited knowledge and draw my own conlcusions, then discuss them with others. Whats to point of it? Having some fun talking about a subject I enjoy, nothing more :)

The reason I came up with the topic was that I read trough one of my books again, and again realised how heavily the USN depends on the Harpoon as the primary anti-ship weapon for both ships and aircraft. I just find it surprising, as the Harpoon which was initialy designed to give martime patrol aircraft a weapon to quickly engage surfaced SSG/SSGN, was the backbone in defeating the soviet fleet. For a navy that always tried to get the best equipment possible, I have the impression they were quicker statisfied regarding ASM. Was it good enough to do the job? Most likely. But for my untrained eye it doesn't look like much overkill.

I don't really see it the same way, as a dependency. We have many different weapons systems for different missions and envelopes. The air-launched Harpoon is our primary stand-off weapon. As such, that makes it our principal weapon against fleets armed with long and medium range ASCMs and defended by capable area-defense SAMs. Such a weapon would be a necessity against SA-N-6 armed SAGs, but Russia had very few of those (a few Slavas, Kirovs, and a Kara used for testing scattered across four fleets).

Ships armed with medium or short range SAM systems (the bulk of the Soviet fleet) could be engaged from standoff ranges with Walleyes, Skippers, and Maverick-Fs in addition to Harpoons. And against lighter craft without significant air defenses, ordinary LGBs and dumb bombs can be used.

And that's just weapons from aircraft.

Bring ships into the picture, and they have the TASM for longer range engagement, Harpoons for medium range, and 5" guns, SMs, and Seasparrows for knife fights/mop-ups.

So, what you call a dependency I call having the right weapon for the job. A lot would have been riding on the AGM-84/-88/Prowler combination early on, but it that didn't work out, you still have several "Plan Bs"... TASMs, low altitude airstikes using medium-range weapons (thus, you end up trying out radar guided, laser guided and TV/IIR guided weapons, something has to work), submarines, and finally, shipboard Harpoons again. So if it turned out that our jamming didn't work and the Russian's soft/hard kill capability could defeat an alpha strike (unlikely, as we saw in 1991, our technology and tactics tended to prevail overwhelmningly over Soviet hardware and tactics), we'd just switch to a Plan B and probably have to live with a higher loss rate than we'd have had if Plan A worked as we'd hoped. That's not an attractive proposition, but the USSR was a superpower. It's not supposed to be easy to beat them.

Couple of more points. Back in the cold war the USN and USAF air wings had the AGM-78 Standard ARM, basically a SM-1 missile with an improved Shrike anti-radar seeker. These were capable of being deployed from A-6B, USAF F-4Gs and from Warships. Way back in the 60 the AS-37 MARTEL armed RAF Bucks and French Mirages and had greater range that the US Shrike (although much lower speed). Of course in 83 the AGM-88 HARM came in to use with even greater range.

Another point all those Russian super ASMs with 300 mile ranges need SOMETHING to find their targets for them, a Bear, a Satellite, a sub whatever. You kill him those missile's ranges get reduced to the range of their carrier's sensors, probably something like 50 miles at most well within Harpoon range and nearly Exocet range (40 miles).

I was just about to mention that but got called in to work:
In a Surface vs. Surface fight everyone talks about the greater number of SSMs on Russian cruisers but no one talks about the number of SSMs and NATO frigates... yes I said frigates no quit giving me that look! The only Russian frigate to carry SSMs was the Krivak and that was at the cost of their ASW missiles (four total). In fact until the Sovermenny DDGs Russian Destroyers were all gun or AAW ships. (Ok yes there were four Kildins armed with six SS-N-1s and a few converted to that design.) NATO had tons of small ocean going ships with Harpoon or Exocet missiles. Perrys, Knoxs, Broadswords, Amazons, Leanders, Wielingens etc had around four ASMs each (some could carry SAMs or ASROCS in place of them for added flexibility).

If I was commanding a Soviet Task Force against a NATO Task Force with out a US Super Carrier I would be worried about three things:
A US or UK SSN blasting my @$$ Belgano style.
UK Harriers downing my Ka-25/28 helis or Bear support robbing me of my OTH capability.
Every warship in the NATO TF sending between 4-8 Harpoons at my one missile cruiser.

A Soviet Missile Cruiser is kinda like the Bismarck. It can do a lot of damage but everyone it faces will pick at it just a little till it bleeds to death.

I think that is a pretty good point. Almost every NATO ship and its sister was carrying 4/8 Harpoons. That realy adds up in term of striking power. The soviets had some massive SSM batteries on their large cruisers/aviation cruisers but almost nothing on the escorts. Even the Kresta II and Kara cruisers had SS-N-14 in favour of SSMs.

EW effectiveness
 

Ah, kind of a late point here, but...

I've noticed that the aircraft ASuW doctrine was based heavily on jammers and HARMs to degrade the Soviet radar systems, since we don't really have standoff supersonic missiles. However, with that there's always the issue of passive radar seeking missiles, home-on-jam. I know that SM-1/SM-2s and Phoenixes have them, so it's reasonable to assume that Russian SAM systems would, too; it would be relatively easy to plot the locations of the jammers themselves, and the SA-N-6s/S-300s have plenty of range. Also, there's no question of EA-6Bs maneuvering to avoid them, and the only way to make a missile go dumb would be to turn off your jamming pod--which would mean that the Sovs have scored a soft kill on you, and very likely hard kills on your inbound strikers. So what would've been the US reaction to this, at least out in the open, since EW doctrine is pretty sensitive material.

Well, I'd defer to Bill on this point, but I'm not willing to assume the Grumble can outrange a Prowler. For one, we don't know the range of the Prowler's jammers. And another point to consider is that whatever sources tell us the "range" is for the Grumble, the truth about SAMs is there is never an absolute number. The effective SAM envelope is 3-dimensional and dome-shaped; ranges against aircraft at altitude are significantly shorter than range against lower-altitude targets. Also, at the far reaches of that dome the missile has a very low energy state and is essentially just floating around, stalled out. In other words, it can't hit a manuevering aircraft at that range. So I'd take any claim that HOJ capability could keep a Prowler from performing the mission it was specifically designed to do with a huge grain of salt.

Assuming in arguendo that the Grumble can outrange the Prowler, then you'd have to move the Prowler to low altitude at maximum jamming range and have it pop up to jam just prior to the 'poons coming over the horizon. The Prowler then goes music off and dives after the Grumbles are some distance considered adequate to get under the horizon before the SAM arrives. You could even have a 2nd Prowler from a different bearing pop up after the first goes music off if the 1st one wasn't up long enough for the jamming to be effective enough. Rinse and repeat as often as necessary.