Why did the IJN lose most all sea battles?

[Sailor Steve]

When people say they "don't believe in luck", do they mean "Luck" as controlled by outside supernatural forces (aka the Roman Goddess Fortuna) or just that sometimes random unforeseeable events happen to us? I don't believe in the former either, but certainly the poor guy who has a plane fall on his house is indeed a victim of "bad luck". When it's not your fault and nothing you did could have prevented it, it's random chance, but can also be described as luck.

In the case in point, the US forces certainly gave themselves all the advantages they could. Even so, both sides were searching vast areas of open ocean. Did the US Navy have advanced knowledge of the proper area to search, or was it random chance that led them to find the Japanese carriers at the opportune moment? If the former, then they certainly tipped the scales with technology and energy. If the latter, then it was still luck...meaning random chance, not supernatural guidance by the fates.

[thegrindre]

Captains, I'm afraid you'll never convince me that there is any such thing as luck in this world. It just doesn't exist.
If a plane falls out of the sky onto your house, it was probably induced by the mechanic who overlooked something on the aircraft to cause it to fall. Maybe pilot error. It's all hypothetical, who knows, but it wasn't luck.
Because it was your house, well, those were just the odds of it happening,
but luck wasn't involved.

Unfortunately, we will never agree... Conversation Over and Out.

Now, let's enjoy the sim.

[Sailor Steve]

I'm sorry, but I find that a little dismissive. You started a great thread with a very good question. You then stated an opinion, which I thought was also good. I attempted to explore it. Not bash it, or even argue with it. Just discuss it. Now you want me to ignore it and "enjoy the sim". But your thread really has nothing to do with the sim. That's cool, it's what this section is for. I just wanted to explore the possibilities.

[CCIP]

I think you also failed to read the actual post, because Torplexed very clearly said "luck was deliberately minimized", which is an indirect way of saying "the USN didn't leave much to chance and planned carefully, so they could make sure that things would go right and the Japanese would fall for the trap." Otherwise, actual luck didn't enter into this discussion until you'd mentioned it. And I think you'll have seen some excellent posts from several people - thanks to Kazuaki Shimazaki for also bringing in a very valid point about the Washington treaties - that actually did a great job of explaining some of the very logical historical issues here.

[Captain Vlad]

On a tactical/operational level, the Japanese higher up's tendency to develop overly complex schemes that relied a bit too much on their interpretation of how Allied forces would react and to split their forces into much smaller parcels also likely had something to do with many of their losses.

[Aktungbby]

Originally Posted by CCIP

which is an indirect way of saying "the USN didn't leave much to chance and planned carefully, so they could make sure that things would go right and the Japanese would fall for the trap." Otherwise, actual luck didn't enter into this discussion until you'd mentioned it. And I think you'll have seen some excellent posts from several people - thanks to Kazuaki Shimazaki for also bringing in a very valid point about the Washington treaties - that actually did a great job of explaining some of the very logical historical issues here.

Actually luck entered into all of it at the critical moment at Midway. Not only was the American carrier point NE of Midway dubbed Point Luck, but the attack on the Japanese carriers, given the extreme range of Spruance's launch/delays coupled with the deplorable attack by Waldron's Torpedo 8 all culminated on one man and luck as fuel was running short and some planes were ditching. "The two squadrons from Enterprise were running low on fuel because of the time spent looking for the enemy. However, squadron commander C. Wade McClusky Jr decided to continue the search, and by good fortune spotted the wake of the Japanese destroyer Arashi, steaming at full speed to rejoin Nagumo's carriers after having unsuccessfully depth-charged U.S. submarine Nautilus, which had earlier unsuccessfully attacked the battleship Kirishima. Some bombers were lost from fuel exhaustion before the attack commenced. McClusky's decision to continue the search and his sole judgment, in the opinion of Admiral Nimitz, "decided the fate of our carrier task force and our forces at Midway ..."[wiki] All three American dive-bomber squadrons (VB-6, VS-6 and VB-3) arrived almost simultaneously at the perfect time, locations and altitudes to attack. In short, all plan A preparations and preliminary ground work aside, and running on plan B due to distance, bad spotting reports, and fuel mishaps came down to one squadron commander tossing aside his initial info and taking a terrible gamble on a lone enemy destroyer's heading to arrive over the carriers of the enemy...His pluck and a whole lotta luck as to the enemy carriers' vulnerability and lack of high air cover directly caused the a ten-minute window of time/opportunity that changed the course of the war. ArashiUSS Nutilaus: 1st patrol at Midway and her plucky commander LCDR Brockman Clarence Wade McClusky-turner of the tide of battle> The case for luck rests!

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by Aktungbby

Clarence Wade McClusky-turner of the tide of battle. The case for luck rests!

While I certainly agree that McCluskey was a resourceful first rate naval airman worthy of all accolades, I think in many respects his decision shows how luck evens out. First of all, McCluskey's group was one of the two SBD groups that hit the Japanese carriers more or less simultaneously. His group had to stretch the limits of their fuel because a known Japanese course change, which occurred after his group launched, and was not reported to him via radio. Had it been reported to him, he would have found the target anyhow. So, that outcome (McCluskey finding the targets) was predicated on two lucky "breaks" that favored the Japanese and one that favored the Americans. The two pro-Japanese breaks were the fortuitous unplanned course change, and the US decision to not report the course change to McCluskey. The pro-US break was McCluskey reasoning that the Japanese destroyer lagging behind was an element of the carrier group.

The destroyer Arashi was there to hunt for the US sub Nautilus with which contact had instigated the Japanese course change, so you can't lay the observation of the Japanese destroyer as a lucky break. Had the US sub not been there for the DD to be dealing with the Japanese would not have changed course at all. In that event McClusky would not have had to extend his search.

The *other* (non-McCluskey) group was directed to the correct position because it was launched after the Japanese course change was known. No matter how you slice it, the Japanese lose at least two carriers in the initial US attack, even if you cut McCluskey out of the equation entirely. Which is basically the result that the Japanese obtained in their pre-operational wargame of the plan (the infamous wargame in which Admiral Ugaki interfered with the umpire's results and re-floated the Akagi, because he didn't like the results).

Most of the events in battles that are attributed to luck can be more usefully attributed to one of three things. 1.) A bad plan. 2.) A good plan badly executed. 3.) Insufficient assessment of enemy capability. It often seems that 99% of the time when someone invokes "luck" it is a case of CYA analysis.

At Midway Japan suffered the consequences of both 1 and 3.

[MaDef]

Most of the events in battles that are attributed to luck can be more usefully attributed to one of three things. 1.) A bad plan. 2.) A good plan badly executed. 3.) Insufficient assessment of enemy capability. It often seems that 99% of the time when someone invokes "luck" it is a case of CYA analysis.

Halsey got "lucky" during Oct 44' in the Leyte Gulf. Had Kinkiad not reacted the way he did, the invasion of Leyte might have failed.

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by MaDef

Had Kinkiad not reacted the way he did, the invasion of Leyte might have failed.

I fail to see how. The Leyte amphibious landings took place on 20th October 1944. The Battle off Samar between Kinkaid's Taffy 3 and Kurita's Center Force was on October 25th. Had the Japanese made it they would have been five days late to the party. Shelling a developing beachhead on D-Day can be devastating; shelling it on D-Day+5 when the majority of the troops have advanced inland and the equipment and supplies have been dispersed to locations away from the beach, would be pretty ineffective. Not to mention that the majority of troop transports had already left to pick up another load.

Yes, assuming he had sufficient ammunition in his magazines left, I suppose Kurita could have sunk some transports at the likely cost of his entire remaining force being annihilated. That was an exchange the Allies could well afford in 1944.

Oh...and welcome aboard. After eight years.

[Aktungbby]

MaDef!Your first post after a long silent run! It's LUCKY Torplexed and I were engaged in hot debate or you might have remained silent longer!

[Torplexed]

Originally Posted by Aktungbby

MaDef!Your first post after a long silent run! It's LUCKY Torplexed and I were engaged in hot debate or you might have remained silent longer!

What can I say. I'm a big believer that all luck evens out.

[MaDef]

Failed was probably too strong a term, Japan was trying to take out the transport/supply ships, they needed to hold the Philippines (without it their supply lines for raw materials were cut). Halsey made a tactical blunder when he took all 60+ ships north without leaving a blocking force at the San Bernardino straights. it was luck that Kurita was turned back by Kinkaid's escort carriers.

[Subnuts]

Another book recommendation: Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 by David C Evans and Mark R Peattie. Essentially a prequel to Shattered Sword, although it was written in 1997 by different authors. Very readable and lucid, even if it's almost 700 pages long.

[Dammit_Carl!]

Originally Posted by Subnuts

... but anyone seriously interested in the Pacific War needs to read Shattered Sword. It explains the inner workings of the IJN and the Japanese naval mindset in way more detail than I could ever hope to do in a single message board post.

Gracias on the suggestion, amigo