China improving its military potence rapidly

[Skybird]

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Chi...eport_2009.pdf

Executive Summary

China’s rapid rise as a regional political and economic power with growing global influence has significant implications for the Asia-Pacific region and the world. The United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China, and encourages China to participate responsibly in world affairs by taking on a greater share of the burden for the stability, resilience, and growth of the international system. The United States has done much over the last 30 years to encourage and facilitate China’s national development and its integration into the international system. However, much uncertainty surrounds China’s future course, particularly regarding how its expanding military power might be used.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery against high-tech adversaries – an approach that China refers to as preparing for "local wars under conditions of informatization." The pace and scope of China’s military transformation have increased in recent years, fueled by acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, and far-reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces. China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance remains limited, but its armed forces continue to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare, that are changing regional military balances and that have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region.

The PLA’s modernization vis-à-vis Taiwan has continued over the past year, including its build-up of short-range missiles opposite the island. In the near-term, China’s armed forces are rapidly developing coercive capabilities for the purpose of deterring Taiwan’s pursuit of de jure independence. These same capabilities could in the future be used to pressure Taiwan toward a settlement of the cross-Strait dispute on Beijing’s terms while simultaneously attempting to deter, delay, or deny any possible U.S. support for the island in case of conflict. This modernization and the threat to Taiwan continue despite significant reduction in cross-Strait tension over the last year since Taiwan elected a new president.

The PLA is also developing longer range capabilities that have implications beyond Taiwan. Some of these capabilities have allowed it to contribute cooperatively to the international community’s responsibilities in areas such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counter-piracy. However, some of these capabilities, as well as other, more disruptive ones, could allow China to project power to ensure access to resources or enforce claims to disputed territories.

Beijing publicly asserts that China’s military modernization is "purely defensive in nature," and aimed solely at protecting China’s security and interests. Over the past several years, China has begun a new phase of military development by beginning to articulate roles and missions for the PLA that go beyond China’s immediate territorial interests, but has left unclear to the international community the purposes and objectives of the PLA’s evolving doctrine and capabilities. Moreover, China continues to promulgate incomplete defense expenditure figures and engage in actions that appear inconsistent with its declaratory policies. The limited transparency in China’s military and security affairs poses risks to stability by creating uncertainty and increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation. The United States continues to work with our allies and friends in the region to monitor these developments and adjust our policies accordingly.

[Skybird]

http://blog.usni.org/?s=DF-21

A few of us (here and over at Galrahn’s site) have been banging the drum for the last few years re. the potential threat posed by China’s ASBM (Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile) which appears to be a variant of the DF-21 (itself, an apparent derivative of the Pershing II MRBM). There has been limited releasable (e.g., unclassified) information from DoD agencies, most of it in the annual DoD report on China’s capabilities. What little else can be gleaned from the open press is primarily Chinese in origin and oft times, in Chinese. Most of the extensive writings have tended to be more generalistic as a result, focusing at the strategic-political level on the implications and challenges such a weapon would pose in a future Taiwan Straits scenario (or some other that takes place at or inside the first island chain). Chief focus has been on the aspect of sea denial to US carriers and the attendant impact that would have on providing tactical airpower in the face of land-based PLAAF forces conducting bluewater ASUW and land attack strikes. The most recent open press article was that found in the May 2009 issue of the Naval Institute’s Proceedings

With the autumn 2009 issue of the Naval War College Review , that body of knowledge has been significantly expanded via two articles. The first, “Using the Land to Control the Sea? ” (link directly downloads a PDF of the article) addresses the larger technical and political challenges, opening with an argument is a familiar to readers of this and the aforementioned blogs:

For China, the ability to prevent a U.S. carrier strike group from intervening in the event of a Taiwan Strait crisis is critical. Beijing’s immediate strategic concerns have been defined with a high level of clarity. The Chinese are interested in achieving an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) capability because it offers them the prospect of limiting the ability of other nations, particularly the United States, to exert military influence on China’s maritime periphery, which contains several disputed zones of core strategic importance to Beijing. ASBMs are regarded as a means by which technologically limited developing countries can overcome by asymmetric means their qualitative inferiority in conventional combat platforms, because the gap between offense and defense is the greatest here.
Today, China may be closer than ever to attaining this capability. In addition to numerous outside reports suggesting Chinese efforts in this area, technical and operationally focused discussions on the topic are appearing in increasing numbers and in a widening array of Chinese sources, some clearly authoritative. This suggests that China may be close to testing and fielding an ASBM system—a weapon that no other country currently possesses, since the United States relinquished a distantly related capability in 1988. In the view of Chinese and Western analysts, even the mere perception that China might have realized an ASBM capability could represent a paradigm shift, with profound consequences for deterrence, military operations, arms control, and the balance of power in the western Pacific.

Discussion that follows is worth the read, but of particular interest is the end analysis where the authors contemplate the impact a range of US responses would have, spanning from indifference to measured and then major response,and what the implications would be if the Chinese were to go ahead and conduct an operational tes:

Responding to the unprecedented strategic challenge presented by an ASBM capability would require the American military and civilian leadership to face hard truths, and continue to develop innovative new capabilities. The United States has many options here, and it must be prepared to exercise them. The most perilous approach would be to neglect such military innovation while continuing to insist that the United States maintained its ability to keep the peace, when in fact the military capabilities that underpin that ability were diminishing, at least in a relative sense. Such a discrepancy between rhetoric and reality would erode America’s regional credibility and fuel Chinese overconfidence. The prospect of documenting that discrepancy publicly might motivate China to conduct a demonstration of an ASBM; a successful test could create the impression that American power projection capabilities—and the regional credibility that depends on them—had been dramatically diminished. Managing the proper response to this potential “game changer” will demand close scrutiny from scholars, analysts, and policy makers alike, as it will critically influence America’s place in the Pacific for decades to come.

Two events point to the efficacy of such a scenario: one, the operational ASAT test conducted in 2007 and the other (and used by the authors) – the bombing tests off the VACAPES prompted by General Billy Mitchell and carried out by Army and Navy aircraft against stationary capital ship targets. In the case of the former, it clearly illuminated not only China’s tchnological capabilities, but some have said that it also demonstrated a certain ascendancy of the military and its ability to veto civilian policy makers who were not favoring an operational test. In the case of the latter – there were major budgetary, policy and even changes in tactics as the nascent Army Air Corps received substantive funding boosts, the Navy began to seriously investigate the use of dive bombers as a means to attack ships and other nations, notably Japan, began to redraw their force structures.

But what of the system itself? How much of it is real and how much is just vaporware? Maskirovka designed to confuse and direct US allocation of forces and funding down blind alleys? The second article, “China’s Antiship Ballistic Missile: Developments and Missing Links ” (same warning as above re. the hyperlink) takes a systemic approach to assessing this ’system of systems’ by an extensive analysis of available open-press Chinese literature. It is worth noting that when conducting a content analysis, one not only focuses on what is found in the body proper of individual texts, but as that body grows, there are larger trends and directions that can be ascertained and from which, judgments as to the status and progress of a program may be made – even absent declaratory supporting statements. As the authors point out, for example, early literature tends to view the problems presented in the complex kill chain of an ASBM with a wider aperture, with wide-ranging, generalist discussions that identify problem areas. As sub-groups of supporting literature grow in number while parsing ever-finer details, say in developing algorithms used to detect, identify and track large surface vessels using space-based assets, or there is wider discussion of the problems associated with exo-atmospheric maneuvering while maintaining targeting (as is the case in the civilian space program and the problems associated with unmanned docking), the fact that such bodies of literature exist lends credence to assessments of the state of development and deployment of a weapons system.
Beyond the ASBM, the authors see far-reaching
impacts on the larger military capabilities and force structure. Developing, building and deploying an operational ASBM with all of the technical, operational and even political challenges posed along the way would have reverberating effects throughout – from Command and Control, to multi-spectral imaging, rapid re-targeting, battle assessment and more – every bit a modern revolution in military affairs and industry as the US experienced in the late 80’s and 90’s with technology crossovers from the space and micro-computer industries.
Points to ponder while working on a “balanced” approach to forces

[Skybird]

Beware: January 2008

http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/fighter/jxx.asp

Home > Air Forces > Aircraft > J-XX 4th-Generation Fighter Aircraft
China is believed to have been conducting preliminary research on its fourth-generation fighter aircraft since the late 1990s. The fighter, codenamed by Western intelligence as J-XX or XXJ, was described as an advanced F-22-class twin-engine stealth fighter with extensive radar cross section (RCS) reduction features such as internal weapon bay. So far very little information regarding the project has been revealed, though it is understood that the two primary fighter aircraft design institutes of the China Aviation Industries Corporation (AVIC) – Shenyang Aircraft Design Institute (601 Institute) and Chengdu Aircraft Design Institute (611 Institute) – have both been working on their own designs to bid for the PLA’s contract.
China is believed to have been conducting preliminary research on its fourth-generation fighter aircraft since the late 1990s. The fighter, codenamed by Western intelligence as J-XX or XXJ, was described as an advanced F-22-class twin-engine stealth fighter with extensive radar cross section (RCS) reduction features such as internal weapon bay. So far very little information regarding the project has been revealed, though it is understood that the two primary fighter aircraft design institutes of the China Aviation Industries Corporation (AVIC) – Shenyang Aircraft Design Institute (601 Institute) and Chengdu Aircraft Design Institute (611 Institute) – have both been working on their own designs to bid for the PLA’s contract.

In 1997, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) reported that an advanced F-22-class twin-engine stealth fighter XXJ was being developed by 601 Institute and Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC). In 2001, an Internet source photo showed a F-22-like aircraft model was being tested in a wind tunnel at 601 Institute. At the same time, it was revealed that 611 Institute was also working its own advanced fighter aircraft design, possibly based on the design and technology of its J-10 fighter.
Despite intensive media interest, it is very likely that the fighter programme is still in its early theoretical evaluation (论证) and programme definition (方案) stage, during which various technologies are examined to meet operational requirements. Theoretical evaluation of the programme and development of key technologies and sub-systems would also be carried out in these stages. While China may be able to benefit from some “off-the-shelf” dual-use technologies available in the commercial market, it will almost definitely seek assistance from its traditional military technology supplier such as Russia, as well as some Western countries.
There has been speculations China’s fourth-generation fighter could enter service as early as 2015. However, designing and developing a fighter of this class will involve huge amount of investment and technology advancement across many fields, including new materials, high-performance aero-engine, avionics, flight control software, stealth technology, computer-aid design and manufacture (CAD/CAM). Only very few countries in the world nowadays possess the capability of designing and developing a modern high-performance fighter aircraft independently, and a project of this scale could last decades before the aircraft finally enters service.
Russian Sukhoi Company (JSC), which has developed close ties with Shenyang over the licensed co-production of its Su-27SK fighter as J-11, has been reportedly working with Shenyang in developing the next-generation fighter technology and sub-systems. Although Russia has yet been able to develop an operational stealth fighter, the J-XX project may benefit from its technologies in two particular areas: thrust vectoring engine and stealth design. Additionally, China may also seek potential partners from Russia, Israel and Europe to co-develop avionics and weapon suites for its 4th-generation fighter aircraft.
Last update: 3 January 2008

There was a great theft of computer data regarding the F-35 project some time ago. Pentagon and Air Force always refused to comment much on it.

[Skybird]

Dark Sword:

http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/424/

Chinese researchers break through the mysteries of UAVs and UCAVs
06:45 GMT, October 14, 2009 defpro.com | Larry Dickerson, senior unmanned systems analyst for Forecast International, recently stated that the international demand for unmanned aircraft is rapidly growing, with the United States continuing to be the key driver of this trend. According to Dickerson, U.S.-based companies will account for more than 60 per cent of the market's value. However, western European countries and Israel are keeping up with the pace and spawning domestic development of such systems, which in some cases could already achieve more or less significant export successes (particularly Israel) with their industrial solutions. With respect to the obvious boom of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development and export programmes in western countries, China, as much as Russia, still lag somewhat behind.


Catching up with world-leading standards

Nevertheless, the gap is quickly closing as the military’s requirement for state-of-the-art reconnaissance UAVs is becoming increasingly important in both countries. However, the activities are principally still focused on analysing (and often enough copying) already existing and fielded systems, such as the United States’ Global Hawk, Predator and Reaper as well as Israel’s Harpy and Heron. Completely domestic and unprecedented solutions emerge in only very few cases, of which many are too ambitious to make it into series production, let alone introduction into service.

In the case of China, the effort to increasingly use unmanned systems, as well as the capability to domestically develop and produce such aircraft, is publicly and proudly demonstrated, as could recently be seen on the occasion of the 60th anniversary celebration of the People's Republic of China. A total of ten short- and mid-range tactical reconnaissance UAVs mounted on their launching rail on the back of a truck, took part in the National Day parade (see http://www.defpro.com/news/details/10219/). “The ten UAVs of three different models have been [provided] to the PLA's special forces to carry out various reconnaissance missions,” Wang Baorong, captain of the UAV formation, told the state-run Xinhua press agency on that occasion.

According to the assessment of Professor Tan Kaijia, a weaponry expert with the PLA's National Defense University, this latest display shows that “China has made substantial progress in intelligent control systems, precise measuring-controlling systems and computer information processing for military uses.” Even more far-reaching concepts, such as the “Dark Sword” or the “Xianglong”, prove this assessment to be true, as the focus and the development is quickly going beyond small propeller-driven tactical UAVs towards high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) UAVs and unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV). The recent spotting of two probable HALE UAVs in front of their hangars at a Chinese air base suggests that such a system is already (near-to) operational.


Still many challenges ahead

However, as Andrei Chang, a Chinese military analyst with the Kanwa Information Centre in Toronto emphasised, it still is puzzling for what reason “the plethora of UAV models on display at Zhuhai do not go into production.” China is having difficulty mastering the technical complexity of operating UAVs in real time, he recently told Defence News. Chang suggests that many of the companies and institutions do not have an actual prototype and are simply looking for a foreign investor for their concept.

In an interview in early 2007 published by sina.com.cn, Tu Jida, chief designer of the Aviation Industries of China (AVIC), said that UCAVs are still at an early development stage in China and current efforts may lead to a successful aircraft system in approximately ten years. He further emphasised that for any such effort, China will be on its own and will have to “rely on its own strength and self-reliance.” The interview also left the impression that China is still working on the development of more secure and resistant control and communication links for the operation of UAVs to prevent enemies from interfering with the control of UAVs and the transmission of reconnaissance information.

Although the extension of China’s military satellite network allows the use of HALE UAVs over long ranges and in operations abroad, China is fully aware of dangers and the importance of satellite communications in modern UAVs. “Without military satellites, the commanders sitting in the United States could not operate their Predator UAVs, which are thousands of miles away on the other side of the globe,” Prof. Chen Hong of the Chinese Air Force's Command College correctly observed. Further statements published by Xinhua (see http://www.defpro.com/news/details/10187/) acknowledge that China’s push in all fields of defence technology proves that the country is prepared to show strength in the air as well as in space and will make sure its networks will be working when their antagonists’ resources are down.
[...)

[Skybird]

Plus cyberwarfare division. Twice as many satellite starts per year than all europe. Tank developement.missile develoepment. Ambitious plans to modernise their fleet of submarines.

Already two or three years bago it was put in question that the US Navy still could dominate in a war near Taiwan/China, and that it'S fleet of submarines can survive in a war scenario near Chinese waters. I think the balance is shifting more in faovur of the Chinese - but doing so with increasing pace. They will not need to take that much time for learning and developement than the Us had to in the past. Technical standards have generally risen globally, there are more options and possibilities to benefit from stolen data, and do espionage via cyberwarfare.

China is now the leading economic power (Thanks to the profit driven elite's practice of exporting jobs). Unless that changes, she will eventualy be the leading military power.

[CaptainHaplo]

China has been preparing for a regional conflict for over a decade. However, if you look at their development - they are not moving toward force projection capability outside their own theatre.

This gives them a large advantage over the US in any regional conflict, as force projection is costly and difficult even for a country that has been doing it for half a century.

The real goal of China militarily is to be able to strike hard at specific targets (lets say taiwan as an example), and then fight a DEFENSIVE action to hold onto the gains. Its also important to note that while many people see a future china/us conflict as the most likely due to taiwan, the reality is that china has its eye on other resource areas, and make no mistake, the is no great love between the Russians and the Chinese.

[antikristuseke]

Wouldn't be the first Russia-China boarder conflict, thats for sure.

[Oberon]

[Skybird]

Originally Posted by CaptainHaplo

China has been preparing for a regional conflict for over a decade. However, if you look at their development - they are not moving toward force projection capability outside their own theatre.

This gives them a large advantage over the US in any regional conflict, as force projection is costly and difficult even for a country that has been doing it for half a century.

The real goal of China militarily is to be able to strike hard at specific targets (lets say taiwan as an example), and then fight a DEFENSIVE action to hold onto the gains. Its also important to note that while many people see a future china/us conflict as the most likely due to taiwan, the reality is that china has its eye on other resource areas, and make no mistake, the is no great love between the Russians and the Chinese.

From the main text'S summary:

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery against high-tech adversaries – an approach that China refers to as preparing for "local wars under conditions of informatization." The pace and scope of China’s military transformation have increased in recent years, fueled by acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, and far-reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces. China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance remains limited, but its armed forces continue to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare, that are changing regional military balances and that have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region.

They may not want to play the role of a world policeman, but they surely install the means to monitor and protect their vital shipping lanes (oil) globally, and their eyes are fixiated on Taiwan. Also, we see an increasing willingness to contribute to what the West calls humanitarian military efforts. It buys them allies and sympathies by investing into this form of soft power.

[Oberon]

I do ponder when they'll make their final move with Taiwan, they're patient, I'll give them that, and they plan faaaar ahead, but I can't see their patience lasting forever, particularly when they finish their naval plans.
The make or break question is, what does the US do? I don't think there's a lot they can do, although it would be a political disaster to lose Taiwan to the PRC and not have the US attempt to support Taiwan because it would signal to all the little independence movements within China which have been suppressed over the years (Tibet comes to mind) that the ally they bank all their hopes on will not and cannot support them. The myth of American invincibility will be shattered and give great encouragement to all the US's enemies.
If the US does protect though, it's going to be hit hard and it knows it.

[Skybird]

I think the Us tries to buy time, and by supporting Taiwan hopes to increase the chances that Taiwan and China unite peacefully and in a manner that at least on the surface allows the US to save it'S face. Washington would be very incompetent if they do not see that the balance is shifting against them and in favour of the Chinese military.

A war over Taiwan wpuld be fought at the terms of the Chinese, who also chose the timing, and are close to their supply bases. Both the growing strength of the chinese military and the battleground itself puts the US Navy at disadvantage, I think. With every year passing, this shift in balance becomes more decisive.

maybe one should seek a Hongkong-like solution. Even more so since we see since months that the chinese are loosing their shyness and preference for indirect methods, but challenge - successfully - Washington and the West more and more openly and aggressively. They are too strong already as if they must maintain an overly cautious attitude. Americas position ragarding military conflict with China is in no way comparable with America'S stand towards the soviets during the cold war. also, economic conditions are different, favouring the Chinese.

[Oberon]

Indeed, and I think that the powers that be in Washington are becoming increasingly aware that the window of opportunity is closing. However, how does one sell such a trade-off to the general public after years of low but obvious support for Taiwan without making it look as though they are selling out to China?
It's definitely going to be a damned if they do and damned if they don't. If they do, the right will damn them for selling out to China, and if they don't then the left will accuse them of dragging them into a war that they cannot win. Trouble is, both sides are right.

[PhantomLord]

*bump for important update!*

Chinese military proudly presents...

[Schroeder]

The link is dead for me.