100 Years Ago Today

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, July 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


(The Members of the Commission on Tientsin enter the room.)

1. The following Report was before the Meeting:

The Commission entrusted with the examination of the Italian claim for the Austro-Hungarian concession at Tientsin, considering on the one hand that

1) The demand of the Italian Government that the Austro-Hungarian concession at Tientsin should be handed over to them is contrary to the principle laid down by the Allied and Associated Powers in Article 260 of the Treaty of Peace signed on the 28th of June 1919 by the Allied and Associated Powers and the German State,

2) The said principle has been embodied after deliberation by the Allied and Associated Powers in Article 22, Section IV, Part IV, of the conditions drafted for re-establishing peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria, and that this Article was submitted to the Austrian Delegation at St. Germain-en-Laye on the 2nd June last,

3) The principle of restoring to China her full rights of sovereignty over former enemy concessions was unanimously adopted by the Allied and Associated Powers in spite of the fact that certain of them might have derived advantages from acquiring possession of enemy concessions bordering their own, in order to give evidence of the confidence which the high contracting parties are disposed to place in efforts towards improvement made by China, who, through declaring war against the enemy Empires, showed her determination to side with the Nations which defend the cause of right,
considering on the other hand that the objects of the Italian claim are deemed justifiable in the following respects:

I) As regards the urgent work which should be carried out for clearing the marshy portions of the former Austrian-Hungarian concession bordering the Italian concession,

II) As regards the works which should be carried out in the Austro-Hungarian concession for regulating the course of the Hei-Ho river and preventing the recurrence of floods damaging to the Italian concession,
is of opinion,

i) That it is inadvisable to modify the principle embodied in Article 22 of Part IV (section IV) of the draft Treaty of Peace with Austria;

ii) That it would be expedient that the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers should request from our Chinese Allies a formal promise that within a period of one year from the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Austria the necessary works of sanitation in the late Austro-Hungarian concession and the necessary works of improvement in the course of the river shall be undertaken with all desirable promptness and shall be entrusted to the Hei-Ho Commission which has already given proof of its competence and activity.

S Tittoni says he wishes to make the following declaration:

The Italian Delegation expresses the wish that the minutes of today’s sitting of the Supreme Council should show that His Majesty’s Government, while giving its assent to what is set forth in Art. 22, Part IV, Section IV, of the draft text of the Conditions of Peace with Austria, insists, nevertheless, on the soundness of its claims submitted in 1917 by the Legation at Peking to the Chinese Government for a rectification of the boundary line separating the Italian concession of Tient-Tsin from the former Austro-Hungarian concession.

M Pichon says that the Report of the Commission will be adopted, and no alteration will be made in Article 22. S Tittoni’s declaration, however, will be inserted in the Minutes.

Mr Balfour questions whether the declaration referred to the same subject as the Report of the Commission.

Mr Gout explains that the Italian concession is separated from the river by a small strip of the Austrian concession. The Italian Government in 1917 had asked for an alteration of the boundaries in order to obtain easier access to the river. The Commission has asked for fuller information on this subject than is available. The Italian delegate had undertaken to obtain it, but it has not yet been received, and the Commission therefore has reserved judgment on the subject.

M Pichon says that the Council is therefore asked for no decision on this matter. It would, however, be necessary to fix a time limit within which the works of sanitation should be undertaken. He thinks it might be sufficient to state that the work should be undertaken within a “reasonable time”.

Mr Balfour thinks perhaps the matter might be left to the League of Nations.

M Pichon observed that there is a Health Section of the League of Nations which might take an interest in the matter.

Baron Makino observes that the sovereignty over the ground in question is Chinese; the Chinese Government will, therefore, have to be approached on the subject.

Mr Gout said that if the Chinese Government takes steps within a year to set the enterprise going, there need be no complaint. Once the Hei-Ho Commission had taken the work in hand, it will certainly complete it thoroughly well.

Baron Makino observes that if the Chinese Government is asked by the Powers to execute a sanitary measure it would surely agree. The determination of the time limit would appear to be a sort of imposition.

M Pichon says that it might be difficult to get the Chinese Government to undertake the work. Once it has undertaken it, it will no doubt execute it.

After some further discussion it is agreed to fix a time limit of one year for the undertaking of the work.

Baron Makino says that as his objection is a matter of form he would agree.

(The Report of the Commission as above quoted is therefore adopted, and it is decided that no alteration need be made to Article 22, and that the Chinese Government should be asked in the name of the Powers to undertake the sanitary work required by the Italian Delegation within a year.)

(The Members of the Commission withdraw.)


(Mr Hoover, M Seydoux, S Crespi and Mr Gorvin enter the room.)

2. M Pichon asks how much, in Mr Hoover’s estimation, has been spent on the revictualling of Austria?

Mr Hoover says he estimates that to complete the present program up to the 15th of August, Eighty Million Dollars will have been spent.

M Pichon asks whether Mr Hoover thinks there are securities in Austria enough to cover the cost of the scheme he proposed to undertake.

Mr Hoover says that he doubts whether the sums already spent could be recovered for three or four years. Everything that could be realized had already been realized. The Austrian Authorities latterly had gone so far as to offer the National Art Galleries in payment for food.

M Pichon says that under these circumstances it seems hardly possible to advance money.

S Tittoni says that the alternative is Bolshevism.

Mr Hoover says that his hope is if priority is given to payment for food, even over payment of reparations, the Austrian Government might take heart and set to work in order to meet its liabilities. This is the only means of giving the present Government enough encouragement for it to hold on. Should the harvest succeed in Hungary, there will be a surplus of food in that country. It was only Allied help that had hitherto kept Austria from Bolshevism. The Hungarians are employing most active propaganda. Should they take the place of the Allies in the supply of food, it can hardly be expected that the Austrians would not join them and become Bolshevik. It seems clear that the Austrian Delegation sincerely wishes to keep a moderate Government in Power in Austria. If they could be assured by the Powers that the help he suggested would be given them, he thinks they might resist Bolshevism.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks Mr Hoover had made out a most serious case. He is not quite sure that the Bolsheviks in Hungary would have much food to spare. He was told that Bela Kun had quarreled with the peasants, who would be inclined to resist requisition. The main point is that it is desirable to set up Austria economically. She cannot be left to starve. Food must be advanced to her either on such securities as existed, or she must be put in a way to earn money. She cannot produce the food she required, as the territory left her by the Treaty is insufficient. Mr Hoover’s proposal is first to encourage the Austrians by a promise, and secondly, to tell the Reparation Committee to think first of making Austria a paying concern before getting money out of her. This appears to him to be the most statesmanlike method. If a man were kept alive by charity, he could not be asked to pay his debts. He is not quite sure, however, what the functions of the Reparation Commission are, or whether the Council cab give it orders as suggested by Mr Hoover.

Mr Hoover says the wording of the German Treaty enables the Reparation Commission to furnish food and raw material to Germany, and to obtain payment for these in priority to payment of reparation. In any case, as the Reparation Commission had complete control of all resources, no other body can intervene.

S Crespi says that the Reparation Commission has the right to raise resources with the object of obtaining food. The Reparation Commission could certainly be given orders by the Governments as it was itself merely an Agent of the Government.

(At this point M Clemenceau entered the room.)

M Clemenceau asks how payment for food will be obtained?

S Crespi says that money can be raised by taxation. Hungarian food might turn Austria Bolshevik. It is for this reason that Italy has sent food into Austria.

Mr Balfour says that he is ready to accept Mr Hoover’s plan, but he will take the opportunity of telling the Austrians that they must give up the arms and ammunition in Austria to the Czechs.

Mr Hoover suggests that the Austrians might be told that the food supplies will cease unless they did so.

S Tittoni considers that the question of the delivery of the arms should be kept quite separate from the question of food. These arms represent one of the securities in Austria for the payment of Reparation. He does not say that the arms should not be delivered, but an equivalent in value should be available for the Reparation fund.

Mr Balfour says that it is most urgent to send the arms to Czechoslovakia at once.

Mr Hoover says that this difficulty has already arisen. Trade has been arranged between Austria and Serbia. Five steel bridges are to be given to Serbia in exchange for food. The same objection had been raised, that these bridges represent a security for the payment of reparation. The Czechs are prepared to exchange coal for arms, but once the Czechs have given coal and the Serbians food, there is no means of making them contribute anything towards the reparation fund.

Mr Balfour says that if S Tittoni’s thesis is carried to its logical extremity, all Austrian trade would be stopped. Austria could get neither food nor anything else. He has no wish to reduce the reparation fund to Italy’s detriment. He thinks it imperative that Austria should be fed, and Czechoslovakia armed.

S Tittoni said that he acquiesces regarding food, which is a matter of primary necessity. It is not so vital a matter to arm the Czechs. Italy and the other Allies should get some equivalent for the liquidation of a valuable Austrian security. If the Czechs are ready to give coal in exchange, Italy should obtain her share of this coal, for the coal situation in Italy is as bad as that in Austria.

Mr Balfour said that in his opinion it is to Allied interests that the Czechs should be armed. If so, it was nearly as important that commerce between Austria and Czechoslovakia should be carried on as between Austria and Serbia for food. He thinks nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of the passage of arms from Vienna to Prague.

S Tittoni says that Italy recognizes the need of Austria for food, but as to coal, Italy needed it just as badly. Italy must therefore have her share in the coal which pays for the arms.

Mr Hoover says that the amount of the surplus of Bohemian coal is infinitesimal, and barely enough to supply the needs of Vienna. Moreover, the Czechs have ceased to export coal because they received no arms from Austria. Austria is afraid of exporting these arms out of fear of the Hungarian Bolsheviks. By a threat to withhold food, the Austrians could be prevailed upon to deliver the arms. They could also be promised, if they did so, Bohemian coal. The Italians, short as they were of coal, had realized Austrian needs, and had themselves supplied coal to Vienna.

S Crespi observes that it is the duty of the Separation Commission to see that all Austrian securities are not one by one spent to the detriment of the common reparation fund.

Mr Balfour says that he will be content to allow the arms to go, and to find out afterwards in what way payment can be obtained. So long as they are delivered to the Czechs, he does not mind in what way the re-adjustment was made for the benefit of the reparation fund.

Mr Hoover suggests that if his formula is adopted, a few lines might be added regarding the sending of arms to Czechoslovakia.

(It is therefore agreed that the following reply should be made to the Austrian Delegation:

“In respect to the Request laid before the Supreme Economic Council from the Austrian Delegates that provision of further food supplies should be immediately undertaken by the Allied and Associated Governments, this request has been laid before the Council of Five and the Council wishes to state that as food and raw materials for Austria during the forthcoming year are fundamental to her recuperation and her ability to make reparation, the method of provision of such food and raw material will be one of the first considerations of the Reparations Commission.

The Council wishes, however, to make this assurance contingent on an undertaking by the Austrian Government. The delivery of arms to Czechoslovakia has been greatly delayed despite the offer of coal in exchange. It must be understood that the continuation of the present supplies of food to Austria, as well as the above assurances, depend on the execution by Austria of the delivery of the arms and ammunition required by Czechoslovakia.”

The question raised by M. Tittoni was remitted for further study to the Supreme Economic Council.)


(At this stage, Marshal Foch, General Weygand, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, Dr Benes, Mr Kramarcz, Mr Pachitch, Mr Misu, and Mr Vaida Voevod enter the room.)

3. Marshal Foch reads a memorandum regarding possible military action in Hungary. He also quotes from a telegram sent on the 10th July to the British War Office by Colonel Cunningham from Vienna to the effect that the red army is composed of 9 divisions, one of which, the 4th infantry division, has been disbanded. Each division can only muster a small number of rifles. For instance, the 9th division had only 2 to 3,000 rifles. To liberate Hungary from Communism in one week a force of 8 infantry divisions, one cavalry division, 100 aeroplanes and as many armored cars as possible would suffice.

Mr Balfour says that one statement in the very remarkable report read by Marshal Foch gives him some apprehension. He refers to the passage in which Marshal Foch alludes to the necessity of establishing in Hungary a Government with which the Entente could negotiate peace. Such a Government would not appear to be a Hungarian Government, but one set up by the Entente Powers. The Peace would be represented for all time, not as one between the Powers and the Hungarian people, but as a Peace between the Powers and their own puppets. This would furnish a weapon to all the enemies of the Entente. He will not ask Marshal Foch to say how this difficulty can be avoided, as the Marshal would doubtless reply, with justice, that this is the business of the politicians.

S Tittoni says that the Hungarian situation is a very difficult one. As to the military proposals, he has nothing to say, but regarding the political side he had some observations to make. Hungary is ruled by a small minority. 80 per cent of the Hungarian troops are against Bela Kun, so are the peasants and the bourgeoisie. At Szeged, there is an opposition Government which was a nationalist center. If the Council determines to have Hungary attacked by Czech, Romanian and Serbian troops, Bela Kun will be able to drape himself in the national colors and pose as a patriotic Hungarian. In the end, it will not be Bela Kun who would be destroyed, but the Hungarian nation. If the Allies, on the other hand, can act in concert with the Szeged Government, they will appear as the deliverers of the country from tyranny. All the Governments have to contend with the criticism and opposition of the Labor parties in their own countries. It is, therefore, highly opportune to appear to act on behalf of the majority in Hungary. He makes no criticism of the military means proposed by Marshal Foch, but he thinks they should be accompanied by political action of the kind he has described.

Mr White asks in what manner S Tittoni would suggest that this political action should be begun?

S Tittoni says that he would send Allied Agents to get into touch with the Government at Szeged before any military action began.

Marshal Foch says that he had, in his report, asked for Governmental instructions. When the armies set out for Budapest, they would be preceded by proclamations conveying the intentions of their Governments. It is for the Governments to determine what these proclamations should be.

Dr Benes says that he thinks S Tittoni’s proposals are based on wrong premises. From information he has received, the Hungarian Officers, though not sharing Bela Kun’s opinions, were loyal to him, because they think the Communist Government would give them means of fighting their neighbors. All of them are passionately attached to the integrity of Hungary. They would like to win back for it Transylvania, Croatia, and Slovakia. There is no hope of seducing these Officers. As to the civilians, no doubt the bourgeoisie parties would like to be rid of Bela Kun, but they will not cooperate with the neighboring nations to that end. If the Powers begin to negotiate with the Magyars, they must count with the suspicions and mistrust of the Romanians, of the Yugoslavs and of the Czechoslovaks. The Magyars do not admit their defeat. They remain Imperialist in spirit and they will use any conversation they might have with the Great Powers to turn the tables on their neighbors. He thinks for these reasons that there are strong objections to the course of negotiating with any Hungarian Party.

M Clemenceau asks Dr Benes whether he agrees to Marshal Foch’s plan?

M Benes says that he does but not to S Tittoni’s.

Mr Kramarcz says that the armies must march under the banner of “Respect for the Armistice”. The existence of a Hungarian army forces the neighboring countries to remain armed. They are anxious to disarm and demobilize. Enforcement of the Armistice Conditions is a complete and sufficient justification for action, and it will serve as an answer to criticism. He has the same fears and interests as S Tittoni, but he is convinced that there should be no talk with any Hungarian parties, as this will only revive Hungarian nationalist ambition. Action should be taken on military grounds if only to uphold the decrees of the Conference.

Mr Vaida-Voevod says that he agrees with Mr Kramarcz and Dr Benes. He thinks it is necessary not to give Bela Kun a pretext for posing as a defender of his country. The majority of the Hungarian population wishes to remain quiet and to be ruled neither by a communist nor by a reactionary government. When the Allied armies have taken Budapest, they might proclaim to the people that it is open to them to choose their own Government. The Allied Commander-in-Chief, however, should consult non-Magyar elements as well. There are Romanians, Serbs and Slovaks of Hungary who know the devices of the parties and who could help the Commander-in-Chief.

General Bliss says that the general purpose aimed at was one he would gladly see carried out, but only the Head of his Government could decide on any action in this respect. In spite of all disguises it is manifest that what is proposed is a renewal of war on Hungary with the object of destroying its present Government. If action is to be based on the pretext of a breach of the Armistice by Hungary, the Allies must be quite clear that the fault is entirely on the side of the Hungarians. In the Armistice arranged by General Franchet d’Esperey on the 13th November at Belgrade, a certain line had been fixed by Article I. North and west of this line the Serbians and Romanians respectively are not to advance. The second Article requires the demobilization of the Hungarian Army down to six Infantry Divisions and two Cavalry Divisions. It is alleged that the Hungarians had broken Article II.

Mr Balfour asks whether there is anything in Clause I forbidding the Serbians and Romanians to cross the line.

General Bliss says that the Romanians should not have crossed west of the line. When they had been relieved of German domination, they had crossed the line in spite of General Franchet d’Esperey. He had then tried to stop them on another line further west, but without avail. The matter had been discussed in Paris and the discussions had lead to the establishment of a neutral zone approximately representing the line fixed in the Treaty of 1916. Even this, however, had not stopped the Romanian advance. At a Meeting held by the Military Representatives at Versailles on the 25th February, 1919, General Charpy, Chief of Staff to General Franchet d’Esperey, had given the following evidence:

"On November 7th, 1918, General Franchet d’Esperey and Count Karolyi had met at Belgrade to sign a supplementary armistice with Hungary on the same lines as General Diaz had signed with Austria. At that time Romania was still under German domination and therefore only French, Serbian and Hungarian representatives were present at Belgrade. They all knew the terms of the Hungarian armistice. A certain zone was to be definitely occupied and further zones could be occupied for strategic reasons. The Armistice was signed on November 13th, and the Hungarians had made no difficulties and had carried out all the conditions. The French and Serbians advanced as agreed. The only difficulties occurred with Romania.

Without informing General Franchet d’Esperey, the Romanians had advanced, especially in the region of Klausenburg. The Hungarians at once protested that this was a breach of the armistice conditions. The Romanians replied that they were in agreement with the Hungarians. This was not correct, but eventually an agreement was reached. The Romanians were allowed to advance up to a line well in advance of the armistice line. This was reported to the Allied Governments.

Unfortunately, the Romanians advanced still further with the result that certain incidents took place; the Romanians oppressed the local population and the Hungarians became incensed. Up to that time, however, the position had not become serious.

The Romanians stated that they feared an attack by Hungarian armies; this was absolutely impossible. Hungary had no organised troops, whereas the Romanian army was well organised. Naturally there was much unrest in Hungary and some Bolshevism, but nothing important, and Bolshevism in Transylvania was not apparent. The Romanians had for some time tried to advance to the Treaty line, but General Franchet d’Esperey had refused so far though he had sent a mission to make inquiries into alleged atrocities. The information received was that the local situation was quite quiet.

Taking these facts into consideration the Romanians should remain on their present line as all the trouble had been caused by their advance. It was not for him to give advice on a political question, but the Romanians should not be allowed to cross the line Arad–Grosswardein–Szatmar–Nemeti and it would be preferable to send Allied troops there; a neutral zone would be of no advantage as there were not sufficient Allied troops to guard it.

To maintain order it would be sufficient to garrison Grosswardein and Szatmair with Allied troops; there were already some at Arad.

In spite of this the neutral zone had been accepted. The Romanians had advanced to the Eastern limit of this zone and finding it empty had proceeded as far as the Theiss. An American observer had informed him that as soon as the Hungarians came to know of the decision taken on March 12th, the Karolyi Government would go. He had written a letter to this effect to the Council. The Hungarian Government had only received information on the 19th. On that very date the Karolyi Government resigned and handed over its powers to Bela Kun. Bela Kun had succeeded in raising an Army solely to repel the unwarranted invasion of the Romanians. The violation of the armistice was first made by the Romanians in spite of the Powers and at a time when the Hungarian Army had gone to pieces. If the Council meant to take action on the ground that the Armistice had been violated, it should examine carefully at what date the Hungarian Army had been reconstituted. He is confident that it would be found that this had taken place after the violation of the armistice by the Romanians."

Mr Balfour says that he has three observations to make on General Bliss’s very important statement. In the first place he agrees with him that the American delegates and he himself as British representative could not initiate a considerable military policy without consulting the Governments at home. He personally cannot authorize a new war, or the resumption of an old war, without reference to London. In the second place he begs to dissent entirely, as far as he was concerned, from the allegation made by General Bliss that the breach of the armistice was merely alleged as a pretext for attacking the Communist Government of Hungary. He wishes it to be understood that he is not animated by any consideration of Hungarian internal politics, little though he might approve of Bela Kun. He agrees with Mr Kramarcz that it is intolerable to allow the Hungarian State to become a military stronghold, from which economic and political disturbances radiates over Central Europe. When he insists on the disarmament of Hungary by reason of her breach of the armistice, he is not disguising his intention, but stating exactly what he wishes. Without the disarmament of Hungary, there can be no peace or settlement of frontiers in Central Europe. On the third point he speaks with more diffidence. General Bliss’ argument is based on the view that the Allied Powers are precluded from sending troops across the line beyond which the Hungarians are not to advance, according to Article I of the Armistice. He is surprised at this view. The Article forbids the Hungarians to go beyond the line, but does not explicitly forbid the Allies to cross it. Clause III moreover gives the Allies the “right of occupying all places and strategic points which may be permanently fixed by the general Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.” It is difficult to reconcile this with General Bliss’ interpretation of Article I. There is another small point on which he does not wish to rely, namely, that when the Convention was signed Romania was not a belligerent. He would like to be told by experts in military jurisprudence whether the Romanian advance, regrettable though it might be, amounts to a breach of the Armistice in the same sense as the obvious and important breach made by Hungarians.

General Bliss says that the interpretation of Article I of the Armistice does not require a lawyer. The very word Armistice means the laying down of arms by both sides on a given line in order that civil plenipotentiaries should negotiate. It cannot impose a purely unilateral obligation. As to Article III, giving the Commander-in Chief of the Allied Armies the right to occupy strategic points, no such provision has been made in the Armistice with Germany. But it had been feared that hostilities with Germany might begin again, and when the Armistice Convention with Austria had been negotiated, it had been stipulated that the Allied Armies should have passed through Austrian territory in order to threaten Germany from the South. A similar provision had also been made in the Convention with Hungary. The provision, however, does not mean that any Allied Commander could occupy any point he liked without reference to the Commander-in-Chief. Romanian action had been taken in defiance of the wishes of General Franchet d’Esperey.

Mr Kramarcz said he does not wish to enter into the legal question. Czechoslovakia is threatened by the Hungarians. The Army of the Hungarians kept Czechoslovakia and other countries armed and mobilized. This is the only question for consideration.

Mr Pachitch says he agreed with Mr Kramarcz, Dr Benes, and Mr Vaida. Action ought to be taken to force Bela Kun to fulfill Hungary’s engagements under the Armistice. The Yugoslavs have reason to expect that they would be the third victim of Hungary. The Hungarians undoubtedly desire to re-establish Hungary in her historic frontiers.

M Clemenceau says that all concerned have now expressed their views. Two Governments, however, have to be consulted before action could be taken.

Marshal Foch observes that on July 11th, when he had been asked to study a plan of operations, the principle of action itself had not been in question. If it is questioned now, it will seem that the Council is in contradiction with itself.

Mr Balfour says that he dissents entirely from what Marshal Foch had just said. He cannot consult his Government on the propriety of military operations unless he knows what their nature is and what chance of success they offer.

Mr White says that as he understands the case, Marshal Foch had been asked to make a report to send to the Governments. Marshal Foch had made a most able report. He cannot commit his Government and even the President would have to be assured that the proposal does not involve a new war before he can assent, without consulting the Senate.

M Clemenceau says that this is not a subject that can be discussed. Each of the members of the Council is free to consult his Government. Marshal Foch has presented a remarkable report showing that success could be hoped for without a great expenditure of effort. General Bliss has put forward certain questions which deserve close examination. He will remind the Council that Mr Balfour had lately drafted a telegram in which the Council had informed Bela Kun that it cannot hold any conversations with him as long as he does not respect the Armistice. No one had then raised any objection.

Mr White says that he wishes that he had followed his usual method, and asked for time to consider the matter.

M Clemenceau says that he would like to point out that a state of war with Hungary still exists and there can be no question of a new war.

S Tittoni asks that the greatest secrecy be observed regarding the discussion.

(It is agreed that the discussion should be resumed on the following day at 10:30 by the Members of the Council.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

18th July 1919

The Cenotaph in London, as designed by Edwin Lutyens, is unveiled to commemorate the dead of World War I.


[803rd Pioneer Infantry Battalion on the U.S.S. Philippine (troop ship), from Brest harbor, France, July 18, 1919] no. 15, Part of 4000 troops on U.S.S. Philippine.


Riding as a passenger, Raymonde de Laroche dies along with the pilot in the crash of an experimental Caudron airplane at Le Crotoy airfield in France.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, July 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


1. M Clemenceau says he has received a dispatch stating that the Greeks have committed atrocities in Smyrna and its neighborhood.

The Sheikh-ul-Islam formally accuses them. He wishes to propose to his Colleagues that they should send a Commission of Inquiry. The Council is not without responsibility, seeing that it had sent the Greeks to Smyrna.

Mr Balfour says he has been much concerned about the reports from Asia Minor. A question has been asked in the House of Commons. It has been found on investigation that the Greeks have in fact committed atrocities. Mr Venizelos has been greatly perturbed, and has himself been forced to admit the truth of the allegations.

S Tittoni says that fighting between the Turks and Greeks must be put to an end. It is very bitter, and no quarter is given on either side.

M Clemenceau asks whether his colleagues would be prepared to agree at once to the dispatch of the Commission.

Mr Balfour says that he would prefer, before deciding to do this, to discuss the whole question of Asia Minor. He does not object to the proposal in itself, though he would point out that if Commissions of Inquiry have to be sent to investigate all charges of atrocities throughout the world, he does not think he would be able to lay his hand on a sufficient number of officers.

M Clemenceau says he proposes to send French Commissioners, even if his Colleagues appoint none. He would, however, prefer that they should do so.

Mr Balfour says that he has no objection, but that it is more important to prevent recurrences of atrocities in the future than to investigate those which have already taken place. Control could only be exercised by the Conference through the local Commander-in-Chief.

M Clemenceau says that Mr Balfour’s plan would only result in the issuing of a proclamation, which would have no effect at all. The Allies would have to deal with the Turks hereafter, and it must be made clear to them they did not send the Greeks to Smyrna merely to commit atrocities.

S Tittoni said that he agrees with M Clemenceau. It is very important to make the Turks feel that the Allies did not propose to have them massacred.

Mr Balfour points out that the atrocities complained of had been committed by soldiers. They should be checked by the Commander-in-Chief in Anatolia. Orders of the Council could be sent and executed through him. He would have certain proposals to make on this subject, and he thinks that M Clemenceau’s plan would fit in with his own.

(It is decided that the question of appointing a Commission of Inquiry should be postponed till the Meeting in the afternoon.)


2. M Clemenceau says that he has received an account of proceedings at Dédéagatch which, seeing that Italy as well as the other Allies, is still at war with Bulgaria, deserves comment and perhaps action by the Italian Government.

S Tittoni said that he agrees with M Clemenceau that the behavior of the Italian officers in fraternizing with the Bulgarians is, if correctly reported, highly reprehensible. He undertakes to have an inquiry made into the matter, and asked that M Clemenceau’s information be handed to him.


3. Mr White informs the Council that he has received the following telegram from President Wilson, and asks his colleagues what answer he should give on their behalf:

“Respecting the decision announced in your telegram of June 30th, to postpone further discussion of the Treaty with the Ottoman Government until the Government of the United States is in a position to say whether it will be able to undertake a mandate for a part of Turkish territory, I am afraid that the delay which this will involve will be very considerable and should like to know what attitude towards Turkey the Powers propose to take in the meantime.”

M Clemenceau says that the only attitude the Powers could adopt as far as he knows is one of expectancy. He is for certain reasons not ready to talk about Asia Minor. He does not know what kind of declaration the President expects the Council to make.

Mr White says he thinks perhaps the President had the maintenance of order in his mind.

M Clemenceau says that on this subject the Council will take the necessary measures in concert. As to the future he can at present enter into no pledges. If the Greeks, Turks, and Italians are fighting it is not his fault.

Mr White asks if M Clemenceau’s intention is to wait until the Government of the United States was in a position to say whether it will undertake a mandate.

M Clemenceau says he will not undertake to wait indefinitely. For the time being he can make no statement. When other work has been done, the Council will do its best to settle the affairs of Turkey. All he can say in reply to the President’s message is that the Council has taken note of it. President Wilson knows full well what the difficulties are. He wishes to obtain a mandate in Armenia and an American Commissioner has been appointed. He asks for part of Cilicia, and is favorably disposed towards accepting a mandate for Constantinople. The question of Constantinople is one of the greatest importance for Europe. It had caused wars in the past, and required the closest study.

Mr Balfour agrees that no definite answer can at present be given to President Wilson. The President is unfortunately prevented by the American Constitution from undertaking anything for the time being. Meanwhile the Council will try and maintain order in Turkey.

(It is agreed that Mr White should reply in the above sense to the President’s telegram.)


4. S Tittoni reads the following agreement between himself and M. Venizelos:

“The line of division between the Greek and Italian occupations in Asia Minor begins from the mouth of the Küçük Menderes river: thence it will follow the course of the river up to the Ayassoluk-Scala-Nova road: thence it will follow the line of the Greek occupation of Ayassoluk and old Ephesus.

From old Ephesus it will follow a line at an average distance of 600 meters from the railway Smyrna-Aidin to the west, then to the south of the said railway, the line to be fixed on the spot by the Greek and Italian Governments in order to allow the Greek troops to protect the railway from sudden attacks from Comitagis.

The line will then reach the Muschluk-Deresi river which will be followed to its junction with the Menderez.

Thence it will follow the bed of the Menderez to the east as far as Keuehk.

The two Governments agree not to pass beyond the line above established. Moreover this occupation has only a provisional character corresponding to the actual state of affairs, the consideration of the definite regime for these regions being reserved to the Conference.

Each of the two Governments agrees to afford in the territory which it occupies full and complete protection to the co-nationals of the other.

Instructions will be given to the commands in order that the officers of the two armies may maintain towards each other most friendly relations.”

He explains that the expression “occupation” implies occupation at the present time.

Mr Balfour says that the question must be considered from a larger aspect than that of a friendly agreement between the Greeks and the Italians. The Entente had told the Greeks to go to Smyrna. Since their arrival there was a divergence of opinion as to whether they had or had not obeyed the instructions of the British Naval Authority on the spot. Commodore Fitz-Maurice considers that they had exceeded their orders, which were not to go beyond the Sandjak of Smyrna. This might not be the fault of Mr Venizelos, but nevertheless it would seem that the harm was done. As to the Italians (he knows this was not S Tittoni’s policy) they had gone to Asia Minor without informing their Allies, and they had made successive advances into the country, also without informing them. The Council of Three had informed S Orlando that there could be no possible conversations until the Italian troops had been entirely withdrawn. Then a change of Government had taken place in Italy, and there had been a friendly meeting with S Tittoni. S Tittoni had said that the Italian Government would be put into a very serious difficulty if the British and French Governments insisted on the total withdrawal of the Italian troops. No formal decision had been taken as a result of this declaration, but the French and British Governments had not insisted.

M Clemenceau observes that it had been decided to send S Tittoni an answer.

Mr Balfour, continuing, says that, in effect, nothing had been done. There were, therefore, in Anatolia, Greek troops who were disobeying orders, and Italian troops who were there without orders. From this resulted a difficult and confused situation. He is anxious that no national susceptibilities should be hurt, but he supposed that the Council also had susceptibilities. He thinks, therefore, that he might suggest that the whole method of procedure should be altered. The Greeks had been told to consult a naval officer before making any movement. It was not the business of a naval officer to know all the intricacies of land operations. This system had not worked well. The Italian troops, on the other hand, acted in an irresponsible manner, and are under no Allied control. Would it not be better for the orders of the Council to be conveyed to all the troops in Asia Minor through its local Commander-in-Chief? In Eastern Europe, General Franchet d’Esperey is the medium for the Council’s policy and Marshal Foch in the rest of Europe. Why should the same procedure not be adopted in Asia Minor, where the Commander-in-Chief is General Allenby? It is not because General Allenby is a British officer that he suggests this, but because he is Commander-in-Chief. There might even be some advantage in his being British, seeing that the British Government has no interests in the region affected. He suggests, therefore, that General Allenby be utilized as an agent of the Council just as Marshal Foch and General Franchet d’Esperey in other parts of the world. If this were done, the Turks would realize that the Conference does not approve of outrages, and that they are to be put a stop to. The face of both Greeks and Italians would be saved, and order would be established in Turkey. This solution would not only be logical, but would conducive to sound administration. This method could not injure Italian pride, as there are Italian troops at Konia already under General Allenby’s command. A very difficult situation could thus be regularized and some order could be made to reign over the trespasses of the Greeks and the unauthorized presence of the Italians.

M Pichon says that he thinks that General Milne is directly in command.

Mr Balfour says he thinks that is the case, but that General Milne is under the superior authority of General Allenby.

M Clemenceau says that to speak his mind freely, though he has great respect for General Allenby, he feels that, in Turkey, he acts as a British officer receiving orders from the British Government rather than as an Allied Commander-in-Chief. The effect of his activities is distinctly anti-French. This ambiguous situation is unsatisfactory. General Allenby commands British troops as a British General. As an Allied Commander-in-Chief he refuses to allow French troops to be relieved. He refuses to allow them to enter Syria. He places them in Cilicia, knowing that the mandate of Cilicia is likely to go to the Americans. All his agents were consistently against the French. On every occasion, he says that the unpopularity of the French troops renders their relief or their stationing in Syria undesirable. There is a pyramid of files on this subject, and he could prove what he said. General Hamelin had telegraphed that he did not dare celebrate the 14th of July, to which he (M Clemenceau) had replied, ordering that the day should be celebrated. It had been done and there had been no trouble. In Damascus, the French had been welcomed, in spite of all General Allenby had said. As a result of all this, a condition of confidence does not exist. He would have more to say on the subject later, but he is so anxious to make peace, that he does not absolutely refuse Mr Balfour’s proposals, provided some assurance would be given that General Allenby would consider himself not a British, but an Allied agent.

Mr Balfour says that he regrets M Clemenceau had raised the vexed question of Syria. He does not believe that his charges against General Allenby would be sustained. M Clemenceau says that he had provoked agitation against the French.

M Clemenceau says that General Allenby’s agents had done so even if he had not. He had also refused to allow the relief of French troops already in the country.

Mr Balfour says that he feels sure that no responsible British officer desired to impair French popularity in Syria. They know that, under no circumstances, would Great Britain accept a mandate in Syria. The British Government, therefore, had no motive for creating difficulties in the path of others. He did not wish to pursue this matter, but only to enter his caveat against these allegations. M Clemenceau might be thoroughly assured that any officer, British or other, to whom the work was entrusted, would be impartial. He thinks, in fact, the officer in charge would be General Milne, acting under the directions of General Allenby. This said, he does not think he need add anything to the arguments he had previously used.

M Clemenceau says that he has not disagreed with the proposal, but has felt it necessary to make a reservation.

Mr White says that he is inclined to approve of Mr Balfour’s proposal. An arrangement made only between the Italians and Greeks would not reassure the Turks. The proposal would regularize the position of the Italians, who had gone to the country without the authority of the Conference. The Commander-in-Chief would be able to issue orders to Turks, Greeks and Italians, and thus the Conference would be put in charge of the situation.

S Tittoni says that (as Mr White had observed), the proposal under discussion would amount to an official recognition of Italian presence in Asia Minor. He takes note of this, as he thinks that this ultimately must be done. Italian troops are there. They can not physically be there and officially not be there. He, personally, had not sent them there, but he is, nevertheless, in an equivocal position and he would like it regularized.

M Clemenceau says that though S Tittoni is not responsible for sending Italian troops to Asia Minor, he seems disposed to take advantage of their presence there. He trusts that whatever arrangements are made, S Tittoni will not base any claim on this situation again.

S Tittoni says that he undertakes not to plead accomplished facts, but to rely entirely on justification, based on title.

M Clemenceau says that provisionally the Council should accept the arrangements made between the Greeks and the Italians, and that it should also accept Mr Balfour’s proposal as giving the Council a means of being obeyed, provided only that the question of substance is entirely reserved. On this understanding only would he accept these arrangements. He suggests that Mr Venizelos be asked to come into the room to express his formal adhesion to the arrangement made with S Tittoni.

(Mr Venizelos then enters the room.)

M Clemenceau, addressing Mr Venizelos, says that the Council is about to take two decisions, to one of which he is a party.

Mr Venizelos says that he was in full agreement with S Tittoni.

M Clemenceau says that the agreement is accepted by the Council subject to the proviso that it does not affect the ultimate decision either on Greek or on Italian rights. Furthermore, the local Commander-in-Chief will be in control of all troops - Turkish, Greek and Italian. They will have to obey the orders of General Milne. It is probable also that Commissioners will be sent to inquire into the atrocities which it is reported have been committed by Greek troops. Mr Venizelos is doubtless aware of what had taken place.

Mr Venizelos says that he fully understands. He would, however, observe that the Government at Constantinople is not in full control of the situation. Action at the Capital therefore might not produce all the effect desired in Anatolia. The Committee of Union and Progress still has more power than appears on the surface.

M Clemenceau observes that Mr Venizelos himself does not always control the actions of his countrymen.

Mr Venizelos says that whenever excesses had been complained of, he had caused the culprits to be severely punished. There have been two executions. He does not wish to conceal anything and is quite ready to accept the Commission of Inquiry. He wishes, however, to leave a note with the Council, asking for the execution of two Clauses of the Armistice, namely the disarmament of Turkey and the control of railways either by Allied troops or failing them by Greek troops and Allied Officers. He further asks that he might be heard when the Council comes to determine the southern frontier of Bulgaria.

(This is agreed to.)

(Mr Venizelos then withdraws and it is decided that his note should be submitted to the Experts.)

(It is decided provisionally to accept the agreement reached between S Tittoni and Mr Venizelos as given above.)

It is further decided to adopt the following Resolution proposed by Mr Balfour:

1) Resolved that the Conference shall communicate to the Turkish Government their intention of immediately marking out the limiting lines beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops will be permitted to move, all rights secured to the Allies under the armistice being of course reserved. The Turkish Government is required to withdraw its troops to a position which will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief. The Turkish Government shall be at the same time informed that the limiting lines above referred to, have no relation to the ultimate territorial arrangements which will be imposed by the Peace Conference.

2) The Commander-in-Chief of the forces belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers in the Asiatic possessions of Turkey shall be directed to send officers who, after communicating with the Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna, and the Italian and Greek Generals, shall fix the military lines above referred to.

3) Any future movement of the Allied forces shall be under the supreme direction of the Commander-in-Chief who is responsible to the Conference for military operations in the Asiatic portion of the Turkish Empire.

M Clemenceau questions whether it would be useful to discuss this matter before Mr Balfour and Mr White have obtained the views of their Governments.

Mr White says that he would like more precise information before he consults his Government.

Mr Balfour says that the policy he would like to see carried out is:

1) That the execution of the Armistice by Hungary is required by the Conference.

2) That if the Armistice is carried out, Romanian troops should withdraw to the original frontier.

3) That the Allies cannot negotiate Peace with those who are breaking their engagements.

4) That the Conference cannot tolerate the continuation of conditions which would make Peace, Commerce and disarmament in Central Europe impossible.

Unless satisfactory evidence of compliance is obtained the necessary steps should be taken to enforce the will of the Conference. His attention has been drawn that morning to certain figures given on the previous day by Marshal Foch regarding the forces at the disposal of Bela Kun. His own hypothesis has been that the Hungarians are trying to collect an aggressive force to attack their neighbors. If this is untrue, the policy built upon it naturally must be abandoned, but if the hypothesis is true, he will recommend his Government to agree to military action.

M Clemenceau suggests that four Officers representing each of the Powers concerned should be sent to Hungary to verify the military situation and that Bela Kun be asked to allow them to make their investigation. Should he refuse, he would be admitting his guilt. Should he accept, the Council will be in a position to form an accurate judgment. A short time ago the Council had addressed him and said that no further conversation could be held with him because he had broken the Armistice. He had replied that a breach of the Armistice had been committed not by him but by the Romanians. The Council before acting, wished to know the exact truth.

S Tittoni says that he has no objection but he would like to re-enforce this action. The Council is dealing with a man whose ill-faith is proverbial. He has already used such communication as he had had with the Powers for his own advantage. He represents a small minority ruling an immense majority which is deprived of the means of rebelling. If his permission is solicited, this would increase his prestige. The Commission should be sent to Hungary without asking for his consent.

M Clemenceau said that he entirely agrees.

Mr White draws attention to the resolution of the Council recorded in H. D. 7 Para. 1,7 taken on July 15th:

“It was decided to refer the communication received from Bela Kun to Marshal Foch for a full report on the observances and non-observances of the original Armistice conditions by all parties concerned.”

M Clemenceau says that information obtained direct from the country would be more valuable than any information accessible to Marshal Foch.

S Tittoni said that the Commission should be numerous in order that it should produce a great moral effect.

M Clemenceau thinks that four General Officers would be sufficient. Instructions could be given to them, before they started, by the Council.

Mr White says that he would prefer to reserve his opinion until the afternoon’s meeting.

(It is agreed that the decision should be postponed until the next meeting at 16:00 on the same day.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, July 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


1. M Clemenceau says that he will ask M. Loucheur to explain the problem of the Austrian railways.

M Loucheur says that every year the Italian Government pays in a sum of 29,000,000 francs to the Sudbahn Company. The payment has been suspended since the outbreak of hostilities. The Italian Government had considered that it had a right to keep the annual payment of the 29,000,000 francs in question by way of reparation. The French Delegation does not agree. It has thought itself bound to protect the interests of shareholders of all nationalities, including German and Austrian Bondholders. The problem is not applicable for these latter, however. With regard to the other shareholders, the Italian Government had agreed to continue to pay in the sum in question to Paris. It had been further decided that a complete reorganization of the Sudbahn was necessary and that this reorganization would be both financial and technical, in view of the fact that the railway line in question now passes through several States. The shareholders will therefore be heard in the event of disagreement; they will be in a position to call for arbitration and the arbiter can be nominated by the League of Nations. Each person’s rights are therefore protected and all can participate in the reorganization that has been foreshadowed.

Mr Balfour says that the question includes two problems: the first one which is financial has been settled. The second is was a question of transportation between the five countries concerned. Has it been settled?

M Loucheur says that it has not been settled up to the present but that it has been decided that in the three months following the signature of the Treaty, a general meeting will be convened in order to settle the question arising out of the reorganization. No special clause for insertion in the Austrian Treaty has yet been thought of although possibly it would be preferable to insert one in order to be able to act at greater advantage in the case of Yugoslavia and the other countries concerned. If the Council so decides it could be drawn up and when decided upon, sent to the Drafting Committee.

(This proposal is accepted and M Loucheur and General Mance withdraw to draw up the text of the Article in question. When the text of the Article had been prepared, M Loucheur and General Mance re-enter the room.)

M Loucheur says that in collaboration with General Mance he has taken the text drawn up by the Italian Delegation and accepted by the Experts, and that they have decided to add the following paragraph:

“This arbitration might, as far as the southern railway lines in Austria are concerned, be demanded either by the Administrative Committee of the Company or by a representative of the Shareholders.”

S Tittoni asks whether the Italian Experts have been consulted and whether the text is in agreement with what they had consented to.

M Loucheur says that they have not been able to find S Crespi: that the text presented differed slightly, since it gives to the Representative of the Shareholders the right to demand arbitration.

S Tittoni says that the point is a new one and that he desires it to be laid before S Crespi.

(After a short discussion it is decided to accept the text given hereunder subject to its being accepted later on by S Crespi: the text is to be sent to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Austrian Treaty:

“With the object of ensuring regular utilization of the railroads of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, owned by private companies, which, as the result of the stipulation of the Treaty, will be situated in the territory of several States, the administrative and technical reorganizations of the said lines shall be regulated in each instance by an agreement between the owning companies and the States territorially concerned. Any differences on which agreement is not reached, including questions relating to the interpretation of contracts concerning the expropriation of lines shall be submitted to an arbitration designated by the Council of the League of Nations. This Arbitration may, as regards the Company, be required either by the Board of Management or by the representatives of the bond holders.”)


2. M Loucheur says that the question only concerns France, Great Britain, the United States and Belgium. The Representatives of these countries had received the Report.

S Tittoni asks whether the Commission deals with the economic questions.

M Loucheur said that it does not do so, but that a Report has been accepted unanimously by the Experts: it is based on the two German notes annexed to the Report. In order to summarize the question it is sufficient to say that the Germans in their note has always desired to modify the text of the Treaty as submitted to them, and that they have further attempted to interpret it in their own way. Our Commission has always rejected the modifications asked for, but it has always taken up a conciliatory attitude in questions of interpretation. The Commission thought that in acting in this way it was following the political lead which had been given to it. Among the modifications asked for, it has been thought necessary to reject the one which dealt with an Imperial Commission. The Commissioner who would have been nominated by the Germans ought, according to them, to be consulted by the Inter-Allied Commission which ought only to act in agreement with him. The Germans had also given a wrong interpretation to certain terms in the Convention; they had thought the terms in question full of pitfalls. They thought that the Allies desired to intervene in questions of primary education and in religious problems. They had been reassured and told that such a thing had never been in the intentions of the Allies. During the discussions there had only been one difficult point. The Germans had stated that the Imperial Commissioner had been nominated: they had been told in reply that the Commissioner should be acceptable to the Allies. In addition to this it had not been possible to agree to the Commissioner being a Representative of the Federal States.

The Germans had been told that if all the Federal States agreed to nominate the same person he would be accepted.

Mr Balfour asks whether the German Constitution had been examined.

M Loucheur replies that the German Constitution had been carefully examined. The remarks made to the German Delegates on the subject of the Commissioner had been suggested to them by the members of the Commission for the Rhine Convention. In, addition, by one of the Clauses of the Convention given we had the right of having delivered to us persons who having committed crime on the left bank of the Rhine, had taken refuge on the right. The Germans replied that they could not accept this clause on account of the question of extradition. They had been told that the question of extradition did not arise since both the banks of the Rhine were German territory. The proposals had therefore been rejected and the clause in question upheld. If the report were accepted, it was proposed that it should be sent in the form of a note to the German Delegation by the President of the Peace Conference.

(The reply to the German notes on the Rhine Convention unanimously recommended by M Loucheur’s Commission is therefore accepted, and it is further decided that an English text should be presented along with the French one after examination by the Drafting Committee.)


3. S Tittoni says he wishes to present the following note in the name of the Italian Government:

“The Italian Delegation reminds the Conference in the following terms of the reservation which it had made previously in similar terms with regard to the Peace Treaty with Germany: the first reservation had been accepted by the Supreme War Council at its meeting of the 16 June. The Italian Delegation thinks that the stipulations contained in the Convention of the League of Nations do not apply to territorial questions, or to such arrangements as may arise out of them; for these latter have been part of the duties of the Peace Conference, and have not yet been definitely settled.”

Mr Balfour says that S Tittoni’s statement amounts to this: the Italian frontiers have not yet been settled. If, therefore, the Italian Delegation agrees to sign the Treaty without reservation, as this latter includes the Covenant of the League of Nations, they might be compelled to accept decisions which they did not fully know before hand. It would not be just, and for this reason the Italian reservation has been made.

S Tittoni said that the reservation only applies to frontiers not yet settled. He thinks that the duty of settling such frontiers falls to the Peace Conference, and not to the League of Nations.

Mr Balfour says he agrees entirely, but that he wishes to ask a question. If the reservation is accepted and an agreement arrived at with regard to frontiers, could Italy at some future time, ten years hence possibly, raise the question again on the plea that it had made reservations? He therefore asks that the reservation should lapse at the date of the settlement of the frontier question.

S Tittoni says that the text of his reservation allows for that, since it deals with frontiers “not yet definitely settled”. When once the frontiers are settled the reservation lapsed.

Mr White says that they are only called upon to take note of a reservation.

M Clemenceau says that possibly they might be called upon to take note of it under Mr Balfour’s interpretation.

S Tittoni said that all that is asked for is that the frontiers between Italy and Yugoslavia should be settled by the Council and not by the League of Nations.

(Cognizance is taken of the following reservation made by S Tittoni on behalf of Italy:

“The Italian Delegation desires to recall and to renew in the following terms the reservation made by it on the subject of the Treaty with Germany which the Supreme Council accepted at its Meeting on June 16th.”

The Italian Delegation is of the opinion that stipulations of the Covenant of the League of Nations are not applicable to territorial questions and to the arrangements connected therewith, which having been made the subjects of consideration by the Peace Conference have not yet been settled.”


4. M Clemenceau says that they are called upon to send out a Commission of Inquiry into Asia Minor.

Mr White says that he has examined the question, and that he does not think he is able to reply to it without first referring it to his Government.

Mr Balfour says that he accepts the principle of the Committee of Inquiry, but that he cannot nominate his representatives before Monday.

S Tittoni said that he is in the same position as Mr Balfour.

(It is decided to send a Commission to Asia Minor consisting of one Commissioner each from Great Britain, France and Italy. The participation of the United States in this Commission is referred to the American Government.)


5. The question of nominating a Military Commission to inquire into the situation in Hungary is adjourned until Monday, so as to await Mr Balfour’s and Mr White’s acceptances.


6. At this moment the experts, General Bliss, Mr Hoover, General Belin, General Cavallero, Col. MacReady, Col. Kisch, and Commandant Lacombe enter the room.

Mr Hoover summarizes the report.

M Clemenceau says that the question involves shipping.

Mr Hoover says that M Clemenceau’s remark is true, but that a decision has to be arrived at as to the port into which the boats were to be sent and the method of transport by railway. The repatriation of the prisoners might take two to three months, and they would have to be fed during that period.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks the question is a military one, and that it should be studied by the military experts at Versailles.

Mr Balfour says that the British Red Cross has spent nearly a million pounds in the upkeep of these prisoners. This would have to be discontinued on account of the approaching demobilization, but that the Red Cross organisation is willing to devote its stores to this purpose, they would suffice to feed the prisoners for 15 days.

Mr Hoover remarks that the stock in question will only feed the 35,000 prisoners in the charge of the British Red Cross, and that it will not supply the other prisoners.

Mr Balfour asks why the Germans should not be approached in this matter. We have undertaken the feeding of these prisoners for seven months without having been obliged to do so. The Allies have done it in order to prevent the Germans from repatriating the prisoners under circumstances disadvantageous to themselves. Ought not, therefore, the Germans be invited to take charge of the feeding of the prisoners. He is told by his experts that Marshal Foch might quite well deal with the question.

Mr White says that a plan of repatriation had been accepted by the Council of Ten in the month of June. He thinks that the Ukrainians and the Poles had prevented the plan from being put into execution.

Mr Hoover says that the military authorities ought, therefore, to investigate the means of transport necessary, and study the question of feeding the prisoners. It should not be forgotten that a political question also arises, since the Allies had maintained the prisoners in Germany in order to prevent them joining the Bolsheviks.

M Clemenceau says that he does not think Marshal Foch can deal with the question, which is a political and financial one. The Allies are not dealing with prisoners taken by themselves, but with prisoners made by an enemy army. He, therefore, proposes to deal with the political and financial questions. Once they are decided upon, the manner in which they can be carried out could be investigated. He desires to have the opinion of his Military Experts on the point in question, which is, after all, a problem of military politics. It had been desired to avoid sending the Russian prisoners lest they should reinforce the Bolshevik Army or spread themselves out over Poland. The danger today is not so great as far as Poland is concerned, and Military Experts could deal with it.

General Bliss says that the question does not seem to him to be in a condition to be submitted to Versailles. It contains two problems. Mr Hoover had stated that there are no funds available for feeding the prisoners. How could they be supported, therefore, if the Germans refused to have anything to do with it? After that, the question arose as to how they should be repatriated and this raised the following problems; Firstly, are the prisoners to be repatriated immediately? Secondly, were they to be repatriated through Poland to the nearest Russian territory. Thirdly, are they to be repatriated to Black Sea Ports? Fourthly, if one of these alternatives is accepted, who would undertake to execute it? Fifthly, who would undertake to send the supplies and the personnel necessary in the interval? Could not the proposal made by the Economic Commission on the 17th June be accepted? In any case, it was necessary to take immediately the necessary measures for repatriating the prisoners. Some solution had to be adopted rapidly, because the operations would require a good deal of time and must be concluded before Winter. If the proposal is accepted, our own Delegation and the Allied Delegations could telegraph to their Governments to obtain the necessary powers. The repatriation must be carried out as rapidly as possible. The Military Authorities could then be put in touch with the question and may study the best means of carrying out the repatriation.

M Clemenceau says that it involves a great danger for Poland. As far as the Russian prisoners are concerned, the question is not one of feeding 35,000 under the charge of the British Red Cross, but of supplying all.

General Bliss says that some decision must be arrived at, because the repatriation will take a long time.

M Clemenceau says that the question should have been presented to the Council at an earlier date.

Mr Balfour says that Marshal Foch had received a communication on the subject four months ago.

Mr Hoover says that the Council had been put in touch with the question four months ago, and that it was noted that nothing had been done. There was a solution possible. There are Armies of Occupation in Germany with the necessary Army Service Corps Units attached. The Armies of Occupation had been reduced in number on account of demobilization with the result that the Army Service Corps Units could take charge of the prisoners.

Mr Balfour says that Mr Hoover’s solution is very ingenious, but that it only settles one of the two questions, that of feeding. The repatriation question remains open, and to settle it more tonnage was necessary together with the consent of the Polish Government with regard to the passage across that country of the prisoners in question. The method of repatriation was the most difficult. Were the Military Authorities at Versailles competent to resolve the question? If they were not, a special Committee would be necessary in which the Versailles Experts should be represented, together with Naval Experts and possibly political Experts.

M Clemenceau says that the Council could decide on political questions.

Mr Balfour says that at the present time 500 Americans are dealing with the supplies and feeding stock. It had been said to him that these 500 Americans were about to be withdrawn, but that the Army Service Corps Units in the Armies of Occupation could carry on the work. The Commission would, therefore, only be concerned with the question of railways, ports, etc.

M Clemenceau says that, under these circumstances, the question could very well be dealt with by the Military Experts at Versailles, to whom Naval Experts could be joined. His proposal was accepted.

(It is therefore agreed

a) That upon the failure of the supplies already provided for the feeding of Russian prisoners now in Germany, they should be fed and supplied by the Military Authorities of the Armies of Occupation until repatriated.

b) That the means of repatriation of the Russian prisoners now in Germany and maintained at the cost of the Allies should be referred for study to the Military Representatives at Versailles with whom would be associated for this purpose the Naval Advisers.)


7. Mr Hoover makes a short résumé of the memorandum on the subject.

He draws the attention of the Council, moreover, to the fact the Georgian Authorities had only agreed to allow the supplies to pass through their territory on condition of a certain proportion being given to them. They now demand one-half of the supplies. This demand is not from necessity, because they do not lack food, but is made simply for the purpose of speculation. For this reason the Council is asked to send a menacing telegram to the Georgian Authorities, in order to facilitate the transport of supplies during two or three months. The future destiny of Georgia depends on the Conference, and there was every hope that they would yield to our wishes.

(It is therefore decided that M Clemenceau, as Chairman of the Peace Conference, should send the following telegram in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Government of Georgia:

“The Council has been made aware of the interference of the Georgian Authorities when food supplies are sent into Armenia in an endeavor on the part of the Allied Governments to stem the tide of starvation and death among these unfortunate people. The Council cannot state in too strong terms that such interference and that such action taken by the Georgian Authorities together with the continuation of such action must entirely prejudice their case. The Council therefore expects that the Authorities in Georgia shall not only give the privileges of transportation over the Railway routes at which they at present control, but will devote themselves to assisting in the transmission of these supplies at no more than the normal charge and remuneration for such service. The Council awaits the reply of the Authorities in Georgia as to whether or not they are prepared to acquiesce in this arrangement.”)


8. M Pichon, who has studied the question, reads an extract from a report of the military authorities dated 11th July.

Baron Makino says that he wishes to make a remark. It had been decided some time back by the Supreme Council that the Czechoslovaks should be evacuated through Omsk to Archangel, and that the Japanese Government should then be asked to protect the railway. He had telegraphed to his Government in that sense. Their reports tended to show that since the Czechoslovaks do not accept the proposal the Japanese Government had suspend its decision. The question now is of repatriation by Vladivostok. This is a new proposal which must be submitted to the Japanese Government. It is probable that it will wish to obtain all the information available and possibly would desire to consult the local authorities. The examination would take several days during which it would be impossible for him to reply to the Supreme Council.

(After a short discussion it is decided that with regard to the repatriation of the Czechoslovaks from Siberia, that M Clemenceau should send a copy of the following telegram to the American Government and that Baron Makino should send the same telegram to the Japanese Government:

“In view of the condition and wishes of the Czechoslovak troops in Siberia, the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers consider it urgently necessary that arrangements should be made for the systematic repatriation of the troops from Vladivostok.

This involves the replacement of those troops along that portion of the trans-Siberian railway which is at present guarded by them.

Information is therefore requested as to whether the American/Japanese Government will furnish the necessary effectives or will co-operate with the Japanese/American Government to this end. A similar telegram has been addressed to the Japanese/American Government.”)

[Jimbuna]

19th July 1919

Aftermath of War

Peace celebrations in the United Kingdom.

General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, and Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for War and Secretary of State for Air, converse in London.


American troops participate in a victory parade in London and salute King George V.


American troops on the ship U.S.S. Philippine as they depart Brest, France to return home.

[Jimbuna]

20th July 1919

British soldiers of the Graves Registration Unit rests on the beach at Ostend, Belgium.


Military units are taking part in the 'Peace Day' parade through central London. This shot of Westminster Bridge was taken from Big Ben and shows the partly built County Hall top left.


Troops of the anti-Bolshevik Russian Don Army in Balashov.


Race riots break out in Washington D.C., as white servicemen and civilians attack black businesses and homes. 15 people are killed on both sides in the following days.

[Jimbuna]

21st July 1919

Aftermath of War

The United Kingdom ratifies the Treaty of Versailles.

French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau famously states, "It is easier to make war than make peace."

Race riot breaks out during celebrations to welcome home the African-American veterans of World War I


United Kingdom flag created out of a giant human formation.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, July 19 & 20, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings these two days.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, July 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


1. (a) Mr Balfour says that before starting with the subjects on the Agenda, he would like to observe that there is not a single item on it touching Peace with Bulgaria, or indeed touching any Treaty of Peace at all. The subjects for discussion ire no doubt important subjects, but the Bulgarians are to come to Paris on the following Friday. He thinks it will be discreditable if the Conference is not ready to hand them a Treaty on their arrival, or shortly after it. He understands that the delay comes from the re-opening of the frontier question. The Reparation and Financial Clauses are delayed in consequence. Unless the ultimate size of Bulgaria were known, it is difficult to estimate what sums she will be able to pay. Another question that is delayed is that of responsibilities, and the method of procedure to be adopted against persons who had broken the laws of war. He has inquired why Clauses similar to those inserted in the Treaties with Germany and with Austria are not adopted for the Treaty of Bulgaria, and he has been given the following explanations. In the other Treaties it had been stipulated that if the crime had been committed to the detriment of a Frenchman, the trial should be in a French Court, and if against an Englishman, in an English Court. If against Nationals of several countries, in a mixed Court. It appeared, however, that a Greek, Serbian, or Romanian Court would not be regarded as offering a fair trial to a Bulgarian who had committed an offence against a Greek, Serbian or Romanian. This might or might not be, but whatever the merits of the case, he thinks the Council should insist that the work be terminated rapidly. He would suggest that M Clemenceau should request the Commissions to expedite their labors.

Mr White says that he would like to add a word to Mr Balfour’s remarks. He wishes to propose that the Council should give authority to the Commission on New States to take up the protection of minorities clauses for the Treaty with Bulgaria. He understands that the Economic Clauses and the clauses prepared by the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission are ready.

Mr Balfour thinks that Mr White’s information is not quite accurate. The Port question for instance, was held up, pending a decision as to whether or not Bulgaria is to have Dedeagatch (modern Alexandroupoli).

Mr White says that in any case the Commission on New States might get to work on Clauses for the protection of minorities.

(It is agreed that the Commission on New States be asked to prepare for the Treaty with Bulgaria.)

(b) S Tittoni says that in accordance with the request of his colleagues, he has discussed the question of frontiers between Greece and Bulgaria with Mr Venizelos. The latter demands the whole of Eastern and Western Thrace, and declines to reduce his claims in any respect. It is therefore impossible to obtain any concession and the question must be decided by the Council. Consequently he considers his mission ended as he can obtain nothing further from Mr Venizelos.

(c) M Clemenceau says that he will ask M Tardieu to explain the situation regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria.

(M Tardieu entered the room.)

M Clemenceau says that the Bulgarians are expected to arrive in four days. He asks him, as President of the Commission dealing with Bulgaria, to explain to what extent the Treaty is ready for them.

M Tardieu says that he is only President of the Commission dealing with the frontier question. In that Commission, the result obtained is total disagreement between the American and Italian Delegations on the one hand, and the British, French and Japanese Delegations on the other. M Tardieu then reads and explains the report. He says that he would like to add a few words in support of the opinions he had himself backed in the Commission. In western Thrace there is no choice between Greece and Bulgaria on ethnological grounds. The vast majority of the population was Turkish. The country, however, is not to be given to the Turks. The next most numerous population is, according to French statistics, Greek; according to other statistics, Bulgarian. It is very likely that the war has brought about alterations in the relative proportions of the population. As to the possession of a Port, the Bulgarians have a good Port on the Black Sea. The internationalization of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles will give them free access to the open sea. As to discontent, there will undoubtedly be discontent in Bulgaria, but the Balkans are the natural home of discontent, and the only question is whether discontent should be chiefly on the side of those who had fought against us, or mainly, among the Balkan Nations who had fought for us. He would remind the Council that the impossible desire to produce union in the Balkans had wasted precious months during the war. It led to the Allied defeat at the Dardanelles, and to numerous troubles in Salonika. The mistakes made in the war should not be repeated in the Peace. As to the ultimate disposal of Eastern Thrace, he did not wish to prejudice the question. It might perhaps be most fitting to attribute it to the territory of Constantinople should the Council decide not to give it to Greece. The point was, not who got it, but who lost it.

M Clemenceau says that the question is evidently one which the Council must solve. He is prepared to discuss it at once, but he is afraid that Mr White will not be able, without consulting his Government, to reach a decision immediately.

Mr White says this is so.

M Clemenceau says that unfortunately he cannot be present in the Council on the following day, and that M Pichon also would be unavoidably detained in Brussels. He is not sure that a meeting can be held on Wednesday. He hopes that by Thursday Mr White can obtain the views of his Government.

Mr White says that he will send a second telegram that very evening to endeavor to obtain instructions by Thursday.

Mr Balfour says that he regrets the delay as he regards the matter as very urgent. He will, however, as it is necessary, assent to a postponement until Thursday.

(In view of the importance of terminating the Treaty of Bulgaria at the earliest possible moment, it is decided that the first item on the Agenda for Thursday, July 24th, should be the determination of the frontiers of Bulgaria.)


2. M Clemenceau says that he has just received a communication from Bela Kun announcing that he proposes to attack the Romanians, in order to enforce upon them respect for the Armistice arranged by the Powers. M Clemenceau adds that he does not know whether the Romanians will be able to resist the attack. They have two divisions with which to oppose it. French troops are not far off and General Franchet d’Esperey has ordered them to fire if attacked. This news perhaps renders the appointment of the Committee unnecessary.

Mr Balfour says that he considers himself authorized to nominate a General to go to Hungary. The General in question is Major-General Gorton.

M Clemenceau says that the Generals might proceed to the front and report on what was going on there.

Mr White says that he has, as yet, received no orders from Washington.

S Tittoni says that, according to news from a good source General Boehm, who had been Commander of the Hungarian Red Army, had paid a visit to Vienna. He had ceased to be Commander-in-Chief but appeared to be still in touch with Bela Kun. It would seem, from what he had said in Vienna, that an effort was being made to convert the Communist Government of Hungary into a Socialist Government. He suggests that the Allied Representatives at Vienna be asked to inquire into this report and inform the Council of the results of their inquiry.

(It is decided not to nominate the Committee of Inquiry until such time as Mr White should have obtained the views of his Government. It is further decided that the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers in Vienna should be asked for information regarding the visit of General Boehm to that city, and to investigate the report that he had declared that he was trying to bring about a movement in Hungary aiming at the transformation of the present Communist Government of Bela Kun into a Socialist Government. The truth and eventual importance of the alleged scheme should be verified.)

(At this point the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites enter the room.)


3. The Council has before it a report of the Military Representatives on the Army of Occupation in Upper Silesia.

Report of the Military Representatives on Army of Occupation in Upper Silesia General Belin reads the conclusions of the report to the effect that 1 division of 13,000 men will be required.

Mr Balfour asks whence this division could be obtained.

General Belin says that, in the first draft of the report it has been suggested that the division should be drawn from the troops employed in the occupation of the Rhineland. He would suggest, therefore, that Marshal Foch be asked if he can spare the troops. These troops would not be lost to Marshal Foch’s command: they would be stationed on the confines of Poland and Prussia, and, should any trouble arise requiring armed intervention, these troops, which would remain under Marshal Foch’s orders, could be utilized to co-operate with any movements made in the west.

M Clemenceau says that Marshal Foch’s estimate for the troops of occupation is 150,000 men. He will certainly be able to spare 13,000 from this number. He entirely agrees with the judicious remarks of General Belin. The division, would, no doubt be composed of international elements.

(It is agreed that the report of the Military Representatives, together with the suggestion that the necessary troops should be furnished by the Army of Occupation on the Rhine, be approves in principle and be submitted to Marshall Foch for his views regarding the possibility of furnishing the divisions required and on its composition.)


4. The Council has before it a report of the Military Representatives.

General Belin reads the conclusions of the Report under the heading “Material Assistance.”

M Clemenceau says that the means of transport to Poland are unsatisfactory. An inter-allied train, laden with munitions on its way to Poland, has been blown up on German territory. The German Government does not appear to be involved. The train was guarded by Polish soldiers, who had apparently been neglectful. It would perhaps, therefore, be advantageous to organize transport by sea.

Mr Balfour points out that the only port available is Danzig and that Allied control over it was not very good.

M Clemenceau says that the situation at Danzig had improved. The turbulent elements are quieter and the German Government appears to be resigned to losing the port. He suggests that the best plan would be to ask Marshal Foch to telegraph to General Nudant in Berlin to open negotiations with the German Government regarding transport by sea.

(It is decided that Marshal Foch be asked to initiate negotiations with the German Government for the transport of material for Poland to Danzig.)

General Belin then reads the conclusions of the report under the heading “Preventive Measures.” He explains that there are Allied officers serving in the Polish Army. Some of these might be nominated in advance to posts on the Delimitation Commission, which, as such, are only to be appointed 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty. These officers might, in anticipation of their future duties, undertake to supervise the handing over of the ceded districts.

(This proposal is agreed to. It is decided that Marshal Foch be requested to report on the possibility of appointing Allied Officers serving in the Polish Army, who would ultimately be nominated to the Delimitation Commission, to supervise the transfer of the ceded territory from Germany to Poland.)


5. M Clemenceau says that he received a letter from Mr Venizelos regarding the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. Mr Venizelos desires that a Greek Commissioner be appointed. This proposal does not appear to be very acceptable.

Mr Balfour points out that the Council had sent French and Italian officers to investigate the incidents at Fiume.

M Clemenceau observes that the case is different. At Fiume the incidents had occurred between Nationals of the Great Powers. In Asia Minor the incidents concern Greeks and Turks. It appears to him unreasonable to appoint a Greek to investigate a case of that kind. If his colleagues disagree with him, however, he will not press this point of view.

S Tittoni says that he is of the same opinion as M Clemenceau. The investigating Commission would be the direct emanation of the Council. It should, therefore, conform to the composition of the Council. If a Greek officer were to be appointed to the Commission in Asia Minor, it might be argued on the same lines that Mr Venizelos should have remained in the room, at a previous meeting, when the Council deliberated on the subject of the Greek occupation in Anatolia.

Mr Balfour said that in the early days of the Conference, it had been laid down that Powers with limited interests should be represented when matters directly affecting them were discussed.

M Clemenceau said that they were heard on matters regarding their interests, but the deliberations were conducted by the Five Powers.

Mr White says that he thinks the argument on both sides is strong, and that he had no very definite preferences.

Mr Balfour asks the military experts present in the room whether they think the collaboration of a Greek officer would be conducive to a sound finding.

General Thwaites expresses the opinion that it is undesirable to appoint a Greek officer.

General Bliss says that the presence of officers of all Allied Nations would give an appearance of impartiality. He does not feel strongly on the subject, but he is inclined personally to think that there should be officers from each of the Allied Nations on the Commission.

M Clemenceau says that the presence of a Greek officer on the Commission would doubtless not matter much.

S Tittoni objects to it as creating a precedent, which challenges the whole mechanism of the Conference.

Mr Balfour observes that the Greek officer would go as a representative of the Powers.

(After some further discussion it is agreed that Mr Venizelos be informed that he might appoint a Greek officer to follow the labors of the Commission. This officer will not, however, have a vote on the Commission and will take no part in its finding.

The following nominations were then made:

For Italy: General Dallolio.
For France: General Franchet d’Esperey to nominate an officer.
For Great Britain: General Milne to nominate an officer.
For The United States of America: An officer to be appointed after a reply from Washington has been received.

It is decided that the Commission should begin its labors at once, and should gather as early as possible at Constantinople.)


6. (It is agreed that nominations to this Commission should be communicated to the Secretary-General on the following day.)

7. Mr Balfour says that the report is to the effect that the Commission is unable to say whether the money required by General Gough is really necessary, whether the Allied Governments could furnish the money and what security exists for repayment. For all the assistance given to the Council, the Commission might as well not have reported at all. He quotes from a telegram from General Gough to the effect that the Germans are paying 15 million marks a month to support the Baltic Landwehr and the troops of Prince Lieven, and suggesting that to deliver Latvia and Russia from financial obligation to Germany, the Germans be ordered to continue payment into a British bank to the account of the Ulmannis Government as a portion of the reparation due from Germany. Mr Balfour adds that it is surprising that the Germans should be able to pay such a sum while all the Entente Powers together could not afford half a million a month.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks the matter cannot be settled at that meeting.

(The question is therefore postponed.)


8. M Tardieu says that, as he had previously explained, there is a Commission to supervise the execution of the Territorial and Political Clauses of the Treaty, and another to supervise the execution of the Reparation and Financial Clauses. There are, however, two other important chapters in the Treaty requiring similar Commissions, namely, the Economic and Colonial. He pointed out that the existing Committees could not perform this work He, therefore, proposes that a Committee be appointed to supervise the execution of these Clauses of the Treaty.

Baron Makino says that, as regards the Colonial Clauses, the most important of these were covered by the work of the Reparation Commission, and the remainder by the Committee dealing with Mandates. The work of these two bodies appeared to cover the main part of the Articles dealing with German colonies. If anything is left over, there might be a reason for appointing a new Commission, and he would be glad to know what remains over.

M Tardieu says that he agrees. The Reparation Commission can, he thinks, in a few hours deal with all questions which the Committee on Mandates left untouched. All he wishes is that some body should be required to do the necessary work on behalf of the Council.

Baron Makino suggests that the Committee on Mandates should be asked to make a report.

(After some further discussion, the two following resolutions are then adopted:

1) That the supervision of the execution of the Economic Clauses of the Treaty with Germany should be entrusted to the Economic Commission. The Commission was asked to report to the Council at an early date.

2) That the supervision of the execution of the Colonial Clauses of the Treaty with Germany should be entrusted to the Mandates Committee. The Committee is asked to report to the Council at an early date.)


9. M Tardieu says that he has just seen a letter which had not been communicated to the Commission dealing with the question of Klagenfurt.

S Tittoni observes that the question relating to war material was totally different from that of the Armistice line.

M Tardieu says that the Council had required a line to be drawn behind which the two belligerent parties could withdraw. It had then been thought right that this line should, as nearly as possible, be the boundary between the plebiscite areas. This had been done. An argument was now raised by the Yugoslavs against withdrawing behind the line on the plea that there was a certain stock of arms and munitions captured by them from the Austrians which they were entitled to remove. He thinks this excuse for not withdrawing should not be tolerated.

Mr Balfour says that he had imagined that it had been arranged that the Serbs should retire leaving behind them a small guard under Allied officers to watch those stores, to which it appeared they had a legitimate title. There appears to be no serious objection to the execution of this plan. The stores belonged to the Serbs and should they have to abandon them they would have a real grievance.

S Tittoni says that the matter is not as clear to him as it seemed to be to Mr Balfour. Mr Balfour seems convinced that these stores belong to the Serbs. The Serbs had occupied the territory in which these stores were after the armistice. They had no right, therefore, to claim as war booty material taken after the armistice. These stores represent a security for the reparation due from Austria. In it the Serbs were entitled not to the whole, but to one-fifth. The whole question should therefore be handed over to the Reparation Commission. If all the armaments in Austria were bartered away, there would finally remain nothing in the country to pay reparation. Further, he thinks the presence of Serbian troops, even in small numbers, is incompatible with the due observance of the plebiscite. As it is, the inhabitants complained that the Serbians threatened them. The same plan therefore should be adopted in this territory as was adopted in the areas in dispute between Germans and Poles. A police force is required, but not one representing either claimant.

Mr Balfour says that S Tittoni’s argument was a strong one, but it could hardly apply to a very small section of Serbian troops posted to guard a building. This he thinks is all that the proposed force amounts to. He would like to ask at what date the plebiscite was to take place.

M Tardieu said that S Tittoni’s observation might have force at the time when the plebiscite was to occur, but this was to be from three to six months after the coming into force of the Treaty. The Treaty had not yet been signed.

Mr Balfour said that long before this the munitions would have been removed, and the Serbian guard would have gone with them.

M Tardieu says that he would suggest a slight modification of Mr Balfour’s proposal, namely, that instead of a Serbian guard, the Allied generals in the area be asked to take charge of the stores, and to give the Serbians a receipt.

(The following Resolution was then adopted:

“It was decided that the troops of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes be required to evacuate the whole of zone “B” in the Klagenfurt Basin, in conformity with the boundary already communicated to them. The arms and stores claimed by them will be handed over for custody to the Allied Generals, who will furnish a receipt for the same.”)

10. M Clemenceau says that there is a complaint communicated by Mr Paderewski that the Germans are removing from Danzig all that is necessary for the working of the factories. The complaint emanates from a Committee of the working population of Danzig.

M Clemenceau proposes that Marshal Foch be asked to deal with the question.

(It is decided to refer the document communicated by Mr Paderewski regarding German action in Danzig to Marshal Foch for suitable action.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

22nd July 1919

Russian peasants line up to receive food from the Red Cross in Archangelsk, Russia, currently occupied by the Allies and anti-Bolshevik forces.


In Chicago, the dirigible “Wingfoot Air Express” catches on fire and crashes into the Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, killing 13 in total. The dirigible.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, July 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

23rd July 1919

American troops taking drawing lessons at the Electoral Palace, Koblenz in occupied Germany.


Refugees returning to the Dobruja region of Romania prepare to sleep outside due to a lack of shelter.

[Jimbuna]

24th July 1919

Aftermath of War

General Sir H. H. Wilson promoted to Field-Marshal.

Military sent into Washington, D.C. to restore order after race riots rampage all over the city.


Five members of the US Air Service departed Bolling Field, Washington, D.C., in a Glenn Martin Bomber for the “Round-the-Rim Flight” around the periphery of US. They arrived back at Bolling on Nov. 9, 1919. The distance of approximately 10,000 miles was flown in 114 hours, 45 minutes.


A man and a woman on their way to being executed as German spies.


At the Erzurum Congress, the Turkish Revolutionaries elect Mustafa Kemal as chairman of the congress and declare “the motherland [Turkey] is a whole and cannot be divided.”

[Sailor Steve]

There will be no meetings on Monday, July 22, Tuesday, July 23, or Wednesday, July 24.

[Jimbuna]

25th July 1919

This is Friday 25th July 1919 and 10,000 people have been invited to Buckingham Palace to attend the King's Open Court in the grounds of the Palace as a grateful and unique tribute to War Workers.


Members of the Czechoslovak Legion return home from Siberia with their pet birds.


A former mosque in Thessalonica, Greece is turned into a shelter for refugees.