100 Years Ago Today

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, April 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 12:15

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


1. Reparation, Dye Stuffs and Chemicals, Drugs, Coal and Coal Derivatives:

(The Articles having been agreed by the British and United States Experts and Commandant Aron having assured M Clemenceau that M Loucheur had accepted them, the Articles in Appendix I are approved and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward them to the Secretary General for a Drafting Committee.)

Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith and Commandant Aron then withdraw.


2. Italy:

Attention is drawn to reports of the movements of Italian troops towards Fiume apparently from Austria and of Italian naval movements towards Fiume.


3. Romania and Hungary:

President Wilson suggests that Romania should be asked to cease their aggressive action towards Hungary. Romania has had considerable assistance from the Allies and is pressing her advantage of numbers and equipment. Her action is distinctly aggressive and might constitute a danger to the Peace. He recalls General Smuts’ suggestion that the Austrians should be invited to come to Paris. He suggests that an invitation might be sent giving a date a short time in advance to quiet things in Austria. This might arrest the danger to the Hungarian ferment extending to Austria. If Austria were put on a footing of respect this danger might be checked. This suggestion, President Wilson says, comes from Mr Hoover who has very good sources of information through his Relief Agencies. Mr Hoover is afraid of a collapse in Austria. He asks if General Franchet D’Esperey commands the armies in that region.

M Clemenceau says that General Graziani is now in command there.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that S Bratiano might be invited to attend and asked to stop the Romanian aggressive movement.

President Wilson suggests that in view of the pressure of time it might be better to send him a joint letter.

M Clemenceau thinks it would be best to hear S Bratiano for ten minutes after which a letter might be sent.

President Wilson suggests that the Austrians might be invited for May 15th.

Mr Lloyd George says there was not a great deal to be settled now with the Austrian Treaty.

President Wilson says it is particularly confined to questions of boundaries, which are in process of settlement and the proportion of Austria’s debt to be borne by the States formerly constituting the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Mr Lloyd George says that he is not sure if the proportions could not be fixed. His view is that general principles should be stated first, and then a Commission should be set up to work out details. The calculation is a very difficult one involving not only the population but also the wealth of the country.

President Wilson agrees that the best plan would be to get a Commission set up.

This question is then dropped without any actual decision being taken.


4. A Communication of the Preliminary of Peace to the German Delegates:

The Council has before them a document prepared by the Secretary General assisted by the United States, British and Japanese Secretaries.


5. Examination of Credentials:

The first proposal for an examination of credentials by an Examining Commission presided over by M. Jules Cambon is approved.

The proposal that the President of the Conference should determine the date and hour of the examination as soon as the German Delegates arrived is also agreed to.


6. Recognition of Yugoslavs:

It is pointed out that the question of the recognition of the Yugoslavs is raised by the suggestion that the Germans might ask for an examination of the Allies credentials.

President Wilson says that the United States has already recognized Yugoslavia.

Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau say that Great Britain and France have not.

(It is agreed that a provisional decision should be taken for the British and French Governments to recognize the Yugoslavian Government before the Germans arrive at Versailles but that action should be suspended pending S Orlando’s return. Unless some reason is shown to the contrary however, the Yugoslavs will be recognized before the arrival of the Germans.)


7. It is agreed that the Germans should submit their observations on the Treaty of Peace in French and English.


8. Written Procedure:

The Germans communicate Their observations in writing

1) It is agreed that the maximum time limit for the Germans to make their observations on the Peace Treaty should be fifteen days.

2) That they should be required to make their observations on particular subjects within such shorter period as might be determined.

3) That M Clemenceau should instruct the Secretary General to place himself in communication with the groups which had considered the different subjects and invite their suggestions as to how long a time should be permitted to the Germans for the consideration of each of the subjects mentioned in his list.

It is pointed out that the League of Nations is not included in the Secretary General’s list.


9. Powers To Present The Secretary General’s proposal that the President should hand Powers To over Treaty to the German Delegation in the presence of the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Great Powers and of the Belgian Delegation only is not approved.

It is agreed:

1) That the full number of the Plenipotentiaries of all Belligerents should be present when the Treaty was handed over.

The question of the inclusion of the Polish and Czechoslovak Delegation as belligerents is discussed but not decided.


10. Danzig:

Mr Headlam-Morley states that in a conversation on Thursday the 24th with Mr Paderewski he had explained to him the proposed arrangement for Danzig. Mr Paderewski said Danzig had obviously been seriously disturbed, but had recognized that the matter had been decided in principle. He had asked, however, that two points should be provided for to which he attached the greatest importance:

1) That there should be secured to Poland not only the use and service of the docks, etc., but the actual ownership, especially of those situated at the mouth of the Vistula and outside the walls of the city.

2) He suggested that the Polish control over Danzig would be secured by the disarmament of Germany, and that in order to help the general principle of disarmament it would not be desirable that Poland should make any display of military force in Danzig. While acquiescing in this idea he still wanted the power of protection against unorganized attacks by German “free-booters”.

Mr Headlam-Morley had then said he would try and secure something giving to Poland the right if required for the protection of Danzig against external attack.

Mr Headlam-Morley says he had not been able to ascertain who were the present owners of the docks.

President Wilson does not consider that either of these requests by M Paderewski can be acceded to.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that Mr Paderewski would be satisfied with power of development of the Port of Danzig.

(This proposal is agreed to, and Mr Headlam-Morley is instructed to draft the final clauses on this assumption.

It is also agreed that the protection of Danzig against external attack will be vested in the League of Nations.)

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, April 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


The Drafting Committee of the Preliminary Peace Conference, consisting of Mr Brown Scott, Mr House Hurst, and M Fromageot are present.


1. The Form of the Treaty of Peace:

The question is raised as to whether the Treaty of Peace with Germany should be “agreed” or “imposed”.

(After a short discussion it is decided that it should be an “agreed” peace and should be prepared in this form.)


The question is raised as to whether the preamble of the Peace Treaty should state the principles on which peace was being made.

Mr Brown Scott says it is extremely difficult when attempted in detail, and it is also pointed out that the Covenant of the League of Nations contained a preamble stating principles.

(It is decided not to state the principles on which peace is being made in the preamble.)

(The project for the Treaty of Peace attached in the Appendix is approved, subject to the addition of a reference to the effect that Germany had declared war on France.)


2. President Wilson suggests that it would make the Naval, Military, and Air terms more acceptable to the enemy if they are presented as preparing the way for a general limitation of armaments for all nations.

M Clemenceau said he would like to see the formula before he agreed.

(The following formula is accepted:

"With the object of rendering possible the preparation of the general limitation of armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes to observe strictly the Naval, Military, and Aerial Clauses laid down below.)


3. M Clemenceau says that the Germans are due to arrive on next Date of Wednesday evening, April 30, and that the first meeting would be held on May 1st at Versailles.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, April 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers


1. M Pichon, having declared the Meeting open, says that the first item on the Agenda paper relates to the right of aerial transit over enemy territory after the conclusion of Peace. The question had come under discussion at the last meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the draft articles for insertion in the Peace Treaty with the omission of the second sentence in Article 3 had been adopted, subject to the agreement of Mr Lansing.

A very long argument follows, ending with the following conclusions:

(The following draft articles for insertion in the Peace Treaty are adopted:

1) “The aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall be accorded full liberty of passage and landing over and in the territory and territorial waters of Germany, and shall while exercising any rights of passage or landing in Germany enjoy full national treatment particularly in case of distress by land or sea.

2) The aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall, while in transit to any other State, enjoy the right of flying over the territory and territorial waters of Germany without landing, subject to such regulations as Germany may establish which will De applicable to the aircraft of both Germany and the Allied and Associated Governments.

3) All aerodromes in Germany open to national public traffic shall be open for the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States, and in any such aerodrome such aircraft shall be treated on a footing of equality with German aircraft as regards charges of every description, including charges for landing and accommodation.

4) The rights of passages, transit and landing provided for in Clauses 1, 2 and 3, are subject to the observance by the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States of such necessary Regulations as Germany may enforce in the interests of her own Municipal legislation, but such regulations shall be applied without obstruction to German Aircraft and to the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States.

5) All certificates of nationality, certificates of air worthiness, certificates of competency and licenses, issued or rendered valid by any of the Allied or Associated States shall be recognized by Germany as valid and as equivalent to corresponding certificates and licenses issued to German aircraft.

6) As regards internal commercial air traffic the aircraft of the Allied and Associated States shall enjoy throughout Germany treatment accorded to aircraft of the most favored nation.

7) Rules as to Lights & Signals Germany undertakes to adopt measures to ensure that every German aircraft flying above its territory shall comply with the Rules of the Air and Rules for Air Traffic on and in the vicinity of aerodromes contained in the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made between the Allied and Associated States.

8) The obligations imposed by these clauses shall continue until 1st of January, 1923, unless prior to that time Germany is admitted to the League of Nations or, by consent of the Allied and Associated States, is permitted to adhere to the Convention relating to International Air Navigation made by the latter States.”

It is also agreed that the Drafting Committee of the Commission framing the convention on International Air Navigation should be instructed to redraft Article 40 of the Convention so as to permit Germany and other enemy countries to adhere under certain conditions to the air convention, should they so desire.)


2. M Pichon called on M Cambon to explain his proposals relating to the amalgamation of the Warsaw Commission with the Commission on Polish Affairs.

(After another very long discussion it was agreed to authorize the Commission on Polish Affairs to proceed with the study of the frontier to be assigned to Poland in Eastern Galicia and to submit a full report.)


4. M Cambon says that the Commission on Polish Affairs has now reached the study of the future frontiers between Poland and Russia. All possible information has been collected, but so far no representative of Russia has been heard. There exists in Paris at the present moment a Russian Political Conference under the presidency of Prince Lvoff, which represents all Anti-Bolshevik parties in Russia. This conference has asked to be heard, and he was authorized by his Commission to inquire whether this could be done. In this connection he wishes to invite attention to the fact that during the last few days an incident had occurred which has a direct bearing on the question he now puts to the Council. The Commission on Polish Affairs having advised the Supreme Council that it would be advisable in continuance of its work to hear the Warsaw representatives and that it was not its intention to call them together unless otherwise instructed by the Supreme Council; the Council of Foreign Ministers had decided at their meeting on April 15th to instruct the Commission on Polish Affairs to continue its study of the territorial questions relative to Poland. The Commission on Polish Affairs decided under these conditions that the Sub-Committee specially charged with the preliminary study of the Eastern Frontier of Poland would call before it the Eurasian representatives delegated by the Lithuanian Assembly, namely, Dr Voldemar and Mr. Ytchas. These gentlemen had appeared on the 23rd April in compliance with a summons addressed to them. They had immediately read a letter addressed to the President of the Peace Conference which had been circulated. After having taken cognizance of this document the Sub-Committee had unanimously agreed that the hearing of Dr Voldemar and Mr Ytchas should be postponed and they accordingly withdrew immediately. The Commission on Polish Affairs, therefore, now requests the Supreme Council to instruct them as to the action to be taken in regard to the Lithuanian representatives and as to the answer to be given them. The Commission on Polish Affairs also considers it its duty to call the attention of the Supreme Council to the fact that the work relative to the Eastern Boundaries of Poland would be greatly facilitated by hearing the competent Russian representatives. But the Commission did not consider itself authorized to take a decision on its own account in regard to this matter and begged the Supreme Council to inform it as soon as possible if it might convoke the members of the Russian Political Conference now convened in Paris.

Mr Lansing asks what is going to be done about the Lithuanians.

M Cambon thinks that the Commission can only wait until the attitude of the Lithuanians has somewhat changed. The Commission on Polish Affairs had been appointed to consider Polish interests. The Commission is naturally anxious to hear the views of all people surrounding Poland, but the Lithuanians have stated that they are not prepared to give information to the Commission on Polish Affairs, as they wish a special Commission to be appointed to deal only with Lithuanian affairs. He thinks under these circumstances, it would be unwise for the Allied and Associated Governments to give way to their pretensions.

M Pichon says that on the 23rd April, 1919, a letter had been addressed by the Lithuanian Delegation to the President, M Clemenceau, the concluding paragraph of which read as follows:

“In spite of the difficulties above-mentioned the Delegation has decided to send the Members summoned by the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference with instructions to give to the Commission on Polish Affairs all information relating to the frontiers between Lithuania and Poland”.

M Cambon says that under these circumstances the Commission on Polish Affairs should now proceed to hear the Lithuanians.

Mr Lansing thinks that instructions should be issued to the Commission on Polish Affairs to call in, and obtain the evidence of, any individual Russians that might be able to give information on the subjects under consideration; but the Commission should not give a hearing to any Russian Delegation or Commission, as such.

(It is agreed that the Commission on Polish Affairs should hear the Lithuanian Delegates and also individual Russians who might be able to give information on the question relating to the Eastern Frontiers of Poland.)


5. M Cambon says that the following report dated April 10th, 1919, has been submitted to the Conference by the Conference [sic] by the Commission on Polish Affairs:

“As a result of recent successes gained over the Bolsheviks, the Polish troops on the one hand, and the Lithuanian troops on the other, are at the present moment, at a short distance from one another. The animosity existing between the Lithuanians and the Poles and the occupation by the latter of a part of the Province of Grodno, which the Lithuanians claimed gave cause to fear that an armed conflict between the two parties might take place. The Commission on Polish Affairs considered that it would be advisable to take steps immediately to relieve a situation which threatened to provoke a serious incident similar to those which had taken place between the Poles and Lithuanians [Ukrainians] in the region of Lemberg. With a view to avoiding such an occurrence, the Commission on Polish Affairs had the honor to recommend to the Supreme Council of the Conference that Marshal Foch be instructed to study means to prevent a conflict between the Lithuanians and Poles, either by bringing about a direct agreement between the Polish and Lithuanian military leaders, or by establishing a line of demarcation which both parties should agree not to cross, or by any other arrangement likely to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between the Poles and Lithuanians and if possible to assure their union against their common adversaries, the Bolsheviks.”

Mr Lansing says he has a decided objection to offer to this question being dealt with as a purely military matter, since, in his opinion, at the present moment, it is far more a political question. An Inter-Allied Military Commission is at present on its way to Warsaw, and its work should now be permitted to proceed without hindrance. In his opinion, the Lithuanian Delegation here in Paris, as well as the Polish Delegates, could be informed that whatever decision might be reached at the present moment would in no way affect the final issue.

(After much more discussion it is agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should notify the Polish and Lithuanian representatives in Paris that whatever arrangements might be reached at the present moment in order to avoid hostilities in the regions of Vilna and Grodno, would in no way affect the final decision.

It was also agreed that the Allied and Associated Governments should notify their respective representatives in Warsaw, to use their good offices with a view to an agreement being reached between the Poles and the Lithuanians in the regions of Vilna and Grodno in order to avoid hostilities.)


6. M de Peretti says that the Committee appointed to draft clauses to be inserted in the Peace Treaty, dealing with the question of the disposal of German Colonies, had received instructions to take up all such special cases regarding German Colonies not already covered by other Commissions. As a result the following clauses had been drafted for insertion in the Peace Treaty.

Article I. Germany renounces in favour of the five Allied and Associated Powers all rights and titles appertaining to her in regard to her oversea possessions.

Article II. All movable and immovable property in such territories belonging to the German Empire or to any German State shall pass to the Government exercising authority over these territories, in the same manner and upon the same terms as such property passes in the case of territory ceded to an Allied or Associated Power. The decision of the local Courts in any dispute as to the nature of such property shall be final.

Article III. The provisions of Section … Part I (Commercial Relations) and Part IV (Property, Rights and Interests, Article B, paragraphs (b), (c) and (i)) shall apply in the case of these territories whatever be the form of Government adopted for them.

Article IV. The Government exercising authority over such territories may make such provisions as it thinks fit with reference to the repatriation from them of German nationals and to the conditions upon which German subjects of European origin shall, or shall not, be allowed to reside, hold property, trade or exercise a profession in them.

Article V. The provisions of article 13 of Annex A of the Report of the Financial Commission shall apply in the case of all agreements concluded with German nationals for the construction or exploitation of public works in the German oversea possessions, as well as any sub-concessions, or contracts resulting therefrom which may have been made to or with such nationals.

Article VI. Germany hereby undertakes to pay, in accordance with the estimate to be presented by the French Government and approved by the Permanent Reparation Commission, reparation for damage suffered by French nationals in the Cameroons or the frontier zone, by reason of the acts of the German civil and military authorities and of German private individuals during the period from 1 January, 1900, to the 1st August, 1914.

Article VII. Germany renounces all rights under the Conventions of the 4th November, 1911, and the 28th September, 1912. She undertakes to pay to the French Government, in accordance with the estimate to be presented by that Government and approved by the Permanent Reparation Commission, all the deposits, credits, advances, etc., which may have been effected by virtue of these Acts in favour of Germany.

Article VIII. Germany undertakes to accept and observe the provisions made or to be made by the Allied and Associated Powers, or certain of them, with any other Power with regard to the trade in Arms and Spirits as well as the matters dealt with in the General Act of Berlin of 26th February, 1885, and the General Act of Brussels of 2nd July, 1890.

Article IX. The inhabitants of the former German oversea possessions shall be entitled to the diplomatic protection of the Governments exercising authority over those territories.

M de Peretti continuing says that these articles will not apply to the province of Shantung, which would be dealt with separately. The Japanese representative on his Committee had asked whether the nations acquiring former German territory would have to take over part of the German National Debt. The Committee had agreed that this question did not fall within its province: but it had been decided to bring the question to the notice of the Supreme Council.

Baron Makino said he accepted the clauses relating to the German colonies, subject to the reservation made by the Japanese representative.

(It is agreed that the above clauses relating to the German colonies be adopted for insertion in the Treaty of Peace.)


7. M Pichon says that the Supreme War Council has referred to the Supreme Economic Council the following item for consideration and report:

“Whether, having regard to the terms of the Brussels Agreement, it is economically possible to send food independently to Bavaria, apart altogether from the political expediency of doing so.”

To that inquiry the following reply dated 8th April, 1919 had been received from the Supreme Economic Council:

“Without expressing opinion on the political aspects of this question, the Supreme Economic Council is of opinion that the course proposed would not be from the point of view of food and finance desirable, nor, so far as they can see, possible. But, if any definite proposal for carrying it out is placed before them, they will be ready to give it their consideration.”

M Pichon, continuing, says that he thinks the Meeting should merely take note of the answer submitted by the Supreme Economic Council.

(This is agreed to.)


8. M Georges Cahen read the report of the Commission on Prisoners of War

(This is an exceedingly long report, comprising several pages)

Mr Lansing congratulates the Commission on the success of its work, and the clear statement made by it. He must confess, however, that he is at a loss to understand why there should be any hesitation in saying that the prisoners would be repatriated as soon as possible after the ratification of peace. In his opinion, anyone retained for forced labor after the signature of peace would be a slave, and such action would constitute a reproach to the nation who enforced any such regulation. If their own Government liked to say that their own people should do work which would be credited as reparation, that would be quite a different thing. But a foreign Government cannot take prisoners and convert them into slaves. Such action would be abhorrent to his own country, and he is sure it would be so also to the French, British, and Japanese nations. Therefore, he recommends that a definite statement should be inserted in Clause 1 to the effect that upon the establishment of peace, prisoners would be returned as soon as possible.

M Pichon says that in principle he fully agreed with Mr. Lansing, and he is sure France has no intention of retaining prisoners of war after peace had been signed. But it seems to him that this is a question which must be referred to the Council of Four for decision. He undertakes, in doing so, to transmit to the President of the Council the views expressed by Mr Lansing.

Lord Hardinge says that he shared Mr Lansing’s views.

M Pichon adds that on the understanding that the question would be submitted to the Council of Four, he also is agreed with Mr Lansing’s way of thinking.

Mr. Lansing raises another objection over Clause 6, which suggests that some prisoners of war should be held as hostages until the Germans hand over certain officers wanted for War Crimes.

M Pichon said that unless such an Article is adopted, the Allied and Associated Governments will be deprived of the means of obtaining the surrender of guilty persons such as the officers who had participated in the murder of Captain Fryatt.

Mr Lansing asks whether if these criminals are not delivered, it is intended to keep the innocent hostages forever.

M Cahen explains that two reasons have influenced the Commission in accepting the clause under discussion. In the first place, it will be noticed that officers alone had been referred to, because the atrocities as a whole had only been committed by a certain military caste, who had worked hand in glove. For this reason, it has been clearly stated that officers alone should be selected by the Allied and Associated Governments for detention as hostages. Consequently, the persons so selected would be those who had approved of the commission of such atrocities. In other words, the persons so selected would indirectly be responsible for the crimes committed. In the second place, the insertion of a clause as suggested would constitute the only method of preventing the clauses of the Treaty relating to the surrender of persons alleged to be guilty of offences against laws and customs of war from becoming inoperative.

Mr Lansing says that he appreciates the reason for this Article, and the argument, but he is strongly opposed to it. Why not for the same reason retain hostages to ensure the fulfillment of every Article of the Treaty? If there is doubt as to Germany’s good faith in accepting one Article, her good faith in accepting any or all Articles might equally be doubted. He cannot consent to this Article. He understands that a Commission is working or is about to begin work on a study of the means of obtaining guarantees for the fulfillment of all the conditions of the Treaty of Peace, and he thinks this question should also be referred to that Committee, to whom it really belongs. But he would most strongly urge the rejection of any proposal to retain hostages after the signature of Peace, as such a proposal would be contrary to the principles of civilized war and the laws of humanity.

Lord Hardinge says that pending the substitution of a clause by some other Commission, which would insure the same results as were obtained by the Article under discussion, he cannot agree to the omission of the Article from the Treaty of Peace.

Mr Lansing says that under the circumstances the only course will be to submit the two questions relating to slavery and to hostages to the Council of Four.

(This is agreed to.)

Mr Lansing, continuing, proposes that the second paragraph of Article 1 should be made to read somewhat as follows:

“On the part of each of the Allied and Associated Powers a Sub-Commission composed exclusively of representatives of the respective Power and of delegates of the German Government shall regulate the details of execution for the return of prisoners”.

(This is agreed to.)

(It is agreed to adopt the following Articles, with the proviso that Article 1, relating to the repatriation of German prisoners, and Article 6, relating to the detention of hostages, should be referred to the Council of Four for decision:

“1) The repatriation of German prisoners of war and interned civilians shall, in the conditions fixed by Article — of the Present Treaty, be carried out by a Commission composed of representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments on the one part and of the German Government on the other part.

On the part of each of the Allied and Associated Powers a Sub-Commission, composed exclusively of representatives of the respective Power and of delegates of the German Government, shall regulate details of execution for the return of prisoners.

2) From the time of their delivery into the hands of the German Authorities, the prisoners of war and interned civilians are to be returned without delay to their house by the said Authorities.

Those among them whose pre-war domicile was in territory occupied by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers are likewise to be sent to their homes, subject to the consent and control of the Military Authorities of the Armies of Occupation of the Allied and Associated Governments.

3) The whole cost of repatriation from the outset shall be borne by the German Government who shall also provide such land or sea transport, including working personnel, as may be considered necessary by the Commission referred to in paragraph (1).

4) Prisoners of war and interned civilians awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offences against discipline shall be repatriated without regard to the completion of their sentence or of the proceedings pending against them.

The foregoing paragraph shall not apply to prisoners of war and interned civilians punished for offences committed subsequent to May 1st, 1919.

During the period pending their repatriation all prisoners of war and interned civilians shall remain subject to the existing regulations, more especially as regards work and discipline.

5) Prisoners of war and interned civilians who are awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offences other than those against discipline may be detained.

6) Until the German Government has taken all the measures required by Clause — of the present Treaty (providing for the surrender of prisoners alleged to be guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity), the Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right to detain in custody such prisoners of war of the rank of officer as they may in their discretion select.

7) a. The German Government undertakes to receive on its territory all individuals liable to repatriation without discrimination.

b. Prisoners of war, or other German nationals, who do not desire to be repatriated, may be excluded from repatriation, but the Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right either to repatriate them, or to send them to a neutral country, or to allow them to reside in their territories.

The German Government undertakes to take no special proceedings against such individuals or their families, and to exercise no repressive or vexatious measures of any kind whatsoever on this account.

8) The Allied and Associated Governments reserve the right to make the repatriation of German subjects or adherents in their hands conditional on the immediate notification and release by the German Government of any prisoners of war, subjects or adherents of the Allied and Associated Governments, who may still be in Germany.

9) The German Government undertakes:

(i) to give every facility to Commissions of Enquiry into the cases of the missing: to furnish them with all necessary means of transport: to allow them access to all such places as camps, prisons, hospitals, etc., and to place at their disposal all documents, whether public or private, which would facilitate their enquiries.

(ii) to impose penalties upon any German officials or private persons who shall have concealed the presence of any Allied or Associated subjects or adherents, or neglected to reveal the presence of any such after it had come to their knowledge.

10) The German Government undertakes to restore without delay, from the time that the present Treaty comes into force all articles, cash, securities and documents which have belonged to Allied or Associated subjects and adherents and which have been taken possession of by the German Authorities.

11) The graves of prisoners and interned civilians, subjects or adherents of the respective belligerents, who have died in captivity shall be properly maintained as provided for by Clause — of the present Treaty.

The Allied and Associated Governments on the one hand and the German Government on the other hand, mutually undertake furthermore:

(i) to furnish a complete list of the dead, together with all information useful for identification.

(ii) to furnish all information as to the number and location of graves of all those who have been buried without identification.”

(The Meeting then adjourns)

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, April 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 15:15

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


The Council has before them the French and English Texts of the Financial Clauses as revised by a special Committee appointed to consider the Report of the Financial Commission.

1. President Wilson says that he has one alteration to propose at the end of Clause 2 of the English Text (Clause 1 (a) of the French Text). This Clause provides that certain payments to be made by Germany to the Allied & Associated Governments in the occupied territories themselves shall be paid by the German Government in Marks. These payments include sums due to the Allies for the up-keep of the Armies of Occupation, and the practice is for Marshal Foch to agree a rate from time to time at which these Mark payments shall be calculated. The text would consequently be clearer if it were made plain that Germany will pay at the current or agreed rate of exchange.

M Klotz is at first doubtful as to the precise significance of this addition, but Mr Davis explains that the words were only intended to mean that until there is an actual current rate for Marks the agreed rate as established from time to time under the present system will govern the payments made by Germany in the occupied territories.

(It was agreed that Clause 2. (Clause 1. (a) in the French Text) should be amended by the insertion of the words “at the current or agreed rate of Exchange” at the end of the penultimate sentence.)


2. President Wilson proposes that the definition of payments which the Allied & Associated Governments might judge to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations in respect of reparation, should be made somewhat less rigid. As defined in the text these payments must be either for supplies of food or for raw material, but there might be other payments which it would be of advantage to allow Germany to make in advance of reparation.

M Klotz thinks that all necessary payments are covered by the definition as it stood in the text, and asks what other payments it might be desired to include in the priority.

Mr Davis says that in certain circumstances it might be desirable to allow Germany to pay a debt due to a neutral country, and he thought that in any event it would be a mistake to close the door against any possible extension by limiting the Allied and Associated Governments to the strict terms of the proposed text.

(It was agreed that the last sentence of Clause 4. (Clause 2. in the French Text) should read as follows:

“The payment of such supplies of food and raw materials for Germany, and such other payments as may be judged by the Allied & Associated powers to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations in respect of reparation will have priority to the extent and upon the conditions which have been or may be determined by the Allied & Associated Governments.”)


3. M Klotz says that it is only just and reasonable that in cases where the Germans had stolen locomotives or rolling stock, for ex-crediting to ample, from France, they should be required to make good those losses to France, not only where the identical locomotive could be discovered, but also by the restitution of similar material.

Mr Lloyd George says that he is quite prepared to accept this principle, but that if it is accepted it must be applied all round. If a German railway wagon is to be handed over to France in substitution for a stolen wagon, apart from the general reparation pool, then the same principle must apply to a ship, and the Germans must make good to the United Kingdom in a similar manner the losses suffered as a result of the Submarine warfare.

M Klotz maintains that there is no comparison between the two cases because ships have been sunk, whereas the identical locomotives could presumably be discovered in Germany in course of time.

Mr Lloyd George replies that this was not at all necessarily the case, and that even if this were so the French Government would be entitled to obtain them under the Reparation clauses.

President Wilson agrees that the case is covered by the Reparation clauses of the Treaty, and that since it is not too late to identify the stolen material, there is no necessity for providing that similar material shall be restored without payment.

(It was agreed that the Clause should be allowed to stand as drafted in the text.)


4. M Klotz says that in Clause 9 (Clause 6 (a) in the French Text) there is a British and a French proposal as between which no agreement had been reached.

The French proposal is to apply a uniform system to all territory changing hands. In the first place the State that takes possession or assumes a Mandate over territory should also take the responsibility control for such portion of the debt of the German Empire as can properly be attached to that territory: at the same time the Mandatory State, or the State to whom the territory is ceded should take over all German State properties within the territory. It would be difficult, in the first place, to make Germany pay coupons on the joint debt of several German Colonies, or be responsible for the administration of the local debts attached to the territories not in her control; and, in the second place, it was necessary that if the Mandatory States took over a portion of the debt they should also take over the State property without payment, since otherwise they would be paying twice over, once for the property, and again for the debt to which the property was attached.

Mr Lloyd George said that he would have the greatest difficulty in defending the principle that the Allies should assume liability for the debts attaching to the German Colonies; for example, General Smuts would naturally and rightly object to paying the debt of S. W. Africa which is largely a war debt for expenditure incurred by Germany for military purposes and directed against the Allies. At the same time he would be prepared to make a concession by admitting liability for the purely commercial portion of the debt. It is perhaps right that we should pay for railways that were not strategic railways, and for buildings and undertakings which were the result of German enterprise which would benefit the Mandatory Power. He proposed, therefore that a valuation of such property should be made and that liability should be acknowledged for the present value of this property. This is the only fair measure of the actual advantage acquired by the State under whose control the territory would be.

President Wilson thinks that it might be extremely difficult to know whether the money borrowed by the Germans on the assets of a Colony had been spent within the Colony or for its advantage.

M Klotz said that he is prepared to leave the whole question to the Reparation Commission.

President Wilson replies that the Reparation Commission might determine the items but that it was necessary now to lay down the general principle which should be applied in all these cases.

M Klotz says that Alsace-Lorraine is altogether in a special position. The Germans had taken over everything in 1871 without payment except the Railways.

M Clemenceau says that for the Railways he would be prepared to return the money which had been received from Germany, but that France had a right to have everything else restored to her which the Germans had forcibly taken in 1871.

Mr Lloyd George says that since 1871 the Germans, by their enterprise, had greatly added to the value of Alsace-Lorraine, and that it is therefore not entirely a question of restoring what had been wrongfully taken. Similarly in Africa the Germans might have built a railway for opening up a new part of the country. In such a case he thinks it right that some sort of compensation should be made, but that he would sharply distinguish between military value and commercial value.

Mr Keynes proposes the following clause:—

“Cedee and Mandatory Powers shall pay the present economic, commercial and administrative value of Government property in territory taken over by them, except that in the case of Alsace-Lorraine property taken over by Germany in 1871 and not paid for shall be returned to France without payment of any kind.”

M Clemenceau says that he cannot accept this text.

(The Representatives of the French Government then withdraw to prepare an alternative proposal.)

As eventually drafted this proposal makes an exception in the case of Alsace-Lorraine on the ground that the principles applying elsewhere do not there hold good in view of the past history of the country.

Mr Lloyd George says that the important thing is that there should be no exceptions, but that a principle should be found which covered all cases alike. In spite of the serious objections which could reasonably be made from the point of view of the British Dominions, he proposes that, after valuation, some payment should be made to Germany for commercial improvements. If this concession could not be accepted and applied all round he would prefer that there should be no payment at all, and that what property there is should be taken as a contribution to the costs of the war. It is impossible to suppose that Mandatories should be required to pay when no payment at all was made for ceded territories.

President Wilson thinks that the case of the Colonies is somewhat different from that of Alsace-Lorraine, seeing that the Colonies had not been wrongfully taken away. The whole world has felt for 48 years that Alsace-Lorraine had been wrongfully torn from France. German S. W. Africa, New Guinea, and even the ceded parts of Posen were not in the same position.

Mr Lloyd George says that he does not press for payment in Alsace-Lorraine, but he does press for the acceptance of a general principle. The British interpretation of the Armistice terms is that a claim might rightfully be made for injury to civilians in respect of the injury done by the Submarine warfare to the business of civilians. In that case he had agreed not to press the British claim but to fall in with the general principles proposed. It is very harsh that in this case, where the general principle happens not to suit another country, an exception should be made in their favor, even though the British Government had agreed not to lodge the whole claim to which they were entitled.

President Wilson states that he had been assuming that the case of Alsace-Lorraine was an accepted exception in the thought of the world. The difficulty on the other side was the inequity of taking over property without paying for it.

Mr Lloyd George says that Alsace-Lorraine is an exception as regards territory, but not as regards expenditure. He could not defend such discrimination. He could not go to the Dominions and press upon them the acceptance of a German debt when their expenditure had been so gigantic in relation to their population. Australia has a population of 4½ million and three hundred million pounds of war debt. She had lost as many dead in the war as the United States, and was now to be required to pay for New Guinea, even though she could not obtain the whole of her just claims against Germany. The only thing that the British Colonies could hope to get was a pension on the French scale when they were paying twice as much from their own resources, and now it was proposed to discriminate against the British Dominions and in favour of Alsace-Lorraine.

Mr Keynes suggests that in respect of Mandatories, the British text should be accepted, and that the new French text should be accepted for ceded territories.

President Wilson says that the Mandatory States would be acting in the capacity of Trustees, and that he thought it was therefore reasonable that they should not pay for the territories taken over; at the same time Alsace-Lorraine is in a special position, and France should not be required to pay for what had been taken from her.

(It is agreed that except in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, Government property in all ceded territories should be paid for, but that Mandatory States, being Trustees, should take over the property without payment.)


5. President Wilson states that he thinks it will be difficult to accept the principle of Clause 13. (Clause 11. in the French text) under which any alienation of property or securities in violation of the financial conditions of the Armistice becomes null and void. It would in any event be quite impracticable to track down the securities which had been alienated.

M Klotz says that he is quite prepared to abandon the chase after securities in Turkey, for the sake of which the clause had been inserted.

(It was agreed to delete Clause 13. (Clause 11. in the French Text))


6. Priority of Allied Nationals Holding German Public Loans:

President Wilson thinks that this Clause also should be omitted.

M Klotz said that it has certain importance for public.

(It is agreed that the Clause should be deleted but that this will not prejudice eventual consideration on their merits of the particular cases mentioned by M. Klotz.)

[Jimbuna]

27th April 1919

General Herbert Plumer, the British Commander-in-Chief of British Army of the Rhine in his office in occupied Cologne, Germany.


Men of the U.S. 31st Infantry participating in the Siberian Intervention against the Bolsheviks near Vladivostok.


Ship Losses:

USS Courtney (United States Navy) The patrol vessel sank in the Bay of Biscay off Brest, Finistère, France.
USS Otis W. Douglas (United States Navy) The minesweeper sank in the Bay of Biscay off Brest.

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, April 27, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings this day.

[Jimbuna]

28th April 1919

British tanks given to be used by the Estonian Army, which is currently fighting Communist Russia.


Egyptians protest in the streets of Alexandria against British rule. Clashes between Egyptians and British troops have resulted in hundreds of deaths the past few weeks.


Ship Losses:

USS Gypsum Queen (United States Navy) The naval tug struck a rock and sank in the Bay of Biscay off Brest, Finistère, France with the loss of 15 of her crew.
USS James (United States Navy) The naval trawler sank in the Bay of Biscay off Brest. Her crew were rescued by USS Marietta ( United States Navy).

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, April 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


1. Mr Lloyd George says that Sir Robert Borden has drawn his attention to the additional protocol to Article 7 of the Report of the Commission on International Labour Legislation, in which it was stated that “no High Contracting Party together with its Dominions and Colonies whether self-governing or not, shall be entitled to nominate more than one member”. Sir Robert Borden had pointed out that the effect of this was to exclude any Dominions from representation on the Council, notwithstanding that within the British Empire, at any rate, the Labour conditions of the Dominions are entirely different from those of the Mother Country. Sir Robert Borden had thought that the amendments he had moved at the last Plenary meeting surmounted this difficulty, but the Drafting Committee said that this was not the case, and consequently, Sir Robert Borden wishes to move another amendment.

President Wilson says that his difficulty was that Mr Gompers has gone home to the United States. He thinks that probably there had been a tussle on the point on the Commission, and he doe not feel justified in assenting without expert advice.

After some discussion, it is agreed:

(That Sir Robert Borden should be supported in moving an amendment on this matter, provided he could first obtain the assent to it of Mr Robinson for the United States of America, Mr Barnes for the British Empire, and M Colliard for France.)


2. Sir Maurice Hankey said he was informed by Mr Hurst, the British Member of the Drafting Committee, that there are a certain number of outstanding questions relating to China for which no provision had been made.

The following resolution is adopted.

“It is agreed that a Special Committee, composed of Mr E. T. Williams for the United States of America, Mr Ronald Macleay for the British Empire, and M Jean Gout for France, shall meet to prepare draft articles as the basis of instructions for the Drafting Committee of the Preliminary Peace Conference in regard to any outstanding questions affecting China outside of Shantung and Kiauchau.

The Committee has authority to consult and secure the agreement of China and any other interested party”.

(Sir Maurice Hankey forwards the above resolution to the Members of the Committee with a letter notifying them to take immediate action.)


3. Sir Maurice Hankey says that he has been informed by Mr Hurst, the British Member of the Drafting Committee, that no instructions had been issued to the Drafting Committee about Luxembourg, although there are important questions relating to the abrogation of the Customs Union and the Railway Federation with Germany.

The following resolution is agreed to:—

“It is agreed that a special Committee composed of Dr Mezes for the United States of America, Sir Eyre Crowe for the British Empire, and M Tardieu for France, and a Belgian representative, shall meet to prepare draft articles as an instruction to the Drafting Committee of the Preliminary Peace Conference, in regard to the position of the Customs and Railways of Luxembourg, and any other outstanding questions of the same order in regard to Luxembourg.”

(Sir Maurice Hankey sends letters to the Members of the Committee and to M Hymans, informing them of this decision, and asking them to take immediate action.)


4. Sir Maurice Hankey draws attention to questions relating to Prisoners of War, which has been presented by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

M Clemenceau said he was not prepared to discuss this matter today.

(The question of Prisoners of War is postponed until the following morning.)


5. Sir Maurice Hankey draws attention to a Clause providing for the prevention of the employment of German military, naval, or air instructors in foreign services, which had been passed by the Council of Foreign Ministers, subject to a reservation by M Pichon.

M Clemenceau says that the French objection in regard to this clause was that it would prevent France from recruiting Germans for the Foreign Legion, and was contrary to French law.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the position of the French Foreign Legion was quite unique, and no other nation had anything corresponding.

(After a short discussion, the following decisions are taken:

1) That the Article should be approved in principle and amended by the Drafting Committee as required to carry out the following proposal by M Clemenceau:

“Toutefois la présente disposition ne porte aucune atteinte an droit de la France de recruter la Légion Etrangère conformément aux lois et règlements militaires frangais en vigueur”.

2) That the clause should be applicable to the naval and air, as well as to military services.

3) That Sir Maurice Hankey should notify the Secretary General accordingly for the information of the Drafting Committee.)


6. Mr. Lloyd George draws attention to a discussion which had taken place at the Council of Foreign Ministers on a proposal to introduce in the military terms of peace an additional article designed to compel the German Government to disclose the means employed for the manufacture of poison gases. It had been decided that if the British Government wished to press the inclusion of this article, the question should be raised at the Council of Four. The British military authorities, who are confirmed in their view by scientific experts, considers that there was a real danger that Germany might discover some new gas, and, without any considerable armaments, might employ this as a means for attacking the Allied and Associated Powers, thus frustrating the provisions made for disarmament. He then read the following proposal for an article to be incorporated in the military terms:

“The German Government will disclose to the Allied Governments the nature and mode of manufacture of all explosives, toxic substances or other like chemical preparations used both in the war or prepared by them for the purpose of being so used, including the mode of manufacture of the synthetic and nitric acids used in the making of such explosives. As a part of such disclosure the Allied Governments shall have the right to inspect all plant used for the manufacture, and shall receive from the German Government full particulars of the processes of manufacture in such plant.”

President Wilson says that the objection to this proposal is that the Germans cannot reveal this information without also revealing trade secrets. He was advised by his experts that nearly every chemical used for the war was related to commercial chemistry, and it was impossible to ascertain one secret without ascertaining others. Moreover, he does not think the proposed clause would prove efficacious. His own university experience enables him to judge how jealously discoverers conceal their secrets, and he does not think that the German chemists would allow their true secrets to be discovered. What he wants to avoid is an article which could be used in a round about way for irritating investigation of all possible secrets. Such matters do not come within the purview of the military terms.

Mr Lloyd George says that it is a matter of great military importance, and that the Allies had suffered very severely owing to the advantage the Germans had had in chemical knowledge. He was advised by Lord Moulton that the Germans are three years ahead of the Allies in these matters.

(After some discussion it is agreed that the following article should be inserted in the military terms:

“The German Government will disclose to the Allied Governments the nature and mode of manufacture of all explosives, toxic substances or other like chemical preparations used by them in the war or prepared by them for the purpose of being so used.”)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward this to the Secretary-General for communication to the Drafting Committee.)


7. The Supreme Council has before them the revised memorandum prepared by the Secretary-General on the subject of the communication of the preliminaries of peace to of Peace to the German delegates.

In regard to paragraph 1, President Wilson asks who are the examining commission referred to.

M Clemenceau said they were the same Commission that has been examining the credentials of the Allied and Associated Powers.

M Clemenceau says he did not know what to advise as to the recognition of the Yugoslavs.

Mr Lloyd George asks what the Yugoslavs have to do with the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

President Wilson pointed out that Serbia is at war with Germany, and Serbia has made herself inseparable from the Yugoslavs.

Sir Maurice Hankey reports that Mr Balfour on that very morning had told him that in present circumstances he thought the recognition of the Yugoslavs would produce a deplorable effect on the Italians.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the Allied and Associated Powers are still at war with the Yugoslavs. He asks whether the Germans are likely to demand to see the credentials of the Allied and Associated Powers. He pointed out that they did not ask for Marshal Foch’s credentials when the armistice was signed.

M Clemenceau pointed out that everyone knows Marshal Foch, but they are sure to ask for the credentials of the Allied and Associated Powers. If it were not for the Italian situation, he would gladly vouch for the Yugoslavs, but he does not want to do anything to irritate the Italians.

President Wilson says if the Yugoslavs were not recognized, the Germans will at once question the validity of their credentials, and say that they are not a legally constituted party to the Treaty. They will say that somebody who was nobody was trying to sign the Treaty. Serbia has, he believed, in some legal form or other, merged herself with the Yugoslavs; the Montenegrins have not.

M Clemenceau suggests that M. Vesnitch, the Serbian Ambassador, might be invited to confer with them on the matter.

President Wilson suggests that in order to save the time of the Supreme Council, the Foreign Ministers might see M. Vesnitch.

(It is agreed that the Foreign Ministers of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Japan, should confer with M Vesnitch on the subject.)

Date of First Meeting with the Germans.

(It is agreed that the first meeting with the German Delegation should be on Thursday, May 1st)

Powers to be present when the Treaty is handed to the Germans.

(It is agreed on President Wilson’s suggestion to add Brazil to the list of effective belligerents who will be present when the Treaty iss handed over to the German Delegates.)

In regard to Poland and Czechoslovakia

President Wilson points out that the Czechs have been technically opposed to the Allied and Associated Powers in the war. The Poles had been divided.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that on the whole it is desirable that the Czechs and Poles should be present, as they had fought for the Allied and Associated Powers.

(It is agreed that the Czechs and Poles should be added to the list, and that the complete list should be as follows:

Belgium
Brazil
Czechoslovakia
Greece
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Serbia

as well as plenipotentiaries of the five great powers.)

(It is agreed that the period of 48 hours should be deleted from this paragraph which should run as follows:

“After having examined the observations presented within the
afore-mentioned periods, the Supreme Council will send their answer in writing to the German Delegation, and determine the period in which the final global answer must be given by this Delegation.”)

(It is agreed that the Germans should be given a total period of 15 days within which to give their decision in writing in regard to the Treaty of Peace, but that they should be informed they are entitled to send their reply on particular headings in the Treaty of Peace earlier, or to ask any question in regard to them. Sir Maurice Hankey is to communicate the above decisions to the Secretary-General.)


9. M Clemenceau reads the demands that have been made by Serbia, Belgium, Portugal and Brazil, at the meeting which their representatives had had with M. Loucheur on the subject of Reparation.


10 President Wilson says that it is difficult to see any practical argument in support of Serbia’s claim to be represented on the Commission, but there was likely to be a considerable public sentiment in the world in favour of it.

Mr Lloyd George says that the position is somewhat anomalous. Serbia has no real interest in the indemnity since she is acquiring a country which is entirely free from war debt. Belgium’s claim is of quite a different order; moreover the question arose as to whether Romania could be kept out if Serbia was admitted.

President Wilson says that if a distinction is drawn between Romania and Serbia it will have to be by an arbitrary decision.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the Commission will have to decide very important questions, and these questions will have to be decided by a majority. The question arises therefore as to whether it is desirable to introduce additional Powers. He thinks the Experts of the Allied and Associated Powers ought to be consulted before a decision was taken.

(It is agreed:

1) That Sir Maurice Hankey should ask the Experts of the Allied and Associated Powers to consult together as to the advisability of Serbia being represented on the proposed Commission.

2) That Belgian representatives should be heard by the Council of Four.
The question is raised as to the attitude to be adopted with the Belgian Plenipotentiaries on the subject of Reparation.)

President Wilson says they should be told that it is impossible to admit claims on a different basis to those granted to other countries. He thinks, however, it might be agreed in principle for some system of credit to enable Belgium to start her national life again.

Mr. Lloyd George agrees in this view.

President Wilson asks what is to be done about Brazil’s claim in respect of shipping.

Mr Lloyd George considers that this claim ought not be allowed. If it is, Brazil would positively make a net gain of over 200,000 tons of shipping although she had only made a very small contribution to the war.

President Wilson asks if Brazil should come into the common pool in regard to shipping.

Mr. Lloyd George replied that she should and that the same applied to Portugal.

(It is agreed that M Loucheur should be asked to reply to the Brazilians and to the Portuguese that it is not feasible to meet their claims in regard to shipping and that they would share in the common pool in this respect.)


11. President Wilson reads a series of Resolutions which, with the approval of his colleagues, he proposes to move at the Plenary Meeting to be held that afternoon.

(This is agreed to.)

President Wilson then gives an outline of the remarks he proposes to make in the afternoon.


12. With reference to the decision taken on April 16th that an Inter-Allied Commission should be sent to the Baltic to study conditions in Livonia, Estonia, Finland, etc., President Wilson says that as each Government has its own observers in the Baltic provinces, it has been suggested to him that the Commission should sit in Paris instead of proceeding to the Baltic.

Mr Lloyd George says he was informed by Sir Maurice Hankey that similar advice had been given by the British experts.

(It is agreed that the Baltic Commission should be nominated at once and should meet in Paris and not proceed to the Baltic.)


13. President Wilson reads a letter he has received from Mr Hoover pleading for the recognition of the Finnish Government. This letter gives very powerful reasons in support of the proposal, pointing out that Finland at the present time has ships which cannot sail the seas because they have no flag to sail under; that they have need of credit but no banker will give it to a Government that is unrecognized; that they are subjected to severe censorship and have no means of issuing recognizable passports. (The remainder of the Letter is not heard as the Secretary is called out of the room.)

Mr Lloyd George points out that the attitude of the Finnish Government up to very recently has been very dubious. One of the reasons for the Murmansk expedition had been to prevent the Finns with the help of the Germans from getting possession of the Murman coast. Until the collapse of Germany Finland had, on the whole, been hostile. After that he had for a time been very doubtful whether Finland would be Bolshevist or Anti-Bolshevist. Now she had put on white gloves and is demanding recognition.

President Wilson admits that it should be agreed to recognize Finland as this is the equitable course.

Mr Lloyd George says that personally he had no objection, but he would wish to consult the Foreign Secretary.

M Clemenceau said he will have to consult M Pichon.


14. Mr Lloyd George hands around a memorandum which Mr Balfour has prepared as a result of his conversation with the Japanese undertaken at the request of the Supreme Council on Friday last.

President Wilson says that this is not sufficiently explicit but shows a decided approach in the Japanese attitude.

Mr Lloyd George says that Baron Makino has, on behalf of the Japanese Delegation, accepted Mr Balfour’s memorandum.

President Wilson asks what the effect would be of saying to the Japanese:

“We transfer to you the German rights but we do not confirm any arrangement you made with the Chinese earlier in the war and we do this provided that you give a definite assurance that you will not exercise your provisional rights for employing military forces in Shantung”.

There is nothing on which the public opinion of the United States of America is firmer than on this question that China should not be oppressed by Japan. Public opinion expects him to take the same line for Japan as he had taken for Italy. There is certainly some difference between the two cases inasmuch as there was a definite undertaking by China to transfer territory to Japan.

(After an interval during which other subjects are discussed, Mr Balfour is introduced and the discussion is continued.)

Mr Balfour says that by the instructions of the Supreme Council he saw Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda on Saturday. The Supreme Council had his memorandum in their hands. Baron Makino had come again to see him on Sunday evening. With great delicacy but perfect clearness he had indicated that Japan wanted a decision on the Japanese claims as a whole. He had pointed out that Japan was asked to agree to the League of Nations although she could not obtain recognition of her claims for equality of treatment. He did not want to make trouble, but public opinion in Japan was very much concerned on this question. If Japan was to receive one check in Shantung and another check as regards the League of Nations the position would be very serious. Consequently, it was very important to obtain a decision on the question of Shantung before the Plenary Meeting to be held the same afternoon on the subject of the League of Nations. He understands that if Japan receives what she claimed in regard to Shantung, her representatives at the Plenary Meeting will content themselves with a survey of the inequality of races and move some abstract resolution which will probably be rejected. Japan will then merely make a protest. If, however, she regards herself as ill-treated over Shantung, he is unable to say what line the Japanese delegates might take.

President Wilson asks if they would go to the length of refusing to adhere to the League of Nations. His difficulty is that he could not possibly abandon China. He had told the United States’ delegation that his line was this:

“If Japan will return Kiauchow and Shantung to China and relinquish all sovereign rights and will reduce her claims to mere economic concessions foregoing all military rights, I would regard it as returning these possessions to China on better terms than Germany had held them.”

Mr Balfour says that there is no doubt whatsoever that Japan is returning these territories to China on incomparably better terms than Germany had held them.

President Wilson say his experts does not agree.

Mr Balfour says that the United States’ experts had not heard the Japanese case. The same had applied to his expert, Mr Macleay, who had signed the expert Report furnished at the request of the Supreme Council. After hearing the Japanese representatives and cross-examining them for an hour he had been entirely satisfied.

Mr Balfour continues that the Japanese Government now in power was not the same Government as had made the Treaty of 1915 with China. He honestly believes that this Government intends adopting a more liberal policy and was influenced by what the Japanese representatives had learned in Paris. He says that Baron Makino had arrived on Sunday evening just after he had dictated his memorandum. His shorthand-writer had read it out to Baron Makino who had accepted it.

Mr Lloyd George says it shows a very considerable improvement in the position.

President Wilson draws attention to the fact that Japan retained the right to keep troops in Shantung whereas Germany had had no such rights, even temporarily.

Mr Balfour says that the Japanese representatives had made it clear that this right would only be exercised temporarily during the period of transfer from Japan to China.

President Wilson says that if the Japanese would concede all military rights and make their agreement a purely economic one, he would agree to what they desired. He referred to a subject he had mentioned at previous meetings, namely, that when the League of Nations was set up he would make a proposal for the cession by all the Powers concerned, including Japan, of their rights of extraterritoriality.

M. Balfour thinks that Japan would be willing to limit herself to purely economic claims. He suggests that he should be authorized to write a letter to Baron Makino.

(After a short discussion as to the line to be taken in the letter, it is agreed that Mr Balfour should do as he had proposed and he accordingly sends a letter to the Japanese.

It is also agreed that the Japanese representatives should be asked to meet the Supreme Council on the following day at 11:00.)


15. M Clemenceau draws attention to the military engagements to be imposed upon Germany, which had been approved at a meeting held on April 22nd. The last paragraph of this he points out is as follows:

“As long as the present Treaty remains in force the pledge by Germany to respond to any inquiry that the Council of the League of Nations may deem necessary.”

He points out that according to Article 5 of the League of Nations Covenant decisions, except as provided in the Covenant, would require the agreement of all the members of the League represented at the meeting. It might, however, he points out, be difficult to obtain a unanimous decision, and he suggests that in these matters the Council of the League ought to be able to decide by majority.

President Wilson reminds his colleagues that a decision was taken within the last few days with regard to the Council of the League of Nations, and decided certain economic question by majority vote not by unanimity. Mr Miller, his legal adviser on the League of Nations Covenant, had pointed out that this was not consistent with the Covenant, and had proposed to insert in Article 5, line 1, after the word “Covenant” the following words “or accept as otherwise provided in this Treaty”. If this was decided upon action ought to be taken in the matter in the afternoon.

M Clemenceau considers it very necessary in this case.

President Wilson says that it might be supposed that there will be unreasonable persons on the Council.

Mr Lloyd George points out that sooner or later Germany or Austria might enter the League of Nations and be represented on the Council, and in this case it would be impossible to get a unanimous vote on this subject.

(The following alterations are agreed to

1) In the League of Nations Covenant, Article 5, the first clause should run as follows:

“Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or in the terms of this Treaty decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or the Council shall require the agreement of all the members of the League represented at the meeting.

2) In the document titled military engagements imposed upon Germany, Clause 3 should be as follows:

“As long as the present Treaty remains in force, a pledge to be taken by Germany to respond to any inquiry that will be deemed necessary by the Council of the League of Nations, which, in this matter, will act by a majority vote.”

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify these decisions to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, April 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Preliminary Peace Conference, Protocol No. 5, Plenary Session
M Georges Clemenceau presiding

Present are Representatives from:

The United States of America.

The British Empire:
Great Britain:
The Dominions and India
Canada
Australia
South Africa

Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
China
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Ecuador
France
Greece
Guatemala
The Hedjaz
Honduras
Liberia
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Serbia
Siam
Uruguay

The Minutes of the Session of April 11th, 1919 (Protocol No. 4) are passed around.

Discussion of the Report of the Commission on the League of Nations The Agenda Paper provides for the discussion of the Report of the Commission on the League of Nations.

The President of the United States opens the meeting with the following speech:

“Mr. President, when the text of the Covenant of the League of Nations was last laid before you, I had the honor of reading the Covenant in extenso. I will not detain you today to re-read the Covenant as it has been now altered, but will merely take the liberty of explaining to you some of the alterations that have been made."

Mr Wilson then explains all the changes made since the version they now hold was passed.

When this is done, Baron Makino of Japan proposes a new Amendment guaranteeing the rights of all nations to equality in the League. With his description of all the events leading to this Amendment his speech is also quite long.

M Hymans makes a speech expressing his disappointment that Belgium was not chosen as the Seat of the League of Nations, but also his gratitude that Belgium will have a seat on the Council.

Señor Juan Antonio Buero of Uruguay praises the Draft Covenant for the League of Nations and the principles which guide the world in this direction.

M Léon Bourgeois of France proposes Amendments to two of the Articles in the Draft Covenant which were rejected at an earlier Meeting in the hope that the revised Articles will be accepted.

M Klotz of France proposes a Draft for a Financial Section for the League.

Señor Burgos of Panama adds his Nations approval for the Draft.

Dr Bonilla of Honduras proposes an Amendment to explain the reference to The Monroe Doctrine in Article XXI of the Draft.

M Pichon of France proposes adding the Republic of Monaco to the List of Nations which remained neutral during the war who are now invited to join the League of Nations.

(After an exchange of views between Mr Pichon and the President, it is decided to refer the proposal to the Council of the League of Nations.)

Dr Affonso Costa of Portugal makes the following observations on the Proposal by President Wilson of The United States to select four Members of the League to serve on the Executive Council. His objection is that Article 4 specifically states that only the League may choose which of its members will sit on the Council, and that the Peace Conference has no right to select members for a future Council when it is not even certain yet what nations will be League Members.

M Clemenceau tells Dr Costa that his reservation is duly noted.

(At this point the proposal by President Wilson for the adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Amendments proposed in the course of the session is voted upon and carried unanimously.)

This part of the Agenda is for Sir Robert Borden of Canada to present his Amendment for Clauses on the Condition of Labor. Mr Barns of Great Britain explains the grounds for alterations in the clauses to be inserted in the Peace Treaty.

Sir Robert Borden presents his Draft for Amendments to the nine Resolutions.

M Vandervelde of Belgium expresses his approval of the proposed Amendment.

(M Clemenceau calls for a vote on the Amendment. The alterations are unanimously adopted.)


Note: I have listed here each Delegate to speak and the on which he spoke. In the Meeting each speech was between two and five minutes long, which yet again if posted without editing would make this post several times as long as it is.
-Steve

[Jimbuna]

29th April 1919

Three people inside the barrels of the 14-inch guns of the USS Idaho.


A Belgian farmer, who lost his horses and cattle during the war, pulls a harrow across his field by himself.


German children around an abandoned anti-aircraft gun protecting Cologne.


American soldiers of the 165th Infantry marching on 5th Avenue through the Victory Arch in New York City.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, April 29, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


1, President Wilson has invited the Japanese representatives to an hour’s conversation before the Meeting. At the moment at which M Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George join them, the President has said that he understands that the Japanese are willing to cede back to China the lease and rights in the leased territory, retaining their rights only in the leased district of Kiauchow, and outside of that only economic rights. They are willing, he understands, to forego their right to place troops along the railway and compel the Chinese to accept police instructors. That right had exceeded Germany’s rights outside the leased territory, and went beyond economic rights. He understands that it is contemplated that there should be a joint Chino-Japanese control of the railway, which will be controlled by a corporation. The latter he proposes should have some control in the police also. But to give this right of police control to the Government would convey the same impression to the world as the German control of the Turkish army.

Viscount Chinda says that Japan’s claims regarding police do not in his opinion exceed the rights actually exercised by Germany. The railway was really German-owned property. As German property the railway and its German personnel had the right to extra-territoriality, and this included the rights of policing, as it was the case with the foreign settlements in China.

Mr Balfour says he had thought that Viscount Chinda had on Saturday told him that the railway ran on Chinese territory and outside of German jurisdiction.

Viscount Chinda says that the territory was Chinese, but the railway had in fact been German-owned, and consequently the railway and its personnel enjoyed extra-territoriality.

President Wilson asks why, because the railway was German-owned, it should enjoy extra-territorial rights? If, for example, the United States of America conceded the property in a railway in its own country to Germany, it would not have the right of extraterritoriality.

Viscount Chinda says that it was because in China foreigners have the right of extra-territoriality. As a matter of fact the Germans had employed Chinese as police, but had had an official of great importance not merely as instructor but as an adviser, and the whole police force had in fact been in his hands, consequently Japan, in asking for instructors, claimed less rights than Germany had exercised.

President Wilson says he does not mind Japan asking for these rights, but what he objects to is their imposing them. He is not arguing as to what rights Germany actually obtained by one act or another, but he was only concerned in what Germany’s rights had been to which Japan succeeded.

Mr Balfour asked if he was not right in saying that on Saturday Viscount Chinda had made the point that Japan became the heir of the German rights - that as Germany had owned the majority of the shares in the railway, Japan would inherit the same. That, however, surely did not give Japan the right of extra-territoriality. The remainder of the shares, he understood, were owned by the Chinese. It was certainly news to him that a commercial property of this kind covered extra-territorial rights, including control of police.

Baron Makino said he does not think it was contended that the majority of shares gave the right to extra-territoriality.

President Wilson asks if it was contended that the fact that the Government was the owner gave this right.

Baron Makino says that it is a fact that Germany actually established the state of things which had been criticized.

Viscount Chinda says that territorial sovereignty belongs to China. Extra-territoriality applies not to the territory but to the people.

President Wilson says he cannot admit this. He does not understand the first part of the settlement, namely, that referring to the control of life. He did not admit by inference that extra-territoriality applied to the personnel administering the railway. He is not contesting the facts of the situation that Germany had brought about, but he does contest what Germany had had the right to bring about if China had opposed it.

Viscount Chinda says that Germany had in fact enjoyed these rights. The police, however, had no right to interfere with the regions outside the railway.

Mr Lloyd George says that in the United Kingdom the policing of railways and docks was very often in the hands of the Company concerned. The Company would arrange with the Home Office to hand over to it a section of the police, but it would remain under the control of the Directors of the Company. It seems to him that some use might be made of this analogy. Control through the Directors would not be derogatory to the sovereignty of China any more than control of the London & North Western Railway police was derogatory to the sovereignty of Great Britain.


President Wilson points out the difference that the London & North Western Railway is not owned by a foreign Government. The police arrangements in the United States of America are somewhat similar, and State or City Commissioners often gave the control of railways to the Companies who paid the wages and were permitted to deal direct with these police. In law, however, the police were the employees of the municipalities, counties, etc. of the Central Government. What he contends is that if the majority of the shares is held by the Japanese which would give a Japanese majority on the Board of Directors, they could in fact control the persons by whom the police were chosen. Why, he asks, should we compel a foreign Government to control what a majority of Directors could control in an administrative manner? If the Japanese Government insist on Government control, and on Japanese instructors, they will offend the sovereignty of China, and get no more in fact than they could obtain through a majority of Japanese Directors. He remarks that there is no stipulation in the German lease concerning the right of police.

Viscount Chinda says that the matter might not be founded on an express understanding between Germany and China. It might be inferred from the fact of the ownership of the railway by Germany. The Japanese claim in this respect was a matter of precaution to obtain the necessary rights in China for safeguarding the railway. Practically it might work out all right if Mr. Lloyd George’s proposal were adopted.

President Wilson objects to the form of this claim, which he regards as an unwise one. It would give the impression of offending Chinese sovereignty. He himself was trying to get away from anything that would do this.

Viscount Chinda pointed out that China had accepted the arrangements voluntarily. In that case there would be no infringement of China’s rights.

President Wilson said that the Chinese maintained that it was not voluntary.

Viscount Chinda said it was necessary to draw a distinction between the so called twenty-one points, and the September agreement of last year.

President Wilson says that circumstances and the temper of the parties has altered by 1918, but nevertheless the 1918 agreement has grown out of the 1915 agreement. One had been the supplement of the other.

Viscount Chinda says that the 1918 agreement, was far from having been made under pressure. It had in fact been initiated by the Chinese Government. There had been no question of pressure.

Baron Makino says that the question of police instructors is related to the policy adopted in regard to these instructors. If the instructors were entered on a political basis and took part in the administrative part of their police duties, this would be going too far. The term instructors is rather a vague one. It might be abused as the Germans had done. In their case it had been a matter of a policy of vindication. If such intrusion was carried out it was a misuse. But if the arrangement was voluntarily entered into it would be regarded simply as a police arrangement.

President Wilson says it is extremely difficult for him in the face of public opinion in the United States of America to assent to any part of the arrangement.

He is seeking a way to make it possible for him to agree, and it is not a simple matter. Public opinion in the United States does not agree to the transfer of the concession. He is bound to tell the Japanese representatives that. He is trying to see all views and to find a way out. In these circumstances it greatly increases his difficulty if there is even an appearance of unusual control insisted on, particularly if the transfer of rights to Japan was greater than those exercised by Germany. He could not possibly justify in the United States his assent to a transfer on such terms. Public opinion would say it did not believe in the transfer of the claims at all and that he had actually given Japan more than Germany had had. He must say frankly that he could not do this. He asked the Japanese representatives to cooperate with him in finding a way out. He wanted to support the dignity of Japan, but he thought that Japan gained nothing by insisting on these leased rights being vested in the Government.

Mr Balfour refers to his conversations with the Japanese representatives on the previous Saturday and Sunday. In view of these he is rather surprised at the tone of the present conversation. He understands and had stated in his memorandum that the intention of Japan was fully to restore Chinese sovereignty within the leased territory, and only to retain rights which were economic in their character. He had shown this memorandum to Baron Makino, who had expressed himself satisfied with it. Hence he is surprised this morning to find the question being discussed as to whether Japan did intend to exercise some rights of sovereignty. He had thought that that was not in dispute. He had thought that there was only a question of temporary and transitional arrangements, which did indeed transgress sovereignty, but only for a short time.

Baron Makino says he thought that the question of police instructors had been mentioned in their conversation. The conditions of the transfer arranged in 1918 had surely been discussed.

Mr Balfour says he does not deny this, but the broad issue is as to whether Chinese sovereignty was to be restored in its entirety. If this is to be done Japan would be within her rights in regard to her position in connection with the railway and the concession to negotiate was reasonable. Her position would be analogous with that of other powers which had concessions in China, although no doubt the whole system deserved to be reconsidered and was in need of revision. These concessions, however, would then only be of an economic character. He thought it was agreed that Japan should retain economic rights, and the only outstanding question related to the transitional period. Hence he had felt a good deal of surprise at the line of conversation this morning.

Baron Makino says he is sorry if there had been any misunderstanding. All this, however, was part of the arrangement of 1918.

President Wilson says that if Baron Makino relies on the agreement with China in regard to the police, he must also remind him that this agreement also provides for the maintenance of a military force by Japan in China. Japan does not insist upon that. Why should she insist upon the police?

Baron Makino says that in the conversation that he and Viscount Chinda had had with Mr Balfour, they had felt considerable surprise at the interpretation that Mr Balfour placed on the proposed concentration of troops at Chinan and Tsingtau, which he had apparently regarded as indefinite. The reason for his surprise was that the idea had never entered into his head, nor he believed into the heads of the Japanese military experts. The troops hitherto had been lined out along the railway at a number of points, and this concentration had been regarded as a mere step towards the final withdrawal of the troops. That being their standpoint he had been surprised when Mr Balfour had assumed that it was intended to be for an indefinite period. In regard to the police, the question was of a somewhat different nature to the disposition of the troops. He was not entering into the wisdom of the arrangement, but according to his interpretation one of the stipulations was for the employment of instructors.

President Wilson says that no limit was imposed in regard to troops there.

Baron Makino agrees that on re-reading the article he had found that it might be construed in that sense. This had surprised him and he believes it to be merely a matter of wrong drafting. He admits the phrase had been ambiguous, but the correct interpretation was the one he had given.

President Wilson says that one of the worst features in the whole of these transactions had been the unfortunate 21 demands and this had included a demand for police instructors, although, of course, on a much wider basis. This had caused the greatest irritation, as it was an invasion of Chinese political and administrative independence. It is impossible to divorce transactions of this kind from the public impression they make. The present arrangement is, in public estimation, tied up with the impression made by the 21 demands. He admits that the police point in itself is a minor one, but in its implications, both in China and the United States, it is very unfortunate.

Viscount Chinda pointed out the difference that in the case of the 21 demands the idea had been to employ Japanese officers in entire regions. Here, however, it was only proposed to confine the police to the railway itself.

Mr Lloyd George says that this is a very important point. As the representative of one of the countries bound to support the transfer he was nevertheless very anxious that Japan should reach an agreement with the United States which was not signatory. Was it not possible, he asked, to reach an agreement on the basis of the practice in the United States of America and Great Britain, to which he had already referred? He can quite see that the Japanese do not wish to leave the railway entirely to Chinese administration. They wish to ensure the security of their property and they do not have their direct or indirect control. The same applies in the United Kingdom where, as elsewhere, some police administrations are better than others. He asks if this could not be done as President Wilson had proposed earlier in the discussion by putting the police under the directors? His suggestion would be to insert a clause in the agreement putting the police in the hands of the railway company, and providing that China would also do what was necessary to establish that police force. This would even give the right to the directors to employ Japanese instructors and no doubt instruction was a very important element. By these means, Japan would obtain all she wanted. She would substantially obtain the administration of the police of the railway, but the Chinese status would not be damaged.

Viscount Chinda says that the practical result of this arrangement might perhaps be adequate and satisfactory. The difficulty, however, is that it would involve a revision of the treaty or else a statement which would be regarded in Japan as of the same effect.

Mr. Lloyd George asks why Japan should not merely give an interpretation of the treaty in this sense.

Viscount Chinda asks if this would be a mere transitory measure.

Mr Lloyd George says it would be as a permanent measure, namely, that the arrangement was to be interpreted by Japan as one that would be worked through the directors. He quots Article 2 of the exchange of notes of September 24th, 1918:

“The Chinese Government may organize a police force to undertake the policing of the Kiauchau-Chinan Railway.”

He asked if it could not be stated that the police force would be chosen by the directors.

Viscount Chinda says that as a practical arrangement this would perhaps do very well, as long as it did not alter the agreement or involve a public statement tantamount to a reversal of the agreement.

President Wilson says that he and the Government of the United States could not admit that the agreements were consistent with the terms of the German concession. What he was asked to do is contrary to the great volume of opinion in his own country, namely, to extend the German rights.

Viscount Chinda says he cannot agree to this interpretation. That is the difference between them. The Japanese contend that the policing of the railway had nothing to do with the sovereignty.

President Wilson says he has examined it on the basis of the text of the transfer to Germany and the notes exchanged between China and Japan. These notes certainly contained more than the German concession.

Viscount Chinda said that the German concession carried with it the right of policing.

President Wilson says he is willing to admit the policing being in the hands of a number of directors, the majority of which might be Japanese and he was willing to admit administrative control by them, but he is not willing to admit the right of the Japanese Government to exercise supervision over the police force.

Mr Lloyd George reads the note of September 24th, 1918, and says he cannot find those rights. It does not say that the Japanese would have supervision of the police force. It merely says that they are to be employed at the headquarters of the police, on the principal railway stations and at the police training school. It does not even mention instructors.

Viscount Chinda says that the right of having instructors employed is the Japanese interpretation of the clause.

Mr Lloyd George says that there is nothing in these clauses which could bear the interpretation of putting the Japanese in the position of repudiating the treaty. It merely says that Japanese are to be employed. He again suggests that there will be no departure from the terms of the treaty if the Japanese say that the Japanese chosen would be selected by the directors of the railway. He has no doubt that in fact the directors will have to apply to the Japanese Government. There will not be many suitable people in China and the Japanese Government would be the only source from which they could be obtained.

President Wilson says that the point is that in the treaty with Germany, we should impose the transfer of the German rights to Japan. His interpretation of the Chino-Japanese agreement is that in handing it back to China Japan will, in fact, extend her rights beyond those exercised by the Germans. The Japanese demand that these rights should be transferred with this extension.

Mr Lloyd George says that the only extension is in respect of police. He asks if the instructors of the police had not, in fact, been Germans?

Viscount Chinda says that they had been termed advisers, but had undertaken the whole of the management. He considered that Japan was asking for less than this.

President Wilson says that Germany had not had any such right, although she had exercised it.

Mr Lloyd George asks Viscount Chinda to consider his proposition for leaving it to the directors to control the police.


(There is a considerable adjournment, during which Viscount Chinda confers with his colleagues.)

After some further discussion, Mr Balfour made certain proposals, which, in the course of the discussion are slightly amended, and eventually reach the following form:

1) The declared policy of Japan is to hand back to China in full sovereignty the Shantung Peninsula and to retain only the economic privileges possessed by Germany.

2) The intention of the clauses relating to the police on the railway is merely to give the owners of the railway security for traffic and will be used for no other purpose.

3) Such Japanese instructors as may be required to assist in policing the railway may be selected by the company.
President Wilson made the following proposal:—

“Surrender to China of all rights of sovereignty and retention with regard to the railway and the mines only of the economic rights of a concessionaire, retaining, however, the privilege of establishing a non-exclusive settlement area at Tsingtau.”

Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda undertake carefully to consider the above two formulae and to let the Supreme Council know as soon as possible whether they can accept them or not. If they are unable to accept them or to make any public announcement in regard to them, they undertake to continue the discussion on the following day.


2. A report from Mr. Headlam-Morley and Dr. Haskins concerning the Saar Valley is approved.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate it to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)


3. Mr Lloyd George mentions a speech by the Burgomaster of Cologne which has been brought to his attention intimating the possibility of the establishment of a separate Republic for the Rhenish Provinces and Westphalia. He undertakes to communicate a copy to his colleagues.


4. Sir Maurice Hankey says that the British Admiralty has sent a telegram, asking that the Treaty of Peace should provide for the surrendered German ships to be handed over at such Allied ports as might be designated. The reason for this is that otherwise the Allies would have to go and fetch the ships.

President Wilson says he believed the ships were already dismantled.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that the ships will be able to steam.

(It is agreed that the first clause of Article 25 should read as follows:—

“Within a period of two months from the coming into force of the Present Treaty, the German surface warships enumerated below will be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Governments at such Allied ports as those Governments may direct.”

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)


5. M Clemenceau says that he has been advised by M Jules Cambon that the German plenipotentiaries for Saxony and Bavaria and other States of the German Empire ought to possess credentials not only from the German Central Government but also from their State Governments. The opinion of the Representatives French legal consultants is that we cannot proceed otherwise.

Mr Lloyd George points out that otherwise the Treaty might be signed by the representatives of the Central Government and yet be repudiated by the State Governments.

President Wilson feels some doubt as to the necessity of this.

M Clemenceau suggests the question should be remitted to an expert Committee to advise.

(It is agreed that the question should be examined by a Committee composed of Mr Lansing for the United States of America, Lord Hardinge for the British Empire, and M Jules Cambon for France.)

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, April 29, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)

M MMG Cahen is present for this discussion.

1. The Supreme Council has before them a Note by Sir Maurice Hankey setting forth questions referred by the War Council of Foreign Ministers.


2. M Cahen says that what the French members of the Commission had had in mind was that, in case the Germans were asked, as part of the Clauses on Reparation, to supply labor for the purpose of restoring the devastated regions, a combined system of railway trains should be worked out. The same trains that brought the workmen might return with prisoners. The French representatives had felt it necessary to postpone the decision, in order that the two questions might be considered together.

M Clemenceau says that the prisoners of war ought to be returned immediately after the conclusion of Peace. Why should we mix up the question of trains with the question of prisoners?

M Cahen said that the only reason is that the two questions are intimately connected.

M Clemenceau says that to keep the prisoners would amount to slavery. The question of the supply of labor was another question that might be arranged at Versailles.

M Cahen asks if it is not proposed to enforce the supply of labor on the Germans.

M Clemenceau replied that it is not. It will be arranged.

President Wilson says he entirely agrees with M Clemenceau. Forced labor would be unprecedented, unless one went back thousands of years.

Mr Lloyd George also agrees with M Clemenceau.

(It is agreed That the new Article referred to in Article 1 on the subject of Prisoners of War should provide for the repatriation of Prisoners of War as soon as possible after the signature of the Treaty of Peace, and should be carried out with the utmost rapidity.)


3. President Wilson says that the proposal in Article 6 is practically to take hostages for the surrender of persons believed to have been guilty of breaches of the laws of war. It would be necessary to go back some hundreds of years to find a precedent for this also.

Mr Lloyd George says it is not as though we were dealing with the former German Government. He doubts whether it would be any use to take hostages in dealing with the present Government.

President Wilson asks what it is proposed to do with the hostages. In the end you would have to return them, and they would constitute no effective threat.

M Clemenceau says that all these should be kept against whom there was a presumption of personal guilt.

President Wilson says that this is provided for. (Article 5.)

M Cahen says that this had been a British proposal. The argument in favor of it is that we had evidence of crimes against the laws of war by persons in Germany. If our sanctions prove insufficient, there will be great popular discontent. We have many officer prisoners of the military caste, which is collectively guilty. We propose that some of these officers should be kept if the accused persons were not delivered to justice. Mr Lansing says that there must be no hostages. This is not in our minds. It is merely proposed to give Germany an inducement to hand over the accused persons. If this proposal is rejected offenders against discipline who otherwise would be released as an act of grace, might be kept.

Mr Lloyd George says that he does not agree in this.

M Clemenceau and President Wilson are of the same view.

(It was agreed that Article 6 should be entirely suppressed.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)


4. M Clemenceau says that the question of the recognition of the Yugoslavs has been cleared up. It has been ascertained that the mere acknowledgment of their credentials was equivalent to recognition, and would give occasion to no special declaration by the Allied and Associated Governments.


5. The attached Articles, prepared by Dr Mezes, Sir Eyre Crowe, Baron de Gaiffier and M Tardieu, in regard to Luxembourg, were approved, subject to the agreement of Belgium.

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward the Articles to the Secretary-General, for communication to the Drafting Committee of the Preliminary Peace Conference.)

6. Sir Maurice Hankey, at the conclusion of the meeting, consults President Wilson as to his recollection of the decision taken in regard to Heligoland on April 15th, when no Secretary had been present. The Drafting Committee, he pointed out, had received conflicting accounts.

President Wilson supports Mr Balfour’s recollection of the decision, namely that the naval harbor and the fortifications are to be destroyed, and that the island is not to be re-fortified.

Sir Maurice Hankey undertakes to report this to the Drafting Committee.

(The meeting then adjourns upstairs to the meeting with the Belgian representatives on Reparation.)

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, April 29, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:30

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance) with Representatives of Belgium


The Council has before it the claim of Belgium to receive absolute priority in regard to Reparation and to be repaid the whole costs of the war.


1. M Hymans said that he will begin by reading two letters which had been addressed on April 24th to M Clemenceau and which summarize the Belgian claim.

The first of these letters refers to previous correspondence on the 18th and 22nd February and asks for the insertion in Annex 11 of clauses which will allow Belgium to obtain from Germany the repayment
1) of her war expenses,

2) of the expenses required for feeding her population,

3) of the expenses required for the maintenance of Government services abroad. These expenses have been covered by loans which Belgium has contracted in England, France and the United States.

Belgium further requests that a clause should be inserted in the Peace Treaty to oblige Germany to take back at the price of 1.25 Francs all the Marks introduced into the occupied region at a compulsory fixed rate.

The second letter, referring to clause 6 of the Reparation Draft, proposes that in the allotment of the first installment of Indemnity paid by Germany, Belgium should receive at least 2½ milliards of francs, and that this amount should not be made available for the repayment of credits which have been opened to Belgium on the understanding that they will be repaid out of the first sums received from Germany by way of Indemnity, It is further proposed that the Belgian share of further installments to be received from Germany should be determined in such a manner that the whole amount due to Belgium should be discharged by Germany within a period of 10 years.

M Hymans said that all these claims were based upon the special position of Belgium which, unlike any other country, was forced into the war through the violation of a Treaty. Belgium relies upon a declaration of Sainte Adresse of the 14th February, 1916 in which the French British and Russian Governments declared that they would not lay down their arms until Belgium had been largely indemnified for the damages which she had suffered; and she relied also upon point 2 of President Wilson’s 14 points.

M Hymans says that if he were to speak quite frankly he must admit that the Belgian Government had come to the conclusion that they could not accept the responsibility of taking home to Belgium a Treaty which provided for no preference in regard to Indemnity. Immediate help was necessary to restore the industrial life of the country.

In regard to the redemption of German currency forcibly introduced into Belgium at the price of 1.25 Francs, M Hymans reads a note detailing the purposes to which these sums will be applied if they are obtained. They are required for

1) the payment of about 3 milliards of francs constituting the principal and interest of the German war tax imposed upon Belgium and represented by short dated inter-provincial bonds which the Belgian banks have been forced to accept;

2) the repayment of one million francs of debt contracted by the municipalities to meet the necessities of the civil population during the occupation;

3) the repayment of 2,200,000,000 Francs of Treasury bonds created for the restoration of the currency and the redemption of Marks.

M Hymans says that the payment of these sums by Germany is not only intimately bound up with the restoration of Belgium, but is also indispensable to the credit of the economic restoration of Germany.

The Belgian Government has come to the conclusion that if the requests presented in these letters are not agreed to and if no definite assurance is given as to the percentage reserved to Belgium out of the Indemnity, they will feel it their duty to refer the matter to their Parliament.


2. Mr Lloyd George replies that M Hymans has raised two very different questions: one of them easy and the other extremely difficult. As regards the claim of Belgium to be allotted a substantial share out of the first installment to be received from Germany, he is in entire agreement and thinks that the amount asked for is moderate and reasonable. He agrees that it might be necessary for the Allies to give some kind of guarantee for the first one thousand million pounds to be paid by Germany if this installment is to be available in time to be of use to anybody. But as regards the second point raised by M Hymans, Mr Lloyd George asks whether he is to understand that Belgium presses for the repayment of the costs of the war by Germany to all the Allies equally or is asking for a discriminatory clause under which the whole war costs of Belgium should be recovered out of the Indemnity in spite of the fact that no other Ally is putting in such a claim or will have any chance of obtaining the full costs of the war even if the claim is put in.

M Hymans replied that he is asking for a discrimination in favor of Belgium.

Mr Lloyd George says that he cannot see how any case can be made for such a discrimination. All statesmen have their Parliamentary difficulties, and he had himself returned to London in order to explain to the British Parliament that Germany could not pay the whole costs of the war to all the Allies. He is sure that M Hymans would not want to get rid of his own Parliamentary difficulties at the expense of other countries. He is emphatically of the opinion that Belgium should have, so to speak, the first cut out of the German sausage, and that the priority of Belgium’s claim should be recognized, but he cannot admit the payment of Belgian war costs - even though there might be some advantage to the United Kingdom if such costs were met by Germany, seeing that the money spent by Belgium on the war had been advanced to her by England, France and the United States. He must oppose the Belgian claim on principle, and he believes that the public in France and in England would not be able to understand the proposed discrimination in favour of Belgium. Moreover Serbia is in the same position: Romania also had been overrun and had only a corner of her country free from the occupation of the enemy. If the categories are to be reopened they must be reopened all round; for example, France has made a concession in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine on the express condition that if such preference are given to Belgium the whole question would have to be reopened.


3. M Van den Heuvel says that the term “costs of the war” requires definition. All the Allies are receiving some costs of the war seeing that they were to be reimbursed on account of pensions. The costs of the war for Belgium fall into three different categories. First the Military expenses in strict sense, which amounted to three milliards: second, incidental expenses, including the cost of removing the Government to Le Havre, and the administrative expenses of the Government while in France; third, the expenses of feeding the population. Only about half a million Belgians left the country. It was the duty of Germany to feed the remaining seven millions who stayed in Belgium, but Germany did not fulfill this duty and the cost to Belgium amounted to 2¾ milliards. Belgium had consequently been compelled to borrow in all 5,493 million francs from her Allies and she now claims to be repaid the whole costs of the war on account of her altogether exceptional position. There is no comparison between the position of Belgium and the position of Serbia, but quite apart from the differences which arose out of the causes and the beginning of the war, Belgium is also in a special position in that the Allies had bound themselves by specific obligations over and over again. The declaration of Sainte Adresse had already been referred to and he would quote further a passage from Mr. Lloyd George’s speech on the 5th January, 1918 in which it was said that the first condition necessary to Great Britain if she were to be prepared to lay down her arms was that Belgium should be, so far as possible, guaranteed complete restoration.

Mr Lloyd George points out that here, as elsewhere, the indemnification promised to Belgium was expressly stated to be within the limits of what proved to be possible: in other words within the limits of Germany’s capacity to pay. He asked what the Belgian Representative on the Reparation Commission had estimated that Germany could pay.

M Loucheur said that the Belgian Representative had fully agreed on this subject with his colleagues on the Commission.


4. M Van der Velde says that he wishes to draw attention to the exceptional gravity of a refusal of the Belgian demands which are strictly moderate and have been reduced to the minimum necessary if the Government of the country is to survive. The King of the Belgians had stated that there are at this moment 800,000 unemployed in the country. These unemployed draw from 7 to 14 francs a head a week at a cost of from 30 to 40 million francs a month to the Belgian Government. There has been an increase in the cost of living amounting to 300 per cent; yet in spite of all these difficulties the country is quiet and the working classes are maintaining order. Two things and two things only make it possible to maintain this order, namely first the good organization of the labor party and second the fact that the Government is committed to obtain for the Belgian people a full measure of Reparation and Indemnity. The working classes are quiet because they rely upon the Government to insure that Belgium will be completely restored. If satisfaction is not given to this expectation the very existence of the Belgian Government will become impossible.

M Van der Velde says that he cannot be suspected of not belonging to the party of moderation. He represents the working classes but he demands the fulfillment of the solemn promises which had been given to Belgium by her Allies. He protests against the comparison of the position of Belgium with that of Serbia or Romania. The Allies rendered a great service to Serbia when they came into the war, whereas Belgium, by defending her neutrality, had rendered a great service to the Allies. Belgium came into the war unconditionally, but Romania came in only on stipulated terms and on condition that she should obtain a reward which was now assured to her. The other Allies were all receiving territorial compensation and it would be an intolerable conclusion if Belgium were deprived of her just claims as the result of her magnanimity in trusting only to the essential justice of her cause.

M Van der Velde says that in 1917, just after the Russian revolution, he was speaking to the most extreme revolutionaries who objected to the payment of an Indemnity of any sort, but even they made an exception to their rule in favour of Belgium. Even the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, admitted that Germany must make compensation for the wrong which had been done to Belgium. How then could the Allies now refuse, seeing that the Belgian claims were not so much for a privileged position as for the very existence of their country. Mr Lloyd George had said the other day that he felt a thrill of pride at the distinction which had been drawn by M Van der Velde himself between the English and the Russian methods. If Belgium is to continue to apply and develop the English method of social reconstruction it is essential that the expectation of her working classes should not be disappointed.


5. After some informal discussion M Hymans says that it had been proposed to him that the claim of Belgium to receive 2½ milliards francs out of the first installment of the Indemnity should be recognized and that the expenses of feeding the civilian population should be included under the heading of “dommages de guerre,” but at the same time he has not been able to obtain any definite undertaking as to the percentage of the total payments from Germany which would be allotted to Belgium, nor as to the duration within which the whole amount due to Belgium would be paid. This is an arrangement which the Belgian Delegates cannot accept on behalf of their Government; the matter would therefore have to be referred to the Belgian Government who would probably feel that they must lay the question before their Parliament.


6. President Wilson asks what M. Hymans precisely means by this procedure. The Allies are on the eve of attempting to arrive at a settlement with the Germans and a refusal of the Belgian Government to accept the terms of the Reparation agreement might involve their not being represented at the Peace negotiations. This would be an extremely grave and serious situation and it is to be hoped that the Belgian Representatives will reconsider their decision. They are requesting what had been unanimously decided at the Council to be impossible for any Government. They are well aware that on all hands there is a cordial desire to meet to the utmost every obligation which had been entered into towards Belgium, but the Armistice had been based upon certain statements which he had been authorized to make to the German Government and one of those statements interpreted the liability of Germany as being limited to the damage caused to the civilian population and to their property. Having once defined Reparation as falling within these limits the Allies were bound by their decision and could not depart from it in favour of any particular Government. All the categories included in the Reparation claim to be presented to the Germans fall within the limits of that definition and if any departure from the accepted principles were now made it would mean that the Allies had misled those who they were now bringing to the Peace table.


7. M Hymans replies that the Government cannot accept the responsibility of telling the Belgian people that they were now to receive nothing or next to nothing and that the matter must therefore be referred to the Belgian Parliament. What will then happen it is not possible to say, but seeing that Belgium is a small country it might be necessary for them to bow to the forces of necessity.


8. M Clemenceau protests against the statement of M Hymans that the Belgian people would, under the proposed arrangement, receive next to nothing. They would in fact receive precisely the same treatment as the rest of the Allies.


9. M Clemenceau says that his thoughts are not only of the necessities of the moment, but that here, as always, he is thinking of the necessities of the future. Peace has not merely to be signed, it has to be lived. It must be made of such a kind that it will mold the social life of the future. Considerations of sentiment might be left aside since they count for little in political life, and it is necessary to approach all these problems in a spirit of conciliation and not to insist too strictly on a full measure of concessions or to propose as an alternative a definite breach between those who were charged with arriving at a solution that will guide the tendencies of the future. He himself might often have broken off negotiations if he had insisted on what he conceived to be his rights. Everyone has had to give way on points which appeared to be vital, and everyone must be prepared to take painful decisions and to bear the bitter reproaches of his own supporters. Parliaments are all alike: each of them wants everything for themselves. Newspapers clamor for the impossible and the best thing was to pay no attention to them whatever. It would be a fatal mistake if the Belgian Delegates forced an issue on a question of principle on which all sides are only too anxious to come to an arrangement. It would have been preferable if the Belgian point of view had been expressed not in the form of a protest but in the form of an appeal. Belgium would not have found that she was met by men who were indifferent to her claims, for there was a need of solidarity which bound the Allies one to another. It would be well if the Belgian Delegates were to consider rather what position their country must take up among the great peoples of tomorrow.


10. M Hymans interrupts M. Clemenceau at this point and says that he is prepared to be reasonable and that all he claims was five milliards of francs and a good percentage of Reparation.


11. M Clemenceau says that he would have liked to have finished what he had to say, but that since the Belgian case was put forward in a spirit of recrimination and complaint he prefers to add nothing to what he had said already.


12. Mr Lloyd George asks whether this means that the Belgians propose to negotiate a separate Peace.

M Hymans says it meant that before signing the Treaty the Belgian Government intends to get into contact with its Parliament which is now sitting.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether the Belgians will be present on Thursday at the first meeting with the Germans.

M Hymans replied that he cannot say for certain that they will.


13. Mr Lloyd George says that if Belgian Representatives are not there the Allies will have no right to put forward any claim on behalf of Belgium. It will merely mean that Belgium will be left to make her own terms, seeing that she repudiated the claim which the Allies put forward on her account.


14. M Clemenceau says that there is a necessity for an immediate decision seeing that within two days the credentials of all parties will be examined. It will therefore be necessary to know within 24 hours what are the powers of the Belgian Delegates in the representation of their Government.


15. M Hymans says that the Belgian Government is not responsible for the fact that these questions had arisen at the last moment. They had written immediately to M Clemenceau on receipt of the letter from M Loucheur notifying them of the decisions which had been arrived at with regard to Reparation.

16. M Clemenceau says that M Hymans need not assume that every remark which was made was intended to be a personal reproach directed against himself. Whoever is responsible for the urgency of the situation the fact remains that the Council must be informed within the next 24 hours of the position which Belgium took up in the matter.


17. After further informal discussion the original proposal by which the expenses of ravitaillement for the civilian population were to have been included among “dommages de guerre” is withdrawn, and it is decided that the Belgian Delegates will recommend an alternative arrangement by which the Peace Treaty would include provision for the reimbursement by Germany to the Allied Governments of all sums which Belgium had been obliged to borrow from the Allied Powers as a consequence of the violation of the Treaty of 1839.

[Jimbuna]

30th April 1919

Battleship USS Tennessee (BB-43) is launched (the ship survives the Pearl Harbor attack relatively undamaged and participates in several WWII battles in the Pacific).


Australian Cycling Corps, who served as dispatch riders, recon, and patrols, is disbanded with the end of the war.


Three Deputy Assistant Provost Marshals (Mounted Military Police) awaiting their lunch. Schlebusch (possibly Leverkusen).

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, April 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four (Italy not in attendance)


1. President Wilson says that Mr Lansing had drawn his attention to Article 46 of the Military Terms which provided that “the Armistice of November 11th, 1918 and the subsequent Conventions thereto remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the above stipulations”. He doubts the expediency of this.

Mr Lloyd George agrees.

(President Wilson undertakes to send word to General Bliss and ask him to give a statement as to the precise signification of this Article.)


2. Finland (It is agreed that Mr. Hoover’s letter on the subject of the recognition of Finland should be sent for examination and report by the Council of Foreign Ministers.)


3. M Clemenceau says that M Jules Cambon is sending word to Herr Brockdorff Kantzau, asking him to meet him on Thursday afternoon at the Hotel Trianon, with the credentials of the German Plenipotentiaries.

Mr Lloyd George urges that the meeting should be held in the morning and not in the afternoon, and that M Jules Cambon should be accompanied by other Members of the Credentials Committee.

M Clemenceau suggests that M. Cambon should be telephoned for.

(The discussion of this subject is adjourned, pending the arrival of M Jules Cambon.)


4. M Clemenceau says that Article 41 of the Treaty of Peace has been reserved.

Sir Maurice Hankey reads the Article, which relates to the establishment by Germany of landing places and dirigible sheds, prohibiting their establishment within 150 kilometres of any frontier.

Mr Lloyd George says he had protested against this clause and considers 50 kilometres sufficient.

President Wilson suggests that the whole Article is ridiculous.

(It is agreed that Article 41 should be struck out of the Air Terms.)

M Clemenceau says he was informed that Article 51 was reserved. This Article states that “the upkeep and cost of the Commissions of Control and the expenses involved by their work shall be borne by Germany”.

(It is agreed that this Article should be retained.)


5. The Council has before them a letter from the Japanese Delegation, asking:

1) That Japan should be represented on the Commission for Reparations, since Reparations is a question of general interest, and

2) To see inserted in Article 16 of the Financial Clauses a particular disposition concerning Japan, which has 4,000 German prisoners while Germany has only a few civil Japanese prisoners.

The discussion of this letter at once gives rise to a discussion on the letter addressed by M Loucheur to President Wilson on the question of the application by Serbia for a seat on the Reparations Commission.


6. After some discussion, the following proposal submitted by M Loucheur, Mr Norman Davis, M Baruch, Mr Lamont, and Mr Keynes, is approved:

“Belgium shall sit, as originally proposed, as one of the five members of the Commission for all general discussions and for all other questions except those relating to damage by sea, for which Japan shall take her place, and those relating to Austria-Hungary, for which Serbia shall take Belgium’s place. The Commission will thus always be limited in number to five, and the Japanese and Serbian representatives on the occasions on which they are entitled to sit will have the same power of voting as the delegates of the other four Powers.”


7. The discussions on M Loucheur’s letter lead to a discussion on the attitude to be taken if the Italian Delegation does not return to meet the Germans.

Mr Lloyd George asks if the Allied and Associated Powers are to put in a claim on Italy’s behalf.

President Wilson replies that we cannot do so.

M Clemenceau asks whether it would not be advisable to let M Orlando know that the Germans have arrived, and that the Allied and Associated Powers would meet them in a day or two.

Mr Lloyd George advocates taking no action. They had been offered a definite proposal.

President Wilson says that as far as he is concerned, Italy can have any district in Austria, provided she can secure it by a majority of votes in the plebiscite. This of course would only apply to a clearly defined district, and not to a small spot on the map. If the Italians allege that a particular island was Italian in character, they could have a plebiscite.

Mr Lloyd George points out that their claim to the islands is based on security.

President Wilson says that argument is not a valid one. If Italy insists on her claims to Dalmatia under the Treaty of London, it would upset the whole peace of the world and especially of the Slavonic world.

M Clemenceau says there was news this morning that an Italian dreadnought had been sent to Smyrna.

Sir Maurice Hankey reminds the Council that M Clemenceau at the last meeting with Ms Orlando and Sonnino had asked a direct question, whether the Italians would be present to meet the Germans at Versailles, and M Orlando had replied that this depended on what happened at Rome.

(There is then some short discussion as to the inferences to be drawn from Ms Orlando’s and Sonnino’s speeches, and as to the awkward situation which would arise if the Italians return and insist on France and Great Britain carrying out the Treaty of London, which President Wilson is unable to support.)

Mr Lloyd George reminds his colleagues that he had asked M Orlando if they would be justified in putting forward claims on Italy’s behalf, if Italy was not present at Versailles to meet the Germans. M Orlando had recognized that this was impossible.

President Wilson recalls a conversation he had had with M Orlando in which the latter had shown quite clearly that he realized that if the Italian Delegates did not return, they could not sign the Treaty with Germany; they would be outside the League of Nations; and he had said some words which indicated that he considered they would be, in a sense, outcasts.

President Wilson had then points out that they were quarreling with their best friends and M Orlando had replied in some phrase to the effect that Italy would rather die with honor than compromise.

(No action is decided on as to making any communication.)


8. Attention is then drawn to the last paragraph of M Loucheur’s letter in which is raised the question of the joint and several liability of the enemy States.

President Wilson asks if that had been decided.

Mr Lloyd George says he thought it had been, subject to a book-keeping arrangement proposed by M Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey says that this had been discussed before he was introduced as Secretary. The only intimation on the subject that he had had was that which M Orlando had undertaken, that the Italian financial expert (M Crespi) should discuss the question with the experts of the other Allied and Associated Powers. He had heard from Lord Sumner that a preliminary discussion had taken place, but after that the Italian Delegates had left, and he thought no more had been done.

Mr Lloyd George considers that the question was very important. Romania and Serbia are absorbing great slices of former Austrian territory which was entirely free from war debt, and it would seem desirable that this asset should be balanced against other liabilities.

President Wilson says that the question is too complicated for an off-hand decision. He sees Mr. Lloyd George’s point, but it would work both ways. Germany would have to take her share of the Austrian, Bulgarian and Turkish liabilities, and to that extent, the direct indemnity obtained from Germany would be lessened.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the matter should be settled at once.

President Wilson suggests that a decision should be taken that Germany should be jointly liable with her Allies.

Mr Lloyd George agrees in this, but suggests that in addition the following questions should be referred to expert examination:

1) To work out the Austrian bill of reparations on the same principle as had been adopted in the ease of Germany.

2) To work out the proportion of the Austrian War debt to be borne by Yugoslavia, Transylvania and other parts of the former Austrian Empire transferred to other nationalities.

M Clemenceau say that he would first like to consult his experts, but will inform them of his views on the following morning.


9. The Council next took up the question raised in paragraph (a) of M Loucheur’s letter.

Mr Lloyd George says he is prepared to accept the principle that the proportions in which the successive installments paid over by Germany in satisfaction of the claims against her should be divided by the Allied and Associated Governments should be determined by the Permanent Commission set up under the Reparations Articles, in proportion to the claims allowed by the Commission. It is true that these will not be known before May 21st, 1919, but he is prepared to accept this principle.

President Wilson says that this seems obviously fair.

M. Clemenceau agrees.


10. The Council has before them the draft Articles relating to China. These have been prepared by a Committee composed of:

China: Articles To Be inserted in the Preliminary Peace Treaty
Mr. E. T. Williams for the United States of America.
Mr. Ronald Macleay for the British Empire.
M. Jean Gout for France.

(The Articles are agreed to, subject to a reservation by Mr Lloyd George in Article VI, as he wished to inquire as to why the German renunciation is in one case in favor of the British concessions, and in the other in favour of the French and Chinese Governments jointly. Note: After inquiry, Mr Lloyd George accepts the Articles.)


11. President Wilson says that he was informed that the Allied and Associated journalists are very anxious to see the Treaty of Peace handed to the Germans. He understands that under present arrangements they are only to be permitted to view the approach of the Germans from behind a hedge. He s informed that there is a room separated from the Conference room by a glass screen, and that a number of journalists can be accommodated in this room, and view the proceedings.

(M. Jules Cambon enters during this discussion. This room is entered by a side door so that the Conference would in no way be inconvenienced.)

M Clemenceau says that this description was correct. He thinks that the journalists might be admitted to this room for this particular meeting.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that it is very undignified and improper to admit the journalists and to treat the meeting almost as though it were a menagerie. He does not mind so much the presence of two or three. But it has to be borne in mind that the Germans are in a very delicate and disagreeable position and might have just cause to complain at descriptions being given of the precise manner in which they received the Treaty. He has no bowels of compassion for the Germans, but he thinks that the admission of journalists on such an occasion would be unprecedented.

M Clemenceau suggests that at any rate, they might be admitted to be present at the end of the corridor in order to witness the arrival and departure of the Delegates.

President Wilson says he does not agree in this decision as he considers on principle that the journalists should be present, but he does not press his objection.

(It is agreed that the journalists should be permitted to witness the arrival of the Delegates from the end of the corridor in the Trianon Hotel.)


12. It was agreed:

1) That the credentials of the German Delegates should be examined on the following morning at 11:00.

2) That M Jules Cambon should be accompanied by the Members of the Committee appointed at the Peace Conference for the examination of credentials.

3) That the Committee for the examination of credentials should report the result of their interview to M Clemenceau, President Wilson, and Mr Lloyd George the same afternoon at President Wilson’s house at 16:00.


13. Publication of Peace Terms

Mr. Lloyd George asks how this matter stood.

President Wilson says he understands it had been decided provisionally to publish a summary when it was handed to the Germans, although that depended on the nature of the summary.

Mr Lloyd George suggests it would be desirable to ascertain from the Germans how they regard the matter. He suggested that M. Cambon should be asked to ascertain this on the morrow.

M Clemenceau undertakes to consult M Cambon on the point.


14. Guarantees of Execution of the Treaty of Peace

The Secretary and Interpreter are asked to withdraw from the room during this discussion. After their return, M Clemenceau hands to Sir Maurice Hankey the following sentence to be added to Article 2 (c) of the clauses approved on April 22nd:

“If, at that time, the guarantees against an unprovoked aggression from Germany are not considered sufficient by the Allied and Associated Governments, the evacuation of the occupation troops may be delayed to the extent deemed necessary by the obtaining said guarantees.”