100 Years Ago Today

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, September 6, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

7th September 1919

Poster for the Canadian National Exhibition celebrating victory in the Great War.


NZ Observer - "Musketry Instructor: Now, boys, remember your rifle is your best friend. Treat it as you would your wife and wipe it over with an oily rag every morning."

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, September 7, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

8th September 1919

General Pershing arrives in New York City September 8, 1919. A view of the pier, decorated in honor of the returning Commanding General of the U.S. Army, General John J. Pershing. At the side, Red Cross workers are lined up to salute the General as he leaves the USS Leviathan.


A crowd outside a factory at Quebec welcomes the Duke of Windsor, (1894 - 1972), then Prince of Wales, during his royal tour. The Duke of Windsor reigned as King Edward VIII until 1936.


Ship Losses:

Arag (Russian Navy White Movement) Russian Civil War: The gunboat was sunk off Lagan Island by mines. 4 crewmen killed.
Casco (United States) The 93-ton schooner was wrecked on the southeast coast of King Island in the Bering Sea during a gale. Her wreck sank in 12 feet (3.7 m) of water on 10 September and broke up completely in a gale on 23 September.
Valbanera (Spain) 1919 Florida Keys hurricane: The passenger ship foundered off Havana, Cuba with the loss of all 488 passengers and crew.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, September 8, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council has before it a Note from the Drafting Committee asking for instruction as to the language in which the Conventions replacing the Acts of Berlin and Brussels should be drafted.

M Clemenceau points out that the Acts of Berlin and Brussels had been in French, and that some of their provisions were maintained in the new Conventions.

Mr Balfour says that in view of this he agrees that the new Convention ought to be in French.

Mr Polk agrees.

S Tittoni also agrees.

(It is decided that the Conventions replacing the Acts of Berlin and Brussels should be drafted in French.)


2. M Clemenceau says that the Germans had first asked the Conference to send Commissions of Control to Germany before the Treaty came into force. Consequently advance detachments had been appointed and each of the Allied Powers had been represented in each section. The Germans had then sent a request that the despatch of the Commissions should be delayed as they appeared to them to be too numerous. The Council then decided to postpone the sending of the advance detachments. Now it appears that the Germans withdrew their objection to the numbers and desired the Commissions to be sent at once. He suggests that the Commissions should accordingly be sent immediately and be composed in the manner already decided on. He was informed that General Nollet was ready to begin.

M Polk says that it is understood that the United States cannot make appointments for the present.

(It is decided that the advance delegations of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should be sent to Germany forthwith.)


3. The Council has before it a reply from the German Delegation regarding the ultimatum of the Conference and a draft answer to this reply.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks the draft a somewhat rough answer. It is the general desire that Germany should carry out the Treaty, but no one constitution wishes her to do so under compulsion, whether by arms or by blockade. This would be a misfortune not only for Germany but for the Allied and Associated Powers. Germany should be given every chance of behaving reasonably. The draft says very truly that the German Government is not the final authority on the interpretation of the Treaty, but the same might be alleged against the Allied and Associated Powers. The interpretation of the Treaty has now become a subject for jurists. He does not think that the Council is the final authority regarding its interpretation.

S Tittoni observes that two points in the German reply had not been met in the answer. The first was a legal point. Article 178 of the German Constitution declares that no Article in the Constitution should affect the Treaty of Peace. Article 61 is thereby rendered ineffective. The second was, that in threatening the extension of the occupation, the Allies are not taking their stand on any Article in the Treaty. Neither of these points were met in the draft reply.

M Clemenceau says that this had been deliberately done. He does not think that either of these points requires a reply. It is hardly tolerable that Germany should violate the Treaty and that the Allies should remain bound by it. The question of legality should have been raised when the letter had been drafted on behalf of the Conference to the German Government. It is impossible now to withdraw from the position then taken up. He reminds the Council that the Austrians are at the moment represented in the German Assembly. This cannot be tolerated. He is persuaded that if the Allies threaten to carry out what they have indicated, they would not be forced to execute their threats. Austria has not yet signed the Treaty and is not, therefore, bound in the same way as Germany, but it must be remembered that she protested against the clause that prevented her from joining Germany.

Mr Polk says that he agrees with M Clemenceau’s contention that the Allies cannot withdraw from the position they had taken up. He thinks that perhaps it might be as well to begin by answering the German arguments. When this has been done the Council can be as stiff as it wishes. He would like to consult the Jurists in respect to the first part of the answer.

M Clemenceau says that he is quite ready to adopt this method and asks Mr Polk to prepare the draft.

(It is agreed that a new draft answer to the German reply concerning Article 61 of the German Constitution should be prepared by Mr Polk and submitted to the Council on the following day.)


4. The Council has before it a letter from Mr Pachitch, dated September 4th, 1919, protesting against certain of the provisions in the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

M Berthelot says that the protest of the Delegation is a long one. The main desideratum is that no mention in the preamble should be made of the year 1913, in order that Serbian sovereignty over territories acquired in Balkan wars should not be limited. The argument is that, as Serbia had settled her own affairs then without the help of Europe, the settlement she had made ought not to be called in question now.

S Tittoni asks whether this request applies to a matter of form only or to a matter of substance. If only a matter of form was involved, he would agree. Otherwise, the effect would be that minority clauses would not apply to Macedonia.

M Pichon observes that they would not apply to the part of Macedonia acquired by Serbia in the Balkan War.

S Tittoni reminds the Council that the Commission had recommended the appointment of a Commissioner to reside in Macedonia on behalf of the League of Nations the Council had decided against this. It is now asked to go much further in the opposite direction and to exclude Macedonia from the protection of the League of Nations. This, he thinks, is not acceptable.

M Berthelot says that, if the passage of the preamble objected to by the Serb-Croat Delegation were suppressed, the change would be a matter of form, but the change carried with it an alteration to Article 9, the last paragraph of which would have to be struck out. This would have to be a substantial change. It is questionable, however, whether the Conference could enact any measures affecting the pre-war acquisitions of any State. If the last paragraph of Article 9 were suppressed, some other Article would be inserted to make the language and educational clauses applicable to Macedonia. This however represented intrusion in another form. It is questionable whether such intrusion was legitimate.

M Pichon observes that when the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 had been called in question in relation to the Romanians, S Tittoni had declared that the Conference had no power to modify pre-war Treaties.

S Tittoni explains he had maintained the Treaty could not be abrogated, but that the Conference was free to introduce stipulations into its Treaties even in contradiction of the terms of that Treaty, by which they were not themselves bound. He observes that the Commission had unanimously decided that protection for minorities was necessary in Macedonia.

M Clemenceau says that he did not feel bound by the unanimous decision of the Commission. In his opinion, the Council could attach conditions to territory which it gave; it could not attach any conditions to territory previously acquired. He suggests that M Berthelot should draft the additional clauses intended to preserve the linguistic and educational guarantees of the population in Macedonia before discussing the matter any further.

S Tittoni says that the view of the British Delegate on the Committee had been that the Balkan settlement in 1913 was not final until its recognition by the Powers. This recognition had not taken place, as negotiations on the subject had been interrupted by the outbreak of the Great War.

M Berthelot says that the Treaty of Bucharest is valid, even without a recognition by the Great Powers.

S Tittoni observes that recognition is necessary to give the Treaty full authority from a diplomatic point of view. He reminds the Council of its previous conclusion, that the protection of minorities was even more necessary in Macedonia than elsewhere. It is now suggested that Macedonia should be excluded from the operation of the Treaties intended to protect minorities.

M Clemenceau says that the problem is exactly as S Tittoni states. It is for this reason that he would like to see a new formula before continuing the discussion of the question.

Mr Balfour says that the discussion is concerned with two questions - one relating to international law and practice, and the other to the situation of the Macedonian population. In regard to the first, he thinks there was no great difference of opinion between the French and British Delegations. Both think that the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 is not a completed transaction until ratified by the Great Powers. This ratification had not taken place because of the outbreak of the Great War. The French Delegation recognizes that the general situation in the Balkans, especially regarding financial arrangements, was not final before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. The French and British Delegations are, therefore, in accord in thinking that the Great War had cut into the necessary completion of the Balkan settlement. This appears to afford some justification to those who thought that on the legal point, the Conference has a right to alter what had been agreed on in the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913. On the other point, he thinks that all are entirely agreed. Special protection for the Macedonians is necessary. Some means might be found of affording the Macedonians special protection in a manner satisfactory to the Powers, but it is unlikely to be satisfactory to Serbia. The Serbians think that all they had acquired in 1913 should be outside the control of the Powers. The Powers think that the considerable accession of territory to Serbia and the special difficulties of Macedonia justified them in exercising control.

M Clemenceau says that all he desires is to find a text which might be acceptable. The Minority Clauses are unpopular and must be made palatable by some concession.

Mr Polk says that the Council had previously concluded that Macedonia requires a special guarantee.

M Berthelot says it will be very difficult to find a formula reconciling

(a) The absence of reference to 1913, and

(b) Special protection for the Macedonians. As the Treaty now stands, the Serbians will probably refuse to sign on the following Wednesday. He, therefore, suggests that he be authorized to have an interview with Mr Vesnitch. If Mr Vesnitch agrees to a compromise, the situation might be saved. If not, the reference to 1913 could be preserved, and if the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation refused to sign the Treaty with Austria, the risk must be run. As to the minor points raised in the letter, he suggests that the Committee be allowed to dispose of them.

Mr Polk suggests that the compromise, as suggested by M Berthelot, should, when drafted, be submitted to the Committee also.

M Berthelot points out that the Delegation also asked for a modification of Article 11. He does not think this could be accepted, and he suggests that the request be refused.

M Clemenceau says that this might be considered on the following day, together with the other points raised on the subject.

(It is decided that M Berthelot should consult with M Vesnitch as to a formula, affording protection to the population of Macedonia, in a manner acceptable to the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation. This formula, if agreed on, should be submitted to the Council after consultation with the Committee on New States, to which the other points raised in M. Patchitch’s letter were also referred.)


5. M Clemenceau says that he has just received a letter from the Romanian Delegation, offering to sign the Treaty with Austria, with a reservation, regarding Article 60, concerning minorities, transit and trade.

Mr Balfour asks whether any Power can sign a Treaty with reservations.

M Clemenceau says that this had not been permitted in the case of the Treaty with Germany. He thinks it is necessary that a Power should sign, or should not sign.

M Pichon observes that Article 60, which he read, covers the whole case of the protection of minorities everywhere.

M Clemenceau suggests that the substitution of the expression “League of Nations” for the expression “Principal Allied and Associated Powers” might perhaps induce the Romanians to be more tractable. If so, he would adopt the alteration. The Romanian argument is that if each of the Allied and Associated Powers considered itself the protector of minorities in Romania, there will be no end to their troubles. If, on the other hand, the League of Nations is the only Court of Appeal, the matter could be settled without repeated diplomatic interventions at Bucharest.

Mr Balfour observes that if the words “Principal Allied and Associated Powers” are deleted, and the words “League of Nations” introduced, Article 60 would stipulate that there should be a Treaty with the League of Nations. This appears to be impossible.

S Tittoni says that he understands the Clauses for the protection of minorities had been formulated by the Conference, and accepted by the Poles, Serbs and Czechs in the Treaties signed with these small States. The League of Nations had been introduced to supervise the execution, but the clauses had been framed by the Allied and Associated Powers and the Treaties had been signed with them. If so, it is hardly possible to mention clauses to be framed by the League of Nations, which did not yet exist, seeing that the clauses had already been framed by the Allied and Associated Powers. He thinks Romania must accept the clauses as laid down, but that she might be asked to accept the supervision of the League of Nations for the execution of these clauses. Since the other small States had agreed, Romania must also agree.

M Pichon points out that Romania would only acquire the Bukovina from Austria. The area she is likely to obtain from Hungary, i.e. Transylvania, is far bigger. If Article 60 in the Treaty with Austria is confined to the Bukovina, possibly Romania would accept. At all events, she would be on worse ground for refusing.

S Tittoni said that if this would induce Romania to sign the Treaty with Austria, the expedient might be accepted.

M Pichon says that he is not certain that this will induce Romania to sign.

Mr Polk says that he thinks an exception in favour of Romania cannot be made. Poland had signed the minority Treaty, in spite of its extreme unpopularity in Poland. Mr Paderewski had overcome great opposition before he was able to sign it. If Romania were now allowed to evade a similar Treaty, Mr Paderewski and his country would feel that they had been treated unjustly.

Mr Balfour agrees. He thinks that Poland deserves far better of the Conference than Romania.

M Clemenceau says that Mr Polk’s argument concerning Mr Paderewski and Poland is very strong. If Romania will not sign, he would like to know what effect this would produce on the rest of the Treaty.

S Tittoni asks whether the Minority Clauses for Romania are the same as those for the other new States.

M Berthelot says that the clauses are the same for all. There is a special clause for the protection of Jews in Romania, and this clause also applied to Poland.

(It is decided to consult the Drafting Committee on the legal issues involved.)

(The Members of the Drafting Committee now enter the room.)

M Clemenceau asked M Fromageot what legal effect would result from the absence of Romanian signature to the Treaty. Romania is unwilling to sign the Treaty without making a reservation on Article 60. The Council is unwilling to allow her to sign with a reservation. What, then, was the situation, for Romania, should her signature be refused, and for the powers that do sign?

M Fromageot says that if Romania does not sign, she would not be a party to the Treaty, could claim no advantages under it, and be made subject to no obligations established by it.

Mr Balfour asks whether Romania would still be at war with Austria.

M Fromageot says that war can cease without a Treaty, just as it can begin without a formal declaration. War is a state of fact. War, for instance, had ceased between France and Mexico without a Treaty.

M Clemenceau asks what will happen to the Bukovina.

M Fromageot says that, according to his personal opinion, Romania can claim no rights over the Bukovina on the ground of a Treaty she did not sign.

M Clemenceau said that the Romanians would doubtless stay in the country without the consent of the Powers. He asks whether she could acquire any financial or economic rights.

M Fromageot says that no such rights can be acquired under the Treaty, if Romania does not sign it.

Mr Balfour asks whether Austrian rights in the Bukovina would be extinguished.

M Fromageot says that there is an article requiring Austria to give up her rights in the Bukovina. This article would stand, even though Romania did not take up the inheritance. It might, perhaps, be stipulated that the abandonment of the rights in the Bukovina be made in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers, as it was clear that none but a signatory to the Treaty could acquire rights transferred by it.

Mr Balfour asks whether it would be possible to adopt the suggestion of substituting the League of Nations for the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, as it is their supervision that Romania appears to resent.

Mr Hurst points out that if the League of Nations is substituted for the Allied and Associated Powers, the question regarding the protection of minorities would come before the Council of the League. By the constitution of the League, Romania, if concerned, will have the right to be present in the Council. As no decision of the Council is operative without unanimity, the mere presence of Romania would secure no interference with her policy.

S Tittoni points out that a similar difficulty will arise in respect of the Treaty with Hungary. Romania might be satisfied with the actual possession of the Bukovina and Transylvania without a title de jure to either, because she might argue that neither Austria nor Hungary will be able for a long time to dispute her possession. But in the case of Bessarabia, unless she acquires treaty rights, it must be clear to her that Russia, once she was restored to power, would certainly wish to regain the country. In this instance, Romania would see that she required the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers or the League of Nations. This might be pointed out to her, and she might be influenced by this argument.

Mr Polk says that he is not prepared to bribe Romania into good behavior. He does not think that the Council has fallen so low as to be forced to resort to such tactics.

S Tittoni points out that he would not have made his proposal unless he had regarded Romania as having a good title to Bessarabia.

Mr Polk says that he quite understands this.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks the proper course is to make no mention of Bessarabia at all. He will confine himself to reasoning with the Romanians, and pointing out that Poland, Serbia, Czechoslovakia, had all accepted similar treaties. This would put the Romanians on bad ground for maintaining their refusal.

M Clemenceau says that it might be added that Romania had failed to carry out what she had undertaken to do under the Treaty of Berlin of 1878.

Mr Polk thinks it might be stipulated that the surrender of the former Duchy of Bukovina should be made in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr Balfour says this will do away with any necessity for a letter to the Romanian Delegation.

Mr Polk agrees that this might be reserved for use in case the Romanians refuse to sign. The change might be made by a special protocol added to the Treaty.

M Clemenceau says he thinks the Romanians will be sufficiently punished if they do not sign, by the effects of their not being parties to the Treaty.

Mr Balfour says that he will accept any suggestion which does not involve a postponement of the signature of the Treaty.

S Tittoni says that he will adhere to Mr Polk’s suggestion, if there is the time to spare. He points out that there is yet time to penalize Romania in the Treaty with Hungary, from which she expects to receive Transylvania.

M Fromageot points out that a special protocol could be contrived, permitting Romania to sign the Treaty with Austria, after the other Powers.

Mr Polk says that he has received visits from some of the Romanian Delegation. He thinks that the Romanians wished to be conciliatory, but at the bottom of their attitude was a sense of grievance that they were not obtaining their due share of reparations. They think that they are faring less well than France and Belgium in this respect.

M Clemenceau says he thinks the best suggestion to adopt is Mr Balfour’s, namely, that an answer be sent to the Romanians, arguing with them that Poland and the other new States had accepted the minority clauses. As to the Bukovina, Transylvania and Bessarabia, he thinks it would be better to say nothing, but to wait and see what action the Romanians would take.

(It is accordingly decided that no alterations should be made in Article 60 of the Treaty with Austria, and that Mr Balfour should prepare a draft answer to the Roumanian Delegation, in the spirit of the above discussion, and that the draft should be submitted to the Council on the following day.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

9th September 1919

Anti-Bolshevik armoured train heads toward the front in northern Russia.
[url=https://postimages.org/]

Spanish steamship Valbanera sinks in a hurricane on its way to Havana, Cuba, resulting in the deaths of all 488 passengers and crew.


Boston police officers go on strike, resulting in an outbreak of crime and violence in the city, with 9 dead. Massachusetts State Guard is sent in to restore order.


President Wilson smiles from a train in St. Paul, Minnesota on September 9, 1919, during a train trip across the country to promote the League of Nations. The trip proved too exhausting for Wilson, and he suffered a stroke soon after returning to Washington.


Ship Losses:

USS St. Sebastian (United States Navy) Florida Keys hurricane: The patrol vessel was wrecked at Key West, Florida in a hurricane.
USS Sylvia (United States Navy) The patrol vessel was wrecked at Key West in a hurricane.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, September 9, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council takes note of Mr Polk’s draft reply to the German Government’s letter of 5th September.

Mr Polk says that he had referred the matter to Dr. Scott, who has consulted with the legal experts of the Drafting Committee, and prepared the note. It appears that, in the opinion of these highly qualified jurists, the German answer had been technically correct. It therefore seems to him that, before a further contention were raised with the German Government in a subsequent letter, the cooperation of the legal experts should be called for, in order to avoid making a legal mistake. He understands that the letter drafted by him had not been agreed to by M Fromageot, although the other jurists of the Drafting Committee had been satisfied with it. He therefore requests that the Drafting Committee should be called in to advise the Council. He had only been given his draft a few minutes before entering the Council Chamber, and had, therefore, not had time to study it closely. He is not entirely satisfied with the form of the letter.

(At this point M Fromageot, Mr Hurst, Dr Scott, S Ricci-Busatti and Mr Nagaoka enter the room.)

M Clemenceau explains to the Drafting Committee the problem before the Council, and briefly recites the events that had led up to the problem now before the Conference. He further explains the main points in the Notes of the Allied and Associated Governments, and of the German Government, on the subject of the violation of the Peace Treaty. Drawing attention to the proposed extension of military occupation on the right bank of the Rhine, and to the legal arguments that had been brought forward against such a measure, he said that he would rather resign his post than consent to France being left by the American and British Governments to enforce unassisted the provisions of the Peace Treaty. America, Great Britain and France have all demobilized and that was inevitable, but, if Great Britain and America refused to support France at the present juncture, the whole weight of enforcing the Peace Treaty would be thrown on his country, and a position would result which would be quite intolerable to him.

M Fromageot says that he had not agreed with the opinion of his colleagues on the legal issue for the following reasons. In a letter, dated 2nd September, Germany had been called upon by the Allied Council to make special enactments by the Entente Governments whereby Article 61 of the Constitution, inviting Austria to participate in the legislation, and administration, of the German Reich, should be rendered null and void. The demand of the Allied and Associated Powers had been clear; they had insisted upon the abrogation and nullification of Article 61. In their reply dated 5th September, the German Government, whether knowingly or not he could not say, had repeated the request of the Allied and Associated Governments, but had repeated it in such a way as to introduce into it certain modifications. Instead of undertaking to make Article 61 of the German Constitution null and void, they had proposed to make it non-applicable and to give it no legal force. This was not meeting the Allied demand; for the Article in question remained part of the German Constitution, and could be made applicable, and given force later on. A mere admission of non-applicability was not what had been desired. In their letter, the German Government had given a special interpretation to Article 61 by virtue of a later Article in the same Constitution, (No. 178), which latter Article enacted, that no provision of the Peace Treaty of Versailles was affected by anything in the German Constitution. Now, the argument brought forward in this respect by the German Government might be good or might be bad. It did not appear to him to be acceptable. The conclusion could not be avoided that, if Article 61 were made non-applicable by virtue of Article 178, the argument could be reversed, and Article 178 be cancelled by Article 61. The Allied and Associated Governments had demanded the nullification of Article 61, and had threatened to take the necessary steps to force the German Government to make the necessary enactments. They had received, in reply, an interpretation, both of their original request, and of the Article at issue, by virtue of which it was alleged, that the measures foreshadowed by the Allied and Associated Governments would not be necessary. The Council might well repeat their original request, and state clearly that they were not concerned with the interpretation of the German Constitution, given in the German Government’s letter of the 5th September. He suggests, in conclusion, that the demand for nullification should be repeated in the strongest and clearest terms in any letter that might be subsequently sent to the German Government; who should also be informed that the Allies would feel themselves to be absolutely justified in taking any measures necessary to enforce their demands.

M Clemenceau asks Mr Hurst to explain his standpoint to the Council.

Mr Hurst says that he could only express a personal opinion, because the matter had merely been the subject of conversation and discussion in the Drafting Committee, and had never been officially referred to them. He quite feels that the prestige of the Allied and Associated Governments demand that the German Government should be told that steps would be taken to enforce compliance with the demands that had been made to them. But a further question arises, which is whether the admission of the German Government, in their letter of 5th September, is not sufficient to afford the necessary satisfaction to the Council. The German Government had clearly admitted that Article 61 of their Constitution had no legal force. He asked whether there is a sufficient difference between this admission and the demands of the Council to justify further action. Would it not be enough to tell the German Government that their admission of the non-validity of Article 61 had been noted and put on record. Another point arises, which is that, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, Austria could be admitted into the German Reich, subject to the consent of the League of Nations. This shows that the Peace Treaty itself does actually leave a means open to Austria, whereby she might eventually become incorporated into Germany. It might be argued that the Allied demand for the nullification of Article 61 was in contradiction to the terms of the Peace Treaty, which they themselves had drawn up. The real protection of the Allied and Associated Powers against an increase of strength to Germany, by virtue of the incorporation of Austria, came from the terms of the Austrian Peace Treaty. After signature, Austria would bind herself not to participate in the affairs of another State and to regard her independence as inalienable. This undertaking by Austria, combined with the admission contained in the German note, would, in his opinion, sufficiently protect the prestige of the Council, and the interests of the Allied and Associated Governments.

M Clemenceau says that he wishes to draw the attention of the Council to three points, which he regards as of primary importance.

(1) He does not see why an Article in the Peace Treaty with Austria, preventing that country from joining Germany, is of any protection, unless the analogous article in the German Peace Treaty were upheld and enforced. What is good for one Treaty is good for another Treaty. Why should an Article in the Austrian Treaty be of any greater protection than an Article in the German Treaty?

(2) The German Government is not qualified to interpret the German Constitution. In his opinion, no Government has such a right.

(3) He wishes to draw attention to a further Article in the German Constitution (No. 112), by virtue of which it had been enacted that no German citizen should be surrendered to a foreign government for trial or punishment. This article, taken in conjunction with No. 61, seemed to him to show a deliberate plan to violate the Peace Treaty; and this raises at once a very grave issue. He desires to assure the Council, that he had no wish to force quarrels; it was not in his character to do so. He is none the less deeply convinced that the German Government will use every means in its power to avoid carrying out the Peace Treaty fully. This is, after all, only to be expected; since such a line of conduct was conformable to the dictates of human nature. The Allied and Associated Governments were in danger, by the fact that demobilization had been forced upon them irresistibly by public opinion in their own countries. But Germany is attempting to reassemble her forces, and would certainly continue to try to do so. He feels that he is, at that moment, testing the spirit of the Entente. If, after making a specific demand, the Council were to allow their orders not to be complied with, a succession of events would take place, which would bring about a very grave state of affairs. By trying to avoid a small crisis at the present moment, the Allied and Associated Governments would inevitably provoke a much graver one later on, at a date which the Germans themselves would choose.

Mr. Balfour says that the decision, which the Council was called upon to take was one of the utmost gravity and importance. He agrees with much that the President has said; but has a few remarks to offer, and a separate suggestion of his own to add. He has listened to M Fromageot’s contention with interest, although he could not quite agree with it. He has understood him to say that it lay with the Allied and Associated Powers to say exactly what the Peace Treaty of Versailles meant. But it appeared to him (the speaker) that although the Allied and Associated Powers had a perfect right, originally, to insert whatever clauses they chose into the Peace Treaty, and to disregard, if they wished to do so, any complaint that the German Government might have to make upon the projected provisions, this original liberty of action did not so extend itself, after signature, as to give freedom of interpretation to the Allied and Associated Powers. Once the Treaty is signed, it seems to him that it becomes a bi-lateral agreement, and that each separate signatory to the document could argue with other signatories on equal terms. It is none the less clear to him that the persons who had framed the German Constitution had deliberately attempted to draw it up in such a way as openly to challenge and possibly to violate, the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Their intentions might be described in English slang as a “try on”. Article 112, to which the President had just called the attention of the Council, appeared to be a far worse violation of the Peace Treaty, than the Article upon which there had just been an exchange of notes. He felt amazed that not one of the Entente Governments had been told earlier that the new German Constitution was violating the Peace Treaty of Versailles, both in letter and in spirit.

He fully agrees with the President of the Council that a moment will arise, when the issue between the Entente and the German Government would be quite clear, and would have to be fought out by argument, or, possibly, by arms, or by the re-imposition of a blockade. But he does not know whether the Entente Powers are choosing a judicious ground for a dispute with Germany, if they forced a crisis on the debatable subject of the extent to which an invitation to Austria to join the German Reich, had violated the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Two most able and qualified men had just given divergent opinions on the legal issue. The differences of opinion, of which the Council had just taken note, would be repeated in the press of all European countries; if the present litigation between the Entente and Germany results in the forcible occupation of Frankfort. As soon as that important German base had been occupied by Entente troops, the press of Europe would pour out cataracts of legal and quasi-legal arguments; public opinion will take sides for and against the Entente, and, though some sections of public opinion would doubtless approve the action taken, there would be others which would bitterly dispute it. He suggests, therefore, that the conflict should be deferred, not because the Allied and Associated Governments doubt the justice of their contentions, but simply because they were not opening the conflict from an absolutely advantageous position. He proposes that a letter should be sent to the German Government, telling them that, in the opinion of the Allied & Associated Governments, two articles of the German Constitution violated the Peace Treaty of Versailles, and that, although Article 178 of the same Constitution, declaring that no provisions contained therein violated the Peace Treaty might absolve them, any argument based on such ground appeared wholly unsatisfactory to the Entente Governments. The time will soon arrive when the intentions of Germany with regard to the Peace Treaty would be absolutely clear. But so long as the Council were only concerned with a prospective agreement between Germany and Austria, requiring the active co-operation of the latter power, before it could be effected, the issue before it is doubtful and unsatisfactory. On the other hand, Article 112 of the German Constitution, declaring that no German citizen could be subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign court, would, in a very few days, bring about a decisive issue. If this article is quoted in reply to a demand for the surrender of officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, there would be no disagreement among jurists, who would be unanimous in thinking that the provisions of the Treaty were being defied and violated. As soon as the German Government should refuse to surrender military criminals, the Entente Governments will say that Article 178 had been drafted in order to throw dust in their eyes and deceive them as to the real intentions of the German Government and the German people. If Frankfort is occupied as a reply to such an open act of defiance, no argument will be possible, and the action of the Entente Governments would receive the moral support of all mankind. He therefore suggests, in conclusion, that a letter of warning, couched in the sternest language, should be sent to the German Government, telling them that, in the opinion of the Allied & Associated Governments, Article 178 of the German Constitution is binding upon them, and that they were expected to carry out, to the letter, the terms of the Peace Treaty signed by their plenipotentiaries, ratified by their Parliament, and agreed to, by the express provisions of their own Constitution.

Mr Polk says that he agrees that a struggle with Germany for the enforcement of the Peace Treaty is inevitable. The Germans will, some time or another, make an effort to avoid its provisions; but he thinks that the Council ought to choose its ground, so as to be quite certain that it is technically, that is to say legally, right. In view of the legal argument advanced by the German Government, to the effect that Article 178 of the German Constitution made Article 61 of no effect, he thought that any further reply sent by the Council ought to be carefully studied by jurists before dispatch. Until such an examination could be made he feels bound to withhold his final opinion.

M Tardieu says that attention has been called to the divergence of opinion among the jurists. He has, however, been struck by the fact that Mr Hurst had advanced arguments far more political than legal in character. Would it not be possible to deal with the question on purely political grounds? Mr Balfour had suggested that another basis should be chosen for the conflict, but by virtue of their letter of the 2nd September, the Allied and Associated Governments had joined with the German Government on a definite issue. Would it not be possible to adhere to the line previously adopted, more particularly as the new Article to which attention had been drawn (No. 112), showed clearly that the German Government wishes, and intends, to violate the Peace Treaty as far as it could?

M Cambon says he has had a long experience of German methods, and of the mental attitude of the German people. He is convinced that if the Council allows itself to be entrapped in the meshes of legal argument, it will be giving encouragement to the German Government to advance more arguments of the same kind; and to obscure the issue, whilst they themselves pursued a persistent policy of violation, behind the cloud of dust they are throwing in the eyes of the Council. By allowing doubtful legal arguments to weigh with them, the Council will be entering on dangerous ground, and will inevitably lose its authority in the eyes of the German Government.

Dr Scott says that as Mr Hurst’s opinion does not seem to be very popular, he desires, from motives of loyalty, to say that he agrees with his colleague.

M Clemenceau says that he fully understands Mr Hurst’s argument, but that it does not weigh with him strongly, as he had asked for a legal, and not a political expression of opinion from him. But the main question before the Council, a question which should not in any way be obscured, is whether the Peace Treaty is violated by virtue of Articles 61 and 112 of the German Constitution. If the Council allows itself to be blinded by the German argument on the subject of Article 178, it would very soon lose all its authority. When the Treaty is violated by one signatory, then, inevitably, the other signatory is no longer bound. He personally has no doubt that the German Constitution does actually violate the Treaty of Versailles. The Council has forwarded certain definite demands to the Germans, who had replied by an interpretation of the Treaty, and of their own Constitution. There is no country in the world where the Government had a right to interpret the Constitution. He wishes to propose an immediate measure. Mr Balfour had said that, by waiting two or three weeks, an issue would inevitably arise. His present proposal is to demand the surrender of certain Germans guilty of breaches of the laws of war, immediately and without delay. He desires to send a letter stating: that the reply of the German Government of the 5th September is not acceptable; that the Allied and Associated Governments had taken note of another Article in the German Constitution explicitly violating the Peace Treaty; and that the immediate surrender of certain persons, mentioned by name, should be effected. He agrees with Mr Balfour that the position of the Council would be more advantageous if the conflict occurred on the subject of Article 112.

Mr Polk asks whether the surrender of certain German criminals could be demanded before the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

M Pichon says that no steps could be taken before the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

A considerable discussion then follows as to the probable date of the ratification of the Peace Treaty by France and Italy, and it is thought that this could not take place in less than a fortnight.

Mr Polk asks whether an examination of the German Constitution cannot be made, with a view to ascertaining all violation of the Peace Treaty that it might contain.

M Clemenceau says that no clearer instance of violation than that now before the Council was likely to occur again. He agrees with every word of what M Cambon had said. The Council had made a demand which had virtually been refused. He notices that all his colleagues, with the possible exception of S Tittoni, who had not yet expressed himself, are agreed that the demands of the Allies should be enforced. He therefore suggests that the whole question should be considered by every delegate, during the next twenty-four hours, and re-discussed at St. Germain, after the signature of the Peace Treaty with Austria, on the following day. If any means could be devised whereby Mr Balfour’s proposals could be connected with the present demand on the German Government, he would think such a line of action absolutely perfect.

M Tardieu draws attention to the necessity of making the Germans nullify the two Articles violating the Peace Treaty of Versailles. The best means of connecting Mr Balfour’s proposals with the demands previously made probably consisted in insisting on the nullification of the two Articles objected to.

Mr Polk said that certain political demands had been made to Germany, and it is evident that the German Government must be compelled to comply. He proposed to refer the question to the Drafting Committee, to see whether the legal and political sides of the question could not be reconciled. The Committee could prepare a report and submit it to the Council at their meeting at St. Germain on the following day. In conclusion, he emphasizes the importance of being absolutely sure of the legal justification for any argument that might be brought forward in the next note to the German Government.

M Clemenceau says that he could not see any legal difficulty, since the German Government has no right to interpret its own Constitution.

Mr Balfour says that doubtless the President of the Council was a better judge of that matter than he was himself. Great Britain is protected against interpretations of her Constitution, by the fact that it had never been defined in writing. On the other hand, the Council has been interpreting the German Constitution in the notes sent to the German Government, and it seemed to him, in consequence, that the Germans have an equal right to do what the Allies themselves are doing.

S Tittoni says that in view of the fact that the Council was called upon to take action, on account of the violation of the Peace Treaty with Germany by Articles 61 and 112 of the Constitution of that country, he wished to draw attention to two points. Firstly, he agreed that Article 61 of the German Constitution absolutely violated the Peace Treaty. Secondly, with regard to Article 112, he thinks that a reply that might possibly be made later on by the German Government ought to be considered before-hand. The Germans might quite well admit that the Allies had a right to demand the surrender of certain persons guilty of offences defined in the Peace Treaty. But such an admission on their part might be made without abrogating Article 112 of their Constitution. When once the surrender of certain specified criminals had been made by the Germans, these latter might be justified in maintaining, that they had complied with the special provisions of the Peace Treaty, and could, from then onward, give Article 112 full legal validity.

M Cambon says that it was not sufficient for the present German Government to say that Article 178 of the Constitution made Article 61 of no effect. The present Government might be followed by another, which would very likely maintain an opposite point of view, if it thinks the circumstances favorable for doing so.

M Clemenceau said that whilst everybody would be free to take opinions from whatever quarter they chose during the next 24 hours, he does not think that his own was likely to alter.

(It is decided that the question of the violation of the Peace Treaty by virtue of Articles 61 and 112 of the German Constitution should be discussed on the following day at St. Germain after the signature of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and that the Drafting Committee should give their opinion on the legal issues involved, to the Council.)


2. The Council takes note of the draft letter to the Romanian Delegation prepared by Mr Balfour.

(The draft submitted by Mr Balfour is accepted.


3. Mr Polk says that he has been informed by Mr Vesnitch, that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegates do not intend to sign the Peace Treaty with Austria, on account of their objection to the Minorities Clauses contained in it.

M Berthelot says that he had interviewed Mr Vesnitch at 8 p.m. on the preceding day. M. Vesnitch had said that it was impossible for him to sign the Austrian Peace Treaty without the express permission of his Government, and had added that he had previously interviewed Mr. Balfour. He had said that, if the Treaty on Minorities were to be applicable to the territories acquired in the first Balkan War, his Government would not allow him to sign. An agreement had been reached between them, whereby the Treaty in question might be made to apply to the whole of the new Serb-Croat-Slovene State. This would avoid mentioning either Macedonia, or the date 1913, in specific terms. Mr Vesnitch had promised to telegraph this proposal to his Government, and hoped to have a reply by Wednesday morning. He had told Mr Vesnitch of the grave responsibility that he would incur by not signing the Peace Treaty with Austria. Such a refusal might result in the Serb-Croat-Slovene State losing all the advantages which it stood to gain from the Peace Treaty. He had told him that it seemed hardly reasonable to resign these great advantages on account of a question of “amour propre”. It is possible that, even when the reply comes from Belgrade, it would be in the negative. The obstinacy of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegates in the matter was very great.

(A long discussion then follows as to whether the signing of the Peace Treaty with Austria should be postponed to Thursday or Friday, and it is finally decided that the signature should take place at 10.0 o’clock on Wednesday as arranged.

It is further decided that a protocol should be drafted, by virtue of which any of the high contracting parties might be allowed to sign the Peace Treaty within a period of three days.)

M Berthelot said that Mr Vesnitch had asserted that he might be able to persuade his Government to sign the Peace Treaty with Austria, if the Council sent a letter to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, expressing confidence in their liberal views, and telling them explicitly, that the Article on the subject of minorities in the Austrian Peace Treaty would be an end to their engagements in the matter. Mr Vesnitch had alleged that Mr Polk had given his approval to such a line of action.

Mr Polk says that he had interviewed Mr Vesnitch, who had explained that a letter on the lines described by M Berthelot, had been sent to the Polish Government, when they had objected to the Minorities Clauses in the Peace Treaty with Germany.

M Berthelot said that no such letter had ever been sent to the Polish Government.

Mr Polk says that he has no objection, in principle, to sending a letter of the kind, although he had not suggested any such measure or expressed approval.

S Tittoni says that he had no objection to such a letter being sent, so long as nothing contained in it could possibly modify the obligations imposed on Serbia by virtue of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and by the Minorities Treaty.


4. M Berthelot said that certain alterations in the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State had been agreed upon by the members of the Committee in New States. Treaty between the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and the Allied and Associated Powers

(It is decided that the Report of the Committee on New States on the subject of certain modifications to be introduced into the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, should be accepted.)


5. S Tittoni says that he wishes to draw the attention of the Council to the contents of a telegram received by him from General Mombelli. This officer states that three-quarters of the Hungarian people are asking for the dispatch of an Inter-Allied body of troops (who would be very well received), in order to ensure that the elections in Hungary should be carried out without intervention or disturbance. Such a measure is necessary if a stable Government, with which the Allies could treat, was ever to be set up in Hungary. The Allied troops would, moreover, be very well received.

M Clemenceau says that he cannot employ French troops on electoral business in Hungary or anywhere else. He does not think that Mr Balfour or Mr Polk could persuade their Governments to send British or American troops for such a purpose.

S Tittoni said that he had merely wished to draw attention to the question, and is quite content that every delegate, on being duly informed, should assume whatever responsibility he thought fit.


6. (It is decided that the General Act revising the General Act of Berlin, February 26th, 1885,4 and the General Act and Declaration of Brussels, July 2nd, 1890, should be accepted, with the following modification. Convention Replacing the Acts of Berlin and Brussels.

Article 11, Page 8. The words “public order and good government” should be changed to “public security and order.”)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

10th September 1919

Aftermath of War

Austria signs Peace Treaty in Paris.

Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye is signed between Austria (Republic of German-Austria) and the Allied Powers, reducing Austria to a fraction of the prewar Austro-Hungarian Empire.


A black veteran named L.B. Reed was hung in Clarksdale, Mississippi, after he was suspected of having a relationship with a white woman.

Ship Losses:

USS Coco (United States Navy) 1919 Florida Keys hurricane: The patrol vessel foundered off Key West, Florida in a hurricane.
USS Katherine K. (United States Navy) 1919 Florida Keys hurricane: The patrol vessel foundered off Key West, Florida in a hurricane.
USS Patrol No. 1 (United States Navy) 1919 Florida Keys hurricane: The patrol vessel was wrecked at Key West, Florida in a hurricane.
USS Sea Hawk (United States Navy) 1919 Florida Keys hurricane: The patrol vessel foundered off Key West, Florida in a hurricane.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, September 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Chateau Saint Germain-en-Laye, Paris, 11:15

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council takes note of the following draft resolution with regard to the Air Convention:

“That the Air Convention shall be signed with the least possible delay by the Contracting States, it being understood that it shall remain open for a period of six months for signature by such of those States as are not at present in a position to sign it.”

Mr Polk draws the attention of the Council to the fact that he is unable to sign the Air Convention on behalf of the United States at the moment. It was even possible that the United States might not be able to give its adherence to the Convention, should the American Government maintain the reservations made by the American Delegates to the clauses relating to patents and customs duties.

(The draft resolution on the subject of the Air Convention is agreed to, subject to the reservation formulated by Mr Polk, on behalf of the United States.)


2. Mr Balfour says that he has closely considered the question left over at the last meeting of the Council. He had prepared a draft note for transmission to the German Government, but was not wholly satisfied with it. The conclusion was rather long and not decisive. Mr Hurst had devised another plan, which seemed more effective than the mere despatch of a note. After reading his own draft Note he called upon Mr Hurst to explain his plan. Violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles by Virtue of Certain Articles in the German Constitution.

Mr Hurst says that he had not been able to prepare any document which could be submitted to the Council. He had, on the previous day, made out a very rough draft, and had shown it to Dr Scott. At the previous meeting he had been aware that the desire of the Council had been to formulate some plan of action, which would combine two separate ideas. Firstly, the two separate violations of the Peace Treaty should be drawn attention to. Secondly, whatever note, or communication, were sent to the Germans, they should be compelled to reply immediately. In addition to this, whatever line of action were adopted it should be of such a nature as to avoid adverse criticism in neutral countries. The solution that had seemed best to him was to collect together all the admissions made by the Germans in their letter; to draw them up in the form of a protocol, which should be presented to the Germans for signature. When this had been done, their admissions would be given legal force, and be binding upon them. The Germans had admitted that the Peace Treaty and the Constitution were not in agreement. If, when presented with this admission in proper legal form, either the German Government, or the Reichsrat, refused to ratify it, then the intentions of the Germans would be made clear. The Drafting Committee had agreed, generally, to this proposal, at their meeting. The manner in which the protocol and the note by which it was to be transmitted were to be drafted, was doubtful, and, before proceeding to work, it was necessary that his main idea should be approved.

M Clemenceau says he understands that the Japanese Representative on the Drafting Committee had a proposal of his own to make.

Mr Nagaoka then read his draft proposal.

S Tittoni said that he had understood, on the previous day, that the Council wishes to force the German Government to make a special enactment, cancelling the Articles in their Constitution that were objected to. He understood Mr Nagaoka’s proposal to consist in demanding a declaration of nullification of the Articles in question, with the addition, that the Reichsrat should itself confirm the declaration.

Mr Balfour says that the Japanese proposal effected no more than what the Germans alleged to result naturally from Article 178 of their Constitution.

M Clemenceau said that he agrees with Mr. Hurst’s proposal, which he considered to be the best solution of the difficulty. He proposed that the Drafting Committee should bring a draft legal instrument before the Council on the following day, of such a nature as to oblige the German Government to sign, in the form of a protocol, whatever they had admitted in their letter of the 5th September. The advantage of Mr. Hurst’s proposal is that the Germans would be unable to enter into lengthy negotiations. The measures proposed, therefore, seemed to him to be the wisest and the most effective possible.

Mr Polk says that he approves of Mr. Hurst’s proposal also.

M Tardieu says that the draft protocol to be prepared by Mr Hurst and the Drafting Committee would have to be sent under the cover of a letter. He thinks that some of Mr. Balfour’s arguments and phrases might be put into the covering letter with great advantage.

(It is decided that the Drafting Committee should prepare a draft protocol, giving legal force to the admissions of the German Government in their letter of 5th September, and should present it to the Council at its meeting on the following day, together with a draft letter under cover of which, the aforesaid protocol should be transmitted to the German Government.)


3. M Cambon reports the decision of the Joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees on the subject of the demarcation line to be adopted in the Teschen area, with the aid of a map. He said that the Polish Delegates had provisionally approved of the line proposed, which is ethnographically correct.

S Tittoni says that he has received a visit from Mr Benes, who had admitted the justice of the new line, from an ethnographic point of view. He, (Dr Benes) had, however, argued, that if a strict ethnographic line were to be adopted in the Teschen area, it seemed hardly fair, conjointly with such a decision, to put four millions of Ruthenes in Eastern Galicia under Polish jurisdiction. A solution might consist in making concessions to the Czechoslovaks in the Teschen area, to balance the very great political and economic advantages that were being conferred on the Poles by virtue of the Galician decision.

Mr Balfour said that he could not consider the analogy between the Galician and Teschen situations as very relevant, for two reasons;

(1) t
The solution proposed for Eastern Galicia was provisional only, and was not intended to be a permanent settlement, an

(2) the decision on the subject of Galicia had been arrived at because the Ruthenian population in that country could not stand alone. It was inevitable that the Ruthenians should eventually be placed under the rule of a non-Ruthenian State. Nothing parallel, or similar, to those considerations arose in the Teschen problem.

M Clemenceau says that the Council proposed to discuss the Teschen question, which was quite difficult enough, without the Galician problem being added to it.

Mr Polk says that Mr Benes had proposed to him a line of demarcation following the river Vistula. The line in question would, however, be quite unacceptable to the Poles; although M. Benes considered that, in proposing it, he was making concessions.

M Pichon says that the Council had heard the point of view of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegations.
The Czech Delegates had insisted that their interest in the Teschen area was centered on the coal that it contained; the Poles had asserted that their interest in Teschen was on a political basis, and was purely concerned with the Polish population in the disputed districts. It was therefore clear that the Poles were asking for population, and the Czechs for coal. A solution might be found by giving the whole of the Karwin district to the Czechs, and the indisputably Polish districts, in the remainder of the area, to the Poles. He did not think that the line proposed by the Joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees could be upheld.

Mr Polk said that, if such a line as that proposed by M Pichon were adopted, it would separate the people working in the mines from their own homes, by a national frontier.

M Clemenceau says that a situation similar to that foreseen by Mr. Polk existed in Northern France, Belgium and the Saar Basin. It had not given rise to any serious difficulties.

Mr Balfour says that the Poles regarded the Karwin Basin as a Polish district, as indeed it was. There was no serious objection to cutting the coal-field into two halves, because geological formations in other portions of the world were frequently divided politically. He was quite sure that the French frontier did not follow the geological structure of that country, in the northern districts, where the coal strata ran over into Belgium and into Germany. This fact did not, however, give rise to serious difficulties, but M Pichon’s proposal involved cutting off a Polish population from the place where it worked, and this constituted a grave danger for the future. His conviction on this point was not only that of the Expert Committees of the Peace Conference, but also that of the International Commission in Teschen, who had studied the question locally. It was very dangerous to try to improvise another solution, more particularly as the line proposed by the Joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees was really favorable to the Czechs, to whom it granted 60 per cent, of the coal produced, and 40 per cent, to the Poles. It could not possibly be said that, under such a solution, the Czechs were being deprived of coal.

M Tardieu says that it should not be forgotten, that the Poles contended, that they could not count on the Silesian coal-fields until the plebiscite in that country had been taken. This argument was ingenious, but it was none the less certain that the Poles would eventually obtain possession of the greater part of the Silesian coal-fields.

M Pichon said that the Poles had repeatedly asserted that they did not care about coal.

Mr Polk says that Dr Benes had stated to him, that either the line proposed by him (Dr Benes) should be adopted, or a plebiscite should be held in the area.

M Berthelot said that Dr Benes had stated to him, that the situation in Bohemia was now so grave that it would be preferable to the Czechoslovaks to risk a plebiscite, rather than to consent to a solution which they regarded as so hopelessly unfavorable to them, and equivalent, in their opinion, to a refusal of all their demands.

S Tittoni said that, if a plebiscite were to be held, the area would have to be divided into two portions, as he had proposed for Kadkersburg and Marburg, when these areas were under discussion.

M Berthelot said that the Czech contention was that, if they could not possess the coal, they would be dependent upon their neighbors for it, and might be cut off from their necessary supplies at a time of diplomatic tension. M Pichon’s solution gave them the coal, and the rest of the Polish population to the Poles. By adopting it, the present state of affairs would not be altered, since the coal areas were now occupied by the Czechs.

Mr Polk said that the difficulty was that, under M Pichon’s proposal, a proportion of the Polish Teschen districts would be ceded to Czechoslovakia.

M Berthelot said that the Karwin coal district could more properly be compared to the Lens, than to the Belgian, coal district, for it was concentrated in a narrow area as in the case of Lens. The original proposals of the Joint Committees had been most favorable to the Czechs, but the proposals in question had now been withdrawn. Even by accepting M Pichon’s proposal, the Poles would be given far more than they had hoped for in the first instance. If, as he now thought possible, Dr Benes could persuade his countrymen to consent to the new proposal, it was surely worth consideration.

Mr Polk says that M. Pichon’s line would place 60,000 Poles under the administration of the Czechs.

Mr Balfour said that it should not be forgotten that even the line proposed by the Joint Committees gave a considerable number of Poles to the Czechs.

M Berthelot says that Dr Benes had based a good many of his arguments on the solution to the Galician problem, contemplated by the Council. The proposed decision was very favorable to the Poles, and the impression left upon the Czechs was that, although the Council was ready to place 4 million Ruthenes under Polish jurisdiction, they were not prepared to make a concession far smaller, from an ethnographical point of view, in favour of the Czechoslovak State. This would, in consequence produce a very bad impression. Dr Benes’ attitude had been extremely moderate and conciliatory, and it would be a great misfortune if he found himself compelled to resign his post, on account of what he considered an unconciliatory attitude of the Conference. Dr Benes’ resignation would be a political consideration, not entirely relevant to the Teschen problem, but the possibility of it could not be disregarded, and ought to be duly considered.

Mr Balfour said that he understood that the line described to the Council by M. Cambon had been adopted unanimously in the Joint Committees. As M.
Berthelot had not been a member of either Committee, he regarded his proposals as interesting, but not of sufficient authority to outweigh a unanimous proposal by an Expert Committee.

M Berthelot agrees with Mr. Balfour and said that the Committees had been unanimous, but it should not be forgotten that their unanimous opinion, for the first six months, had been to adopt a solution far more favorable to the Czechs than any now proposed. They had subsequently altered their opinion, and this, when made known, would cause a bad impression in Czechoslovakia. The Committees had studied the problem from its ethnographical and economical sides, leaving out political considerations, which seemed to be for the Council to decide. The French representatives on the Joint Committee had originally objected strongly to the line reported on by M Cambon that morning, but they gave their assent to it finally, in order to facilitate a solution of some sort. The consent of the French representatives had only been given on the understanding that the Poles should be obliged, by some means or another, to grant special facilities to the Czechs with regard to the coal and to the railways.

S Tittoni said that he understood that the line described by M. Cambon would not be adopted without a special convention, assuring to the Czechs the special economic facilities described by M Berthelot.

Mr Polk says that he had understood that the Joint Committees had been unanimous. If they had not been, the question ought obviously to be referred back to them.

M Berthelot said that the Report of the Joint Committees had only been unanimous because the French representatives had given their consent, so as not to isolate themselves from their colleagues.

M Clemenceau said that he did not understand the reasons that had prompted the French representatives on the Joint Committee to give their assent to a proposal of which they did not approve. He retained opinions independently of whether they were shared by others or not. He had thought M Pichon’s proposal a very good one, and had hoped that it might have been adopted.

Mr Balfour says that he sees grave objections to the adoption of M Pichon’s solution.

M Clemenceau said that, whilst agreeing with Mr. Balfour,
he was convinced that the coal question in Teschen was the outstanding problem.

M Cambon said it should not be forgotten that, in the Karwin Basin, which M Pichon proposed to cede to Czechoslovakia, there were nearly 70,000 Poles.

M Clemenceau said that Mr Balfour could not agree with M Pichon. He, himself, could not agree with the Committee’s proposals. He therefore proposed to refer the whole question back to the Joint Committees, who, as they had already changed their minds several times, could certainly do so again, and present another report. He would never accept a line cutting a coal basin into two, for such a solution would be like placing a man on one side of a frontier, his wife upon the other, and dividing the children up between the two.

M Cambon said that he admitted M Clemenceau’s objection, but drew the attention of the Council to the fact that it was just as unwise to devise a line giving the surface of the land to one country and the subterranean deposits to another, and this seemed to be what was required of him the Joint Committees.

(It was agreed that the Teschen question should be referred back to the joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees for report on the following day.)


4. Mr Polk drws the attention of the Council to the fact that the Bulgarian Delegation was objecting to having the Peace Terms presented to them without a formal diplomatic ceremony.

M Dutasta further called attention to the fact, that the Bulgarians were asking for a period of thirty days, after the presentation of the Peace Terms, in which they might be allowed to draft their replies. Their request was based upon the plea that it would be necessary for them to take the terms to Sofia, and discuss them in the Bulgarian Sobranie.

(After some discussion, it is agreed that the Peace Terms to the Bulgarians should be formally presented to them at the Quai d’Orsay at a date which should be decided upon later.

It was further decided that the Bulgarian Delegation should be given a period of 25 days after the presentation of the Peace Terms, for the preparation of their replies.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

11th September 1919

American soldiers in Siberia with their goat mascot. They are part of the Allied intervention against the Bolsheviks.


A welcome home parade is held for General Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force, after his return from Europe.


Ship Losses:

USS Helena I (United States Navy) 1919 Florida Keys hurricane: The patrol vessel was wrecked at Key West, Florida in a hurricane.

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, September 11, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. Mr Balfour says that he wishes to draw the attention of the Council to an urgent matter. He does not suggest the matter should be discussed immediately, nor does he wish himself make any statement on the subject. He wishes to hand in a document which he had himself received on the previous day from General Seely. This document gives an alarming account of the development of aircraft industry in Germany. Internal civil aviation is being developed on an immense scale and German companies were buying up old army aeroplanes. The first difficulty which arises in this connection was whether those aeroplanes belong to the Allies or to the purchasing companies. There is the additional risk that under the guise of civil aviation Germany was merely creating a strong offensive force, more especially as civil aviation was being heavily subsidized by the Government. He suggests that the French General Staff should study this matter and in the hope that this would be done, he begged to hand the document to the Chairman. It is also worth noticing that German aircraft industry has already obtained a footing in neutral markets and it was certain that the foundation of German air power was the development of the aircraft industry. It appeared that the best military brains of Germany are being employed in the construction of aeroplanes.

M Clemenceau says that he will have the matter examined by the French General Staff.

(It is agreed that the question of aircraft construction in Germany should be reported on by Allied experts, and again brought up before the Council.)


(The Members of the Drafting Committee enter the room.)

2. Mr Hurst reads the reply to the response to Article 61 of the German Constitution.

M Clemenceau says that he had one observation to make. In the proposals made on the previous day, it had been suggested that the German Government should be given 15 days to obtain from the Legislative Assembly a repudiation of the Articles infringing the conditions of the Treaty. He does not lay any particular stress on the period of 15 days, but he think some fixed period should be laid down. If the German Delegation protests that the period allowed them as too short, and asked for an extension, he would agree to it, but he does not think it proper to leave it to them to estimate the period themselves.

Mr Hurst asks whether M Clemenceau refers to a period for the signature of the instrument itself.

M Clemenceau says that he refers to the ratification of the instrument by the German National Assembly.

Mr Balfour observes that the German Government was asked to undertake and present the instrument to the Assembly at its next Meeting.

M Clemenceau says that he would prefer, instead of the words “when it next assembles”, to say “within 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty”, that was to say, upon ratification by three of the Great Powers.

Mr Polk asks how soon the German Delegation is to sign the proposed declaration.

(It is decided to introduce into the text, the word “forthwith” in this connection.)

M Clemenceau observes that the German Delegation must have time, if they required it, to telegraph to Berlin. He also informed his colleagues of a telegram received that morning to the effect that the National Assembly was being summoned at Weimar to reconsider the provisions of the Constitution complained of. This was not official news, but informal information he had received.

(After a few slight verbal alterations, the draft reply and declaration as are accepted.)


(The Members of the Commissions on Polish and Czechoslovak Affairs enter the Room.)

3. M Cambon says that in accordance with the directions of the Council on the previous day, the two Commissions had met in the afternoon. The majority maintained their original opinions. He then reads and explained the report of the Meeting.

Mr Balfour says that he fears the result of the plebiscite in Teschen would be to deprive Czechoslovakia not of 40% of the coal, but of 100%. The territory is Polish and the Commission had attributed it to Czechoslovakia, because of the railway running through it connecting Bohemia and Slovakia. This railway would almost certainly become Polish property. Surely this is far more contrary to the interest of the Czechoslovaks than anything the Commission had proposed. Nevertheless, as Dr Benes appeared to accept a plebiscite, it must be assumed that he knows his own business best.

M Cambon says that neither Dr Benes nor Mr Dmowski could be brought to accept either of the lines suggested in the Commission. Both, however, agree to accept the plebiscite.

S Scialoja says that it is impossible for the Council to refuse the plebiscite if both claimants agreed to it.

(It is then agreed that a plebiscite should be held in the Duchy of Teschen and in the districts of Spisz and Orava in accordance with the proposals of the Joint Commissions. The detailed organization of this plebiscite is referred for examination and report to the Joint Commission.)


(At this point the members of the Labour Commission enter the room.)

4. M Clemenceau says that on the previous day he had come to an agreement with Mr Barnes. It had been agreed that the Congress should be left free to invite the attendance of the German and Austrian Delegates or not. As it was practically a foregone conclusion that the Congress would invite them to attend, the French Government would facilitate the granting of passports in anticipation to the Germans or Austrians, who might be delegated to go to Washington.

Mr Barnes says that he had received information that President Wilson was willing to invite the German and Austrian Delegates to Washington.

Mr Polk says that this is not quite correct. The President says that he was willing that the Labour Congress should decide whether or not the German and Austrian Delegates should be admitted. He, himself, as Head of the American Delegation, had undertaken that no passport difficulties would be made on the American side, to prevent the Germans and Austrians from going to Washington, in the hope of being admitted to the Labour Congress.

Mr Barnes says that he is not sure that these arrangements would be satisfactory to the Germans and Austrians.

M Clemenceau says that they should take what was being done as a sign of goodwill. He is himself making a step in the direction of conciliation, since, in the Council of Four, he had decided adversely. Now that Peace is signed, he is ready to yield to some extent. He has been assured by the French Labour Representatives that they would be satisfied with the very thing he was now offering.

S Scialoja said that Italian labor opinion required an implicit invitation to the Germans and Austrians. Otherwise, Italian working men would not attend the Congress. There were two distinct questions involved. The first was admission to the Congress and the second was admission to the International Organisation of Labour. As to the second, it must be left to the Congress to decide and each State could give its representatives instructions. The first, however, which involved the right to be heard in the Congress, could only be decided by the Council.

M Clemenceau said that nothing would ever prevail upon him to extend an invitation on behalf of the Council to German and Austrian Delegates to attend the Labour Congress. He would not submit to pressure from Italian socialism, which had been consistently against the war and pro-German.

Mr Barnes observes that the Council has already decided that Germany would be admitted to the second meeting of the Labour Congress. Consequently, Germany would, ipso facto, be let into the International Labour Organisation.

M Clemenceau says that this is no doubt the case. What he refuses to do is to invite them, in the name of the Council, to attend the Congress at Washington. He is prepared to leave the question to the Congress.

Mr Balfour says that he is of the same opinion, but he will ask Mr Barnes whether the abstention of the Italian Socialists would have any effect on Labour Organisations in other countries.

Mr Barnes says that it would have a certain effect. He had tried to anticipate it by telling British Labour Organisations that the admission of the Germans and Austrians depended upon the representation of Labour and Socialism in the Congress. This would be an inducement to Labour and Socialist representatives to attend the Congress.

Mr Polk says that he does not think the question is one the Council should decide.

S Scialoja said that he is not a defender of the Socialists. There are in Italy, as in other countries, moderate and extreme Socialists. The Italian Government wished to support the former rather than the latter. He thinks that public opinion should be made to feel that the Council is not opposing moderate demands.

M Clemenceau says that the Congress will almost certainly invite the Germans and Austrians to attend, and he will himself state in the Chamber of Deputies that the decision taken is taken in a conciliatory spirit.

(It is decided that the question of the admission of German and Austrian Delegates to the forthcoming Labour Congress at Washington should be left to the decision of that Congress. In the meantime, the Allied and Associated Governments would put no obstacles in the way of German or Austrian Delegates desirous of proceeding to Washington, in anticipation of a decision in their favour.)


5. Mr Barnes says that confirmation by the Council is asked for a resolution passed by the Labour Committee on the 4th June, 1919. In spite of a Rights decision taken some two or three months earlier, the principle embodied in this resolution had not found a place in the Treaty with Austria. The Italian Delegation had therefore suggested that a resolution be adopted by the Labour Commission. The resolution had been taken and it was hoped that the Council would endorse it.

Mr Polk says that, as the proposal involved questions of law, he is not prepared to state off-hand the attitude of the American Delegation.

M Clemenceau says that German workmen at present engaged to work on the devastated districts of France, brought with them their own rights and privileges.

Mr Balfour asks whether foreign workmen going to England are also to have their own rights.

Mr Barnes says that the case did not arise in England, as a foreign workman was granted British rights even to the extent, after a certain period, of receiving a share in the National Health and Unemployment Insurances and Old Age Pensions.

Mr Polk says that he cannot, for the time being, express an opinion, but he has no objection to the principle.

Mr Barnes observes that it is only the principle of reciprocity that was involved. It did not become binding on any given State, unless that State made individual agreements with another State.

M Clemenceau says that he is ready to vote the resolution.

(Subject to an announcement, at a future date, of the views of the American Delegation, the resolution passed by the Labour Committee on June 4th is accepted as a general principle of the Conference.)


6. M Dutasta says that the Drafting Committee requests instructions as to the language in which the Air Convention should be drafted. Should it be, like previous Conventions, in French, English and Italian, the French text prevailing in case of divergence, or in French and English, each having equal authority, as in the case of the Conventions signed at Versailles?

S Scialoja said that, as the Convention was very important for Italy, he desired an Italian text.

(After some discussion, it is decided that the Air Convention should be drawn up in English, French and Italian, the text in the two former languages having equal authority.)


7. After some discussion, it is agreed:

That the Bulgarian Delegation should be invited to receive the Treaty in the Salle de L’Horloge, at the Quai d’Orsay, and that the Greek and Roumanian observations just received should be discussed at the next meeting of the Council.


8. M Clemenceau says that he has received a letter from Mr Pachitch stating that as the Government had resigned, the Delegation was bound to wait or authority before signing the Treaty of Peace with the Austrian Republic.


9. Mr Polk draws attention to a telegram received from Budapest.

M Clemenceau says that he is not at all disposed to offer the Hungarian Government financial credits, nor is he prepared to see the Government of the country handed over to the Allied Generals at Budapest. He agrees, however, that it is desirable to send the Mission instructions.

It is decided that the question of sending further instructions to the Inter-Allied Mission at Budapest should be placed on the Agenda.

Mr Polk observes that the Romanians are under the impression that the United States alone, among the Allied and Associated Powers, raised objections against their conduct in Hungary. This impression had not been set right by Allied representatives on the spot. It is desirable that the Roumanian Government should be informed that the Council had acted only upon information received from the Inter-Allied representatives.

M Pichon observes that as M Clemenceau signed all the telegrams sent in the name of the Council, France is incurring a great deal of unpopularity in Bucharest, where it was supposed that France is particularly antagonistic to Romanian ambitions. It has therefore been pointed out to the Romanian Government that these telegrams emanated from the Council of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers and not from M Clemenceau as French Prime Minister.

Mr Polk says that he thinks it is the people on the spot who created the impression that America alone was responsible for Romanian troubles.

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

12th September 1919

Italian nationalists led by Gabriele D’Annunzio (center with stick) occupies the city of Fiume (Rijeka, Croatia), seeking to have Italy annex it. The occupation inspires the rise of Italian Fascism.


British government bans the Dáil Éireann (Irish Parliament) and the political party Sinn Féin, forcing the organizations underground. British troops raiding Sinn Féin headquarters.


Edward, Prince of Wales, reviewing Canadian troops at Saskatoon, Canada.


As an army political agent, Adolf Hitler was sent to report on an emerging far-right group, the German Workers' Party (later renamed the Nazi Party). Finding he agreed with their nationalist, anti-Semitic beliefs, he joins the obscure group as its seventh member.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, September 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

13th September 1919

Thomas Orde-Lees, survivor of the Shackleton expedition, demonstrates a parachute jump over New York Bay.


The Australian Imperial Force cricket team, made up of Australian servicemen in the Great War, concludes its tour of England and returns to Australia.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, September 13, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.