100 Years Ago Today

[Jimbuna]

10th July 1919

French flying ace Jean Navarre, credited with 12 aerial victories and nicknamed the “Sentinel of Verdun,” dies while preparing for a stunt where he would have flown through the Arc de Triomphe.


Anti-Bolshevik Russian General Sidorin addressing his troops in the city of Balashov.


A celebration of the first East to West Crossing of the Atlantic by air. 2019 marks the centenary of this event which saw the Airship R.34 leave East Fortune Airfield on 2 July 1919 and land in Mineola, Long Island, USA four days later. It also marks the first return flight across the Atlantic. R.34 took off again on 10 July 1919 arriving in Pulham, England, 75 hours later.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, July 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


1. M Clemenceau says that he has a question to submit to his colleagues. In the Council of Four there had been a question, before President Wilson left, about the secrecy of the minutes of proceedings in the Council. President Wilson had taken the view that these Minutes could not be communicated. Mr Lloyd George had not adopted a very firm attitude on the subject. He, (M Clemenceau) had said that he would not be able to refuse them to a Parliamentary Committee. At the present moment the Parliamentary Committee was asking for the Proces-Verbaux of the Commission on the League of Nations. These Proces-Verbaux had been printed and kept secret. He thinks there can be no objection to showing these documents to the Parliamentary Committee but this raises a question of the communication of other similar records. He would like to know from his Colleagues whether they would agree to the communication of records of discussions other than those of the Council of Four.

Mr Lansing says that personally he has no objection whatever but he does not know what the feelings of the President might be. He would like to have the opportunity of finding out.

M Clemenceau asks whether he might give his Parliamentary Committee the Minutes of the League of Nations.

Mr Lansing says that he does not feel sure.

M Mantoux then gives an account of the conversation on this subject which had taken place in the Council of Four on the 28th of June, at the Senate at Versailles.

Mr Balfour says that he cannot believe that any harm would result from the communication of the record in question to a Committee of the French Chamber. This, however, might create a precedent which might be inconvenient. For instance, he questions whether it would be desirable to communicate the records of the present Council.

M Clemenceau says that that is not in question. The present Council is the successor of the Council of Four and these Minutes must remain secret. He refers for the present to the proceedings of commissions.

Mr Balfour asks whether he proposes to communicate the proceedings of the Council of Ten.

M Clemenceau replies in the negative.

Mr Lansing says that even in respect to the deliberations of Committees embarrassing questions arise. For instance, concerning responsibilities there had been very frank discussions. It might be imprudent to communicate all that is consigned in the Minutes on that matter. President Wilson had been chairman of the Commission on the League of Nations and before the Minutes were communicated he ought to be consulted.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Lansing if he would consult President Wilson regarding the request he had made about the Minutes of the Commission on the League of Nations.

Mr Lansing agrees to do so.


(At this point M. Loucheur enters the room.)

2. M Loucheur says that he wishes to submit a proposal regarding the Inter-Allied Commission to negotiate with Germany on the subject of the Rhineland agreement, slightly different from that put forward on the previous day by the British Delegation. He proposes the following:

Draft Resolution Relating to Negotiations With Germany on the Subject of the Rhineland Agreement

“An Inter-Allied Commission should be appointed to discuss with the Germans the details of the Convention in accordance with the terms of the letter addressed on the 27th June by M Clemenceau to the German Delegation at Versailles. The Commission shall be composed of one representative for Great Britain, for France, for the United States, and for Belgium. In case of need this Commission shall consult on military matters the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies”.

(The above proposal is accepted.)

M Loucheur further points out that the British Member, Mr Wise, had been nominated. He would be glad to know the names of the other Commissioners.

M Clemenceau nominates M Loucheur for France.

Mr Lansing says that he will notify the Secretariat later.

M Loucheur asks that Belgium be approached through the Secretariat General.

(This is agreed to.)

(M Loucheur withdraws.)


3. M Clemenceau says that according to news he has received the Poles have made an advance in Lithuania in defiance of the orders of the Conference. He thinks that Marshal Foch should be requested on behalf of the Council to order the Poles to withdraw.

(It is agreed that the dispatch received by M Clemenceau should be sent to Marshal Foch in order that the latter can take suitable action.)


4. S Crespi says that on the previous day he had submitted three notes, one addressed to Bela Kun, another to various Governments, and a third to the Press. Mr Lansing had objected to the first, and the other two had been sent back to the Financial Commission for re-drafting. He now submits two re-drafts.

(After some discussion, the following drafts are adopted:

1) According to information received, Bela Kun has ordered all Banks established in Hungarian territory to hold at his disposal all Joint Note kinds of securities deposited with them. It appears that steps are already being taken to enforce this order.

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers hereby declare that this action is nothing less than robbery. They consider all these measures of confiscation as null and void.

The Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers desire to draw the attention of the of Government of . . . . . . . . to the danger which may be incurred to all countries by the constitution of a fund created for the purpose of a destructive propaganda in foreign countries.

It appears to them that common action is required to defeat this policy and to protect depositors threatened with spoliation.

They therefore propose to the Government of . . . . . . to forbid or at all events to supervise the importation and negotiation of all securities coming from Hungary. It would also be useful to establish a control over all Hungarian securities.

Communication to the Press

2) According to information received, Bela Kun has ordered all Banks established in Hungarian territory to hold at his disposal all kinds of securities deposited with them. It appears that steps are already being taken to enforce this order.

The Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers consider this to be nothing less than robbery. They consider all these measures of confiscation as null and void.

They call the attention of the Governments of all the Associated and Allied and Neutral Powers and also the Governments of the German Empire and Austria to the danger which may arise for all countries from the constitution of funds for the purpose of supporting propaganda in foreign countries. They request that all those Governments will take the necessary steps to prevent the realization or sale within their territories of the securities stolen by Bela Kun.)

Mr Lansing asks in relation to these proposals, whether the censorship on Hungarian Mails is to be maintained.

M Clemenceau observes that as a state of war still exists with Hungary censorship will automatically remain in force.

S Crespi says that he has just received from Austria a complaint that 15,000,000 kroner had been introduced into the country and that these were probably the product of sales of securities in Hungary.


5. (It is decided that all Commissions dealing with matters necessary for the Treaty with Bulgaria be asked to report not later than July 25th. It is further decided that the Bulgarian Government be asked to send a deputation to Paris on that date.)


(At this stage General Naulin, General Summerall, General Thwaites (representing General Watts) General Cavallero (representing General di Robilant) enter the room.)

6. M Clemenceau, addressing the Generals, says that they are being sent to Fiume to inquire into the events that had taken place there. They are requested to proceed to Fiume as quickly as possible and to devote all their efforts to discovering the truth about the incidents. Their inquiry was of the greatest importance to the maintenance of good relations among the Allies. The Italian member of the Commission, General di Robilant will join it on its way and the British Representative, General Watts, will follow very shortly. The Commission should report to the Council and apply for assistance should it find any difficulty in carrying out its task.

Mr Lansing asks whether the instructions drafted on the 8th had been given to the Generals.

(It is agreed that these instructions should be given in writing to each member of the Commission.)

(The Generals then withdraw.)


(General Sykes, General Groves, Mr Hurst, General Duval, General Cavallero, and Rear Admiral Knapp enter the room.)

7. Mr Lansing says that the American Representatives have no authority to negotiate an agreement.

Mr Balfour suggests that Mr Hurst be heard on the legal aspect of the question.

Mr Hurst says that Article 319 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany foreshadows an early acceptance of the air convention. He has been informed of the difficulty experienced by the American Delegation in agreeing to the convention. He points out that similar difficulties had arisen at the Hague in 1907, and the solution adopted then was to leave the question of signature open for eleven months. It will be easy in this instance to permit the postponement of signature until June 1920. This will give time for full discussion and will entail no alteration in the draft. It will also permit the fulfillment of what is provided for in the treaty with Germany.

Mr Lansing says that he had made a similar proposal on the previous day but since then he has learned that the American experts had made certain reservations. On reference to America, should Congress uphold these reservations it would be impossible to get the American signature to the Convention in its present form. There has not yet been an opportunity to discuss the economic side of the Convention with the heads of American industry. There are questions of customs and patents which need to be examined. America might therefore be deprived of the possibility of adhering to a very important Convention. For this reason he does not think the method proposed by Mr Hurst a suitable one.

Mr Balfour says that he understands it would be in accordance with international practice to make reservations at the time of signature. The Convention in its present form had been largely assented to and it would be a great misfortune if nothing were done to carry out the arrangements foreshadowed in the Treaty. He thinks, therefore, it might be possible to adopt the plan proposed by Mr Hurst, providing that the deferred signatures might be accompanied by reservations to the substance. This cannot be done in a Treaty of Peace but might be done in a Treaty of this kind. He hopes that this method might reconcile the two views.

Mr Lansing says that the document before him appears to be a report. He is prepared to accept the report with the reservations expressed by the American expert. What is being discussed are the proposed rules. These he cannot accept.

Mr Balfour remarks that if any change were made in the Convention he could not guarantee that the numerous Powers concerned in drawing it up would adhere to it in its new shape. The consent of each must be given on its own initiative.

Mr Lansing says that he is not himself endowed with full powers to sign such a Convention. He asks Mr Balfour if he is.

Mr Balfour says that he believes that he is possessed of such powers.

Mr Hurst suggests that the Drafting Committee be asked to prepare the Convention for signature. The question of full powers is one for each Government to determine. The treaty with Germany seems to suppose that the Convention would be signed in a short time. The formula he had suggested would enable full powers to be issued and further consideration to be taken by any Government concerned.

General Duval points out that the project had been completely drafted with the exception of the preamble.

Mr Lansing quotes Article 18 of the Convention as one of those to which he objects.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Lansing how long he thinks it would take him to obtain the agreement of his Government should it be willing to accept the Convention.

Mr Lansing replies that he thinks this might be done in three weeks.

General Duval says he thinks this delay would be regrettable. At the present time aircraft are confined within frontiers and it would be very discouraging to the industry to find the Convention had been postponed. The whole incentive to establishing long-distance commercial air navigation might disappear and each State might establish preferential rules in favour of its own nationals.

Mr Lansing observes that the reservations made by the American Experts require discussion. He is prepared to discuss them on the following day. If agreement could be reached the process would be hastened. He does not like the disposition shown to press the American Delegation to accept what it does not approve.

Mr Balfour says he sympathizes with Mr Lansing’s view but he would ask him in return to sympathize with the British and French view. In the United States it is possible to fly thousands of miles within one national territory. In Europe it is difficult to fly 500 miles without crossing a frontier. If commercial flying is to be of any value it is vital that frontiers should be crossed without difficulty. He would therefore ask Mr Lansing to help in this matter in order that European material interests should not suffer.

Mr Lansing says he understands the principal reason alleged for speedy signature is that the industry interested in flying should know exactly how it stands and so avoid loss on its enterprises. In this connection he asks whether the reservations made by the United States directly affect the question.

General Duval says he thinks they do not.

Mr Lansing suggests that while the United States Government is considering the Convention, European industry might be told that their Governments mean to sign the Convention.

M Clemenceau suggests that the delay of three weeks proposed by Mr Lansing be accepted.

Mr Balfour says that though this represents a loss of three weeks of summer weather he will consent if this is likely to lead to an agreement.

(It is agreed that the subject be brought up again in three weeks.)

Mr Balfour says that the House of Commons is anxious to see this Convention. He would like to know whether his Colleagues have any objection to the Convention being shown.

(It is agreed that the proposed Convention might be published.)


8. S Crespi says that he has looked through the document handed to him by M Clemenceau. This document declares that trains carrying military material for Czechoslovakia, Serbia, Romania, Poland and the French Army in the East had been held up. It concludes, however, by stating that supplies for the French troops had passed unhampered. He wishes to draw attention to this admission. The note makes no mention of consignments of food. Presumably therefore food had been allowed to proceed. Difficulties, however, had arisen by reason of the state of things on the Eastern Frontier of Italy. There was considerable tension of feeling among the Yugoslavs and conflicts of patrols have been frequent. He had received news on the previous day of a fight between a Yugoslav patrol on the one hand and a patrol on the other composed of four Italians and one Frenchman which had resulted in the death of two Yugoslavs. The Italian Military authorities had discovered on a train declared to be a food train a wagon full of machine guns. Lately a whole train composed of 32 trucks had gone to Serbia carrying heavy bombing aeroplanes. Three trains of this character had been observed proceeding to Serbia. These were French trains and there were French soldiers on them.

Mr Lansing asks whether there is anything improper in the dispatch of arms from one Ally to another. As far as he is concerned he is prepared to sell arms to the Serbians as Allies.

S Crespi said that 14 tanks had also been dispatched in the same direction. The Italian Military Authorities think that the Serbs were mobilizing against Italy. He therefore proposes that the Inter-Allied Military Representatives at Versailles should lay down some limit to the armaments sent in that direction. He would like to know why it is necessary for Serbia to receive so much equipment. He therefore proposes that some supervision should be exercised by Marshal Foch and by the Military Advisers at Versailles.

Mr Lansing asks whether S Crespi proposes that the inquiry should extend to mobilization on both sides of the Italian frontier.

S Crespi replies that it is necessary for Italy to take precautions.

Mr Lansing observes that the Serbs perhaps also thought alike.

S Crespi says that he can prove that Italy is demobilizing. Moreover she has demobilized two classes more than France. He has with him the decree ordering demobilization.

Mr Lansing asks how many Italian troops there are in Istria.

General Cavallero says that on the armistice frontier from the Tyrol to Istria there were from 700 to 800 thousand men. He does not know how many of these are concentrated in Istria. There might be 100 thousand. There are in addition perhaps half a million men in the interior. Italy has demobilized two and a half million men.

M Clemenceau asked S Crespi to furnish him with a reply in writing. He had been much struck by the assertion in S Crespi’s remarks of a right to impede the passage of arms from one Ally to another.

(S Crespi agrees to furnish the written reply on the following day.)


9. Mr Balfour says that he has no time to consider this reply.

Mr Lansing suggests that the Drafting Committee be asked to draft a reply in case the Council should decide to decide to ask one.

(It is agreed that the Drafting Committee should be asked to put up a for consideration on the following day.)


10. M Tardieu gives an explanation of the report of the Commission. He points out that the American proposal involves reopening the question of the frontiers between Austria and Czechoslovakia. As there had been no agreement in the Commission, he begs leave to make a personal suggestion. He thinks that Czechoslovakia can do without most of what had been conceded at Gmünd, and the bulk of the territory attributed to her at Feldsberg. Thus with a very slight alteration the historic frontier of Bohemia would be maintained. The very slight addition to this frontier, which he suggests, would be sufficient to safeguard the economic situation. In compensation for this, Czechoslovakia might be given the bridgehead of Pressburg. All needful precautions might be taken against the militarization of the ground on the right bank of the Danube. In any case this strip is so shallow as to be militarily indefensible.

Mr Balfour thinks that on the face of it there is much to recommend.

M Tardieu adds that the political effect in Czechoslovakia of altering the frontier announced on June 2nd, without any ostensible reason save counter-proposals from Austria, must be taken into consideration. It might encourage undesirable tendencies in the country.

Mr Lansing says that this would appear to be an argument against any change. If so, it would apply to Pressburg as well.

M Tardieu says that it was for this reason he proposes to neutralize the effect of altering the frontier between Austria and Czechoslovakia by offering the latter Pressburg as a compensation.

Mr Lansing suggests that M Tardieu should formulate his proposal and illustrate it by a line on the map on the following day in order that time should be given to consider the new proposal.

(This is agreed to.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

11th July 1919

President Wilson personally delivers the Treaty of Versailles to the U.S. Senate and urges the senators to approve it and join the League of Nations: “We cannot turn back. The light streams on the path ahead, and nowhere else.”

Secretary of War Newton Baker addresses Army officials and members of the Lincoln Highway Association at the "zero mile stone" marking the start from Washington, D.C., of the 60 car Army motor train with 300 men for the Pacific coast via the Lincoln highway, 11 July 1919.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, July 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


1. M Pichon takes the Chair and explains that M Clemenceau is detained in the Peace Commission of the Chamber of Deputies. He sends his apologies and will come later.

(At this stage M Tardieu, General Le Rond, M Laroche, Mr Leeper, M Stranieri, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Hudson enter the room.)

M Tardieu says that he had been asked on the previous day to mark on a map the compromise he had suggested. This compromise gives back to the Austrians half of the ground given to the Czechoslovaks in the neighborhood of Gmünd, only leaving the junction of the railways within Czechoslovakia. In the region of Feldsberg two-thirds of the territory was returned to Austria, only the railway and river remaining in Czechoslovakia. In compensation to Czechoslovakia for this reduction of territory, he proposes to attribute to her the Bridgehead at Pressburg and the railway junction. He would add that in the area round Feldsberg left to Czechoslovakia there are a number of Czechs, which was not the case in the rest of the territories mentioned.

S Crespi says that the Italian Delegation has made reservations particularly in respect to the Bridgehead. He can see no reason for bringing Czechoslovakia across the Danube. There are no military reasons and he thinks it would be a cause of perpetual dissension between the two States. The possession of an isolated bridgehead had an offensive appearance both against Austria and against Hungary. Politically therefore there was little to recommend the transaction. The Italian Delegation would prefer to satisfy the Czechs in any other region than this.

Mr Lansing asks what S Crespi thinks of the other changes suggested by M Tardieu.

S Crespi says that the Italian Delegation thinks that it would be best to leave the frontier as previously decided, and also that no change should be made at Pressburg.

Mr Balfour says that he understands S Crespi’s feeling about the possession of the Bridgehead. Against this, he would set the consideration that nowhere else had a town been cut in two by a national frontier. There is an integral part of the town on the right bank of the Danube. If the river is taken as a boundary, an economic and social unit would be arbitrarily divided - moreover from the main town, the railway station, the electric works and the public gardens would be cut off, and a customs barrier would be established on the bridge connecting the two parts of the city.
S Crespi says that he was told that the portion on the right bank of the river was not an integral part of the city but a suburb.

Mr Lansing says that the United States has considerable experience of divided cities on the Mexican border. This kind of arrangement causes the greatest possible friction. He thinks it is a mistake to make a river divide in two a Town, both parts of which had grown up together under one Municipal authority, and had never been separate. If, therefore, changes are to be made in other parts of the frontier, he would be disposed to allow the whole of Pressburg on both sides of the river to go to Czechoslovakia. Compensation could be given to the German population by frontier rectification elsewhere.

M Pichon asks whether he is right in believing that Mr Balfour and Mr Lansing accepted M Tardieu’s proposal which S Crespi rejected.

Mr Lansing says that he is not quite in agreement on all points. M Tardieu wishes to give the railway junction near Gmünd to Czechoslovakia. He does not think this necessary.

M Tardieu says that this Junction exclusively serves Czechoslovak interests. His proposal withdraws one line entirely from the boundaries of Czechoslovakia. He considers, therefore, the retention of this Junction as economically essential.

Mr Lansing says that he is informed that 99 per cent of the population in the Gmünd area is German. He therefore proposes that the historic line should be reverted to.

M Tardieu says he understands that on the previous day a compromise was to be sought. His instructions were that if a compromise could not be reached, the frontier announced on June 2nd was to be adhered to. He would add that according to the Czechs, a good deal of the population was Czech though he did not make himself personally responsible for this statement. Undoubtedly the majority was of German speech, whether or not of Czech origin. Further, the Czechoslovak Government had somehow learnt that an alteration of frontier was contemplated and Mr Kramarcz had already made a protest. It must be remembered that there was a new Government at Prague inclined to seek a balance between the Allied and Associated Powers and German influence. If the compromise he suggested was accepted, the Czechs would no doubt complain.

Mr Lansing says that he would like to give Pressburg to the Czechs but not without full compensation, namely, the return of the German speaking inhabitants around Gmünd. As to the Feldsberg area, with the exception of four villages, containing he was told, 4,000 Germans and only 260 Czechs, which might without disadvantage be restored to Austria, he is content with M Tardieu’s proposal. In the Gmünd region he would like to return to the historic frontier. He dislikes the salient created by the proposal.

Mr Balfour says that M Tardieu’s compromise is like all compromises, open to criticism. Nevertheless, he accepts and supports it as the best way out of a difficult situation. In effect the Council is taking from the Czechs something already officially given to them. The problem is therefore not quite an open one. It involves undoing something already done. He thinks that if the portion of Pressburg on the right side of the Danube be given to the Czechs while the bulk of the German speaking people near Feldsberg and near Gmünd are restored to Austria, neither side ought to complain.

Mr Lansing says that he would prefer to avoid the use of the word “bridgehead”. He would prefer to say that a suburb of Pressburg was restored to the city. The line proposed in Feldsberg with the exception of the four villages in the South East of the district, to which he had referred, he would accept. In order to obtain agreement he would also accept the line proposed in the region of Gmünd.

M Tardieu says that he would like to add two remarks. The Committee thinks that the course of the Morava and Thaia which now became a frontier line should be internationalized. The second remark is that the railway going south from Pressburg which was attributed to Hungary should have a servitude imposed on it ensuring free circulation for the Czechoslovak State. He would suggest that in the Treaty with Austria an addition be made to Article 313 to the following effect:

After the first railway mentioned, the second should be:

“from Bratislava (Presbourg) towards Fiume via Hegyeshalom–Csorna–Hegyfalu–Zapabér–Zala Szent Ivan–Mura Keresztur and the branch line from Hegyfalu–Szembathely and from Mura Keresztur to Pragerhof.”

The second as at present mentioned should become the third.

Similar provision should be made in the Treaty with Hungary regarding the railway which is to be within the Hungarian boundary.

(It is decided to accept for the Austrian frontier the compromise proposed by M Tardieu, subject to a slight modification proposed by Mr Lansing.

The Slices of territory attributed to Czechoslovakia in excess of the former administrative frontier should be reduced in the regions of Gmünd and Feldsberg to a minimum by way of compensation for the suburb of Presbourg situated on the right bank of the Danube.

M Tardieu’s Commission is asked to define the new frontier line and to forward it to the Drafting Committee.

It is further decided that the course of the Morava and of the Thaia insofar as they became frontier lines should be internationalized.

It is also decided to modify Article 313 of the Treaty with Austria by the addition; after the first railway mentioned of a second

“from Bratislava (Presbourg) towards Fiume via Hegyeshalom–Csorna–Hegyf alu–Zapabér–Zala Szent Ivan-Mura Keresztur and the branch line from Hegyfalu–Szembathely and from Mura Keresztur to Pragerhof.”

The second Railway at present mentioned should become the third. And to insert a similar provision to Article 313 in the treaty with Hungary.)


2. (After a short discussion, the recommendation of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways made at its Meeting of July 9th, is accepted, and it is decided that the following insertion be made in Article 33 of Part 12, as paragraph 2 of that Article:

“The establishment of an the Frontier Stations between Austria and the contiguous Allied and Associated States, as well as the working of the lines between those stations, shall be settled by agreements similarly concluded.”)


3. With reference to a letter from the German Delegation of June 25th, it is for consideration whether an answer should be sent.

Mr Balfour expresses the opinion that it is undesirable to send any answer. His colleagues concurred in this opinion, and it is decided that no answer should be sent.


4. S Crespi begs that this question be adjourned.

Mr Lansing agrees, as he wishes to have the differences between this Treaty and that with Poland Associated examined.

S Crespi says that on the 17th of June Baron Sonnino had suggested certain additional clauses of general application. This had been referred by the late Council of Four to the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Council of Foreign Ministers has now ceased to exist. He presumes that the question might be referred to whatever body now represented the Council of Foreign Ministers. The decision to refer the question to the Council of Foreign Ministers had been taken because the Commission on New States thought the proposals were outside their competence. He explains that the proposals are to the effect that the political clauses inserted in the Treaty with Austria should be generalized in such a way as to apply to all the New States formed out of the former Dual Monarchy.

(After some discussion, it is decided to refer to the Committee on Political Clauses in Europe Baron Sonnino’s proposal tending to apply the political clauses of the Treaty with Austria to all the States formed from the territories of the late Dual Monarchy.)

(At this point the Experts withdraw.)


(M Clemenceau enters the room and the members of the Drafting Committee are summoned.)

5. Mr Hurst reads the following:

“On he Ratification by Germany of the Treaty of Peace - Note for the Supreme Council

Article 6 of the law, dated February 10th, 1919, of the German Empire, relating to the provisional exercise of the Imperial Power, provides that:

“The affairs of the Empire are conducted by an Imperial President. The Imperial President will represent the Empire in international matters, will conclude in the name of the Empire Treaties with foreign Powers, and will accredit and receive ambassadors.

Declaration of war and Treaties of Peace are made in conformity with the law of the Empire.

The instrument of ratification signed by President Ebert, and countersigned by Bauer, President of the Council of Ministers, mention being made of the approval of the “legislative bodies”, appears to fulfill the above stipulation.

It may be deemed that Article 4 of the same law, dealing with the preparation of the future constitution of the Empire, lays down that the territory of the German States cannot be altered without the consent of those States, but this provision appears only to restrict the powers of the National Assembly on this subject.

In these circumstances, the instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Peace of June 28th, 1919, forwarded by the Government of the German Empire, is not in the opinion of the Drafting Committee open to objection, but may be regarded as complete, and in due form, from the international point of view.”

M Clemenceau says that it followed from this opinion of the Drafting Committee that the blockade on Germany must be raised from the 12th of July, in accordance with a letter received by him from the Inter-Allied Blockade Committee.

(It is decided to accept the interpretation given by the Drafting Committee, and to terminate the blockade on Germany from the 12th July, 1919.)


6. Mr Balfour says that in connection with this subject he wishes to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that a blockade on Russia had been conducted under the guise of a blockade on Germany. The latter being now removed, it is for consideration whether any form of blockade can be continued with the object of preventing the passage of supplies and arms to the Russian Soviet Government. This Government has not been recognised and the Allies are not at war with it. It does not seem possible, therefore, to legally declare a blockade on it. Nevertheless, it is obviously a serious matter to allow Sweden and other countries to furnish Soviet Russia with the means of fighting our friends. He suggests this matter be considered and discussed at a very early date.

(It is decided to put on the Agenda for the following meeting the question of the consequences of the termination of the Blockade on Germany on the unofficial blockade of Russia.)


(At this stage Mr Misu, Mr Vaida-Voevod and Mr Plessia of the Romanian Delegation; M Patchitch and M Vesnitch of the Serbian Delegation; and Mr Kramarcz and Dr Benes of the Czechoslovak Delegation; Marshal Foch, General Weygand, the Versailles Military Representatives and General Thwaites enter the room.)

7. M Pichon gives the delegates a short account of what had taken place in Council at previous meetings on this subject. He also reads to them the report made by the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles regarding the military measures to be taken to enforce respect for the armistice on Hungary.

M Clemenceau asks Marshal Foch to say what he thinks of the projected operation.

Marshal Foch says that the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles contains no projected operation. It merely states what forces are available for action. He understands the purpose is to make Hungary respect the conditions of the armistice. In the meantime Hungarian forces have increased from six to nine divisions, and the success obtained over the Czechs had improved the morale of these forces. If Hungary is to respect the armistice, she must be forced to reduce these troops to six divisions, and also to withdraw from certain territories. 84,000 men are said to be available for use to effect this. This number is small for the purpose. The main contributor to this number was Romania. Not only is the total not great, but there is no cohesion between the various elements contributing to it. The Romanian Army is under Romanian Command, the Serbian army is under Serbian Command, the Czech Army is under a French General, and the French troops under French Command. A single Command is obviously the first requisite for a successful campaign. Moreover, the probable length of the operations must be taken into account. It seems unlikely that the desired end can be obtained by one rapid stroke. If this were the case the troops above mentioned would require reinforcement. Obviously assistance must be looked for in this from the neighboring states. Before making a plan it must be known what these States would do, how much they would contribute, and whether they would agree to act under one Command. The desired results were first to defeat the Hungarian army, and second to occupy Budapest. The first alone is difficult with the forces locally available. The second is still more difficult, as Budapest is the central fortress of the Hungarian plain. It is a considerable city, and if taken will require a large occupying force. Before embarking on the adventure there must first be a political understanding between the States taking part in it. Secondly a military understanding. Thirdly, a plan of operations.

M Clemenceau asks Marshal Foch whether he requires more troops than are currently at his disposal. If so, would he name a figure?

Marshal Foch says he will have to study the question. The whole operation is conditioned first by the terms of the agreement that might be made between the states concerned, and secondly by the probable length of the operations.

M Clemenceau asks the Romanian representatives to state the view of their Government.

Mr Misu said that the Romanian Government will certainly take into consideration the desires of the Conference. Romania is greatly interested in the condition of Hungary by reason of its neighborhood. Romania is already bearing a heavy burden and maintaining seven divisions in Hungary. Two army corps are forming in Transylvania and are not yet ready. Four divisions are maintained on the Russian front, and two more are being mobilized with the help of equipment supplied by the Allies. He agrees with Marshal Foch that the first requisite was an understanding between the Governments concerned. On behalf of the Romanian Government he feels entitled to say that a very willing spirit will be shown.

M Clemenceau asks the Serbian representatives to express the views of their Government.

Mr Vesnitch says he entirely agrees with Marshal Foch that a single Command is necessary. With this proviso he thinks that the forces at present available, if assisted with arms and munitions, could achieve success without much difficulty. It should also be impressed on the Government at Budapest that the Allied and Associated Powers were absolutely at one, and seriously intend to have their will respected. This will produce a moral effect perhaps even greater than the military effect of the forces employed.

As to Serbia’s share, he has no instructions from the Serbian Government, but he thinks he can go so far as to say that Serbia will make her contribution and he is prepared to advise his Government to do so. He must point out that Serbia herself is threatened at certain points and he would ask that, during the campaign, Serbia be guaranteed by the Powers against threats from without. He mentions, for example, that the Bulgarians have not yet been disarmed.

M Clemenceau asks how many troops Serbia would contribute.

Mr Vesnitch replies that Serbia will contribute what the Military Representatives at Versailles had asked for, namely, one division.

M Pichon says that he hoped Serbia might contribute more.

Mr Vesnitch says that perhaps the Serbian Government might see its way to making a larger contribution, but he can make no undertaking on its behalf.

M Clemenceau asks how far he thinks the Serbian Government will go.

Mr Vesnitch replies that this depends on general circumstances.

M Clemenceau observes that an Army cannot be made of general circumstances.

Mr Vesnitch says that the Military Representatives at Versailles had considered one division necessary.

General Belin explains that the report made by the Military Representatives had merely stated what troops were believed to be available. The figure mentioned was not a desideratum but a statement of what was ready for immediate use. The report had also stated that the troops locally available will require reinforcements.

M Clemenceau says that it is evidently desirable to have exact figures. Once they are obtained, Marshal Foch can be asked if they are sufficient. Mr Vesnitch had said that Serbia would contribute a division, but, if so, must be protected against the Bulgarians. In other words, what he offers with one hand he withdraws with the other.

Mr Vesnitch says that he had declared Serbia’s readiness to help. Nevertheless, the precarious condition of the country must be taken into account. He is prepared to offer the whole of the Serbian Army on condition that, while it was away from home, the house should not be burgled. One division had been mentioned in the report of the Military Representatives; he had understood that they desired one division. He now understands from General Belin that more, if possible, would be acceptable. It is necessary, however, for the Serbian Military Authorities to judge what can be done under the circumstances. The first business of Serbia is to ensure her own existence. She is being asked to make an effort in the common cause and on her behalf he has expressed her readiness to do her best. Marshal Foch has said that action must be preceded by political agreement between the countries concerned, namely, Serbia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. He would like to observe that, as a Military action was required and that as, for success, it ought to be rapid, a great deal of valuable time would be lost in conducting negotiations at Belgrade, Budapest, and Prague. He thinks it would be best to place the available forces directly under Marshal Foch’s command.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Vesnitch if he could inform the Council of the present distribution of the Serbian Army.

Mr Vesnitch gives the following information:

1) The Morava division in the Banat.

2) The Drina division in Batchka and Slavonia.

3) The Danube division in Croatia and Slovenia.

4) The Choumadia division in Belgrade (one regiment) and on the Bulgarian frontier.

5) The Timok division in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Fiume.

6) The Yugo-Slav division in the Sandjak, on the Albanian frontier, in old Serbia and in Montenegro.

7) The Vardar Brigade in Macedonia.

M Clemenceau then asks the Czechoslovak representatives to state the case for their Government.

Mr Kramarcz said that the Hungarian situation is undoubtedly a threat to Czechoslovakia. His Government does not desire Hungary to have a larger Army than that allowed to her in the armistice, but the present moment is not propitious for action by Czechoslovakia against Hungary. When Czechoslovakia was attacked, the moment was more propitious. At that time, Czechoslovakia had mobilized 150,000 men, but munitions and equipment were lacking. The Conference had then imposed an armistice between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Hungarians had observed this armistice and had evacuated Czechoslovakian territory. What pretext, therefore, was there for the Czechs to attack the Hungarians? The proposal now is to demand the reduction of the Hungarian forces to the number stipulated, but so far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, the Hungarians have fulfilled the conditions of the armistice required of them. He agrees with Mr Vesnitch that a political agreement between the three States is not desirable. The question is one concerning the Entente. It relates to the armistice negotiated between Hungary and the Allied and Associated Powers. No doubt Czech troops, if employed, will do their duty, but before they could be employed the Government at Prague must be consulted.

M Clemenceau inquired what contribution from Czechoslovakia had been suggested in the Versailles report?

Mr Kramarcz replied 20,000 men. He does not conceal that Czechoslovakia had more men than this available, but he cannot say whether the Government at Prague would consent to act. As the Council knows, the Government had lately changed.

Marshal Foch says that he has just received a letter from General Pellé dated 8th July. He reads this letter to the Council. It follows from this letter that Hungary is determined to react against fate. It will seize its opportunity when the Allied nations have demobilized and disarmament has set in. He would like to explain that the preliminary understanding he had referred to was the kind of understanding that could be obtained in the Council. He does not suggest that the negotiations be carried on in Prague, Bucharest and Belgrade.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Balfour whether any British help could be expected.

Mr Balfour replies that he had repeated to the British War Cabinet the argument he had set forth to the Council. He thinks the Powers cannot submit to a continued breach of the armistice by Hungary. This affects central Europe and perhaps even the whole of Europe. Unless this is put to a stop, there is no hope of peace or of restoring the economic condition of central Europe. It is of the utmost importance to act quickly. He thinks an effort must be made and that all Allied countries must contribute. A decision on this subject is one of a very momentous character. Up to the present time he has received no answer from the British War Cabinet. He does not know whether General Thwaites has received any answer from the War Office.

General Thwaites says that he has received no answer.

S Crespi says that he had telegraphed to Rome in the same sense as Mr Balfour. He thinks all are agreed in regarding the question as one of European importance. He has so far received no answer. The question, however, is being considered. Italy is passing through a critical time. Demobilization has proceeded even further than he had stated on the previous day. (S Crespi handed M Clemenceau a paper on this subject.) Italy is threatened by her own Bolsheviks. A general strike is possible if Italy acts against the Bolsheviks, whether in Russia or elsewhere. He expects S Tittoni to be back in Paris on the following Sunday. He will then be able to make a statement on the subject.

M Clemenceau says that the result of the discussion does not appear to furnish Marshal Foch with a very coherent force.

Marshal Foch says that if the military resurrection of Hungary is to be prevented, action should be rapid. If all the Governments co-operate, he thought success could be achieved.

Dr Benes says that one precaution must be taken if a campaign against Hungary is started. When the Magyars had attacked Czechoslovakia it was found that there was considerable Austrian connivance with the Hungarians. It would be necessary to take all precautions that Austria did not hamper the military action undertaken by the Allies.

M Clemenceau says that, to sum up, there appear to be six Romanian divisions, two French, one Serbian and a doubtful quantity of Czechoslovaks.

Dr Benes says there are troops in Czechoslovakia, but a scarcity of equipment. He is therefore not prepared to state a figure.

M Clemenceau says that he would be glad to know what contribution Great Britain would make. Perhaps Mr Balfour would be able to state this on the following day.

Mr Balfour says that he hopes this might be so. There are no British troops at present on the spot.

M Clemenceau says the question is whether any could be sent.

Mr Balfour says that he does not know.

M Clemenceau asks Marshal Foch whether he can act on this information.

Marshal Foch replies that preparations could be made. After discovering what each could contribute and the dates on which the contributions could be made, he thinks that he would be able in a fortnight to elaborate the first outlines of a plan.

M Clemenceau suggests that Marshal Foch should give a sketch of the plan of operations in a week, in order that the matter should be kept before the Council’s attention.

Marshal Foch says that, if he were to do this, he must be authorized to treat with the Governments concerned and find out from them what they could undertake to supply and at what period they could fulfill their undertakings.

Mr Kramarcz says that he does not know whether his Government will contribute to the operations, but should it do so he must ask that action be taken at Vienna, in order that munitions and arms stored there be delivered to Czechoslovakia.

M Clemenceau replies that this point should be explained to Marshal Foch.

(It is agreed that Marshal Foch after consulting the authorities of the countries concerned, should formulate the plan of operations and report progress to the Council in a week’s time.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

12th July 1919

General Afrikan P. Bogaewsky, leader of the Don Republic, is made Honorary Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George by British officers in Novocherkassk.


Work is approved to transform the collier “Jupiter” into the first U.S. carrier, the USS Langley.


Lieutenant Frank Ragan King, USN (b. 1884) was killed during minesweeping operations in the North Sea while in command of the trawler USS RICHARD BULKELEY when it was sunk by a mine on 12 July 1919. The USS KING (DD-242) was named in his honour.


Ship Losses:

USS Richard Bulkeley (United States Navy) The minesweeper struck a mine and sank in the North Sea with the loss of seven of her 25 crew.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, July 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


(M Cambon enters the room.)

1. M Clemenceau says that the Council has before them a proposal of Mr Lansing to the effect that the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments should be given 10 days to arrive at an understanding between themselves on the Teschen question. He requests M Cambon to explain his point of view.

M Cambon says that the Teschen question has been much discussed. No particular solution has been accepted, for it was hoped that Mr Paderewski and Dr Benes would be able to come to an understanding. They had not been able to do so, with the result that conflict continues in the area in question. It is therefore necessary to arrive at some solution and he thinks that Mr Lansing’s proposal is a good one.

(After some discussion it is decided to accept Mr Lansing’s proposal and to grant a period of 10 days to the Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia to arrive at an agreement between themselves on the question of Teschen.)


2. M Clemenceau says that Mr Lansing had submitted a proposal to the effect that the Orava question should be referred to the Polish and Czechoslovak Committees, in order that they might correct the frontier previously adopted, in a manner which should conform to the ethnographical data on the subject. He therefore asked the experts to accept the ethnographical frontier and asked M. Cambon for his opinion.

M Cambon said that the Czechoslovak Committee had examined the question with care: the Committee in question had decided to grant Orava to Czechoslovakia as a compensation. At present the populations affected are stated to be dissatisfied and Mr Lansing had asked for a re-examination of the question.

Mr White says that two peasants had visited President Wilson on the 28th June and that they had spoken to him on behalf of 50,000 inhabitants of the region in question.

M Cambon thinks that the two Committees might meet and submit a new proposal.

Mr Balfour says that President Wilson desired strongly that the question should be examined afresh.

M Clemenceau says that the question should be referred to the Committees, which should be asked to make a new examination of the question, without being bound by any obligation to return to the ethnographical frontier line.

(It is therefore decided that the question of the frontier between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia should be referred to the Polish and Czechoslovak Committees for examination and report.)

(M Cambon withdraws.)


3. M Clemenceau says that the Council has to look into the effect upon the Russian Blockade of the termination of the Blockade of Germany.

Mr Balfour says that while he recognizes how urgent and important the question is, he finds that it raises points of such difficulty that he would be grateful if the Council would put off the discussion to its next meeting.

(Mr Balfour’s proposal is agreed to.)


4. M Clemenceau says that it is proposed that a Committee of Experts should examine the Italian demand for the cession of the Austro-Hungarian Concession in Tientsin to them.

Mr White says that he is obliged to remark that the Government of the United States has always been opposed to any new concessions at Tientsin being made by China.

S Crespi says that it is not a question of a new concession but simply of an extension of the existing Italian concession. The Note submitted by the Italian Delegation to the Council shows that the Italian concession only consists of 124 acres whilst those granted to other countries were more extensive.

M Pichon said that the question should be summarized as follows: There is an article in the German treaty by virtue of which German concessions are restored to China. Germany had ratified the Treaty. It is to be observed that none of the concessions in question had been given to the Allied and Associated Powers, but that they had been restored to China, on the simple condition that the latter country should open its ports to international Commerce. The clauses in question are contained in Articles Nos. 128 to 132. The Italian proposal is therefore no less than an abrogation of the principle accepted by the Conference.

Mr Matsui said that he entirely agrees with M Pichon. The return of the concessions to China is part of the Treaty with Germany. The same thing applies to Austria; and the Austrian Government had received a copy of the text of the Treaty. It is therefore equitable to return the Austro-Hungarian concessions to China.

Mr White said that in spite of his keen desire to satisfy the Italian claims, it seems impossible to him to grant to Italy what belongs to China.

S Crespi says that the Italian Government has long been asking for an improvement in their concession from China.

The concession in question is very limited and surrounded by marshy ground. It does not even contain any land suitable for setting up a hospital for the sick and wounded. The Conference is very cognizant of Chinese methods and the discussions had been so drawn out that the Italian Government had received no satisfactory reply. It had therefore been decided to put the question before the Conference, with a view to making the concession a question of reparation. The Italian concession is too small to allow of any economic development and he is of opinion that the Chinese Government would not oppose the enlargement of the concession in question.

M Clemenceau says that he proposes to nominate a Committee.

Mr White says that he opposes any Committee being nominated, since the question before it would be that of ceding Chinese property. He does not see any objection to the Italian Government raising the question directly with China; but if Austria-Hungary is deprived of the concession by virtue of the Treaty, it must inevitably be returned to China.

S Crespi proposes that the question should be referred to the Reparation Committee.

M Clemenceau states that he prefers that it should be examined by experts. He reminds Mr White that no decision will be taken unless he authorizes it, since every member has a right of veto. But it seems difficult and not very conciliatory to oppose the nomination of a Committee.

Mr White says that he agrees under the reservations which he had already made.

Mr Balfour remarks that the representative of the American Delegation would always be able to refuse to accept the decisions of the Committee in question.

Mr White states that he agrees to the nomination of a Committee, but that he would be opposed to its decisions. The United States had renounced all claims to any concession and was, moreover, opposed to concessions in principle. He cannot, therefore, recognize the necessity of nominating any Committee.

S Crespi says that he does not wish to press the discussion further, but that he begs Mr White to agree to the nomination of a Committee without thereby engaging himself in any way.

Mr White states that under these circumstances, he agrees.

Mr Balfour states that he agrees to the proposal but that he does not see what good will come of it in view of the American right of veto. The work of the Committee will be without effect, but if it could give any satisfaction to the Italian Delegation, he would not be opposed to the nomination of the Committee.

Mr White states that he thinks the question should be dealt with by direct negotiation and reads Article 3 of Section IV, Part III, of the Peace Treaty with Austria:

“Austria cedes to China all her rights over the buildings, wharves and pontoons, barracks, forts, arms and munitions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless telegraphy installations and other public property which belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and which are situated or may be in the Austro-Hungarian Concession at Tientsin or elsewhere in Chinese territory.”

S Crespi states that the Article in question has not yet been submitted to the Austrian delegation and that it is only a project.

(It is decided to nominate a special Committee to examine the Italian demand that a clause which should cede to Italy the Austrian concession in Tientsin should be introduced into the Peace Treaty with Austria.)

(The American Delegation accepts the proposal while making a reservation that it will not be bound by the findings of the Committee appointed.)


5. M Clemenceau states that he is obliged to submit to the Council a document which had been communicated officially by the Serbian delegation. It had been found in Klagenfurt in the Office of the Senior Officer of the District. The document seems to show that the Austrians had been informed of the movements of the Serbian army by the indiscretion of the Italian Authorities.

(It is decided to communicate the document to the various Delegations for their scrutiny.)


6. M Clemenceau produces a document addressed to him directly by Bela Kun.

M Mantoux then reads it aloud.

Mr Balfour states that it seems to him that the Council is in a very difficult position with regard to the document in question. It should be remembered that the Allied and Associated Powers had approached Hungary with a view to making that country withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia on the condition that an analogous order should be imposed upon Romania. Hungary had accepted and had withdrawn its troops. Romania had not obeyed the order. Mr Bratiano had said in a private conversation with him that it would be impossible for Romania to withdraw her troops before Hungary had disarmed. The argument was strong. Romania was threatened by Russian Bolshevism on its eastern frontier and by Hungarian Bolshevism on its western frontier. Up to the present time the country had managed to hold its own, owing to the fact that on the Hungarian side, it was protected by the line of the Theiss which could easily be defended. The Romanians stated that if they were to abandon this line and attempt to defend themselves further back, they would have no guarantee against an attack from Bela Kun which, if made, would make it difficult for Romania to defend herself. Although Mr Bratiano had not made a precise statement to that effect, he had given the impression that if Hungary had disarmed according to the conditions of the Armistice, Romania would carry out the wishes of the Allies and would retire to the line which had been laid down. Mr Bratiano had further explained that Hungary by withdrawing its forces from Czechoslovakia had not lessened the danger to Romania, which was on the contrary more than ever menaced by the Hungarian movement.

M Clemenceau says that he supposes that Bela Kun’s ready obedience to the orders he had received could be explained in this way.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks the Romanians would be justified in not withdrawing their army so long as the Hungarians were not prevented from re-enforcing theirs and from manufacturing munitions and war materials.

M Clemenceau proposes that Mr Balfour should prepare a reply.

S Crespi says that new facts have to be taken into consideration, which had occurred since the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops. Massacres and looting subversive of human rights had taken place. The Italian representative, who was President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission, had formally protested to the Government of Bela Kun and had been able to prevent certain executions.

Mr Balfour proposes that a reply should be given to the effect that no discussion can be undertaken with Bela Kun so long as he does not comply with the Armistice conditions.

M Pichon says that the Italian representative had evidently done everything within his power. He drew the attention of the Council to a telegram received by him.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks that Mr Balfour’s proposal is the best.

(It is therefore decided to send the following telegram in reply to the wireless telegraphic message sent by Bela Kun to M. Clemenceau:

“The Peace Conference cannot discuss any matter with you while you do not carry out the conditions of the Armistice.”)

6. [misnumbered] M Clemenceau asks whether S Crespi has the report on Supply Trains at Modane asked for by the Conference.

S Crespi says that the report in question will be ready during the afternoon. The examination that had been made showed that the trains had not been held up at Modane except for a few hours on account of customs formalities.

M Clemenceau says that he will examine the report.


7. S Crespi says that he wishes to draw the attention of the Council to the following note on the subject of the actions of the Greeks in Asia Minor.

M Clemenceau says that even though the Greeks have passed the lines of demarcation laid down, they are nonetheless in the country with the authorization of the Peace Conference, and this cannot be pleaded for the Italians, who, in spite of our wishes and of our decisions, have occupied the country. In a full Conference, at which S Orlando and Baron Sonnino were present, Italy had been asked to withdraw her troops. She had not done so. If the Greeks had acted in the manner described, in the note, it was regrettable, but how could they be blamed for it? He therefore proposes that Mr Balfour should send a dispatch to the British Commodore on the spot, instructing him to report on the situation.

Mr Balfour says that he will do so, but is the Commodore to confine his inquiry to the actions of the Greeks in the region in question, without taking note of the actions of the Italians?

M Clemenceau says that what the Italians have done is well-known. The Italian forces are in the region in violation of a formal decision of the Conference. S Orlando and Baron Sonnino had taken no notice of the requests made to them, nor of the decisions made. Together with Mr Balfour, he had sent a memorandum to S Tittoni, to which a reply has just been received. It had been agreed that the Italians should send no more troops into the regions in question, and in spite of this, three thousand more have been sent. He therefore proposes that an inquiry should be made by the British Commodore, but he does not see how he can place any blame upon the Greeks.

S Crespi says that S Tittoni will soon be back, and that he, personally, does not wish to enter into the discussion, more particularly as a memorandum has been sent. He will confine himself to saying that the Italian Government thinks that it possesses rights over the region in question by virtue of Article 9 of the Treaty of London. He nonetheless thanks the Council for the proposal for an inquiry, which he agrees to.

(It is decided that Mr Balfour should direct the British Commodore in command on the Coast of Asia Minor to send in a report on the subject of the incidents that had occurred between the Greeks and Italians in the region in question.)

[Jimbuna]

13th July 1919

Captured German artillery guns are heaped on top of each other in Paris for tomorrow's Bastille Day celebrations.


A British soldier hangs from an abandoned German cannon in Ostend, Belgium.

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, July 13, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE


There are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

14th July 1919

Lieutenant Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower participating in the Transcontinental Motor Convoy to test the country’s road system.


Australian workers and their families who came to work in British munitions factories prepare to return to Australia.


Francois Flameng- "The parade of Victory, July 14, 1919"

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, July 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE


There are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

15th July 1919

During a mine-clearing operation, British airship N.S.11 (pictured is sister ship N.S.8) explodes, killing all 9 crew members.


British Guards Division march in Paris for the Bastille Day parade.


A rare sight of all six of the Royal Australian Navy’s J Class submarines together, alongside the 3445 tons purpose-built depot ship HMAS PLATYPUS. Photo was taken soon after the main body of the submarines, together with HMAS PLATYPUS and the cruiser HMAS SYDNEY arrived in Sydney.


Ship Losses:

Derband (Soviet Union) The cargo schooner was shelled and sunk in the Caspian Sea by HMS Emile Nobel and HMS Kruger (both Royal Navy).
Useyn Abbad (Soviet Union) The cargo schooner was shelled and sunk in the Caspian Sea by HMS Emile Nobel and HMS Kruger (both Royal Navy).

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, July 15, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


1. M Clemenceau says that he has received a communication from Bela Kun, which is a reply to that sent on behalf of the Council according to the decision taken on July 12th.

M Mantoux read the communication from Bela Kun.

M Clemenceau expresses the opinion that Bela Kun has right on his side. He has been told that if his troops evacuate Czechoslovakia, the Romanians will be ordered to evacuate the part of Hungary they had invaded, but they have not done so. Mr Balfour had since informed the Council that the Romanians could not safely carry out the order. It is a pity this point of view had not been explained before the order was made. Nevertheless, whatever reasons the Romanians might allege, if the Conference does not order them to withdraw and cannot enforce the order, the Council will be in a bad position.

Mr Balfour admits there is force in M Clemenceau’s remarks. He believes that the Council of Four would not have taken the decision it took on June 12th, to arrange an Armistice involving the withdrawal of the Romanians, had they known that the Hungarians were breaking the most essential terms of the original Armistice. This had not been known until both President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George had left Paris. M Clemenceau had not been aware of it, as he had expressed doubt when the matter was first brought to his notice. No doubt the Council was in an unsatisfactory position, but it would be in a worse one if it were to order the Romanians to withdraw. Mr Bratiano, in his farewell visit, had expressed himself very firmly and concisely. He said that the Powers had no authority to demand of Romania a retreat which they could not protect. Unless the Powers could guarantee the safe withdrawal of the Romanian troops and the secure holding of another line of defense against a superior enemy, it would be unfair to enforce the demand on Romania. According to the military advice he had received, in view of the increase of the Hungarian army, Romanian national existence might be at stake if this were done. In his communication, Bela Kun alleged breaches of the Armistice by the Czechoslovaks and by the Romanians. It was the business of the military authorities to see that the Armistice was carried out. He thought that the military authorities had not treated the politicians very well, as they had not kept them informed of the breaches of the Armistice whether by one side or by the other. He would, therefore, propose to send Bela Kun’s letter to Marshal Foch before any reply was made, and to ask the latter for a report regarding the way in which both the Hungarians and our own Allies had respected or broken the Armistice. He thought it might be possible to reply that, when the Council had addressed Bela Kun in June, it was not aware that Hungary was breaking the Armistice in doubling her army. If, however, the Hungarians now agreed to respect the terms of the Armistice, the Council would obtain the withdrawal of the Romanians. It might further be stated that the frontier between Hungary and Romania had already been fixed by the Peace Conference and that no amount of local fighting would alter this decision to Hungary’s advantage or detriment. He wished to draw attention to a communication he had had from General Greenland, to the effect that the Hungarian population on the eastern side of the Theiss were greatly alarmed at the prospect of the Romanians withdrawing, lest they be left thereby to the tender mercies of Bela Kun.

(It is decided to refer the communication received from Bela Kun to Marshal Foch for a full report on the observances and non-observances of the original Armistice Conditions by all parties concerned.)


2. At M Clemenceau’s request, M Mantoux reads a lengthy document, which it is decided should be circulated and discussed at a future meeting.


3. The Council had before it a Joint Note by the Allied Blockade Committee and the Eastern Blockade Committee and a Note by the British Delegation.

(At this point, Sir W Mitchell Thomson, Mr Waterlow, Captain Fuller, M Seydoux and Mr J F Dulles entered the room.)

M Clemenceau says that the Council is considerably embarrassed in dealing with this question. He reads paragraph 7 of the Joint Note.

M Seydoux says that the question had been raised by the Supreme Economic Council, which had received in reply a communication of the decision taken on June 17th by the Council of Four, in the following terms:

“After the acceptance of the Conditions of Peace by Germany, measures are not still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevist Russia or Hungary. On the recommendation of the Supreme Economic Council it was approved that there should be an abstinence from any positive measures or public announcement indicating the resumption of such trade. The Supreme Economic Council is asked, however, to examine whether, consistently with this decision, means could be found for preventing war material from being carried by sea from Germany to Bolshevist Russia.”

This decision was communicated by Sir Maurice Hankey in a letter to Mr McCormick.

Sweden has now opened the question and it is necessary to find some solution. The solution suggested is contained in the terms of the last clause of paragraph 7 of the Joint Note. This applies only to the Baltic. In the Black Sea, the position is less acute. There are few countries anxious or able to import much into Russia. In Petrograd, however, the situation is critical. It is but a few hours’ steam from Stockholm and Copenhagen. The means suggested are, he admitted, opportunist methods, based on the fact that naval hostilities are taking place in the Baltic. It might be possible without declaring a blockade, which is legally impossible, to proceed on the ground of these hostilities to enforce an embargo which should only be raised at the discretion of the Allied Powers. There is, however, another way out. The Allied and Associated Powers have offered help to Admiral Kolchak on certain terms. If this help is to be given to him, it must be given at all points. If neutrals ire to be allowed to furnish supplies to the Bolsheviks whom he was fighting, Allied assistance elsewhere would be neutralized. The neutrals might therefore be told that the Allied and Associated Powers would consider it an unfriendly act on their part should they send supplies to Bolsheviks. This could now be stated with more confidence since help had been promised to Admiral Kolchak. He suggests that the Council adopt one or other of the two plans proposed.

Mr Balfour said that Mr Seydoux’s statement was very clear. The question is an extremely embarrassing one. The Council is being hampered at every turn by difficult questions of international law, both in relation to new States and to unrecognized or de facto Governments. There are two areas to be considered, first the gulf of Finland, and second the Black Sea. The White Sea is already provided for. Trade with the Baltic States of Finland, Latvia etc., need cause no concern because trade with them would not lead to the percolation into Soviet Russia of any arms or ammunition. Of the two doors into Soviet Russia, one would be closed by ice at the end of November. Until that date, the means of stopping trade from passing through it, which had been suggested amounted to this - that neutral States be informed that the Allied and Associated Powers are not making a formal blockade on Soviet Russia; but, seeing that active hostilities were in progress in the Gulf of Finland, they must insist on the right of turning back trading vessels from the zone of operations. The waters in question are mined, and operations must for success be provided with secrecy. He does not suggest that trading vessels should be subject to capture, sunk or proceeded against in Prize Courts; only that they should be sent back to their port of origin. This course is no doubt open to objection, but less so, he thinks, than any other, and it seems the best that could be done to carry out the policy laid down by the Council of Four. As to the Black Sea, he understands there is a proposal to recognize a blockade to be declared by Kolchak and Denekin. These methods he would be inclined to accept.

M Clemenceau says that as temporary expedients the proposals put forth by M Seydoux might be adopted.

M Seydoux says it must be clearly understood that no legal right can be appealed to. In order to endow Kolchak and Denekin with some powers to enforce the blockade, he suggests that they might be supplied with a Destroyer or two by the Allied Powers.

S Tittoni says that the proposals are expedients, but as he can see no better, he will accept them.

Mr White says that all that has been suggested amounts to a pacific blockade. The American Government is extremely sensitive regarding matters of this kind. Without special instructions he would hesitate to accept any proposal tending to stop traffic on the High Seas in time of Peace.

Mr Balfour says that in his view, what is proposed is not quite a pacific blockade. The régime in the Gulf of Finland is not peace. Even though it might not legally be war, active hostilities are being waged. As the Soviet Government has not been recognised these hostilities cannot lawfully be considered war, since it appears that war can only be waged against a recognised Government. The military operations going on have an object accepted by all the Allied and Associated Governments, namely, to preserve the small border Republics which have sprung up in the north-west of Russia. Commerce, therefore, cannot be allowed to interfere with these operations. He thinks the suggestion made in the last paragraph of the Addendum by the British Delegation to the Joint Note might be adopted.

S Tittoni observes that the Powers cannot escape the anomaly of assisting Kolchak in one quarter, and allowing his enemies to be assisted in another.

M Clemenceau observes that President Wilson has offered his help to Kolchak.

Mr White says that he is willing to send a cable message to Washington, explaining the views of his colleagues, but he cannot accept them without reference to his Government. Theoretically there is peace with Russia. He will ask whether he might join in the proposal before the Council which he understands his Colleagues all accept.

Mr Balfour says that he fully understands Mr White’s position, but the question addressed to the British Government by the Swedes has to be answered. He does not know how long the answer can be postponed.

M Clemenceau suggests that Mr White inform the Council of the views of his Government within two days.

Mr Dulles says that it will be necessary to explain to President Wilson why the question was re-opened. At the time when the Council of Four had made its decision, it was well aware that the present situation was bound to come about. The question had been considered first in the Blockade Council, then in the Supreme Economic Council, and lastly, in the Council of the Heads of Governments. No aspect of the situation, therefore, had been lost sight of and the very contingency now being discussed was that in view when Sir Maurice Hankey sent his Note to the Supreme Economic Council. It would, therefore, be necessary to inform President Wilson of whatever new circumstance might exist which justified the re-opening of the question.

Mr Balfour says that it was no doubt quite accurate to say that the Council of the Heads of Governments had decided that nothing could be done, and it was doubtless reasonable to say that President Wilson must be informed of the reason why the present Council desired a different decision. He would point out that, in the decision of the Council of Four, Hungary was coupled with Russia. Nevertheless, a blockade on Hungary had been imposed. At the time of the latter, there was some hope that Petrograd would fall; this would have removed all necessity for a blockade. It might, further, be pointed out that the Soviet Government was conducting active hostilities against the small Baltic States. Should the Powers not protect the latter, the Soviet Government could land troops in the rear of their forces and destroy them. Hence it was necessary for the Powers to maintain maritime control of the Baltic. This could not be done without active operations, as the Soviet had ships and showed fight. It was impossible to carry on naval operations in narrow waters and to allow merchant shipping to go through with food and arms. The removal of the blockade was, therefore, inconsistent with the conduct of the policy unanimously favored by the Powers.

Mr Dulles observed that the blockade on Hungary was maintained because the Powers were still at war with Hungary. They had never been at war with Russia.

(It is agreed that Mr. Dulles should draft a telegram to be sent in the name of the Council to President Wilson explaining the reasons for maintaining in the Baltic and the Black Sea an embargo on merchant shipping trading with Soviet Russia.

It is further agreed that the subject should again be put on the Agenda on the 17th instant.)


4. M Clemenceau says that he had received a communication stating that the Belgian and Dutch Governments had nominated their representatives for the Commission which was to revise the Treaties of 1839. It was, therefore, desirable to summon the Commission. The Belgian Government asked that the first meeting should be fixed for Tuesday, July 29th, as the two Belgian representatives, Mr Orts, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mr Segers, Minister of State, were detained in Brussels until the 28th, for the festivals in honor of the President of the Republic. The British and Italian representatives on the Commission had already been nominated. The American and French remained to be appointed. On behalf of France, M Clemenceau nominated M Laroche - on behalf of the United States of America, Mr White nominated Mr Hudson.

(It is agreed that the first meeting should take place on 29th July, at 10:30 at the Quai d’Orsay.)


5. The Council has before it the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles.

(At this point, the Military Representatives and their Chiefs of the Staff enter the room.)

Mr Balfour says that he has read the report. The only difficulty he has is in finding 13,000 men.

M Clemenceau says that he has none to offer. He counts on Mr Balfour.

Mr Balfour says he had none to offer. He counts on General Bliss.

General Bliss says that it is not beyond the limits of possibility that Allied troops might be entirely dispensed with. The Inter-Allied Commission which, is to conduct the plebiscite, is to spend six months studying the country. It will be able to report whether order can be maintained without armed forces. It has been provided that there should be neither German nor Polish troops in the area. He suggests, therefore, that the Commission, together with its staff, which will be numerous, should go to the country and report later whether it requires an Allied force or not.

Mr Balfour quotes paragraph “D” of the general consideration set forth in the report and points out that it seems to have been the intention that the Commission should have an Allied force until local police can be organised. If, however, General Bliss considers that the risk of doing without an Allied force can be taken, he will not insist on a pedantic adherence to the original intention.

General Buss says that the plebiscite is not to take place until six months after the coming into force of the Treaty. This will give the Commission plenty of time to find out whether an armed force can or could not be dispensed with.

M Clemenceau asks what would happen should the Commission find that they require troops.

Mr Balfour draws attention to the provision excluding any participation of the Germans in the forces of occupation. He asks whether this should be held to apply to police forces.

General Bliss thinks that it will not apply to police forces.

Mr Balfour asked when the Commission is to proceed to Silesia. He also asks whether members have been nominated.

Mr White says that he understands the Commission is to proceed to Silesia 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty. As to nomination, so far as the United States are concerned, no American member can be appointed until the American Senate has ratified the Treaty.

M Clemenceau says that he is informed that the Commission to supervise the execution of the clauses of the Treaty has examined this question and that it can furnish a report at the next meeting.

(The question is therefore postponed till the following day.)


6. The Council has before it a Report from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council.

M Clemenceau observes that in spite of the platonic recommendations of the Military Representatives, it appears from the footnote that Italy will contribute one battalion, Great Britain 40 men, America none, while Trance has in the area two divisions, two-thirds of which he proposes to demobilize. The only way out of the difficulty that he can think of is to ask the Italians who were on good terms with the Bulgarians to stand surety for their good behavior.

S Tittoni says that he is not aware of any special intimacy between Italy and Bulgaria.

M Clemenceau says he can show S Tittoni evidence to that effect. He makes no complaint; in fact he would be glad if Italian policy could produce in Bulgaria the results desired by the Conference. The only end in view is to make the Bulgarians behave peacefully towards the Greeks.

S Tittoni said that Italian policy is to conform with the policy of the Allies.

M Clemenceau says that he had dreamed that Italy was inaugurating a new policy, and is now seeking to make friends with her neighbors in the Adriatic, applying in case of misunderstanding to her Allies for arbitration, which would be most willingly undertaken.

S Tittoni said that he is quite willing to conform with M Clemenceau’s dream.

M Clemenceau says that if an agreement between the Bulgarians and the Greeks could be arranged through Italy it would be a great service to the Allied cause. The Bulgarians have been summoned to be in Paris on the 25th. There remain only ten days. If in this period S Tittoni could give the Allies a foretaste of the new policy, the situation on the arrival of the Bulgarians would be much easier.

S Tittoni said he would be very pleased to do his best.

M Clemenceau suggests that S Tittoni should have private conversations on behalf of the Council with Mr Venizelos.

Mr Balfour asks to what extent disarmament had proceeded in Bulgaria.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks the situation unsatisfactory. He does not think that General Franchet d’Esperey has controlled events very successfully according to the instructions given him. He has the impression that the Bulgarians mean to resort to force should they be dissatisfied with their new frontiers. He is asking General Franchet d’Esperey’s opinion on Bulgaria and its present condition from the military point of view. If, meanwhile, S Tittoni would have a talk with Mr Venizelos, good results might be obtained.

Mr Balfour says that he presumes that S Tittoni’s conversation with Mr Venizelos would be on the basis of what had been decided at the Conference.

M Clemenceau says that it must undoubtedly be on the basis that the Entente was victorious, and that Bulgaria had been defeated.

S Tittoni asks that he might be supplied with the requisite information by his colleagues.

Mr Balfour inquires whether the intention is that S Tittoni should discuss frontiers with Mr Venizelos.

M Clemenceau says he suggests no plan whatever. He leaves the whole matter to S Tittoni’s ingenuity. He has heard among other things that Greece thinks of giving Bulgaria a share in the port of Kavalla. If so this is a good beginning which deserves encouragement.

(S Tittoni agrees to engage in conversation with Mr Venizelos and report the results obtained daily to the Council.

It is further decided that General Franchet d’Esperey should furnish as soon as possible all available information regarding the military situation of Bulgaria.)


7. The Council has before it a Report from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council.

M Clemenceau asks General Belin what the conclusion of the Report was.

General Belin says that it is proposed that the Frontier Delimitation Commission should begin to function at once instead of waiting for the time appointed, namely, 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty.

M Clemenceau says that he does not think there is any authority to set the Commission at work before its time. This can only be done by agreement with the Germans. Should they refuse the Council can do nothing. It is important not to exceed Treaty Rights. In this connection he wishes to inform the Council that the Germans had approached him with a request for permission to occupy Frankfurt with troops by reason of disturbances expected there. On the strength of the Treaty he had refused this request. It is therefore hardly possible to ask Germany for favors. He suggests that the Report expected from the Commission to supervise the execution of the Treaty be awaited.

(It is therefore decided to postpone the consideration of this question till the following day, when the Report of the Commission to Supervise the Execution of the Treaty will be heard.)


8. M Clemenceau says he wishes to read a dispatch he has received from General Franchet d’Esperey.

S Tittoni says he will immediately make an inquiry into the allegations made in this despatch.


9. M Clemenceau causes a letter from Mr Venizelos to be read:

"Greek Delegation to the Peace Conference,
Paris, 10 July

The Head of the Greek Delegation (Venizelos) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)

Mr. President: I have the honor of informing you that, according to the news which comes to me from Constantinople, military preparations are being continued by Turkey in an undeniably aggressive spirit, and are assuming such a magnitude that one risks seeing the war kindled again in all Anatolia and the settlement of the affairs of the East rendered impossible.

Nearly 60,000 men are already concentrated at Konia. Mobilization continues throughout the country and it is probable that a total force of 300,000 men will soon be on a war footing. The leaders of this organization, with whom the Minister of War himself collaborates will have at their disposal material and munitions in sufficient quantity for such an army.

This information is known by the Allied Military Command at Constantinople.

I am forced to say that the gravity of this news is increased by the fact that the Turks appear to be encouraged in their designs by the Italian authorities.

Indeed, it has been proven that the zone occupied by the Italian forces south of Aidin served as a base of operations for the Turks in their successive aggressions against the Greek troops north of the Meander. The first Greek division has just seized Turkish proclamations dated July 4, in which was printed a telegram sent from Mylassa by the Italian general reassuring the Turks that they had nothing to fear from the Greeks because their troops were obliged to withdraw to the north of the Meander and that in case they did not, the Italian forces would take the necessary measures.

Moreover, two distinguished young Turks who are very influential, Mahmoud Essad and Chukri, have just gone from Lausanne to Milan, for the purpose of directing the attentions of the Italian authorities to a position on the coast of Smyrna. It is likely that they were accompanied by their friend Kiazim Nourri, deputy of Aidin, relative of the ex-vale of Smyrna, Rahmi Bey.

Under these conditions, I believe, Mr. President, that the situation will be aggravated to the point of compromising the settlement which the Peace Conference plans in the East, if prompt and energetic measures are not taken by the Allied and Associated Powers to restrict the mobilization of the Turkish Army and to put an end to the encouragement encountered up to now from the abettors of dissension.

Please accept [etc.]

E. K. Venizelos
His Excellency Mr. Clemenceau
President of the Peace Conference"

S Tittoni says that he denies in a most formal manner the allegations made in this letter. Greek troops are refusing to obey the orders of the British Admiral on the ground that they are receiving direct instructions from the Peace Conference sent to them by Mr Venizelos. It will be necessary for the Conference to settle this matter. The British Admiral’s powers will have to be increased. The Italian Commander is in complete accord with the British Commodore at Smyrna. He has himself summoned General Bongiovanni and given him personal instructions that no further Italian troops should be landed, and that no new localities should be occupied. He is, moreover, to act only in concert with the British Admiral. It is necessary to enforce a similar line of conduct on the Greeks. The Turks at present believe that they are being invaded by the Greeks, and that they must fight them. The Greeks must conform to a common plan, and must realize that they form part of the forces of the Allied Powers. The Greeks must therefore first halt on their present positions.

Mr Balfour suggests that Mr Venizelos be asked to attend the Council in order to give a frank explanation of what was going on. He would like to ask the Military Experts what they think of the allegation made in the letter read by M Clemenceau that there were 300,000 well-armed Turkish troops in the field. The British Military Experts are of the opinion that this is far from the mark.

General Belin replies that he thinks that these figures very much exaggerated. He agrees that there are perhaps some 60,000 men in all Anatolia.

(It is agreed that Mr Venizelos should be invited to attend the Council on the following day to discuss the situation in Asia-Minor.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

16th July 1919

Soldiers of the Colonial Army at the Cenotaph's Feet dedicated to the dead for the Homeland of Etoil, Paris (VIIIth arrondissement), France.


Itagaki Taisuke, Japanese politician and soldier who founded Japan’s first political party, the Liberal Party (Jiyūtō), has passed away.


German chemist Emil Fischer who won the 1902 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his work on sugar and purines (including the first total synthesis of caffeine) has passed away.


Ship Losses:

HMS Gentian (Royal Navy) The Arabis-class sloop-of-war struck a mine and sank in the Gulf of Finland.
HMS Myrtle (Royal Navy) The Acacia-class sloop-of-war struck a mine and sank in the Gulf of Finland.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, July 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


(M. Venizelos is introduced.)

(Captain Fuller, Major Temperley, Captain Macindoe, and Mr Butler enter the room.)

1. Mr Venizelos says that on the 18th June he had sent a letter to the President of the Peace Conference calling attention to the concentration of Turkish troops in various places, notably the Smyrna region. On June 23rd the situation had appeared to him to be so disquieting that he had told the Greek General to take such action as was necessary in order that he should not be driven into the sea. What he must ask the Council to grant him is either a definite line or liberty of action for his troops. He points out that there are three railway lines converging on Smyrna. His suggestion is that Greek troops should occupy these lines up to a fixed point. He further suggests that in the space left between the Greek and Turkish advance posts small detachments, for instance a company of Allied troops, be placed. The moral effect of this would be great and would probably render any conflict unlikely. He wishes to put an end to the present situation in Smyrna. This situation is such that he is compelled to keep a whole army there. There are five Greek divisions in the area. He wishes to reduce them to two. This would enable him to reinforce his troops in Macedonia against the Bulgarians.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Venizelos to indicate on the map the area in Anatolia occupied by Greek troops.

Mr Venizelos does so. He further states that if there is real collaboration between the Greek and the Italian troops and if this collaboration is manifest to the Turks the situation will be completely remedied.

S Tittoni agrees.

Mr Venizelos says that he does not wish to extend Greek occupation. All that he wants is to be safe in Smyrna and to maintain his hold on certain places the population of which is entirely Greek. He is well aware that no conquest would influence the decisions of the Conference.

M Clemenceau says he understands the Greek population is entirely on the coast.

Mr Venizelos replies that it extends to 80 or 100 kilometres inland.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Venizelos for his estimate of the number of Greeks in Smyrna.

Mr Venizelos replies that there are 230,000 Greeks and 95,000 Turks and the rest of the population is of other nationalities. A large number of Greeks live on the land and cultivate figs and grapes, in fact these Anatolian Greeks are among the best Greek cultivators.

M Clemenceau says that Mr Venizelos apparently considers the Greeks in Smyrna form a majority.

Mr Venizelos says he does.

Mr Balfour says that without going far back into the history of the case, he would like to put the present situation on a sound basis. There are three separate armies in the area; one Greek, one Italian and one Turkish. The last is of uncertain size, largely composed, presumably, of irregulars, formidable for attacks on lines of communication but not for a set battle. How this had come about is not very material. Mr Venizelos had sent troops to Smyrna and beyond at the invitation of the Council of Four. Italy had sent troops because of her local interests and because she interpreted the Treaty of London as giving her certain rights. Unquestionably much of the trouble arose not from the action of the Turks but from the mutual distrust of the Greek and Italian troops. There are, therefore, three bodies of troops all afraid of attack from each other. According to his information the Turks are undoubtedly actuated by fear in all that they had done. They see the Greeks at Smyrna spreading out to Aidin and elsewhere. This seems to them the prelude of a great advance; this might lead to massacres. If it were made clear to the Turks that there would be no advance beyond a definite line it might be possible to control them, especially if they realized that it would not be armed action but the deliberations of the Council that would prescribe the final settlement. As to the relations between the Greeks and Italians Mr Venizelos had just stated and S Tittoni had previously more than once stated that he would base no claim to territory on armed occupation. Both agreed that the Peace Conference alone had the right to determine frontiers. S Tittoni, while recognizing this, had made an appeal to the Council begging that he be not asked to withdraw Italian troops entirely from Asia Minor by reason of the effect this would produce in Italy. Mr Venizelos was in Asia Minor at the request of the Council, but no limit had been laid down to his advance. It is clear that the machinery for the co-operation of the Greek Commander and the British Commodore had not worked smoothly. It would therefore be best to lay down the principle that there were definite lines within which the Greek and Italian troops must remain and the Turks could then be told that there was to be no trespass beyond this line if they maintained a proper attitude. He would like to remind the Council that General Allenby is still technically in authority over the whole of Turkey in Asia on behalf of the Allied Powers. This fact has been lost sight of and he has not been consulted either by the Council of Ten or by the Council of Four, nor had the Italians or Greeks referred to him. Nevertheless, he still remains the Military Representative of the Powers in Asiatic Turkey. He suggests that General Allenby be asked to send Officers to investigate the situation at Smyrna and to mark out the boundaries of each force. Thus any difficulty as between Greece and Italy or Greece and Turkey would be avoided and the scheme would be in harmony with the general course employed elsewhere for managing conquered territory during the armistice.

S Tittoni says that he agrees in the main with Mr Balfour. All advance should be stopped and the Turks should be convinced that there is no intention to declare war on them and that the Armistice continues. Both the Greeks and the Italians should stay where they are. He would also favour the interposition of Allied troops between the Greeks and the Turks.

Regarding the collaboration of the Greek and the Italian Armies, Mr Balfour suggests that the delimitation of their spheres should be carried out by General Allenby. He, himself, thinks that direct agreement between the two would be more rapid and more satisfactory. Should no agreement be reached, another authority could then be called in.

M Clemenceau said that he is disposed to favour S Tittoni’s plan. If need be, he might even agree to the employment of General Allenby should S Tittoni and Mr Venizelos fail to reach an agreement. Happily this seems unlikely. As to the means of reassuring the Turks, he thinks this could best be done by the Conference directly. He hopes that on the following day S Tittoni and Mr Venizelos would be able to bring a definite agreement to the Council. It would then be possible to send the Turks a message telling them exactly what to expect and that the ultimate solution would not be prejudged by any military occupation.

Mr White asks who would deliver the message on behalf of the Conference. He thinks perhaps this should be General Allenby, as the Turks have the greatest respect for military authority.

Mr Balfour agrees as General Allenby is Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the Powers.

S Tittoni asks whether Admiral Calthorpe, High Commissioner in Constantinople, would not be the right authority.

M Clemenceau says that he does not quite agree with Mr Balfour. General Allenby commands in Syria and Mesopotamia, not, he thinks, in Anatolia. When the Greeks had been sent to Smyrna, General Allenby had not been consulted. Admiral Calthorpe had been informed. The Conference could correspond with the Turks and had already done so. Surely a direct message from the Council would have more effect on the Turkish Government than anything else, especially if it be made clear to the Turks that the Italians and Greeks would stop their advance.

Mr Balfour says perhaps the advance would not be arrested for long.

S Tittoni says that if he and Mr Venizelos make themselves personally responsible, he thinks there would be no further advance of their respective forces.

Mr White says that it is of great importance that the communication to the Turks should be made in the name of the Conference, otherwise they would think that the Italians and Greeks had plotted to partition the country. He doubts, however, whether the authority of the Sultan really controls events in Anatolia.

M Clemenceau says that this is perhaps true as the rebellion of the Turks had been spontaneous and not controlled in Constantinople.

S Tittoni says that the General in command had nevertheless come from the capital.

Mr Venizelos observes that it might be necessary for the Greek troops to make certain movements. It is therefore desirable that some military authority should lay down exactly in what conditions it would be safe for the Greek advance to be halted. Where Greek and Italian troops were neighbors, both could safely halt on the same line; where the Greeks faced the Turks, it might be necessary to occupy a few additional points.

S Tittoni says he thinks the whole front should halt, otherwise the Turks would not believe in the message sent to them.

(It is decided that S Tittoni and Mr Venizelos should seek an agreement regarding the delimination of the Italian and Greek zones of occupation in Asia Minor and that they should submit the result of their conversation to the Council as soon as possible.

In case an agreement is reached, a communication would be made in the name of the Council to the Turkish Government informing the latter of the decision taken and offering assurances regarding the intentions of the Allied Governments.)

(At this stage Mr Venizelos and the experts withdraw.)


(At this point the Drafting Committee enters the room.)

Treaty With Austria:

(a) M Fromageot explains that the Drafting Committee has been asked by the commission on New States to modify the provisions in the Austrian Treaty, as handed to the Austrian Delegation, in order to make them conform with similar provisions regarding Minorities in the Treaty with Poland. This amounted to an aggravation of the terms. He therefore asks for orders from the Council.

M Clemenceau expresses the opinion that the Commission on Minorities has no authority to direct the Drafting Committee to make this alteration.

Mr Balfour points out that it had previously been decided that every mitigation made in the Treaty with Germany after considering the German Counter-Proposals, should be introduced into the Treaty with Austria without discussion. Any aggravation of the terms would therefore be inconsistent with this policy.

(It is decided not to accede to the request of the Commission on New States and to maintain without modification Section 6 of Part III (Protection of Minorities) of the Treaty as presented to the Austrian Delegation on the 2nd June.)

(b) M Fromageot says that the Treaty with Germany (Article 373) contains a general provision regarding the obligation of Germany to allow the construction of certain railways on her territory. The Treaty with Austria (Article 312) had been endowed with a similar provision concerning the special cases of railway lines over the Reschen and Predil passes. The Treaty with Germany had been modified and the present Article 373 had been substituted for the previous one and only stipulated for the construction of certain lines interesting to Czechoslovakia at the cost of the latter. The Council had issued instructions on July 2nd that all concessions made in the German Treaty should be inserted in the Treaty with Austria. An attempt therefore had been made by the Drafting Committee to modify Article 312 accordingly. There had not, however, been unanimity and the Drafting Committee therefore asked for instructions. The proposed Article reads as follows:

“Within five years, from the coming into force of the present Treaty, Italy may require the construction or improvement on Austrian territory of the new Trans-Alpine lines over the Reschen and Predil passes. The cost of construction or improvement shall be borne by Italy”.

S Tittoni says that there is no analogy between the two cases. The lines which the Treaty with Germany requires to be constructed on German soil are exclusively for Czechoslovak interests and are very trifling in extent. In the other case the lines were far more costly and though they are very necessary to Italy, they were also of great importance to Austria. He would prefer that arbitration should decide the allotment of the cost. He can see no reason for saddling Italy with all the cost without any inquiry. Should it be shown after arbitration that only Italy was interested, Italy will pay. If Austria is interested, why should Italy bear all the cost? He therefore proposes that the text on the lines of the original draft be maintained.

(General Mance and Mr. Hudson enter the room.)

Mr Balfour says that the original provision in the Treaty with Germany had demanded of Germany that she should construct lines on her territory at the request of her neighbors and at her own expense. The German Delegation had protested and their protest had been accepted. The general clause had been suppressed and a special clause introduced enabling the Czechoslovaks to build two small lines on German territory at their own expense. His feeling is that it would be wrong to impose on Austria anything more severe than what had been imposed on Germany. Austria will undoubtedly be poor and even though the lines in question might be advantageous to her, she might think her resources insufficient for the enterprise. If S Tittoni’s plan is adopted, Austria might be forced into an expense which she herself judges to be beyond her means.

S Tittoni suggests that the arbitrator might decide whether or not Austria’s resources justified any expenditure on the railways.

Mr Balfour says that he would be prepared to agree to a formula which entitles the Austrians to plead before the League of Nations that they could not afford these lines.

M Fromageot expresses the opinion that a clause could be drafted to cover this case.

S Tittoni says that the arbitrator might also be empowered, even should the initial cost be furnished by Italy, to decide whether or not profits had accrued to Austrian lines, as a consequence of the construction, and to apportion to Italy out of these profits, if any, something towards the cost of construction.

(It is decided that the cost of constructing the railways mentioned in Article 312, if desired by Italy, should be borne by Italy. If, however, the construction of these lines should subsequently prove to have increased the profits of Austrian railways, part of the cost of construction should be made good to Italy out of the increased profits above mentioned, in accordance with the decision of an arbitrator, to be nominated by the League of Nations.)

The Drafting Committee is asked to draft an Article in the above sense.


3.

(a) M Tardieu reads and explains the General Recommendations concerning the establishment of Territorial Clauses.

(The report is accepted.)

(b) M Tardieu reads and explains the Report on the establishment of Schleswig.

(With the exception of the passage at the end of paragraph 8, requiring the German Government to issue certain orders to its military and civil authorities in the third zone and under certain conditions to evacuate the area, the report is accepted.)

It is pointed out that these provisions go beyond the stipulations of the Treaty.

(It is therefore agreed to suppress these passages, and only to ask the German Government to abstain from making any arrests for political reasons in the area concerned.

With this exception, the report is accepted.)

S Tittoni says that should the Inter-Allied Commission consider that the voting had been influenced by German action in the third zone, the result might be declared void.

(This is agreed to.)

With regard to Article 3 of the report, Mr Balfour says that he understands that the American and British arrangements are complete. There is some difficulty about the French arrangements, but the British Admiral had undertaken to step into the breach and furnish the required number of troops should French troops be lacking. He suggests, therefore, that the arrangements made by the Americans and British be allowed to proceed and that French help be called for only in case of need.

(This is agreed to.)

(c) M Tardieu reads and explained the report on the establishment of the Free City of Danzig.

(The proposals contained in it are accepted, and it is agreed that the nominations for the Commission should be made on the 18th instant.)

On the subject of the supply of an Inter-Allied force, M Tardieu expresses the hope that it might be possible to do without. In any case, the Commission can proceed to the spot without troops, and report at a later date whether it requires any.


4. M Tardieu points out that the Committee over which he presides has been asked to provide for the execution of the political and territorial clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. M Loucheur presides at a Committee to supervise the execution of the Reparation Clauses. There remains economic and colonial clauses, the execution of which was at present supervised by no Committee. He suggests that the former be entrusted to the Supreme Economic Council. The latter, might perhaps, be dealt with by the Committee which had just met in London to consider the question of Mandates.

(It is agreed that this question should be brought up on the following day.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

17th July 1919

Cavalry of the anti-Bolshevik Don Cossacks on parade at Novocherkassk.


The Lithuanian-Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, chaired by Kazimierz Cichowski (pictured), is dissolved after a few months after Polish troops conquer much of its territory.