100 Years Ago Today

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, November 3, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council has before it a report from the Military Representatives at Versailles relative to the occupation of Memel prior to ratification of the Treaty.

General Desticker reads and comments upon the report.

(After a short discussion it was decided to approve the report as prepared by the Military Representatives at Versailles, and that no troops should be sent to Memel before the entry into force of the Treaty.)


2. The Council has before it the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles relative to the suppression of the Inter-Allied Transport Commission.

General Desticker reads and comments upon the report.

(It is decided to suppress the Inter-Allied Transport Commission, as proposed by the Military Representatives at Versailles in their report.)


3. The Council has before it a note from the French Delegation on the Hungarian situation.

M Berthelot reads and comments upon the note prepared by the French Delegation. He wishes to bring to the attention of the Council that in paragraph 2 of Page 4, the phrase relative to the Inter-Allied force under discussion should be understood in the sense that the force includes only Serbian, Romanian and Czecho-Slovak troops, under an Inter-Allied command.

Mr Polk states that he has not yet seen a final report from Sir George Clerk and he thinks it might be advisable to await this information before discussing the question. He should, however, inquire how the Council intends to treat the Inter-Allied Commission of Generals; if this Inter-Allied Commission has not succeeded, it is because the Supreme Council has not backed it up sufficiently.

M Berthelot thinks that they have not carried out with sufficient authority the instructions given them by the Supreme Council, and on the other hand they have not shown initiative, and do not seem to have had a consistent policy. As for Sir George Clerk, he does not seem to have succeeded in his mission with Herr Friedrich. The affair seems to be dragging along; H Friedrich has not yet retired and the Democratic Government has not been formed as was expected by the Council. He adds that the French proposition is not to belittle the mission of Sir George Clerk in any fashion, but it is important to clear up the situation and settle this vexatious question.

M Pichon thinks it is extremely important to solve this question as soon as possible.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Romanian and Hungarian questions of course involve each other. Sir George Clerk has insisted on the importance of getting the Romanians out of the country, and a stable government cannot be formed until this has been settled. The information from Sir George Clerk says there might be disadvantages, but the balance of advantage is that the Romanians should be gotten out. The Romanians are defying the Council. S Bratiano was dragging on negotiations with no intention of following the instructions of the Council. He certainly thinks that they should insist on getting an answer from Romania and he thinks that the Council should publish the note which has been sent to Romania. S Bratiano was spreading false versions of the note, sent in the course of the electioneering campaign which is going on in Romania, and is pretending that there is no disagreement as between the Allies and Romania.

M Berthelot states it is quite evident that the Romanian troops should first get out but there is great danger if the Romanian troops are to leave the country before other troops are sent to replace them. In that case, the Allies will find before them at Budapest only a Friedrich Government which has in its hands a force of police; outside of Budapest is Admiral Horthy with an army of 20,000 men or so; at any rate he is reactionary and is a symbol of the Hapsburgs. In conclusion: first, the Romanians should get out; secondly, the Romanian troops should be replaced in such a way that the Allies will be in a position to impose their policy at Budapest; but the departure of the Romanians will be dangerous if the Allies do not have other means of controlling the situation. As far as the Romanians are concerned, there is no doubt whatever they should be obliged to answer the note which has been sent them, and it might become advisable to publish this note, although this might not be of very great practical value, as elections were being held at this time. S Bratiano Is pretending that this note had never been delivered to the Romanian Government by the Conference. According to his theory, only three out of the four Principal Allied and Associated Powers had presented the note, and the Italian representative had not associated himself with this step. General Coanda, who has just arrived in Paris, claims that there is no need to reply to a note which has not been received.

Mr Polk has noticed in the French note a reference to the American General which he does not approve. He thinks the American General has been doing his best to follow his instructions. His only contention is that Romania is not on trial, but that the Supreme Council should be obeyed. The impression is going abroad in Romania that the orders which are being executed by the Commission do not correspond to the real orders of the Supreme Council and also that if the text of the note does not sound quite French, it is because it stands for an Anglo-American translation. On the whole the impression is that America was against Romania; that is not so, it is only a question, as he has said before, of the orders of the Supreme Council being followed. If there is so little coordination of action between the Allies in this case, it augured badly for the future.

M Pichon says they are all agreed that the Inter-Allied cohesion should be maintained.

Mr Polk asks how it is possible after they had ordered the Romanians to leave Hungary, to think of leaving them in the Inter-Allied forces referred to in the latter part of the French note.

Sir Eyre Crowe said M. Berthelot’s remark - that the Supreme Council’s note had not been received, - is a surprise. If that is so then they cannot insist upon its being carried out. That lack of cooperation in Bucharest is very serious.

S Scialoja remarks that he has no information on the non-presentation of the note by the Italian representative; he will, however, get more information on the subject.

M Pichon states that according to a telegram from the French Chargé d’Affaires at Bucharest there has been delay in presentation of the note to the Romanian Government for the reason that the Italian representative has not received his instructions. A second telegram has informed him that the note has been delivered by three out of four representatives of the Allies without awaiting any longer the instructions of the Italian representative. He does not know whether the Italian representative has now received these instructions, but he wishes to point out that the Romanians are still maintaining that they have not received the note.

Sir Eyre Crowe mentions that S Bratiano is spreading the report that this was an Anglo-American intrigue.

M Pichon is of the opinion that the note should be published so as to put a stop to these rumors, and also a further note, should the Council so decide.

Mr Polk wishes to point out that the Council can only repeat the conclusions it has adopted at its meeting of August 5th or thereabouts.

M Berthelot wishes to point out that one cannot reproach the French Government with having opposed itself to any of the orders sent to Bucharest. The French representative has always delivered the notes either in the name of the Allies or in the name of the French Government. Should S Bratiano wish to try and cause disagreement between the Allies this should carefully be avoided. He repeats that two points are to be distinguished; on the Romanian question there is no discussion possible as to the attitude to be taken, but the Hungarian question remains. The departure of the Romanians from Budapest runs the risk of bringing about a state of anarchy or the reappearance of the Hapsburg monarchy.

Mr Polk thinks that early in September the Council had ordered the Romanians to turn over 10,000 rifles to the Hungarian police which was to be organized, and he understands that only 1,000 rifles had been delivered up to this time without bayonets, without sufficient ammunition, and that the machine guns had been delivered without tripods. He thinks there would be no use sending another Mission to Budapest if there was to be no compliance with the orders already sent out by the Council. If the present Mission had not done its work, it would then be advisable to recall it.

M Pichon agrees that this might be exact, but there remains the danger of an armed force under the orders of Admiral Horthy, with the shadow of a Hapsburg reaction. The Romanians might be lying, but they again affirmed that they had given up these arms; it would be easy to verify this through the Mission and the orders should then be carried out. He again pointed out how dangerous it would be to recall Romanian troops without being able to oppose an Inter-Allied force to the Horthy force. It is important to organize a democratic Government at Budapest or it will be impossible to sign peace with Hungary.

Mr Polk wishes to remark that four of the Powers had sent representatives to report on conditions in Hungary - he personally had great confidence in General Bandholtz, - and if the Council did not have confidence in these representatives it was for it to recall them. Later the Council had sent Sir George Clerk, in whom also he had the greatest confidence. He thinks the Council should have confidence in the men they send on these Missions, and he considers it had been well represented so far.

M Berthelot says that if the police force at Budapest is armed, that does not inspire great confidence, for it is in the hands of the Friedrich government. It is quite clear that the Council got its information from representatives wherever sent; it had also the advantage of a general view of all the problems. The important question is that there should not remain a dangerous and ridiculous center of disorganization in central Europe; a negative policy was not sufficient. They should have a positive policy.

M Pichon asks what is to be done about Hungary. Are they going to deliver it to the Friedrich government or to the Archduke? As the Allies will not have forces available to send there, it seems that the best solution would be to have the occupation force composed of Serbian, Romanian and Czechoslovak troops under an Inter-Allied command. If the Council had in mind a better solution, this was the time to put it forward.

Mr Polk asks whether the question should not also be examined by the Financial experts.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests that Sir George Clerk should be informed by telegram of the discussion, and asks for an opinion on the possibility of employing Romanian, Serbian and Czechoslovak troops.

Mr Polk agrees with Sir Eyre Crowe, that the Council should not think of acting without Sir George Clerk’s opinion.

M Pichon remarks that Sir George Clerk could also consult the Generals.

Sir Eyre Crowe inquired whether, in the existence of the disturbed state of the country, it would be expedient to use Romanian troops, and whether a force containing Roumanian and Serbian troops would work well.

M Berthelot thinks that this was simply a question of command. He thinks, however, that the Romanians might be excluded, especially if this exclusion might be used to show them how little confidence was put in them by the Supreme Council. But it was most important that they should have the symbol of an Inter-Allied force, so as to disarm Horthy. Telegrams would not be sufficient to do this. This occupation would not be very long, and with an efficient high command it would be easy to await the formation of a democratic Government.

M Pichon sums up, stating that the Council is agreed to send immediately a telegram to Bucharest, insisting that the Romanian Government should answer the last note sent by the Council. M Berthelot will now prepare the text of this telegram.

M Berthelot submits to the Council a draft telegram which is approved. He thinks it advisable to give the text of this telegram to the Romanian Delegation that same afternoon, and to publish the new and the former note the next day.

Sir Eyre Crowe informs the Council he has at that moment received a telegram from Sir George Clerk, which he proceeds to read to the Council.

(The Council unanimously agrees to adjourn the examination of the draft telegram to be sent until the next meeting of the Council)

(It was decided:

(1) To send a note to the Romanian Government insisting on a prompt answer to the note which had already been sent by the Council on October 12th;

(2) That this note should be immediately delivered to the Romanian Government at Bucharest by the four representatives of the Powers without waiting for further instructions from their respective Governments;

(3) To give the Romanian Delegation at Paris a copy of this note that same afternoon;

(4) That the present note, and also the original note, should be published the following day.)


4. The Council has before it a report from the New States Commission and a draft Treaty with Greece.

M Kammerer reads and comments upon the report of the New States Commission and the draft Treaty with Greece. He adds that the proposed Treaty concerns European territory only and should any Asiatic territory be attributed to Greece at a later time, a new treaty will be necessary. Greece should also be informed that the Treaty would be communicated to her at this time, but that the signature would only follow upon the final attribution to her of certain territories.

(After a short discussion it is decided:

(1) To approve the draft Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Greece, prepared by the New States Commission;

(2) That in communicating the text of this treaty to the Greek Delegation the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference should inform the Delegation that it only applies to territories situated in Europe, and that Greece will not be asked to sign the Treaty before the territories to be attributed to her had been determined.)


5. M Fromageot wishes to inquire which Powers should figure in the preamble of the Treaty with Bulgaria, and also which Powers are to sign. America and Japan were not at war with Bulgaria, but it seemed anomalous that they should not sign, taking into account the different dispositions of the Treaty.

Mr Polk understands that the question has already been settled and that it was agreed that all the Principal Powers sign.

M Fromageot says that as for the other Allied and Associated Powers, a certain number had not declared war against Bulgaria, but their full powers had already been presented to the Bulgarian Delegation; under those circumstances they have a right to sign. He proposes that a circular letter should be sent them asking whether they intended to sign, and he thinks this would not delay the delivery of the reply to the Bulgarian counter-proposals.

(It was decided:

(1) That all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign the Treaty with Bulgaria;

(2) That a circular letter should be addressed to the other Allied Powers which had not declared war against Bulgaria, to inquire whether it was their intention to sign the Treaty.)


6. The Council has before it the note from the Dutch Government and the draft reply prepared by the Drafting Committee to this note.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon both documents. He wishes to add that the note sent by the Supreme Council on October 15th to Germany conformed to the declarations made in March at the Conference in Brussels concerning the question of ships in course of construction. He wishes to point out that the decision was formerly that all ships in course of construction were to be delivered to the Allies.

S Scialoja remarks that, in the reply to the Dutch Government, paragraph 7, Annex 3, to Part VIII of the Treaty with Germany should be had in mind. A possible objection from the Dutch Government should be foreseen: the Treaty states that Germany agrees to take any measures that might be necessary for obtaining the full title to the property in all ships which might have been transferred during the war to neutral flags. It therefore follows that Holland might very well tell the Allies that they should address their demands to Germany and not to her. He would like the Drafting Committee to take into consideration the possibility of that objection in the note to be sent to Holland.

Mr Polk states that apparently the said paragraph ties the hands of the Supreme Council; but as a matter of principle, this would not be in accord with the American view of International Law. Should not this note be sent back to the Drafting Committee to prepare a text which would satisfy all the members of the Council?

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to remark that if an argument is begun with the Dutch Government it will be difficult to foresee how long this discussion might last.

(It is decided to refer back to the Drafting Committee the draft reply to the note from the Dutch Government for further examination.)


7. The Council has before it a report from the Allied Railways Commission in Poland relative to the opening for commercial traffic of the three railroads crossing the German-Polish frontier north of Warsaw.

Colonel Kisch reads and comments upon this report. He brings up the personal suggestion that the Armistice Commission was not the proper authority, but that the question should be referred to the Allied Representatives in Berlin.

(After a short discussion it is decided to approve the conclusions of the report as presented by the Allied Railways Commission in Poland, with this modification: that the Allied Military Representatives charged with the Polish-German Affairs acquaint the German Government with the agreements if any, concluded at Warsaw.)


8. The Council has before it a request of the European Danube Request of the Commission on the International Conference to establish the regime of the Danube, as provided for in Article 349 of the German Treaty.

(After a short discussion it is decided to refer this request to the Drafting Committee for examination and report as to points of law.)



9. The Council has before it the request of the European Danube Commission for the attribution of two tugs to that Commission.

(It is decided to attribute two tugs belonging to the Enemy Powers to the European Danube Commission for an indemnity to be fixed by the arbitrators.)


10. The Council has before it the note from the German Delegation to the Reparations Commission regarding the transport by sea of potatoes purchased by Germany in Denmark.

(It is decided to refer back to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission this question for examination and report.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, November 4, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.



1. Marshal Foch states that the President of the Armistice Commission has informed him that at a meeting at Treves of the Railways Commission the German delegates informed the Allied representatives that the German Government had decided to stop all passenger train service from the 5th to the 15th of November, both in the occupied and unoccupied parts of Germany. After the 15th of November passenger traffic would be restored but all express trains would be suppressed. He wishes to be authorized by the Council to reply that the suspension of railway service in the occupied territories could not be admitted and that if a reduction of railway service in these territories is consented to, it will only be on condition that rapid communication with the large centers of unoccupied Germany, with respect both to passenger traffic and postal service, should continue to exist.

(It is decided to approve the communication to be sent by Marshal Foch to the German Government notifying it that the Allied and Associated Powers cannot permit a substantial curtailment of service on railroads in the occupied territories.


2. The Council has before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council dated November 1st, 1919.

M Berthelot says that it is evident from reading Sir George Clerk’s telegram that everyone in Hungary desired the departure of the Romanian troops; they are an embarrassment both to the Friedrich Government and to the Allied Generals, whose authority is compromised by their presence. But, in spite of this fact, it remains necessary to have an Inter-Allied force on the spot. This seems to him all the more essential as he notes that the only Allied representative having a real influence in Hungary is Admiral Troubridge, and he supposes that this is because of the vessels under the Admiral’s command. So the Romanians should leave, but on the other hand, it is necessary to have an Inter-Allied force which will be more than a moral force. Sir George Clerk’s telegram also indicates that the Friedrich Government will retire as soon as the Romanian troops have left. Under these conditions it seems to him that the order of events should be as follows:

(1) Formation of an Inter-Allied force, if it is decided to form one;

(2) Departure of the Romanian troops, as soon as this Inter-Allied force can reach its destination;

(3) Withdrawal of the Friedrich cabinet; and,

(4) Formation of a Democratic government which will take charge of elections. Sir George Clerk, as a perfect gentleman, seems to feel confidence in Admiral Horthy, in whom he has found a pleasing personality. As far as he is concerned, it seems to him that the word of an Hungarian Admiral, however likeable he might be, and whose intentions moreover are known, is not sufficient.

S de Martino says that the Italian Delegation is of the opinion that the occupation of Hungary by an Inter-Allied force composed of Yugoslavs and Czechs will result in trouble; these troops, particularly the Yugoslav troops, have shown in the past that they are not averse to pillaging. Moreover, there exists a profound hatred between Hungarians and Serbs. The Italian Delegation therefore thinks that the troops which it is proposed to send to Hungary will only increase disorder. The Italian representative at Budapest has proposed an alternative plan of charging the Inter-Allied Military Mission with supervising the organization of the Hungarian army and of ensuring that it did not fall into the hands of the reactionaries. Such a mission for the Generals could be considered as falling within the terms of the Armistice and will not constitute an illegal interference in the Internal affairs of Hungary. In any case it will be well to know what kind of government it is desired to establish in Hungary. Sir George Clerk’s report seems to place confidence in Friedrich and Horthy, while, on the other hand, the French Delegation has characterized them as tools of Archduke Joseph; a definite policy should be adopted.

M Berthelot replies that if the Serbs and Czechs are to be commanded by Serb and Czech officers it will evidently be impossible to use them, but it is proposed to place these troops under Allied command. Moreover, whatever bitterness might exist in Hungary against the Serbs, he thinks that Hungarian public opinion is resigned to the loss of certain territories. In the next place, it seems scarcely possible that Admiral Horthy’s army can be controlled by a Commission which has no material force at its disposition: to follow any such line of action would be tantamount to insisting on a policy of impotence. Finally, as to the question of knowing what government should be supported, he thinks that there is no difference of opinion, and that S De Martino himself has no doubts concerning the true aims of Friedrich. This point of paramount importance remains: as long as the Romanians are there, the Hungarian Government has been able to do nothing. The day the Romanians left and nothing remained but the moral force of the Allied Generals, the country will be delivered over to reaction and monarchical restoration. It is vital to have a real force in Hungary; the question is to know what this force should be.

Mr Polk asks who will pay the Czechoslovak and Serbian troops placed under Allied Command. It was evident that it will not be their governments.

M Berthelot observes that the financial question will have to be examined but that it is less important than the question of principle which should be decided first.

M Pichon points out that it is necessary to know if it is agreed to organize an Inter-Allied force. For his part he thinks it indispensable. As long as Friedrich is there the establishment of a democratic form of government cannot be counted upon. Friedrich had proved that he was either unable or unwilling to establish one.

Mr Polk says that his difficulty is that the plan now proposed has not been suggested either by Sir George Clerk or by the Allied Generals; it is being discussed at long range. Moreover, he thinks that there will be difficulties in obtaining the necessary cooperation of the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs; it will also be difficult to persuade the Romanians to withdraw completely, and the Council will find it hard to maintain control of the situation. Finally, he doubts if an Allied command will suffice to prevent the pillaging and disorders that S De Martino mentioned.

M Pichon says that evidently no decision can now be taken and that Sir George Clerk and the Allied Generals should be consulted.

M Berthelot observes that it will certainly be preferable to send Allied troops into Hungary, but that none are available. It is also clear that it will be difficult to eliminate the Romanians, and that if the three countries bordering on Hungary participate in that operation the difficulties will be less. On both sides there are adverse considerations between which a choice will have to be made.

S de Martino requests that his proposal be submitted also to Sir George Clerk. He is, moreover, greatly impressed by the fact that Sir George Clerk thinks that Horthy can be persuaded to keep his promises.

M Pichon thinks it is extraordinary that Admiral Horthy, who has raised an army with certain well known intentions, should suddenly renounce his designs.

S de Martino points out that Sir George Clerk has also indicated the possibility of trusting Friedrich and has spoken of private negotiations relative to the formation of a Ministry, whereas M Berthelot has said that the Council had already pronounced against Friedrich.

M Berthelot says that it should be recalled that after Sir George Clerk’s first trip, the Council had agreed that Friedrich must be eliminated. A draft to this effect has been prepared. In order not to seem to intervene in the internal affairs of Hungary this telegram has not been sent and it has been decided to entrust Sir George Clerk with a new mission, but Sir George Clerk’s instructions are contained in the draft telegram. This draft has been prepared by Sir George Clerk and himself. Sir George has pointed out to him that it would be best not to give Friedrich an order to withdraw and to only tell him that for the last time he was asked to form a democratic government - a thing which they judge it impossible for him to do. He recalls also that the Council has thought of publishing the telegram in order to strengthen the hands of the Hungarian Democratic elements. It is clear that if Friedrich had been able to form a democratic government he would long since have done so. Sir George Clerk, moreover, does not seem to have any doubt of his withdrawal. It seemed to him that the Friedrich Government, like any monarchical Government which attempts to establish itself in Hungary, should withdraw.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he entirely agrees that Sir George Clerk should be consulted; he himself had suggested it at the preceding meeting of the Council. There is first of all a point which has to be clarified, namely: what is being asked of Hungary? It is to have a stable Government which will preside over the elections and with which Peace can be concluded. The occupation, which M Berthelot thinks will be a short one, is therefore bound up with the question of elections, and might well be prolonged. Furthermore, Sir George Clerk thinks that Friedrich will withdraw after the departure of the Romanians and he manifests a great deal of confidence in Admiral Horthy’s assurance that he will recognize a Government resulting from the elections. Sir George must have serious reasons for this opinion and he, himself, attaches great weight to it. Moreover, it is well known that the majority of the Hungarian population favor the establishment of a conservative form of Government; if the elections take place without mismanagement it is almost certain that the resulting Government will not be democratic. However, there exists no right to prevent the Hungarian people from forming a Government corresponding to its own tendencies, provided there is no question of restoring the Hapsburgs. He thinks indeed, that Admiral Horthy is counting on the elections to bring about in Hungary a Government satisfactory to himself and that doubtless explains his attitude and the assurance he had given to Sir George Clerk. Ought military intervention be resorted to, in order to prevent such elections? The whole question lay there. In the meantime, elections are impossible in Hungary until the Romanians have retired beyond the Theiss. The intervention of the Czechs and Serbs might likewise create difficulties. He doubts whether that intervention could be obtained since the Czechs are probably not inclined to favor the formation of a Government whose tendencies will cause them anxiety. Moreover, if the intervention of the Yugoslavs is requested they might ask to be guaranteed against an Italian attack; what would be done then? He thinks, for his part, that Sir George Clerk ought first of all to be asked if he thinks it expedient to form the Inter-Allied force which had been suggested. Why not be satisfied with the departure of Friedrich and the formation of another Government? That is what had been desired by the Council. There had been no thought of military occupation and no new fact had occurred to justify that occupation.

M Berthelot thinks that there is a new fact, namely; the organization of Horthy’s army. He is very nearly in agreement with the essential part of Sir Eyre Crowe’s statements. It is indeed probable that the elections will be favorable to politicians of the same shade of opinion as Friedrich, but the principle should be agreed to that the return of the Hapsburgs cannot be tolerated. It is impossible to intervene in opposition to the opinion of the country, nevertheless this opinion cannot be allowed to do what it pleases. Moreover, he does not think that the Czechs will create any difficulty over giving the assistance which would be asked of them, for Dr Benes has been the first to point out the danger. There is no doubt that the police of Friedrich and the army of Horthy will, at the time of the elections, act favorably to the reactionary elements.

Sir Eyre Crowe adds that Sir George Clerk should be asked if he is sure of the good faith of Friedrich and Horthy.

S de Martino says that Sir Eyre Crowe has alluded to a question which the Yugoslavs will doubtless raise if they are asked to send troops into Hungary. He cannot better reply than by reiterating the opposition of the Italian Delegation to the sending of Serbian troops into Hungary.

M Berthelot asks the reasons for this opposition?

S de Martino said the reasons are those that he has already pointed out; he is willing, however, for Sir George Clerk to be consulted on this point provided that his (S De Martino’s) suggestions are also submitted to him.

M Pichon points out that Sir George Clerk had made another recommendation, namely sending an Inter-Allied Mission to Transylvania. For his part he approves of this recommendation.

M Polk asks if the members of this proposed Mission could not be taken from the Allied officers at Budapest.

Sir Eyre Crowe recalls that Transylvania was to be given to Romania, and inquires whether such a Mission could be sent without previous negotiations with Romania.

Mr Polk suggests that Sir George Clerk be asked what part of Transylvania is referred to in his telegram.

M Pichon adds that he might also be asked to specify the accusations made against the Romanians.

M Berthelot reads a draft telegram which he has prepared in conformity with the views expressed in the course of the discussion.

Mr Polk asks if the sense of the Council is that the Romanians should eventually be represented in the Inter-Allied force?

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he, just as did the American Delegation, sees difficulties in such a course.

M Pichon says that he is not desirous to have the Romanians included in this force but he thinks that their exclusion will create additional difficulties.

Mr Polk remarks that he had only said that it seemed to him difficult for the Romanians to accept exclusion from the Inter-Allied force.

Sir Eyre Crowe calls attention to the fact that Sir George Clerk had asked if he was authorized to state that the Allies would recognize a Government, acceptable to him, which did not include Friedrich. A reply on this point should be sent to him.

Mr Polk says he takes it as understood that the telegram would be submitted to the Council before being dispatched.

(It was decided that at its next meeting the Council will examine a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk to be prepared by M Berthelot in conformity with the discussion of this question at the meeting of November 4th.)


3. The Council has before it a note from the French Delegation dated November 3, 1919.

General Le Rond said that there has already been preliminary conferences between the British and French delegates on the various Plebiscite Commissions. It will be very advisable for the Italian delegates to participate as soon as possible in these conferences. The Council should not forget that these Commissions are important bodies, that each country has to organize numerous personnel and that such organization will necessarily entail a long delay. In these preliminary conferences it will be necessary to agree on the personnel to be furnished by each Allied country and to prepare the negotiations with the Germans.

S de Martino thinks that November 7th is somewhat early. The 8th or 9th would be better.

General Le Rond observes that there is no obligation to commence negotiations with the Germans exactly on the 10th.

M Pichon wishes to draw the attention of the Italian Delegation to the question of the contingent to be supplied by Italy for the forces of occupation; the Council does not yet know if Italy has withdrawn her reservation.

General Cavallero says that the instructions he has just received authorizes him to withdraw that reservation. The Italian contingent will consist of five battalions and two batteries of Field Artillery, that is to say, three battalions and two batteries of Field Artillery will be sent to Upper Silesia, one battalion to Marienwerder and one to Teschen. He will come to an agreement with Marshal Foch’s Staff to have the strength of the three battalions destined for Upper Silesia sufficiently reinforced to equal approximately the five battalions demanded.

Marshal Foch says that this plan ought to be examined more closely but in principle it seems admissible.

M Pichon says that the Presidents of the Commissions should be named. The Council had decided on the 18th October that the Presidents should be elected by the Commissions themselves, but it later seemed preferable to have the Council appoint them directly. Ought it to wait until the Commissions had been formed?

General Le Rond thinks that it is important to make these appointments as soon as possible. Indeed the Presidency carries with it certain obligations; the nations furnishing the Presidents will also have to furnish a larger personnel. They, therefore, should be settled upon as soon as possible. If it is decided that the Presidency of each Commission should be given to the Nation to which has been entrusted the command of the troops in the same zone, he wishes to recall that at Allenstein the military command will be British, at Marienwerder Italian, in Upper Silesia French, and at Teschen American; but as for Teschen the American participation is awaiting the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate, and the question is all the more urgent inasmuch as only two months are left in which to hold the plebiscite.

M Pichon says that the Council feels that it is fitting that the military command in each territory to be occupied, and the Presidency of the plebiscite Commission in the same territory, should pertain to the same Nation.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests that while waiting for America to assume the Presidency of the Teschen Commission it should be held by France, which already administers the neighboring territory of Upper Silesia.

Mr Polk agrees.

General Weygand says that a telegram has just been received from General Henrys containing information of the agreements concluded between the Germans and Poles with respect to regulating the taking over by Poland of territories to be immediately ceded to it by virtue of the Treaty of Peace. The application of these agreements, moreover, raise certain difficulties; for instance, it involves the passage over part of the territory of the free city of Danzig of German troops. Under these circumstances he thinks it important to notify the Poles to send representatives qualified to continue their negotiations with the Germans under the auspices of the Conference.

(This recommendation is approved.)

(It is decided:

(1) That the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on Plebiscite or Administrative Commissions, to the extent of at least one Delegate from each Power on each Commission, should assemble at the Quai d’Orsay as soon as practicable - November 7th if possible;

(2) That the Polish Government should be invited to send to Paris representatives empowered to conduct with the German Government - under the auspices of the Conference - the negotiations rendered necessary by the cession to Poland of German territory, at the same time as the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers discussed with the German Delegates questions raised by the putting into force of the Treaty of Peace.)

(It is further decided:

(1) That the Presidency of the Plebiscite Commissions should at Allenstein be held by the British Representative, at Marienwerder by the Italian, in Upper Silesia by the French, and at Teschen by the Americans; although provisionally it should be held at Teschen by the French Representative;

(2) That the question of the strength of the Italian troops of occupation should be settled by Marshal Foch and the Italian Military Representative.)


4. The Council has before it a note from the Belgian Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference dated October 25th, 1919.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the question is decided by the former decisions of the Council. The best course would be to transmit this note to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission stating that the Council is of the opinion that the instructions previously given by it to this Commission involved the granting of the Belgian Delegation’s request.

(It is decided to transmit to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission the note from the Belgian Delegation relative to German vessels laden with wood destined for Belgium, and to inform that Commission that the Supreme Council is of the opinion that the instructions previously given by it involve the granting of the Belgian request.


5. General Weygand states that with respect to their railway system the Baltic Provinces are in a peculiar situation. During the war the Germans changed the tracks to normal gauge with the result that at present only German material and transformed Russian material could circulate on the Baltic system. It is evident that in order to assure the continuance of the economic life of the country part of the German material should be retained on the spot. Neither the Armistice nor the treaty accorded the right to demand this. He proposes that the German Government be informed that, by reason of Germany’s deliberate transformation of the railways of the Baltic Provinces, General Niessel should be empowered to determine the amount of German material to be retained in those territories.

(It is decided that the German Government should be informed by Marshal Foch that, in consequence of the transformation of the railways of the Baltic Provinces effected by the Germans during the war, General Niessel will be empowered to determine the amount of German rolling stock which should be left in those regions.)


6. The Council has before it the draft letter to the Chargé d’Affaires of the Dutch Government relative to the vessels sold by Germany during the war to Dutch Navigation Companies.

(It is decided to approve the text of the note to the Chargé d’Affaires of the Dutch Government relative to German ships sold during the war to Dutch Navigation Companies.)


7. The Council has before it a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 3rd, 1919.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that the only thing to do is to approve the recommendations of the note. The Council at that moment agrees that the Secretary-General of the European Danube Commission, that is to say, Colonel Rey, should be Secretary-General of Conference provided for by Article 349 of the Treaty of Versailles. Representation of the European Danube Commission Conference Provided for by Article 349 of the Treaty of Versailles

(It is decided:

(1) To approve the recommendations of the note prepared by the Drafting Committee relative to representation of the European-Danube Commission in the Conference provided for by Article 349 of the Treaty of Versailles;

(2) That the Secretary-General of the European-Danube Commission should act as Secretary-General of the said Conference.)


8. M Fromageot says that the Drafting Committee wonders whether it would not be expedient to have Bulgaria sign a Protocol similar to those signed by the German and Austrian Delegations at Versailles and at St. Germain. It is difficult to take the Versailles Protocol as a guide for the Protocol in question. On the other hand, the St. Germain Protocol contains provisions which it would be advantageous to have Bulgaria sign.

For instance, it provides, in Section 1, that the list of persons to be handed over to the Allied and Associated Governments by Austria pursuant to Article 173, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, should be sent to the Austrian Government within a month of the coming into force of the Treaty.

A similar clause could be inserted in the Bulgarian Protocol. The provisions contained in Section 2 seem inapplicable to Bulgaria.

The same is not true of the provisions of Section 3; but as the Bulgarian Treaty, with respect to reparations, differs greatly from the Austrian Treaty, he thinks that the opinion of the Reparation Commission should be asked on that point.

Finally, Section 4 could be advantageously reproduced. Austria had also signed at St. Germain a declaration by which it undertook to communicate to the Allied and Associated Governments all the information at its disposal relative to vessels sunk or damaged by Austrian naval forces during the war. It might not be very beneficial to have Bulgaria sign a corresponding declaration, but at least it could not be prejudicial.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Drafting Committee should prepare, to be signed at the same time as the Bulgarian Treaty, a draft protocol similar to the protocol signed September 10, 1919, at Saint Germain, by the Austrian Delegation, subject to the decision of the Reparation Commission as to the expediency of repeating in the said protocol the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of the protocol of Saint Germain;

(2) That the Drafting Committee should prepare, to be signed by the Bulgarian Delegation at the same time as the Treaty of Peace, a declaration similar to the one signed on September 10, 1919, by the Austrian Delegation.)


9. Mr Matsui states that he has been telegraphically informed that the Emperor of Japan, on October 30th, had ratified the Treaty of Versailles. Under the final clauses of the Treaty of Peace it becomes his duty to make a formal notification of this ratification. Should he do so at once or await the signature of the procès-verbal relative to the deposit of ratifications? It seems to him that he might await this latter date.

M Pichon says that the Conference will approve the procedure prescribed by the Drafting Committee.

M Fromageot says that that Committee has provided for this contingency in the draft procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications which had been approved by the Council. This draft had spoken of “deposit of ratifications or of notifications of ratifications.”

(The meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

5th November 1919

American soldier attached to the Red Cross distributes shoes to Russian prisoners of war still stuck in Germany due to the Russian Civil War.


Ship Losses:

Audrey P. Brown (Canada) The schooner ran aground in Liverpool Bay, Nova Scotia.
Silny (Russian Navy White Movement) Russian Civil War: Medvezhyegorsk Operation: The gunboat was scuttled to prevent capture in Lake Onega.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, November 5, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council has before it a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk.

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to remark that he proposes to replace paragraph 2 on page 1 by the following paragraph: “The Romanian troops shall evacuate Hungary completely and shall withdraw to the other side of the frontier as fixed by the Conference: It is indispensable that they should allow full liberty to the Hungarian elections.” In the following paragraph he suggests that the words, “immediately thereafter” should be omitted. He wishes to give Sir George Clerk discretion on the question of the time when the Friedrich cabinet should withdraw. If he were to await the complete evacuation by the Romanian troops, this might be found too long.

S de Martino asks that a change be made in paragraph 1 of page 2, so as to follow the suggestion made by the Italian representative at Budapest.

(The text is agreed to read as follows: “Another suggestion had been made which charged the Inter-Allied Military Mission with the supervision of the organization … etc.”

Mr Polk suggests that the beginning of paragraph 3 on page 2 be changed to read as follows: “The Council would like to know whether, after having consulted the Inter-Allied Mission, and after … etc.”

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to add to paragraph 3 of page 2, after the words, “by the Hungarian gendarmerie” the following words, “which might be placed under the Control, direct or indirect, of the Inter-Allied Military Mission.”

(This change is adopted, and it is agreed to put after paragraph 3 of page 2, the paragraph suggested by S De Martino)

(It is decided:

(1) That Sir Eyre Crowe should send to Sir George Clerk, in the name of the Supreme Council, the telegram.

(2) That the telegram sent by the Supreme Council to the Romanian Government at its meeting of November 3rd, 1919, should be communicated to Sir George Clerk.)


2. M Pichon inquires whether Mr Polk has received an answer on the subject from President Wilson.

Mr Polk says that the President will surely issue the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations; the only question is the form of thee letter which the President should write. This is still open and he expected an answer within a short time.

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to state that the British Government has agreed upon Paris as the place of the first meeting of the Council.

M Berthelot states it is understood between Sir Eric Drummond, Colonel House and the French Representative that this meeting should only nominate the Commission charged with fixing the boundaries of the Sarre district. There still remains the appointment of the Commission for the Government of the Sarre district. As soon as the Treaty is put into force, the German Government might ask, to whom should the sovereignty over this territory be transferred. The difficulty might of course be solved by prolonging the military occupation regime until the Commission for the Government of the Sarre had been appointed; but it is important that the Allies should agree on this intermediary solution. From the French standpoint, however, it is quite certain that it would be wiser to appoint the Government Commission at once and that it is to especially please the American and British Governments that this solution might be accepted.

Mr Polk remarks that he understands that this is the view of his Government.

Sir Eyre Crowe fears that the Germans might cause trouble, if this is not fixed; Sir Eric Drummond however having agreed with his French and American colleagues, he (Sir Eyre Crowe) concludes that M Berthelot’s solution is correct.

M Berthelot remarks that of course Germany will be very likely to send notes to the Allies on the subject but as it is only a question of a few weeks at the most, he thinks it will be easy to gain the necessary time.

(It is decided:

(1) That Paris should be the place of the first meeting of the Council of League of Nations;

(2) That on the agenda of the first meeting of the Council the only matter taken up will be the appointment of the Commission charged with fixing the boundaries of the Sarre territory;

(3) That the present military occupation of the Sarre territory should continue until the Commission charged with the government of the Sarre district had been appointed.)


3. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation.

(After a short discussion it is decided that Sir Eyre Crowe should notify the Delegates of the provisional Government at Memel that the permission requested could not be granted but that as soon as the Treaty of Peace was put into force the Allied and Associated Powers would welcome the cooperation of the local Officials who are natives of the country.)


4. The Council has before it instructions to General Niessel, President of the Commission charged with the control of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the last phrase of instructions paragraph 1, Section 5 entitled, “Action of the Allied Navy in the Baltic,” beginning with the words, “the Commission will serve as an intermediary” be removed.

(This is agreed to.)

Sir Eyre Crowe also wishes to remark that as far as transportation is concerned, the British Government would do all in its power, but cannot guarantee transportation.

M Berthelot states that General Niessel had already insisted before the Council on his Commission getting the necessary credits; it had adjourned the examination of this question, but General Niessel called the attention of the Council to a case which needed its immediate decision. From the information at hand, it seemed that Colonel Bermondt’s troops will probably be dissolved, and it is important to know what will happen to the Russian troops which make up his forces. Of course every effort will be made to have these troops put under General Yudenitch’s command, but a certain period might elapse before this can take place, and meanwhile it will be necessary to supply them if one does not want to throw them into the hands of the Bolshevists. He thinks it necessary to allot a certain amount of money to General Niessel which would be shared between the three Allies.

Mr Polk wishes to state that, as far as America is concerned, it can provide no funds for that purpose.

Sir Eyre Crowe also remarks that he questions the likelihood of his Government’s participation.

M Berthelot states that it is already well understood that each power should stand the expenses of its representatives; but there surely are bound to be common expenses, and it seems impossible to send this mission without a credit: France might decide to advance the sum for this purpose, it being well understood of course that the other Governments would reimburse it later.

Mr Polk remarks that the appropriations of the United States Government were so made that it can only pay the share of expenses for its own mission, and for a determined purpose.

M Berthelot explains that this is the reason he suggested a fixed amount. He thinks the Council should recognize the importance of the solution.

Sir Eyre Crowe inquires why they should not adopt M Berthelot’s solution, which is on the same lines as the procedure in the missions of Sir George Clerk and General Gough, where the British Government paid at first and the expenses were later shared.

M Berthelot agrees that France is ready to follow this procedure, if it is understood that the other Allies would reimburse her for their share.

Mr Polk states that his Government cannot give a penny towards a Mission of a political nature.

Sir Eyre Crowe emphasizes that his Government understands the mission to be a reply to the German demand for some body to supervise the German evacuation, and therefore it cannot countenance its becoming involved in political activities.

M Berthelot thinks the question is a more complex one.

Mr Polk says he is quite sure that General Niessel understands that the American representative has strict instructions not to become involved in questions of a political nature.

S de Martino thinks that it might be very difficult to make a difference between political questions and purely military questions; the one might involve the other; and he thinks it important that the Generals should get definite instructions in advance on political questions which might come up, so that the action they took should be covered by a common agreement.

M Pichon answers that it will be for the General to ask the Council for instructions. He sums up that the Commission will be the best judge of what measures it should take, and should they include or involve questions of a political nature, then the Council should be informed immediately and a decision given.

(It is decided:

(1) That in the section of instructions to General Niessel, entitled “Action of the Inter-Allied Navy in the Baltic” the phrase which reads, “The Commission will serve as intermediary between the Supreme Council and the Inter-Allied Military Mission,” should be omitted;

(2) That the Commission should keep strictly to the wording of their instructions and should refer to the Supreme Council any questions of a political nature involved in the carrying out of these instructions.


5. The Council has before it a list of questions prepared by the French Delegation.

M Berthelot reads and comments upon this list. He wishes to remark that on the list submitted, certain questions might not belong to the Supreme Council and can be treated through ordinary diplomatic channels. He suggested that each delegation prepare a revised list on these lines, and the Secretary-General will coordinate all the lists handed in.

(It is decided that each Delegation should prepare a list of all questions which still remain to be taken up by the Supreme Council, and that the Secretary-General of the Conference should collate these lists for the Council’s examination.)


6. Mr Polk states that the Supreme Council has made a decision on the question of the tank ships on September 27th; this decision stands, but he personally has decided without knowledge of the full facts, wished to have the question raised at a later date when he had all available information. He simply wished this set upon the record.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

6th November 1919

British soldiers occupying Cologne, Germany have their last dinner before demobilization and heading home.


19-year-old female Montenegrin guerilla fighter who fought the Austro-Hungarians when her country was occupied. She is wearing an Austrian Colonel’s uniform.

[Von Due]

On 6 November 1919 a joint meeting of the Royal Astronomical Society and the Royal Society heard the results of expeditions led by the British scientists Arthur Eddington, Frank Dyson and Andrew Crommelin who observed a total solar eclipse and tested and confirmed Einstein’s general theory of relativity.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, November 6, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council had before it two telegrams from Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council dated November 4th and November 5th, a telegram from situation in the Interallied Military Mission dated November 5th, and another telegram from the same sources dated November 3rd, all concerning the situation in Hungary.

M Pichon points out that the telegram sent by the Council to Sir George Clerk on the preceding day satisfied in great measure the requests contained in his two telegrams. Both Sir George Clerk and the Inter-Allied Military Mission are opposed to the despatch of Yugoslav and Czech troops. As the suggestion of the French Delegation has not met with approval the point will not be insisted upon.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that Sir George Clerk had asked authority to recognize at once the coalition government which he hoped would be formed. It would be well to give him this authority. The telegram of the preceding day gave him, as a matter of fact, an answer on this point. Sir George Clerk likewise desires not to be obliged to insist on the immediate withdrawal of Friedrich. On this point also the Council should meet his views.

M Pichon says that a telegram should be sent to Sir George Clerk confirming the previous instructions of the Council and stating, moreover, that the Council relies on his tact. But the question still remained: What will happen after the departure of the Romanian troops? Would not the presence of an Inter-Allied force be necessary? Would the Inter-Allied Mission suffice for the maintenance of order?

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that this question had already been raised in the telegram sent on the preceding day, which had crossed Sir George Clerk’s telegrams. He wishes to call attention to another point: Would it not be well to request the Yugoslavs and the Czechs to retire immediately within their frontiers as laid down by the Council? According to the telegram of November 3rd, from the Inter-Allied Military Mission, the Czechs are raising difficulties with respect to the evacuation of the mines of Salgo-Tarjan: they were demanding as a condition precedent, reimbursement for their expenses relative to the supply of the Hungarian population. Would it not be well to request the Czechs to withdraw, at the same time assuring them that the Council would take into consideration the question of reimbursement for their expenses? Likewise, in the south, the Yugoslavs were still occupying the mines at Pecs, whereas, according to the decisions of the Council, that territory was to remain in the possession of Hungary.

S de Martino thinks that this is the time to insist upon all States bordering on Hungary recognizing the frontiers of the Hungarian State.

Mr Polk observes that the Governments concerned had been notified of the lines laid down as the northern and eastern frontiers of Hungary; he wishes to inquire whether there has been a similar notification with respect to the frontier between Hungary and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

M de Saint Quentin explains that at the time the Council had disallowed the Yugoslav claims in Baranya and Batchka, the Serbian Delegation had been notified of its decision. As a result of this notification the Serbs had formulated new proposals: They had, in particular, asked the right of exploiting the mines of Pecs for five years. The Serbian request had been referred to the Reparation Commission and the Economic Commission but both of these considered themselves without jurisdiction, as the question, to their minds, was essentially a political one; however, the Serbian request had neither been examined by the Central Territorial Committee nor the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Romania and Yugoslavia.

M Pichon says that the Serbs must be informed that the territorial question had been settled, but that this decision would not prejudice the decision to be taken by the Council with respect to the exploitation of the mines of Pecs. He suggests that the latter question should be referred to the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Romania and Yugoslavia.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that a new fact had occurred; on October 25th the Serbian Delegation had asked that the evacuation of the territories actually held by the Yugo-Slav troops should be deferred until the question of the exploitation of the mines had been settled.

M Berthelot thinks the Yugo-Slav request inadmissible from the territorial point of view.

M Pichon says it was agreed that the Czechoslovaks and the Yugoslavs, as well as the Romanians, should be asked to evacuate. Moreover, M Berthelot will prepare a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk.

M Berthelot reads a draft telegram prepared in accordance with the views expressed by the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels it useless, since it had been decided not to send Czech and Yugoslav contingents into Hungary, to ask Sir George Clerk if he deems it expedient to send an Interallied force.

M Berthelot thinks that the question should nevertheless be raised, because if Sir George Clerk should say that such a force is necessary it will be worthwhile studying the plan anew. In view of Sir George’s report as to the attitude of Friedrich it might be well to reflect on what would happen when Friedrich, with 30,000 men, found himself opposed to the Supreme Council and a mission of Generals without any troops.

Sir Eyre Crowe wonders what would happen if Sir George Clerk indicates that the sending of an Inter-Allied force is essential or even desirable. The only possible reply would be that no one could be sent.

M Berthelot acknowledges that the situation will be difficult but he thinks that it will not present an absolute impossibility.

S de Martino remarks that Italy will certainly not send any troops.

M Pichon agrees that the French also would find great difficulty in sending any.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the question is purely an academic one. The wording proposed by M Berthelot presents the difficulty that Sir George Clerk might well think that he was being offered something which the Council could not give him.

M Pichon agrees that the telegram should be modified in the light of Sir Eyre Crowe’s remarks and should state that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would find it very difficult to send any troops if the need should arise.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that Sir George Clerk should also be asked if he deems the Hungarian Police force adequate to cope with the situation.

S de Martino desires a further addition to the effect that the Police force could be placed under the control of the Interallied Military Mission.

(It is decided:

(1) That Sir Eyre Crowe should send to Sir George Clerk, in the name of the Supreme Council, the telegram prepared by M. Berthelot;

(2) That the Czech and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments should be requested to withdraw their troops immediately beyond the frontiers of Hungary as laid down by the Council;

(3) That the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government should be informed that the decisions taken by the Council with respect to territorial questions are final, but that the evacuation requested will not prejudice the solution of the question of the exploitation of the mines of Pecs;


(4) That the request of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation proposing the grant to that Government for five years of the exploitation of the mines of Pecs, should be referred to the Committee for the study of Territorial Questions relating to Romania and Yugoslavia.


2. M Berthelot informs the Council that the Germans have given to the Press a fairly complete summary of the note and annexed Publication of protocol sent to them by the Council. He inquires if, under the circumstances, it would not be advisable to publish the complete text of that note.

(After a short discussion it is decided to publish the text of the note addressed to the German Government relative to the putting into force of the Treaty of Peace as well as the draft protocol annexed to that note.


3. The Council has before it a letter from General Nollet dated October 21, 1919, a note from the Drafting Committee dated October 29th 1919, and a letter from Marshal Foch dated November 3, 1919, concerning the Salaries of the Personnel of Commissions of Control in Germany.

General Walch reads and comments upon Marshal Foch’s letter.

Mr Polk, with respect to the organization of the personnel of the Commissions of Control, asks why it is necessary to call upon civilian engineers?

General Walch explains that the military technical personnel are inadequate to control the manufacture of war material. It is necessary to call upon competent specialists who cannot be found in the regular army.

General Nollet has called upon about 10 engineers and about 40 university graduates. In so doing he has only followed the example furnished by the British Commission of Control.

(It is decided that the payment of the salaries of the personnel of the Military Commissions of Control in Germany not belonging to regular military forces, should be assumed by Germany.)


4. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation dated November 3, 1919, concerning the Publication of the Correspondence With the Austrian Delegation.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the note of the British Delegation specifies that extreme care should be exercised with respect to the publication of the Austrian Notes marked “Confidential”.

Mr Polk says that evidently such notes cannot be published without the consent of Chancellor Renner.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests that Dr Renner could be asked if he still objects to the publication of those Notes.

S de Martino observes that the publication of the notes raises some questions which are delicate from an Italian point of view, and he asks that a decision on this point be postponed.

(The question is adjourned)


5. The Council has before it a letter from Marshal Foch to the President of the Peace Conference dated October 30th, 1919, and a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 5th, 1919, concerning the Demobilization of the Men of Haller’s Army.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon these documents.

(After a short discussion it was decided to approve the recommendations of the note of the Drafting Committee relative to demobilized Poles who had borne arms against Germany.)


6. The Council has before it a note from the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission dated October 31st, 1919, concerning Financial Measures of Coercion Taken Against Germany on Account of the Non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon this note. He observes that it is not correct to speak of the annulment of authorizations which might have been given: The question is one of revocation of said authorization. Germany cannot now create new pledges by availing itself of authorizations previously given, inasmuch as any such authorizations are now revoked.

(It is decided that the Drafting Committee should prepare a reply to M Loucheur’s letter dated October 31st, 1919, relative to the interpretation of the financial measures of coercion taken against Germany on account of the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.


7. The Council has before it a note from the Drafting Committee concerning the Liquidation of the Property of Inhabitants of Schleswig.

M Fromageot states that the Danish Government has pointed out that after the plebiscite the inhabitants of Schleswig would become Danish citizens. What would become of the interests of those newly-made Danish subjects whose property in the meantime might have been liquidated by one of the Allied and Associated Powers as belonging to enemy subjects? The Drafting Committee has considered this contingency in the note which the Council had before it. It appears that answer might be made to the Danish Government along the lines of the last paragraph of the said note; the Allied and Associated Powers, however, would always be at liberty to avail themselves of their rights of liquidation with respect to such new Danish subjects as did not seem to merit the consideration therein contemplated. Moreover, if the Principal Allied and Associated Powers arrive at such a decision, they should notify the other Allied Powers who, doubtless, will raise no difficulty over adopting the same procedure.

M Pichon suggests that the Drafting Committee should come to an agreement with the Economic Commission, which has the question in hand, on the draft of a resolution to be communicated to the other Allied Powers.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the Danish Government will have to be approached.

Mr Polk takes it as understood that the draft resolution will be submitted to the Council. He points out that he will have to refer the matter to his Government.


8. M Berthelot reminds the Council that at a previous meeting the question of an American Military Mission reported to be at Riga had been brought up. According to his present information there appears to be at Riga, besides a mission of relief and supply and a Red Cross mission, a mission under Colonel Holliday, who was reported to have arrived at Riga on October 15th. The Colonel was reported to have stated that he did not desire to collaborate with the Anglo-French Mission.

Mr Polk explains that Colonel Holliday is there alone. His duties are purely to collect information, and he has no political role to play. Moreover, General Cheney will see that he does not exceed his powers.


9. S de Martino informed the Council that the Italian delegates to the Plebiscite and Delimitation Commissions will arrive at Paris on November 10th. They will be ready from that day on to confer with their Allied colleagues.

M Pichon says that Marshal Foch will be informed of this.


10. S de Martino says that he has been informed from Vienna that Serbian and Romanian representatives wish to participate in the work of the Commission, presided over by Sir Francis Dent, which is charged with the distribution of rolling stock. This claim seems inadmissible, inasmuch as neither Serbia nor Romania had signed the Austrian Treaty.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the Commission in question is only a provisional one.

M de Saint Quentin explains that it has been decided to send to Vienna a provisional Commission which would become a permanent Commission when the Treaty comes into force. The character of the Commission is apparent from the fact that Hungary, an enemy country, is represented on it; it will therefore be difficult to deny representation to the Serbs and Romanians.

S de Martino says that he will examine the question anew.


11. Mr Polk says that his Government wishes to know if the question of the recognition of Luxembourg is to be decided by the Council.

M Berthelot summarizes the history of the question: When the question first arose five or six months ago the French Government declared that, from a political point of view, it would refrain from active participation in the Luxembourg question, and that it thought that the Belgian Government should be the first to make a decision. Belgium had told the French Government that it was opposed to recognizing the Grand Duchess. The French Government had transmitted this information to Rome, Washington and London and the Principal Powers abstained from recognizing the Grand Duchess. Eventually, and after at first refusing, Belgium consented that the fiancé of the Grand Duchess should be allowed to go to Luxembourg. The marriage was taking place that very day. Two days previously the Belgian Government had asked the French Government if it intended to recognize the Grand Duchess and to be represented at the marriage ceremony. He himself had replied by putting the same question to the Belgian Ambassador, since France had decided that Belgium should have the first word in political questions concerning Luxembourg. The Belgian Government had not yet replied. The French Government had been informed from other sources that the British Government intended to recognize the Grand Duchess and to be represented at the marriage ceremony. The French Government had then acquainted the British Government with the exact situation, at the same time informing the Italian Government.

M Pichon says that the Council will arrive at a decision on the Luxembourg question.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

7th November 1919

Inspired by Cape Town's daily Noon Gun Three Minute Pause, King George V institutes the Two Minute Silence, following a suggestion by Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, to be observed annually at the Eleventh Hour of the Eleventh Day of the Eleventh Month.

Hugo Haase, German socialist politician who co-chaired the Council of People’s Deputies after the German Revolution, dies due to severe injuries a month after he was shot by Johan Voss.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, November 7, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. Sir Eyre Crowe states he cannot nominate the British Representatives as the experts of the British Delegation on that subject were in London.

S de Martino wished to remark that there already was a Commission of Responsibilities.

M Escoffier says the Commission of Responsibilities has finished its work; this was a question for a special Commission charged with the preparation of the execution of Articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty with Germany.

M Pichon says that the Council agrees that the nomination of this Commission should be adjourned, but it is important that this should be settled in as short a time as possible.

M de Martino thinks an adjournment necessary as he would have to get in touch with his Government.

(It is decided:

(1) That a Commission will be nominated,
(a) To compare the lists of individuals charged with crimes to be delivered by the German Government;
(b) To decide the composition, procedure and seat of the mixed tribunals to be set up under Article 229 of the Treaty with Germany;

(2) That the Principal Allied and Associated Powers nominate as soon as possible their representatives on this Commission.)


2. The Council has before it a report of the Military Representatives at Versailles on the subject.

(After a short discussion,

It is decided to approve the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles dated November 5th, in answer to the request for instructions received from the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany.)


3. Sir Eyre Crowe regrets that this declaration has been delayed by numerous communications with his Government. The present proposal results from the proposition which had already been made by the American Delegation and also by the Polish Commission; in a few words, this proposition tends to eliminate anything in the nature of a temporary arrangement. The British Government is opposed to anything leading to a final union of Eastern Galicia and Poland. It has also discussed the question with Mr Paderewski and has pointed out to the latter that Poland would be acting in a sense diametrically opposed to the claims made by Poland for the district of Teschen. A large majority of the population in Eastern Galicia is not Polish. The British Government thinks that they ought not to shut the door to the real aims of Eastern Galicia which would allow its population to join other nationalities. It wishes, therefore, to adopt the following suggestion, namely: Poland will get a Mandate for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations for a determined period, such as 15 years; the League of Nations can then consider whether Eastern Galicia should be joined to Poland or make some other political arrangement. The British point of view insists that the settlement should be provisional. He personally had done his best to conciliate the views of the Council with those of the British Cabinet.

Mr Polk regrets that they are unable to reach an agreement on this subject; but he adds that he has not given up hope of finding a satisfactory solution. What impresses the American Delegation is that if a date is fixed for a Mandate, it would mean that Galicia would be in a state of ferment, and Poland remain in uncertainty over this grave question. This case is not the same as that of other countries where a Plebiscite was asked for; it would be difficult to see where Eastern Galicia would go, if not to Poland. The problem is all the more difficult for Eastern Galicia on account of fighting taking place between Ukrainia and the Bolshevists on one side and Denikin on the other side. He wishes to ask Sir Eyre Crowe the difference he makes between the position of the British Government at this time and the position that it had taken before.

Sir Eyre Crowe answers that it is no longer a question of a plebiscite, but of giving a Mandate to Poland for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations.

Mr Polk suggests that the views of the British Delegation should be referred to the Polish Commission for examination and report for Monday, November 10th.

M Pichon agrees.

(It is decided to refer to the Polish Commission for examination and report to the Supreme Council on November 10th, 1919, the proposal made by the British Delegation tending to give Poland a Mandate for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations for a determined period.


4. The Council has before it a note from the German Delegation dated October 3rd, 1919, on the organization of the plebiscite in Eupen and Malmedy, and the observations presented by the Belgian Delegation in its letter of October 14th, 1919.

Mr Polk says this matter has been brought to his attention and he understands the good faith of the Council is involved. He would suggest that this be referred to the Belgian Committee for examination.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the Belgian Commission should prepare a draft answer to the German Note which the Council would have before it on Monday.

(It is decided:

(1) To refer back to the Commission on Belgian Affairs for examination the Note from the German Delegation dated October 3rd, on the organization of the plebiscite in Eupen and Malmedy, as well as the observations of the Belgian Delegation dated October 14th, 1919.

(2) That the Commission on Belgian Affairs should present to the Supreme Council at its meeting on November 10th, 1919, a draft reply to the German note.)


5. The Council has before it a report from the American representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Mission relative to the removal by German authorities of the material belonging to the German Government at Danzig.

Mr Polk suggests that this question be referred back to the Drafting Committee for examination and report.

(It is decided to refer back to the Drafting Committee for examination and report the note of the American representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Commission in Poland, with regard to the removal of German Government property from Danzig.


6. Mr Polk repeats what he said at a preceding meeting: The President will be very glad to call the first meeting of the Council, but the question has been raised in Washington as to his power under Article V of the Covenant to call the meeting before the Treaty had come into force: under Article V his power exists only from the date of the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty; his suggestion is that the meeting should take place on the following day, but he has no objection to the procedure adopted by the Drafting Committee and in turn adopted by the other members of the Council. The real trouble is that the letter will be issued at a time when the pact had not yet come into force.

M Pichon thinks in that case that the convocation of the first meeting might be issued on the day when the ratifications are exchanged, and then that the meeting could take place the following day.

Mr Polk makes it clear that he does not wish to insist on this, if the other members of the Council preferred the other solution.

M Berthelot pointed out that the difficulty lay in the period which would elapse between the deposit of ratifications and the first meeting of the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests that the President of the United States can now advise the Powers represented on the Council of the League of Nations that as soon as the treaty had been put into force by the deposit of ratifications, the President, acting under Article V of the Covenant, will send a telegram calling the first meeting, and it will be advisable to take all the necessary measures in provision of this convocation.

Mr Polk thinks that Sir Eyre Crowe’s suggestion is already covered by M Clemenceau’s letter. He also suggests that the State Department in Washington, on being advised of the exact hour of the deposit of ratifications, can notify the representatives at Washington of the Powers which are to be represented on the Council of the League of Nations, the first meeting of the Council; on the other hand, all the necessary measures will have been taken for the first meeting to take place.

M Fromageot says he understands the American argument, but thinks there is great analogy between this case and the convocation of the Labor Conference at Washington.

Mr Polk says that everyone in America is attacking the legality of this convocation.

M Fromageot thinks that if the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations considers only the question of nominating the Commission charged with the delimitation of the boundaries of the Sarre district, the Council of the League of Nations would then have fifteen days within which to nominate the Commission.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests there is the possibility of a ratification by the United States, in which case the first meeting might have a longer agenda: It is therefore important that the convocation of the first meeting should be considered immediately.

M Pichon proposes that the question be referred to the Drafting Committee to examine whether it was possible to take into consideration the remarks made by Mr Polk.

It is decided to refer back to the Drafting Committee for examination and report the question of procedure to be followed for the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, taking into account remarks of a legal character made by the American Delegation.


7. M. Berthelot says that they have reasons to think that the Germans were going to answer their last Note by proposing that the conferences which were made necessary by the execution of the Treaty, should take place in Berlin on account of the great number of experts the German Government wished to send; and only the final conferences would take place in Paris.

General le Rond thinks that all the questions which cannot be considered in Paris should be taken up on the spot, and that it is not necessary to have conferences in Berlin. He also wishes to add that, as the conferences between the Allies could not begin before November 10th, it would not be possible to meet the German representatives before November 15th.


8. M Pichon states that Mr Venizelos would ask to be heard by the Council on the day that the report of the Inquiry Commission on Smyrna comes under discussion.


9. Mr Polk asks whether the question of the temporary regime of Western Thrace should not be studied by a competent Commission. He suggests that it might be referred to the Central Territorial Committee.

(This is agreed to.)

It is decided to refer back to the Central Territorial Committee for examination and report the question of the temporary regime of Western Thrace.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

[Mr Quatro]

What a great job you have done Steve and Jim

I wish I had time to read it all interesting history

Looking forward to Monday November 11th ... Will that be a big day to report?

[Jimbuna]

Appreciated but I'm not sure what will occur on the 11th until my source updates itself (daily).

I'd like to think so though.

[Jimbuna]

8th November 1919

Coinciding on the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, the first Palmer Raids (named after Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer) are carried out in the U.S. against members of the Union of Russian Workers.


King George releases a statement supporting a 2-minute silence on November 11

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, November 8, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. Sir Eyre Crowe states that in the next to the last meeting the Council had had to pass upon a proposal made by General Walch on behalf of General Nollet. He had understood that it was a question of laying upon Germany the payment of the salaries of all the personnel of Military Commissions of Control in Germany. That proposition conformed to the point of view maintained by the British Government. He read, however, in the procès-verbal, that Germany was only being charged with the payment of the salaries of personnel not belonging to the regular military forces, that is to say, the civilian personnel. There were no civilian personnel in these Commissions, or at least among the military members there were many who were civilian technical experts put on the footing of officers.

M Clemenceau thinks that Sir Eyre Crowe’s rectification calls for no objection.

(It is decided to modify resolution No. 3 of H. D. 85, so as to read as follows: “It was decided that the payment of the salaries of the personnel of the Military Commissions of Control in Germany should be assumed by Germany.”)


2. M Clemenceau points out that the agenda brings up the discussion of the report of the Commission of Investigation in Smyrna. Mr Venizelos had asked to be heard. It seems to him that there were two questions in to be asked of Mr Venizelos. First, he should explain the massacres of which the Greek troops are accused. Moreover, he himself is much struck by reading in the Commission’s report that the Greeks would not be able to maintain themselves in Smyrna by their own efforts. The Greeks had been sent to Smyrna on the clear understanding that their occupation should not be taken as equivalent to a definite attribution of territory to them. He noted that the Greeks had gone beyond the limits of the Sandjak of Smyrna without the permission of the Council and had done so upon a telegram from Mr Venizelos. He thinks that it is necessary to remind them that the Turkish question is not settled and to ask them to state definitely if they could maintain themselves at Smyrna by their own efforts. The information received indicated that in many respects the conduct of the Greeks had been abominable, and that Turkey would never accept, unless obliged to by force, Greek occupation, or, to a certain extent, Italian occupation. As far as the Greeks are concerned, he thinks this information is correct. The question would not have arisen if the Greek occupation had not given rise to certain incidents. It was not the Council’s fault if the question had to be raised. The Turkish problem was not settled. He feels that the Council would be more and more led to respecting the integrity of Turkish territory; under these circumstances it would be well to warn the Greeks that they should not behave as conquerors of Asia Minor.

S de Martino wishes to associate himself with what M Clemenceau had just said: the military occupations in Asia Minor were clearly only provisional and should in no way prejudice the final settlement of the Turkish question. This question could not be divorced from the more general question of the fate of the territories of the former Ottoman Empire which is of interest to all Mediterranean powers. Italian opinion is clearly favorable to the principle of respecting the integrity of these territories. Moreover, he wishes to point out that the relations between the Italian troops and the Turkish population in Anatolia are excellent and that no conflicts have taken place between them; on the contrary, on many occasions the local populations and authorities had indulged in manifestations of gratitude.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that the Council is entering upon a basic discussion of Greek occupation. He thinks that the conclusions of the Commission go beyond the instructions received by it. The Commission had been formed, at the request of Mr Venizelos himself, to investigate the massacres. Its report treats, in general terms, the whole problem of Greek occupation, and also questioned the decisions of the Supreme Council. What would happen if the Council, as the report suggested, asked the Greeks to leave Smyrna? Would they be replaced by Turks or was an Inter-Allied occupation contemplated? The affair of the Vilayet of Aidin had just shown how difficult of realization such an occupation was: The French Government had felt it impossible to send a battalion and, under these conditions, the British Government had not felt that it could assume this burden. If Inter-Allied occupation was impossible could the Council really think of allowing the Greeks to retire when there was no one to replace them. Could it possibly think of evacuating the country before peace had even been concluded?

M Clemenceau thinks it clearly could not. He feels, with Sir Eyre Crowe, that it is impossible at the moment to ask the Greeks to retire but it would perhaps be well to have some officers on the spot who could inform the Council as to the situation at Smyrna.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the Greeks unfortunately claim that many of the difficulties arose from the fact that they did not have complete authority in that region. In any case it seems impossible to agree with the conclusions of the Commission which proposes a regime under which the Greeks might perhaps occupy but the Turks would govern. Rather than create an organ of supervision it would be better to give the Greeks greater liberty of action and at the same time a larger and more definite share of responsibility.

M Clemenceau observes that the danger is that the Greeks will take too much latitude.

Mr Polk wishes to know what the attitude of the Council is? It seems to him that there is some thought of rejecting the conclusions of the report now before it. He is not so inclined. The Commission had thought its mission was to establish the responsibility for the events at Smyrna; it had pointed out these responsibilities as it saw them and had not hesitated to question the acts of the Council itself. The report contained serious matters. Did the Council intend or not to take them into consideration? For instance, paragraph 37 of the report pointed out that Mr Venizelos himself had ordered the reoccupation of Aidin without taking the Entente into consideration. He feels that it is impossible not to repose confidence in the investigators whom the Council had chosen, or else another Commission should be sent.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the order given by Mr Venizelos had already been discussed by the Council of Four.

S de Martino feels that it is impossible not to discuss the report inasmuch as it emanated from a Commission set up by the Supreme Council.

M Clemenceau says that the report would be discussed after Mr Venizelos had been heard.

(At this point Mr Venizelos enters the room.)

M. Venizelos hopes that the Council will permit him to give a brief historical summary of the conditions under which the investigation had been conducted; he feels that this recapitulation would show that he had good reason to ask that this investigation should be considered null and void and that another investigation should take place. On the 18th of July, after he had asked the British Government, as a result of a question which had been put in the House of Commons, to send an investigating officer to Smyrna, the Supreme Council had decided to create a Commission of Investigation. No Greek officer sat on that Commission. He had protested to the President of the Conference and had received the reply that a Greek Representative should follow the work of the Commission. On August 22nd he had been obliged to inform the Supreme Council that his representative, Colonel Mazarakis, was not allowed to be present at the taking of testimony, under the pretext that his presence might intimidate certain witnesses. The Commission had declared that it would confine itself to communicating the depositions to him. He, Mr Venizelos, had protested against that decision, which was contrary to elementary rules of justice. Later on the Commission had made it known that the Greek representative would be put upon the same footing as the Turkish representative who was permitted to follow its work. Such similar treatment, offensive to an Allied people, forced him to protest. On the 14th of September he had again been obliged to protest because the Commission had refused to call the witnesses which the Greek Delegate had proposed should be heard, and because it had refused to communicate to Colonel Mazarakis the testimony which had been taken. The President of the Conference had replied to him that the Greek Delegate was not entitled to insist on being present at all deliberations of the Commission, but that the minutes, including the hearings of witnesses, would be delivered to Colonel Mazarakis who could then present his observations thereon to the Commission before the latter reached its conclusions. Nevertheless the Commission had not wished to communicate to the Greek Delegate the depositions made before it on the pretext that secrecy had been promised certain witnesses. In so acting it had violated the most elementary principles of justice and it put, unintentionally doubtless, a positive premium upon false testimony. He had addressed himself to the Conference which had answered that it could not go behind a promise given by the Commission. He wishes to press this point upon the Council; an investigation conducted under such conditions could not be trustworthy. It was impossible thus to pass judgment upon the honor of an army without having given that army the means of defending itself. He felt that he was entitled to satisfaction, since it was a question of a State which had always been faithful to its alliances and friendships, and since this request was formulated by a representative of that State who had always borne himself loyally towards the Conference.

M Clemenceau asked if General Bunoust had any remarks to make as to the materiality of the facts in question.

General Bunoust said that he did have some remarks to make. The Commission had never decided to communicate the depositions taken; it had unanimously decided that the depositions would lack sincerity if the Greek representatives had to be informed of them. The Turks would not have opened their mouths in the presence of a Greek officer. In spite of that precaution the Commission had sometimes had difficulty in finding witnesses; thus at Aidin no Turkish witnesses had been found. When the Supreme Council’s telegram of September 30th reached the Commission it had not yet ended its labors; it had only concluded the summary of the established facts and it had transmitted this in full to Colonel Mazarakis. Colonel Mazarakis had presented observations on this subject which the Commission had taken into account on one point.

M Clemenceau asks whether, after the Commission had received the telegram of September 30th, it had taken depositions which it had not communicated to Mr Venizelos’ representative.

General Bunoust thinks that the Commission might, after that date, have taken the second deposition of Colonel Smith.

Mr Venizelos does not wish to insist upon that point. He feels, however, that he might say, without offending anyone, that civil investigators would have been more anxious not to violate cardinal principles of justice, and that they would not, for instance, have allowed witnesses to be heard without being sworn. At Aidin the Commission might well have taken non-Turkish testimony and have been satisfied therewith. He feels finally that he might remark that the procedure adopted inevitably exposed the investigators to the danger of being carried away by false depositions and reaching unjust or inaccurate conclusions. The animosity between Turks and Greeks was an incontestable fact; moreover, it was certain that many Europeans in Smyrna preferred the continuance of the Turkish regime which, with respect to strangers, was a regime of special privileges, rather than the establishment of the Greek regime, which was a regime of equality.

M Clemenceau asks if Me Venizelos did not intend to discuss the facts brought out in the report.

M Venizelos says that he does not want to discuss conclusions based on testimony which had not been brought to the knowledge of the Greek representative.

M Clemenceau observed that it was a serious matter to make such a reply. The Council had expected from Mr Venizelos precise answers on questions of fact. As head of the Government he must know if the alleged facts had really happened. He was astonished that Mr Venizelos did not wish to discuss them.

Mr Venizelos recognizes that there have been excesses but he thinks that they are readily explained. He admits equally that the conditions under which the debarkation took place created an administrative responsibility of the Greek Command. The Greek Government moreover had inflicted heavy penalties. But the Council could not forget that the day before the occupation the Turkish population had assembled, and that protests against the occupation had been posted up.

General Bunoust says that these posters are not appeals to resistance. The Turks are only asked to assemble in order to prove that the Turkish element was in the majority; the crowd of Turks, moreover, was not armed.

Mr Venizelos observes that in any event there was a tendency to resistance, inasmuch as the day before civil prisoners had been released.

General Bunoust explained that they had only been released during the night preceding the debarkation. The Commission’s report, moreover, had recognized the responsibility of the Turkish Governor in these circumstances.

M Venizelos adds that stores of arms have been looted by the crowd. Under these conditions the debarkation took place. The officer commanding the Greek troops had been guilty of imprudence. The Council knows how gunshots, coming from parts unknown, had provoked a reply on the part of the Greek troops. A panic followed and that was the beginning of the excesses. He thought he ought to point out that the next day or the day after a Court-Martial had been organized, that in the first five days of its sitting this Court-Martial had condemned three Greeks to death, one of them being a looting soldier, and that it had totaled seventy-four convictions, of which forty-eight were of Greeks. Nothing more could be asked of the most civilized country. As for the massacre of the prisoners who were being led on board vessels in the harbor, Colonel Mazarakis’ investigation, which had resulted in severe condemnation of the Lieutenant commanding the escort, had established that the excesses of which the prisoners had been the victims were largely due to the crowd, and that only about twenty prisoners had been killed. In any event, forty-eight hours after the debarkation of the troops, order had been reestablished. He wished to ask General Bunoust if since that time the city had not been perfectly calm.

General Bunoust replied that such is the case.

Mr Venizelos states that Colonel Mazarakis does not agree with the Commission on the affair of Menemem. According to the Colonel, a Greek battalion which had evacuated Pergamum, after having suffered serious losses, while entering Menemem had been attacked by Turkish fanatics. This attack had provoked excesses. The Commission, which did not consider that Turkish aggression had been established as a fact, had certainly been led into error by the witnesses which it had heard; it spoke of three hundred Turks killed; according to his information, only twenty had been killed. It was evident that on this point an investigation in the nature of a cross-examination would have been suitable.

General Bunoust observed that the Commission had attached very little importance to the figures furnished it; it was perfectly aware of their inexactness. In any event it had not based its conclusions on a Turkish report, according to which one thousand were killed, but on an investigation made the day after the uprising by a French officer.

Mr Venizelos states that in the affair of Nazilli the fault lay with the Greek officer who, threatened with attack, thought he could evacuate the town prior to the time ordered by the English Admiral. In any event, in that affair, it was the Greeks who had suffered most. As for Aidin, he maintained that twenty-five hundred Greeks perished and that the number of Turkish victims was far less.

General Bunoust explained that the Commission had relied upon a French investigation, according to which there were reported to be about twenty-five hundred Greek victims and fifteen hundred Turkish. The estimation of the number of Turkish dead was moreover difficult on account of the exodus of the population.

Mr Venizelos acknowledges that Aidin, occupied by the Greeks and then evacuated, had been re-occupied on an order given by him, which order had had unfortunate results. He wishes to give the reasons which had caused him to issue that order. The Greeks are in a state of war with the Turks. If the Turks could boast of having expelled the Greeks from Aidin, their situation at Smyrna would have become impossible; therefore he had given the order to re-occupy the town. Moreover, he had informed the Council of what he was doing. Already, prior to that time, he had instructed the Greek military authorities not to hesitate, in the event of attack by Turkish bands, to go beyond the limits of the zone of occupation in order to break up centers of hostile resistance. In any event these incontestable facts remained: the Greek section of Aidin was entirely destroyed, twenty-five hundred out of eight thousand Greeks had perished, the Greek element formed the richest and most civilized part of the population; and it was the Greeks who had suffered most. He regrets that the procedure adopted by the Commission had not allowed the Turkish losses to be ascertained. Finally, he feels obliged to protest against the passage of the Commission’s report which repeated an accusation of the Sheik-ul-Islam to the effect that the Greek Red Cross had introduced arms into Smyrna.

General Bunoust observes that the Commission had not considered this accusation well founded.

Mr Venizelos says that it is true that prior to the Greek occupation the Greek Sanitary Officer had insisted that the boxes of the Red Cross which were unloaded at the customs be not inspected, and that the Turkish Governor had consented thereto; but he could not allow the Greek Red Cross to remain under the shadow of suspicion. The Sheik-ul-Islam also pretended that the Greeks had taken advantage of their occupation to bring about an influx of Grecian population in those regions. This is entirely false: since the events of May, 1914, there had been in Greece 300,000 refugees from Asia Minor. He had ordered them to be repatriated, but it had been pointed out to him that the dwellings they had left were being inhabited by Turks whose lodging would have to be insured, and that the question was a delicate one. Under those circumstances the repatriation had been postponed. There had only been isolated cases of repatriation and he did not think that there were more than 5,000 or 6,000 who had returned. He felt sure that the excesses, which he deplored, had not gone beyond what should have been expected under analogous circumstances on the part of any army. The affair had certainly been exaggerated; moreover General Bunoust did not deny that severe punishment had been meted out to those found guilty. The Greek army had not deserved ill of its Allies and the Greeks had ensured the maintenance of order. If certain fugitive Turks had not returned to Smyrna that fact could be attributed to the pressure brought to bear on them by the Turks in the interior.

General Bunoust remarks that it is quite possible.

M Clemenceau asks what was the importance of the Turkish bands with whom the Greeks had to deal?

General Bunoust says that the Commissioners had spent a day with these bands; and they did not seem to have great cohesion and they had no offensive capacity. The Nationalist movement, however, was a serious matter and it could arrest all military progress in Asia Minor unless an operation on a large scale should be decided upon.

Mr Venizelos says that there is no question of that.

M Clemenceau observes that that, however, was just what Mr Venizelos had done. Greece had had a Mandate from the Conference and had not kept within the limits of that Mandate. Some members of the Council were wondering what would happen if the Turkish attacks should increase in severity. Could Greece, without the support of her Allies, make the necessary military and financial effort until such a time as the country should be completely pacified? That was the troublesome point.

Mr Venizelos replies that certainly the longer the question was dragged out the more financial difficulties would increase for a small country such as Greece. She had an army of 12 divisions of 325,000 men; an army stronger than it was at the time of the Armistice. He feels assured that if the Conference should charge Greece with the task of defeating Turkey she would be able to do so.

M Clemenceau says that he had put the question the other way.

Mr Venizelos said that with 12 divisions he had nothing to fear. Mustapha Kemal only had 70,000 men. It was evident that if the present situation was unduly prolonged Greece would have financial difficulties, but he hoped that would not be the case.

M Clemenceau thanks Mr Venizelos in the name of the Council for his presentation of the case.

(At this point Mr Venizelos leaves the room.)

M Clemenceau suggests that the discussion be postponed until the following Monday.

(This is agreed to.)

(The meeting then adjourns).

[Jimbuna]

9th November 1919

From yesterday.


Romania holds its general elections, with the Romanian National Party, led by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, winning the most seats.


Arabs meeting US General James Guthrie Harbord at Ras el Ain (Now in NE Syria) during an American fact-finding mission to the Middle East.

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, November 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

The Great Council does not meet today.