100 Years Ago Today

[Jimbuna]

30th August 1919

Aftermath of War

First of series of Anglo-Russian successes in N. Russia.

German Minister of Defense Gustav Noske in Munich. Captain Karl Mayr, standing left of Noske, is the immediate superior of Adolf Hitler and will introduce him to politics.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, August 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M Cambon reads aloud the French text of the draft covering letter, in reply to the Austrian counter-proposals, prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr. On concluding, he remarks that the letter now before the Council is longer than the former communication drafted by the Editing Committee. He further remarks, that, in Mr. Philip Kerr’s draft covering letter, no mention was made of the fact that the Allied and Associated Powers had decided to call the new Austrian State the Austrian Republic, and to avoid all mention of the expression “German Austria”. The Covering Letter in Reply to the Austrian Counter proposals.

S Tittoni says says that it had been decided that the expression “Republic of Austria” should be employed in all official communications addressed to that Country. He does not think that it was within the power of the Council to do more.

M Clemenceau said that he agreed with S Tittoni.

M Cambon reads the passage in the original covering letter drafted by the Editing Committee, dealing explicitly with the point in question.

Mr Balfour says that he wishes to make a general comparison between the former document, prepared by the Editing Committee, and the one now before the Council. He accepts M Cambon’s statement that the new draft covering letter is longer than the former. He also agreed with him that the new letter omits certain points which had been dealt with by the Editing Committee. With regard to the manner in which the Austrian Government should henceforth be addressed, the Council had always referred to the “Austrian Republic” in all official documents, and it was not possible to do more than this. Neither the Council nor the League of Nations can prevent any Country from conferring upon itself any title that it might desire to be known by. The original document drawn up by the Editing Committee is an extremely able one and a proof of this statement consisted in the fact that the new draft before the Council was based entirely upon the old covering letter, to which it owed everything. None the less, he preferred the new version to the old. What is desired was a document drafted in such a form, that it should be read widely in Allied, and in enemy, countries. This document should, moreover, express in the clearest and most forcible terms, the main contention of the Allied and Associated Governments, which is that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had largely caused the war and that the Austrian Republic was the direct successor of the old Kingdom. He thinks that this main argument was expressed with greater force in the new document. If, however, the Council desired to adhere to the former draft covering letter drawn up by the Editing Committee, he would point out that it had not been the work of a single mind; that, in consequence, it contains a certain number of repetitions; and that it insisted on details, which, though important to the Allied Governments, and possibly to Austria, would not excite the interest of the ordinary public.

He thinks that in the new document, Italy’s case had been better stated. Attention is drawn to the selfish and unscrupulous manner in which the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had always tried to arrange her frontiers with Italy in such a way that she would have that country at her mercy. He does not think that too much emphasis could be given to this. In favoring the acceptance of the new document before the Council, he bases his preference on the conviction that it would be more accessible to the mind of the ordinary public throughout the world.

Mr Polk says that there is no great choice between either draft. On the whole, however, he is ready to agree with Mr Balfour to accept the one prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr, but drew attention to the fact that a few changes would be necessary in it.

S Tittoni said that the new document before the Council had been very well drawn up, and that it possessed the qualities ascribed to it by Mr Balfour. He therefore accepts it.

Mr Matsui says that he accepted the English draft.

M. Cambon drew attention to the fact that in the old draft letter drawn up by the Editing Committee, the question of a possible union between Germany and Austria is dealt with. It is not mentioned in the new document.

M Clemenceau says that the question of the future relations between Germany and Austria would be discussed.

M Cambon draws attention to the American proposal contained in Appendix F of H. D. 38.3 This proposal points out that the original covering letter was not in agreement with the preamble of the Peace Treaty on the subject of the present status of Austria.

Mr Polk, in further explanation, states that in the preamble of the Peace Treaty the words “Austria is recognised as a new and independent State under the name of the Republic of Austria” appeared. In the original covering letter, Austria had been treated as the successor of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He suggested that the matter could be settled by deleting from the preamble of the Treaty the phrase above quoted. In addition to this, the word “Austria” on page 8 of the preamble, should be replaced by the expression “Republic of Austria”.

Mr Balfour remarks that the words “Austria is recognised as a new and independent State” had been inserted by President Wilson, who would not, he thought, raise any objection to their suppression.

Mr Polk says that the manner in which Austria was referred to in the preamble had an important bearing upon the future obligations of the new Republic. The phrase in question affected the Peace Treaty; the covering letter was not concerned with it.

S Tittoni remarks that in the new document before the Council, the “tyranny” of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was emphasized in one place and the “centralization” of that Government in another. He thought that the last expression weakened the first.

Mr Balfour says that the centralization of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had been drawn attention to, in order to show the Austrian people how much the dominant position of Vienna, in former days, stood to their prejudice at present.

Mr Polk says that on page seven of the English Draft, the words “Committees who reported on the question” should be replaced by the word “Conference”. He also said that the resolution passed on the previous day, with regard to Radkersburg, made it necessary to amend the statement on the subject of the Austro-Hungarian frontiers.

M Tardieu says that a small sub-Committee of the Reparations Commission had been of the opinion that a special clause should be inserted in the draft letter.

Mr Balfour said that he thought such a clause ought to be put in a separate document.

(After some discussion, it is agreed the proposed special clause should be added to the covering letter, in some way, possibly, as a footnote.)

It is decided:

(1) That the covering letter prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr, and submitted to the Council, should be accepted as a whole, but that the following modifications should be introduced:

(a) Page 7 (English Text) Paragraph 4. Lines 8 & 9, the words “Committees who reported on the question”, should be replaced by the word “Conference”.

(b) That the statements in Paragraph 4, Page 7 (English Text) on the subject of the Austrian frontiers, should be amended in conformity with the resolution taken on the previous day with regards should be added to the covering letter in the form of a foot-note, or in some other suitable manner.

(2) It was also decided that the following changes should be made in the preamble of the Peace Treaty with Austria:

(a) On Page 8, Line 11 from the bottom, the word “Austria” should be replaced by the words “Republic of Austria”.

(b) On Page 8, Lines 5 & 6 from the bottom the words “Austria is recognised as a new and independent State under the name of the Republic of Austria”, should be deleted.)


2. The Council takes note of the reply of the Drafting Committee to the question put before it by the Council on the 28th August.

M Clemenceau says that he cannot agree with the reply of the Drafting Committee. In his opinion, Article 61 of the new German Constitution not only violates the Treaty of Versailles, but calls for the collaboration of the Austrian Republic in that very violation. The situation caused is a serious one, and must be faced. In his opinion, the attention of the German Government should be called to this act of violation and should be forced to give a reply. He thinks that the Drafting Committee’s argument is an extremely clever one, but the assent of the German Government to that argument must be obtained. International lawyers were notorious for their differences of opinion. One lawyer would assert that an object-was red, another that it was blue, whilst a third would be equally certain that it had no color at all. These differences of opinion, though entertaining, were not a suitable basis for measures affecting the peace of Europe. Article in the German Constitution Violating the Peace Treaty With Germany.

Mr Balfour says that there are two questions before the Council. Firstly, the insertion of a clause in the Peace Treaty with Austria, with a view to counteracting the provisions of Article 61 of the new German Constitution; and, secondly, the action which should be taken with regard to Germany in view of her violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. He would like to know the opinion of the lawyers of the Drafting Committee upon the legal side of the question.

Dr Scott said that, in his opinion, the insertion of Article 61 in the German Constitution showed that the German Government had willfully, deliberately, and without cause, broken the pact into which she had entered at Versailles.

M Clemenceau says that it might be sufficient to make the Austrian Government undertake not to be a party to the German Government’s maneuver.

(It is agreed that a special clause should be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Austria.)

Mr Balfour says that he agrees with M Clemenceau, but that he would like to hear a concise statement of the problem in international law raised by Article 61. He believes that the Drafting Committee had not been unanimous in its opinion on the subject.

M Fromageot said that he thinks that the new German Constitution violates the Peace Treaty, and added, that the advice to the Council, in the form submitted, had been unanimously accepted by the Drafting Committee.

M Clemenceau says that he has news, in the form of a letter, which he has not yet circulated to the Council, that the attitude of the German Government was quite unsatisfactory. They were opposing Allied action in Silesia and his latest information was to the effect, that one army corps would now be necessary for that country. All this only constituted an extra proof of the bad faith of the German people, and its Government.

Mr Hurst said that there had been a difference of opinion in the Drafting Committee as to the extent to which the Peace Treaty of Versailles had been violated, although all were agreed that it had been violated in a certain degree. The point at issue was as follows. Article 80 of the Peace Treaty with Germany contained two references to the independence of Austria. In the first, Germany was called upon “to respect strictly the independence of Austria.” In the second, she agreed that “this independence shall be inalienable.” Undoubtedly Article 61 of the German Constitution violated the letter of the Peace of Versailles, but it was in the form of an invitation to Austria to join Germany. A country’s independence was recognised by abstaining from all acts of coercion against it; and an invitation, which was the very reverse of a coercive measure, could hardly be said to threaten the independence of a sovereign State.

M Tardieu says that Mr Hurst’s argument is to the effect that Article 61 of the German Constitution exerted no pressure against Austria. The Peace Treaty of Versailles, however, stipulated that nothing should be done to interfere with Austrian independence. As an act prejudicial to that independence had been taken, the question of whether there had, or had not, been direct pressure, could be laid to one side.

M Clemenceau says that he thought a letter should be sent on the subject to the German Government, which should be called upon to reply.

M Tardieu said that the action of the German Government had been taken by the Legislative Authorities. In previous cases (Slesvig, etc.) the Executive Authorities had been concerned. In either case, the Council could act.

M Clemenceau says that the Council was called upon to take a political and not a legal decision; and suggested that Mr Balfour, who is a moderate man, should draft the communication to be sent to the German Government.

Mr Balfour says that he did not think that moderation was the exact quality required, and he thought that M Berthelot, who was not a moderate man, ought to draft the letter.

S Tittoni remarks that the cases of Austria and of Germany was not quite analogous. Germany must be called upon to perform her Treaty engagements. He did not know whether Austria could be called upon to settle, finally, her future condition, at the dictation of the Council.

M Pichon says that in the draft Article for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Austria, the manner in which the future independence of Austria was to be assured by the League of Nations was clearly provided for.

(It is agreed:

(1) That the draft Article regarding the independence of Austria (See Appendix “C”) should be accepted and inserted in the Austrian Peace Treaty;

(2) That M. Berthelot should draft a letter for transmission to the German Government on the subject of Article 61 of the new German Constitution and should submit his draft to the Council at its next meeting.)


3. The Council takes note of the Drafting Committee’s report on the draft articles to be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Austria, for the settlement of differences between States called upon by that Treaty to conclude special Conventions.

(After some discussion, it is decided that the draft articles for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Austria should be accepted.


4. The Council takes note of a document drawing attention to the divergences between the French and English texts of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Mr Balfour proposes the following draft resolution:

“The present Treaty in French, in English and in Italian shall be ratified. In case of divergence, the French text shall prevail, except in Parts I and XIII, where the French and English texts shall be of equal force.”

He says that in bringing forward this resolution, he desires to make it quite clear, that he did not wish it to be thought, that he was provoking a competition for priority between the French and English languages:

(After some discussion, it is agreed:

1) That in the case of divergence between the French, English and Italian texts of the Peace Treaty with Austria, the French text should prevail, except in parts I and XIII, where the French and English texts should be of equal force.

2) That the Drafting Committee should insert an Article in the Peace Treaty with Austria in conformity with the aforesaid resolution.)


5. The Council takes note of a communication from M Pachitch, on behalf of the Yugoslav State, to the effect that the Yugoslav Government could not undertake to sign the Peace Treaty with Austria, until the special Treaty between themselves and the Allied & Associated Govts., provided for in Article 59 of the Peace Treaty with Austria, had been communicated to them. Proposed Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Yugo-Slav State

(It is agreed that the consideration of this question should be adjourned to the Meeting of the Council on Monday, September 1st, 1919.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

31st August 1919

The English Football League resumes play in Britain after it was on hold for the past four years due to the war.

Anti-Bolshevik troops recaptures the Ukrainian capital of Kiev from the Red Army.

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, August 31, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

1st September 1919

Aftermath of War

Ongoing series of Anglo-Russian successes in N. Russia.

Russian filmmaker Vladimir Gardin opens the Moscow Film School (today the Gerasimov Institute of Cinematography), the oldest film school in the world.


The Communist Labor Party of America is established after it splits from the Socialist Party of America.


Talk about shell games! Pile of shells that cost the British government $25 each. An enterprising Philadelphian, scenting a bargain, managed to buy them for 60 cents apiece. Now that shell cocktail shakers have gone out of vogue, wonder will he convent them into rolling pins.


Ship Losses:

HMS Vittoria (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War, British campaign in the Baltic: The V-class destroyer was torpedoed and sunk by Pantera ( Soviet Navy) in the Gulf of Finland off Seiskari, Finland. She was salvaged in 1925 but found to be beyond repair.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, September 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council has before it a Draft copy of a Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and the The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the Treaty before the Council was similar to that with Romania already approved by the Council. There are three such Treaties, one with Romania, one with Yugoslavia and one with Greece, all on the same lines. The Treaty with Greece will be ready in a few days. The Committee has had the advantage of consultation with Mr Venizelos in regard to the last of these Treaties. The suggestions he has made have been very helpful. His attitude had been very different from that adopted by the other States. As to the Treaty with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the Delegation of that State had protested both against the principles of the Treaty as a whole, and also against its application to old Serbia. The first of these objections is no concern of the Committee. As to the second, the Committee is of opinion that the questions involved were questions of principle which should govern the whole policy of the State. The Committee thinks that it is not practically possible to distinguish between one part of the territory of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and another. Serbia in 1912 had had a population of three millions, but after the Balkan war, this population increased to five millions, and at the present time it amounted to twelve millions. The State, moreover, has changed its name and a Constituent Assembly is to be gathered in order to draw up the Constitution for the whole territory. The Committee therefore, thinks it is fair to consider the whole as a new State. It did not think that the stipulations in the Draft Treaty represented any real derogation from the authority of the sovereign State.

M Clemenceau asks whether the supervision of the Minority Clauses is to vest in the Allied and Associated Powers, or in the League of Nations.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the State conferred these rights on the Allied and Associated Powers pending the creation of a League of Nations, and thereafter stipulated that they should be transferred to the latter.

M Clemenceau says that this provision satisfies him.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that there is agreement in the Committee on all points save one. Before proceeding to describe this point, he wishes to draw attention to the very first sentence of the preamble. The date 1913 had been deliberately chosen in order to show that the Treaty had under consideration, not only the acquisition of territory made subsequent to the Great War, but also those which resulted from the Balkan War. This was the more necessary as the territory acquired in the Balkan war contained most of the population for whom special minority legislation was necessary, for instance, Macedonia. All were agreed that a strong and a just Government is necessary in Serbia. It is even more necessary that the Government should be strong than that it should be just. Macedonia is now to be delivered to Serbia in perpetuity. The question arises whether any restriction, not contained in the general clauses, for the protection of Minorities, should be imposed on the Serbian Government in this area. The French Delegation is of the opinion that nothing should be done in this sense. The argument is that freedom of religion and language were to prevail in Macedonia and that the population would have appeal to the League of Nations. The French Delegation thinks this sufficient. The Italian Delegation on the other hand proposes a far-reaching scheme amounting to a special form of autonomous Government for Macedonia. He will not explain this scheme as the British Delegation has not supported it. He would prefer that it should be explained by a member of the Italian Delegation. The American, British and Japanese Delegations propose what is included in the first version of Article 12. The suggestion is that the League of Nations should have their representative living in the country, who should report to the League and give advice to the Serbian Government. It is thought the presence of such a representative would be beneficial to the population as well as to the Serbian Government and might help to avoid outbreaks of violence. It is proposed that this arrangement should last five years. He has taken the liberty of consulting the Secretary-General of the League of Nations unofficially. He, on his side, makes no objection.

S Tittoni says that he would not insist on the Italian proposal. He is ready to adhere to the proposal of the majority.

M Berthelot says that the view of the French Delegation was that the Article proposed by the American, British and Japanese Delegations constituted an obvious mark of distrust of the Serbian Government. It had a further objectionable feature in that it left Macedonia open to Greek and Bulgarian intrigue, instead of allowing it to merge into Serbia, as it more naturally should, since it became part of Serbian territory. He thought the proposal would make it very difficult for the Serbian Government to accept the Treaty, especially as no special reasons for this distrust could be alleged.

Mr Polk asks whether the proposal applies only to Macedonia.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that it is intended to apply not only to Macedonia, but also to areas in the neighborhood of Albania, where a considerable part of the population is Albanian.

M Berthelot says that those people, like other minorities, had certain guarantees, including appeal to the League of Nations. The view of the French Delegation is that the Serbian Government has not deserved any special mark of suspicion.

S Tittoni observes that the measure is a temporary one, and that the Commissioner could be withdrawn after five years.

M Clemenceau says that he would prefer to tell the Serbian Government that the League of Nations will establish a Commissioner in the country if disturbances arose. The Minority Treaties are already ill-received by the Poles and the Romanians. He thinks it very undesirable to incur the ill-will of the Yugoslavs as well.

Mr Balfour says that he also would like to avoid hurting the feelings of the Serbs. Apart from their feelings, however, he thinks there were strong arguments in favour of the British, American, Japanese proposal. It is said that the people of Macedonia can appeal to the League of Nations if they were oppressed. Is it not better for the League of Nations to have an Officer on the spot who could report on the state of the country, rather than to receive Delegations from Macedonia in Geneva, Brussels or wherever the seat of the League might be? In the latter alternative, the League of Nations would have a poor chance of estimating the comparative mendacity of the reports brought to them. The Council has had experience of the kind of evidence supplied from the Balkans. There is equally hard swearing on both sides, and it was hardly ever possible to disentangle rights and wrongs. The Commissioner on the spot, assuming he were an able man, would know what really happened and he could give the League better evidence than could ever be obtained from rival Delegations. He does, however, think it is a serious matter to give offence to small Nations who were perhaps unduly sensitive about their sovereign rights. He is therefore inclined somewhat favorably towards M Clemenceau’s proposal; but it involves delivering Macedonia to the mercy of the Serbs until such time as the arrangement breaks down.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the Committee has been influenced by the evidence of people with a knowledge of Balkan affairs. They have led the Committee to apprehend not legal injustices as in Poland, but outbreaks of illegal violence, such as massacres and petty persecutions. He ventures to suggest that if the outbreak of such forms of disorder are to be awaited, the object of the Conference will not be attained. He thinks it can be fairly stated to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation that it was a matter of common knowledge that they would have trouble in governing certain areas, and it would be an advantage not only to the local populations, but also to their Government, to have a representative of the League of Nations on the spot.

M Clemenceau says that the adoption of the preventive system would cause the Conference to have great difficulties with the Serbs. On the merits, he thinks Mr Headlam-Morley is quite right, but the result of any stipulation such as he proposed would be to encourage a large section of the Macedonian population to have recourse to the Commissioner of the League of Nations in opposition to the Central Serbian Government. This would in the end probably come about, but he would prefer that it should come about as the result of the faults of the Serbian Government, rather than as the result of action by the Conference.

S Tittoni said that he thinks an extraordinary commissioner might possibly cause annoyance. The desired result might be obtained by extending the powers of Consuls in Macedonia.

M Clemenceau says that conflict will inevitably ensue with any such system. It might even amount to the re-introduction of the “capitulations”.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the object of the Committee should be to do away with any reminiscences of the old control of the Powers. A very careful attempt had been made to avoid this difficulty.

Mr Polk says that he feels the same scruple as M Clemenceau. He does not wish to hurt the national pride of the Serbs. On the other hand if nothing is done the Macedonians will suffer.

M Clemenceau says it is for this reason that he suggests the threat of imposing a Commissioner. He suggests that a formula be introduced in the Treaty to the effect that the League of Nations would send a Commissioner to Macedonia, should trouble arise in the area. The Serbs would understand that they must behave.

Mr Polk asks whether M Clemenceau suggests the insertion of this in the Treaty of Peace itself.

M Tardieu says he thinks that if anything of the sort is said, it would be better to say it in a letter, but he does not think it desirable to say anything of the kind. Why should Macedonia be specially singled out?

Mr Polk asks whether the suggestion could not be made to the Serb, Croat Slovene Delegation. Their opinion might then be obtained.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that though the Delegation has not seen the draft Treaty, he is quite certain they would refuse to sign it. He did, however, think it urgent to submit the Treaty to them. They would certainly make comment on the Article as at present drafted. It was better to submit it to them in a strong form, in order to have a margin for concessions.

Mr Polk says he thinks in the end it will be necessary to amend the Article in the sense suggested by M Clemenceau. He agrees, however, that the Article in its present form might be shown to the Serbs.

Mr Headlam-Morley said that the Committee wished genuinely to obtain the views of the Delegation. The Committee has not had the advantage of discussing the question with them in consequence of their uncompromising attitude. The conversations with Mr Venizelos on the other hand had been very fruitful.

Mr Balfour asks what the Committee will do if the Serbs regard the Article as such an insult to them that they refuse to discuss it.

S Tittoni suggested that the Article be so worded as not to impose a Commissioner, but to suggest the appointment of one if necessary.

M Tardieu says that whatever the situation in Macedonia might be, he does not think it right to add a special provision to the clauses, which in themselves are extremely unpopular. There are other areas in which disturbances might be expected. He does not look forward to the administration of part of Serbia by the League of Nations. Such a provision could not in any case be made general.

Mr Balfour says that the Commissioner, he thought, would not have an agreeable post. He would have no executive authority and no protection. He could only offer advice which might be neglected with impunity. There seem to be areas in which mutual massacres are the only method of reaching conclusions.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that this is what the Committee expects will take place if no arrangements were made in anticipation. There will be at once considerable agitation fostered by the friends of the Bulgars, in America, Great Britain and perhaps in France. They would claim the attention of the League of Nations; and the trouble would be aggravated.

M Tardieu says that if information is all that is desired, consuls can make reports.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that this is the old system, which it was desirable to eschew.

M Tardieu says that the old system includes international gendarmerie. The appointment of a Commissioner appears to reintroduce that system, in contradiction of the principles of the Conference, and in particular of the League of Nations.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that he accepts M Tardieu’s general criticism, but that he thinks this special exception is justified.

Mr Balfour says that no doubt the Serbs, if they knows their own interests, will suggest the appointment of the Commissioner themselves, but it is clear they do not.

M. Pichon says that what chiefly shocked the world in the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was the violation of Serbian sovereignty. If the Conference adopts the same course, Serbia will refuse to sign. Mr Pachitch has already declared quite clearly that he will not.

Mr Balfour inquires whether the League of Nations has a right under the Covenant to send representatives to make an inquiry, should massacres take place.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the League has this power according to the terms of the Minority Treaties; in this instance, according to Article 11, the League of Nations can act if an infraction of the Treaty occurs.

M Clemenceau after reading Article 11, expresses the opinion that these stipulations are sufficient to protect Macedonian and Albanian minorities in the Serbian State.

Mr Balfour agrees that it will be easier in practice to give effect to Article 11, rather than to Article 12.

S Tittoni suggested that the words “prendre telles mesures” be substituted for the words “procéder de telle façon” in the French text of Article 11.

(It is then decided to accept the Treaty as a whole, to expunge Article 12 entirely, to amend Article 11 by the substitution of the words “prendre telles mesures” for “procéder de telle façon”, and, after the necessary drafting amendments, to communicate the Treaty to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation.)


2. M Tardieu explains the letter sent by Mr Venizelos to the President of the Council on the 24th August. He points out that since then a new element in the situation had been introduced by a telegram from President Wilson. This telegram sets aside both the alternatives considered.

M Clemenceau said that he thinks that it is a very dangerous proposal to ask the Commissioner at Constantinople to take charge of an area containing 700,000 Greeks and 700,000 Turks, who would be in a continual state of warfare. He cannot therefore accept the proposals made by President Wilson, but he is ready to listen to any new proposals that might be made.

S Tittoni suggests that the question be adjourned, as no decision could be reached that day.

Mr Balfour points out that the Bulgarians are awaiting the Treaty, which must be completed without further delay.

M Clemenceau said that if President Wilson adhered to his proposal it was not possible to reach a settlement.

Mr Balfour says that the future of Constantinople and Asia Minor need not be settled before the conclusion of the Treaty with Bulgaria. It was possible to say that Bulgaria should have nothing south or south-east of a given line. The fate of the territories outside that line might be reserved.

S Tittoni said that if this plan is followed, difficulties will arise in Western Thrace. Eastern Thrace could be reserved without any difficulty, as it is occupied by Turkish troops. But the Bulgarians will be called upon to evacuate that part of Western Thrace they at present occupied. If so, they must be told to whom they were to deliver the country.

M Tardieu said that there is also a difficulty for Greece if the decision is adjourned until the fate of Constantinople has been settled.

Mr Balfour says that it was possible to distinguish between the questions at issue. The most pressing of the problems is to decide what was the boundary of Bulgaria. The other questions as to exactly how the parts of the Turkish Empire South of the Bulgarian boundary should be disposed of, could be for the time being deferred. As to President Wilson’s telegram, he could not help feeling the President had not given sufficient consideration to the position of Mr Venizelos. Mr Venizelos is the only statesman in the Balkans who had sincerely tried to assist the Conference, and whose policy aimed at maintaining peace in the Balkans, yet if the American policy in Eastern Europe were carried out, Greece of all these States, would fare worst. Serbia would acquire three times as much territory as she previously possessed. Romania, in spite of her constant defiance of the Conference, would double her population. Poland and Czechoslovakia were created by the Conference itself. Greece, if a large Greek population in Thrace were not added to her, would hardly increase at all, except in national debt which was as great as Bulgaria’s, even when the Bulgarian indemnity of £90,000,000 was counted in. He thinks that it is not altogether fair to treat Mr Venizelos in this manner nor did he believe it to be in the interest of Peace, especially as all Greece asks for is the application of the Fourteen Points. The President’s message, however, must be seriously considered. He therefore suggests that a line be adopted for the purpose of the Treaty with Bulgaria and that the attribution of all territories south of it be reserved.

M Tardieu says that to the reasons adduced by Mr Balfour might be added the fact that Greece since the Armistice, at the instance of the Conference, had mobilized three more divisions than she had under arms during the war. She had increased her army from 9 to 12 divisions. Greece is the only Power which had increased her Army since the Armistice. Out of 7¼ million Greeks living in compact masses in Greece, Thrace and Asia Minor, 2,300,000 living at the very gates of their own country would be excluded from it by the President’s plan. He does not think this would conduce to peace. There is also another aspect to the question. The Council had seen fit to deny the Hapsburgs the recovery of the throne in Hungary. If Greece were to be treated as was now suggested, King Constantine would be back on the throne within six months. He agrees that Mr Balfour’s solution would meet the practical necessity of framing a treaty for Bulgaria, but he thinks the arguments raised against the President’s message should be put to him.

Mr Polk says he would gladly send the arguments to President Wilson. He heartily agreed with what Mr Balfour had said concerning the attitude of Mr Venizelos during the Conference. This attitude had always been most loyal and generous. It is therefore most distasteful to the American Delegation to adopt any decision not immediately acceptable to Mr Venizelos. He does not wish to enter into all the reasons which had determined President Wilson. He would only point out to M Tardieu that, if all the Greeks outside Greece were allowed to join Greece, it was rather the territory round Constantinople than the territory round Adrianople which would become Greek. He felt sure that the danger of the restoration of Constantine was recognised by President Wilson.

(It is decided that the Central Territorial Committee should determine a boundary line in accordance with President Wilson’s message, as the Southern frontier of Bulgaria. The portion of Western Thrace to be ceded by Bulgaria will be ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers. This territory will be occupied by British, French, Italian and Greek troops, the last being kept in the portion of this territory by general agreement attributed to Greece. The Treaty should, further, stipulate for Bulgarian access to a port on the Aegean.)


3. Mr Balfour says that he has sent M Clemenceau’s proposals to the British Government with a personal opinion in their favour, and is waiting to hear further as to representatives being sent out to confer regarding details.

(It is agreed the question should be adjourned.)


4. Mr Balfour says that he understands the policy of the Conference to be that repatriation of the German prisoners in British and American hands should be carried out without delay under the auspices of an Inter-Allied Commission. It is not intended that the Commission should delay repatriation, even for an hour. The Commission itself is mere camouflage. He is ready to discuss any report the Commission might make, provided repatriation went on in the meantime. He did not, however, think that it was necessary for the Commission to make any report. All it had to do was to give a free hand to the British and American Authorities to carry out the repatriation. On Saturday he had heard that the engine drivers on the French trains said that they will take no German prisoner trains into Germany without a direct order from M. Clemenceau. Repatriation of Prisoners of War

M Clemenceau says that no obstruction has been put by him on the process of repatriation.

M Alphand explains the report made to the Council and the interpretation of its orders made by the Commission. He further points out that the Treaty stipulated that repatriation of prisoners should be carried out with the help of German rolling stock.

M Clemenceau points out that it had not been intended that the Commission should make any arrangements with the Germans. All it was to do was to facilitate in every way the repatriation of the prisoners held by the British and the Americans.

Mr Matsui asks whether there is any objection to a discussion within the Commission regarding repatriation of prisoners held by the Japanese.

M Clemenceau says that he sees no objection.

M Alphand asks whether German civilian prisoners held by the French Government should also be repatriated.

M Clemenceau replies in the negative.


5. The Council has before it a draft note to the German Government regarding the violation of the Treaty constituted by Article 61 in the new German Constitution.

M Clemenceau says that he sees several solutions, none of which are entirely satisfactory. One is to tell the Germans that the Treaty will not be ratified unless they alter their Constitution. Another is to say that, as Article 178 of the German Constitution rendered Article 61 inoperative, the German Government is asked to acknowledge the nullity of the latter. The third idea that strikes him is that the Council should avail itself of the article in the Treaty providing for a prolongation of the occupation of the Rhine if guarantees against German aggression appeared insufficient.

M Tardieu points out that Article 428 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany stipulates for something to take place after the lapse of 15 years. The breach of the Treaty complained of had just occurred. It seemed a long time to wait before taking action.

Mr Balfour said he thinks the notion of not ratifying the Treaty must be rejected. He thinks, however, it would be quite legitimate to occupy more territory on the East of the Rhine should the Germans not amend their Constitution.

M Tardieu agrees with Mr Balfour that action should be taken at once of such a kind as to discourage Germany from a repetition of the offence.

Mr Balfour points out that the German Government alone can do nothing. It cannot alter the Constitution. It can interpret it but its interpretation could be called in question by another Government. Only the German Parliament could deal with the matter and the German Parliament was not sitting. He suggests that the German Government be told that it had committed a breach of the Treaty which cannot be accepted, and that this breach must be remedied within a certain time, failing which the Allied and Associated Powers would take such action as they might think fit.

M Clemenceau suggests that such action might be the occupation of Frankfurt.

(It is decided that M Berthelot should re-draft the message to the German Government regarding the breach of the Treaty constituted by Article 61 of the new German Constitution in the spirit of the discussion and that the new draft should be considered at the following meeting.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

2nd September 1919

An American Red Cross dining room in Tomsk, Siberia that provides for Russian refugees fleeing the Russian Civil War.


Edward, Prince of Wales, lays the cornerstone of Peace Tower of the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa.


General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, waves goodbye to France as he returns to the U.S.

[Jimbuna]

3rd September 1919

US: President Wilson leaves on a tour of the country to get support for the League of Nations.

Edward, Prince of Wales, during his visit to Montreal, Canada.


Jan Smuts, Boer War general, becomes the 2nd Prime Minister of South Africa.


An Airco DH4A biplane, G-EAJC, of the British airline, Aircraft Transport and Travel Limited, about to leave Hounslow Heath Aerodrome (later Heathrow), London, for Le Bourget, Paris, 3rd September 1919.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, September 2, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council noted the new draft letter to the German Government, on the subject of the violation of the Peace Treaty, by virtue of Article 61 of the German constitution.

Mr Balfour says that he notices that the Germans were only given fifteen days in which to reply. It might be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for them to answer within such a period. Their Parliament is not now in session, and he thinks it doubtful whether their parliamentary procedure, of which he knew nothing, would permit them to accede to the wishes of the Council within the period stated.

M Clemenceau says that he had foreseen the difficulty, but thought it was rather an advantage than otherwise, to give the Germans a short period within which to reply. They would be sure to object and to say that it was impossible, but the brief period imposed upon them in the letter would make it necessary for them to deal with the subject matter of the letter without delay.

(It is agreed that the draft letter for communication to the German Government, calling their attention to the violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, by virtue of Article 61 of the new German constitution, should be accepted.)


2. Mr. Polk states that he has received a telegram sent from Colonel Goodyear to Mr Hoover. It is stated therein that Colonel Goodyear has been informed, by a telephonic message from General Dupont, that this latter officer had received no orders from M Clemenceau to proceed to Silesia. The telephonic communication had been made on 31st August.

M Clemenceau says that he has received a later telegram to the effect that General Dupont was ready to start.

Mr Polk says that he will so inform Mr. Hoover.


3. M Tardieu explains the frontier line which the Central Territorial Commission proposes for acceptance by the Council, with the assistance of a map.

Mr Polk remarks that the line drawn on the map differs from the frontier proposed by President Wilson. The United States are, none the less, prepared to adopt the frontier line now proposed by the Central Territorial Commission.

(It is decided that the frontier line presented to the Council by the Central Territorial Commission and adopted unanimously by them, should be accepted.)

M Tardieu explains the problem of the Bulgarian access to the Aegean, and says that the question has been dealt with by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways, when it had discussed Article 24 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty. The central point of the problem was whether Dedeagatch should belong to Greece, or whether it should be part of an International State. This was a question which, of course, only the Council could settle. If it should be decided that it is to belong to Greece, the Central Territorial Commission is of the opinion that a general clause ought to be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, guaranteeing to that country free access to the Aegean Sea by river and railway. The final allocation of Dedeagatch also raises the question of how the International Commission for that port ought to be constituted. The original proposal had been that the International Harbor Authority ought to be composed of a British, a Bulgarian and a Greek official. He considered that a French port officer should be added and, in addition, a representative of the United States, who would certainly act in a most impartial manner in all questions that came before him. His reason for suggesting a French representative is that France had been one of the Powers signatory to the Peace Treaty, assuring Greek independence.

S Tittoni says that while agreeing to M Tardieu’s proposals, he does not quite understand why no Italian representative was suggested for the International Harbor Commission at Dedeagatch.

M Clemenceau said that he will take note of S Tittoni’s suggestion.

Mr Polk says that it is important that a clause should be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, guaranteeing free access to the Aegean Sea for that country; it was also important that Greece should have a free economic access to Eastern and Western Thrace.

M Tardieu says that Greek troops ought to occupy such territory as is definitely to be assigned to them by common consent. With regard to the remaining portion, he has consulted with Marshal Foch’s staff and with that of General Alby. He had been told by these military experts that one mixed Brigade, composed of six Battalions, and four Squadrons of Discussion Cavalry, would be necessary. There was, at the present moment at Dedeagatch, a force composed of two Battalions of French infantry and one Squadron of French cavalry: the French contribution could not be increased, except possibly by a small contingent of mountain artillery. The four Battalions and 3 squadrons of cavalry necessary to bring the force of occupation up to the strength required could be supplied by the other Allied Powers. If necessary, small reinforcements could be supplied by the Greek Government. He does not consider the situation to be disquieting, in view of the fact that troops were already in occupation, and others might be sent.

Mr Polk says that it would, in his opinion, be most unwise to send any Greek troops, for it would be absolutely impossible to get them out again. He thought it would be preferable to leave the Bulgarian forces in the area under discussion, since they would probably behave better under the threat of the eventual occupation of the territory by Greek troops. He added that no United States’ troops would be available for any Inter-Allied occupation of Thrace. He is sure that no trouble will occur so long as Inter-Allied troops are used for the occupation of the country.

S Tittoni said that the Italians already had one battalion in Bulgaria, and that, if an Inter-Allied occupation of the areas now under discussion took place, the populations would remain in a state of tranquility, even though the military occupation were effected by small forces.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks Great Britain is in a position to make her contribution, but he did not like to make a definite statement without consulting his experts. He thinks, however, that the British troops in Constantinople might be utilized.

(It is agreed that M Tardieu should examine

(a) The question of assuring free economic access to the Aegean Sea by river and railway to Bulgaria, by means of general guaranteeing articles in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

(b) The question of an Inter-Allied Military occupation of the territories in Thrace now held by Bulgarian troops.

(c) That his report on these subjects should be presented to the Council at an early date.


4. M Tardieu explains the proposed Romanian frontier in the Dobrudja with the assistance of a map.

Mr Balfour says that the original idea of the Council had been that the southern portion of Dobrudja was properly speaking, Bulgarian but that as it was Romanian territory, and as Romania was an Allied and friendly Power, she could not be forced to cede any portion of her territory to an enemy State. At the present moment, however, Romania had almost ceased to have that character. He had just received a telegram from Admiral Troubridge showing the grave situation in Hungary caused by the action of the Roumanian authorities.

Mr Polk says that the American Delegation had received similar information from General Bandholtz on the previous day.

S Tittoni said that the four Generals are the source of information from which the Council ought to draw. He does not know why reports are being received independently, while the Inter-Allied Committee of Generals is in session.

M Clemenceau says that eight days had elapsed since a telegram had been sent to the Romanian Government by the Council, and that no reply had been received.

S Tittoni said that he thinks the Council ought to receive a collective opinion on the situation from the four Generals. It was most important that the Council should be kept informed of their views, and he did not understand why they did not communicate their joint opinions more frequently. He thinks that they ought to be called upon to do so.

Mr Polk says that the Romanians have now been defying the Conference for an entire three weeks, and had given no answer to the numerous communications sent to them. Every kind of Note had been sent to them. Some were couched in moderate terms; some in more forcible language, and others in a menacing style. Each style had failed to produce any result, and he thinks that the time for sending Notes is now over. All information received combined to show that the Romanians intend to make a separate Peace with Hungary. They were making requisitions on their own behalf, and acting in a completely independent manner. It was inconceivable to him that Romania should defy the Council, which had behind it the support of three Great European Powers, without receiving encouragement from some quarter or another.

M Berthelot says that he had recently received a visit from Mr Antonescu, who, when asked why no reply had been given to the communications of the Council, had answered that they were couched in too violent terms.

Mr Balfour then reads a telegram from General Gorton and remarks that the last sentence contained in it did not seem to be connected with the first part.

At this point the Council takes note of all the telegrams received by the French Foreign Office and signed by the Inter-Allied Military Mission, since August 26th, on the subject of the situation in Hungary.

M Clemenceau says that it appears to him to be clear that the Allied Generals are not carrying out their original instructions, which had been that they should keep in communication with the Romanian authorities, and report to the Council on what they discovered. Instead of doing this they were plunging themselves into political questions. He had come to the opinion that the Romanian situation was now so grave that prompt measures were necessary in order to prevent it from developing further.

Mr Polk says that the Inter-Allied Generals at Budapest had originally attempted to carry out their instructions. They had got into communication with the Romanian Authorities as directed, but had found that it was of no use receiving polite assurances from the Romanians, and taking note of promises which these latter had no intention of fulfilling. The Military Mission had been at Budapest for three weeks, and, having found that it was impossible to carry out their instructions as originally drafted, had none the less attempted to make themselves useful to the Council, and had, in consequence, got involved in political questions.

M Cubmenobau says that he thinks the moment has come to send an ultimatum to the Romanians. He thinks it should be communicated to them by some well-known public man, whose nationality was not a point of any importance.

Mr Balfour says that he has a plan which might be followed in conjunction with that of M Clemenceau. It had for long been evident that the promises of the Romanian authorities were of no use. The only success that the Council had obtained in its dealings with the Romanians had occurred when the authorities of that country had been told that they must either accede to the wishes of the Council, or come into open conflict with the Allied troops. He gives as an example the action of Admiral Troubridge, who, when in charge of the monitors on the Danube, had resisted the Romanian requisitions of barges, and the action of the Romanian authorities in stopping the transit of food across the river. Admiral Troubridge’s attitude had been firm, and, as it was backed by force, the Romanians had given way. At the present moment the Council was unable to get any reply to its communications to the Romanian Government, but although this was the case, he was certain that no Roumanian Statesman would take the responsibility of bringing the troops of his country into conflict with the Allied Armies. His proposal therefore, was to occupy some place in Hungary with a small body of Allied troops. He is sure that the Romanians would never fight them. It might possibly be easier to send a force of warships into the Black Sea.

Mr Polk says that the only vessels belonging to the United States of America in the Mediterranean area are stationed at Fiume and Smyrna.

S Tittoni said that, before taking the action proposed by M Clemenceau, the Council ought to wait for a complete report from the Inter-Allied Mission of Generals at Budapest.

M Clemenceau, commenting upon Mr Balfour’s last remark, says that the Romanians had recently got hold of the Paris press. He did not attach great importance to this, but, at the same time, he did not wish to let the French people think that he had performed a quasi-belligerent act against the Romanians, without having previously communicated an ultimatum to them. He thinks that Allied war vessels might be sent into the Black Sea, pending a reply from the Romanian Government, but that they should not be called upon to act until an answer had been obtained.

The three demands which he proposes to make to the Romanians are:

(1) That they should cease from making requisitions in Hungary, and should place all the material that they had seized at the disposal of the Council;

(2) That they should promise definitely that they would make no separate peace with Hungary;

(3) That they should withdraw their troops from Hungary.

S Tittoni says that he thinks that, before warships were sent to Romania, a reply to M Clemenceau’s ultimatum ought to be obtained. With regard to the three demands which M Clemenceau proposes to make to the Romanian authorities, he agrees that the Romanian Armies should be ordered to cease their requisitions, and place the material seized at the disposal of the Allies; he agrees that they should be ordered to make no separate peace; but before he could consent to ordering the Romanians to evacuate Hungary, he thinks the Council ought to be sure that the Romanian withdrawal would not open the door to a recrudescence of Bolshevism, and a revival of a new series of Bela Kuns. A police force, sufficient to maintain order in that country, should be raised.

M Clemenceau says that the occupation of Budapest by Romania, and the continued defiance of the Council, is a situation quite as grave as any produced by a Bolshevik Government in Hungary.

S Tittoni said that it might possibly be best to make the Romanians promise that they would retire on receiving orders from the Council.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks that a decision ought not to be taken finally until the following day.

(At this point a general discussion as to the most suitable person to be entrusted with the ultimatum to Romania, ensues. The names of Sir Eyre Crowe and Admiral Troubridge are mentioned in this connection.)

S Tittoni said that he cannot for the moment promise Italian participation in any Naval action that might ensue. With regard to the person who should be entrusted with the communication of the ultimatum, he thinks that sending an Admiral to Bucharest would be like making a Naval demonstration without ships. He prefers that a diplomat should convey the orders of the Conference.

Mr Polk says that, in his opinion, the dispatch of an ultimatum to Romania does not bind the United States to subsequent Naval action.

(It is decided that the question should be adjourned to the following day.)


5. M Fromageot says that the Economic Commission had, on the previous day, presented the Drafting Committee with a clause, which it proposed should be added to Article 263 of the Peace Treaty with Austria.

The Drafting Committee could not do what it had been asked to, without the approbation of the Council, and was of the opinion that the proposed clause should not be added. In the first place there were difficulties, owing to the fact that, as the boundaries of the future Hungarian State had not been settled, it was hard to lay down rules as to the future status of all citizens now situated in the territorial area provisionally called Hungary. In the second place, Article 90 of the Peace Treaty with Austria clearly lays down that Austria should recognize the validity of all the provisions of the future Peace Treaty with Hungary. He therefore thinks that the clause asked for by the Economic Commission should be added to the Hungarian Treaty, since it is obviously too late to put it into the Austrian Treaty.

(It is decided to reject the proposal of the Economic Commission to the effect that the special clause drafted in Appendix “F” should be added to Article 263 of the Austrian Peace Treaty.

It is agreed that a clause effecting the results required should be added to the Hungarian Peace Treaty.)


6. Mr. Woolsey says that the reply to the Austrian Government on the subject of the Economic Clauses in the Peace Treaty, had referred to certain concessions made in a Note from the Council, dated, July 8th, 1919,3 and addressed to the Austrian Delegation. In view of the importance of the Note, and of the decision of the Council on August 28th, to refer the reply now being made to the Austrian Government, to the Drafting Committee, in order to ascertain whether changes in the Peace Treaty were necessary, on account of interpretative passages in the proposed reply, he made the following suggestion:

Interpretations of the Austrian Peace Treaty Contained in the Replies to the Austrian Delegation:

“That the Note of July 8th, 1919, as well as any other Notes to the Austrian Delegation, containing interpretative passages on the Treaty of Peace, should likewise be referred to the Drafting Committee, to ascertain whether changes in the Peace Treaty might be necessary, on account of such interpretative passages.”

He had another point which he wished to bring before the notice of the Council. On August 28th, the Council had decided that a Clause should be inserted in the proposed covering letter to the replies to the Austrian Delegation, on the subject of the Peace Treaty, to the effect that the covering letter in question ought not to be taken as in any sense modifying the text of the Treaty. In view of the fact that the reply of July 8th, 1919, to the Austrian Delegation might be regarded as interpretative of the text of the Treaty, he suggests:

“That the clause in the covering letter should be made to cover all replies made to the Austrian Delegation, and not only the covering letter under consideration.”

(These two proposals are referred to the Drafting Committee, who enter the room to report on them.)

M Fromageot says that, in answer to the first point raised by Mr. Woolsey, he would draw the attention of the Conference to the fact that the first edition of the Peace Treaty had been presented to the Austrians on June 6th. A long series of communications had followed; and the second edition of the Peace Treaty had been presented on July 20th. It was with this second edition that all replies to the Austrian Delegation were concerned, and it was therefore not necessary to discover whether replies of an earlier date than July 20th contained interpretative passages of a superseded text of the Peace Treaty.

(Mr Woolsey’s first proposal is therefore rejected.)

He thinks that Mr Woolsey’s second suggestion ought to be adopted, and the phraseology of the covering letter altered, so as to meet the point.

(It is agreed that the wording of the general covering letter to the replies of the Austrian counter-proposals of the Peace Treaty should be so modified as to state that no passage in any of the replies should be regarded as an authoritative interpretation of the Peace Treaty.)

(The Meeting then adjourned for a discussion in camera.)

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, September 3, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

[Jimbuna]

4th September 1919

Turkish delegates, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (center), gather in Sivas to organize resistance against Allied occupation and the partition of Turkey.


Jacques Schneider Trophy National Seaplane Race officials of the Aero Club outside the hangar.


Ship Losses:

HMS Verulam (Royal Navy) Russian Civil War, British campaign in the Baltic: The V-class destroyer struck a mine and sank off in the Gulf of Finland off Seiskari, Finland. She was salvaged in 1925 but found to be beyond repair.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, September 4, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M Clemenceau draws the Council’s attention to the objections of the German Government to the advanced Commissions of Control being sent at once. He adds that in his opinion it would be better to postpone sending out the advance Commissions of Control for a certain time. This is the opinion of General Nollet, although Marshal Foch was of another opinion. In conclusion, he draws the attention of the Council to the fact that the Allied and Associated Powers have no positive right to send out these advance Commissions of Control if the Germans now objected.

General Desticker said that the despatch of the full personnel of the Commissions of Control depended upon the date of the complete ratification of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Marshal Foch has been of the opinion that an advance detachment of the Inter-Allied Commissions should be sent forward at least ten days before the full Commissions arrived. This preliminary measure was necessary in order to prepare the work with which the Commissions will be concerned later on. The whole question, therefore, hinges upon the probable date of the final ratification of the Peace Treaty with Germany.

M Clemenceau says that Marshal Foch had thought that the Peace Treaty would be ratified by three Great Powers by 15th September.

S Tittoni said that as far as Italy is concerned that will not be possible.

Mr Balfour then suggests that the German objections appear to be based on the very large number of officers who were to be sent under present proposals. Would it not be possible to adhere to Marshal Foch’s proposal, and, at the same time, reduce the number of Commissions dispatched, by making one nation responsible for one particular department, another nation for another branch, and so on. The large number of the personnel was due to the fact that each Department contained Inter-Allied Representatives.

General Desticker says that he does not think that Mr Balfour’s proposal is practicable, and thinks that it would be better to delay sending out the Commissions of Control for a few days in order to adhere to the original program.

Mr Polk draws attention to the fact that the United States cannot, for the moment, be represented upon the Commissions of Control.

(After some further discussion it is decided that no advance Delegation of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should be sent to Germany for the present.)


2. (It is agreed that the Austrian request for a prolongation of two days of the time allowed for the consideration of the Allied, reply should be granted.)


3. The Council took note of M. Misu’s letter to the President of the Peace Conference, stating that the telegrams of the Council to the Romanian Government had, to a large extent, not been received in Bucharest.

M Clemenceau said that the situation was rather changed by virtue of S Bratiano’s plea. He had hardly credited it at first, but had, later on, come to the conclusion that there might be a certain degree of truth in the statement made.

S Tittoni said that S Bratiano’s statements were to a certain extent borne out by notices appearing in the French press, to the effect that wireless telegraphic communication from Paris was somewhat interrupted.

Mr Polk says he understands that the French Minister at Bucharest had acknowledged the receipt of the dispatches for transmission to the Romanian Government by telegram.

M Berthelot says that this is not the case. The French Minister had not acknowledged the receipt of the dispatches under discussion, nor had he stated that they had been communicated by him to the Romanians. In confirmation of this he drew the attention of the Council to the fact that a batch of telegrams received that morning by the French Foreign Office, from Bucharest, made no reference to the previous communications of the Council.

Mr Balfour says that he does not understand how the nonreceipt by the Romanian Government of previous dispatches of the Council could be explained in any credible manner.

Mr Polk said that the Queen of Romania had written a letter to Mr Hoover, wherein she protested in the strongest terms against the United States’ attitude towards her country. This was surely evidence that the Council’s dispatches had been received.

M Pichon said that the information on which the Queen of Romania’s letter had been based, might have been obtained from the public press.

S Tittoni says that it would possibly be better to make use of the military organisation for the transmission of telegrams. He draws the Council’s attention to the fact, that, according to Mr. Misu’s letter, the Romanian Government is now considering the possibility of withdrawing their armies from Hungary. This is the first occasion on which they had made any statement of the kind.

Mr Polk then reads a letter from an American officer, who had had an interview with one of the Romanian authorities in Bucharest. The conversation recorded in the letter was to the effect, that the Romanians had occupied Budapest, and intended to stay there; that they intended to settle, and manage, their own affairs in their own way; that they had received an insulting letter from the Council, which they had answered in the most suitable way, by ignoring it; and that the Romanians had nothing to fear from the Allies, who did not intend to follow their menaces, up by effective action. This, letter showed clearly that the Romanians were conscious that they were treating the Council with contempt, and that they intended to continue to do so.

M Pichon draws the Council’s attention to a telegram received that morning from M de Saint Aulaire, and remarked that the information it contained somewhat contradicts that received by Mr. Polk.

Mr Polk, commenting upon the telegram circulated by M Pichon, says he thought it was the most amazing attempt to avoid the real issue that he had ever read. In view of the act that the Allied generals in Budapest had been urging the Romanian Government to form a gendarmerie for the maintenance of order, and had been positively opposed by them in any such measure, the statement contained in the telegram from M. de St. Aulaire that the Romanians were anxious to restore order, was little short of ridiculous.

Mr Balfour says that he finds it very difficult to believe, that the Romanian Government was not playing with the Conference. The Romanian authorities at Budapest, and the Roumanian representatives in the Allied capitals, know by the papers, and from the Allied Generals at Budapest, what were the wishes of the Council. The Military Representatives at Budapest, in particular, had continually explained the wishes of the Council. It is folly to suppose that communications made to the Romanians at Budapest were not sent on to the Central Government at Bucharest. The present complaint of the Romanian Government, that they were in ignorance of the real wishes of the Conference, seemed well nigh incredible. He had not had time to weigh the evidence in support of their plea carefully; but it seemed to him that their present arguments were only advanced as part of an elaborate scheme of ignoring the wishes of the Allies, and of acting in whatever manner they themselves thought best. There was a remarkable agreement between the conversation of the American officer, communicated to the Council through Mr Polk’s kindness, and the actual facts of the case. He was far more inclined to believe the statements made by the Romanian official to Mr. Polk’s correspondent, than he was to give credence to Mr Bratiano’s assurances, that the Romanian Government was still waiting for the instructions of the Council.

Mr Polk then communicated a further extract from the same letter, in which his correspondent stated that he had been informed by the Romanian official, that the Allies had made a peace which was unfair to small nations; and that the Romanians, therefore, intended to take the matter into their own hands, and to settle the matter equitably in their section of the world.

S Tittoni said that the difficulties were increased by the fact that there was no properly constituted government at Budapest; if there had been one it would have been possible to collaborate with it, in setting up a force sufficient to maintain order, and, when this had been done, to ask the Romanians to go.

Mr Polk says that S Tittoni did not seem to have realized the exact nature of the difficulty. The Allied generals at Budapest had frequently urged the Romanians to allow the Hungarians to form a police force. The Romanians had positively obstructed any such measure. The Romanian authorities had been asked, by the Council, not to devastate Hungary. The Council had been told in reply, that it was incumbent upon Romania to get back the material taken from her at an earlier period of the war. The requisitions far exceeded anything that might have been done under such a plea. About 4,000 sealed cars had gone across the Romanian frontiers from Hungary, carrying everything that could possibly be requisitioned. He fee.s very strongly in the matter for a particular reason. There is, at the present moment, an American general officer in Budapest, who was being flouted by the Romanian authorities. The situation is, therefore, so humiliating, that he feels the President ought to be advised to withdraw the United States general officer from Budapest.

M Clemenceau says that he agrees, in the main, with Mr Polk, but thinks it is difficult to act as though the Council were absolutely certain that the Romanian Authorities are acting in bad faith.

Mr Balfour says that, although some doubt might exist as to whether the Romanian Government had received the telegrams of the Council, it is none the less certain that they are fully aware of the policy of the Allies.

Mr Polk says that a dispatch has been agreed upon at the Meeting of the Council on the 23rd August. It had been published in the papers in Paris on the 26th August, and transmitted to the Generals in Budapest on the 27th. It must, therefore, have been sent on to Bucharest. If the Romanian representative at each of the Allied capitals were summoned to the Foreign Office, and told that the Council was in earnest, he is certain that the situation in Romania would improve. All information received through the United States Secret Service was to the effect, that the opinion prevailed among the Romanian Authorities, that the Council is not serious in its intentions.

Mr Balfour then reads the letter which he had drafted for communication to the Romanian Government at Bucharest.

S Tittoni says that the letter has been very well drafted. He suggests that in the first sentence of the second paragraph the words “rightly” or “wrongly” should be deleted. The sentence as corrected would be a more impartial expression of opinion.

A long discussion then follows as to the method of communicating the letter to the Romanian Government and

(It is decided that the letter drafted by Mr Balfour should be taken by Sir George Clerk personally to Bucharest, and be presented by him to the Romanian Government.)

(It is further decided that Sir George Clerk should also take copies of all telegrams previously sent by the Conference to the Romanian Government and should communicate them with the aforesaid letter.)


4. M Berthelot commented on the report on the subject of the immigration clauses for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria. He says, in conclusion, that, in his opinion, Mr Venizelos’ proposals were too complicated to be put into effect, and that it would be better for the States affected to set up mixed Commissions to settle the matter between themselves. He did not think that any clause ought to go into the Bulgarian Treaty.

Mr Coolidge says that the opinions expressed by M Berthelot were not those incorporated in the report of the Commission on New States.

M Berthelot says that the original report of the Commission on New States had been made more than a month previously. It is too late for the Council to enter into negotiations with the States concerned, as proposed by Mr Venizelos. In the meanwhile, the Drafting Committee are asking that a decision should be given, since they cannot carry on with the work of drafting the Bulgarian Treaty unless the point is settled.

(After some further discussion, it is agreed:

(1) That no clause on the subject of reciprocal immigration in the Balkans should be inset in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

(2) That the report of the Commission on New States should be accepted, and that this Commission should be authorized to consult with Mr Venizelos as to the best method of putting his proposals into effect.


(At this point, Dr Benes, Mr Paderewski and Mr Dmowski enter the Council.)

5. Dr Benes explains the question of Teschen to the Council with the aid of maps. He says that the problem should be looked at from four points of view, namely, the ethnographical, the historical, the economic and the political.

According to the latest statistics, there are in the Teschen area, 230,000 Poles, 150,000 Czechs, and 60,000 Germans. This Polish majority is questioned by the Czechs, who doubt the accuracy of the statistics. Owing to the policy of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the resistance of the Czechs to Austrian rule had been combated by every administrative measure that could be brought against them; and in consequence, the Austrian policy had been systematically to weaken any ethnographical statistics favorable to the Czecho-Slovak population. This could be seen from the fact that the figures given vary from one census to another. The German and Polish elements are generally grouped together; because these two sections of the population were always able to agree in their opposition to the Czechs. There are, in the mining district of the Teschen area, a large percentage of workmen, who are not, properly speaking, inhabitants of Teschen. The Austrian Authorities had assisted the Polish agitation in Teschen since the year 1873, when the centralizing tendencies of the Viennese government began to be put into effect. Since that date, Polish schools had multiplied, and a continuous effort had been made to replace the local Czech, administration by Polish or German Authorities. The result of all this had been that the statistics of the Polish population had increased, but the Czecho-Slovak Government thought that false classifications had deliberately been introduced into the data on which the statistics were based. The population in Teschen did not speak the proper Polish language, but a dialectic mixture of Czecho-Slovak and Polish. It was even declared that there were no villages in which separate Polish and Czech inhabitants lived side by side. There were, none the less, centers where the Czecho-Polish dialect was universally spoken. This showed that the population of Teschen, from an ethnographical point of view, was in a transitional state. There was further to be taken into consideration the tendency of the population towards a particular form of culture, and it was certain that the tendency of the population in the area was towards the adoption of Czech customs. All these facts combined to show that the Austrian, statistics could not be trusted, or at least, that they presented only one side of the question. The Czech Government maintained that there were not more than 45 per cent of Poles in the Teschen area.

(a) Ethnographical Considerations

The situation of Czecho-Slovakia in the past, was of importance. That country had always identified itself with the ancient Kingdom of Bohemia, formed out of Moravia, Bohemia, and that Potion of Silesia which included Teschen. The strife of the sixteenth century had almost exterminated the Bohemian population. A revival of Bohemian national sentiment had occurred later, but the moral sentiment sustaining it had been based upon the historical status of the Bohemian Kingdom, and the national unity of that country. Basing itself upon these feelings, Bohemia had always resisted the attempts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to force their country into a Central European Federation. They had never, in the past, abandoned their standpoint that the old Kingdom constituted a historic unit, and ought never to be divided. This sentiment was very deep, and existed at the present moment; the population could not understand the projected division of Teschen, at a moment when the ethnographical problem had not been finally resolved.

(b) Historical Considerations

The coal question affected Czechoslovakia very deeply. There were large masses of coal in Poland, and in those parts of Upper Silesia which would undoubtedly be ceded to that country. Statistics showed that the total capacity of the Polish coalpits amounted to 86 billion tons; the pits in Czechoslovakia, including Teschen, only had a capacity of 9 billion tons. Czechoslovakia was essentially an industrial country. It had produced 70 per cent of the metal work of the old Austro-Hungarian Kingdom, 93 per cent of the sugar products of that country, and had worked a preponderating proportion of the blast furnaces employed in Austro-Hungarian industries. All this showed how much the Czechoslovak State was dependent upon a continuous supply of coal, and how little they were asking for themselves. The mines in Czechoslovakia were only capable of supplying the needs of the country for 250 years. Poland imported very little coal from Teschen, and statistics showed that in the past, only 25 trucks were sent into Poland every day. The industrial character of Czechoslovakia obliged her to import coal from Silesia.

(c) Economic Considerations

Mr. Polk then asks whether some of the coal imported by Czechoslovakia did not go to Austria.

Mr Balfour also asks whether Dr Benes’ figures included the importation of lignite.

Dr Benes, replying to Mr. Polk, says that a certain quantity of coal was transmitted to Austria through Czechoslovakia, but that two-thirds of the total importation remained in the last named country.

Replying to Mr Balfour, he says that there was enough lignite in Czechoslovakia for the domestic needs of the country.

Passing to the Railway question, he draws the attention of the Council to the fact that the most important railway line, maintaining communication between Slovakia and the disputed coal districts, runs through Teschen. This railway is absolutely necessary for the transport of the products of Czechoslovakia. (Dr Benes here illustrates his statement by a reference to a diagrammatic map, showing the great proportion of Czechoslovakian goods carried over the Oderberg-Kaschau line.) It is impossible for the new Czechoslovak Republic to build a new railway line on its own resources.

If the supply of coal upon which Czechoslovakia depends so greatly are taken from her, that country would have to rely upon Poland for the essential elements of her existence. Czechoslovakia is a more industrial country than Poland. Her sugar industries, her metallurgical works, and her blast furnaces could only be developed and continued by having a continuous supply of coal. If a decision were made unfavorable to Czechoslovakia, it would cause a great revulsion of feeling in that country. He had been surprised how deeply Czech feeling had been roused by the question. During the long negotiations of the past months, he had done everything in his power to calm the population of his country, but he had only been able to do so because his countrymen were hoping for a solution favorable to themselves. They now see themselves faced with the possibility of a situation arising in which they would be deprived of these things which were necessary for the reconstruction of their country. He had always attempted to advocate moderate views, but he doubts whether his influence would prevail over the growing excitement in his country.

(d) Political Considerations

He would like to draw attention to the economic effects of diplomatic friction between his country and Poland. In a period of strained relations, Poland would only have to hold up the railway traffic into Czechoslovakia, to paralyze that country in 24 hours. He would like the Polish representatives to understand that Czechoslovakia is not demanding rights over Polish populations, but merely putting forward a claim for things necessary for her very life. Czechoslovakia was surrounded by countries in a state of ferment, and the supply of materials necessary for her reconstruction was an absolute necessity to her, if she were to remain free of the existing political confusion in Central Europe. He had desired to see his country reconstituted on a firm economic basis as rapidly as possible, in order that he might make it a sort of rallying point for the political aims of western European policy. By doing so, he had hoped that her neighbors would gather round her, and that the western Powers would find a support for their policies in Czechoslovakia. Poland is necessarily involved in the politics of Eastern Europe. She is faced with all the difficulties of the Russian situation, in which she would be involved for a long time to come. For this reason, Poland would require the collaboration of Czechoslovakia, but this could not be given if the last named country were deprived of Teschen, which was regarded as essential to her economic existence. During the war, the Czech population had adhered to their wish for the integrity of their country. They had had the deepest faith in the policy of the Entente. He feared that if a decision unfavorable to Czechoslovakia were given on the Teschen question, there would be a deep and general reversion of feeling. He feared that the proposed solution of the Teschen question would give rise to a deeply hostile feeling towards Poland, which might be seen from the fact that the Radical Parties in Czechoslovakia are now adopting an inimical attitude towards Poland. In order to counteract this unfortunate sentiment among his countrymen, he had proposed a compromise, which he had hoped would satisfy both Poland and Czechoslovakia. He had originally suggested that the line of the Vistula should be the boundary between the two countries. It had been pointed out to him that larger concessions were necessary, and he had endeavored, with success, to make popular opinion in his country, favor the concession of the whole of the Bielitz district to Poland. His own opinions had been regarded as heretical by his countrymen: notwithstanding this, he had accepted a solution, which he hoped would have satisfied both Poland and Czechoslovakia. More than this, he had always wished to advance conciliatory proposals in the case of Glatz. He had accepted a frontier between his country and Hungary, which placed 132,000 more Slovaks under Hungarian rule than there were Hungarians under Czech administration. He is now faced by a frontier line, proposed by the Joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees, which divided the mining district into two portions. Such a solution could not possibly be accepted. The artificial nature of the division proposed, could be seen by the well known fact that there was constant communication between the districts which it was proposed to separate: large numbers of workmen were continually moving from one area to another, and back. The new frontier line would interrupt free communication with Slovakia, and would oblige the Czech Government to construct a special railway line, which would practically run through one continuous tunnel. The German population were all in favor of maintaining the economic unity of the Teschen area. He did not wish to lay emphasis on this argument, which none the less, could not be completely neglected. He had recently received a Delegation, largely composed of miners and workmen, from the Teschen district. On the news being received that the Teschen Basin was going to be divided, large numbers of Polish workmen had protested against such a measure. It was to be noted, that many of the Delegates belonged to political parties quite averse to chauvinistic feeling (Socialists, Socialist Democrats, etc). None the less, they had expressed themselves strongly on the point, and had stated that they feared for the future. He did not think he was exaggerating when he said that this population now so profoundly disturbed, would act against the wishes both of the Polish and of the Czechoslovak Governments, and deal with the problem by independent action on their own account. At the present moment, strikes of a political character were occurring, in which Polish workmen were taking part. He had tried to keep the population quiet, but he had begun to feel that a conciliatory policy on his part was more and more difficult in face of a general movement of protest and indignation. Teschen would always be of secondary importance to Poland. The Poles had complained that an economic argument was being brought against their ethnographical claims. The Poles, themselves, had not hesitated to do the same when they thought that such arguments would be favorable to them. He desires, in conclusion, to ask the Conference to consider with the utmost care, all the arguments that he had brought forward, to weigh the grave political consequences which might follow a decision contrary to the wishes of the Czechoslovak population, and to take into account the immense sacrifices which Czechoslovakia had made in supporting the Entente throughout the war.

(It is agreed that the Polish Delegates should be heard on the following day, and the meeting then adjourned.)

[Jimbuna]

5th September 1919

Soldiers of the U.S. 1st Division arriving in Hoboken, New Jersey, returning from Europe.


[September 5th, 1919] Reims, Marne, Champagne, France.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, September 5, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M Clemenceau says he has received a telegram from General Dupont, regarding the situation in Silesia, which is reported as being very bad. He had nothing to propose, but only wished to communicate the news to his colleagues.

Mr Balfour observes that nothing can be done until the Treaty is ratified. He hopes that this will take place in about 10 days.

Mr Polk says that according to Mr Hoover there was a prospect of the situation in Silesia improving.


2. The Council has before it a draft Article for insertion in the Treaty with Bulgaria, proposed by the American Delegation.

Mr Polk says that, as his colleagues will remember, he has deferred his reply to the question of the frontier between Bulgaria and Romania in the Dobrudja, at a previous meeting. He realizes that there are many reasons against the insertion of any clause such as that suggested, in the Treaty itself. The American Delegation will be satisfied if a sentence to the same effect were inserted in the covering letter to the Bulgarian Delegation. It might then be suggested that the ultimate settlement should be in the hands, either of the Allied and Associated Powers or of the League of Nations.

Mr Balfour points out that the covering letter would only be sent to the Bulgarians after all their Notes regarding the Treaty had been received. In other words, several weeks would elapse before the letter was sent.

Mr Polk says that the Bulgarians will certainly raise the point in their comments on the Treaty. This will give an opportunity for making a statement on the subject.

Mr Balfour suggests that the Council should resolve to take up the subject again when the covering letter was considered. He is ready, himself, to state that the attribution of Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria would be conducive to a lasting peace in the Balkans. Secondly, he thinks that it is impossible, as long as Romania remains an Allied Power, or, at the worst, a neutral, to insert any clause in the Treaty with Bulgaria, requiring a surrender of Romanian territory. Thirdly, he thought that it would be well to consider the matter again at the time of drafting the final covering letter. By that time, the attitude of Romania towards the Conference would be defined. The Council will then know what advice could be given to the Romanians and what methods it is right to employ. In any case, it will not be possible to make Romania yield territory unless she becomes an enemy State.

Mr Polk says that he agrees. He points out, however, that according to the future provisions of the Treaty with Hungary, Romania stands a chance of receiving considerable accessions of territory in Transylvania and Bukovina. Her acquisition of these territories might be made contingent on her yielding ground in the Dobrudja.

Mr Balfour says that this might be difficult, as the frontiers in Transylvania and Bukovina had been drawn on ethnological lines. It will be difficult to alter these frontiers, without violating the principles of the Conference.

Mr Polk says that a close examination of the boundaries would probably reveal some instances on which the ethnological principle had not been strictly followed.

M Pichon says that a serious question of principle was involved. The Conference, hitherto, had never attempted to revise Treaties anterior to the war.

M Clemenceau said that he thinks that dealing with the matter in a covering letter was not very practical. A promise to Bulgaria, by the Conference, that Romania would be invited to yield territory, would amount to nothing. An invitation to Romania to do so would equally amount to this. He wonders whether the basis of a bargain existed anywhere. Without a bargain, he thinks nothing can be achieved.

S Tittoni says that he does not think the question of the Dobrudja could be made corollary to the question of Transylvania or Bukovina. The matter of Bessarabia, however, remains. He would be inclined to ask Romania to make a concession in the Dobrudja, as a condition of obtaining what the Commission recommended in Bessarabia.

Mr Polk observes that he has not suggested making any promises at present.

M Clemenceau says the case would be the same in three weeks time.

M. Tardieu observes that the advantage of the procedure suggested by Mr Polk was that the Bulgarian Treaty could be proceeded with.

S Tittoni said that he understands that the question of the Dobrudja would be considered at a later stage in connection with the question of Bessarabia.

Mr Polk says that he is ready to adopt Mr. Balfour’s plan; namely, first, that in principle, it was accepted as desirable that Romania should yield a part of the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria; second, that no clause to this effect should be inserted in the Treaty with Bulgaria; third, that the means of obtaining this result should be considered at the time of sending the covering letter to the Bulgarians. He wishes it to be understood that nothing he had said committed him to an offer of Bessarabia to Romania in exchange for Southern Dobrudja.

(It is agreed that, for the purpose of the Treaty with Bulgaria, no change should be made in the frontier between Romania and Bulgaria, as existing at the outbreak of War.)

(At this point Mr Dmowski and later Dr Benes, and still later Mr Paderewski entered the room.)

3. Mr Dmowski says that it is extremely painful to him to have to defend his cause against his friends, the Czechoslovaks. He had hoped that Poland and Czechoslovakia would always stand together throughout the Conference. Now they appear as rival litigants before the Council. He thinks that the independence of Poland and Czechoslovakia is not yet achieved, though the Conference had given a basis for both. In return Poland and Czechoslovakia owe it to the Allied and Associated Powers to be the defenders of peace in Eastern Europe. He himself had always defended the Czecho-Slovak cause as if he had been a Czechoslovak himself. He would continue to do so. He would always endeavor to secure a friendly agreement between the two neighboring countries. He thought that the worst cause of conflict between neighbors was the subjection of one nationality to another. Should this take place, as between Poland and Czechoslovakia, friendship between the two countries would never be possible. Dr Benes had said that full rights would be accorded to the Poles in Teschen under Czechoslovak sovereignty. The first right of the Poles in Teschen was to belong to Poland. Dr Benes had further said that the Polish claim was based on ethnographical reasons. This is not the case. He was prepared to leave ethnography to savants and philologists. Statesmen established their claims on the wishes of peoples. The Polish claim was based on the national sentiment of the populations in question. The population of Teschen was literate. It could not be treated like an inarticulate mass. Each man knew what his national feelings were. In the first Slav Congress at Prague in 1848, the representative of Teschen had joined the Poles, and the first newspaper published in Teschen during the nineteenth century had been Written in Polish and not in Czech or in German. His thesis was that the country was not so much ethnically Polish as sentimentally and culturally Polish. The proof of this was that the Polish Delegation had suggested holding a plebiscite and this had been refused by the Czechoslovak Delegation. On the 5th of November of the preceding year, when the Austrian Monarchy broke up, the population of Teschen had, on its own initiative, made a provisional Settlement of the country. They had divided the country into two parts, and the line thus obtained had not aroused any protest either in Poland or in Bohemia. Both nations, therefore, seemed inclined to accept it. Difficulties had been made by the political leaders. The Czech people had been led to suppose that they could obtain the whole of Teschen from the Conference. When the decision of the Commission had been communicated in vague terms to the press in Bohemia, an organised protest by means of strikes was decided on. The Czech authorities had stopped trains running from Warsaw to Paris, had used troops to force the workmen to strike, and had even threatened to flood the mines should the men go to work; A German owner, whose Polish Workmen wished to work in the mines had told them he could not guarantee their lives. In spite of pressure, nevertheless the miners had continued work. This indicated that the country was undoubtedly Polish, and unwilling to collaborate in the plan of solving the fate of the country by strikes. S
Dr Benes had impugned the Austrian official statistics of the population in Teschen. He had said that the figures had been falsified in favour of the Poles, because of the consistent opposition of the Czechs. This was really not the case. The Austrian Government had been more anti-Polish in Teschen than anti-Czech, because their strongest adversaries in the area were the Poles. In 1900 the census showed 60% Poles, 23% Czechs, 15% Germans. In 1910 the proportion was, 54% Poles, 27% Czechs, 18% Germans. From these figures it followed that the Polish percentage was shown as diminished, just as the Czech and German percentage rose. It might be inferred that a pro-German policy tended to minimize the Polish element, and to increase the Czechs. Dr Benes had introduced a number of economic reasons. These were very strong. Bohemia, being a highly industrialized country, needed coal and therefore desired to possess the mines, but it could not be laid down that need makes ownership. The Polish Delegation maintained that the balance should be in favour of the national sentiment of the population. By a very strict application of this principle, Poland had been deprived of Danzig, which was the lungs of Poland. Danzig represented far more for Poland than the mines of Teschen for Bohemia. It would not be possible to deprive the Poles of the advantage of a rule which had been made to operate against them in favour of defeated Germany. He wished to remain the friend of the Czecho-Slovak republic. Poland would desire to sell her coal to her neighbors. In this instance it was the quality of the coal that mattered. The coal derived from the Karwin Basin was convertible into coke. In Poland there was no coal of this character. Should Upper Silesia as a result of the plebiscite go to Poland, there, would be some such coal in Poland, but not much. The gas works in Warsaw employed coal from the Karwin Basin. The Poles needed it more than Bohemia, which had coke producing coal in other parts of the country. Bohemia needed ordinary coal. This could not be obtained from the Karwin Basin. Bohemia had always imported some of her coal from Upper Silesia. Should this country go to the Poles, Poland would now become her supplier. But the fact that Bohemia required coal from Upper Silesia was a poor reason for giving her the Karwin Basin. Bohemia would buy rather more coal than she used to, and Poland in return would import her industrial products. Poland was very ready to sign a Convention to supply Bohemia with enough coal for her industries. It would be far easier to settle the matter in this way, than by making an unfair settlement in Teschen. If the true national line were adopted, Poland would receive 51% of ordinary coal and 44% of coke-out of the production of Teschen. The Polish Delegation was ready to yield a certain number of mining communes in which the population was not clearly Polish. This would reduce the Polish proportion to 29% of ordinary coal, and 22% of coke.

Polish ambitions were therefore not excessive. Poland required coke perhaps in a less degree than Bohemia because less industrial, but, nevertheless, she did need some. He thought the whole coal situation could be solved on these lines and by means of a Convention between the two countries. This would be far easier than by committing an injustice in Teschen, against which Poland would always protest and which would always disturb the peace. As to the railways, M. Benes had said that the Oderberg–Kaschau line was the principal communication between Bohemia and Slovakia. He begged to point out that this line had never served such a purpose before. It was the main line between Berlin and Budapest. It carried coal from Upper Silesia to Hungary and to the Balkans. It was necessary not for Bohemia, but for Poland, when Upper Silesia became Polish. There were four other lines connecting Bohemia and Slovakia. Two of these needed small connecting tracks of 8 kilometres in one case and 12 kilometres in the other. If these tracks had not been laid, geography was not the culprit. It had been Hungarian policy to stifle the development of Slovakia. Now that Bohemia and Slovakia were united in one State, no such reasons existed. The Czecho-Slovak Republic would easily construct what was required and he undertook to prophesy that, in 20 years, Bohemia would be connected with Slovakia by at least 8 lines of railway. On the other hand, Poland required the railway from Oderberg to Kaschau to export coal from Upper Silesia. The map prepared by the Commission, which he had seen on the previous day for the first time, had somewhat alarmed him. In order to attribute to Czechoslovakia the southern portion of this railway, the Commission had handed over to Czecho-Slovakia the most Polish of the Polish areas in Teschen,—he might almost say the most Polish population in Poland. There were few parts of Poland in which the population was 100 per cent Polish: in this area it was. The population had another characteristic. It was protestant in religion. These protestant Poles had always taken a very prominent part in the Polish national movement and it was these very people whom the Commission attributed to Czechoslovakia on the pretext that Bohemia required the southern part of the Oderberg–Kaschau railway, which, in reality, she did not require. It had been pointed out to him by a military authority that the line suggested by the Commission would give the Czechs a dominant position over the Polish part of the country. He put such considerations aside, as he did not wish even to contemplate the thought of war between the two countries. On national and economic grounds, he considered the Polish claim was right and he would only repeat what he had said at the beginning, that the essential condition for good relations between two neighboring States, whose independence was not yet achieved and whose function was to be guardians of the peace in Central Europe, was to avoid the subjection of the population of either to the other. All he asked for was the application of the national principle which had been applied with considerable severity against Poland in favour of Germany.

Dr Benes says that the local agreement referred to by Mr Dmowski between the Czech and Polish population in Teschen had really been made according to the administrative districts which previously existed. It had not been intended that the question of ultimate sovereignty should, in any way, be pre-judged by this provisional settlement. In Bohemia, protests had not arisen, until the Polish Government had ordered mobilization in the Polish part of the territory, as if the provisional settlement had established Polish sovereignty in the area. Mr Dmowski had referred to various acts of Czech officials. He did not wish, himself, to go into such details, though he had numberless reports containing equivalent allegations against Poles. At Oderberg and Bogumin, Polish troops had forced the Czech workmen to sign a petition in favour of annexation to Poland. However, recriminations of this kind would be endless and he preferred to avoid the subject. Mr Dmowski had argued that the census had been falsified against the Poles. In fact, the Czechs and Germans had never united against the Poles; the Poles and Germans had always combined against the Czechs. He had previously pointed out that the mines in Teschen only exported 25 wagon loads of coke to Poland. Bohemia, on the other hand, had to import coal from Upper Silesia, which was to become Polish. Upper Silesia contained quantities of coke producing coal. Mr Dmowski had pointed out that Bohemia would always depend on Upper Silesia, that is to say, on Poland, for coal. This is too true, and Czechoslovakia only asked for what was strictly necessary, in order not to be at the mercy of every eventuality. M. Dmowski had made use of the percentage of coal Poland and Czechoslovakia would obtain from Teschen should it be divided between them, but had made no mention of the immense resources in Poland. But Czechoslovakia required 30 million tons a year and only produced 26 million tons. Moreover, the Treaty forced Czechoslovakia to supply Austria with coal. This would leave the industries of the country entirely dependent on Poland.

As to the railways, it is true that there were communications between Bohemia and Czechoslovakia, but Mr Dmowski had omitted to state that the railway from Oderberg to Kaschau was the only line going through Slovakia from west to east. The hills in Slovakia went from north to south and-no other railway could be built across the country. The Teschen question for Czechoslovakia was analogous to the question of Alsace-Lorraine for France. The culture of the country was Czech. This was evidenced by the habits of the people, their dress and the architecture of their houses. All these resembled what prevailed in Moravia. A large part of the admittedly Polish population of Teschen had declared in favour of union with Czechoslovakia; in case of a plebiscite, this population would vote in the same sense.

Mr Paderewski says that he was almost ashamed to join Mr Dmowski against Dr Benes. Dr Benes however was a champion who would, he felt sure, be equal to both of them. In any case, he did not mean to be aggressive. No one more than himself desired good relations with Czechoslovakia. It was the destiny of the two countries to live in peace and it was also their duty. They owed it to the Allied and Associated Powers who had given them independence, to humanity and to their own exhausted peoples. Discord would not prevail between Poland and Czechoslovakia if Dr Benes and he could make mutual concessions. The Teschen area interested Czechoslovakia because of its coal. It interested Poland because of its population. The arguments on one side were economic and on the other side national. Dr Benes, taking as his model the judgment of Solomon, suggested cutting the country in two. Poland protested. It might be inferred on which side was real maternity. In any case, the child had reached the age of discretion and was able to say to which country it belonged. There were, in addition, impartial observers, among whom he quoted the work of two Bohemian savants. It was true that there were some villages in Teschen with a Czech majority. Mr Dmowski had told the Council that Poland did not claim them. As the Polish Delegation had good reason to know, States were better off without alien minorities. Dr Benes’ remarks about coal might lead the Council to suppose that his country was in dire peril. Was coal so important a matter as to justify the subjugation of an unwilling population and the estrangement of a country nearly four times as big as Czechoslovakia? On the same lines, what should Italy do, seeing that she had neither coal, oil nor forests? In reality, was Czechoslovakia so poor in coal? Out of a production of 26¼ million tons of lignite throughout the former monarchy, 83 per cent had been produced in Bohemia and 86 per cent of Austrian and Hungarian coal came from Bohemia. These figures proved Bohemia to be one of the richest coal-producing countries in the world, after Great Britain, America, and Germany. These figures were derived from an authority who would not be denied by Dr Benes; they were derived from the work of President Masaryk. Dr Benes had stated that Czechoslovakia needed 30 million tons of coal and had only 26 million. If President Masaryk’s figures were not accepted, he would refer to statistics. In 1913, 34 million tons of brown and black coal (23 million brown and 11 million black), had been produced in Bohemia; divided among 13 million inhabitants, this represented two thousand kilos, per head of brown and 900 kilos, per head of black coal. Poland, in the same year, had produced 11,814,000 tons of black coal and 952,000 tons of coke for a population now amounting to 29 millions. This represented not even 400 kilos, per head. In view of the tragic situation in Upper Silesia, the Council could judge whether Poland could lightly abandon the coal of Teschen. If Upper Silesia became Polish, the situation would be different and Poland would make every concession in order to supply Czechoslovakia with the coal she required. This matter could be settled between the experts of the two countries. As to the railways, Mr Dmowski had pointed out that all Czechoslovakia need do to perfect her communications was to build two lines measuring 8 and 12 kilometres. Poland wished to be a good neighbor to Czechoslovakia and was ready to bear half the cost of construction. Before concluding, he would like to quote an incident of his last journey to Poland. At the first frontier station in Teschen in an open field were gathered some 3,000 persons, mostly workmen, women and children. It was raining hard but he was received with songs, music and speeches. Several speeches were made. The one which struck him most was made by a workman, who said that the quarrel between the Poles and Czechs should be put an end to as soon as possible. The Czechs and Poles were both Slavs and cousins. The Czechs ought to have all the coal that could be spared, but no Polish land should be given to them and no Czech land to the Poles. The speaker might now be dead, as the place he lived in had been much oppressed by the Germans, who were shooting the Poles like rabbits. The moral of his speech had been understood in Warsaw. He hoped that it might be understood in Prague.

Dr Benes says that Czechoslovakia was not only interested in Teschen for its coal. The country is connected with the rest of Czechoslovakia by history, culture and administrative bonds. Mere figures cannot determine the question. The future needs of Czechoslovakia must be taken into consideration. The statistics quoted by Mr Paderewski were not conclusive. Production had been far more intensive in Bohemia than in Poland. On the other hand, the possibilities of production in Poland were infinitely greater than in Czechoslovakia. He had been himself as conciliatory as possible, but it must be remembered that he was not alone and that the peoples in both countries were passionate and excitable. It was better that each should be self-sufficient, as if either depended for vital necessities upon the other, there would be no solid peace. In other cases the Conference had sacrificed small minorities in order to establish lasting arrangements. This was a case in which this method should be put in practice, as had been done in the case of Ratibor against Czechoslovakia. Perfection could not be attained. If Poland and Czechoslovakia were independent of one another in respect of their vital needs, agreement between them would be easy. In any case, whatever the decision of the Conference, he would faithfully observe it and, in so doing, continue the policy he had consistently followed from the start, that of seeking friendship with Poland.


4. The letter is approved and signed by M Clemenceau.

The note to the Roumanian Government was signed by all the delegates.


5. The draft of Article 48 for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria is accepted, subject to the approval of Mr Polk to be communicated later in the day to the Secretariat-General.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

6th September 1919

After 62 days, a U.S. Army motor convoy completes a transcontinental voyage across the U.S., revealing the poor state of infrastructure in many parts of the country. Lieutenant Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower is a member of the convoy.


Canada: George-Étienne Cartier Monument unveiled.