100 Years Ago Today

[Jimbuna]

27th December 1919

A mob lynched WWI veteran Powell Green in North Carolina, one of over 80 lynchings in 1919.

The Committee of Representation, the executive branch of Turkish nationalists which includes Mustafa Kemal Pasha, move to Ankara.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, December 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M Dutasta informs the Council that Baron von Lersner had visited him on the previous day. The Chairman of the German Delegation had come to discuss two kinds of questions with him: he had first stated that the German Government was prepared to receive the Allied Naval experts responsible for determining the exact number of floating docks existing in Germany. Baron von Lersner had even added that his Government would like the experts to start as soon as possible. He had also come to ask whether the Allied Powers were prepared to allow their technical delegates to negotiate with the German experts of whom Hr von Simson was the head. Otherwise Hr von Simson and his colleagues would leave again for Berlin. M Clemenceau, to whom he had reported this request, is of opinion that the opening of negotiations as soon as possible between the experts of both sides could not but be beneficial. He had informed Sir Eyre Crowe of this opinion.

Sir Eyre Crowe adds that he has already telegraphed to London as a result of the communication made to him on the previous day, pointing out that in his opinion their experts should leave as soon as possible for the German ports. He believes, moreover, that the inquiry which they are about to make will last some time - the experts even suggest several weeks. However that might be, they are in rather a difficult position. They had verbally informed the Germans that they were prepared to make them concessions: the Germans asked them to define those concessions in a sort of agreement to be signed before or at the same time as the Protocol. Such a procedure would necessarily involve an alteration in the text of the Protocol. He is uncertain whether it would not be better, instead of so doing, to indicate if possible, in the Protocol in its present form that the figures claimed was the maximum. This solution would certainly involve a slight alteration of the Protocol and it would consequently be necessary to obtain the consent of the American Government to this alteration: but he thought it unlikely that this consent would be refused, since from the outset the American Delegation had been of opinion that their conditions were too hard and since Mr. Polk had insisted that the Reparation Commission should be consulted: Mr. Wallace might sound his Government on that particular and point out to it that the proposed change would be in conformity with the American views and that the Germans alone would have to sign the new document in the presence of the Allied delegates.

M Clemenceau personally thinks it would be better, if possible, not to alter the Protocol. They might merely note the concessions they had decided to grant Germany in a letter to Baron von Lersner. The German delegation is already aware of them from the verbal communication for which M Dutasta was responsible.

S de Martino points out that this procedure has the drawback of causing discrepancy between the Protocol and the letter.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that for his part he is ready to accept this proposal if the Germans could be persuaded to agree to it.

Mr Wallace states that if the Council so desires he is in a position to explain the views of his Government on this question. The American Government has repeatedly declared that the question of reparation to be demanded of Germany must be considered from a purely economic point of view. Germany’s power to make reparation depends on her power to produce and export. It is thus closely connected with the economic conditions of the world at a time when a large part of it is in a critical economic position. The American Government cannot, therefore, accept any claim for reparation seriously affecting Germany’s power of payment. It has realized that by claiming the surrender of docks, dredgers and harbor material they had committed a great mistake. President Wilson has always thought that German ships surrendered to the Allies as reparation should be destroyed. The fact that the German crews had destroyed them themselves does not therefore cause such heavy loss to the Allies that they are justified in renouncing that principle of reparation which he had just recalled. As to the acceptance of the original Protocol by Mr Polk, the Council will recall the fact that the American delegate had afterwards regretted it. The American Government therefore accepted the delivery of the 192,000 tons which Germany declared her readiness to supply, but it was definitely opposed to any supplementary cession of harbor material as reparation for the Scapa Flow incident.

M Clemenceau begs to point out that Mr Polk had formally accepted the Protocol providing for the surrender by Germany of 400,000 tons of floating docks. He made the following proposal: the Protocol should not be altered, and, in his capacity as President of the Conference, he will write to Baron von Lersner specifying the concessions they are prepared to make. But they could obviously decide nothing without the consent of the British Government.

Sir Eyre Crowe hopes to obtain that consent but they must not ignore the fact that if their action have not the desired effect their position will be rendered more difficult.

Would it not be sufficient for the moment to have another conversation with the German delegates and to tell them that their claims were satisfied on the whole. They could then be asked whether they wished these promises to be noted in writing and if they would then be satisfied. If the German reply was in the negative they would have the advantage of not having compromised themselves.

M Clemenceau thinks this suggestion excellent: M Dutasta might see Baron von Lersner that very day and ask him what satisfaction he desired. It is, moreover, possible that Baron von Lersner will reply that he wished for an alteration of the Protocol. They would then see what could be done.

M Dutasta says that his interview with Baron von Lersner had given him the impression (which is, however, a purely personal one) that if the Supreme Council were to confirm in writing the verbal communication made in its name and definitely stated that after the immediate supply of the 192,000 tons proposed by the Germans themselves time would be granted for the delivery of the material still to be supplied, it would be possible to come to an arrangement. The German experts were most alarmed at the demand for immediate delivery of all the material claimed.

M Berthelot supposes that under those conditions the Protocol would not be altered.

Sir Eyre Crowe fears that they could not really avoid altering the Protocol in this way.

S de Martino agreed with the last speaker. The American representative should at once ask for the consent of his Government to a possible alteration of the Protocol.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks it might be enough to add a few words to the Protocol stating that they only claimed a quantity of docks, dredgers, floating cranes not exceeding 400,000 tons. Such a formula would allow of all necessary arrangements with Germany without involving more serious alteration of the Protocol.

He indeed thinks it difficult to sign the Protocol without altering it, since they had not stated elsewhere in writing that they would not demand 400,000 tons.

M Berthelot sees no real difficulty: A “contre-lettre” will be sufficient.

M Dutasta thinks this all the more possible as they have already expressly stated in the Protocol that their claims might be reduced in order to take into account the economic difficulties facing Germany.

M Clemenceau asks whether there is any objection to a conversation between M Dutasta and Baron von Lersner with a view to inducing the latter definitely to state his point of view.

Sir Eyre Crowe would prefer that the Secretary-General should in no case state that they would if necessary accept the delivery of new material specially constructed for them.

M Clemenceau agrees.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks M Dutasta might make the following statement. The inquiry which they were about to make is twofold: First there is the verification of figures, which might be fairly quickly done; then there is also the investigation of the possible effects of the execution of the Protocol on German economic life. This was a much more delicate problem, the solution of which might take much time: he thinks it would be difficult to pledge themselves on the second point. On the other hand, it would be easy to reduce their demands if they had made a mistake in the facts concerning the docks of Hamburg or of Danzig.

M Dutasta also pointed out that, if they are prepared to grant a delay in delivery, the German objection based on the eventual paralysis of the economic life of the country falls through to a great extent.

M Clemenceau suggests that as a preliminary M Dutasta might state that they had requested of London that the experts might be sent speedily.

(M Clemenceau withdraws and Mr. Cambon takes the chair.)


2. A note, dated 26th December, 1919, from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies is laid before the Council.

General Weygand reads and comments on Marshal Foch’s note. He adds that there are points in the reply to the German experts to our Memorandum which could be accepted and others which did not admit of discussion. For instance, it is certain that whatever were the arrangements made between the Germans and the Poles for the evacuation of territories ceded to Poland, there was no need to await the 26th day after the coming into force of the Treaty in order to let our troop trains through; before that date at least two trains per day could run through Western Prussia. Other questions are of a more difficult nature. If they are satisfied with the four trains per day offered by the Germans, a period of twenty days would be necessary for the transport of troops for Upper Silesia and the occupation of other territories would not be completed for 40 days. He asks the council whether such a state of affairs would not have drawbacks; for his part, he thinks it would.

On the other hand, if they manage to run six trains per day, transports for Upper Silesia would be completed in 15 days and at the end of twenty-five days, the northern territories will have received the contingents allocated to them. Should the Council consider it necessary that the occupation troops should all be on the spot within a period of 15 days from the coming into force of the Treaty, a larger number of trains will obviously be required. However, in view of the fact that they had claimed ten trains per day and that the Germans offered them four, he thought they might easily demand six.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that if, at the rate of six trains per day, the transport of troops is effected within a period of 25 days, that is a solution which could be accepted. He would not say the same if the transports would not be completed for 40 days.

S de Martino refuses to give an opinion in the absence of his military expert, but is ready to agree with the opinion of the majority.

General Weygand says his opinion is that of all the military delegates who had examined the German Note together.

S de Martino withdraws his reservation in those circumstances.

M Cambon says the Council therefore invites General Weygand to demand six trains per day.


3. General Weygand passes on to another point: If transport begins immediately on the coming into force of the Treaty and if this coming into force is close at hand, they will be obliged to mark time, owing to the special position of the British contingents which cannot leave the Rhine before about January 20. Such interruption might have a bad effect on the Germans and he therefore thought it best that transport should take place without interruption. That would be possible if it began on January 8 at the rate of four trains per day or January 13 at the rate of six trains per day.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks General Weygand’s scruple probably useless as it is doubtful whether the procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be signed before January 13.

General Weygand asks, however, that trains might be fixed to run on January 13 if the Treaty comes into force before that date. As he requires 5 days to settle the final details, he also asks to be informed 5 days before the coming into force of the Treaty.

M Cambon assures General Weygand that he will be informed in good time by the Secretariat-General.

General Weygand says there remains the question of wagons and that of the cost of transport. The Germans declared that they could supply no wagons. The French lines could supply a certain number of trucks and of flat wagons, but no passenger wagons; the men must, however, travel in heated wagons. He would add that it was morally essential that the Allied soldiers should be as well treated as the German prisoners, for whom heated passenger wagons perfectly fitted were provided. With the consent of the Council, he will therefore demand passenger wagons of the Germans.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests that, if necessary, the German prisoners might wait a few days.

M Cambon notes that the Council approves of this proposal.

General Weygand says that, with regard to the cost of transport, the Germans claimed payment at the general rates in force for goods and passenger transport. He thinks this claim incredible.

Sir Eyre Crowe considers it quite inadmissible.

S Cambon agrees that this claim cannot be accepted and that no discussion of the point by the Germans can be allowed.

(It is decided that, with a view to the transport to plebiscite territories of Interallied contingents, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies should:

1) (a) Require the German Government to run a minimum of six trains per day;

(b) Require the German Government to supply all the passenger wagons required;

(c) Refuse to allow these transports to be effected at the rate generally in force in Germany and demand the application of the military rate.

It is also decided that if the transport is effected at the rate of six trains per day, these trains should not begin to run before January 13, in order that it might continue uninterrupted until the completion of the transport.)

2) That the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies should be informed five days beforehand of the date of the coming into force of the Treaty.


4. A note from the Naval experts, dated December 26, is laid before the Council.

(After a short discussion, it is decided that the Interallied Naval Commission should come to a final decision regarding the transfer to Poland of ex-Austrian torpedo-boats, taking into consideration the views developed in prior meetings.)


5. A note dated December 26, 1919, from the French and Italian naval experts is laid before the Council.

M Leygues reads and comments on the Note from the French and Italian experts.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks they are all agreed in wishing to grant the request of the French and Italian navies if possible. But the question is whether that request is in conformity with the Treaty. It had been recognized at a previous meeting that it was not and that they must content themselves with semi-official overtures to the Germans. The Joint Secretariat had formulated the Council’s decision inaccurately. Under these conditions the naval experts had met again but the French navy had preferred to begin the discussion afresh. They were faced by a difficulty which they all desired to settle and he was quite prepared to consent to refer the matter once more to the legal experts, unless M Fromageot who was present, could give their definite opinion at once.

S de Martino says that the Note explained by Mr. Leygues had been drawn up in agreement with the Italian experts. He therefore agreed with this argument.

Mr Matsui thinks that in common sense the claim made by the Minister of Marine seems well-founded, but Sir Eyre Crowe had rightly points out that the terms of the Treaty and the Protocol are so definite that a claim seems hardly possible. He thinks the question should be referred to the legal experts.

M Leygues asks M Fromageot for his opinion.

M Fromageot states that Article 185, which, moreover, in its original form provided for the destruction of the ships, refers to Clause 23 of the Armistice Convention, which stipulated that vessels must be disarmed. Article 185 nevertheless adds that the artillery must be completely re-embarked.

Vice-Admiral Levavasseur points out that only the breeches had been re-embarked.

M Fromageot says that disembarked material is at present in the hands of the German Government. It therefore belongs to the categories referred to in Article 192 of the Treaty. As for the five cruisers the delivery of which was provided for in the Protocol, that document certainly makes no mention of Article 192 and there was no question of any destruction. It only refers to Article 185, i. e. it specifies that the ships should be handed over disarmed with their artillery. The destruction of the material is doubtless not provided and the Treaty does not come into play, but if they wish to obtain the delivery of all that material, it is nevertheless necessary to alter the terms of the Protocol.

M Leygues thinks M Fromageot confused two ideas when he declared that material disembarked under Article 185 came under the categories referred to in Article 192. In reality, they must distinguish between three kinds of boats:

(1) Boats referred to in Article 185. It was not stated that material disembarked from them belonged to the German Government and would not be handed over to the Allies. Indeed, this material had only been disembarked because they mistrusted the German crews responsible for handing over the vessels.

(2) Article 190, on the other hand, specifies that a certain number of ships should be left at the disposal of Germany. Article 192 concerning the destruction of excess material only referred to material disembarked from the vessels mentioned in Article 190. He thinks it impossible to combine Article 185 with Article 190. Still less can they adduce Article 192 in relation to the third category of vessels, i. e. the cruisers the delivery of which was claimed by the Protocol of November 1. He would go further and would ask whether it was possible in international law to hold that a vessel should not be surrendered with all its material, unless it was expressly stated that before delivery such material should be disembarked for purposes of destruction.

M Fromageot regrets that he cannot accept the point of view of the Minister of Marine. It was indeed true that, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, a vessel must be surrendered with all its material and appliances, but Article 185 referred to by the Protocol definitely provides for the disarmament of ships to be surrendered. Article 192 seemed to have a general bearing. Nevertheless, it might be argued (he is not very convinced of the value of the argument) that the material disembarked from the vessels referred to in Article 185 is not in the hands of the German Government, since it was placed under Allied control; consequently, it will not come under the scope of Article 192.

M Leygues thinks the meaning of article 192 perfectly clear; the word “in excess” contained therein clearly indicated that it applies to arms and material of all kinds disembarked from the vessels referred to in Article 190. He is quite prepared to accept a formula which would give the result he is seeking in any way whatever, but how can they prove to public opinion or a parliament that, while they left Germany armed cruisers, they allowed her to surrender disarmed boats. He thought it rather dangerous to count on verbal communications and German good will in order to attain their object. He is afraid Germany would not lose such a good opportunity to be unpleasant. He must, moreover, point out that in reality the cruisers concerned had not been disarmed.

Sir Eyre Crowe considers that all this should have been thought of when the Protocol was drafted.

MS de Martino thinks it would be best if the naval experts and the drafting committee examined the question together once more.

Sir Eyre Crowe says they are faced by a purely legal problem, that of the interpretation of the Treaty. Discussion at that meeting had produced no fresh arguments; he is afraid the fresh examination by the legal experts will lead to no better results.

M Fromageot says they will be pleased to reconsider the question, but is afraid they can reach no other solution.

Sir Eyre Crowe returns to his original suggestion. Could not M Dutasta discuss the matter with Baron von Lersner since it was of no importance to the German Government, as the material would not be left to it in any case?

M Leygues thinks such action will have serious draw-backs: what would be their position if the Germans refused their request, even unofficially.

Sir Eyre Crowe says the same question might be raised with regard to the Protocol. They did not pledge themselves to anything. It is merely a matter of an inquiry.

M Cambon asks whether the Minister of Marine agrees that the Germans should be asked this question by M Dutasta.

M Leygues says he does not agree, and asks again what their position will be in the event of a German refusal.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that if they insist on settling the question they must then alter the protocol.

M Cambon said he is struck by Mr. Leygues’ argument. He is indeed afraid that unless M Dutasta is successful, they will be in a worse position. They had the choice of two solutions: either a fresh examination of the question by the legal experts, or a conversation between M Dutasta and Baron von Lersner.

S de Martino thinks a conference between the naval and legal experts might be very helpful; hitherto they had deliberated separately.

Mr Matsui agrees with this opinion.

Sir Eyre Crowe is not opposed to referring the matter to the legal experts.

(It is decided that the Drafting Committee and the naval experts should examine together the conditions of surrender of German warships destined for delivery to the Allies.)


6. An aide-mémoire from the Swiss Legation in France is laid before the Council, to which is annexed the Federal Decree of November 21, 1919, concerning the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations, together with a note from the Drafting Committee, concerning the aide-mémoire.

M Fromageot reads and comments on the note of the Drafting Committee.

S de Martino asks whether the Swiss aide-mémoire had been transmitted to the French Government or to the Peace Conference.

M Fromageot replies that it had been transmitted to the French Government.

M Cambon asks whether there is any need to answer it.

M Fromageot thinks there are drawbacks to leaving the Swiss arguments unanswered.

M Cambon thinks it better that the reply should be drafted and sent on behalf of the Conference. He proposes that the Drafting Committee should submit a draft to them.

(It is decided to accept the principles developed in the Drafting Committee’s note with regard to the Swiss aide-mémoire concerning the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations.

It was also decided to instruct the Drafting Committee to prepare a draft reply to that aide-mémoire.)

(The meeting is adjourned.)

[Jimbuna]

28th December 1919

Chinese general Feng Guozhang, former President of the Republic of China, has passed away.


The Boeing B-1, the first commercial craft for Boeing, begins air mail service between Seattle and Victoria, British Columbia.

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, December 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

The Supreme Council does not meet today.

[Jimbuna]

29th December 1919

President Poincaré of France visits the city of Lens still in ruins.


William Osler, Canadian physician and one of the founding professors of Johns Hopkins Hospital, has passed away.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, December 29, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


...

[Jimbuna]

30th December 1919

Aftermath of War

Acute food distress in Austria: Bread ration in Vienna 4 oz. per week.

Bolshevik prisoners of war held in Siberia.


General August von Mackensen is met with crowds on his return to Germany after being held as a POW.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, December 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


...

[Jimbuna]

31st December 1919

Polish soldiers in front of the armoured train Śmiały (Polish for “Bold”)


Lt. Samuel Woodfill receives a Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions neutralizing 3 German machine gun emplacements while suffering under the effect of mustard gas and then leading his men back without casualties. Gen. Pershing called him the most outstanding soldier in WWI.


Recy Taylor is born. An American activist known for pursuing a case against the white men who sexually assaulted her in Alabama in 1944 that many credit for helping give birth to the civil rights movement, in Abbeville, Alabama.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, December 31, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


...

[Jimbuna]

1st January 1920

In the second round of the “Palmer raids,” 3000 people with suspected leftist radical ties are arrested across the US. Authorities confiscating documents.


A worker at the Ford Motor Company.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, January 1, 1920

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

The Supreme Council does not meet today.

[Jimbuna]

2nd January 1920

Isaac Asimov is born to a family of Russian Jewish millers in Petrovichi, Russia (his exact day of birth is unknown, but he celebrated his birthday on January 2).

First Red Scare in the United States: The second of the Palmer Raids takes place with another 4,025 suspected communists and anarchists arrested and held without trial in several cities.

The Depression of 1920-21 begins in the United States after the shift from a war economy to peacetime and the demobilization of millions of troops.

Battleship USS Arizona in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.


Ship Losses:

Ernest T. Lee (United States) The schooner was abandoned in the Atlantic Ocean. Her crew were rescued by Hildebrand ( United Kingdom).
Jemtland (Sweden) The liner struck a mine and sank at Herthas Flak with the loss of seven of her 26 crew.
Nicolaas (Netherlands) The cargo ship struck a mine in the North Sea off the Dogger Bank and sank with some loss of life.
Nipponier (Belgium) The cargo ship foundered in the Bay of Biscay (44°24′N 9°03′W). Her crew were rescued by Rio de Janeiro ( Norway).
Roumanier (Belgium) The cargo ship caught fire whilst ship berthed at Antwerp. Her hull was badly damaged and the ship was laid up. She was scrapped in 1923 at Hamburg, Germany.
Stella II (United Kingdom) The schooner was wrecked on the coast of Africa.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, January 2, 1920

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

The Supreme Council does not meet today.

[Jimbuna]

3rd January 1920

Admiral Jellicoe with Admiral Niblack on the latter's arrival at the Union Station, Washington D.C., January 3, 1920


Admiral Jellicoe


An earthquake hits Veracruz, Mexico, resulting in 648 deaths.


Aftermath of a landslide in Juneau, Alaska.


Ship Losses:

Figueira (Portugal) The cargo ship collided with Ango ( France) at Oporto and was beached.