100 Years Ago Today

[Jimbuna]

26th July 1919

The U.S.S. Texas of the Pacific Fleet pass through the Panama Canal.


USS Wyoming (BB-32) passing through the Galliard Cut, Panama Canal.


Members of the Women's Police Force arrive at Buckingham Palace, London, to attend a party for war workers.


Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg (pictured) becomes the first President of Finland after the Finnish Parliament selected him over General Carl Gustaf Mannerheim.


Ship Losses:

Hauruto (United Kingdom) The cargo ship departed Saigon, French Indochina for Hong Kong. No further trace, presumed foundered with the loss of all hands.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, July 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


1. Mr White states that before dealing with the questions on the Agenda he would like to communicate to the Council some information that had been received with regard to General Boehm’s visit to Vienna. The information in question had been transmitted through Mr Hoover whom he requests the Council to ask for information.

(At this moment Mr Hoover enters the room.)

Mr Hoover states that the proposal in question has been submitted to the Allied representatives at Vienna by General Boehm, who had been the Commander-in-Chief of the Bolshevik Hungarian armies. General Boehm had stated that if he could be suitably supported by the Allies and given certain assurances, more particularly on the subject of raising the blockade, and the importation of foodstuffs, together with the re-opening of traffic on the Danube, he on his part, would be ready to set up a social democratic government with himself as temporary dictator. Bela Kun would be deposed from power; all terrorist actions will cease, and order would be restored.

Mr Balfour stated that he had seen Mr Hoover on the previous evening who had communicated the contents of the telegram to him, and that, moreover, he had had the advantage of discussing the matter with his Military Experts. He now wonders whether the best way of getting rid of Bela Kun is by means of military intervention. It is now possible that the best solution lay in adopting the suggestions contained in Mr Hoover’s telegram. As the Hungarians have now assumed the offensive and have crossed the Theiss they opened their flank to an attack from the south by the Serbian and French armies. It was evident that it would be preferable to conduct military operations with Hungarian assistance, but the following question presented itself. Was it possible to place full confidence in General Boehm? Even though it were possible to place full confidence in him, he would not be disposed to enter into an elaborate political arrangement with him. He thinks that it will be best to direct General Boehm to carry out his promises by means of the army which he states was under his control, and to tell him to confine his action to establishing some kind of military dictatorship with a view to calling a Constituent Assembly which should be in a position to express its will freely. Such a solution had a great advantage. In each of our countries there are sections of opinion which, without being actually Bolshevik, have none the less a certain sympathy for Bolshevik programs. Those portions of the public were most strongly opposed to military action against the Bolsheviks. All these disadvantages would be avoided by proceeding through General Boehm. He will be given the moral support of the Allies, who would promise him the guarantees demanded, if he is actually in a position to set up his dictatorship and to convene the Assembly which would determine the future of Hungary. The one question which had to be determined was whether confidence could be placed in General Boehm’s promises. Before deciding, it was necessary to have a formal assurance to the effect that he was able to carry out his promises, because, if he were not, fresh delay would be caused by entering into further discussions, which would prejudice the opportunity of successful military action which now presented itself.

M Clemenceau states that he believes it will be well to take this question up again on the following day, in order that the Council might have time to reflect upon it. He considers it would be well to have Marshal Foch at the meeting in order that he might give his advice on the military situation.

Mr Balfour observes that the important question is to know whether the Allies could have complete confidence in General Boehm.

Mr Coolidge states that he has with him a copy of a telegram which he had personally sent three months ago. In this he had stated that General Boehm was very popular in Hungary, that he had a strong political party supporting him, that his political views did not tend to the extremists and other parties of the Left, but rather inclined to those of the Right. He further observes that General Boehm was not a military man, but is none the less popular in army circles and with the working classes and that, if the situation has not changed since the time in question, he still had a powerful political faction behind him.

Mr Balfour asks whether the Council had any reason to believe that General Boehm was solely actuated by personal ambitions, and is working for his own selfish interests.

Mr Coolidge states that he does not believe this to be the case, for the reason that General Boehm had mentioned in the course of his conversations, three men whom he, Mr Coolidge, knew personally, and whose names he had mentioned in his telegram and in whom he had the greatest confidence.

Mr Hoover asked whether the Supreme Council could not at once establish a general principle, and declare that it is ready to sustain any non-terrorist Government and furnish supplies of food to it. By doing this the Council would in no way bind itself adversely, even though the movement instituted by General Boehm should fail. Military operations should always be preceded by a political declaration. The important thing he believes is to make such a declaration at once.

Mr Balfour asked whether the proposition extended to raising the blockade and furnishing food supplies to the country without undertaking military operations.

M Clemenceau states that the difficulty is not in going to Budapest, but as to what steps should be taken thereafter.

Mr White states that he would prefer to have the military operations carried out by the Hungarians themselves.

Mr Balfour observes that he would prefer to see a written proposition before taking a definite decision on the matter, and asked whether Mr Hoover cannot submit a report to the Council on the following morning.

M Clemenceau stated that he would request Marshal Foch to be present at the meeting which could be fixed for 10:30 the following morning, and that the proposals of Mr Hoover could then be examined.

Mr Balfour observed that he would like to know what was the decision from the point of view of international law in which Hungary now stood in regard to the armistice. She had accepted the Allies conditions, and yet at the present moment was attacking one of the Allied Powers, and he feels that in acting thus she had re-opened hostilities against all the Allies.

(It is decided that the question of further action on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments in Hungarian affairs, in view of the latest information received with regard to General Boehm’s proposals, should be discussed by the Council on the following day, and that Marshal Foch and Mr Hoover should attend.)


(M Cambon enters the room.)

2. M Cambon says that the Supreme Council has granted the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia a period of ten days in which to attempt to settle between themselves the question of Teschen, and that this period expired to-day. The representatives of these governments had not yet reached a satisfactory solution. A dispatch received from Warsaw indicates that the Polish Government wishes to obtain an extension of time. He had brought this matter to the attention of the Czechoslovak and Polish Sub-Committees, and these bodies were disposed to grant the extension. He has also taken the matter up with Dr Benes and Mr Dmowski, and these latter are also disposed to grant the extension but believed that the same should be short. He stated that it was therefore proposed to grant an extension of ten days. If, on the expiration of this, no agreement had been reached the matter should be decided by the Supreme Council. He believed that the Governments at Prague and Warsaw were doing everything in their power to reach an agreement, as they had already constituted two small committees for the matter, and these were at present studying the question.

Mr White states that he thinks that the Czechoslovak and Polish Committees ought to take advantage of the extension of time by themselves examining the question and preparing a solution for the Supreme Council, in the event of the two governments concerned not being able to come to an agreement.

(It is decided that a further period of ten days should be granted to the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, to arrive at an agreement between themselves on the Teschen question.

It is further agreed that the Czechoslovak and Polish Committees should in the meantime examine the question in order that the Council should be in a position to decide, if no agreement should be reached by the aforesaid Governments.)

At this point the military representatives of the Supreme War Council and General Thwaites enters the room.

Military, Naval & Aerial clauses of the Bulgarian Treaty (Mr Hoover and Mr Coolidge leave the room.)

M Clemenceau states that the Council had received the proposed Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty, which had been prepared by the Supreme War Council at Versailles. He requests General Belin to inform the Council regarding the matters upon which the experts had differed.

General Belin stated that no differences of opinion between the military experts existed with one exception, that the Italian military representative had made one reservation, which was indicated on the draft, regarding the method of recruiting. Briefly the Italian military representative insisted upon the reservation which he had already made for the Austrian and Hungarian States, namely: That the Bulgarian army should be organised on a basis of one year compulsory service.

S Tittoni said that this was a question of detail which he did not wish to press.

(It is decided that the report of the Military Representatives with regard to the Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria should be accepted.)


(At this point the Military Representatives leave the room, and M Larnaude enters.)

Clauses of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty Relating to Responsibilities M Clemenceau asks M Larnaude to explain the question.

M Larnaude stated that he merely wished to outline the manner in which the Committee had discussed the question. They had found themselves faced by Articles 227, 228 and 229 of the German Peace Treaty, and the question had come up whether these Articles should be adopted as they stood in the Bulgarian Treaty. The Greek, Serbian and Romanian Governments had opposed this, as indicated in the Report presented by the Committee. They feared that their good faith would be questioned adversely and therefore preferred that persons guilty of crimes against their citizens should be brought to judgment before international tribunals and not before national military tribunals of each of the Powers whose citizens had been injured, as was the case in the German Treaty. The American Delegates had made certain reservations and the French Delegates, whom he represented, had merely requested that note be taken of the position which they held with regard to this proposal. The French Delegates believed that it would be difficult and dangerous to adopt a different method of punishing the same criminal acts, should they agree to the proposal to grant to Bulgaria international guarantees of impartiality, which they had refused to grant to Germany.

M Clemenceau observed that it would be well to know whether the same differences of opinion existed in the Council.

M Larnaude stated that the United States and France had made certain reservations, but that the British Government supported the Greek, Serbian and Romanian proposals.

Baron Makino observed that the Japanese Delegates had also made reservations, having reiterated those which they had already made regarding the Treaty with Germany, and that he wished to take the same position as his experts on the Committee.

M Larnaude stated that the Japanese Delegates had merely renewed the reservations which they had previously made, in regard to the prosecution for breaches of the laws and customs of war of enemy Heads of States, before a tribunal constituted by the opposite party.

S Tittoni says that, if the question arose theoretically as to a choice between two tribunals, the Council might hesitate, but, as the Greek, Serbian and Romanian Governments themselves believed that they might be suspected of bad faith, and therefore requested the support from an international government, it seemed to him difficult for the Council to refuse them its support.

M Clemenceau observe that another question was involved, namely, that of the precedent established in the German Treaty.

M. Tittoni answered that, in the case of Germany, the good faith of the Allies’ judgment was not questioned and no one of the Allies thought of it. In the case of Bulgaria, the very Powers themselves who were interested in the matter had brought the question up.

M Clemenceau remarks that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had had the courage to undertake their responsibilities, and that the Council should reply that the Governments now in question should take theirs.

S Tittoni stated that he did not wish to carry his point of view as the solution of the matter. It did not vitally concern him.

Mr Balfour said that the Council must not lose sight of the fact that the Greek, Serbian and Romanian Governments considered themselves competent to try the Bulgarian prisoners actually in their hands before military courts, but that they did not believe themselves competent to try persons who might be turned over to them under the terms of the Treaty.

M Larnaude said that the point in question had not been missed and that he had drawn the attention of the representatives of these various Governments to the fact that they were open to the charge of inconsistency. One of these latter, however, M Politis, had stated that the number of persons to be brought before military courts was not great.

Mr White states that it was for this reason that they wished to place the responsibility of trying the numerous persons who were to be handed over to them by the Treaty upon the Great Powers. It had been stated that the Serbians had a list comprising from 15,000 to 20,000 persons.

M.
Larnaude stated that he did not wish to enter into a discussion, but only to explain the point of issue. He did not see why there should be any difference between the two countries, and that justice should be applied everywhere in the same manner.

Mr Balfour stated that the proposal originally submitted to the Council of Four with regard to Germany was that an international tribunal, such as was now demanded by the Greek, Serbian and Romanian Governments, should be set up. In spite of the favorable view taken by the Committee, the Council had actually decided otherwise. He did not know why the modification had been adopted, but it must certainly have been based upon strong arguments. For this reason, he was not inclined to adopt a contrary principle.

S Tittoni said that the decision would be a matter of indifference to him.

M Clemenceau then stated that he proposed to adopt the same formula as had governed the German Treaty.

(It is decided that the Clauses relative to Responsibilities in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria should be drafted on the same principle as that governing the corresponding clauses in the Peace Treaty with Germany (National Military Tribunals competent to judge the crimes committed by the Bulgarians.) See Articles 228–230 of the German Peace Treaty.)


(At this point M Larnaude leaves the room and M Tardieu enters.)

The Report of the Committee Supervising the Execution of the Peace Treaty With Germany on the Subject of Belgium M Tardieu stated that the Committee supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany did not foresee any difficulty in the nomination of five members by the Allied and Associated Powers to the Committee of Seven Members, who, by virtue of Article 35 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, should lay down locally the new frontier between Belgium and Germany. There was, therefore, no special recommendation to be made. It would be sufficient if the Allied and Associated Powers would nominate their representatives, in order that the Committee might start work as soon as possible.

(It is decided that, at the next meeting of the Supreme Council, each Delegation should nominate its representative on the Committee provided for under Article 36 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, for the purpose of determining, locally, the new boundary line between Germany and Belgium.)


6. M Tardieu stated that Article 48 of the Peace Treaty provided for the nomination of three members by the League of Nations, who could act in a Commission of five members, which should be charged with the duty of delimiting locally the boundary line of the Saar Territory as laid down in the Treaty. He admitted that it was not impossible, theoretically, for the League of Nations to make the necessary nominations within the fifteen days following the signature of the Treaty. The Convention in question was part of the Treaty, and the Powers represented on the Council of the League of Nations were named; the Committee supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty thought, however, that it would be difficult in practice for nations whose members were on the Council of the League of Nations, and who should not have ratified the Treaty, to be able to nominate representatives to the Committee. If such a participation were impossible, the Delimitation Committee might be nominated in the manner foreseen in the Peace Treaty, but the Supervising Committee thought that the necessary nominations might be made temporarily by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Such a procedure would make an agreement with Germany necessary, since nominations made in this manner were not foreseen in the text in the Treaty. The ratification of the Pact of the League of Nations would take place as soon as possible. The Committee therefore recommended that the Supreme Council should come to a decision on the subject. Report of the Committee Supervising the Execution of the Peace Treaty With Germany on the Delimitation of the Saar Basin

Mr Balfour states that the League of Nations had certain defined duties with regard to the Basin of the Saar, but the League could only act after ratification. It followed that the American Government, which did not appear to be able to give the necessary ratification in a short time, would be prevented from taking its place on the Commission for some while. It was therefore proposed that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should make a temporary nomination; it was open to question, however, if they had the right to do so.

M Tardieu stated that they had not such a right without arriving at an agreement with Germany.

Mr Balfour stated that he did not favour any request being made of Germany, but, that in the case in question, he thought no difficulty would arise.

M Tardieu stated that at the present moment there was no use in [approaching the German Government, but that the Council could agree to the principle which should be applied when the time came.

Mr White stated that he could not take any decision with regard to the ratification without referring to President Wilson.

M Pichon stated that the point was important, since the American Government had the duty of convening the Council of the League of Nations.

M. Tardieu stated that the text of the telegram to be sent to President Wilson could be made out.

(It was decided:


That M. Tardieu, at the next meeting of the Supreme Council, should present a draft telegram for transmission to President Wilson, on the subject of the Commission for the delimitation of the Saar Basin.)


7 M Tardieu stated that the Committee had submitted a Note, which had been sent to the various Delegations. Note From the Drafting Committee on the Subject of the Sale of State Property in Slesvig

The Committee proposed a slight modification to the text submitted to the Supreme Council. A formal assent was all that was necessary. (It was decided:

That the Drafting Committee’s proposed modification in the text of the notification to be sent to the German and Danish Governments on the subject of the sale of State property in Slesvig should be adopted.)

8 M Tardieu suggests that a Note dated 8th July had been received from the German Delegation on the subject of the preparatory measures which should immediately follow the ratification of the Peace Treaty, in order that the clauses of the Treaty with regard to the Eastern Provinces of Germany, should be carried out.Evacuation of Territories Ceded by Germany to Poland

The Committee supervising the execution of the Treaty submitted a draft rep

(It is decided that the draft reply to the German Delegation, submitted by the Committee to supervise the execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany, with regard to the opening of negotiations between the Allied and German Governments, on the subject of the preparatory measures to be taken for enforcing the provisions of the Treaty dealing with the cession of the Eastern Provinces of the German Empire, should be accepted.)


9 M Tardieu stated that the German Delegation had sent a Note dated 16th July 1919 asking that the names and powers of the Allied Commissioners for Eastern Prussia, should be communicated to the German Government. The Committee had drafted a reply.


(It is decided that the draft reply to the German Delegation, submitted by the Committee, to supervise the execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany, with regard to furnishing the German Government with the names and powers of the Allied and Associated Commissioners in East Prussia, be accepted.)

10. (At this point M Tardieu left the room and Mr Ignace enters.)

Clauses in the Peace Treaty With Bulgaria With Regard to Prisoners of War Ignace stated that the clauses inserted into the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria and submitted by the Committee were only a repetition of similar clauses in the Austrian Treaty with the exception of Article 9, which provided for an Inter-Allied Committee of Inquiry to examine the question of subjects of the Allied and Associated Powers not yet repatriated. The Inter-Allied Committee would further examine the cases of those persons who desired to remain in Bulgaria, and would investigate criminal actions which might be punished. The Article provided for the manner in which the Committee should be constituted. It lays down also that its inquiries shall be communicated to each Government concerned, and after that, to the Tribunal provided for in Article 3 of the Treaty. He had just learned that the Supreme Council had decided that there should be no Inter-Allied Tribunal, but that each Government should judge actions coming under the above head, by means of a Military Court.

M Clemenceau states that it had been decided to act in the same way as had been done in the case of Germany.

Mr Ignace states that it would be sufficient to make a slight modification in the text of Article 9, and to suppress the second paragraph, numbered 2.

(It is therefore decided:

That the proposed Articles for the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, presented by the Prisoners of War Committee should be accepted with the exception of the second paragraph numbered 2 in Article 9, which should be deleted.)

(At this point Mr Ignace leaves the room.)


11. M. Clemenceau reads the Austrian Note dated 21st July. He draws attention to the statement in the Note:

Austrian Reply on the Subject of the Delivery of Arms and Munitions to the Czechoslovaks “That all arms and munitions demanded hitherto are being handed over to the Royal Italian Armistice Mission at Vienna. The Mission in question has undertaken to transmit the materials to the Czechoslovakia Government, which procedure has been decided upon with the full consent of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Vienna”.

He draws attention to the fact that he has no knowledge of this.

Mr Balfour states that he also has no information and would like to have certain points cleared up. He asks whether the arms and munitions had been handed over to the Head of the Italian Mission only, or to the French and Italian representatives conjointly?

M Clemenceau states that the arms and munitions belong to all the Allies.

Mr Balfour says that he would like to know how long it is since the delivery of arms and munitions had been taking place, what quantity had been handed over, and how much was still to be delivered.

M Clemenceau states that it is also necessary to know who had consented to the procedure.

(It is decided:

To send the following telegram to the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Vienna with regard to the delivery of arms and munitions to the Czechoslovaks:

“The Austrian Delegation has replied to a communication from the Peace Conference, wherein the aforesaid Government was directed to deliver up its war material in the following terms:

All the arms and munitions demanded up to date are at present being handed over to the Royal Italian Armistice Mission at Vienna. This Mission has undertaken to transmit the materials in question to the Czechoslovak Government with the knowledge and consent of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Vienna. The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers therefore request that it may be informed:

1) Who gave the consent referred to in the Austrian reply and in what form?

2) Whether the arms and munitions delivered by the Austrian Government have been handed over to the Royal Italian Mission only, or to the French and Italian representatives conjointly.

3) Since what date has this delivery taken place.

4) What are the total amounts of the different classes of war material, and what proportion of them have been delivered.”)


12. After a short discussion it is decided that the texts of the following draft instructions for the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry into the events in Asia Minor should be accepted. The Inquiry of the Committee should take as its subject matter the acts which had taken place during and after the occupation of Smyrna, Aidin, Aivali and the adjacent regions by the Greek troops. These acts had been reported in the form of a complaint by the Sheikh-ul-Islam. The Inquiry was to be extended to all events relative to the above from the date of occupation to the present moment. The Committee was to determine the responsibilities and to submit its report to the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, together with such conclusions as it might consider relevant as soon as possible.


(At this moment M Seydoux enters the room.)

13. M Seydoux states that the question had to be resumed from where it had been left off at the last discussion. The American reply had not been received.

Mr White states that the American Government thinks that it cannot collaborate with the Allies in the Blockade of Russia since it was not in a state of war with Bolshevik Russia. The President had sent him a reply in the above sense. The President thinks that the practical difficulties of commerce would prevent any suitable assistance being given to Soviet Russia.

M Seydoux says that the President’s reply put the Supreme Council into a difficult position for it had been desired to block the Gulf of Finland. The Scandinavian Governments had made requests to be authorized to renew commercial relations with Petrograd. No reply had been given, since it was thought that Petrograd would soon fall. This, however, had not taken place. Since that date Kolchak had been informed that the Allied and Associated Powers were ready to support him; this had, in fact, been done. He asked whether it was now possible to authorize certain nations to assist Kolchak’s enemy by their commerce. The Swedish Government had demanded quite openly that it might be allowed to re-open commercial relations with the Government of Lenin. By acceding to this, Lenin would be assisted, and by taking the measures necessary, might distribute what he received in whatever manner he chose. The excuse of assisting unfortunate peasant populations could not be brought forward. A new note had been received moreover to the following effect: The French Minister at Copenhagen who has been informed of the questions laid before the Supreme Council by the Blockade Committees in Paris and in London, on the subject of commercial relations with Bolshevik Russia, reports that the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs stated, in an official letter addressed to the English Minister, that the Danish Government would not assist the exportation of any merchandise from Denmark to Soviet Russia, before the deliberations on the subject, now going forward in Paris, had been concluded.

Mr Balfour states that he knows nothing of this communication.

M Seydoux says that information had been received from Stockholm to the effect that the Swedes had not renewed their request and had not dispatched vessels since they knew that they would be stopped. They had not been undeceived. The questions might be raised again at any time however, and it would be difficult to know how to deal with them.

M Clemenceau states that the discussion with President Wilson should be taken up again since new arguments could now be brought forward. Everyone had to undertake a certain amount of responsibility. Should they not, therefore, submit the questions afresh and wait for his reply.

S Tittoni states that it was known from an authoritative source that the Soviet Government was making a large number of Allied bank notes. If commercial relations were renewed it would facilitate the circulation of these false notes.

Mr Balfour states that Mr White’s remarks submitted to President Wilson are very complete. On the other hand one or two important points had been omitted.

Mr White had spoken of Kolchak and of the assistance that should be given to him. In his opinion the question was much more serious for at that moment British forces were fighting at Archangel. In addition to this the populations of the Baltic States were being organised and armed in order that they might fight against Bolshevism. So at the moment we were asked to assist our enemies by allowing them to receive arms, munitions and material of every kind, which although they were not sent to men with whom we were legally at war, were none the less being dispatched to persons who were fighting against us. What would be the position of the League of Nations if it were in existence? Supposing that it had existed and decided, as the Supreme Council had decided, to assist Kolchak, Denikin and the Baltic States to fight against the disorder of Soviet Russia. How would it operate? Undoubtedly it would declare a blockade for no other means would be at its disposal. Englishmen, and soldiers in Kolchak’s and Denikin’s armies were being killed daily in the fighting against the Bolsheviks. If a state of war does not exist legally, it existed none the less in point of fact. The position of the Allied and Associated Powers was, however, difficult. If the question were examined from the political point of view, was it possible to ask peoples already pressed by heavy taxes to make new sacrifices in order that arms should be sent to our friends; whilst at the same time, arms were being allowed to pass into the hands of those against whom we were fighting.

Mr. White stated that he would have to consult an expert in international law. He desired, however, to draw attention to President Wilson’s reply. What the President had said was not an article of a Treaty binding upon all, and the other Powers were free to set up a blockade without American help.

M Clemenceau states that before arriving at any solution, he thinks President Wilson should again be approached and he proposed that Mr Balfour should draw up a telegram in the sense of his remarks.

Mr Balfour stated that in reply to Mr. White, he recognizes that President Wilson in his reply did not bind us, but he asks what position should we be in if an American vessel were to carry munitions.

M Clemenceau stated that, if it became necessary to act without American assistance, President Wilson would have to be asked to give an undertaking to send no ships.

M Seydoux states that, in his opinion, this is a point which should be insisted upon. Assistance to the Bolshevik Government could not be justified by the argument that relief was being given to an unfortunate populace. The Government of Lenin was such that his agents centralized all foodstuffs and distributed them as they wished. Little or no food would be sent to the populace. The only result would be that Lenin’s Government would be strengthened.

(It is decided that Mr. Balfour should prepare, for the next meeting of the Supreme Council, a new dispatch to be sent to President Wilson on the subject of the Blockade of Russia.)

(At this point M Seydoux leaves the room.)


14. M Clemenceau states that a declaration which was to be signed by the Austrian Plenipotentiaries had been submitted to the Conference. (Agreement by the Austrian Government With Regard to Vessels Sunk by Their Naval Forces

(After a short discussion, the draft declaration is accepted.)


15. S Tittoni states that, as the Agenda had been worked off, he wishes to draw attention to the grave situation in Italy with regard to coal. The stocks of that material would be practically exhausted in a fortnight. During the war an Inter-Allied body had decided on the manner in which coal should be distributed among the Allies. This body no longer existed. He asked whether it would be possible to re-constitute it and asked, further, that this should be done, because the situation in Italy was of the utmost gravity.

Mr Balfour states that it is one of the most urgent questions of the immediate future.

Mr White says that Mr Hoover is in agreement with Mr Balfour.

M Clemenceau says that he proposed that S Tittoni in collaboration with Mr Hoover should make a proposal in writing.

Mr Balfour states that Mr Hoover has reported on the coal situation in Europe in an extremely pessimistic sense. He thinks that the cause of the evil was that workmen were no longer working. This was more particularly the case in Central Europe and Upper Silesia. The reduction of the number of hours had made the situation even worse. It had been improved by the fact that the German authorities had threatened to cut off the provisions from mining districts where production diminished. This measure had increased the quantity of mineral taken from the mines, but the progress had been short. It was, therefore, not a question of war but a social crisis.

(It is decided that S Tittoni should submit to the next meeting of the Supreme Council his proposals with regard to the re-constitution of the Inter-Allied Committee for the distribution of coal.)


16. M Clemenceau states that the Drafting Committee had brought the following note before them:

The Drafting Committee would be obliged if the Supreme Council would give information as to whether Treaties with the Serbian, (Croat-Slovene) State, and with Czechoslovakia and Romania, all of which are to be signed at the same time as the Treaty with Austria should, like this latter, be drawn up in English, French, and Italian. The French text being authoritative in case of divergence.

(After a short discussion, it was decided that the proposal of the Drafting Committee to the effect that the Peace Treaties with the Serbian (Croat-Slovene) State, with Czechoslovakia, with Romania and with Bulgaria, should be drawn up in three languages, the French text being authoritative in cases of divergence.)


17. M Clemenceau says that the French Delegation had submitted a note with regard to the credentials of the German Diplomatic Agents. It had drafted a letter to the President of the German Delegation. (This draft is accepted.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

27th July 1919

Ataman Hryhoriiv is shot dead during a parley with Makhno. (Ukraine).

A member of the state militia faces off against an African-American veteran during the 1919 Chicago Race Riot. July 27, 1919.


Belgian cyclist Firmin Lambot wins the 1919 Tour de France, which had been put on hold since 1914 due to the war.


Ship Losses:

Admiral Knight (United States) The cargo ship was destroyed by fire off the mouth of the Fraser River. Her crew were rescued.
USS May (United States Navy) The naval yacht ran aground off Cape Engaño, Dominican Republic. She was abandoned as a total loss on 28 February 1920.
Synovya (Russian Navy White Movement) The steamer was beached and burned to prevent capture in the Volga Estuary.
Yekaterina (Russian Navy White Movement) The steamer was beached and burned to prevent capture in the Volga Estuary.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, July 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


(At this point Marshal Foch, General Weygand, and the Military Representatives from Versailles enter the room.)

1. M Clemenceau states that, before passing to the subjects on the Agenda, he would ask Marshal Foch to explain the dispute that has now arisen between the Poles and the Lithuanians with regard to the line of demarcation that had been laid down by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Marshal Foch shows the demarcation line upon a map which he presents to the Council, and draws attention to the point at which the line in question has been violated. He points out that the question of the German evacuation of the territories under discussion was involved, and that, according to latest reports, General von der Goltz had begun a general withdrawal.

M Clemenceau states that, as certain aspects of the problem are new to the Council, he would propose that the question should be adjourned until the afternoon’s meeting, and that M Cambon should attend.

(It is therefore decided that the question should be re-discussed at the afternoon’s meeting and that M Cambon should be present.)


2. M Clemenceau reads two telegrams, dated July 7th and 24th respectively, relative to a rupture of communications through Warsaw between Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries, and asks Marshal Foch whether he is familiar with the details of this matter.

Marshal Foch replies that the question has not been brought to his attention.

(It is therefore decided to adjourn the discussion of this question until the afternoon’s meeting, at which time Marshal Foch would have investigated the matter.)


(At this point Mr Hoover and Mr Coolidge enter the room.)

3. Marshal Foch refers the Council to his military report of July 17th. He reminds them, however, that the political side of the question still asserts itself, and that this could not be dealt with by him.

M Clemenceau draws attention to the fact that the question of General Boehm’s action had now arisen.

Marshal Foch replies that General Boehm’s proposals are of a purely political nature, and that the military situation had altered to a certain extent by reason of the Hungarian attack upon the Romanian forces. These latter had been prepared, however, and were in a position to resist. The situation, therefore, was in the same posture as it had been when he reported on July 17th.

Mr Balfour asks whether Marshal Foch knows anything about General Boehm.

S Tittoni remarks that General Boehm is the Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Bolshevik forces.

Marshal Foch says that, according to his latest information, General Boehm had held a Lieutenant’s rank.

M Pichon remarks that he is actually the Hungarian Minister at Vienna.

Mr Balfour states that, while the problem is both military and political, one side of it is half way between the two. Boehm stated that he had sufficient influence with the Hungarian Armies to crush Bela Kun and set up a Constituent Assembly without the Allies being called upon to strike a blow. This presents the question partly political and partly military. He would therefore like to know whether, in Marshal Foch’s opinion, Boehm had the degree of military influence that he claims and what are the probabilities of his being successful.

Marshal Foch replies that he knows nothing about Boehm, nor of his military qualities. At the same time, the small countries surrounding Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Romania, would not keep a passive attitude for very long in the face of Hungarian aggression and would shortly take an initiative of some kind, since it was obvious that they could not keep their armies mobilized indefinitely.

S Tittoni says he thinks that the information received from Hungary during the past month gives a tolerable picture of the state of affairs in that country. It is clear that Bela Kun represented no more than a minority and that he had raised against himself internal and external enemies. It is even stated that 80 per cent of the Bolshevik Armies in Hungary are hostile to him; if this were so, the offer of Boehm was only a manifestation of this discontent. Whatever was going to happen, it is evident that the Great Powers must lend some kind of assistance, either military or moral, since the reconstruction of Hungary from within was going to be a lengthy process. Two courses were now open. The first was to send out the Committee, as had been contemplated, and to support it with the promise of ultimate military force. The second course was to adopt immediately, and to put into effect, the military action proposed by Marshal Foch. All reports agree in thinking that Austria would soon be affected by Bolshevism.

M Pichon says that he agrees with S Tittoni, but thinks that the functions of the Committee must be kept distinct from the negotiations arising out of Boehm’s proposals.

S Tittoni remarks that, when the Committee has been decided upon, it has been agreed, at the same time, that it should not enter into relations with Bela Kun.

M Pichon states that the telegrams from the Allied Ministers prove that Boehm’s proposals were being taken seriously. It was therefore for consideration whether the Committee should not, after all, be authorized to deal with him.

S Tittoni states that, if Boehm is actually in a position to overthrow Bela Kun, it is none the less certain that he requires something from the Allied and Associated Governments. What is it, therefore, that he really wants?

M Clemenceau said that Boehm asks for nothing except moral support.

Mr White states that, by sending out the Committee, it might appear that the Allied and Associated Governments wished to enter into negotiations either with Boehm or with Bela Kun; it was not desirable to give this impression. Mr Hoover has a proposal to make which avoids this difficulty.

M Mantoux then reads aloud Mr Hoover’s proposal.

Mr Balfour then reads a draft proposal of his own, stating that it has the fault of coming to no definite conclusion.

M Clemenceau says that, as S Tittoni had observed, the Council is not entirely clear as to the requests and proposals which Boehm had made to the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr Balfour remarks that both the military plans and the proposals of Boehm had as their object the expulsion of Bela Kun.

S Tittoni then says that the following distinct questions should be put to the Allied representatives at Vienna:

1) Is Boehm in good faith, or was he merely acting as an agent of Bela Kun?

2) Is Boehm able to carry out his promises, or does he want assistance?

3) What does he require?

Mr Hoover says he thinks Boehm had definitely asked that the blockade should be raised, foodstuffs sent into the country and navigation on the Danube reopened, if he, on his part, established himself as a temporary dictator.

Mr White confirms Mr Hoover’s point of view by reading a portion of the relative document.

M Pichon says that Boehm had made no demand, but had submitted proposals.

Mr White states that the Allied Representatives at Vienna evidently think that Boehm is to be taken seriously.

Mr Balfour summarizes S Tittoni’s questions, and states that he thinks they had been answered by the fact that our representatives at Vienna believed that Boehm was to be trusted, and was doing no more than asking for certain specific things.

S Tittoni says that he is not of the opinion that explicit answers had been given, and that more detailed replies should be obtained.

Mr Balfour then asks Mr Hoover if he is not justified in saying that the questions had really been answered.

Mr Hoover replies that, in his opinion, it is dangerous for the Allied and Associated Governments to open negotiations with secret agents. Would it not be possible to make a public declaration of policy and to allow Boehm to make his own deductions from it? Such a declaration might take the form of a statement to the effect that economic assistance would be given to a properly constituted government, and that such a statement would not bind the Conference to subsequent military action.

Mr Balfour points out that the fact that Bela Kun had not carried out the Armistice and had made war against our Allies stood out. He remarks that he would conclude his proposals by saying that, if any responsible government should be set up in Hungary, economic aid would be furnished it by the Allied and Associated Powers. He asks, however, whether the conclusion of the Council was that whether military action should be taken or the situation allowed to remain in its present state. He ask, in conclusion, how the declaration could be made public.

M Clemenceau replies that it could be published in the press.

Mr White read from a telegram to the effect that Colonel Cunninghame had, on that day, interviewed Boehm, who would be ready to act in a month’s time and undertook to overthrow Bela Kun in 48 hours, but that Boehm could not act until he knew whether the Allies would approve of his plans.

M Clemenceau remarks that the capture of Budapest seemed to be an easy matter, but that the questions which would follow it were most difficult. For instance, if the Romanians entered Budapest, a very strong feeling would be excited among the Hungarians. He then asks Marshal Foch for his opinion on the actual situation of the Hungarian Army.

Marshal Foch replied that Hungary has actually not disarmed. The Army is still in the field and it mattered little whether its leader was Bela Kun or Boehm. Even though a political formula were adopted, as the basis of subsequent action, any person who received support from the Allies might subsequently adopt a new attitude with every prospect of success.

M Clemenceau then asks how Hungary could be disarmed.

Marshal Foch replies that it could be done by laying down terms so severe that disarmament would be certain. The fact remains that, instead of the 6 divisions which had been allowed to the Hungarian Army, 12 are actually in the field.

Mr Balfour then asks whether Marshal Foch believes that an effective disarmament of the Hungarian Army could take place without an occupation of a portion of their territory.

Marshal Foch answers that an ultimatum, backed by military force, could effect what was desired. The threat to attack must remain. He has already stated that the Allied Armies acting in Hungary must be commanded by a single General, who would possibly be a foreigner. Could not the civil government be instituted in the same way by the assistance of a Czechoslovak or Romanian or other nominee? Some decision was none the less necessary.

Mr Balfour points out that there is no inconsistency between the points of view of Mr Hoover and Marshal Foch. In a public notification it could be stated why the Allies could not deal with Bela Kun, and what kind of person they would consent to deal with.

(It is therefore decided that Mr Balfour and Mr Hoover should confer in the preparation of a public notification to be sent to Hungary, and that it should be presented to the Council at the afternoon meeting.)

4) M Clemenceau asks Marshal Foch to explain his report to the Conference.

Marshal Foch then reads the conclusions of his report, in which he had stated that the total strength of the Army of Occupation should be 6,500 Officers, 151,000 men and 35,000 horses. He states that these figures had been reached in consultation with the Allied Military Representatives at Versailles. He had since received a letter from General Pershing in which the latter stated that the strength of the American Forces of Occupation would be approximately 6,800 men comprised of one regiment of infantry, one group of cavalry and certain auxiliary troops. He asked whether the proposals in his report were acceptable to the Council.

Mr Balfour then asks whether the proportion and numbers of troops to be supplied by each of the Allies in the Army of Occupation had been definitely fixed; because he himself was not aware of this having been done.

General Weygand states that the only question which had been discussed at Versailles was the total effective strength and not the proportion of the strength to be furnished by each Country.

General Thwaites remarks that the proportion to be furnished by Great Britain had not yet been considered by the War Office.

(After some discussion it is agreed that the proposals of Marshal Foch’s report on the subject of the total eventual effective strength of the Armies of Occupation upon the Rhine should be accepted. It is further decided that the question of the proportions in which this total strength was to be furnished by each of the Allies should not be discussed until the War Offices of the Countries concerned had been able to examine the question.)

5) Marshal Foch submits his reply to the question laid before him by the Council, with regard to the Allied Forces necessary in the plebiscite zone in Upper Silesia. In commenting upon his reply, he draws attention to the fact that the Division required must be an Allied Division, and that each Ally must furnish an equal quota. He further draws attention to the fact that there is a clause in the Peace Treaty providing for the armed Forces under consideration.

Mr Balfour says that the question of employing British troops was most difficult and that the War Cabinet must be consulted.

M Clemenceau remarks that the question had been decided by the Council of the Heads of Delegations in the sense that an Inter-Allied Division would be necessary. He reads the previous decision on the subject.

Mr Balfour asks whether it has been decided that the Armies of Occupation on the Rhine should supply the troops.

Marshal Foch said that such a decision had been arrived at but insisted that the force must be made up by equal numbers of Allied troops.

Mr White remarks that in his opinion the former resolution of the Council had been inconsistent in that it contemplated the use of the troops taken from the Army of Occupation alone, whereas the clause of the Treaty, referred to by Marshal Foch, states that troops of all the Allies should be used. Italy, one of the Allied Powers, has no troops in the Army of Occupation.

The question of the length of time during which the Army of Occupation of the plebiscite zone would be necessary, was then raised and it was stated that whilst it might be six to eight months, the longest period contemplated was eighteen months.

Mr White, further commenting upon the resolution of the Council, asks Marshal Foch whether the Division could be raised from the Armies of Occupation when they had been reduced to their ultimate strength of 150,000 men.

Marshal Foch says that the Division could be raised under those circumstances from the Army of Occupation, but that at the same time it was necessary to get it ready at once.

(Mr Balfour again draws attention to the fact that it is necessary for him to refer the matter to Sir Henry Wilson and after a short discussion it was agreed that the question should be adjourned until Mr Balfour should have consulted with the British War Office.)

6) Mr Balfour reads aloud a draft of the telegram that he had prepared for President Wilson.

(It is agreed that M Clemenceau should communicate the despatch to the President of the United States.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, July 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


(Marshal Foch, the Military Advisers, Mr Hoover and the experts on Polish Affairs enter the room.)

1. M Cambon says that the line proposed by Marshal Foch include in the Polish area the districts of Suvalki and Seiny. The population of this area was Polish. It is therefore preferable so to fix the line as to attribute those territories to Poland.

M Clemenceau asks whether these areas are still occupied by the Germans.

M Cambon says the Germans are evacuating the territories slowly.

Mr Balfour says he would like to know how the various lines which have been drawn had come about. He understands that the territory is Polish but that it had been deliberately excluded from Polish occupation by the Council of Five. If it is true that the Council has laid down a policy to which the Poles had refused to submit, it would not be very satisfactory to reverse the Council’s policy in favour of the Poles merely because they had been insubordinate.

General Le Rond explains that when it had been a question of establishing a line of demarcation between Poles and Germans a line had been drawn north and east of the districts of Suvalki and Seiny, giving these to the Poles. This line had been notified but had never been acted on. It had been drawn in accordance with a recommendation of the Committee dealing with the eastern frontiers of Poland. The recommendations of the Committee had come up before the Council but had not been accepted. All the experts had agreed that the territory in question was Polish.

M Clemenceau says that he has been told that the territory was mostly Lithuanian. He would like to know what the opinion of the experts really is.

(The American, British, French and Italian experts agree that the population in these districts is mainly Polish.)

General Le Rond continuing, says that at a later date, according to the demands of the Lithuanian Military Mission, the question was brought before the Council and a line passing just north of Augustovo had been fixed as the line of demarcation between the Polish and Lithuanian forces. This is the green line on the annexed map. The Poles have complained that there are distinctively Polish areas north of this line and on the 20th June they had proposed that the line of demarcation should be that shown in blue on the map. This line, not only enclosed Polish areas, but also a wide defensive zone in addition. The line since proposed by Marshal Foch, enclosed what were really Polish areas and only a shallow defensive zone in addition. This is the red line on the map.

M Clemenceau asks whether the change from the green to the red line had been accompanied by or was the result of an offensive action taken by the Poles.

General Weygand said that this is not so. General Henrys has been told to allow the Poles to occupy Polish territory evacuated by the Germans.

Mr Balfour says that he had been given the impression that the Poles had defied the orders of the Conference, but he is prepared to accept the explanation given and to agree to the line proposed by Marshal Foch, in view of the unanimous opinion that the territory which would be assigned to the Poles was Polish in character.

(Marshal Foch is then instructed to communicate through General Henrys the line of demarcation between Polish and Lithuanian forces in the region of Suvalki, Grodno, and Vilna, in accordance with the red line on the annexed map.)


2. Mr Balfour says that he has had a talk with Mr Hoover and as a result of his conversation, has prepared a draft Hungarian which he then reads:

“The Allied and Associated Governments are most anxious to arrange a peace with the Hungarian people, and thus bring to an end a condition of things which makes the economic revival of Central Europe impossible, and defeats any attempt to secure supplies for its population. These tasks cannot even be attempted until there is in Hungary a Government which represents its people, and carries out in the letter and the spirit the engagements into which it has entered with the Associated Governments. None of these conditions are fulfilled by the Administration of Bela Kun: which has not only broken the Armistice to which Hungary was pledged, but is at this moment actually attacking a friendly and Allied Power. With this particular aspect of the question it is for the Associated Governments to deal on their own responsibility. But if Peace is to be settled, if economic reconstruction is to be attempted, if the blockade is to be removed, if supplies are to be made available, the co-operation of the Hungarian people is required. It is only with a Government which really represents them that such a settlement can be arranged.

The Associated Powers think it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of Hungarian territory, as defined by the Peace Conference, will cease as soon as the terms of the Armistice have, in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, been satisfactorily complied with.”

Mr Balfour, continuing, says that the last paragraph means that the Romanians would have to evacuate territory occupied in what was to be Hungary according to the Treaty, as soon as the Armistice had been carried out on the Hungarian side. The draft deals with one half of the Allied policy. It would explain to the world and to the Hungarians the intentions of the Powers. What instructions should be given to Marshal Foch to carry out this policy remained to be decided. He is strongly of opinion that the Council could not allow the Armistice to be violated with impunity. Having ordered the Hungarians to reduce their troops to six divisions and by implication to remain at peace with the Allies of the Powers, the latter cannot sit and watch the Hungarians double their forces and attack their Allies. If Marshal Foch could put an end to this with the forces available, it appears clear that he ought to do so.

M Clemenceau says that when Mr Balfour says that the Powers cannot tolerate violation of the Armistice, he presumably means all the Powers. It is noticeable, however, that there are no Italian, no British and no American troops available, but only the remnants of the two French divisions, together with Czechoslovaks, Romanians and Yugoslavs. According to Marshal Foch, the initial effort required will not be great, and the troops at hand might suffice, but the sequel must be considered.

S Tittoni said that regarding Italian co-operation, he sees no difficulty in the region of foreign policy, but in respect to internal politics, the outlook is not so clear. Any campaign against Hungary would produce a general strike in Italy. The cost of living had reached heights unequaled in any other country. As to coal, there is only a fortnight’s margin. He must therefore state, with great regret, that the economic situation in Italy and its political consequences will not allow Italy to contribute any force for action against Hungary, although action in this direction would suit his foreign policy admirably.

Mr Balfour says that two questions are raised by M Clemenceau’s remarks. One is a general question, and the other a military one. As to the latter, he needs to say little, as Marshal Foch considered he has enough troops on the spot to undertake action. As to the general question, he would like to ask whether in M Clemenceau’s opinion, it is necessary, whenever Inter-Allied military action is required, that the troops be furnished by an equal contribution of all the Powers interested.

M Clemenceau says that he did not mean his remarks to be stretched to that extent. He would like to say, however, that his situation, though not as serious as S Tittoni’s, had some analogies with it. There are two French divisions in Bulgaria who were expected to assist the Greeks, and there were two in Hungary, which were expected to act without any Allied assistance whatever.

Mr Balfour says the only question remaining then is whether Marshal Foch is right in saying that he had enough troops to proceed with.

Marshal Foch says that he had reported on July 17th. Nothing has happened in the intervening week to make him alter his views, provided a definite policy is adopted and an agreement is reached between small States who would be called upon to furnish the main contingent.

Mr Balfour asks M Clemenceau what alternative he has to the policy suggested.

M Clemenceau says that his alternative would be to allow Hungary to settle her own fate without military intervention. The war is over, the American Army has been withdrawn very rapidly, the British Army nearly as rapidly, and the French Army is being demobilized. He is forced to demobilize very quickly; it could not be helped. He cannot, therefore, contemplate the sending of two French divisions into Hungary unsupported by their Allies. There would shortly be only two classes under the colors in the French Army. Marshal Foch quite reasonably asks for a definition of the exact intentions of the Conference. This is a political question, and to tell the truth, it is hard to give him an answer. In any case, he is not ready to begin fighting again. He feels inclined to adopt the proposals made by Mr Balfour and Mr Hoover. He will encompass Hungary with a ring of hostile States, and rely on her to rid herself of the tyranny of a minority in her own way. Hence, it will be well, as Marshal Foch suggests, to consult the small Powers, who are, in any event, principally concerned. Their position is not clear. The Serbians will only act on certain conditions, the Romanians also make reservations, and so do the Czechs. What is the net result?

Marshal Foch says that it is for this reason that he recommends that the small Powers should be consulted, in order that the Conference might determine whether their terms could be accepted.

Mr Balfour says that he quite understands M Clemenceau’s position. It means, however, that the Allied and Associated Powers confess their impotence to enforce their will on a small nation. If what had been said in the Council were known outside, namely, that all the Powers had demobilized so fast under the stress of domestic necessity, it would certainly be regarded as absurd that the Powers, which, eight months ago, were the conquerors of the world, could not, at the present moment, impose their will on an army of 120,000 men. This inglorious situation he does not particularly mind, but he wondered how the Conference would be able to terminate its work successfully. An unpleasant Treaty would have to be imposed on the Bulgarians, and a still more unpleasant one on the Turks. Further, the new small States lately created, must be controlled, and prevented from attacking one another. If the Conference cannot enforce its will on Hungary, can it do all these things? If the picture drawn by M Clemenceau is accurate, the Conference will have to leave its work unfinished.

M Clemenceau says that he does not take such a gloomy view. All that he wishes to do is to adapt the means at the command of the Conference to the ends it had in view. He believes Mr Hoover holds the key of the situation. The offer of food in return for good behavior would be a very effective weapon. The case was similar to that of Russia, but in the case of Russia, there is no means of coercion; against the Hungarians there were. They can be surrounded, and in time, will have to come to terms. This might be inglorious, but there was little glory in fighting without men, or in making threats that cannot be carried out.

Mr Balfour says that there is not a very great difference between his policy and M Clemenceau’s. Marshal Foch might be requested to demand that the Hungarians at least observe the Armistice.

M Clemenceau says that a reiteration of this demand would not be of much avail, as it has already been made and neglected. He would prefer to accept the proposal Mr Balfour had read, to avoid issuing any ultimatum, to refrain from engaging Marshal Foch or any troops and to give General Boehm the month for which he had asked. At the end of this time, the situation would not be much worse than the present, one-third of the French troops would have been demobilized, but there would still be means of action, if absolutely necessary.

Marshal Foch says that as long as there is no understanding between the great and the small Powers the situation would not be clear. It would not improve after the lapse of a month or even two or three months. It is even possible that the smaller Powers would get out of hand and destroy the edifice so laboriously set up by the Conference.

Mr Balfour says that if assured that the situation would not grow worse he would raise no objection. He presumes that if the Military Authorities say that they can settle the matter at once, failing which the situation would grow worse, M Clemenceau would agree to act. If Bela Kun is going to fall there need be no anxiety, but on the other hand if he is going to have a military success the result might be grievous.

M Clemenceau says that he is not prepared to prophesy what would happen. The world had just gone through a fearful war and had only secured fragments of peace. The people were looking out for means of starting their economic life again. He wishes to do nothing to jeopardize this reasonable ambition. He cannot ask his people to go to war again. They would not do it with the same readiness as they did in 1914. The situation appears to him to require prudence. No doubt prudence involves some elements of risk but there is a greater risk in giving an ultimatum which, if rejected, would lead to war. Marshal Foch does not offer a clear solution. He makes his action conditional on the definition of a certain policy and on the agreement of the lesser powers concerned. Any check would have very serious results in Italy, as S Tittoni said, in France and also probably in Great Britain. He does not wish to run this risk. The plan General Boehm offers for the moment is a better outlook than existed a week ago. If the Hungarians are really in the majority opposed to Bela Kun they might under the stress of M Hoover’s blandishments over-throw the Bela Kun Government. There might then occur a favorable opportunity of which Marshal Foch could avail himself.

Mr Balfour says that he sympathizes with M Clemenceau as he also has no wish to plunge the world into war again. He would add that without a French Commander-in-Chief and without the cooperation of the two French divisions he thought there was little prospect of success. As M Clemenceau said that neither of these conditions could be fulfilled the case was judged; but he would like to say in justification of the advice he had given that he is not animated by any spirit of adventure. He wishes to get his own and other countries out of an adventure. He wishes to avoid further misfortunes in the future. He wishes the Conference to have the authority which power alone could give. He agreed that the economic weapon was still available. Nevertheless rapid demobilization had put the Conference into a difficulty which is almost comic. Right months ago the Allies had fifteen million men in the field; now it was difficult to lay hands on a single battalion. His fear has been that if Bela Kun is allowed to know that the Conference was militarily powerless he might use this knowledge to great effect and the evil might spread all over the world. If the French Government who had two divisions available declined to use them, it was not for him to press for the campaign. Possibly the prestige of past victories and economic power might enable the Allies to over-come this difficulty. He would therefore content himself with half of the policy he had proposed.

Mr White says that he agrees with M Clemenceau. According to his information Bela Kun is backed by a strong Nationalist movement. Military interference would only reinforce this sentiment which it was not desirable to inflame. The less national support Bela Kun had, the better. The action exercised by Mr Hoover would therefore have, he thinks, greater chances of success than military intervention.

After some further discussion it is decided to issue in the Press and by wireless the following declaration:

“The Allied and Associated Governments are most anxious to arrange a Peace with the Hungarian People and thus bring to an end a condition of things which makes the economic revival of Central Europe impossible and defeats any attempt to secure supplies for its population. These tasks cannot even be attempted until there is in Hungary a Government which represents its people, and carries out in the letter and the spirit the engagements into which it has entered with the Associated Governments. None of these conditions are fulfilled by the administration of Bela Kun: which has not only broken the armistice to which Hungary was pledged, but is at this moment actually attacking a friendly and Allied Power. With this particular aspect of the question it is for the Associated Governments to deal on their own responsibility. If food and supplies are to be made available, if the blockade is to be removed, if economic reconstruction is to be attempted, if peace is to be settled it can only be done with a Government which represents the Hungarian people and not with one that rests its authority upon terrorism.

The Associated Powers think it opportune to add that all foreign occupation of Hungarian territory, as penned by the Peace Conference, will cease as soon as the terms of the armistice have in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, been satisfactorily complied with.”

M Clemenceau says that in the meantime conversations might be undertaken with the smaller powers.

Mr Balfour thinks that if it is intended to do nothing this is hardly desirable.

M Clemenceau says that he has not meant to convey that he would never act: on some favorable occasion he might. Meanwhile if possible he would like to see the success of General Boehm.

Mr Balfour says that if the smaller Powers are called in consultation, the state of demobilization would have to be revealed to them.

M Clemenceau says they could be dealt with individually and asked to state under what conditions they would act should action be decided on. The Serbians, for instance, had certain desiderata.

S Tittoni says that they desire that the Conference should intercede between them and the Italians.

M Clemenceau says the Conference would do so.

Mr Balfour asks what news Marshal Foch had received of the Romanian Forces.

Marshal Foch says that the news was not bad and that the Romanians were not alarmed by the Hungarian attack.

Mr Balfour says that it would make a great difference if the Hungarian attack fails. Should Bela Kun fall of his own weight it would certainly be better than if he were overthrown by the Allies.

(It is then decided that Marshal Foch should continue negotiations with the Serbo-Croat-Slovene, Romanian and Czechoslovak Delegations in order to obtain from them their exact views regarding the guarantees they required for military intervention in Hungary.)


3. M Clemenceau reads the telegram from General Henrys asking, in agreement with the Entente Military representatives, that energetic action should be taken to force the Germans to cease hostilities in Silesia and in Posnania. The village of Wirruszom had been daily bombarded and partially destroyed. Women and children have been killed and the population is abandoning the village and the cultivation of the fields.

Marshal Foch says that on the 24th instructions had been sent to General Nudant asking him to order the Germans to put a stop to this at once.

Mr Balfour suggests that it would be desirable to send a Mission immediately.

Mr Hoover says the situation in Silesia is producing a very serious diminution of the output of coal. Most of central Europe depends on Silesia for coal. For instance, the parlous condition of Vienna resulted from this situation. The best hope resided in an early appointment of a Commission which might restore order. In view of the plebiscite, both Poles and Germans are conducting active propaganda which is having a demoralizing effect on production.

S Tittoni says he has already nominated the Italian member on the Commission.

M Clemenceau asks Marshal Foch, in consultation with the French War Office, to arrange for a designation of the French member.

(It is decided that each power should nominate one member for a Commission to undertake the administration of the plebiscite area of Silesia during the period of plebiscite.)

(It is further decided that the Commission for the delimitation of the Eastern frontiers of Germany be appointed as speedily as possible. It should be composed of four officers for each power (one Commissioner, Head of the Commission, one Assistant Commissioner, two Technical officers.) The nominations are to be made on the following Monday.

Mr White says that he cannot make a nomination without reference to Washington; in fact, no American nomination will be possible before ratification of the Treaty by the Senate.

M Clemenceau said that the other members can be nominated in the meantime.


(Marshal Foch and the Military Experts withdraw, and M Clementel and the Financial & Economic Experts enter the room.)

4. (After a statement by M Clementel, it is decided that the examination of the question should be resumed on the following Monday.)


Baron Makino gives notice of an amendment to Article 29, which he will propose at the next meeting.

5. Colonel Peel says that there is unanimous agreement about these clauses. The gist of the proposals is that Bulgaria will undertake to pay two milliards and a francs in gold. This sum might be reduced by the Reparation Commission should it consider it excessive. An international body, distinct from the Reparation Commission, on which France, Great Britain and Italy will be represented, would be established in Sofia to work out the details. It will have considerable powers, both of raising and controlling taxation in order that the Reparation clauses should be duly executed.

(The Reparation clauses submitted are then accepted.)


6. Mr Sergent said that there was complete agreement regarding the Financial Clauses.

Mr White says that the American Expert has a word to say.

Mr Dulles says that he thinks the text of the Reparation and Financial Clauses should be communicated to the Serbians, Romanians and Greeks, as they are concerned.

Mr Balfour asks what had been done regarding similar clauses in the Treaty with Austria.

Mr Dulles says that there has been a plenary meeting at which the smaller Powers had complained of the short time they had for considering the proposals.

Mr Balfour asks whether they are likely to wish to discuss the proposals or merely to hear them.

Colonel Peel says that he feels sure that they would be anxious to discuss them and that the discussion would be interminable. He agrees however that the clauses should be communicated to them.

(It is agreed that the Serbian, Romanian and Greek Delegations should be informed by the President of the Committees, which have drafted the financial and reparation clauses for the Treaty with Bulgaria, of the provisions of these clauses. Should no modification of the present draft result, the text should be communicated forthwith to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Treaty.)

(The Experts then withdraw.)


7. It is agreed that the nominations of this Commission should be sent to the Secretary-General as speedily as possible. A Commission for the Delimitation of Frontier Between Belgium and Germany


(Members of the Commission on Baltic Affairs enter the room.)

8. The following document is read:

“Considering the importance of maintaining ordered and stable Governments in the Baltic territories as a barrier against Bolshevism on the one hand and against German aggression on the other, and the necessity of close co-operation between these Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments which can only be secured if the Baltic peoples have complete confidence in the intentions of the Allies to protect their liberties in case of the re-establishment of a strong centralized Government in Russia, the Baltic Commission are of opinion that the time has come when the Allied and Associated Powers should clearly define their policy towards these Governments and recommend that a joint declaration be made to them in the following sense:

In response to the representation addressed to the Peace Conference by the Estonian, Lettish and Lithuanian Delegations, the Allied and Associated Powers desire to draw the attention of the Governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the fifth condition of their Note to Admiral Kolchak, which runs as follows:

‘If a solution of the relations between Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of Russia agrees to recognize these territories as autonomous, and to confirm the relations which may exist between their de facto Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments.’

The Allied and Associated Governments are anxious and willing to do all in their power to assist the Baltic Governments to organize their local defenses and to re-establish in the interests of general peace an orderly and stable government in these countries.

They further declare their intention to protect their liberties in the event of the re-establishment of a strong centralized Government in Russia.

At the same time it seems to them impossible to reach any definite solution which will guarantee a durable peace without a previous arrangement with a recognised Russian Government, and while reserving to themselves the right of collaboration either directly or through the League of Nations to obtain a settlement satisfactory to both parties, they cannot at the present moment take any steps which would bind them as regards a definite settlement pending the restoration of a recognised Russian Government.

The Allied and Associated Powers would add that they feel confident that if they assist the Governments of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, they may rely on these Governments to accept such provisions as the Allied and Associated Powers may consider necessary for the protection of racial and religious minorities in these territories.”

Mr Balfour says that the objections to these proposals are clear to him. Their advantages are not manifest.

M della Torretta said that no precise instructions had been given to the Commission on Baltic Affairs. It had therefore studied questions connected with the New States set up on the north west frontier of Russia. There are in these countries de facto Governments which had been encouraged by the Allied and Associated Powers to resist, both the Germans and the Bolsheviks, who were either intriguing against them or fighting them. The Commission had thought that these Governments required some moral support from the Entente. A dispatch had been sent to Admiral Kolchak from the Conference in which reference had been made to these New States. A satisfactory answer had come from Admiral Kolchak, The Commission thinks that it is opportune to do something to encourage these New States. They cannot be offered independence, but they might be offered some guarantee for the preservation of their liberties without interfering with Russian sovereignty. In some way or other these de facto Governments must be recognised.

Mr Balfour says that he had some doubt concerning the Policy proposed. He did not see whom it would please but it would certainly displease the Russians who desired Russia to be restored to its old frontiers. It is unlikely even to please the new states. In one paragraph the telegram to Kolchak was quoted. This telegram was known to the Lithuanians, Letts and Estonians. Nothing was therefore gained by restating it. The first paragraph added to this extract from the telegram no doubt expressed a truth; but unfortunately the Allied and Associated Powers cannot do all they desired to do. There was not much money to give. As to arms and munitions they are being given. If this declaration were made, the Lithuanians, Letts and Estonians might be led to suppose that they were about to receive more; but this was impossible. The declaration therefore would either merely restate what was being done or raise false hopes. The next paragraph is either not new or represents a somewhat formidable undertaking on the part of the Entente Powers to enter into antagonism with a strong centralized Government in Russia. Such a declaration will not help the Baltic States and might greatly embarrass the Allied Powers. The first sentence of the next paragraph appears to him to go too far. He hopes that Russia will reconstitute itself, but for the time being he sees no elements tending in that direction. Is it desirable to tell the Baltic States that they must wait for the settlement of their fate until a very remote contingency had taken place? Such a statement could only discourage them. As to the last paragraph, desirable as the proposals suggested might be, it was not an opportune moment to ask for the acceptance of these provisions at a time when the Allied Powers could only offer a very slight assistance to the Baltic States. He could not help thinking that the proposal was a dangerous one and that it failed to convey the encouragement it wished to convey. He will not advise the Council to accept it.

M della Torretta says that the Commission has been unanimous and has considered that its proposals followed directly from the Allied Policy outlined in the telegram to Kolchak. There seemed to be no other way of reconciling the unity of Russia with an offer of autonomy to the Baltic peoples. Certain things had been done which had led these peoples to believe that their fate would be settled by the Conference. They are being supplied with money, arms and munitions. The declaration suggested made no essential alteration in the Allied attitude. All that was aimed at was a transitory regularization of the situation and a confirmation of the declarations previously made. The Commission is informed that the Baltic Governments required some encouragement of this kind to continue action against the Bolsheviks on one hand and the Germans on the other.

M Pichon says that the Lithuanians, Estonians and Letts had repeatedly asked the Governments of the Powers to recognize them. They had always been told that their efforts were sympathetically regarded and help had been given them as de facta Governments in their struggles against Bolsheviks. They had always been told, however, that the Powers can go no further. The ultimate solution must depend on the outcome of the Russian situation. The Council of Five had always kept these two considerations closely connected. The Baltic Delegates had asked whether the Conference would end without settling the question of Russia. He had replied that he hoped it will not but he cannot undertake to make a definite statement. The declaration suggested by the Commission would not, he thought, give them any particular satisfaction nor would it please the Russians. What the Baltic States really wanted is separation. This the Conference can not for the time being offer them. Promises of autonomy would not satisfy them. No other declaration, however, could be made without producing a very difficult situation in regard to Russia.

M della Torretta says that the Commission recognizes that the declaration will not entirely satisfy the Baltic States. It will, however, be a beginning. On the other hand it would not displease the Russians as it does not threaten the separation of the Baltic Provinces which they feared.

(After some further discussion the question is adjourned.)


9. M Clemenceau reads a telegram suggesting that three Karelian Delegates elected by an Assembly held at Olonetz be heard by the Peace Conference in order to express the wishes of the population of that region. The Finnish Government is greatly interested in the question and would like the affairs of Karelia to be explained to the Conference.

(After some discussion it is decided to refer the question to the Commission on Baltic Affairs.)


10. M Clemenceau said that the Council of Transylvania has asked the French Representative at Bucharest to grant passports to five Swabians of the Banat anxious to come to Paris to explain to the Conference the desires of the populations they represented. S Bratiano favors their request. Before authorizing the Delegation to proceed to France the French Government wished to know the opinion of the Allied and Associated Delegations.

(It is decided that this question should be referred to the Committee on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, July 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Ministry of Commerce, Paris, 18:00

Meeting held under the chairmanship of M. Clémentel.


269. Finance Section.

The Council considers a report submitted by the Finance Section in accordance with the request of the Council at its 26th Meeting.

The American Delegates point out that the Committee for the Organisation of the Reparation Commission needed the assistance of the Finance Section and its technical organisation in the decision of financial questions arising with reference to reparations, and suggested that as a practical matter it would be desirable for the Finance Section henceforth to report to the Committee for the Organisation of the Reparation Commission instead of the Supreme Economic Council.

After further discussion it is agreed:

i) That the Finance Section should be maintained until the definite organization of an International Economic Council and of the Reparation Commission.

ii) That the Finance Section should be asked to collaborate with the Committee for the Organisation of the Reparation Commission in all financial questions which are in process of execution or the solution of which is urgent.

iii) That the Finance Section should refer to the Committee for the Organisation of the Reparation Commission all decisions to be made relative to financial questions concerning

a) The supply of food and raw materials to ex-enemy countries and

b) Reparations.


270. Sub-committee on Germany.

The American Delegates suggest that the Sub-Committee on Germany should in future report to the Committee for the Organisation of the Reparation Commission instead of to the Supreme Economic Council.

The French Delegates call attention to the fact that the Organisation Committee is already dealing directly with the Germans.

It is agreed that the decision of this question should be deferred until the Meeting of the Council to be held in London on August 1st, at which time the report of the Sub-Committee would be presented for the consideration of the Council.


271. Allied Maritime Transport Executive.

It is agreed that the Allied Maritime Transport Executive as one of the sections of the Supreme Economic Council, should in future refer for final decision to the Committee for the Organisation of the Reparation Commission, instead of to the Supreme Economic Council, all questions of enemy tonnage which relate to reparations.


Appendix 250.

Report to the Supreme Economic Council on the Necessity of Maintaining the Finance Section.


I.

The Supreme Economic Council, in its meeting of the 10th July, decided that the Finance Section should be authorized to continue its work, with a view to settling all questions which are still pending as quickly as possible.

The Finance Section has in fact been principally engaged on investigating and applying the financial means of execution of the Armistice clauses:

(a) The carrying out of the Spa, Trèves and Brussels Agreements as far as Germany is concerned.

(b) The carrying out of the Armistice with Austria, and of the subsequent agreements concerning the provisioning of Austria by the Allied Powers.
The raising of the blockade of Germany only dates from the ratification of the Peace Treaty by the German National Assembly.

The Agreements with Austria are still in process of execution, and a letter from Dr Renner, dated the 9th July, requests the continuance of Allied assistance. The National Assembly of German Austria only voted the laws concerning the requisitioning of securities and the organisation of mortgages on the forests in its meeting of the 8th July.

The Finance Section has still to undertake the final solution of the following questions:

A) As regards Germany:

1) The ultimate disposition of the gold delivered by Germany in payment for foodstuffs. The amount intended for the United States will be sold by Germany without option of repurchase.

The Germans have not yet replied on the question of the proposed sale with option of repurchase on the part of the United Kingdom.

2) The procedure to be followed in the sale of the requisitioned securities transferred to Amsterdam by the Germans, and the division of the proceeds of this sale among the Allied and Associated Powers.

3) Utilization by the Germans of Argentine securities for German purchases of foodstuffs in the Argentine.

4) Final examination of a proposition made by a consortium of Dutch banks to make an advance for which requisitioned securities would serve as guarantee.

5) Settlement of the French account; provisioning of Germany by France.

6) Utilization of proceeds of the sale of lignite briquettes to Switzerland (application of the Agreement of 25th March).


B) As regards Austria:

1) Final settlement of the conditions of the new advance of 3 million dollars allowed by the Government of the United States to the three Allied and Associated Powers.

2) Delivery of gold and securities. This delivery was demanded to take place on the 12th July in the case of gold, and on the 31st July in the case of securities. These periods will have to be extended.

3) Supervision of the transport of the gold and securities to Venice.

4) Nomination and despatch of experts to Venice to examine the gold and securities.

5) Nomination and despatch of forestry experts to Austria to fix the value of the pledge.

6) Settlement of the food accounts among the Allies in consequence of supplies provided by Italy for the account of France and Great Britain.
It would seem that the Finance Section, which is acquainted with all these questions, is better fitted than anybody else to supervise the execution of the decisions which have been made, and that in any case it is most desirable that the Section should be able to continue and complete this part of its work.


II

The work of the Supreme Economic Council, however, has not been confined to the provisioning of Germany and Austria. The Council has had to listen to appeals from the reconquered or liberated countries, from the new nations and from the devastated regions.

The Finance Section has had to grapple with the difficult problem of the financial measures necessary for the reconstruction or the provisioning of countries or of groups, but it has only been able to deal with the most urgent affairs; the most immediate requirements have been satisfied, thanks to the great relief work undertaken by Mr Hoover’s organisation and by each of the Associated Governments. Thus it has been necessary to defer the settlement of questions which are now of extreme urgency, and the solution of which has as yet only been outlined by the Section.

Thus, to mention only questions which have been raised and are not yet settled, the following should be quoted:

(a) Financial assistance to be given to the three Baltic States. General Gough has requested that 500,000l, should be placed at his disposal immediately, and other credits will become necessary in the near future.

(b) The agreement for the expenses of maintenance of Russian prisoners in Germany.

(c) The expenses of the restoration of navigation on the Danube.

(d) Expenses for the supply of locomotives and trucks to Lithuania.

(e) The investigation of methods of coordinating the advances which have already been made to Russia by the different Treasuries.

When the Council decided to transform itself into an International Economic Council, it recognised that collaboration in economic affairs between the Allied and Associated countries must continue. Such collaboration necessarily involves corresponding financial collaboration, and it is desirable that there should be no breach of continuity between the action of the Finance Section of the Supreme Economic Council and that of whatever body is to fulfill similar functions in the International Council.


III

It is necessary, on the other hand, to take into account the fact that the raising of the blockade of Germany and the approaching signature of the Peace Treaty with Austria will involve the disappearance of the bodies set up to co-ordinate the measures which had to be taken during the Armistice.

The execution of the financial clauses of the Peace Treaty is to be entrusted to the Reparations Commission, which is at present in process of organisation.

As a matter of fact, the Preparatory Committee entrusted with setting up the Reparations Commission has not limited its activities to this only. It has already had before it such definite questions as the utilization of the proceeds of German exports, and it will doubtless shortly have to consider the question of the provisioning of Germany, all of which matters have hitherto been dealt with by the Finance Section, acting as a Sub-Committee of the Supreme Economic Council.

It would seem, both in view of avoiding at present any clashing of functions and, in the immediate future, to hasten the solution of problems with which the Finance Section is better acquainted, as it has dealt with them for several months, that it would be desirable for the Finance Section to act in close collaboration with the Preparatory Committee of the Reparations Commission, even if only to transmit to the latter such questions as are at present being investigated or negotiated, and which will henceforward fall within its competence.

Consequently, the Supreme Economic Council may think fit:

1) To decide that the Finance Section be maintained until the definite organisation of an International Economic Council and of the Reparations Commission.

2) To recommend to the Council of Representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers that the Finance Section should be asked to collaborate with the Preparatory Committee of the Reparations Commission on all financial questions which are in process of execution, or the solution of which is urgent.

[Jimbuna]

28th July 1919

Today marks the fifth anniversary since the start of the Great War in 1914 and the first anniversary to be observed in peacetime.

In Newberry, South Carolina Elisha Harper, who just returned from WWI, narrowly avoids getting lynched for insulting a 14 year old white girl.

Two seventy-year-old Czech members of the Czech Legion, survivors of the terrible Siberian campaigns against the Russian Bolsheviks.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, July 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


1. M Clemenceau says that as his colleagues know, he has informed the Chamber of Deputies that he could not communicate to them the records of the proceedings of the Council of Four. This had been in accordance with the wishes of his colleagues. The Minutes of the Council of Four had been given to the members of the Council only. The present Council, it had been agreed, should proceed in the same manner. He now heard that the British Delegation wished to distribute the Minutes to as many as twelve experts or departments, while the French and other Secretariats were interpreting the order more strictly. He thought that the Minutes should only be sent to persons present in the Council.

Mr Balfour asks how many copies of the Minutes were sent to French experts or departments.

M Clemenceau says that none were sent.

S Tittoni says that he agrees with M Clemenceau that the distribution should be very carefully restricted, and that only extracts be sent to the experts or departments concerned.

Mr Balfour explains that a request had been made from London that various Departments should receive copies of the Minutes, as they concerned the work in which they were engaged. As his colleagues desired that the circulation should be restricted, he would reply that this could not be done.

(It is agreed that a strict interpretation of the Resolution adopted on the 7th July should be adhered to.)


(At this point, M Loucheur and Mr Waterlow enter the room.)

2. S Tittoni put forward the following proposal:

“In consideration of the fact that the persistent difficulties of provisioning Allied countries necessitate the continuation of a united and coordinated course of action in order to avoid the danger of famine.

It is resolved that the Allied and Associated Powers shall form an organisation whose duty it will be to control and determine the respective requirements so far as concerns the most essential products (grain, coal, etc.) and to coordinate action so far as concerns purchases in the various producing countries and transport; and

It is also resolved to refer the question to the Supreme Economic Council with a recommendation to the said Council to name a Commission which shall determine as speedily as possible the working details of the above-mentioned organisation and which shall render the said organisation effective.”

M Loucheur says that the French Delegation had always supported the continuance of the Supreme Economic Council, in spite of British and American opposition. The British opposition had since been modified, as Mr Lloyd George had come to see the importance of a common purchasing policy. The American Delegation, however, seems still firmly opposed to the proposal.

Mr White says that the United States are, in fact, quite unwilling to sanction the continuance of the Supreme Economic Council.

S Tittoni says that the question he had raised was one of extreme importance for Italy. Italy was in distress. This distress was a consequence of the war and should be treated in the same manner as it would have been treated had it come about during the war. As long as the Government could keep the people fed and supplied with work, it could maintain order. Without these conditions, it could not. He felt it necessary to make this statement. If Italy were left without succor he would decline all responsibility as regards the future.

Mr White says that he expected Mr Hoover back from Brest on the following day. In the meantime, he does not object to the reference of the question to the Supreme Economic Council, as it still existed.

M Loucheur says that, quite apart from any questions of the official constitution of the Council he and his colleagues had agreed to meet to see what measures could be taken to assist an Ally in distress. There is still a small sub-Committee dealing with coal. He is himself Chairman of this Committee, and he is ready, should the Council desire it, to call the Committee together to study the question raised by S Tittoni.

Mr Balfour asks who the British Representative is.

M Loucheur says that he would be able to inform Mr Balfour later.

Mr Balfour says that the question is not merely one of help from one country to another. It goes deeper than that. The war was now over and new problems but equally difficult problems, had arisen. The situation resulting from the war had to be liquidated. The various Allied States were mutually indebted. Their only means of discharging their debts was by exports. Great Britain could only pay off her indebtedness by the production and exportation of coal. For coal is not only one of the principal British exports, but it is also the means necessary for every form of manufacture. The situation could not be solved, as during the war, by suppressing train services and doing away with superfluities. It goes to the roots of the whole economic relations of all countries, not merely of the Allied countries between themselves. It is not simply a question of the rich helping the poor in any one particular commodity. It was for this reason that he had inquired who the British Representative on M Loucheur’s Committee was. It is necessary that a matter of this sort should be dealt with by a first-class Minister, intimately acquainted with the whole economic and financial situation. He understands that the future Economic Council, if created, would include first-class Finance Ministers from each of the countries concerned.

M Clemenceau said that the question, nevertheless, was one of life or death. Whether it be a peace question or a war question, it makes little difference whether a man died by bullet wounds or by starvation. He, therefore, suggests that the matter be discussed on the following day, together with Mr Hoover and M Loucheur.

(This is agreed to.)

M Loucheur asked if he was authorized to examine the situation in the meantime with the Italian experts.

S Tittoni says that he would be able to furnish him with all the figures showing the stocks at present existing in Italy.

(M Loucheur’s suggestion is approved.)


3. M Loucheur says that, before he leaves, he would like to draw attention to an item on the Agenda which is a Report of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways, affecting the distribution of rolling stock in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. This rolling stock represents a security in the hands of the Allied and Associated Powers on the same footing as other possessions of the Enemy States. The Commissions mentioned in Article 371 and 372 of the Treaty with Germany should not, in his opinion, act independently of the Reparation Commission. He is in no manner opposed to the nomination of the Committee of Experts, as suggested, but he thinks this Committee should work in conjunction with the Reparation Commission.

(Note is taken of M Loucheur’s views on the subject, and the question of the appointment of a Committee of Experts is postponed for a future meeting.)

(M Loucheur then withdraws.)


(At this point M Seydoux enters the room.)

4. M Clemenceau says that he understands that the United States of America and Great Britain had resumed postal relations with Germany without informing France.

Mr Waterlow states that a notification had been published in the British Press to the effect that postal relations might be resumed.

Mr White says that, when it had been decided to put an end to the Blockade and to the Censorship, it had been understood that a resumption of postal relations followed automatically.

Mr Balfour says that the main decision had been to put an end to the Blockade and to the Censorship and that the logical consequence of these decisions was the resumption of intercourse.

M Clemenceau says that, nevertheless, no warning had been given to France. Further, until ratification, the Allied and Associated Powers were still in a state of war with Germany.

M Seydoux says that the Supreme Economic Council had been asked to study the question of resuming postal relations. It was obvious that some letters must be allowed to pass, if the Blockade and Censorship came to an end. Technical experts had, therefore, prepared the document before the Council. At the very same time, he had read in the “Daily Mail” the notification alluded to by Mr Waterlow and had since heard that the United States had taken similar action. He then read and commented on the following document:

“The Special Committee charged by the Supreme Economic Council to study the question of the re-establishment of postal relations with Germany, has unanimously taken the following decisions:—which are submitted for the approval of the Supreme Council of the Heads of Governments.

1) The Post Offices of the Allied and Associated countries are authorized to enter into direct relations with the German Post Office for the immediate re-establishment of postal relations both for ordinary and registered post, and for samples and parcels.

2) The question of transport of postal matter by Germany will be examined by the German Delegation at Versailles together with the Allied and Associated Delegates.

3) The telegraph offices of the Allied and Associated countries are authorized to enter into direct relations with the German telegraphic office for the provisional re-establishment of telegraphic and telephonic communication.

4) The public will be notified as soon as possible that postal and telegraphic relations with non-occupied Germany will be re-opened under the following conditions:

a) Commercial correspondence can be sent sealed.

b) Private correspondence can only be sent by postcard.

c) The above-mentioned correspondence can be registered.

d) Telegrams should be written en clair and only in the following languages: French, English, Italian or German.

e) Each administration will later publish the conditions under which the telephone service will be re-started.

5) The postal and telegraphic control services will be notified of the above decisions so that they may take any necessary measures.

6) In submitting the above propositions to the Supreme Council of the Heads of Governments, the Special Committee recommends that the resolution of the Communications Section concerning the immediate re-establishment of international railway services with Germany may be adopted, in order to render the lifting of the blockade effective, and that this resolution be passed for action to the Governments concerned.”

M Clemenceau asks why private correspondence is restricted to postcards.

M Seydoux replies that the Censorship had asked for this.

Mr White asks how it will be possible to distinguish between a commercial and a private letter. If all sealed letters were presumed to be commercial, anyone wishing to make a private communication would enclose it in a sealed letter.

(It is agreed that this Article be omitted.)

M Clemenceau says that he considers the proposals excellent, but he notes that it is recommended that international railway services with Germany be started again. He thinks this was going too fast, seeing that there is still a state of war. As to telegraphic and postal communications, there was nothing to be done, seeing that America and Great Britain had stolen a march on France.

Mr Balfour says that he understands that France had allowed the resumption of commercial relations with Germany.

M Clemenceau asks M Seydoux if this is the case.

M Seydoux says that, when the Blockade had been raised, it had been declared that trade could be re-established under certain conditions. Had this not been done, only the Neutrals would have profited by the cessation of the Blockade. All commercial regulations consonant with the state of war were maintained, but certain licensed exceptions were being made. General exceptions in favour of certain categories had been established.

M Clemenceau says that a very curious situation appeared to result from this. The German Delegates are closely watched at Versailles by Colonel Henri’s Mission, yet French frontiers were going to be opened to German traders, who would therefore be able to come freely to Paris, while the only Germans prevented from doing so would be the official Delegates of the country.

M Seydoux says that the passport regulations still exist.

Mr Waterlow observed that there is no question of allowing Germans to come to England or British subjects to enter Germany. Only goods are allowed to pass.

M Clemenceau says he understands the proposal is to allow free passage of letters, but not of persons.

Mr Balfour says that there was a small matter in this connection which he must bring to the notice of the Council. If the Council agreed, he would ask Mr Waterlow to state the case.

Mr Waterlow says that, under Article 289 of the Treaty with Germany, bi-lateral agreements could be revived by a notification within 6 months of the coming into force of the Treaty. Among these bi-lateral agreements was one between Great Britain and Germany concerning the parcel post and money orders. Great Britain was in a different situation in these matters from the other Powers. The latter had been parties to a general International Convention. Great Britain has made separate agreements. The British Government now proposes to take steps, without further delay, to revive the agreement with Germany regarding the parcel post and the money order service in advance of the coming into force of the Peace Treaty. It is suggested that the agreement be revived by means of direct communication between the British Post Office and the German postal authorities. This was subject, of course, to the agreement of the Council, to whom it had been thought right to submit the question.

M Seydoux says that, in regard to parcel post, he sees no objection, as the parcel post is a means of sending goods. This was consistent with the cessation of the Blockade and the resumption of commerce. But the money order service involved financial questions which he was not competent to judge.

Mr Waterlow says that only small sums were involved, and the service would be revived subject to the proviso that no clause in the Peace Treaty was violated.

Mr Balfour says that he does not wish to ask the Council to accept anything that was not clearly understood. He suggests that M Seydoux should examine the question with the French financial experts and that the question be brought up again on the following day.

Baron Makino draws attention to the languages enumerated in paragraph 4 (d) of the Note read by M Seydoux. He would like that “Japanese” be added to this list, unless there were objections to this course.

(No objection is raised, and this is agreed to.)

(It is then decided that the whole question, together with the subsidiary question of parcel post and money orders, raised by the British Delegation should be put on the Agenda for the following day.)

(The proposals of the Special Committee are modified in two respects, and were provisionally approved, as follows:


“4. The public will be notified as soon as possible that postal and telegraphic relations with non-occupied Germany will be re-opened under the following conditions:

a) Commercial “and private” correspondence can be sent “closed”.

b) The above-mentioned correspondence can be registered.

c) Telegrams should be written en clair and only in the following languages: French, English, Italian, German “or Japanese.”

d) Each administration will later publish the conditions under which telephone service will be re-started.”)


5. M Clemenceau says that in this connection he wishes to inform his colleagues that the process of demobilization forced him to withdraw 45,000 men from the French Armée D’Orient. He was not able therefore to undertake the conquest of Hungary, as only three Brigades mixtes would be left.

S Tittoni observes that the Anti-Bolshevik Government at Szeged expected to conquer Hungary if supplied with arms and Munitions.

M Clemenceau said that Anti-Bolshevik Governments had made similar statements before, but had never been successful.

M Seydoux says that the Blockade of Hungary is a special case. Allied posts had been situated all round the circumference of Austria. Since peace had been made with Germany, the blockade along the Bavarian frontier has been raised, but it was maintained on the other frontiers. The blockade had been exercised by Inter-Allied agency. He had lately heard, however, that the American Government wished to recall its personnel. He also pointed out that the British Government had never sent any personnel with the exception of a single representative at Vienna. The work was disagreeable and unpopular, and it would be shared by France and Italy. It is evidently desirable that all the Allied and Associated Powers should play their part in this. Before addressing an urgent request to the British and American Delegations, the Blockade Committee has taken into consideration the stipulations which were to be required from the Austrian Delegates to the effect that Austria should undertake to maintain the blockade against Hungary.

The Committee has therefore prepared the following Note:

"July 21, 1919.

“Question of the Blockade of Hungary

The Committee of the East considers it necessary to submit to the Supreme Council of Heads of Governments the question of the blockade of Hungary, the maintenance of which was decided upon by the latter on June 26 last.

At the time when they sign the treaty of peace, the Austrian delegates should sign a declaration in the following sense:

‘Except in case of a contrary request presented by the Associated Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, the Government of Austria shall continue effectively to prohibit the importation, the exportation and the transit of all merchandise between Austria and Hungary, and to maintain these prohibitions until the moment of the formal acceptance by the Hungarian Government of the peace conditions which shall be proposed to, it by the Associated Governments.’

It seems to result from this declaration that, after the signature of the peace treaty, the Austrian Government alone shall have the responsibility of taking measures to maintain the blockade of Hungary on its border.

However, if the measures taken are not effective, the arms, munitions, and other materials of war still to be found in Austria in large quantities could pass into Hungary during the interval allowed by the treaty of peace for the delivery of this material to the Allies.

Under these conditions, the Committee on the Blockade of the East wishes to know:

1) Whether the Austrian Government should be, from the signature by its delegates of the declaration presented above, placed in sole charge of maintaining the closure of the Hungarian border. In this case, the Allied military posts maintained on this border should be withdrawn from the date of the signature;

2) If, on the contrary, the Austrian Government should be assisted in its task by Inter-Allied cooperation, it is important to know whether the Allied military posts on the border should be maintained:

a) either until the coming into force of the treaty,

b) or until the expiration of the interval provided for the delivery of arms and munitions,

c) or until the conclusion of peace with Hungary. An immediate decision is necessary because the American delegate at Vienna has announced the intention of his Government to withdraw at the end of the present month its agents from the service of the Hungarian border, and the British Government has not yet sent its agents. At present the military posts on the Hungarian border are for the most part occupied by American personnel.”

In his opinion the best proposal was that Inter-Allied assistance be given to Austria. This would be welcomed by the Austrian Government, and the French Minister at Vienna had strongly supported the plan. The Austrian Government was weak, and if it was desired that the blockade should be maintained effectually against Hungary, it was desirable to reinforce the Austrian Government by Allied assistance.

M Clemenceau asks how many men would be required to fulfill this plan.

M Seydoux says that two officers and five or six men from each Nation would be enough.

There remained the question of the time for which this blockade should be maintained. Probably, he thinks, it would have to be maintained until the conclusion of peace with Hungary.

M Pichon says that the period might be shortened if General Boehm succeeds.

Mr White says that he understands that the American Government maintains three posts, but had since ordered their withdrawal.

M Seydoux replies that this is so.

Mr Balfour says that Austria had been required to undertake the maintenance of the blockade against Hungary. He quite agrees that Austria must be assisted in doing so. If the Allies desire the blockade to be effective, it was manifest that they must assist in maintaining it. He thought that all the Allies should participate, and he undertakes to try and induce the British Government to take their part.

Mr White says that he would do likewise.

Mr Balfour says that as to the time at which the blockade could cease, it might be decided to raise it as soon as Hungary showed signs of good conduct, and sent Delegates to negotiate Peace. This point, however, need not be settled at present, and might be allowed to depend on events.

(It is then decided that the Blockade of Hungary should be maintained until the Council should decide otherwise, and that the participation of the Four Powers should be arranged for to assist the Austrian Government in maintaining it.)


6. M Seydoux reads a note of the Supreme Economic Council.

Question of Imports Into Serbia M Clemenceau observes that in theory at least there is no blockade at Fiume. In practice, however, there was. The Italian Government, without justification, continually stopped trains.

S Tittoni says that the question of transit was quite distinct. He has already sent a full explanation to M Clemenceau, but no decision had yet been taken.

M Clemenceau says that the French base at Fiume had been hampered many times in its operations.

S Tittoni said that pending a final solution, orders had been given by him, that all trains should proceed without interference.

M Berthelot says that a telegram has been received to the effect that the food situation in Serbia was very serious in consequence of the stoppage of goods from Fiume. Men, women and children have been dying of hunger while stores are accumulating in the port.

S Tittoni says that he has sent telegraphic orders two days previously for the free passage of trains.

M Clemenceau asks S Tittoni whether he guarantees that his orders will be carried out.

S Tittoni replies that he did. He requests, however, that the situation be regulated speedily. As far as he knows, the goods in question are not landed on the quays in Fiume at all. They go by train and the railroad is open.

M Berthelot says that, according to information he had received, the railroads are blocked with traffic. In consequence, disembarkation of goods at Fiume is asked for.

M Clemenceau asks whether S Tittoni recognizes that the Serbians have a right to expedite goods through Fiume.

S Tittoni says that it is not a question of transit through Fiume, but a question of establishing Serbian bases there. This would prejudice the question of Fiume and he is not prepared to accede to this.

M Berthelot says that they would be satisfied if they obtained free passage either through the French base at Fiume, or through the Italian commissariat.

Mr Balfour asked when the Council might have information that this was being carried out.

S Tittoni says that he would give telegraphic orders that goods destined for Serbia through the port of Fiume should proceed immediately, and that the revictualling of Yugoslavia in food, clothes, petroleum and other goods at present waiting at Fiume, should not be hampered by the interruption of communication, as the forwarding of these goods was of vital importance for the army and population of Yugoslavia.

S Tittoni agrees to the use by the Serbians of Fiume as a port of transit, provided the French base or the Italian commissariat be used exclusively. The choice of either should be left with the Serbians.

Note is taken of S Tittoni’s declaration regarding the orders given by him two days previously for the resumption of transit by land.

S Tittoni urges that a solution of this question be reached as early as possible.


(General Mance and Mr Hudson enter the room.)

7. M Berthelot reads and explains the note attached for Clauses for Insertion.

Clauses for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria on Ports, Waterways and Railways (It is agreed that there is no objection to the nomination of a French Member to the Commission.)

S Tittoni says that he would express his view later.

Mr Hudson says that final action on paragraph 24 should, he thinks, be postponed until the settlement of the territorial question. He therefore asks that the question of the insertion of clauses regarding Ports, Waterways and Railways be deferred until the territorial solution had been arrived at.

Mr Balfour says there ys force in this proposal, but he would like to know when a decision on the territorial question could be expected. The Bulgarians had already arrived.

Mr White says he has received a communication from President Wilson and therefore was able to discuss the question of Western Thrace. He would be ready to do so on the following day. In this connection, he wishes to communicate the following document:

“Regarding the events mentioned in the report of the British, French and Japanese members of the Central Bulgarian Territorial Committee with respect to the alleged desire of the Mussulmans of Western Thrace that this territory be ceded by Bulgaria to Greece, the United States Chargé d’Affaires at Sofia, under date of the 24th instant, reports that the petition was prepared by one Mussulman deputy, who drew it up without the authority or knowledge of the other persons whose names were signed thereto. The Deputy in question has fled from Bulgaria and is believed to be in Italy or in Turkey. All the other Muslim Deputies made an official denial before Parliament and also stated in a letter to the Prime Minister that they had not signed the petition and added that their views were entirely opposed to the sentiments expressed therein. In the opinion of the Chargé d’Affaires, the Muslim population of Western Thrace, if forced to choose between Greek and Bulgarian rule, would greatly prefer here, as well as elsewhere, the latter, in spite of the fact that the Greeks have spent large sums in this district for purposes of propaganda. The Chargé d’Affaires concludes by saying that, in his opinion, an impartial investigation or a plebiscite would prove the foregoing beyond any question of doubt.”

Mr White, continuing, says that the belief that the Mohammedan population of Western Thrace desired union with Greece had had considerable weight with the American Members of the Commission dealing with Greek Affairs. If this belief was as ill-founded as his later news implied, the situation was considerably modified.

M Clemenceau asks Mr White whether he is able to obtain the official denial of the Mohammedan Deputies referred to in the Note.

Mr White says he would try to do so.

M Clemenceau says that Mr Venizelos must be heard on this subject, and he proposed, with Mr White’s consent, to send him a copy of this Note.

(It is then agreed that Mr Venizelos be invited to attend the Council at 17:00 on the following day, when the question of Western Thrace would be discussed.

It is further decided to postpone until the following meeting the discussion of the Clauses relating to Ports, Waterways and Railways, for settlement in conjunction with the territorial questions affecting Bulgaria.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, July 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


(At this moment M. Tardieu enters the room.)

1. M Tardieu states that the question of setting up the Committee for coordinating the clauses of the Peace Treaty with Germany had been submitted to the Committee for supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty, by the American representative. After three meetings, the Committee had adopted a plan.

Mr Balfour states that the proposal is to the effect that a Committee should be set up in Paris to supervise the execution of the Peace Treaty, and to coordinate its provisions. Would not there then be some confusion between this new Committee and the League of Nations? There would be a Permanent Committee at Geneva and another Permanent Committee at Paris; this might lead to disputes.

M Tardieu replies that Mr Balfour’s question had been answered in Paragraph 1 of the Report. The manner in which the functions of the Committee had been limited was clearly expressed; and there was therefore no risk of overlapping. In addition to this, paragraph 5 of the Report states that the Allied and Associated Governments would determine what the relations between the two bodies in question should be.

Mr Balfour replies that he is entirely satisfied; but that he would like to raise another, not very important question. Did the Council see any objection to the members of the Paris Committee being ambassadors.

M Tardieu replies that paragraph 2 of the Report answers the question. It had been thought that there was nothing to prevent ambassadors being appointed as representatives to the Committee, but, on the other hand there is no need specially to recommend that ambassadors should be appointed.

(It is agreed that the Report of the Committee for supervising the execution of the Peace Treaty, with regard to setting up a Coordinating Committee to deal with questions of interpretation and execution should be adopted.)


(M Leygues and the Naval experts enter the room.)

2. M Clemenceau states that the Naval experts had met to discuss the question, without being able to come to an agreement except on one point, which was, that, before they could deal with their side of the matter, a decision with regard to their general policy in the matter must be taken by the Governments concerned.

Admiral Ronarc’h states that the admirals had met several times without coming to an agreement and that their remarks on the differences of opinion between the Admiralties of the countries concerned could be seen in the Report submitted to the Conference.

M Clemenceau states that he does not see how the question of whether the vessels should be destroyed, sunk, or distributed, could again be raised. It had already been discussed by the Council of Four, and, finally, in reply to the French request, it had been decided that the vessels should be distributed; and that each recipient country should put the vessels allotted to it to what use it chose. There could be no doubt on the question, because, when the Scapa Flow incident occurred, Mr Lloyd George had expressed his regret for what had happened, in view of the fact that France was to receive a certain number of the vessels sunk. He had again renewed his promise, and had given a list of vessels that might finally be given to France by way of compensation. The Scapa Flow incident had added itself to the question of disposal. The German vessels had been placed under the guard of the British Admiralty. He did not wish to be critical; but simply to draw attention to the fact, that a report on the whole question had been promised to the Supreme Council, and that the report in question had not yet been tendered. He had intended, at the time, to send a French Admiral over, but, since Mr Lloyd George had not received the suggestion favorably, he had not insisted. The responsibility rested with the British Admiralty, and it was therefore necessary that a report should be submitted to the Council, in order that responsibility for the affair might be determined. The German Admiral was going to be tried by a British court martial; but it should not be forgotten that the Admiral in question was at the time Commander-in-Chief of the German Fleet; and that he had admitted to having given orders to sink it. The German Government was therefore clearly responsible, and the Allies had a right to demand reparation. Mr Lloyd George had stated that reparation would be given, but, after inquiring, he had not appeared to think this possible. An argument had been brought forward, to the effect that the provisions of the Armistice did not establish sufficient control over the German vessels; Mr Lloyd George had further recalled Marshal Foch’s opinion against surrendering these vessels. Before discussing the question of distributing the German fleet, it was necessary to know where the fleet in question actually was: one portion was at the bottom of the sea in Scapa Flow, another, smaller, portion was possibly afloat in the same locality; finally, there were vessels in German ports. How could the Admirals have given any other reply? They could only do what they had done, and draw attention to the fact that no political decision had been taken. This was the essence of the question, and before pursuing the discussion further, he wished to know the opinion of his colleagues.

Mr Balfour states that the remarks of the President of the Council raised three points. Firstly, he had alluded to a declaration of Mr Lloyd George in favour of distributing the Fleet.

M Clemenceau states that the question had been twice discussed, and that finally, President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George had acceded to French wishes by accepting the principle that the Fleet should be distributed.

Mr. Balfour says that the Council of Four had agreed that the distribution should be made between the Allied Powers, but that he was not aware of the exact basis of this distribution. He asked whether it had been decided, for example, to make an equal division of all surface vessels of the same class, or whether compensations in another form were to accompany the distribution.

S Tittoni states, that, inasmuch as the principle of distribution had been determined upon, it is necessary to know the manner in which it was to be carried out.

M Clemenceau answers that the principle of distribution had alone been discussed, and not the details of this distribution.

Mr Balfour asked whether the matters included in the minutes of April 25th represented a definite decision taken by France.

M Clemenceau replies that he is quite ready to re-discuss the question for the fourth or fifth time. He wishes to draw attention, however, to the fact, that, as Mr Lloyd George had proposed to hand over to the French a certain number of vessels whose names were given, this in itself proved his admission of the principle of distribution.

Baron Makino states that he can remember this statement.

Mr Balfour states that it is very important to know what had been decided upon by the Council of Four, in order that the question should not continually recur. He did not think, that, as a matter of principle, it is advisable to re-open matters already discussed and decided upon by that body.

M Clemenceau answered that he could not entirely accept Mr. Balfour’s statement of principle. It was contradicted by the fact that a decision had been made to occupy the Rhine territory for fifteen years. Notwithstanding this, six days before the Treaty had been signed, Mr Lloyd George had re-opened the question and it had been re-discussed. He is nevertheless in agreement with Mr Balfour. It is necessary to see exactly what had been said and to consult the minutes drawn up by the secretariat. In addition to this, the report promised on the Scapa Flow incident should be forthcoming.

Mr Balfour states that he sees no objection to a report being made.

M Clemenceau stated that the British Admiralty is not of that opinion.

Mr. White stated that the question was new to him, and that it was necessary for him to examine carefully the minutes of proceedings, in order that he might know what President Wilson had thought.

M Clemenceau states that they were therefore in agreement on the two points previously raised by him.

S Tittoni stated that the principle of distribution was agreed upon; but the manner in which it was to be carried out had yet to be decided.

M Clemenceau states that the last point had never been discussed; and that Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson had only agreed to the principle. He further drew attention to the fact that he had raised the question of German responsibility.

Mr Balfour states that he does not doubt that such a responsibility existed, but even if established, what advantages would accrue?

(It is agreed that the secretariat should examine the minutes of proceedings in order to report on all that had been said in the Council of Four with regard to the distribution of the German Fleet. It was further decided that Mr. Balfour should ask the British Government for the report on the Scapa Flow incident).

(M Leygues and the Naval Advisers then leave the room.)


3. M Tardieu reads Article 65 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, which read as follows:

“Within a period of three weeks after the coming into force of the present Treaty, the port of Strasburg and the port of Kehl shall be constituted, for a period of seven years, a single unit from the point of view of exploitation. Nomination of a Director for the Port of Kehl

Nomination of a Director for the Port of Kehl

The administration of this single unit will be carried on by a manager named by the Central Rhine Commission, which shall also have power to remove him.

This manager shall be of French nationality.

Pending appointment of the first manager by the Central Rhine Commission, a provisional manager, who shall be of French nationality may be appointed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, subject to the foregoing provisions.”

He points out that the French Delegation requested the Supreme Council to appoint the temporary Director provided for under the above Article, and that the Delegation had proposed to the Council the name of M Detousse, Ingénieur des Fonts et chaussées.

Mr White points out that under the terms of the Treaty, the Allied Governments themselves were called upon to ratify the appointment.

(It is decided that the nomination of M Detousse as Temporary Director of the port of Kehl, and of the port of Strasburg, should be submitted by each respective Delegation to their Governments for approval.)


4. M Tardieu states that the Yugoslav Delegation had addressed several Notes to the Council on the subject of their claims to certain territories.

Report of the Commission of Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs Regarding the Demands of the Yugoslavs in the Banat Balfour stated, that before pursuing this discussion, he wishes to remark that he prefers not to take up the Yugoslav claims, during such time as the Serbians refused to respect the decisions taken by the Council with regard to Klagenfurt.

M Tardieu remarks that as the claims are rejected in the proposed replies, these letters are in line with Mr. Balfour’s remarks.

S Tittoni says that he considered it useless to discuss the question, as the Council’s decisions are not being respected.

M Tardieu answers that the proposals themselves might be considered, because they did not grant the Serbians claims.

M Clemenceau states that the entire discussion is put aside by Mr Balfour’s remarks, with whom the Council agrees.

M Tardieu states that since the questions could not be further discussed, despite the fact that the claims put forward had been rejected, the Council would presumably be less inclined to discuss points upon which concessions had been made. There remained a question of Ada-Kalessi Island which does not concern Yugoslavia. In a telegram dated 11th July General Franchet d’Esperey had reported that the Romanians and Yugoslavs both laid claim to Ada-Kalessi Island, which lay in the Danube opposite Orsova, and which, after being left to Turkey by virtue of the Berlin Treaty of 1878, had been occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1908. In view of the fact that the Ada-Kalessi Island had been occupied by Austria-Hungary the Committee, proposed that it should be given to Romania, which country had received the Austro-Hungarian territories of Transylvania adjacent to the Danube. The Committee requires that the stipulations of Article 52 of the Berlin Treaty, with regard to the prohibition of Military works on the Island should be upheld.

(It is agreed that the Ada-Kalessi Island should be granted to Romania, and that the clauses of Article 52 of the Berlin Treaty, as detailed above, should be upheld.

It is further decided that M Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, should inform the Yugoslav Delegation, that, in view of the Serbian refusal to recognize decisions of the Supreme Council with regard to Klagenfurt, it was impossible to proceed further with the latest claims presented by their Delegation.)


5. M Tardieu states that the Secretary-General had informed Marshal Foch of the decision taken by the Council on the 16th July, to the effect that French troops should not be sent to Schleswig, since the means of their transport were not yet ready. Marshal Foch had now reported that the decision in question arose out of a misunderstanding. The French battalion for Schleswig had been formed, and was now ready to start at four days’ notice. Marshal Foch further reported that he had informed the British Admiralty to the above effect. Inter-Allied Forces for the Plebiscite Zone in Schleswig

Mr Balfour says that the decision that French troops should not participate had been taken, simply because it had been wrongly supposed that they were not ready. Since this was not the case it would be advantageous if the French flag were represented.

(It is decided that the French battalion now ready should participate in the military occupation of Schleswig; and that the British Admiralty should give Marshal Foch the four days’ notice in advance which was to precede the despatch of the battalion.)


6. Mr White states that an Austrian Note with regard to the minority clauses of the Peace Treaty had been presented. He suggests that it should be transmitted to the Committee on New States for report.

Mr Balfour said he believes that certain clauses on the subject of minorities had already been sent to another Committee. Would it not be preferable to submit the Austrian proposals to this latter Committee in order to avoid confusion?

M Berthelot states that the question of minorities should have been the exclusive object of study of the Minorities Committee. Other questions, involving problems of finance and transportation, had however been submitted to it.

M Clemenceau draws attention to the fact that the note accompanying the presentation of the Austrian Peace Treaty states clearly, that, as the text of the Treaty represented decisions finally arrived at, it would not be possible to reply to notes that had been received in the past, or would be received in the future, from the Austrian Delegation. It therefore seemed impossible to discuss the question raised by Mr White.

(It is decided that the Austrian proposals with regard to minorities should not be examined by the Council, in view of the letter accompanying the presentation of the Peace Treaty, wherein it is stated that no further replies would be given to Austrian notes.)

[Jimbuna]

29th July 1919

A Russian prisoner of war still held in Altdamm, Germany (today Dąbie, Poland) washes his clothes after receiving soap from the Red Cross.


Italian Navy in the city of Pola, formerly part of Austria-Hungary. The area is disputed between Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia).


A wounded Serbian soldier, wearing artificial legs on both legs, returns home after being a prisoner of war in Austria-Hungary.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, July 29, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


1. M Berthelot referring to the decision taken on the previous day says that he understands the decision to refer to Austrian notes dispatched before the final Treaty had been handed to the Austrian Delegation. It would clearly be necessary to reply to any Austrian notes dispatched since then. He proposes, therefore, that the note regarding minorities be examined by the Committee on new States.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks the same principle might be adopted in dealing with the Austrian notes as had been adopted regarding the notes sent by the German Delegation. In the latter case there had been a Committee to survey the whole of the replies. He would, therefore, propose that M Dutasta be asked to arrange for a similar machinery in order that the whole of the replies be coordinated.

(These proposals are accepted.)

Note: The Resolution referred to is as follows:

(It is agreed that a Committee should be appointed for the purpose of editing the reply to the German Note. The Secretary-General is requested to arrange for this Committee to meet with the least possible delay, and to communicate to it the various portions of the reply as they were approved.)


2. M Pichon said that the Austrians had asked for an extension of one week beyond the period of 10 days allowed them to present their observations regarding the Treaty. They justify their request by reference to the change of Foreign Minister which had lately occurred. He thinks the demand could not be resisted, and asked his colleagues if they agreed with him.

(It is agreed that the period of ten days allowed to the Austrian Delegation to present observations on the Treaty handed to them should be extended by one week and that this should be communicated to them by the Secretariat-General.)


(M Loucheur, M Seydoux and Mr Waterlow enter the room.)

3. M Seydoux says that on the previous day the question of the resumption of the parcels post and of the money order service had been raised by the British Delegation. He had raised no comment on the resumption of the parcels post, but he had asked for time to consult the Ministry of Finance regarding the money order service. He had consulted the Ministry of Finance and found that the question had already been considered. On the 26th June the French Postal Service had been addressed by the Ministry of Finance which took the view that the instability of the mark made it undesirable to resume any money order intercourse with Germany. He found that the same opinion still prevailed. From this he concluded that the objection of the French Finance Ministry was a technical one and was not concerned with any political consideration. If the British Government therefore felt that there was no technical objection from the British point of view, there seemed no reason to object to the resumption of money order interchanges between Great Britain and Germany. The British Government, as far as France was concerned, was, he thought, free to act as it wished. The French Government, however, did not for the time propose to restore the money order service. Re-establishment of Postal Communications With Germany

M Pichon says that the only objection would be that the Allies would not be acting identically, but as the question was not a political one the matter was not of great importance.

(It is agreed that there is no objection to the resumption by Great Britain of parcels post and money order interchange with Germany in accordance with the proposal of the British Delegation.)

(It is further agreed that the proposals of the Special Committee as modified on the previous day should be accepted.


4. The Council has before it the proposal made by S Tittoni on the previous day.

Creation of Inter-Allied Organisation for the Distribution of Raw Material M Loucheur says that S Tittoni’s proposal really amounted to the perpetuation of the Supreme Economic Council. The very functions he wishes exercised were those hitherto exercised by the Council with the help of the Wheat Executive, the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council, and similar organisations. The problem before the Council is therefore merely restated in other terms. As the Council knew, the French and Italian Delegations favor the continuance of the Supreme Economic Council. Great Britain latterly had taken the same view. Only the American Delegation disagreed, and had wired to Washington for instructions. On the following Friday and Saturday there was to be a meeting of the Council in London. Everything depended on the instructions that might be received from the Governments. Without them the members could take no action.

Mr Balfour says that he has prepared a draft resolution to the following effect:

“That the problems arising out of the present difficulties of providing food, coal and raw materials to the Allied Powers be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council for examination and report.”

He has expressed his resolution in these terms in order not to bind the Supreme Economic Council in any way. S Tittoni’s proposal appeared to dictate the conclusion in some manner.

M Loucheur observes that neither resolution offered a solution of the question. All that could be done was to postpone it unless instructions were received for the Supreme Economic Council to continue its functions. In regard to the primary necessity of finding coal for Italy, he wishes to inform the Council that he had had a conversation with S Tittoni. There is information that between the dates of August 5th and September 5th, Germany would furnish one million three hundred and fifty thousand tons of coal. This coal was intended for French uses according to agreement. France, however, had agreed, in order to assist Italy, to despatch out of this one hundred and seventy-five [Page 372]thousand tons to the latter country. This would save the situation. In addition to this, in spite of considerable shortage in France, he had given an order for the despatch from the Saar Basin to Italy of one thousand two hundred tons daily. He hoped that Great Britain would also help to ease the situation and he expected to have a conversation with Sir Auckland Geddes at the end of the week.

(It is then resolved that the problems arising out of the present difficulties of providing food, coal and raw materials to the Allied Powers be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council for examination and report.)


(At this moment Mr Hudson, Mr J F Dulles, S Fiori, and Major Greig entered the room.)

5. M Loucheur says that on the previous day he had asked that the Expert Commission for the distribution of Rolling Stock in Europe should work in harmony with the Reparations Commission. This had apparently been interpreted by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways, as meaning that the Expert Commission should work under the orders of the Reparations Commission. This was not what he meant to convey. It was clearly necessary that the work of the Expert Commission should be coordinated with that of the Reparations Commission. He therefore, proposes that the following Note, prepared by the British Delegation, be accepted:

“The Presidents of the Main Expert Commissions on the distribution of rolling-stock, will work in close touch with the Reparations Commission in order that the latter may take the necessary measures for effecting financial adjustments resulting (a) from the transfer or liquidation of the above rolling-stock, craft and installations and (b) from such other decisions within the competence of the above Expert Commissions as may affect the Reparations Commission. No final decision will be communicated to the States affected without the previous concurrence of the Reparations Commission.”

He would like to add that, should there be disagreement between the Expert Commission and the Reparations Commission, the disagreement should be referred to the coordinating Committee, the setting up of which had been agreed to on the previous day.

Mr Balfour says that two quite different considerations have to be reconciled. It is obvious that the rolling stock of Europe, as being a financial asset, should not escape the grasp of the Reparation Commission, but it is clearly important that for the economic reconstruction of Europe, so essential an instrument of reconstruction should be employed to the best purpose. Without this, work on Mines, Farms, Factories etc., would be wasted. From this point of view, there is no more important resource than rolling stock for the economic revival of Europe. This resource must be husbanded by the Experts. It is therefore necessary to reconcile these two important objects.

Mr Hudson says that the Commission of Experts which is to deal with the distribution of rolling stock is, according to the Treaty, entirely independent. It could not be subjected to the Reparations Commission. Should it be so subjected the Germans would have cause for complaint that the Treaty was not being observed. He quite agreed that it should work in harmony with the Reparations Commission, but if it were unable to take any decision without the concurrence of the Reparations Commission, the object for which it was created would be defeated. It is essential that it should be able to take independent decisions and have them executed speedily; should it have to wait for the previous sanction of the Reparations Commission it could not do its work.

M Loucheur says that the experts might be allowed to make provisional allotments of the railway stock, subject to sanction by the Reparations Commission. He disputes that the experts under the Treaty have any right to dispose finally of such material. The Reparations Commission, it had been stipulated, could intervene in all matters touching the disposal of material. He quite agreed that every day lost was a serious thing for the economic fate of Europe, but he could not admit that any of the material resources of the enemy countries could be disposed of irrespective of the Reparations Commission.

Mr Balfour said that he understands M Loucheur to agree to a temporary allotment of railway stock by the experts. They are bound, however, to inform the Reparations Commission of what they were doing. Their action would then be considered in its financial aspect, and the result of the action would be considered by the two Commissions together.

M Loucheur points out that according to the Treaty, only the Reparations Commission can receive material in discharge of the reparations debt. No transfer of material can, therefore, be made without the knowledge and concurrence of the Reparations Commission. He cannot therefore admit the complete independence of the experts.

Mr Hudson maintains that the experts should be entirely free to make a distribution of the railway stock according to the technical necessities of the case. It is the role of the Reparations Commission to consider the financial consequences of the action of the Experts.

M Loucheur quotes Articles 19 and 20 of Annex II of the Treaty. He points out that the Reparations Commission did not propose to make the allocation of the rolling stock, but should the experts make such an allocation that Germany was not able to restore her economic life in such a manner as to pay reparations at all, it was clear that the Reparations Commission had a right to intervene. In his view a mistake has been made in drawing up the Treaty, and the Experts should have been placed under the Reparations Commission. Without this there would inevitably be constant conflict of authority. However the Treaty had been signed and so he proposes that the experts should make a distribution, that they should inform the Reparations Commission, and that in case of disagreement the matter should be referred through the coordinating Committee to the Governments.

Mr White says that he sees no objection to this course.

Mr Dulles says that as the American representative on the Reparations Commission he sympathizes with M Loucheur. Should the Reparations Commission think it necessary to order a supply of coal from one country to another its intentions might be defeated, if the experts had allocated rolling stock in such a way that coal could not be moved.

Mr Hudson says that he thinks the subjection of the experts to the Reparations Commission a violation of the Treaty.

M Loucheur says that what he proposes is no violation of the Treaty, but a matter of internal arrangement among the Allies.

Mr Balfour says that the last sentence of the proposal under consideration seemed to imply that final decisions could be taken but not communicated to the Governments concerned. This appeared to be an absurd situation. He thinks that the experts can make provisional allocation, but that no communication of their allotment as final should be made till the Reparations Commission had sanctioned it.

Mr Hudson points out that the experts can only decide how the rolling stock should be distributed. They will be bound to utilize the Governments in order to have their plans carried out. For instance, should they decide that a proportion of German rolling stock was required in Denmark, they will be bound to inform the German and Danish Governments in order that they could execute the proposals. It is impossible to wait for the sanction of the Reparations Commission.

Mr Balfour says that a test question would be, should the Technical Committee desire to send 500 wagons to Czechoslovakia, are they entitled to do so without the consent of the Reparations Commission.

M Loucheur says that the answer in the case of experts would be yes, and in his own case it would be no. The experts, for instance, might lose sight of the necessity of transporting coal. If the Council of Five were in existence reference could be made to it, but, if it were not in existence, chaos would ensue. He thought it absurd that experts should act irrespective of orders. They should receive instructions from the Governments. The Clauses of the Treaty operated as against Germany, not as against the Allies among themselves. The various parts of the machinery employed for the execution of the Treaty must work together, otherwise there would be complete disorder. He therefore asked that definite instructions be given to the experts, so that they should not work independently of the Reparations Commission.

Mr Hudson says that M Loucheur had stated the issue very clearly. Poland, for instance, had been attributed certain territory which had been German. The accepted theory was that a certain amount of rolling stock went with this territory, in order to make its economic life possible. It might, in the opinion of the Reparations Commission, be necessary to allot Poland some rolling stock by way of payment in the Reparations account. Restitution is no business of the experts, but, after the Reparations Commission had done what it thought fit, it might appear to the experts that Poland required more rolling stock. The experts would then take a decision for the sole purpose of employing the rolling stock available to the best general advantage. According to M Loucheur, Reparations questions came in at this point. This, he submits, is widening the sphere of the Reparations Commission unduly. The Expert Committee, in his view, ought to be able to say that for technical reasons, rolling stock is required at such and such a place. M Loucheur’s view falsified the intentions of Article 371. Was this Article to be applied in its obvious interpretation, or was its application to be made subject to the political situation of Europe as a whole? For instance, is Poland to be deprived of necessary rolling stock because the Reparations Commission decided to pay Belgium in coal?

M Loucheur says that he thinks the clauses drawn up by the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways have entirely left financial considerations out of account. He does not say that the Expert Commission should not allocate rolling stock, but that this allocation should be provisional. The value of the rolling stock thus assigned, must be determined by the Reparations Commission. If, for instance, Poland can not pay for the rolling stock allotted her, was she to receive it for nothing? This would entirely stultify the work of the Reparations Commission. What he asked for was coordination. It was regrettable that better liaison had not been maintained by the various Commissions which had framed different portions of the Treaty. As the Treaty itself did not provide for coordination, arrangements must be made for co-ordination in its execution.

Mr Balfour said that he thinks perhaps the following proposal would reconcile the two points of view:

“The immediate distribution of rolling stock shall be made on the authority of the Expert Committee; but no such distribution shall be final until the financial aspects of the question have been considered and approved by the Committee of Reparation.”

(This proposal is accepted provisionally subject to further examination by the Experts present of the Reparations Commission and of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways.)

Mr. Hudson asked that subject to this, the nomination of the experts should be made in accordance with proposal annexed.

(With the addition of a French member in the Principal Commission Para. 1(a), the proposals contained in the Report—Appendix “C”—are accepted.)

(M Loucheur, Mr Hudson, Mr Dulles and S Fiori withdraw.)


(At this point Mr Polk enters the room.)

(M Clementel, M Alphand, Mr Nogara and Mr Hutchinson enter the room.)

6. M Clementel said that the draft Clauses now before the Council has been unanimously agreed to. He explains the various clauses in which alterations had been made since the last edition. Some discussion arose concerning Article 29.

Mr White asks whether the Smaller Powers might not claim equal rights with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in respect to the “most favored nation” treatment.

M Clementel explained that this provision had been inserted at the request of the Japanese Delegates.

Mr Balfour asks why it is proposed to re-impose Consular Courts on Bulgaria.

M Clementel says that it was merely a case of re-stating preexisting rights.

Mr Balfour says that he had not been aware of any right of Consular jurisdiction in Bulgaria, but, in any case, he would have thought it more in keeping with the times to abolish or curtail such a right rather than to re-assert or extend it.

Mr White says that the United States did not wish to claim extra-territorial rights in Bulgaria.

M Pichon said that the French Government are negotiating just before the outbreak of war for the abolition of the capitulations in Bulgaria.

M Clementel points out that the formula employed is permissive. Special conventions might be entered into by each of the Allied and Associated Powers with Bulgaria. There was nothing to compel them to do so. The sentence regarding “most favored nation” treatment had been added at the request of Japan.

Mr Balfour observed that things are not left just as they had been before the war, as the United States and Japan were added to the list of Powers entitled to negotiate with Bulgaria regarding special rights which they had not possessed before the war.

M Pichon observes that they need not avail themselves of this right. France has rights which had not been put into practice. Just before the outbreak of the war, negotiations were going on for the abolition of those theoretical rights. The object of the Article was therefore quite a restricted one, namely, to enable France to resume these negotiations.

Mr Balfour remarks that it is odd that an Article with so restricted an object, contrives to add two Powers to the list.

Mr Matsui says that he understands that there is in practice no consular jurisdiction in Bulgaria. Japan, however, has been for a long time urging her right to exercise such jurisdiction in Turkey. Japan would therefore seem to be weakening her position unless this sentence were inserted in the Article. If none of the Powers chose to exercise their rights under the capitulations, Japan will do nothing; should the Powers wish to do so, Japan desires to be in the same position as the rest. Nothing very substantial is being asked for, and he thought that any exercise of the right was improbable. In view of the negotiations with Turkey, however, the Japanese Delegation had thought it desirable to have this sentence inserted.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks it is strange to insist in a Treaty on a right which no one wished to exercise, and which no one approved. With this comment, however, he would be content, and would not oppose the acceptance of the Article.

The Economic Clauses as drafted are then adopted for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

It is further decided to communicate these Clauses in the same manner as the other Clauses, through the President of the Committee, to the Smaller Powers concerned.


(M Clemenceau and M Tardieu enter the room.)

7. Mr Balfour reads the following telegram. He thinks this amounts to a refusal on the part of General Pilsudski to obey the orders of the Council.

(M Clementel, M Alphand and Mr Nogara withdrew.)

Telegram From Sir P. Wyndham, Warsaw to Mr Balfour.

July 25th, 1919.

“On July 24th I saw General Pilsudski as instructed by you in your telegram of July 23rd.

Upon my raising the question of the Polish troops being withdrawn to the line of demarcation General Pilsudski said that this was a responsibility which he would not take as the immediate result would be the outbreak of disturbances, possibly leading to regular warfare. He declared that he would resign Office and leave Poland for Lithuania if we insist on the Polish troops being withdrawn, and showed absolute determination on this point.

The internal situation is now so difficult that, as it seems to me, General Pilsudski would gladly avail himself of any opportunity to resign which might be afforded to him by foreign pressure in opposition to a cause which is popular in Poland. The political consequences will be serious if he carries out his threat.”

M Clemenceau observes that the telegram is dated July 25th and that the decision of the Council had been taken on the 26th.


Reply to Herr Von Bethmann-Hollweg

8. It is decided that no answer need be made to Herr Von Bethmann-Hollweg’s letter regarding his personal responsibility for the outbreak of war.


(At this point Mr Venizelos and the Members of the Commission on Greek Affairs, enter the Room.)

9. M Clemenceau, addressing Mr Venizelos says that of the Council thinks that he would probably have something to say regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria.

Mr Venizelos said that he would have something to say on the subject, but before dealing with that, he would like to give an explanation regarding the document produced by Mr White at a previous meeting. This document had been communicated to him by the Chairman and the Council would understand that he was considerably upset by it. It was implied that he had made use of a forged document to influence the Conference. He had never stated that the Mussulmans of Western Thrace desired to join Greece. Should they be given the choice, it was obvious that they would be inclined to choose the Allies of Turkey rather than the enemies of Turkey. What he had suggested was that Allied Officers should consult the Mohammedan Deputies without the knowledge either of Bulgaria or Turkey. He then reads a letter addressed to him by 8 Mussulman Deputies of Western Thrace. This petition he had sent to M Cambon, but he had never attempted to represent the Mussulmans of Thrace as desiring a union with Greece.

Mr Venizelos then reads a series of observations he had prepared on this subject. He adds that he had made complaint to the Government at Washington regarding the imputation made against him by the American Delegation.

Mr White said that the document had been communicated to Mr Venizelos confidentially. Mr Venizelos has therefore no right to make any communication to Washington on the subject.

Mr Venizelos said that the document had been communicated to him by the Chairman of the Council, and he thinks he had a right to defend himself vis-à-vis the American Government.

M Clemenceau says he thinks Mr Venizelos would have done better to reserve his justification for the Council.

Mr Venizelos says that he would withdraw his complaint at Washington.

M Venizelos said that in Thrace as claimed by him for Greece there are more than five times as many Greeks as Bulgarians. There are, in addition, a large number of Greeks in Constantinople and in the districts surrounding it. To these he makes no claim and he argues that this reinforces his claim to the other parts of Thrace. Against the ethnographical argument which entirely favors Greece an economic argument is alleged in favour of Bulgaria. He recognised that free access to the sea was one of the principles of the Conference. Whenever interests were opposed which could not be reconciled, it was necessary to decide which deserved the greater respect. The principle of nationality should take precedence over economic considerations. Bulgaria has excellent ports on the Black Sea. An outlet on the Aegean Sea is not a matter of primary necessity since the opening of the Straits would convert the Black Sea into an open sea. The inclusion of Greek populations in Greece was however a vital interest. Bulgaria could have commercial access to the Aegean either at Dédéagatch or, if this port were regarded unsuitable, at Cavalla. Similar rights might be guaranteed to Bulgaria as had been guaranteed to other land-locked states. Four states, each of them larger than Bulgaria, namely Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary and Poland had been left by the Conference without direct access to the sea. Why should a similar arrangement not be enough for Bulgaria? Poland had not been given Danzig, in order that the nationality of the intervening populations should be respected. It has been alleged that the arrangement he proposed served Bulgarian purposes well enough in peace, but would not suit them in war. He thinks this argument operates in his favour. There will be no chance for Bulgaria to establish a submarine base on the Aegean. Bulgaria was a continental power. Greece was very largely an island power. Should Bulgaria have complete control over a port in the Aegean, she could intercept the movements of Greek troops by means of submarines. He knew that strategic arguments were not in favour at the Conference but he only used this as a secondary argument and in reply to an objection. It is needless to attempt to satisfy Bulgaria. Nothing but Hegemony in the Balkans would satisfy her. She will undoubtedly attempt to upset the settlement made by the Conference. The only hope for peace in the Balkans was to set up her neighbors as ethnic units each individually too big to be attacked. It had also been said that the Greeks had left Western Thrace. This was true. They had been driven out by the Bulgarians and had for five years been refugees in Macedonia and Greece. Mr Venizelos then reads copious extracts from a work entitled “Rapports et Enquêtes de la Commission Interalliée sur les violations du droit des Gens commises en Macédoine orientale par les armées Bulgares”. He adds that the American Red Cross Society which has worked in Eastern Macedonia thoroughly corroborates the report of the Inter-Allied Commission. He argues that it is undesirable to entrust to the rule of a nation which could behave in the manner illustrated by these extracts, any foreign population whatsoever.

(Mr Venizelos then withdraws.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

30th July 1919

6000 Illinois Army National Guard troops are deployed in Chicago to stop the ongoing race riot in the city.


In Dublin, the special unit the “Squad,” formed by Michael Collins (pictured), conducts its first assassination against the Royal Irish Constabulary.


As part of the Hungarian-Romanian War, Romanian troops cross over the Tisza River towards Budapest. Romanian King Ferdinand and Queen Marie overseeing the operation.


Ship Losses:

USS G-2 (United States Navy) The G-class submarine sank at her moorings, Niantic, Connecticut. 3 inspectors killed.
Toyo Maru No.2 (Japan) The cargo ship was destroyed by fire.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, July 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M Clemenceau stated that he wished the question to be adjourned until the following day. The Greeks are engaged in discussions with the Italian Delegation and, in addition to this, M Tardieu is required in the Chamber of Deputies. The question was therefore adjourned.


2. Mr Balfour asks whether this question could be discussed without a settlement of the frontier question.

M Berthelot admitted that the clauses dealing with Ports, Waterways and Railways are dependent on the settlement of the Cavalla frontier line.

Mr Balfour asks whether it would not be possible to accept all the Articles with the exception of Article 24 which is dependent on the frontier settlement.

(It is agreed that the draft clauses for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria dealing with the question of Ports, Waterways and Railways should be accepted with the exception of Article 24.)


3. M Fromageot states that the Commission on New States had submitted draft clauses on the subject of the rights of minorities for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria. The Articles had been drawn up on the basis of those which were to be inserted in the Austrian Treaty, with the exception of those dealing with the guarantees of the League of Nations. These latter were based upon similar provisions in the Polish and other treaties. In addition, the Committee had added Articles Nos 3 and 4 which were not in the Austrian Treaty. These lay down obligations on Bulgaria to grant rights of Bulgarian citizenship to persons living continuously in Bulgaria, despite the fact that they came of foreign parents. The Drafting Committee thinks that, though Articles 3 and 4 ought to be inserted in Peace Treaties with New States, whose legislation was as yet unknown, or in the Peace Treaties with old States, which did not give sufficient guarantees on the subject, they are none the less superfluous in the case of Bulgaria, since the legislation of that country on the point in question was in conformity with that of the most advanced European States. It had therefore been thought that the two articles should be omitted from the text, which were otherwise analogous to that prepared by the Committee on New States. In addition to this, the latter Committee had left out a clause, by virtue of which the Bulgarians would be obliged to raise no obstacle against Bulgarian subjects, at present living in territories granted to other countries, opting as to their citizenship. The text prepared by the Drafting Committee differed from the one drawn up by the Committee on New States, in that Articles 3 and 4 had been omitted, and an article dealing with the right of option inserted. Political clauses in Peace Treaty With Bulgaria.

Mr Balfour states, that as Bulgaria is an old State, and as its legislation was satisfactory on the point in question, there was no use in compelling it to modify its statute book.

M Scialoja states that it has been reported to him that the Committee had not taken up its work, owing to the fact that it was not sure that it was competent to deal with the question. It should also be noted, that the disposal of Thrace affected a portion of the work of this Committee.

Mr Hudson states that the Committee had been of opinion that articles 3 and 4 were necessary in Romania’s case in order that the Jews might be protected. In the 1878 Treaty the same rights had not been granted to the Jewish population as had been given to other citizens.

The question is, whether the article should be enforced in Bulgaria’s case.

Mr Balfour remarks, that since the clauses had been adopted for such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, he sees no reason against their being put into the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

M Fromageot says, that in the Peace Treaty with Austria, although clauses had been inserted to protect minorities, no provision had been made for special nationalities, since the legislation of the country seemed a sufficient guarantee. The clauses are therefore only applicable to countries whose legislation is unsatisfactory and to others whose future legislation could not be foreseen. Bulgaria had dealt with the question of nationality in a satisfactory manner in the past. Was it necessary, therefore, to insert the clause? The Council had to decide whether, in spite of her previous legislation, Bulgaria was to be classified definitely in one of the two categories.

Mr Balfour says that the discussion might be indefinitely prolonged. Romania is an old State, and had the obligations contained in the disputed articles imposed on her. He does not mind whether they are put into the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria; but, if a vote were called for, he would prefer that Bulgaria should be treated like Romania and not like Austria.

(It is therefore decided that the political clauses dealing with the protection of minorities, as drafted by the Committee on New States, should be accepted.

It is further decided, that a clause granting the right of option to Bulgarian citizens living in territories that had changed their sovereignties, should be inserted in the Peace Treaty.)

The Drafting Committee is directed to draw up the clause, and to insert it in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.


4. M Berthelot states that Marshal Foch had submitted a letter dated 28th July to the President of the Peace Conference on the subject of the attitude of General Von der Goltz, in particular and of the Germans in general in the Baltic Provinces. The Marshal had enclosed in his letter a copy of the correspondence exchanged on the subject with the German Government, together with a letter from the British Delegation covering a report from General Gough. In submitting his report Marshal Foch was asking for precise instructions from the Council whether the proposals of the British General, which were supported by Marshal Foch, were acceptable.

It is decided to inform Marshal Foch that General Gough’s conclusions as submitted in Marshal Foch’s letter of the 28th July are acceptable.

Marshal Foch is directed to take all measures necessary for putting the proposals in question into effect.


(At this point the Naval experts enter the room.)

5. M Berthelot, at the request of the President and on behalf of Secretariat, reads out extracts from the texts of I. C. “A” 176–E.3 and C. F. 91. He draws attention to the fact that the texts of Sir Maurice Hankey and M Mantoux are virtually in agreement.

Mr Balfour says that from quotations made in previous Minutes it is evident that M Clemenceau has accurately remembered the discussion of 25th June. It nevertheless seems that, previous to the Scapa Flow incident, the Council of Four had been uncertain as to the ultimate action to be taken with German vessels. The French evidently had desired that they should be distributed. The Italians and Japanese did not appear to have been of the same opinion. The Scapa Flow incident had then occurred. He did not think that it was anybody’s fault, but the incident was none the less regrettable. Without attaching blame to the Admiralty it was none the less a fact that the German fleet had been sunk in British waters by its own crews. Mr Lloyd George had evidently spoken with great feeling, and had renounced in favour of France the British share in any compensation obtainable, at the discussions that had followed the incident. On the extracts now before the Council M Clemenceau bases his views which are (1) that no destruction of enemy vessels should take place, (2) that England renounces all claims to vessels which would have fallen to her share but for the Scapa Flow incident. He is entirely in agreement with the second point and thought that England’s renunciation must be admitted. Two important points, however, remained undecided:

1) How are enemy ships to be disposed of?

2) If division among the Allies be decided upon in what proportion shall it be made?
He does not think that Mr Lloyd George’s remarks could be regarded as a statement of a considered policy for the reason that when he made it he defined only the French position and made no mention of Italy, Japan or America.

Even admitting Britain’s claim to be lost, the questions he had put forward remained for decision.

S Scialoja states that Italy had not been represented at the Conference on the 24th June. It ts probable for that reason that Mr. Lloyd George’s remarks did not mentioned Italy. On the 25th June, the matter had been discussed and referred to the Council of Admirals. Italy’s position to-day was the same as that of France.

M Clemenceau asked in what sense the Admirals had reported.

M Berthelot replies that all the Admirals had differed, since each one upheld the standpoint which he believes to be that of his own country. He adds that the statements attributed to President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George were capable of being interpreted in the sense that the principle of distribution had then been admitted. In support of this, he quoted the phrase in which compensation to small Navies had been allowed for, and he also drew attention to the fact that President Wilson spoke in several places of the division of the enemy fleet.

M Clemenceau states that as the entire matter appears not to be understood fully by his colleagues, he wishes to make a statement as to the exact discussions which had taken place in the Council of Four, and in informal conversations preceding the meetings. Mr Lloyd George had said to him, on one occasion, that if all countries could be of one opinion, the sinking of the German fleet in the open sea, in the presence of the Allied Navies, would be a magnificent spectacle. He had dissented from this, knowing that the French people would desire to have a certain portion of the enemy fleet.

A similar question had arisen as to the disposal of the enemy submarines, Mr Lloyd George advocating that they should be sunk as their use had been illegal. President Wilson had in a way assented to this view. He, M Clemenceau, had refused to agree and maintained that the submarines as well as the surface vessels should be divided, unless all existing submarines were destroyed. It was his conclusion from the discussions that a tacit understanding had been reached between Mr Lloyd George, President Wilson and himself to the effect that the enemy vessels should be divided, and not destroyed. The Scapa Flow incident had then occurred and Mr Lloyd George had been particularly upset over it owing to the fact that he had advocated the sinking of the fleet, and its destruction by the Germans had occurred in a British port. The incident would never have aroused such feeling had any form of destruction been previously decided upon. The very fact that this distribution had been admitted had made the act of voluntary destruction by the Germans more keenly felt. In conclusion, he could only repeat that it had been decided, that the enemy vessels should be divided, and that each ally should take what action it liked with the share allotted to it. He was surprised to hear the Italian claim put forward for the first time. He admitted it, however, but insisted that, if it were maintained, a pool of all enemy vessels should be made and a distribution effected among the Allies. He still requires a report on the Scapa Flow incident.

Mr Balfour states that he had asked for a report from the Admiralty, which had replied, that it had not received any previous request to forward it.

Captain Fuller reads a telegram confirming Mr Balfour’s statement.

M Clemenceau states that the discussion could be proceeded with after the report had been placed before the Council. He points out, however, that the question of the disposal of the remainder of the enemy fleet must be settled.

Mr Balfour asks what was the American point of view on this subject.

Mr White answers that he had not been acquainted by President Wilson with the discussions which had been referred to, but he always believed the United States advocated the sinking or destruction of the warships. He added that it was impossible for him to agree to any decision until he had consulted President Wilson by telegram.

M Berthelot then points out that the minutes of April 25th indicated that President Wilson’s views on the disposal of the submarines, and the surface vessels, differed.

M Clemenceau states that he would agree to submit to President Wilson any proposal which might be put forward, but that he would never agree to the sinking or destruction of the warships.

Mr Balfour then states that the quotations from previous minutes of the Council are not sufficient authority for him to act upon; and that he proposes to send a telegram to Mr Lloyd George asking for further instructions.

Mr White and Mr Polk say that they would send a telegram in the same terms to President Wilson.

Mr Matsui says that he would ask Baron Makino to give him a statement of his impressions of the conversations that had been quoted.

(It is agreed that the discussion should be adjourned until the British and American Representatives should have communicated with their Governments.)


6. M Clemenceau states that Mr White has proposed the following Resolution:

“In view of the fact, that the Supreme Council has granted an additional delay of one week to the Austrians for submitting their answer to the Conditions of Peace handed to them on July 20th, it is suggested that the Secretary-General be requested to instruct the various committees dealing with Hungarian matters to take up and finish their reports for the Hungarian Treaty.”

(The draft Resolution is agreed to.)


7. M Berthelot stated that the Delegation of the Yugoslav State had sent a letter dated 28th July to the President of the Peace Conference asking to be heard on the subject of the Financial and Reparation clauses in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

M Clemenceau says it seems difficult to refuse the request.

S Scialoja draws the attention of the Council to the fact that the situation had changed since the letter had been sent. The Serbians had been given audience by the Committee, and had submitted a memorandum. This latter had been examined, and two requests out of the three had been acceded. The requests had been:

1) That they should be given cattle to compensate their losses in livestock;

2) That they should have the right to recover movable property carried into Bulgaria;

3) That they should take part in the deliberations of the Inter-Allied Reparation and Finance Committees in Bulgaria. The first two proposals had been granted but the third had been disallowed, since it would have created a precedent. Had it been granted, it would have been difficult to refuse similar requests made by other States, and endless disputes would have arisen.

It is decided that a report of the Economic Commission be awaited regarding the requests of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the subject of livestock, movable property and representation on the Inter-Allied Committees on Reparation and Finance.

The decision to refuse the request for audience of the above mentioned Delegation is maintained, and the Secretary-General is instructed to notify them to that effect.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

31st July 1919

Aftermath of War

Generals Sir H. Plumer and Sir E. Allenby promoted to Field Marshals; German Sir H. Rawlinson sent to N. Russia to co-ordinate withdrawal.

Germany: A republic is declared at Weimar and a new constitution adopted.

British Gurkha Rifles march in Baku, Azerbaijan. The area is under British occupation to protect local oilfields.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, July 31, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M. Tardieu explains the report of the Central Committee on territorial questions regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria in the south. He explains the divergent points of view of the American and Italian Delegations on the one hand and of the British, French and Japanese Delegations on the other. If he were asked to argue his own point of view, he would argue it on three grounds - ethnological, political and moral. If Western Thrace is not given to Greece, 92,000 Greeks will be excluded from the Hellenic Kingdom. As the exclusion of Western Thrace from Greece will be followed by the exclusion of Eastern Thrace another 145,000 Greeks will be denied Greek citizenship. In the whole of Thrace, north and west of the Enos-Midia line there are 237,000 Greeks. In any case 1,835,000 Greeks will remain outside Greek Sovereignty. Unless Thrace is made Greek the Treaty which claimed an ethnological basis will leave more than 2 million persons of Greek race subject to non-Greek States. The whole Greek race only numbered 7 millions. This is a paradoxical result of a policy which claimed to be based on nationalities. It also appears to him to be quite unjust. Greece no doubt will receive a good many things but if Bulgaria obtains free access to the Aegean, obvious difficulties will ensue for the Greeks. Their communications with the Islands and with Asia Minor could very easily be intercepted, especially in time of war. Greece had taken the side of the Allies in the war of her own free will. She had incurred a war debt of 2½ billion francs, borrowed no doubt from the Allies, but most States after all were in a similar condition. She deserves some consideration for the part she had played in the war. It is sometimes said that Western Thrace belongs to Bulgaria in law and in right.

When the Treaty of San Stephano was signed in 1878, it was made according to the wishes of Russia which at that time was entirely pro-Bulgarian. The frontier laid down by that Treaty was almost the same as that proposed by the French, British and Japanese Delegations. Bulgaria had obtained Western Thrace by the Treaty of Bucharest. It is argued that if Mr Venizelos raised no claim to it then, he had forfeited any claim to it now. This is not so, for at that time Mr Venizelos was ready to do anything to establish the Balkan League. He had failed in this and after him the Allied Powers had also failed. It was clear that the Bulgarians would not be pleased, but nothing would please them save the establishment of Bulgarian authority over 9 million people, only 4 million of whom would be Bulgarian. It is not right to say that Bulgaria would be very harshly treated in this Treaty. Germany, by the terms imposed on her, lost one fifth of her population. Bulgaria, according to the terms proposed would only lose one eighteenth. The other clauses were not very severe. She was asked to pay 2½ billion francs, but on easy terms which could be made even more easy by the Reparations Commission. Moreover her debt to Germany was abolished, a provision which had not been made in favour of any other enemy State. Though she lost access to the Aegean Sea, she still preserved access to the Black Sea and to the Danube and the opening of the Straits would be to her advantage. The restitution clauses were also light. For instance, she was to restore to Greece only 1500 milch cows out of 4500 taken, 2200 horses out of 9000, 1800 oxen out of 19,000 and 6,000 sheep and goats out of 260,000. He sees no particular advantage in offering Bulgaria a premium on aggression, violence and crime. The Bulgarians had no right to keep the fruits of the robbery committed by them in 1913 and again in 1915 with the help of Turkey, especially if to do this, 300,000 Greeks were to be kept out of Greece and as a final result 34% of the Greek race were to be kept under alien domination.

Mr White says that M Tardieu had made constant allusion to Eastern Thrace. He understood, however, that Western Thrace was the subject under discussion. The main point was whether or not Bulgaria should have access to the Aegean Sea. Mr. White then made the following statement:

“In regard to the statement by Mr Venizelos before the Supreme Council on July 29th, it need only be said that the statement contained no arguments which the American delegation has not heard repeatedly and weighed carefully, unless exception be made of his references to the telegram of the American Charge d’Affaires at Sofia and his quotations from the American Red Cross report on Bulgarian atrocities. As for the telegram (which I may remark parenthetically contains no charges of any nature against Mr Venizelos or his Government, but merely referred to an active Greek propaganda, and large expenditures of funds in the district, without implication as to the source of either), it must be admitted that Mr Venizelos’ suggestion that the eight Mussulman Deputies merely denied that they had asked for Greek sovereignty, but did not repudiate the document upon which he places so much weight, does not carry conviction. Our information is explicit and unequivocal to the effect that they denied fore-knowledge of any such document and declared their signatures thereto to be forgeries. However, we do not care to stress this point, as even were it valid the American Delegation would not give it much weight as a reliable indication of the real sentiments of the mass of the Mohammedan population in Western Thrace. We merely point out that one of the chief arguments presented by the Greek Committee in support of their finding rests on evidence which, to express it mildly, needs verification.

As regards the long reading of citations of Bulgarian atrocities, we fail to see the relation between Bulgarian atrocities committed in one place and the drawing of frontiers in another. If I thought such arguments valid, I might read at length the descriptions of Greek atrocities contained in the well known Carnegie Report, and cite them in support of the American opinion that Western Thrace should not be given to the Greeks. The American opinion, however, rests on no such feeble basis. It is founded on certain facts which are not subject to dispute on certain principles which have guided this Conference in its labors hitherto, and on one and only one ambition: namely, to contribute loyally and unselfishly to the great end we all have in view: a just and enduring peace in Europe.

There is here no question of giving territory to Bulgaria. The only question before the Council is: shall we take territory away from Bulgaria and give it to Greece?

It is not denied that Bulgaria had a good and valid title to this territory when she entered the present war. She acquired it not by conquest, but through a peace imposed upon her when she was beaten and helpless. Greece and her Allies, although conquerors, saw the wisdom of according to vanquished Bulgaria an outlet to the Aegean Sea. What was wise in 1913 is doubly wise in 1919, when we are endeavoring, more earnestly than ever before, to prepare a peace which will endure.

If Bulgaria’s legal title to Bulgarian Thrace does not admit of discussion, what are the grounds upon which we are asked to deprive her of this territory and hand it over to Greece? Certainly no serious argument for such procedure can be based on ethnic grounds. It is scarcely open to doubt that following the cession of this territory to Bulgaria, and before Bulgaria entered the war, the Bulgarian population outnumbered the Greek population, while Turks constituted, as always, the overwhelming majority. It does not invalidate this fact to argue that many Greeks were atrociously expelled from the region. When we remember that according to Mr Venizelos’ own figures there were, before the Balkan wars, only 70,000 Greeks in the area as against 60,000 Bulgars, we must admit that, expulsions or no expulsions, the feeble Greek superiority in numbers must inevitably give place to a Bulgar superiority as soon as the territory was ceded to Bulgaria. Greece knew, when she agreed to give Western Thrace to Bulgaria, that with the incoming Bulgarian administration, the development of Bulgarian commercial interests at the ports and elsewhere, and the migration of Bulgarians from new Greek territory into this new Bulgarian territory, the Greek population would most certainly and altogether naturally drop to third place in the proportion of races. In such a case, evidence as to atrocities and expulsions becomes wholly irrelevant. The vital fact remains that in any case the valid occupation of the region by Bulgaria must inevitably have brought about the ethnic preponderance in Bulgaria’s favour which actually intervened.

Nor do we believe that there is reliable evidence to show that the Turkish majority of Western Thrace prefers Greek to Bulgar rule. Many of these Turks speak Bulgarian as their native tongue, while comparatively few of them speak Greek. In the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, it is natural to assume that this population would be better off under the government of those who speak their own language. The evidence to the contrary thus far presented is at least open to suspicion, and is off-set by the declarations of the Chief of the Mohammedan Church in Bulgaria to the effect that his people preferred to be left under Bulgar rule. Assuredly we cannot find in the principle of self-determination any sound argument in favour of annexing Bulgarian Thrace to Greece.

Is it sought to take this territory from Bulgaria and give it to Greece as a punishment for Bulgaria’s action in joining our enemies? If this be the pretext for the proposed annexation, we must observe that while the wisdom and the method of administering punishment may be matters for discussion, there can be no doubt of the fact that punitive annexations of territory are in flagrant contradiction with the principles upon which we agreed to make peace in Europe, and with the principles which have hitherto guided the deliberations of this Conference. The honor of the Entente will be gravely compromised if in order to punish an enemy and to pay a friend we take from the one and give to the other territory to which only the present possessor has a valid legal, ethnic and economic title. Never has the American Government approved territorial changes for punitive reasons; and it cannot now adopt a principle of procedure so fraught with danger to the future peace of the world.

The fact that Germany, Austria, and Hungary are being deprived of large tracts of territory does not constitute a reason for taking territory from Bulgaria. In the first place the cases are not analogous, for Germany and Austria Hungary had long been wrongfully annexing territory from their neighbors, whereas Bulgaria has recently been defeated and had stripped from her such territories as her neighbors saw fit to appropriate. In the very nature of events less remained to Bulgaria which can rightfully be taken from her; and the American Delegation has, in fact, agreed to deprive her of small areas at four different places along her frontiers. But far more important is the fact that all territories taken from Germany, Austria and Hungary were taken for valid reasons, and in the interests of justice and future peace. Such reasons do not exist in the case of Western Thrace, and we do not believe that to take this territory from Bulgaria would be in accord with justice or in the interest of a future peace.

On the contrary, we believe that to deprive Bulgaria of Western Thrace is to cut her off from her only direct and convenient territorial access to the Aegean Sea, to inflict upon her a loss of territory which cannot be justified by the principles according to which we stand pledged to execute this peace, will be to render impossible the conciliation of the Balkan peoples, to sow the seeds of future trouble in South-Eastern Europe, and seriously to endanger the edifice of peace we have labored so long and painfully to construct. It is for this reason that the American Delegation is unable to accept the proposal of the Greek Committee, and for this reason that its representatives on the Central Territorial Commission have recommended the formula contained in the Report of that Commission as submitted to the Supreme Council.”

Mr Balfour says that as he takes a different view to that expressed by Mr White, he thinks he had better make a statement. He feels that he need not add much to the very clear explanation given by M Tardieu. He accepts the general proposition that a punitive adjustment of frontiers was wrong. Nevertheless, when other circumstances balanced one another evenly it had been the practice of the Conference to give the benefit of the doubt to friends rather than to foes. If he were forced to appeal to this practice he would do so, but in this case he thinks that the theoretical merits lay entirely on the side advocated by M Tardieu. It is clearly both wrong and inexpedient to allow nations which embarked on aggressive and acquisitive wars to find this practice paying. In the whole war there had been no action more cynical and more disastrous than that undertaken by the Bulgarians. Had the Bulgarians not behaved as they had, Turkey would not have entered the war; the disastrous Gallipoli Campaign would not have taken place; the war would have ended years sooner, and needless suffering would have been saved. The most plausible objection raised was that if Western Thrace were taken from Bulgaria a lasting peace in the Balkans would be jeopardized. Bulgaria, if she obtained Southern Dobrudja which he hoped she would, would actually be larger than before the war. Mr White had avoided any mention of the Greeks in Eastern Thrace. This question, however, is intimately connected with that of Western Thrace. If it is desirable that the Greeks in Eastern Thrace should be included within the limits of Greece, the attribution of Western Thrace to Greece was a means to that end. He had been rather shocked at Mr White’s theory about massacre. Mr White appears ready to accept the results of massacres with great equanimity. The American Delegation had been greatly influenced by the theory that every country should have direct access to the sea. He could not believe, however, that it is good policy to allow Bulgaria to retain territory obtained from Turkey as a bribe for declaring war on us. In any case, Dédéagatch was not the only port which could serve Bulgarian ends. The opening of the Straits added greatly to the value of Bulgarian ports on the Black Sea. The value of the opening of the Straits could be inferred from the outcry there would have been in Bulgaria had the Straits been open before the war and had the result of war closed them for Bulgarian traffic. In any case the port of Dédéagatch had never been and would never be a good port. He hoped that the arrangements that were to be made at Salonika or Cavalla would suit Bulgarian purposes far better. For these reasons he supported M. Tardieu. He might also quote the earlier views of the American Delegation. These views had changed while the views of the other Delegations had not.

M Tardieu says that he would like to make a brief reply to some of Mr White’s remarks. It was probable that the real value of the letter written by the Mohammedan Deputies of Western Thrace could never be estimated. At a time when Thrace was not occupied by the Bulgarians these Deputies had written to General Franchet d’Esperey. Since the Bulgars had occupied the country the signatories had felt impelled to recant. It is reasonable to believe that their first mood was more sincere than the second.

M Clemenceau suggests that perhaps neither is sincere.

M Tardieu says that the argument that because the Turks in Western Thrace speak Bulgarian, they will prefer a Bulgarian to a Greek Government, is not to be relied on. Experience had disproved this many times. As to the diminution of population as a result of massacres, it could hardly be maintained that this should redound to the advantage of the authors of the massacres. He does not suggest that a punitive territorial arrangement should be made, but he does not think that it was good morality to recompense the Bulgarians for wrong doing. As to the legality of Bulgaria’s title to Western Thrace, he would point out that Romania’s title to Southern Dobrudja is equally good, yet the American Delegation wished to restore South Dobrudja to Bulgaria. The same legal argument could not justify the retention of Western Thrace by Bulgaria and the cession to her of Southern Dobrudja. If Bulgaria were given Southern Dobrudja, Eastern and Western Thrace and were only asked to contribute two and a half billion francs, this would amount to an invitation to begin again. As to a lasting peace, when Bulgaria possessed Western Thrace she was not prevented from embarking on an aggressive war. She was not more or less likely to do so after being deprived of it.

S Tittoni says that the population in Western Thrace is mainly Turkish and Greek. In Eastern Thrace to the south it was Greek and to the North Bulgarian. Assuming, therefore, the Enos-Midia line to be a line beyond which neither Bulgaria nor Greece could extend, he thought that a line dividing Eastern Thrace according to the national distribution of the population would be the most satisfactory.

M Tardieu says that in 1913 when the Bulgars possessed Dédéagatch they had wearied all the chancelleries of Europe to obtain Cavalla, as they considered Dédéagatch an inadequate harbor. It is unlikely that if left with this port only they would be satisfied.

M Laroche observes that they had gone to war to obtain Cavalla.

S Tittoni said that if they had had Cavalla they would have made war to obtain Salonika.

M Clemenceau said that according to S Tittoni’s plan Adrianople would be Bulgarian instead of being either Greek or part of the territory of Constantinople.

S Tittoni said that Adrianople was on the line of demarcation between the Bulgarian and Greek populations. It might be assigned to either. This is a question for the Experts to decide.

Mr Balfour asked whether the Italian Delegation had ever made this proposal in the Commissions.

S Tittoni said that the Italians had always supported the American view.

Mr Coolidge observes that the railway to Dédéagatch had been snatched from Bulgaria by Turkey after her defeat by the Greeks and Serbs. At that time the Great Powers had protested very strongly, and among them Great Britain.

S Tittoni corroborates this statement.

Mr White explains that he is not so hard-hearted as Mr Balfour has made him appear. He thought that the Greeks had withdrawn from Western Thrace rather because they feared massacre, than because they had suffered it. Doubtless the Bulgarians would withdraw from any territory invaded by Greeks as a consequence of similar apprehensions. In the East fluctuations of population commonly had this cause. As to Dédéagatch, he thought it could be converted into a good port. Access to the Mediterranean from a port in the Black Sea is obviously more circuitous and less desirable. He wishes to state that at the instance of his colleagues he had communicated with President Wilson and explained the difficulty in which the Council found itself. President Wilson, as a possible way out of the difficulty, had suggested the following:

“Bulgaria recognizes the right of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to transfer to the proposed International State of Constantinople the territory of Bulgarian Thrace as herein defined, and agrees to accept and cooperate in the effectuation of such transfer whenever it is made.”

M Clemenceau says that if the territory of the future State of Constantinople is increased to this extent, its attribution to any mandatory power will become impossible. There might be agreement if only Constantinople and the Straits were in question, but he sees no chance, if large territories are added.

M Tardieu said that Internationalized States had been invented for a definite general advantage. The State of Constantinople is considered desirable in order to safeguard the freedom of the Straits. If a large hinterland, including Thrace, were added to it, the result would be that it would include 760,000 Turks, 650,000 Greeks, and 75,000 Bulgars. On what pretext could a mass of 650,000 Greeks at the very frontier of Greece be made subject to another State? This would clearly be contrary to the principle of nationality adopted by the Conference. He thinks perhaps the experts might attempt to work out S Tittoni’s idea.

S Tittoni says that his proposal is based entirely on ethnographical considerations.

M Clemenceau says that in his opinion it was impossible to dissociate Eastern and Western Thrace.

Mr White says that he cannot decide without further reference to President Wilson.

M Tardieu says that the future State of Constantinople could be easily imagined if it were restricted to the Straits, the Sea of Marmara and the populations who made their living by the sea, but if large territories are added to it, and Adrianople and Maritza had to be administered as well, the task would be impossible.

M Clemenceau says that a very clear and restricted program must be made for Constantinople, otherwise no mandatory would be found.

M Tardieu says that the proposal made by President Wilson shows one concession at least to the opinion of the other Delegations. It denies Bulgaria direct access to the Aegean. He takes note of this concession. S Tittoni’s proposal gave Western Thrace to Greece, some of Eastern Thrace to Bulgaria, and the rest to Greece, making both Greece and Bulgaria coterminous with the new State of Constantinople. He thinks that it might be possible to work on this thesis, and to obtain some agreement.

Mr Polk asks how many Greeks inhabit the part of Thrace south of the Enos-Midia line.

M Tardieu said that there were 420,000 Turks and 408,000 Greeks, and 5,000 Bulgarians.

Mr Balfour observes that the Enos-Midia line had been introduced into the discussion not as the final boundary of the State of Constantinople, but as the limit beyond which the recommendations of the Commission on Greek and Bulgarian Affairs should not extend.

S Tittoni said that the Enos-Midia line had been invented at the London Conference of 1913. Had not the Bulgarians attacked the Greeks and Serbians, this line would have become a final frontier line.

Mr Polk suggested that the discussion be adjourned.

(It is decided to adjourn the discussion on Bulgarian frontier to Saturday, August 2nd, at 15:30. The Experts are requested to consider the suggestion made by S Tittoni, for an ethnographical partition of Eastern Thrace, and to submit a report in time for the Meeting on Saturday.)


2. General Belin reads the report of the Military and Naval Representatives.

(After some discussion of the implications of Article 101 and 103 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, the following resolution is adopted:

“Respecting the report of the Military Representatives on the Military and Naval measures to be taken for the occupation of the territories of Danzig and Memel, it is decided:

1) To forbid Polish forces from entering the territory of the free city of Danzig.

2) To compel the evacuation of German forces from this territory.

3) To postpone the question of military forces to occupy the territory.

4) To ask the Commission on Baltic Affairs to examine the question of the occupation of Memel.

It is further decided that during the intermediate period pending the nomination of a High Commissioner by the League of Nations, the Commission provided for in Article 101 of the Treaty, should receive instructions to report to the Council of any measures necessary for the maintenance and order in the territory of the free City of Danzig.”)


3. The Council has before it a request from the Swedish Legation to be heard on the subject of the Åland Islands by the Peace Conference.

(After a short discussion it is decided:

That a favorable answer should be given to the request of the Swedish Legation for a hearing by the Conference regarding the Swedish views on the question of the Åland Islands.)

(The Meeting then adjourns).