100 Years Ago Today

[Jimbuna]

9th August 1919

The serialized novel “The Curse of Capistrano” begins publication, featuring the character Zorro for the first time.

[Buddahaid]

Jim, I'm getting error message for most all of the images you've been posting for the past week or so.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, August 8, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


(Marshal Foch and the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council are present.)

1. M Clemenceau communicates a letter from the Financial Italian Delegation on this subject to the Council.

S Tittoni asks that the question should be submitted to the Finance Committee for examination and report.

(It is therefore agreed that the letter from the Italian Delegation with regard to the Financial Situation in Fiume should be submitted to the Finance Committee for examination and report.)


2. M Clemenceau asks whether the Americans have any news from Budapest.

Mr Polk communicates a telegram.

M Clemenceau said that he does not see that the Council can do anything at present.

Mr Balfour, commenting upon the telegram, asks why the Allied and Associated representatives at Vienna had received some, and not all, of the instructions given to the Committee of General Officers.

Mr Polk said that he can only say that the instructions had been sent through Warsaw to General Gorton.

General Sackville-West says that the instructions had been sent on the previous day, in writing, and by telegram. The former would go by courier, but the latter would have to be communicated by the best means that the Allied representatives in Vienna could devise.

Mr Balfour asks whether the American organisation for telegraphic communication with Central Europe had been employed.

Mr Norman replies that an attempt had been made to send the communication by wireless telegraph from the Eiffel Tower.

Mr Balfour said that he did not think the question was of great importance, so long as every means had been employed for communicating with the Allied and Associated representatives concerned.

S Tittoni then draws attention to the instructions to the four Generals, dealing with the distribution of war materials to the Allies.

He thinks that the insertion of the phrase in the instructions in question was somewhat premature. He understands that the Council is to decide finally on the distribution of the total war material taken from the enemy, on the general principle that each Ally was to have a share proportionate to its effort. The question, therefore, still remains to be settled.

Mr Balfour says that he does not quite understand how the phrase objected to by S Tittoni had been inserted.

M Clemenceau agrees with the principle enunciated by S Tittoni, and said that he thinks a telegram should be sent to the Generals.

General Weygand said that he would draft the necessary telegram to the Generals.

(It is decided that General Weygand should send a telegram to the four Generals on the Commission to Budapest, informing them that as the general principle governing the distribution of enemy war material to the Allies had not as yet been decided on by the Council, their functions in the matter should be limited to making such recommendations as they might think fit.)


3. Mr Balfour states that the Austrian Delegation has just sent in a general reply on the subject of the peace terms. The communications in question would be sent to the various Committees for examination, in accordance with the procedure established. Furthermore, each Committee would report separately on the points in the Note with which it is immediately concerned. The Council, after receiving and considering the replies of these various Committees, would send them to the Coordinating Committee for the necessary action. He therefore proposed a modification of the procedure, which would consist in sending the replies of the various Committees to the Coordinating Committee first, which latter body, after considering them as a whole, should report to the Council. Replies to Austrian Notes

Captain Portier informs Mr Balfour that this procedure has already been adopted.


(The Finance Experts enter the Room.)

4. M Cheysson drew the attention of the Council to the telegram contained in Appendix “C”. He says the Council is faced with the alternative of the eventual bankruptcy of the Turkish state, or of partially consenting to the measures which the Ottoman Government were taking. He thought it would be better to have further information before taking definite measures. Such information would take the form of a general report on the financial position of the Turkish Government. He did not think that it would be proper to allow the Turks to proceed with the sale of state property without further inquiry. He suggested that they should be asked why the sale of their credits and property was so urgent, and what form of realizable property they proposed to sell. Sale of State Property by the Ottoman Government

S Tittoni said that he agrees with M Cheysson as to the need of a general report upon the financial position of Turkey. He thinks, however, that a distinction should be made between

1) The private property of the Sultan

2) The properties of religious foundations, and

3) The State domains.
No. 3 constituted a fund of State property which was a most important guarantee of ultimate reparation. The private property of the Crown could be sold by the Turkish Govt. as it could not be regarded as confiscated property, subjected to the payment of war damages. The properties of religious foundations could not be seized in payment of war damages, and the Turkish Government might, in a similar manner, sell them.

M Cheysson said that in the Peace Treaties with Austria and Germany, the Crown property had been regarded as belonging genuinely to the State, and as being, in consequence, liable to confiscation.

S Tittoni said that he can not quite agree, as a distinction had been established between the private and public property of the Ruler, the later falling under the jurisdiction of the National Executive.

M Pichon says that he does not think that distinctions of the kind were applicable to Eastern countries, and that it would be better to adopt a simpler general rule.

S Tittoni said that he only desired that in communicating a general report upon the financial situation in Turkey, the Financial Commission should take into consideration the point that he had raised.

Mr Balfour asks whether, under the terms of the Armistice, we were empowered to ask for the exact information required. Could we, for instance, have made a similar request to Germany?

M Cheysson remarks that he thinks that until such time as the Peace Treaty should be signed, the Allied and Associated Governments were able to take whatever measures they thought necessary for the preservation of their interests.

Mr Polk says that as it would be a long time before the final peace could be arrived at, with Turkey, and as the existing Armistice was incomplete in certain points, due to its having been drawn up at an early period, would it not be advantageous to draft a more complete and conclusive Armistice, which would enable us to tide over the intervening time?

Mr Balfour says that he thinks Mr Polk’s suggestion, if put into effect, would be a trifle high-handed.

Mr Polk suggests that the necessary measures might be effected by mutual agreement.

Mr Dulles draws attention to the fact that in the successive Armistices imposed upon Germany, measures had been taken with a view to preserving securities and other properties for the purposes of ultimate reparations.

Mr Balfour agrees, but says that these additional terms have only been imposed in exchange for concessions on other points granted by the German Government.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks the necessary measures could only be put into effect by Treaty provisions.

Mr Balfour then suggested that it might be best:

1) To refuse to recognize the sales of property now being carried out by the Turkish Government until the final signature of the Peace Treaty. Such a measure would put prospective purchasers on their guard, and

2) After receiving a full report on the financial position of the Ottoman Government, authorization might be given to proceed with sales of a certain class, in order that the Turkish Empire might be saved from bankruptcy.
(It is therefore decided:

1) That a communication should be sent to the Ottoman Government through the French High Commissioner at Constantinople, informing it that the Allied and Associated Governments refused, and would refuse to recognize the validity of any sales, effected by such Government, between the signature of the Armistice and the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

2) That the Allied and Associated Governments should reserve to themselves the right to grant special licenses to the Ottoman Government for the sale of such property as the aforesaid Ottoman Government might desire to realize: the conditions of sale, and the property to be realized, being specified, in detail, beforehand, to the Allied and Associated Governments.

3) That the Financial Commission should Inquire into, and present, a general report on the financial position of the Ottoman Government, and should examine the question of the sale by that Government of

a) Private properties of the Crown.

b) Properties belonging to religious foundations.

c) State domains.


(At this point Colonel Peel enters the Room and M Cheysson withdraws.)

5. Colonel Peel presents and remarked on the proposals put forward by the Reparations Commission.

He draws attention to the observations made by the Delegations of the Greek, Roumanian and Yugoslav Governments on the subject of the Reparation Clauses, and to the opinion of the Reparation Commission upon the criticism raised against the articles in the Peace Treaty dealing with reparations by Bulgaria.

In conclusion, he draws attention to the calculation made by the American Delegation on the subject of reparations in Balkan countries. The results of this calculation were that the reparations to be paid by Bulgaria were to be regarded as a national payment of Fes 600 for each citizen. The total load of debt and obligations upon Serbia, represented a payment of Fes 300 per citizen.

Finally, he wishes that a modification should be inserted into Article 14, so as to enable the Reparations Commission to collect debts due by Germany to the National Bank of Bulgaria.

(It is agreed:

1) To accept the figure of 2¼ milliards of Francs, which the Reparations Commission considered to be the maximum sum payable by Bulgaria.

2) To accept the findings of the Commission with regard to the debts due by Germany to Bulgaria, and by Bulgaria to Germany, and not to add such credits to the total sum payable by the Bulgarian Government.

3) To accept the findings of the Reparations Commission on the subject of the cattle and live stock to be delivered by the Bulgarians to the Serbs.

4) That neither Greece, nor Romania, nor Yugoslavia should be represented on the Inter-Allied Committee for Bulgaria.

5) That Article 14 of the Financial and Reparation Clauses should be modified in such a manner as to allow the Reparations Commission to collect debts due by Germany to the National Bank of Bulgaria.)


6. Marshal Foch explained his report on the subject of the German Forces in the 10 kilometre and 50 kilometre zones on the right bank of the Rhine.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch’s proposals with regard to the German Military forces for maintaining order in the 10 kilometre and the 50 kilometre zones on the right bank of the Rhine should be accepted.)


7. Marshal Foch says that the question to be discussed had been brought forward in his letter of the 6th of August to the President of the Council. His conclusion has been, that the Council ought to take an immediate resolution with regard to the constitution of the Allied Forces, and to the total forces necessary.

M Clemenceau asked whether Italy should be regards as consenting to participate in the occupation.

Marshal Foch replied that he understood that Italy would participate, and that contributions to the forces would come from four sources.

M Clemenceau says that the question before the Council is whether each Country consented to send a quarter of the total effectives.

Mr Balfour said that Great Britain is quite willing to send her share; but that a practical difficulty with regard to the provisioning of the troops called for solution. It would be very difficult for Great Britain to send the necessary provisions to any of its forces stationed in Upper Silesia; On the other hand, such an operation would be relatively easy for France. He therefore proposes that the Headquarter Staffs should examine the question of distributing the troops. England might take a greater share in any operations affecting the coastal regions, such as Danzig; while France might make a proportionately larger contribution towards operations in such regions as Upper Silesia. The total force would be the same; only the disposal of the troops would be modified.

M Clemenceau remarks that a decision has been arrived at, to the effect that the forces of occupation in Upper Silesia should be taken from the Armies in the Rhine territories. The question of transport had not therefore arisen, since troops taken from such sources would probably be sent by land. Since the provisioning of the troops on the left bank of the Rhine was carried out en bloc, the same thing would probably hold good for military forces in Upper Silesia. It was most important that all forces of occupation sent out by the Allies to various parts of Europe should, in every case, comprise a certain number of men from each one of the Allied and Associated Powers. This principle was particularly important in such areas as Danzig. He does not make any concrete proposal, but considers that the spirit of the Treaty would be violated by failing to make all forces of occupation, composite, Inter-Allied, Units.

Marshal Foch says that he concluded from Mr Balfour’s remark that the British Army would be represented in Upper Silesia.

Mr Balfour says the British forces would certainly take part in that occupation.

General Bliss said that a decision had been arrived at, to the effect that every Army was to be represented on the Rhine. He is of the opinion that the command in any one locality should be homogeneous. The United States would contribute. With regard to the proportion of troops to be furnished by each nation, he reminded the Council that he had been a Member of each Committee that had examined the problem, when the question of the Army of Occupation on the Rhine had been discussed. He had told President Wilson that the figure arrived at for the United States Forces was an absolute minimum. His observations had therefore been accepted and the necessary orders given. He had thought, however, that the American troops were to remain on the Rhine, and were not to be sent into Upper Silesia. It would therefore be necessary for him to ask President Wilson whether the United States contingent for the Rhine should be considered as indivisible, and, if sent elsewhere, whether it should be replaced.

M Clemenceau says that when the question of the occupation of the Rhine had been discussed, President Wilson’s plan of an Inter-Allied occupation had been accepted in spite of his (M Clemenceau’s) opposition. It therefore seemed difficult to admit that President Wilson was in a position to discuss the matter further.

Mr Balfour said that he believed General Belin had informed the Council that a Division in Upper Silesia could be of strategical use in the event of the recurrence of active operations on the Western Front.

General Bliss said that he was sure that President Wilson would make no objection. The only point to be considered was whether the United States force should be regarded as a Unit not capable of division, and whether if it were sent to Upper Silesia, it should be replaced on the Rhine by other troops.

Mr Polk says that the question is one of numbers.

M Clemenceau said that he realized, that, from a practical point of view, it would be better for certain Units in the Armies of Occupation not to be Inter-Allied Forces. From the political point of view, however, it was most important that Occupation Forces should be so constituted; this was more particularly desirable in view of the fact that the Allied soldiers had always worked well together, and that no friction had risen between them.

Mr Balfour says that he agrees with M Clemenceau. It was most advantageous to show everywhere, that the Allies remained associated together in the achievement of certain objects. He did not foresee any difficulty with regard to the troops; but he did anticipate numerous practical difficulties with regard to provisioning. He proposed that Marshal Foch should examine the problem in collaboration with the Headquarter Staffs of the various Governments concerned.

S Tittoni said that he did not think that the principle of equal contribution had ever been accepted, and that he could not undertake to furnish a quarter of the total effectives in the Division for Upper Silesia, more especially as Italy had no troops on the Rhine.

M Clemenceau says that although there are no Italian troops on the Rhine, Signor Orlando had none the less accepted the principle of the Forces of Occupation being divided among the Allies.

S Tittoni says that he thinks that the American and British Governments had made reservations.

M Clemenceau said that these Governments had consented to furnish their contingents; the only reservations that they had made, dealt with the subject of the distribution of troops in certain specified sectors.

Marshal Foch asked whether he is to understand that the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, would participate equally in the occupation of Upper Silesia.

S Tittoni said that he accepts the principle, but makes a reservation with regard to the number of effectives to be supplied.

M Clemenceau answers that the principle of Inter-Allied occupation had been proposed by President Wilson, and accepted by all. It has been completely understood that an equal representation is intended; for, when no such understanding had been arrived at, the question has been raised and decided. This had been the principle arrived at for the Rhine. No statement had ever been made to the effect that unequal contributions would be given by the various Governments to the Army of Occupation in Silesia. Mr Balfour and Mr Polk have accepted the general principle, and he asks S Tittoni to give his consent to it.

S Tittoni said that the theater in which the operation was to take place was further away from Italy than it was from other countries.

M Clemenceau says that such a fact might be an excuse for Italian troops arriving late, but that he insisted on knowing whether S Tittoni does, or does not, accept the principle that Italy should supply a quarter of the total effectives necessary for the occupation of Upper Silesia.

S Tittoni says that he accepts the principle.

(It is decided that the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, should each supply a quarter of the total effectives necessary for occupation of Upper Silesia.

It is further decided that Marshal Foch, in collaboration with the Allied Headquarters Staff should consider what advantage would be derived from each of that Allied Governments being represented in the Forces of Occupation in Eastern Europe. Marshal Foch should further consider the disadvantages which might arise from the constitution of composite Inter-Allied Forces, owing to difficulties of provisioning each of these contingents, and from any friction that might occur between the soldiers of the Allied Nations. Finally, Marshal Foch is to submit a report on what he considers would be the most advantageous distribution of the Allied troops.)

Marshal Foch says that the same question arises with regard to Danzig and Memel, which are occupied by Inter-Allied troops. He asks whether

a) The principle of equal contingents had been accepted.

b) Mr Balfour says that the principle is not disputed. What ought to be decided is whether it would not be more practical for each Government to have its forces concentrated in certain sectors, so as to simplify the problem of provisioning. The total number of effectives in each locality would not be altered; he takes as an example the occupations of Upper Silesia, and of Danzig, and of Memel. It might be decided that the British contingent in Upper Silesia ought to be replaced by a French contingent of equal strength. In compensation for such an arrangement, France would not have to send any contingent to Danzig. On such a basis, France would only have to send provisions to Upper Silesia, and not to Danzig; while Great Britain would only send provisions to Danzig, and not to Upper Silesia. He wishes the problem, as he has brought it forward, to be studied by Marshal Foch and the Allied Headquarters Staffs.

Marshal Foch states that the Upper Silesia question has been settled and ought not to be raised afresh. He asks for a decision with regard to Danzig and to Memel.

General Weygand says that the articles in the Peace Treaty are different with regard to the two regions. The Inter-Allied occupation of Upper Silesia had been decided upon, but no such decision has been taken with regard to Danzig. The question has been laid before the Supreme Council at Versailles; but the military experts have not been able to agree to the necessity of sending troops of occupation. The French Delegation favors such a measure; the British and American Delegations oppose it. A decision is very necessary.

S Tittoni remarked that in a previous discussion it had been decided that German troops should evacuate Danzig, which should not be occupied by Polish forces; and that the question of sending Inter-Allied troops into that region should be adjourned. Troops should only be sent into the Danzig region if thought necessary by the members of the Delimitation Committee on the spot.

Mr Balfour says that in his opinion only a very few troops will be necessary for Danzig. The Germans, whose propaganda might have been serious, now seemed to be resigned and the situation in this locality had much improved. He does not think that it is therefore very urgent to come to an immediate decision.

General Weygand said that the difficulty arises from the fact that officers sent out to the regions in question might at any moment ask for troops. The High Command must keep this in mind in drawing up its general military program. At the present moment all armies were demobilizing. Soldiers are returning to their civil occupations and if the constitution of this contingent is not decided upon it might be impossible to form it when desired.

S Tittoni says that the troops would only be sent if the officers on particular Commissions and Committee asked for them. Such officers can not even take up their posts until the ratification of the Treaty and this fact gives us time to consider the question.

M Clemenceau says that it is therefore decided that Marshal Foch should only examine the question of Upper Silesia.

General Weygand says that the Danzig question was also important and read out a telegram received that day from General Henrys:

"Warsaw, August 6, 1919:

The Polish Government requests me to intervene with you in order to obtain the dispatch of two Allied battalions to guard the supplies transported from Dunkerque to Danzig, and to prevent thefts at Danzig.

I should be grateful to be informed of the intention of the Allies on the subject of the operation of the Polish base at Danzig. If an Inter-Allied Commission is to be charged with the management of the port and of transportation at Danzig, I consider that it would be to my advantage to be represented on the Commission for questions of transport which directly concern the forwarding of supplies to Poland."

The question of sending Allied troops to Danzig and Memel is adjourned.

(S Georgi then enters the room.)

M Clemenceau asks S Georgi to explain the question of the participation of the armies in the work of clearing up battlefields in the liberated regions.

S Georgi explains the text of the letter, dated 30th June, 1919, and sent by the Minister of the liberated regions to the President of the Peace Conference.

Mr Balfour says that the question is simply a labor problem.

General Weygand says that the position is as follows: after the armistice of the 11th November, 1918, the American army had been split up into two portions. The first portion had moved eastwards towards the Rhine; the other had moved back towards its bases preparatory to re-embarkation. As a result of this, the zone occupied by it at the time of the armistice had been completely evacuated. But the zone in question had not been the theater of protracted battles; it had therefore been less devastated, and less obstructed by débris, than other portions of the front.

The French troops that had taken over the old American sectors had cleaned up the area and restored order, with the result that the general work of clearance was in a more advanced state in that sector than it was in others. In the British sector, on the other hand, English troops had remained in occupation throughout, since they needed it as a means of communication with their bases. In addition to this, the sector occupied by the British army in November 1918 had been the theater of long and protracted struggles, in which the artillery of the combatants had deluged the whole area with machine gun fire and projectiles.

Extensive protective fortifications had been set up throughout the area. The result is, that in this zone, the work of reconstruction and clearing is enormous, and is, moreover, very far behind. The British sector runs into Belgian territory; and the Belgians have asked frequently for assistance in restoring order in their war zone. It is in the sector just described that the assistance, and collaboration, of British troops is asked for. At the present moment, General Asser was concerned in sending back to England all men who could possibly be of use. All deteriorated ammunition, and all abandoned German ammunition had been left behind.

M Clemenceau calls attention to the fact, that an agreement has been reached between the Allies, to the effect that each body of troops should be responsible for cleaning up the sector occupied by it at the time of the armistice.

Mr Balfour says that he does not know it.

S Georgi said that the agreement in question was recorded by a letter dated 14th January, 1919, in which Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig undertakes to clean up the zone occupied by the British Armies. He has also offers to assist the peasants.

Mr Balfour said that the result of the situation was that the more an ally had fought, the longer it would remain behind after the conclusion of hostilities, to clear up the sector occupied by its armies.

M Clemenceau objects to the form in which the question had been raised. He reminded the Council that it had been France’s misfortune to supply the battlefields. He did not lay particular emphasis on this sad privilege, but merely stated it. It had been decided that each combatant should clear up in its own sector. If one of the Allies could not consent to doing this, France would necessarily have to carry it out.

Mr Balfour says he has only wished to draw a conclusion, and to note that, as the Americans had not fought for such a long time, and had been engaged in an easier sector, the French had done the work of clearing for them, after they had left. The British troops had been bitterly engaged for four years, and they were now asked to remain behind, for many months, in order to clear up the sectors that they had occupied. The British Government in no way withdraws from the obligations that it has entered into.

M Clemenceau says that there was no question of obligation. It was simply one of assistance.

Mr Balfour says that he fully understands the situation in which France stood. More than that, every Englishman understood it, and all the other Allies as well. All obligations would be carried out.

M Clemenceau says that he only wished the question to be put before the British military men, to see whether help could be given. By doing this, the French would be gratified and assisted.

General Weygand said that he wished to make a practical proposal. Would it not be possible to form an Inter-Allied military committee at the Ministry of Liberated Regions, in order to study the question in detail? It will be quite sufficient that each Government should make Mr Balfour’s words the instructions to its representative. This would ensure the problem being examined in a general spirit of good will.

M Clemenceau says that the French are not asking for British troops, because the clearing work was being carried out, as far as possible, with German prisoners. Great Britain is asked to help, simply because it had not been possible to carry on the work of clearing in the zones of the British Armies. He asked, therefore, whether it would not be possible for the British Government to employ the German prisoners at present in the British Army zones.

(It is decided to nominate an Inter-Allied Military Commission, which should sit at the Ministry of Liberated Regions, and should study the practical means that might be employed to ensure the cooperation of the Allied Armies in the work of clearing up the munitions, and war materials, left in the liberated regions.

It is further decided that Marshal Foch should collaborate with the Commissariat-Général for the reconstruction of the liberated regions in making nomination to the above Inter-Allied Committee.)


(S Georgi then left the room, and General Nollet entered.)

9. General Nollet says that as he is the President of the Inter-Allied Commission of Military Control, he could not speak for the Naval and Aerial Commissions of Control. The Military Commission was divided into three sub-committees:

(a) The Sub-Committee for Arms and Munitions.

(b) The Sub-Committee for Effectives and Recruiting.

(c) The Sub-Committee for Fortifications.

Sub-Committee (a) was at the present moment the most important. There are large numbers of trained men in Germany at the present time. If German arms and munitions were taken away, the value of these trained men would disappear, and security would result. This had been the reason for the provision in the Peace Treaty whereby the time for the reduction of the German forces to an ordinary standard had been limited to three months. The Sub-Committee in question would have to see to it that all material in excess of what had been laid down, should be handed over to the Allied and Associated Governments. It would, moreover, actively supervise the production of the numerous factories in Germany to prevent the country from taking up the production of war material in a disguised form. It is evident that this sub-committee ought to have a considerable personnel, and a large number of specialists, in order to be able to act with rapidity. The field of its operations extended over the whole German Army, and all the factories of Germany.

Sub-Committee (b) had a different character. Its immediate functions are obviously most important, but its work in the future would be of far greater consequence. The avowed, and actual, intentions of Germany could only be ascertained with certainty by studying closely the manner in which German mobilization would be carried out, and by examining the new legislation of that country. The members of this Sub-Committee would have to study German organisation from this point of view, and would have to see how all the questions enumerated affected the general situation. The Sub-Committee might be composed of a smaller, non-specialist, personnel.

Sub-Committee (c) on fortifications would have an easier task. Fortified works could not be disguised. Their position is actually known, and they are largely in the territory that had fallen to France. The remainder were mostly in the Rhine territories, now under French occupation.

The whole Military Commission of Control, as outlined, would be very important. It would have to be constituted by 350 officers, 150 Interpreters, and 800 ordinary soldiers. He thought that the figures given ought to be regarded as the minimum of what was necessary, in view of the large number of problems that would have to be studied locally, and the rapidity with which examinations would have to be effected. After the ratification of the Treaty, it would be necessary to spread a whole network of investigating bodies over Germany. He called upon the Council to examine the figures put forward by him, and to remember that the whole Committee would be an Inter-Allied body, and not a French one.

Mr Balfour said that he is entirely in agreement with General Nollet’s conclusion with regard to the numerous personnel necessary for carrying out the work of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control. Practical difficulties would, however, arise in points of detail, such as the transporting, provisioning and quartering of the staffs. As British representative, he would like to propose that the three Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should come under Marshal Foch’s orders, or else, later on, under the orders of the French General commanding on the Rhine.

(It is decided that Marshal Foch’s Headquarter Staff, or the Headquarter Staff of the French Commander on the Rhine, should settle all questions arising out of the transportation into Germany of the Inter-Allied Committees of Control, as well as the questions affecting their quartering and provisioning, when established in that country.

It is further decided to accept General Nollet’s proposals on the subject of the personnel out of which the Inter-Allied Commission of Control should be constituted.)


(At this point General Nollet leaves the room.)

10. Agreement Between the Military Clauses in the Peace Treaty With Hungary and Those in the Austrian Peace Treaty General Sackville-West said that a report had been presented to the Council on the subject of the Military forces, which might be maintained by the various States of Central Europe. The report on Austria had been sent back to be modified. Certain alterations had been put into it, and he asked the Council whether the articles affecting Hungary were to be remodeled, and brought into conformity with those in the Peace Treaty with Austria as finally modified.

General Belin says that the Council had decided on the maximum number of effectives which were to constitute the new Hungarian Army.

M Clemenceau says that the Council could not reply; since the Hungarian Treaty is not yet complete.

General Belin said that the Military Representatives had proposed a maximum figure of 40,000 men for Austria. The Supreme Council had lowered the figure to 15,000. The final decision was that an Army of 30,000 men should be allowed. In the case of Hungary the two extreme figures were 45,000 men and 18,000 men respectively. What figure between these two latter was the Council going to decide upon.

S Tittoni says that if the Austrian Peace Treaty was to be taken as a basis, Hungary ought to be allowed an Army of 35,000 men.

M Clemenceau says that in the present state of the Peace Treaty with Hungary it was difficult to arrive at an exact figure. He did not see that there was any particular need for deciding immediately.

S Tittoni said that the figure had to go into the Peace Treaty.

M Clemenceau says that he agrees that the Military Representatives ought to make the two Treaties agree in such articles as had been definitely settled. It was quite impossible to settle the question in the case of articles not decided upon. Austria had been allowed a large number of effectives in order to conciliate her and to detach her from German influence. His own suggestion had been for an Austrian Army of 15,000 men. It was not possible to settle the Hungarian Army on the basis of the Austrian.

(It is decided that the Military Representatives should co-ordinate the articles in the Peace Treaty with Hungary now definitely decided upon, with the corresponding articles in the Peace Treaty with Austria.)


11. M Clemenceau asks that the question should be adjourned in order that he might discuss it with Mr Polk.

(It is therefore decided to adjourn the question.)


12. Mr Balfour says that it has been the wish of the British Government not to declare a Blockade on Russia, but to concert measures for closing the ports of Baltic Russia to International traffic in which all the Allies could act conjointly. President Wilson had just replied to the effect that he could not participate in the Allied policy. It was, therefore, not possible to come to a decision at once, for, whilst regretting the necessity of abandoning the policy suggested, he would not adopt another unacceptable to America. At the present moment commercial transit was not active in the region in question, and, in another three months, ice conditions would make it impossible. All that was necessary was to tide over this short period, and to be ready to reexamine the question if any important change took place.

S Tittoni remarks that the Blockade of Hungary had only been declared because Bela Kun had not carried out the Armistice conditions. We are now refusing to Blockade Russia despite the fact that Lenin, the head of the Bolshevik Government, had defied the elementary laws of human society. Would not the Allied and Associated Governments be fully justified, in view of this comparison, in declaring a blockade on Russia? He is willing, however, to submit to the opinion of his colleagues.

Mr Polk says that morally he agrees with S Tittoni. But there is an important legal point, which should not be forgotten. No war had been declared against Russia. He proposed that President Wilson’s suggestion should be accepted, and that the Experts should study a means of effecting what was desired by means of mutual co-operation.

Mr Balfour accepts Mr Polk’s proposal.

(It is decided that the Experts of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should examine the problem of carrying out, conjointly, measures which should be equivalent to a Blockade of Russian Baltic ports. When the problem had been fully examined a report should be made to the Council.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, August 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

Originally Posted by Buddahaid

Jim, I'm getting error message for most all of the images you've been posting for the past week or so.

I'm changing from imgur to another image posting site.

[Jimbuna]

10th August 1919

Aftermath of War

Anglo-Russians defeat Bolsheviks on N. Dvina River (Archangel).

New Zealand troops onboard a troopship returning home from England.


Illinois troops come home on the leviathan.
first tennessee atm locations

Ernst Haeckel, German scientist who coined terms such as “ecology,” “phylum,” “phylogeny,” and “Protista,” among other achievements, has passed away.


Ship Losses:

Wanick (United States) The 18-gross register ton, 48.9-foot (14.9 m) towing vessel became stranded and was lost without loss of life at Lost Harbour (54°13′45″N 165°36′30″W) in the Territory of Alaska.

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, August 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

11th August 1919

The Weimar Republic ratifies the new constitution for Germany, replacing the Constitution of the German Empire.


Guy W.S. Castle, commander of the troopship USS Martha Washington who received the Medal of Honor for his service during the U.S. occupation of Veracruz, Mexico, dies of suicide.


Andrew Carnegie, Scottish-American industrialist, business magnate, philanthropist, and one of the richest people in history, has passed away.


50 people killed in Berlin when hungry mob riots attacks police and kills, eats their horses.


A Farman F.60 Goliath airliner flies eight passengers and a ton of supplies from Paris, France, via Casablanca, French Morocco, and Mogador, French Morocco, to Koufa, Senegal, flying more than 4,500 kilometers (2,795 miles).


The Felixstowe Fury, also known as the Porte Super-Baby, crashes in Plymouth Sound off Plymouth, England, on the eve of its planned flight to South Africa, killing one of its seven crew members.


Ship Losses:

Archangel (Russian Navy White Movement) Russian Civil War: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War: The minesweeping tugboat was sunk by mines in the Dvina River. One British officer was killed.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, August 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M Clemenceau asked if any of his colleagues have any news from Hungary.

Mr Polk distributes a number of telegrams.

Mr Balfour asked if there were any indication that the Romanians have received or mean to obey the orders of the Council.

M Clemenceau says that there was not the slightest sign.

Mr Balfour says he thinks the silence on the part of the Romanians is deliberate.

M Pichon said that he does not think this could be inferred with certainty. The latest news was dated 7th or 8th and by that date the orders of the Council could not have arrived. There is a rumor that the line to Budapest has been cut. He adds that a telegram had been received from the French Chargé d’Affaires at Bucharest dated 10th which is to the effect that he had handed, on the previous day, the telegrams from the Council to the Romanian Government. None of the news contained in the telegrams distributed by Mr Polk was subsequent to the 9th.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks that the Romanian Generals at Budapest must have been made aware of the desires of the Council.

Mr Polk says that according to information given to him by Mr Buxton the Allied Generals have had great difficulty in their dealings with the Romanian General in avoiding unpleasant incidents. The attitude of the Romanian General was very insolent.

M Pichon says he fully admits that the Romanians are not behaving well but he suggests that a judgment should not be based on the news received.

M Clemenceau says he thinks it would be best to wait until the following day.

Mr Polk observes that the way in which the Romanians treated the Conference might become a pattern not only for other Small States but possibly even for Germany.

S Tittoni asked what means of communications exist between the Conference and the Roumanian Generals at Budapest.

Mr Balfour says he understands the telegraph is in American hands as far as Vienna; communication thence to Budapest is by telephone. If the Romanians had cut the telephone, communications were severed. He adds that he hopes the Allied Ministers at Bucharest were being kept informed of the instructions sent to the Generals at Budapest.

S Tittoni asked whether communication by wireless cannot be maintained.

M Pichon says that he will inquire from Marshal Foch what other methods could be employed to establish communication.


2. The Council has before it a letter from Dr Benes.

Mr Balfour suggests that a suitable acknowledgment should be sent to Dr Benes of his letter and that he should be told that it would receive full consideration.

(It is then decided that Dr Benes’ letter of August 8th, 1919, regarding Czechoslovak Interests in Hungary should be acknowledged and that Dr Benes should be assured that due note would be taken of its contents.)


3. The Council has before it the following communication from Colonel Haskell.

“From: Colonel Haskell, High Commissioner for the Entente in Armenia. Situation in Armenia

To: President Clemenceau, Peace Conference.

Have received official notice from the British Command at Constantinople that all British troops at the present time in the Caucasus have orders to commence complete evacuation on August 15th; an order from London only can prevent this movement.

The Italians officially declare that they will not send troops. This retreat will leave several million dollars worth of relief provisions deposited at Batum Tiflis, Erivan, etc. without protection and will stop all measures of assistance now operating, without which thousands of Armenian refugees in Russian Armenia are exposed to death from famine. The Armenians are surrounded by enemies and have not enough arms munitions or energy to protect themselves. Two million of lives are in danger after the retreat of the British troops; anarchy will reign in the Caucasus where all the lives and properties are menaced. The French High Command in the East declares that British troops in the Caucasus are not under his jurisdiction.

In the name of the future of these regions, I ask that the British Government be requested to revoke the evacuation order until the question of the method of occupation shall have been decided. This viewpoint receives the approbation of all the authorities here who understand the situation.

Signed: William Haskell.
Allied High Commissioner to Armenia”

Mr Balfour says that the situation in Armenia is very serious and very disturbing. Historically what had led to the present position was, as far as he could remember, as follows. British troops had been sent into the country in 1918. In March and April of the current year it had been made clear to the Conference by Mr. Lloyd George that the British troops would be withdrawn. The date for withdrawal had first been the 15th July, but had since been postponed to the 15th August. It was probable that movements had already begun. It had therefore been known to the Conference for a long time that continuance of British occupation could not be expected. It had been understood that Italian troops would replace the British. Italy had accepted this exchange and the relief had been expected. From certain remarks made lately by S Tittoni, he infers that Italy regards the enterprise as too great a burden. What resulted was that British troops were leaving the country, that Italian troops were not coming to replace them and that America was not sending any men.

S Tittoni said that the question in as far as it concerned Italy, related to Turkish Armenia and not to Russian Armenia, of which Mr Balfour had spoken. Italy at one time had thought of sending troops to Georgia and Azerbaijan, not to Armenia proper. Georgia demanded complete independence and on this condition raised no objection to occupation by Italian troops. On the other hand, Admiral Kolchak was unwilling to grant the independence of Georgia, though he might be ready to grant autonomy. If Italy had accepted a mandate on the conditions demanded by the Georgians, Italy would have taken upon herself responsibility for safeguarding the independence of Georgia. This, she could not do. In any case the area to be guarded was a large one; the Railway line from Baku to Batum was of very considerable length; some 40,000 men would be required and, in addition, shipping and supplies would have to be found. The last were to have been lent by Great Britain, though it appeared at the present time that British shipping would not be available. The initial expense would be, he was told, 75 million lire and the annual cost would be as much as 1 billion lire. Italy could not undertake so heavy a burden and the idea had therefore been given up. Nevertheless, he wished again to point out that the question of Georgia was quite distinct from that of Armenia.

M. Clemenceau asks whether the United States could do anything.

Mr Polk says that the United States could do nothing until Congress acts. Troops could not be sent into a country with which the United States were not at war. The question of a mandate for Armenia would be put before Congress by the President.

Mr Balfour asked whether President Wilson is aware of the critical condition of Armenia.

Mr Polk replied that he had sent him two strong personal messages on the subject already within the last few days.

M Clemenceau says the conclusion is that France can do nothing: Italy can do nothing: Great Britain can do nothing and, for the present, America can do nothing. It remained to be seen whether, as the result of this, any Armenians would remain.

(As no Government is prepared to furnish troops for Armenia, the question raised by Colonel Haskell of August 5th, 1919, is left without solution.)


4. M Clemenceau asks his colleagues whether they had read the letter sent by General Dupont to Marshal Foch. For his part he thinks that what Erzberger had said was true. All French agents, both civil and military, are of one mind on the subject. He thinks, therefore, that General Dupont’s conclusion is sound. He has no intention of giving up the principle of demanding the surrender of culprits, but it might be advisable to confine the demand to a few symbolic persons, for instance, the Kaiser, the assassin of Miss Edith Cavell and the murderer of Captain Fryatt. A demand limited to a small number would probably not be resisted. The suggestion he would make was that each of the members should name one representative to proceed to Berlin and to consult General Dupont as to what was practicable. For himself, he would nominate M Haguenin, who knows everybody in Berlin and whom he could trust implicitly to form a correct estimate. Probably his colleagues could make equally satisfactory nominations.

Mr Balfour said that he considered M Clemenceau’s proposal very worthy of consideration, but before he can give complete assent to it, he would like to observe first that it represents an abandonment of the Treaty. Secondly, this abandonment is on a point, concerning which English public opinion had been greatly excited at the time of the Election. He thought that scarcely a Member had been returned who had not addressed his constituents on this subject and promised them that the guilty should be punished. He would therefore ask to be allowed to consult Mr Lloyd George before assenting to M Clemenceau’s proposal.

Mr Polk says that from his point of view, the proposal represented a change in the Treaty.

S Tittoni Said that he quite agreed with General Dupont’s proposal. He also concurred in the opinion that it was not advisable to try the Kaiser.

M Clemenceau said that he does not intend to abandon anything. What he proposes to do is to execute the Treaty bit by bit. It is desirable to help the present German Government to live on for a few months. He believed that the presentation of the full demand would destroy it. He, himself, had a list of 1,000 names. Doubtless his colleagues had similar lists.

Mr Balfour said that M Clemenceau’s plan was doubtless excellent. It consists not in giving up any of the culprits, but in deferring the demand for some of them. The proposal was therefore different from that made by General Dupont who only proposed to take a few. He does not think, however, that it will comfort the Germans.

M Clemenceau says that M Haguenin had a very long conversation with Erzberger who had assured him that this was not a thing to be trifled with. There was no intention on the part of France to abandon the execution of the Treaty. At first, it was suggested that a few prominent culprits should be asked for; the rest could await their fate for a few months.

Mr Balfour says there are three possible plans. One was to stick to the Treaty to the letter and ask for all the culprits at once. The second was M Clemenceau’s plan to ask for a few well selected victims at once and to put off the rest. The third, to abandon part of the Treaty entirely and only insist on the surrender of a very few. He thinks these three possible plans should be submitted to the various Governments.

(It is decided to postpone discussion on the execution of Articles 227–230 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, pending consultation of their respective Governments by Mr Balfour and Mr Polk on General Dupont’s proposals.)


(M Seydoux enters the room.)

5. M Seydoux gives the Council an explanation of the document regarding the exchange of goods between different countries.

Mr Balfour asks why, since the Blockade had been raised, it had been necessary to bring this question before the Council at all.

Mr Seydoux says he agrees with Mr Balfour that there is no particular reason for the intervention of the Council.

(It is decided that the raising of the Blockade has rendered unnecessary any action by the Council regarding the regulation of exchanges of goods between the countries of Central Europe.)


6. M Seydoux reads and comments on the report of the Sub-Committee of the Supreme Economic Council on Russia, dated 9th July, 1919:

“With reference to Minute 244 of the Supreme Economic Council, the Sub-Committee on Russia presents in Russia the following report:

1) The Committee considers that any discussion of the ultimate economic rehabilitation of Russia is at present purely academic.

2) The Committee considers that economic assistance should at once be given to those areas of Russia now under the jurisdiction of the so-called “Provisional Government of Russia” in conformity with the terms of the telegrams exchanged by the Council of Four and Admiral Kolchak.

3) This assistance should take the form of credits from the various Allied Governments to be expended in purchases and transportation of commodities from the countries furnishing such credits.

4) The Nature of these credits and the commodities to be supplied and their distribution should be determined by a Commission organised for this purpose from the countries supplying the credits and the goods. The Commodities to be furnished should be of such a character as are necessary to rehabilitate transportation and the production of manufactures. Their distribution should be organised in such a manner as to reconstitute commercial life.

5) It appears to the Committee that credits to the amount of £50,000,000 sterling would cover the amount of commodities (exclusive of arms and munitions) that could advantageously be supplied and used within a period of twelve months.”

Mr Balfour suggests that consideration of the question be deferred until the discussion of the general policy to be adopted regarding Russia.

(It is decided to defer consideration of the proposals of the Supreme Economic Council regarding the economic reconstitution of Russia until the settlement of the general policy of the Council regarding Russia.)


(At this point M Seydoux withdraws and members of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council and other experts enter the room.)

7. Captain Morizot-Thibault reads the note of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council.

Participation of the Interested Powers in the Improvement of the Railway From Chambery to Turin M Tittoni says that the question is not a military one but a financial one. The Transportation Council had, he thought strayed beyond its province. The Supreme War Council had agreed that the improvement of this Railway was a matter of common Allied interest, and should be undertaken. All the Transportation Council should have done was to allot the expenses proportionately. It had, as a matter of fact, reached conclusions which modified the original decision of the Supreme War Council, because it had suggested that the participation of the Allies should be limited to meeting the excess cost of labor and material furnished during the war. In so doing, it had exceeded its functions. It suggested that the sharing of the cost should cease at the end of 1918. But the work once begun had to be completed. If all the Allies were responsible for the beginning of the work, they must remain responsible for it up to its completion. Had the Armistice come about immediately after the decision taken by the Supreme War Council, he asked what Powers would have borne the cost. In his opinion all the work carried out on this line had the same inter-allied character. The Council, however, made a distinction between work before January, 1919, and work subsequent to that date. The resolution adopted by the Supreme War Council represents a binding contract. If Italy had not been assured of help, she would not have undertaken the work. Since December 30th, 1918, all that had been done was to complete the work begun during the war.

M Pichon says that as the question involved large sums and complicated financial considerations, it should be referred to the Financial Commission.

S Tittoni said that in any case the original contract cannot be interfered with or altered in any way.

Mr Polk says that apparently a commitment had been made during the war. He knows nothing about its exact value or the justness of either method of settlement proposed.

(It is then decided to refer to the Financial Commission for consideration and report the Note of the Inter-Allied Transportation Council regarding the division of the cost among the Powers of the improvements to the Railway from Turin to Chambery.

It is also decided to communicate the record of the discussion of the Council as well as other relevant documents to the Financial Commission.)


8. Mr Polk says that he had received a reply from Washington in which Mr Lansing states that it was possible that suitable tonnage might be available from the United States’ Army by August 30th, but neither the State Department nor the War Department has any funds of its own which could be used for the purpose in question. It was roughly estimated that repatriation would cost 250 to 300 dollars per man.

Mr Polk inquired whether any agreement had been reached as to financing the operation.

M Berthelot says that France had hitherto advanced all the money for the Czechoslovaks in Russia and in Siberia. The advances amounted to one milliard a year. Great Britain had furnished arms, munitions, and supplies as an advance. These advances were ultimately to be shared by France, Great Britain and the United States in equal thirds. Application for ships had been made to Japan and the United States. The United States had not made a definite reply but thought it might be difficult to find the ships, while Japan had found enough for about one-third of the force. It was always understood that the cost would be equally divided between Great Britain, France and the United States.

Mr Balfour asks whether it had never been thought that the Czechoslovak State should pay.

M Berthelot replies that it is a matter of course that the Czechoslovak would repay the whole cost.

Mr Polk asks if a statement might be prepared for him regarding the agreements made.

(It is agreed that M Berthelot should furnish Mr Polk with a statement of the agreements reached regarding the payment of the expenses for maintenance, transportation and repatriation of the Czechoslovak troops in Russia and Siberia.)


9. Mr Polk draws attention to the decision of the Council taken on August 6th adopting three proposals by General Groves. He thinks that the first and third Proposals To of these proposals exceeded the terms of the Treaty and that the Germans might be justified in refusing to comply with them. He thinks it is very necessary to examine the question at once as it was clearly undesirable to exceed the Treaty rights of the Council.

(It is decided to ask the Air Commission to re-examine at once the Resolution taken on August 6th regarding the sale of aeronautical material by Germany, with a view to establishing whether the action decided on goes beyond the terms of the Treaty of Peace.)

(It is further decided to suspend all action on this Resolution pending receipt of the report.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

12th August 1919

President Wilson reviews a military parade on White House grounds in Washington D.C.


Submarines to get underwater radio messages.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, August 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. On Mr. Balfour’s proposal it is agreed:

Instructions to Committees Preparing Clauses for Treaty With Hungary That all the Committees engaged in the preparation of clauses for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary except those which have already forwarded their recommendations to the Secretariat General for submission to the Supreme Council, should do so forthwith.


2. M Clemenceau says that the French Chargé d’Affaires in Vienna stated that General Graziani will be in Budapest on the 12th August.

S Tittoni says that he had no news.

Mr Polk says that General Bandholtz had arrived in Budapest on the previous day.

M Pichon draws attention to a Note prepared by General Weygand regarding the means of communication with Budapest.

(Note is taken of the statement of General Weygand regarding means of communication with Budapest.)


3. (M Tardieu, M Aubert, Mr Nicolson, Col Castoldi, Prof Coolidge and M Adatci are present during the following discussion.)

M. Tardieu says that he cannot offer the Council any agreed solution of the problem; the margin of disagreement, however, had been reduced. He would briefly recall various phases which the question had passed through. The first phase was the blue line suggested by the Commission on Greek Affairs. This line had been rejected in the Committee on Bulgarian frontiers by the American Delegation. A compromise had been sought by means of mutual concession. The initial demand of the American Delegation had been to leave Western Thrace to Bulgaria with the 1915 frontier. The British, French and Japanese Delegations had disagreed.

After a variety of views had been proposed, the American Delegation suggested that Eastern and Western Thrace should be attached to the International State of Constantinople. This had not been accepted by the other Delegations. Then, S Tittoni had proposed an ethnographical line intended to give more Greeks to Greece and more Bulgarians to Bulgaria. A solution had been sought in this direction giving both Bulgaria and Greece a frontier with the International State. No success had been achieved. The line suggested took Greece up to Lule Burgas leaving the northern part of Eastern Thrace to Bulgaria. The American Delegation had objected that this left Bulgaria no exit on the Aegean. Then it had been suggested that the South Western part of Western Thrace should be given to Greece and that an International State with an outlet at Dedeagatch should be created with control over the railway from Dedeagatch to Adrianople. Eastern Thrace would then be attributed to Greece up to a line from the Gulf of Xeros to Midia. To this the American Delegation had objected that the Western part of Western Thrace was not economically connected with the rest. The International State would therefore be economically unsound. The American counter-proposal was that North Western Thrace should be given to Bulgaria whilst the International State should be limited by a line 10 kilometres east of the Maritza including Adrianople. Disagreement was therefore limited; for it was admitted by all that the best solution was some form of international control over Dedeagatch and the railway. The French, British and Japanese Delegations wished to extend this International State West and North, maintaining on the East the 1915 frontier. The Americans wished to extend it to the East 10 kilometres from the Maritza and including Adrianople while ceding North West Thrace to Bulgaria.

S Tittoni said that a very slight concession would now produce agreement. A free State might be formed with a capital at Adrianople.

M Tardieu says that there were in Adrianople 26,000 Turks, 23,000 Greeks and a few Bulgarians.

Mr Balfour says that Adrianople is a Turkish Town in a Greek area. He sees considerable advantages in giving it to the free State as it was a Holy City for the Mohammedans.

M Tardieu says that his private opinion was that an International Commission at Dedeagatch with complete control over the railway would be quite enough to ensure all the guarantees required by Bulgaria.

M Clemenceau says that in any case he will not agree to any territorial reward to Bulgaria. He thinks that no International State will live long and that all the personal solutions suggested promised new wars.

After considerable further discussion it appears that the principal alternatives before the Council are:

1) The separation of Eastern and Western Thrace by an International State under the League of Nations, or

2) The mere control of Dedeagatch and the railway to it from Adrianople by an International Commission.
To the former scheme were attached the following proposals:

(a) In Western Thrace Greece to obtain at least the districts of Xanthi and Gümuldjina, with a frontier sufficient to protect the coastal railway.

(b) That the Port of Dedeagatch, the town of Adrianople and an area covering the railway connecting these two should be constituted into an autonomous State under the League of Nations.

(c) That with the exclusion of Adrianople, the whole of Eastern Thrace, as comprised between the existing Turco-Bulgarian frontier, and a line drawn from the Gulf of Xeros to South of Midia, should be given to Greece.
Mr Polk states that he is committed to the plan of an international state. But he is willing that Mr Venizelos should try and persuade President Wilson to accept the second plan. If President Wilson accepted, Mr Polk would be willing to be overruled.

(It is then agreed that Mr Polk should confer with Mr Venizelos, explain both solutions to him, and submit them to President Wilson. Mr Polk would inform Mr Venizelos that he was at liberty to send himself any message he desired to President Wilson.)


4. The Council has before it a communication from M Jules Cambon.

Mr Balfour says that the Allied and Associated Powers might insist on addressing the State of Austria as the Republic of Austria and in using that designation in the Treaty of Peace. More than this he thinks could not be done. Should the people of Austria choose to call themselves citizens of German Austria it does not seem possible to compel them to do otherwise.

M Clemenceau says that he entirely agrees.

(It is decided to maintain the expression “Republic of Austria” in dealings with the Austrian Peace Delegation and in the Treaty of Peace.)


5. The note of the Commission on Political Clauses is read and accepted.

(It is decided in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission on Political Clauses

(1) To send for redraft to the Drafting Committee Articles 32, 33, 34, 35 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

(2) To send Articles 36 & 37 to the Central Territorial Commission with a request that it should consult on this subject the Commission on New States.

(3) To send to the Financial Commission Articles 38 and 67. The last should also be examined by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways.)


6. The Council has before it the following resolution:

Clauses on Responsibilities in Treaty with Hungary The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties, having been invited, in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Council dated July 30, 1919, to hasten the conclusion of its report relating to the Treaty with Hungary, and taking into account the fact that its liberty of decision is restricted by the solutions already reached as regards penalties in the Treaty with Germany as well as the Conditions of Peace with Austria and with Bulgaria, is of the opinion that the Articles relating to penalties to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary probably cannot differ from the solutions already adopted with regard to the other enemy Powers.

July 31—August 5, 1919.

(The resolution proposed by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties in respect to the Treaty of Peace with Hungary is accepted.)

(The Meeting then adjourns for an informal discussion on the situation in the Adriatic.)

[Jimbuna]

13th August 1919

Die Freundschaft (Friendship),” one of the first gay magazines to be openly published, is founded in Germany (it is forced to shut down in 1933 during the Nazi era).

Ship Losses:

Basilicata (Regia Marina) The Campania-class protected cruiser was sunk at Tewfik, Egypt, by the explosion of one of her boilers. She was refloated in 1920 and later was scrapped.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, August 13, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The following telegrams are before the Meeting:

“Budapest Aug. 12, 1919.

Supreme Council Peace Conference, Paris.

At the meeting today August 12th the Roumanian plenipotentiary several times stated that the Roumanian Government cannot accept orders from the Commission of Inter-Allied generals but can only enter into agreements with them for the solution of the difficulties which may come under discussion. The three generals namely American, British and Italian, who compose the commission at present (General Graziani arrived this evening but has not yet been interviewed) are of unanimous opinion that the instruction received from the Supreme Council at Paris should be interpreted as orders which the commission should give to the Roumanian army in Hungary and which the latter is obliged to carry out in order that the required solution may be arrived at (for example paragraph one sub-paragraph C and E and paragraph three sub-paragraph B). The commission urgently requests a prompt reply whether its interpretation of the instructions is correct and if it can act accordingly that is to say that it can refuse to continue discussion with the Roumanian plenipotentiary if the latter insists in his refusal to accept the instructions as orders.

Inter-Allied Mission.”


“Budapest Aug. 12, 1919.

Supreme Council Peace Conference, Paris.

The Inter-Allied Military Mission had a full day’s session this date during which a conference was had with Mr Constantin Diamandy, the Roumanian plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference. Mr Diamandy stated he was authorized to transact business with the Mission. He was furnished a part copy in French of the instructions to the Mission and asked whether or not his Government would abide by same. He replied he could not give an answer without first conferring with General Mardarescu, who is expected any moment to arrive and assume command of the Roumanian forces. He stated that the Roumanian Government was deeply hurt at press notices to the effect that the succession of the Archduke Joseph’s Government was in any way due to Roumanian influence.

It is represented to him that the food situation is serious and that famine and riots would result in case this situation was not alleviated. The Commission while disassociating itself from all responsibility for the present deplorable condition in Budapest, suggested that he immediately arrange to prevent the requisitioning by Romanians for supplies within a prescribed zone surrounding the city of Budapest and that the Romanians remove no more rolling stock. He stated that he would give the matter his immediate attention and became very angry when it was intimated that the Romanian Government might be considered as responsible for any famine or suffering in Budapest under present conditions.

He is asked to state what portions of the Mission’s instructions the Romanian Government could immediately accept and became angry, stating that Romania is not a conquered nation, that it was coordinate with the other Allies and that he would receive orders from nobody except from his Government. He finally subsided. The Mission then insisted upon the urgency of the case but he would not commit himself as to when he would give an answer but stated he would confer with General Mardarescu and they may see the Commission tomorrow August 13th. He was asked if the Romanian Government had within the past day or so delivered another ultimatum to Hungary and replied in effect that he was sure it had not, because such paper would naturally and properly have been presented by him, and he is ignorant of existence of an ultimatum, the Archduke yesterday and today gave Commission details of a plot intended evidently to demoralize his Government. He stated that the three Hungarian liaison officers attached to Holban’s headquarters had dictated to them a document by a Monsieur Ardeli, formerly Ambassador from Romania during Tisza Government. The document contained the following terms among others. The Banat is claimed by the Romanians, Bekesaka must belong to Romania. Romania has six hundred thousand men under arms. The military power of Entente is nil and they have labor difficulties. Various other inducements are offered if there is a Hungarian-Romanian union against Slav danger. If terms are not accepted Romanians will sweep Hungary like Mackensen and leave it to its destiny. This document after being signed by one of the liaison officers but not by Ardeli, was presented to Prime Minister. Today the three officers again presented themselves to Government and informed it that if terms were not immediately accepted Romanians would leave the country taking with it the Government, sweep it bare and stir up labor troubles. The above is the Archduke's story, he was much agitated on these occasions and appealed to Commission for advice. The first ultimatum, as he termed it, is in our possession signed by one of the liaison officers who, the Archduke states, has been with him throughout the war. The plot is obviously childish but it succeeded in frightening the Government. We have told the Archduke to take no notice.

Inter-Allied Military Mission.”

Mr Balfour observes that the first telegram asks for precise instructions on a definite point. The Inter-Allied Mission wished to know whether it was authorized to give orders to the Romanian Army in Hungary. Technically he supposed that the Allied Generals in Budapest had no authority to give orders to the Roumanian Commander in the manner in which a superior officer gave orders to a junior officer, but that the Commission of Generals were entitled to deliver to the Roumanian Commander the views of the Allied and Associated Powers merely as a message from the Conference. The Generals could say that they conveyed these views to the Romanian command, indicating that the Romanian Government, should it mean to remain within the Alliance, would doubtless give the requisite orders to carry out the intentions of the Conference. Should the Romanian Government decline to do so, it would shoulder the consequences of breaking the Alliance. It is obvious, in that case, that the Conference would have no further authority over Romania once she had left the Alliance.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks the Allied Generals are wrong in holding conversation with the Government of the Archduke Joseph. This Government is a reactionary Government and the public of the Entente countries would not allow any backing of such a Government. There are therefore two questions. One was the question to which Mr. Balfour had given, in his opinion, the right answer, namely, could the Allied Generals in Budapest give orders to the Romanian Army? The second was whether they should have relations with the present reactionary Hungarian Government? He thinks the answer in this case is in the negative.

Mr Polk says that there is no evidence that the Generals had, on their own initiative, sought out the Archduke’s Government.

M Clemenceau said that the telegrams indicate that the Generals are holding conversations with that Government.

Mr Balfour points out that in the instructions sent to the Generals they were asked to get into touch with the Hungarian Government.

Mr Polk observes that there is a difference between obtaining information from a Government and having relations with it implying its recognition. The Generals must obviously take steps to obtain information. He agreed that the Generals should take no action likely to commit the Allied and Associated Powers; but to prohibit their communicating with the de facto Government in Budapest would be to tie their hands.

M Clemenceau says that he thought the Conference must be careful to avoid the appearance of backing a reactionary Hungarian Government against the Romanians.

Mr Polk observes that the Romanians had established this government.

Mr Balfour asks whether M Clemenceau was aware of the report to this effect.

M. Clemenceau says that according to the telegram M. Diamandy denied it.

Mr Polk said that a warning might be sent to the Generals that they must avoid committing the Conference, but the question arose, who was to carry out the terms of the Armistice? Was the Conference to wait for another government to be formed?

M Clemenceau says that at all events the Conference should have the minimum of relations with the present Government.

S Tittoni said that this minimum should be at least enough to ensure the execution of the Armistice.

M Clemenceau says that the following dilemma then arises. The Conference would tell the present Government to carry out the original Armistice but the Romanians had another Armistice competing with the former; thus the Conference would be standing behind the Hungarian Government as against the Romanians.

S Tittoni said that it was, of course, understood that the Roumanian Armistice gave way to the previous one.

M Clemenceau says that the present government in Hungary might not last; if so the Conference would be backing an ephemeral administration against the Romanians. This would make things too easy for the Romanians.

Mr Balfour then proposed a draft of instructions to be sent to the Allied Commission in Budapest.

After some discussion the draft is finally adopted in the following form:

“We quite recognize that you cannot avoid having relations with any de facto government holding power in Budapest. You will however bear in mind that according to our information the Government of the Archduke Joseph has as yet little authority and has not so far been accepted by the country. We are most desirous of dealing directly with any genuine Hungarian Government in order to settle terms of peace and resume normal economic relations. But we must not be committed to any administration which has not authority to speak for the Hungarian people. While it will therefore be your duty to listen to anything the Government has to say, you must remember that it has not yet been accepted by those for whom it professes to speak.”

M Clemenceau said that M Berthelot had had an interview with Mr Antonescu. The latter had received a personal telegram from Mr Bratiano.

M Berthelot says that the telegram alluded to was not the official answer of the Romanian Government. This was to be sent to Mr Misu who would communicate it to the Conference. What Mr Antonescu had been told in the telegram was that the Romanians had in no manner assisted in the establishment of the reactionary Government of Archduke Joseph. As to the requisitions imposed on Hungary, they were regarded as legitimate as they did not exceed what the Hungarians had taken in Romania in cattle and railway material. In other words, the Romanians were merely recouping themselves for their losses.

Mr Balfour says that as M Clemenceau would not be present on the following day, he wished to ask him whether he would authorize his colleagues to reply to the Romanian Government on this point should its official communication be of the same nature as that made to Mr Antonescu.

M Berthelot says that Mr Antonescu had told him that the Romanian generals had made a mistake in requesting from the Hungarians a fixed percentage of their cattle, railway stock, etc., but he thought they were right in requiring from the Hungarians an equivalent for what the Hungarians had taken from the Romanians.

Mr Balfour says that it would be necessary to make the Romanians understand that they were in the wrong in doing this.

M Clemenceau said that France had lost hundreds of thousands of heads of cattle. France had only recuperated from Germany 94,000. France had submitted to the decisions of the Conference. The victory of the Allies had found Romania bound by the Peace of Bucharest, in other words at the feet of Germany. As a result of the victory of the Allies, Romania is doubling her territory. She now wishes to lay her hands on goods which belong to the Alliance as a whole. If France and Italy had behaved like this, there could have been no peace. France and Italy had obtained far less than their demands and far less than they had lost.

Mr Polk said that this was the first open defiance of the authority of the Conference. The Council was on its trial. Should this defiance be tolerated, it would form a bad example for other small Powers and ultimately for Germany. He was authorized to say for President Wilson that if the Romanians continued in their present course, he would not look favorably on any of their claims. He added that he had information that the Romanians were taking steps to hold elections in Bessarabia although the disposal of the province had not yet been settled.

Mr Balfour asks whether M Clemenceau would authorize the Council, if the Romanian official answer proved to be what was anticipated, to tell the Roumanian Government that its action could not be tolerated and that if the Romanians wished to remain in the Alliance, they must alter their policy.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks the expression “tolerated” too stiff. He would prefer to say “accepted”.

Mr Balfour asked in what manner pressure could be exercised over the Romanians.

Mr Polk asked whether Romania would not obtain Transylvania in virtue of the Treaty with Hungary. He also added that the partition of the Banat was not satisfactory to the Serbians.

S Tittoni observed that the misconduct of the Romanians was no adequate reason for rewarding the Serbs. He wished to make reservations on this matter.

(It is decided that on the receipt of the formal answer of the Romanian Government, action should be taken in accordance with the above discussion, even in M Clemenceau’s absence.

After a short discussion, it is decided to send a further dispatch to the Allied generals at Budapest and to communicate this dispatch to the Romanian Government at Bucharest. The following is the text of the dispatch:

“The Commission of Allied Generals is invested with the authority conferred on it by the Supreme Council. It is not qualified from a military point of view to give direct orders to the Roumanian generals but it is qualified to communicate to them the views of the Allied Powers.

“If the Roumanian Government means not to break away from the Allied Powers, it will give its generals necessary orders to conform to the decisions of the Conference.

“The Conference cannot believe that the Romanian Government will by refusing to conform to the views of the Allied Powers, take a decision so serious in its consequences.”)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

14th August 1919

British Brigadier General Digby Inglis Shuttleworth with the Shah of Persia in Baku, Azerbaijan. Baku is under British occupation to control the region’s oil fields.


American thoroughbred Man o’War (considered one of the greatest racehorses of all time) loses his only race to the colt aptly named Upset.


Sgt. Stubby, famed American war dog, returns home.


Ship Losses:

Lettie (United States) During a voyage in the Aleutian Islands from Atka to Unimak Island and Unalaska with a crew of four and a cargo of four tons off general merchandise and salted cod on board, the 27-gross register ton schooner was wrecked without loss of life in dense fog and strong tides on Samalga Reef off the southwestern end of Samalga Island in the Fox Islands subgroup of the eastern Aleutians.
Skorpion (Soviet Navy) Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War: The patrol boat was shelled and sunk by artillery in the Dvina River.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, August 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 17:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M Pichon communicates a letter from the Romanian Minister in Paris and the Council takes note of a further communication from the same source intimating that Mr Diamandy had been appointed High Commissioner for Romania at Budapest. He then asks if Mr Balfour has any observations to make on the Romanian reply to the Note of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr Balfour says that the letter as a whole is satisfactory, since the Romanian government consented to abide by the decisions of the Entente Powers. With regard to the remainder of the letter, he asks whether it would be profitable to reply to all the controversial points raised. He does, however, think that the Romanian Government had advanced several arguments, which called for discussion, and possibly a reply. The first of these arguments is that dealing with the supposition on the part of the Romanian government, that the Armistice of November 1918 had lapsed, owing to subsequent acts of war initiated by the Hungarian government, and owing to the explicit invitation of the Conference, by virtue of which Romania was called upon to take military action against Hungary.

S Tittoni said that he regarded the first argument as a strong one, since the attack of the Hungarian army was a positive violation of the armistice. He regards the second argument as weak, because, whilst admitting that the Romanians had been invited to initiate military action against the Hungarians, a similar invitation had been sent to the Czechoslovaks and the Yugoslavs; and no action by any of the parties consulted had followed upon these negotiations.

M Pichon says that the Romanians are not in a position to claim that the armistice had lapsed on account of the invitation sent to them by the Allied and Associated Powers for the simple reason that they were invited to enforce it by the communication to which they referred. He agrees with Mr Balfour, that there was a satisfactory side to the Romanian reply. He thinks, however, that the Romanians were attempting to take up too isolated an attitude. They speak of collaborating with the Conference; they were not called upon to do that; but to obey its decisions.

S Tittoni says that M Pichon’s remark was a matter of nuance, since, if the Romanians wished to conform with the decisions of the Conference, they would evidently have to collaborate with it.

Mr Balfour says that under the circumstances, it would probably be better to make no reference, in our answer, to the ambiguous phrases of the Romanian note; but to lay emphasis on the satisfactory assurances that it contained. The next point, to which he wished to draw attention, was the protest of the Romanian Government on the subject of the Conference decision with regard to war material. It was obviously necessary that they should be assured, in a most formal manner, that the war material captured by them belonged to the Allies as a whole. The statement in their note, to the effect that they had not compromised the economic activities of the countries they had invaded, was contradicted by the information submitted to the Conference. It seems as though the Romanians assumed, that, because they had been robbed by the Hungarians at an earlier period of the war; and because booty had been carried from their country into the territories that they had now invaded, they had a right to carry away with them, whatever they could seize in order to equalize matters. This argument should be replied to, by showing them that France, Belgium, Serbia and Italy had suffered in the same manner, and would never recover the booty that had been taken from them by the German and Austro-Hungarian armies in the days of their successes.

M Pichon says that according to the information at the disposal of the Conference, the Romanians had requisitioned 50% of everything they could lay their hands on; railway rolling stock, live stock, and agricultural implements.

M Berthelot said that when General Mackensen had invaded Romanian territory, a large amount of the railway material (2000 locomotives) requisitioned by him had remained in Hungarian territory. These engines could not be restored under the armistice because they were of German make and were indistinguishable from the ordinary machines, used normally on the Hungarian railways.

Mr Balfour says that he would like to know the opinion of the French Foreign Office, and of his colleagues on the Romanian protest, to the effect that the Allies had allowed themselves to be swayed by the calumnious accusations of an unscrupulous enemy.

M Pichon says that we have not received information from such a source, but from our accredited representatives. He further remarks that the Romanians admitted implicitly the accusations, against which they protested, by trying to justify them on the plea of military necessity.

S Tittoni suggested that there should be no recriminations; the main point being that the Romanians should be made to conform to the decisions of the Conference.

M Pichon says that he agrees with S Tittoni, but thinks that the question of war material must be dealt with in our reply, which, he thinks, M Berthelot might possibly draft.

M Berthelot says that he will draft a reply, and asked whether it should not deal also with the entire disarmament of the Hungarian army, and the withdrawal of the Romanians behind the Theiss; since these points had been decided upon by the Conference, before sending out instructions to the Mission of Allied Generals to Budapest.

Mr Balfour remarks that the Romanians must be made to retire to their frontier and not only to the Theiss. They had already promised to do so after the disarmament of Hungary.

S Tittoni remarked that the moment at which the withdrawal of the Romanians should begin ought to be left to the Generals to decide. Further events in Hungary might make it most desirable to have a strong force of Romanians present in Budapest, which had been, during the past few months, the scene of Bloodshed and massacre.

General Weygand says that, under the circumstances, it might be best to examine carefully the instructions given to the Generals, and to see whether they were complete in all points. If it should be found that they are not, they can be revised and added to them if necessary.

Mr Balfour asks whether it had not been decided in these instructions what particular strategic points should be occupied by the Romanian army.

General Weygand replies that the Generals had been left free to decide on the points in Hungarian territory which ought to be occupied by the Romanians, and what forces should be employed by these latter for this purpose.

M Berthelot then reads the draft of the telegram that he has prepared for communication to the Romanian government.

Mr Balfour asks whether special mention should not be made of the rule laid down with regard to war booty and requisitions since the rule in question had been accepted by the governments of other Allied countries which had been invaded. He further asked whether these countries should not be mentioned by name.

Mr Berthelot says that it would, in his opinion, be unwise to mention Allied countries by name in this connection, on account of the Serbian actions in the Banat.

Mr Polk asks whether it is desired that the Romanian statement with regard to the lapse of the armistice should be allowed to stand.

M Berthelot says that he thinks it would be unwise to argue the question closely. There had been two armistices with Hungary. The first had not been very successful, and it had been altered by subsequent decisions of the Conference, since, by its provisions, Hungary was allowed to remain in Slovakia. The second armistice had then been substituted. It is now superseded by a third one, imposed on the Hungarians by the Romanians. The Conference could not very well re-open the whole discussion on armistices by replying in detail to the Romanian argument on the subject.

Mr Polk says that the sentence of the Romanian note stating that the armistice had lapsed owing to an invitation to take military action, communicated to Romania by the Allied and Associated Governments, could hardly be allowed to stand.

Mr Balfour suggests that a general sentence might open the reply, saying that the Conference does not wish to discuss the controversial points in the Romanian note.

(It is agreed to send a telegram drafted by M Berthelot to the Romanian Government and to the Mission of Allied Generals at Budapest.)


(At this point Mr. Hutchinson enters the room.)

2. Mr Hutchinson reports and comments on the Report of the Economic Commission with regard to the Economic Clauses in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

Mr Balfour asks whether the modification proposed to Article 25 would entail the acceptance on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments of the clauses in the Peace Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 whereby Romania obtained a certain portion of the Dobrudja.

Mr Hutchinson replies that he is unable to answer Mr Balfour’s question as the Economic Commission cannot deal with territorial questions.

(It is decided:

(1) That the proposed modification to Article 25 should be submitted to the Drafting Committee who should inform the Council whether by virtue of the aforesaid modification the Allied and Associated Governments would be bound to recognize as valid the territorial clauses in the Peace Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, more particularly those whereby a certain portion of the Dobruja was ceded to Romania.

(2) That the proposed modification to Article 36 should be accepted.)


3. The Council takes note of a telegram from the High Commissioner at Constantinople.

M Pichon says that he believed that it was intended that the Greek Officer should be present at the meetings of the Commission.

S Tittoni remarked that in his opinion the decision only implied that the Greek Officer was to be at the disposal of the Commission without being present at every sitting.

Mr Balfour says that he agreed with S Tittoni.

S Tittoni then accentuated his previous statement by saying that in his opinion the witnesses cited before the Commission would be intimidated by the presence of a Greek Officer.

M Pichon said that a decision in the same sense as the one previously taken must be made with regard to the Turks.

S Tittoni then remarked that he does not think that the resolution in H. D. 12, paragraph 5, had been accurately drafted, and points out that he had drawn attention to the inaccuracy in question on the following day.

Mr Balfour replies that the decision had been communicated to the Greeks and could not now be altered or modified.

M Pichon then says that the previous decision could be interpreted as excluding the Greek Representative from the deliberations of the Commission. The words of the decision had been that he was to “follow the labors of the Commission”. He is therefore in a position which could be compared with that of a foreign Military Attaché who followed the deliberations of the Headquarters Staff to which he was attached, without taking part in them.

(After some further discussion, it is decided that the previous decision of the Council (See H. D. 12, Article 5) should be explained to the High Commissioner at Constantinople in the sense that the Greek Representative should not be present at the meetings of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna. All necessary data should be communicated to him, however, and similar facilities should be given to a Turkish Representative, if subsequently appointed.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)