100 Years Ago Today - Page 281

Jimbuna · 10-28-19, 09:00 AM

28th October 1919

Ruins of chateaus destroyed by Bolshevik forces in Poland.

Sailor Steve · 10-28-19, 08:05 PM

Tuesday, October 28, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

...

Jimbuna · 10-29-19, 09:14 AM

29th October 1919

U.S. Congress passes the Volstead Act, which establishes the prohibition of alcohol. The bill was vetoed by President Wilson, but Congress overrode the veto with a two-thirds majority.

Shaku Sōen, Japanese Buddhist monk who was the first Zen Buddhist master to teach in the U.S. and raise awareness of Zen Buddhism in the country, has passed away.

Ship Losses:

Frej (Sweden) The wooden schooner, en route from Åbo to Malmö, sank after striking a mine in the Baltic, west of Gotland. The crew survived.

Sailor Steve · 10-29-19, 09:20 PM

Wednesday, October 29, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a report from the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, dated October 23, 1919, a note in three parts from the British Delegation dated October 23, 24 and 25, 1919 and a letter from the Minister of Finance to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

General Weygand reads and comments upon the report dealing with the violations of the clauses of the Armistice, the preparation of which had been entrusted to the Armistice Commission at Cologne.

Captain Fuller reads and comments upon the notes from the British Delegation dealing with violations of the Naval Clauses of the Armistice.

M de Celle reads and comments upon the letter from the Minister of Finance to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, and adds thereto the following observations:

The Germans were to have supplied a complete list of the plunder and thefts committed by them; there were numerous omissions in the lists supplied. It had been indicated clearly to the Germans that in matters of specie and personal property omission might occur only in exceptional cases and that they should be made known within twenty-four hours of their discovery. The despatch of a new truckload of property had just been made known to them. They had to acknowledge that the German delegates in Paris are actually doing their best to give satisfaction.

Similarly, the documents which Clause 13 of the Protocol of Spa, dated December 1st, 1918, had in mind, concerning notes issued by towns during the German occupation (list of printed notes, lists of notes whose issue had been authorized, list of notes actually issued, list of water-marked paper stocks, etc.,) had not so far been supplied, notwithstanding the formal promise made by Germany to send them before December 10th, 1918. Those lists were of extreme importance in order to discover and suppress possible forgery.

Lastly, as for the recovery of objets d’art, if those that belonged to public museums had been restored this was not the case with objets d’art or furniture taken from private houses. The Germans profess that there has been no official storage of these objects: they know, however, that the experts who had superintended their collection had worked publicly and that furniture and pictures had been carefully packed for transport. It was impossible to admit, as the Germans pretended, that the vanished furniture had been used merely for furnishing posts of command or dugouts.

M Clemenceau asks whether a member of the Council wishes to make any remark.

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes for the moment to leave aside the two most serious violations of the Armistice, namely, the question of the Baltic Provinces and the Scapa Flow incident, to which he intends to return. As for the other violations it is important to adhere to this: that obligations incurred by the terms of the Armistice be retained when the Treaty comes into force. Guarantees to this effect are necessary. If their legal advisors are of the opinion that the stipulations of the Armistice will no longer subsist with the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, it is absolutely necessary to oblige the Germans to sign a special Protocol assuring to the Powers every possible guarantee corresponding to the guarantees of the Armistice.

Mr Polk agrees with Sir Eyre Crowe that the legal advisers should be consulted.

S Scialoja finds the difficulty to arise out of the fact that the conventions of the Armistice, while constituting a veritable treaty, has been imposed in military form. He thinks there are grounds for preparing a Protocol enumerating all the obligations still to be fulfilled, but what sanctions would the Council still wield since the coming into force of the Treaty would deprive it of the sanctions which the Armistice afforded? It is necessary that the Protocol itself incorporate sanctions.

Sir Eyre Crowe maintains that for the very reason adduced by S Scialoja, he has drawn the distinction between the more important and the less important violations of the Armistice: is not such sanction necessary for the less important violations?

M Clemenceau thinks that they do not wish to commit themselves to a perfectly futile manifestation; a definite date has to be fixed. As a matter of form it would be well to say that unless the obligations undertaken were fulfilled they would have to demand sanctions which, as it seemed to him, ought to be of a military nature for in reality there are no others. Therefore, in the Protocol a list of all the so-called secondary violations of the Armistice had to be prepared. He thinks it hardly possible to say to the Germans that they will not have the Treaty come into force until after the execution of those clauses: it would be sufficient to say that if the clauses are not fulfilled, sanctions of military nature would be imposed. The questions of Scapa Flow and of the Baltic Provinces remain. In the former matter they had done nothing; on the latter they had decided upon a course of action the preceding day. Would it not be necessary to know what sanctions they would employ if the mission of General Niessel arrived at no success?

Mr. Polk asks whether it is intended to tell the Germans what sanctions will ultimately be applied.

M Clemenceau says there certainly is no such intention. It would be sufficient to say that there would be some sanction: but of course the Germans would have to sign the Protocol before the Treaty would come into force.

Mr Polk remarks that the Protocol should be submitted first to the Council, which would then have to discuss the question of sanctions.

M Clemenceau agrees.

Mr Polk inquires whether the Council has communicated to the Dutch Government the note sent to Germany relative to the delivery of ships she had sold to Holland.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Dutch Government has been informed of such a note having been sent and told that if it claimed property rights in the ships in question, it would have to justify its claims before the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe reverts to the violation of the Armistice committed in the Scapa Flow incident. The Council had been apprised some time ago of a British proposal on the subject. The sinking of the ships could be considered either the individual act of the officers and crews, or an act for which the German government is responsible. The British Delegation believes that there are grounds for holding the government responsible. In the latter case reparation was due for the value of the sunken ships, cost of salvage of the ships, cost of surveying the anchorage, buoying the wrecks and any subsequent expenses incurred, e.g, in clearing the anchorage of wrecks, etc. It is proposed further that reparation should be in kind, for example in the surrender of the five light cruisers that Germany still possessed and of floating docks, cranes, harbor craft, etc.; that the Germans should be asked further to supply to the Armistice Commission a complete list of this material, delivery of which the Armistice Commission would be authorized to accept.

M Clemenceau says that they are agreed in considering the German Government responsible.

Mr Polk states that he does not yet have the report of his naval experts on the question and asks that it be adjourned.

Sir Eyre Crowe maintains that if they hold the German Government responsible, they can, as the British Delegation believes, repatriate the German officers and seamen of the crews which had been taken prisoner on the destruction of the fleet.

M Clemenceau proposes to discuss that question on the following day.

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to remark further that in the matter of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces the terms of the Armistice are repeated in the body of the Treaty. In that respect, therefore, they do have guarantees.

(It is decided:

(1) To ask the Drafting Committee to prepare a Protocol to be signed by the Representative of the German government before the Treaty comes into force and to contain, along with the list of the unfulfilled clauses of the Armistice, an undertaking by Germany to fulfill those clauses within a prescribed time under penalty of such measures which the Allied and Associated Powers would reserve to themselves in the event of noncompliance;

(2) That the question whether the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces and the Scapa Flow incident were to be explicitly mentioned in this Protocol be provisionally reserved.)

2. General Niessel wishes to point out to the Council that it would be difficult for his Mission to leave the Monday or Wednesday following; his Italian colleague has not yet arrived and General Turner’s officers will not be in Paris before the end of the week. Lastly there will be difficulties from the point of view of railroad transportation.

M Clemenceau says that General Niessel will leave on Wednesday at the latest.

M Clemenceau thinks that they might agree provisionally that the expenses of the Mission will be divided between the Allies.

M Berthelot explains that for the moment it was only a question of the immediate expenses of maintenance and voyage.

Mr Polk says that it would be best that each Power supply the expenses of its own representatives.

(It is decided that, subject to later examination of the question by the Supreme Council, each Power should pay the expenses of its representatives on the Inter-Allied Baltic Provinces Military Commission.

3. The Council has before it a note from the New States Commission asking the Supreme Council for instructions.

M Kammerer reads and comments upon the first part of the note.

S Scialoja thinks it preferable to insert in the Bulgarian Treaty a clause by which Serbia and Romania would incur the same obligations as those of article 46 of the Treaty with Greece.

M Kammerer suggests that if, in the Treaty with Bulgaria, the same terms are inserted which had prevented Serbia from signing the Treaty with Austria, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would not sign the Bulgarian Treaty; the result would correspond to the second procedure suggested by the Commission.

Mr Polk wonders whether, if they make it possible to sign the Bulgarian Treaty without inserting therein the same terms as in the Austrian Treaty, they might not leave it optional to certain powers to sign one Treaty and not the other. It is most important, he thinks, to tell the Romanians and the Serbs that if they do not sign the Austrian Treaty neither will they sign the Bulgarian Treaty.

M Kammerer agrees that the insertion of a new article might be possible; he thinks, however, that it would be disagreeable to the states concerned for the Council to tell them that they could not sign the Bulgarian Treaty before signing the Austrian Treaty.

Mr Polk does not see that they have to modify a treaty so as to satisfy a power that refuses to sign.

M Pichon considers the second method preferable; they will inform the Romanians and Serbs that they cannot sign the Bulgarian Treaty unless they signed the Austrian Treaty. The Council will thus be in possession of a further means of bringing pressure to bear upon them.

Sir Eyre Crowe considers that there should be on the agenda of an early sitting of the Council, the question of the signature of the Austrian Treaty by the Romanians and Serbs.

M Pichon said Mr Trumbic has arrived and that General Coanda has left Bucharest the previous day. According to a telegram he had received that morning, he thinks the signature probable.

Sir Eyre Crowe’s information does not give him the same impression.

Mr Polk is in a similar situation. He has the feeling that the Romanians wish simply to gain time.

M Kammerer reads and comments upon the second part of the report of the New States Commission.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks what right Bulgaria has to set up as champion of the Turkish cause.

M Kammerer explains that it is not Turks properly speaking, but Turkish subjects who had taken refuge in Bulgarian territory. The Italian Delegation is afraid that Serbia is preventing their exercising that right of option which the 1913 treaty gives them, but which the outbreak of war had made impossible. There is no doubt that the insertion of special clauses in the Treaty would be unpleasant enough for Serbia.

Sir Eyre Crowe maintains that it is always dangerous to modify a treaty once it has been signed, and that the Allied and Associated Powers had already signed the Minorities Treaty.

M Kammerer explains that it is the Italian Delegation that insists upon that solution.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks if there is any evidence to show the Turks intend returning into Serbian territory?

Mr Polk explains that it is a question of Macedonian refugees.

M Pichon asks whether, instead of changing the text of the Treaty, a procedure which as Sir Eyre Crowe had pointed out, presents serious disadvantages, they could not demand of Serbia written declarations on the point?

M Kammerer is of the opinion that Serbia would prefer that solution.

S Scialoja points out that in the Bulgarian Treaty a clause could be inserted analogous to that in which Greece was placed by Article IV of the proposed Greek Treaty.

M Kammerer says that the Commission has judged that this involves difficulties and that there is no point in concealing the fact that the insertion of a clause of such nature in the Bulgarian Treaty would be extremely disagreeable to the Serbs.

S Scialoja maintains that Serbia would have to restore to its refugees the right of option which the outbreak of war had prevented them from exercising in the prescribed time.

M Pichon believes that Serbia should make the declaration in a letter.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should make known to the Roumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegations that these latter countries will not be allowed to sign the Treaty with Bulgaria before having signed the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty;

(2) That the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government be asked to make known by written declaration that it would authorize its Ottoman subjects who, owing to the war, had not been able to avail themselves in the prescribed time of the right of option envisaged by the Treaty of 1913, to take advantage of that right.)

4. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation dated October 27th.

(After a short discussion it is decided to refer to the military representatives at Versailles, for examination and report, the request for instructions addressed to the Supreme Council by the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany.

5. The Council has before it a draft note to the German Government, prepared by the Polish Commission.

(It is decided to approve the draft note to the German Government on the question of municipal elections in Upper Silesia as prepared by the Polish Commission.)

6. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation dated October 27th.

M Pichon considers it logical to adopt the proposal, which conforms to previous decisions of the Supreme Council.

Mr Polk asks who will fix the salaries.

M Pichon says it will be a matter for deciding as in analogous cases.

(It is decided:

(1) That the salaries and allowances of the temporary Administrator of the Free City of Danzig and his staff, and of the Administrative Staff of Memel should be a charge upon local revenues;

(2) That the rate of these salaries and allowances should be fixed by the Sub-Committee on the Execution of the Treaty with Germany.)

7. The Council has before it a report of the Commission entrusted with examining the question of the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners from Siberia.

Captain de Corvette Fabre reads and comments upon the report of the Commission.

Mr Polk thinks that the order of repatriation could be modified by financial considerations. As regarded the Czechs, an agreement had been arrived at, which placed the immediate expenses of repatriation on Great Britain, the United States and France. No account has been taken so far of the Poles, the Romanians and the Serbs. Perhaps the United States will be led to assume responsibility for this repatriation. In any case, he is obliged to remark that the financial rulings of the United States Treasury Department forbid his government from participating in expenses of a provisional nature that might be subject to a later readjustment among the Powers; the United States could only make direct advances to the small nations concerned.

M Pichon holds that the thing to do at the moment is for each Power to appoint a financial expert and a political representative to be attached to the Commission actually existing.

Captain de Corvette Fabre remarks that the Commission is qualified to deal only with prisoners. It is therefore asking the Council to decide whether it will be competent to deal likewise with the volunteers of friendly nationalities who ought to be repatriated.

M Kammerer insists on the necessity of the Commission being empowered to deal with volunteers as well as prisoners. The two questions are bound together from the point of view both of transport and of finance.

Sir Eyre Crowe does not think his Government inclined to participate in the expenses of repatriating 250,000 German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners; they had the repatriation of their Allies to consider.

M Berthelot holds that distinction must be made between repatriation of their Allies and of prisoners belonging to one of the enemy powers: from the humane point of view these were alike; politically, there are raised questions of quite different kinds. The Council has already decided that the repatriation of enemy prisoners should wait until after that of Allied volunteers. They are informed that the Germans have already been trying to conclude private contracts with Japanese ship owners. If they are to let Japanese shipping companies repatriate enemies who are ready to pay a very high price, the effect would be disastrous, and it is important that Mr Matsui should draw the attention of his government to the question.

Mr Matsui states that his government has informed him that the statement that ships have been chartered on behalf of Germany is incorrect. The Japanese government has no ships at its disposal; and private ship owners have concluded agreements to charter ships for the purpose of repatriating Czechs. Once the Treaty comes into force it would be for each government to get into direct touch with the ship owners. He had already acquainted Tokyo with that decision of the Supreme Council, which had in mind giving priority to the repatriation of the Allies.

M Kammerer holds that they can and, indeed, ought to leave to the Germans the care of arranging the repatriation of their prisoners. It is for the Commission only to make sure that that repatriation should not precede the repatriation of volunteers of friendly nationalities.

Captain de Corvette Fabre points out that it is exactly for that reason that the Commission had asked enlargement of its powers. It had been formed originally to organize the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners of war, but had found itself confronted by a resolution of the Supreme Council which specified that the repatriation of those prisoners should not take place until after the repatriation of volunteers of friendly nationalities. So long as the repatriation of those volunteers had not yet begun, the Commission could not work to any purpose.

Mr Polk thinks that the Commission could confine itself to examining the repatriation of prisoners without taking any executive steps.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks why the Commission should have to concern itself with German and Austrian prisoners of war at all. Article 215 of the German Treaty envisages the setting up of a special commission, for the repatriation of prisoners. This question was its peculiar concern, and he understands that it was forming a Sub-Commission to take care of this particular case.

Captain de Corvette Fabre states that the Commission refers to in article 215 had to deal exclusively with enemy prisoners taken by the Allied and Associated Powers; the repatriation of prisoners from Siberia taken by the Russians did not concern it. Indeed practically all the prisoners in Siberia had been taken by the Russians, and it would be impossible to repatriate them without authorization of the Government of Omsk which might wish to retain them as hostages.

M Pichon acknowledges that they have no legal obligation towards enemy prisoners who had been retained in Siberia.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Commission entrusted by the Supreme Council with studying the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners from Siberia should examine at the same time the question of repatriating the volunteers of friendly nationalities;

(2) That, in view of the consequent extension of their powers and because of the complexity of the problems raised by the question of repatriation, each of the Allied and Associated Powers should nominate to the Commission representatives for political and financial questions.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna · 10-30-19, 06:54 AM

30th October 1919

The International Labour Organization holds its first conference in Washington D.C., with French socialist politician Albert Thomas as its first director.

Anti-Bolshevik cavalry under General Denikin marching in Kharkov.

Pilot and navigator of the Alliance plane that attempted a London to Australia flight.

Sailor Steve · 10-30-19, 06:49 PM

Thursday, October 30, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a draft note of the Drafting Committee on the notification to the German Government of the coming into force of the Treaty.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon this note.

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to raise a point of mere form relative to the second paragraph of this draft note. He desires that this paragraph be changed to read as follows:

“The President of the Peace Conference has the honor to inform the German Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely, the British Empire, France and Italy, have ratified the Treaty, and Germany, on the other hand, having likewise ratified it, the above mentioned condition is fulfilled.”

This change is merely designed to prevent the note being drafted in such form as to notify the German Government that it had ratified the Treaty.

M Pichon says that the question of the date to be fixed for the coming into force of the Treaty should not be discussed at the present time.

M Fromageot concludes his commentaries on the draft note by saying that, as a result of the decision taken the preceding day by the Council relative to the unexecuted Armistice clauses and to the drafting of a Protocol, he thinks that a paragraph should be added at the end of the draft note to the effect that the German Government should send a representative to Paris prior to the ratification of the Treaty, with power to sign a Protocol relative to the unexecuted Armistice clauses.

(This was agreed to.)

The Drafting Committee thinks that a large majority of the unexecuted Armistice Clauses are covered by provisions in the Treaty itself: in most cases the Treaty in terms imposes upon the German Government the same obligations as did the Armistice, and a large number of these Treaty provisions likewise specified the penalty for non-fulfillment of these obligations.

M Pichon observes that for such violations of the Armistice clauses as the Scapa Flow incident no penalties are provided.

M Fromageot says that this is true, and that likewise no penalties were provided for the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, although in this case the Treaty does take care of this obligation (Article 433). With respect to most of the remaining unexecuted clauses of the Armistice the Treaty provides penalties. He thinks it might be well to give a brief summary of the unexecuted clauses. There is nothing in the Treaty with respect to the delivery by the German Government of rolling stock. With respect to the Financial Clauses, the Treaty in Article 238 not only reiterated the obligations incumbent upon the German Government, but explicitly provides penalties. This is likewise true with respect to the handing over of agricultural and industrial implements. The Penalties provided for Germany’s non-fulfillment of her obligations in general are laid down in Article 430 and paragraphs 17 and 18 of the second annex to Part VIII (Reparations). The question of works of art is likewise fully covered. The question of aeronautic material is not so well covered. Articles 170, 202 and 210 of the Treaty prohibited the exportation of such material but no penalties were provided. The Committee does not feel that it quite understands the argument of the Minister for Finance relative to the payment by the German Government of maintenance expenses of the troops of occupation. The question of the German mercantile marine, which at present resolved itself into a matter of the tank steamers, the five vessels alleged to be sold to Holland and some undelivered vessels in neutral ports, was also fully covered by the Treaty. The foregoing summary seems to indicate that in general the Treaty takes into account the probability of the German Government not having fulfilled all its obligations under the Armistice prior to the entry into force of the Treaty.

M Pichon asks if there are any remarks.

Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to know if this note is to be sent to the German Government without at the same time informing it what it was proposed to include in the Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses. He thinks that if the German Government is directed to send a representative to sign such Protocol without knowing what it is to contain, further delay would ensue.

M Berthelot remarks that there was no need at the present time to arrive at a decision as to the date of deposit of ratifications. The Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses will be ready on the following Saturday; the point is to agree upon the form of the note which should be sent at the proper time.

M Pichon says it is only necessary to agree on the principle of this note.

Marshal Foch says that he agrees in principle with the foregoing remarks, but he feels that it is important to let the German Government know what has to be done. He thinks that the following arrangement would be most advisable: without letting the German Government know the exact date of the deposit of ratifications it should be informed that the Treaty will be put into force at an early but undetermined date which could be designated as “D” day. The German Government can be informed at once that on “D” minus 8 day for instance, it would be notified of the date of deposits of ratifications and that on “D” minus 6 day, for instance, its representative must be in Paris. He thinks that an arrangement of the note on such a basis would solve all difficulties.

M Berthelot inquires if it is intended that the representatives of the German Government should all be in Paris and not in the various regions where Allied Commissions and troops of occupation are to arrive.

General Weygand said that the German representatives must be here and come to an agreement before the Treaty could be put into force.

M Berthelot brings up the example of Silesia. Should it be decided here in Paris what German officials would remain there in order to effectuate a transfer of authority in that territory without a hitch?

General Le Rond replies that German representatives should be here in Paris to settle the general principles involved, and that officials should likewise remain in Silesia and other territories where the same situation was presented in order to effect the necessary arrangements with the incoming Allied Commissions and troops of occupation. The procedure to be adopted consists of two phases.

General Weygand thinks it would be better not to put these details in the draft note, as confusion would certainly be caused thereby. It is most important that the summoning to Paris of the German representatives should not be bound up with the question of settling the date of deposits of ratifications.

M Pichon agrees that pourparlers should certainly start in Paris before the date of deposit of ratifications is necessarily fixed.

M Polk, referring to Marshal Foch’s idea as to rearrangement of the draft note on a time-table basis, inquired whether this is to include the unfulfilled Armistice clauses. He supposes that it is only meant to refer to movement of troops, evacuation, and similar points.

M Pichon says that this is so.

S Scialoja thinks that the draft note should be modified so that the invitation to the German Government to participate in the deposit of ratifications should be eliminated so long as that date remains unsettled. It will be enough to merely inform the German Government that as the time for deposit was approaching, it became necessary for it to fulfill the conditions precedent thereto.

M Berthelot thinks that the German Government should be informed why the deposit of ratifications had not yet taken place.

S Scialoja thought that representatives of the German Government should be summoned to Paris immediately to discuss the matters still remaining unsettled prior to the fixing of a date for the deposit of ratifications.

M Fromageot still thinks it would be better to retain the framework of the draft note to the extent of acquainting the German Government with the proposed procedure, this in order to avoid any argument on their part that the Treaty should now automatically be put into force.

M Pichon sums up by suggesting that the draft note should be changed so as to accord with the views above expressed by Marshal Foch, S Scialoja, Sir Eyre Crowe and M Fromageot, and that as so modified, it should be submitted to the Council on the following Saturday, together with the Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses.

(This is agreed to.)

(It is decided:

(1) To accept in principle the note of the Drafting Committee on the notification to the German Government of the coming into force of the Treaty, with the following modifications:

(a) In the first part of said draft the German Government should be invited to participate in the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty at a date specified as not yet being determined.

(b) That the German Government, at the same time, should be informed that the date of the coming into force of the Treaty will later be communicated to it in ample time but that without awaiting the notification of said date it should immediately send representatives to Paris to discuss the settlement of the matters constituting conditions precedent to the putting into force of the Treaty.

(c) To add at the end of said draft a paragraph to the effect that the German Government, prior to the date of deposit of ratifications, should send representatives to Paris with power to sign a Protocol dealing with the unexecuted clauses of the Armistice.

It is further decided:

(1) To change the form of the second paragraph of said draft so that it should read as follows: “The president of the Peace Conference has the honor to inform the German Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely: the British Empire, France and Italy, have ratified the Treaty, and Germany, on the other hand, having likewise ratified it, the above mentioned condition has been fulfilled.”

(2) That the draft note of the Drafting Committee should be modified as above indicated and submitted to the Council on the following Saturday, together with the Protocol relative to the unexecuted Armistice Clauses.

2. Captain Fuller RN explains to the Council that the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers met on the preceding day; no report had been made by them to the Council, but the report which he was now going to read had been agreed to by the British, French, Italian and Japanese representatives, and in great part had been agreed to by the United States representative, who, however, wishes to submit a minority report. He then reads the majority report. He adds that it is understood that in the event of the surface vessels being broken up and sunk, the same procedure should not be adopted in the case of floating docks.

Mr Polk asks if Rear Admiral McCully might read his minority report.

Rear Admiral McCully then reads his minority report.

Mr Polk says that the point of view of the minority report is this: although it had already been decided that the German Government should give up certain ships, their disposition had never been definitely determined. At one time there had been some question of sinking them. Now the ships in question had actually been sunk. The majority report proposed to take mercantile material, which of course could not be destroyed, in reparation for the vessels sunk. This mercantile material would be useful to the Reparation Commission. It seemed to him better, by way of reparation for the vessels sunk, to take from the German Government naval material which could be destroyed if so desired. The point he wished to emphasize was that he thought that the proposal to take over mercantile material, raised a question which distinctly affected the Reparation Commission.

M Pichon remarks that the French Government had never agreed to the sinking of these ships.

Mr Polk replies that such is not his contention. That is not the point now at issue. His question is whether it is not better to leave this mercantile material to be devoted to such purposes that it would become useful to the operations of the Reparation Commission, rather than, by taking it away, to diminish Germany’s power of making adequate reparation.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks that several questions are now being confused. He points out that the British Government has been willing to make a big concession; it is willing to bear all the loss resulting from the Scapa Flow incident, therefore, it seems to him that the opinion of his Government should now bear some weight. To him it seems pointless to take over from the German Government ships which are useless to them and are equally useless to the Allied and Associated Powers. He thinks that such an action might indeed be pleasing to the German Government. Likewise the docks which it proposes to take over are so large that they are only useful for large sized ships of which the Germans now have none, and certainly it is not desired to encourage them to build any.

M Berthelot thinks that Mr Polk’s observations have shown that the argument of the United States is entirely based upon the sinking of the ships. The question has now, however, reached a further stage. Neither the French nor the Italian Governments had ever agreed to the sinking of the ships and they had demanded their distribution. Certainly there is no point in distributing the ships if they are thereafter to be sunk. He recognizes the force of Sir Eyre Crowe’s argument and he wishes to point out that the British Government has even made another concession: although the British Government is prepared to have the ships sunk and thinks that the American Government will agree, nevertheless, it is ready to admit the right of France and Italy to dispose of their share of the ships as they see fit. He thinks it is important to settle now the question whether or not the ships are to be sunk.

Mr Polk inquires if M Berthelot means to say that naval material ought not to be replaced by naval material. However the Council is not now discussing the disposition of ships; he merely wishes to repeat that he thinks the question now under discussion is one that interests the Reparation Commission. The action proposed by the majority is, to give a priority, on account of reparation, for the ships sunk. To his mind three points are involved: there is no question at the present time of the disposition of the ships; he understands and appreciates the attitude of the British Government; he thinks that this is a question for the Reparation Commission. He points out that his position is purely a matter of principle inasmuch as the United States will not get any ships.

M Pichon thinks that this presents a new phase of the question.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that this will make it impossible to settle the Scapa Flow incident prior to the drafting of the Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses and will indefinitely postpone the entry into force of the Treaty.

M Pichon agrees, and observes that Marshal Foch had pointed out to him that as this is a question of a violation of the Armistice the Reparation Commission could not yet be interested therein. The American argument can equally be applied to all material to be handed over by virtue of the Armistice clauses.

Mr Polk asks if the Financial experts have not been consulted with respect to the delivery of locomotives and similar questions?

Marshal Foch said that they have not, for the reason that the Reparation Commission has not yet existed and does not yet exist.

Mr Polk thinks that on that basis it will be easy for the Armistice Commissions to seriously embarrass the Reparation Commission.

M Pichon remarks that all matters heretofore adjusted had been controlled by the Supreme Council.

S Scialoja adds that the conception of reparation only existed by virtue of the coming into force of the Treaty.

Mr Polk says that he is surprised to learn that the Financial experts had not been consulted. He thinks that the American Financial experts had at least given an opinion on these matters.

M Pichon says that the French Government cannot yield on this point.

Mr Polk remarks that if the docks and similar material now proposed to be demanded are received, the United States would get something, otherwise they would not.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the principle of demanding floating docks and similar material should be maintained, at the same time giving instructions that only the large ones and those belonging to the German Government or in which it had a predominating interest should be taken.

Mr Polk thinks that the Naval Representatives can easily agree on that basis.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the Naval representatives should immediately meet and settle this question.

M Pichon remarks that the question is a very urgent one inasmuch as it has to be settled before the Protocol, which is to be submitted the following Saturday, can be drafted. The Naval representatives should come to a conclusion by the following day at the latest and communicate the same to M Berthelot and M Fromageot.

Captain Fuller, RN, said he understands then that the Committee of Naval Experts might call upon the German Government to make over by way of reparation: (1) Government docks; (2) docks, cranes, etc., in which the German Government had a predominating interest; and, (3) docks, cranes, etc., the removal of which would not affect the working of ports in which they were situated either from the Allied or from the German point of view.

(It is decided:

(1) To accept the principle of the responsibility of the German Government for the sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow.

(2) That the Committee of Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should meet immediately and agree as to the reparation to be exacted from the German Government for the sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow, being guided by the principle that docks and similar material belonging to the German Government or in which it had a predominating interest, or too large to be suitable for present German maritime uses, should be taken by way of reparation.)

3. The Council has before it a report of the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers relative to the dispatch of naval vessels to Flensburg.

M Pichon suggests that the recommendations contained in this report be adopted.

(This is agreed to.)

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he only wishes to recall the fact that although it had been intended to send three battalions to Schleswig, only two battalions would go there. It is worth considering, in view of the adoption of the Naval Representatives’ recommendation not to send Allied warships to Flensburg, whether this force is sufficient.

(It was decided to accept the report of the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers relative to dispatching naval vessels to Flensburg.

4. M Pichon thinks that, as the Central Territorial Committee is not unanimous, the best procedure is for it to submit majority and minority reports which would be discussed and settled by the Council at its meeting on the following Saturday.

M Laroche observes that certain delegations have stated that the opinion held by them relative to the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier might be influenced by the Council’s solution of the Dobrudja question; certain other delegations had stated that their opinion would not be changed by such a solution.

Mr Polk inquires if the question of Dobrudja is not a short one susceptible of being settled immediately.

M Pichon remarks that he can only say that the opinion of the French Government is that Dobrudja, a province belonging to an Allied Government, should not be taken away from it and given over to Bulgaria, an enemy.

Mr Polk points out that he is not insisting on that matter being settled now. The only point before the Council is what kind of an answer should be sent to Bulgaria? He quite understands that in this answer there would be nothing relative to transferring Dobrudja to Bulgaria.

M Laroche says that the settlement of the Dobrudja question is intimately connected with that of Bessarabia.

Mr Polk replies that in his opinion the question of Bessarabia should not be discussed at the present moment particularly on account of the situation in Russia.

M Pichon agrees.

M Laroche says that if the question of Bessarabia is not to be raised he thinks the question of Dobrudja should likewise not be raised.

Mr Polk thinks that at some other time or in some other form, by the medium of another Treaty or action on the part of the League of Nations, the question of Dobrudja could be brought up.

M Pichon says the French Government absolutely does not agree to any solution contemplating the transfer of Dobrudja to Bulgaria.

M Laroche thinks that if the matter is left for future action in the manner intimated, with the implication that Dobrudja will eventually be transferred to Bulgaria, it was equivalent to certainly depriving Romania of this province.

Mr Polk remarks that the chief trouble is that Romania has been given everything she wanted in a territorial way without any equivalent being demanded. The time to bargain would have been when Romania’s territorial requests had been freely granted.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests that it will be sufficient to say in the answer to the Bulgarian counter-proposals that in a Treaty with Bulgaria the question of Dobrudja cannot be raised.

M Berthelot agrees. He thinks that it would be inadvisable to mention anything further, particularly in regard to the League of Nations.

(The suggestion of Sir Eyre Crowe meets with approval and the discussion of the questions of Dobrudja and the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier is fixed for the meeting of Saturday, November 1st, 1919.)

5. M Berthelot, referring to the draft instructions to the Inter-Allied Commission charged with examining into the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, calls attention to Section X thereof.

In the first paragraph of that Section it is provided that: “In order to accomplish its mission, the Allied Commission shall have at its disposal the personnel of the British and French Allied Missions now operating in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with a view to preventing any isolated initiative or divergence of action.” He observes that no mention has been made of Italian and American Commissions. He thinks that the paragraph should be redrafted so as to include the personnel of the Military Mission of all the Allied and Associated Powers. He understands that there is no Italian Military Mission in that region but that there is an American one.

Mr Polk states that there is no American Military Mission in that region, but that he had no objection to the change proposed.

(It was decided to modify Section X of the draft instructions to the Inter-Allied Commission charged with the examining into the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, so that the first paragraph thereof should read as follows:

“In order to accomplish its mission, the Inter-Allied Commission shall have at its disposal the personnel of the Military Missions of all the Allied and Associated Powers now operating in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with a view to preventing any isolated initiative or divergence of action”.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Jimbuna · 10-31-19, 07:00 AM

31st October 1919

U.S. transport ships in Trebizond Harbour, Ottoman Empire (Turkey)

Barbed wire barricade protecting the home of German War Minister Noske in Berlin due to unrest in the city.

Ship Losses:

Fazilka (United Kingdom) The cargo liner was wrecked on Great Nicobar Island, India.

Sailor Steve · 10-31-19, 06:11 PM

Friday, October 31, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna · 11-01-19, 08:23 AM

1st November 1919

A train crash at Vigerslev, Denmark results in the deaths of 40 people.

upload images for free

Damaged streets in Riga after fighting occurred between Latvian and Estonian troops against the German-backed West Russian Volunteer Army.

A padre placing a wreath on a fallen soldier's grave in a cemetery near Cologne, Germany following World War One on 1st November 1919.

Ship Losses:

Volturnus (United Kingdom) The coastal cargo class ship was sunk in the Kattegat 5 miles Southeast of the Skaw light vessel by mines.

Sailor Steve · 11-01-19, 08:17 PM

Saturday, November 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

Saturday, November 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

1. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation dated October 28, 1919.

Sir Eyre Crowe states that the question is a very simple one, and is summarized in the note from the British Delegation which had been circulated among in the members of the Council. The Council had appointed, at some prior time, General Milne as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in Asia Minor: It seems that neither the French nor the Italian authorities had been informed of the decision of the Council.

M Pichon thinks indeed that the question cannot raise any difficulty so long as the beginning of the note, as submitted to the Council, is altered slightly: The British Delegation had said that the General Officer commanding the British troops at Constantinople and in Asia Minor (Syria excepted) had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in those regions. This assertion was correct, as far as Turkey in Asia was concerned, but the question of the command at Constantinople was the object of negotiations between the British and French Governments.

Sir Eyre Crowe agreed with this remark, but asked, above all, that the French and Italian military authorities be informed of the decisions of the Supreme Council, which had recognized the authority of General Milne.

M Berthelot thought that there could be no doubt whatsoever on this question, and added he could not understand the misunderstanding which had taken place, for the necessary information had been given at the same time to M de France and to General Franchet d’Esperey.

S Scialoja asked that the same instructions be repeated to the Italian military authorities.

M Pichon agreed that this information should be reiterated.

(It is decided that the French and Italian Delegations take the necessary steps to inform their representatives in Turkey that the Supreme Council had appointed General Milne as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Asia Minor, Syria excepted.

2. The Council has before it a draft note prepared by the Drafting Committee.

M Fromageot comments upon this draft note and remarked that the Drafting Committee has taken account of the observations made at the preceding meeting of the Supreme Council, and also that the new draft was presented by all the members of the Committee.

General Weygand says that the draft, as prepared by the Drafting Committee, invites the German Government to send representatives to Paris on November 6th. He would like to know whether on the 6th of November they could profitably discuss with the German delegates: would the Commissions be ready on that date?

M Berthelot said that he had proposed November 6th to take into account the wish expressed by General Weygand himself that the conference should take place as soon as possible, but could easily be put off for a few days.

General Weygand thinks that from a military standpoint they would certainly be ready on November 6th, but that perhaps that date might be a little early for the Commissions.

M Pichon proposes the 10th instead of the 6th.

(This proposal is adopted)

(It is decided that the draft note to the German Government, prepared by the Drafting Committee, relative to putting the Treaty into force, be approved, and that the German Government be asked to send representatives to be in Paris on the 10th, and not on the 6th, of November, 1919.

3. The Council ha before it a draft Protocol, prepared by the Drafting Committee.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon the draft prepared by the Drafting Committee, and remarked that there was occasion to modify the draft on the following points:

(1) Page 1, point 3: Eliminate in the second line the word “immediately” and add after the words, “in Russian Territory” the words, “as soon as the Allies judge opportune.”

(2) Page 1, point 4: Substitute the word, “coercive” for the word, “consecutive.”

(3) Page 1, point 5: Substitute the word “fiduciary” for the word, “judicial.”

(4) Page 2, point 6: Add to the end of the paragraph, “destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over.”

(5) Page 3, point 11: Add to the end of the paragraph, “and various other merchant vessels.”

(6) Page 4: Add to the end of the second paragraph, “and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over.”

(7) Page 4, point 2: Add to the end of the paragraph “also the three submarine engines of U–146, which still remained to be delivered in reparation for submarines destroyed in the North Sea.”

He explains that in point 1 of Page 1 they had mentioned an interval of thirty-one days expiring December 11th, 1918. Was this exact?

Marshal Foch says it is not quite right; the time limit had been exceeded by mutual consent and in consequence of various agreements. There is no need to mention it. On the other hand, he considered that as regarded handing over of rolling stock, the Germans had not, properly speaking, committed any real violation of the Armistice. There had been certain slowness of execution. It would be a mistake therefore to treat as equally serious the non-fulfillment of that clause and specific violations of the Armistice like the Scapa Flow incident and the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. It would perhaps be better to mention in the beginning of the note the more important questions, and to consider secondary violations in a final paragraph.

M Fromageot says that they had followed the order of the clauses of the Armistice conventions; obviously that might be modified. From a legal point of view, on the other hand, he feels obliged to remark that the fact of an obligation being in course of fulfillment did not prevent their considering it unexecuted.

Marshal Foch thinks that it would be sufficient to say that, on that point, the Allied and Associated Powers had not received full satisfaction. He wishes to repeat, in that case, that there is no formal violation of the Armistice, and that it would be well not to confuse in the same category formal violations and incomplete execution.

M Berthelot says it had seemed advantageous to make a complete enumeration, but he wishes to remark that, in the last part, they had to take into account the arguments the Marshal had in mind, and that, doubtless, it would be sufficient to omit in that last part, paragraphs Nos. 4 and 5 of page 4.

M Pichon sums up that they are agreed to modify the first paragraph of page 1 in the following manner: “The obligations, etc., have not been carried out, or have not received full satisfaction.”

(This suggestion is adopted)

Marshal Foch wishes to remark that as for point 2, they cannot reproach the Germans with not having made the reimbursement of the upkeep expenses of the troops of occupation, for the simple reason that they had not yet told them the total amount of these expenses. It would therefore be better to omit the paragraph.

M Berthelot thinks it is all the easier, as the obligation is covered by the Treaty.

M Pichon concludes that the Council decided to omit this paragraph.

M Fromageot stated that with regard to Germany’s obligation to deliver documents, specie, valuables carried away by her troops, they had not felt in a position to mention the valuables removed from the prisoners’ camps, as the Minister of Finance had demanded, because the Armistice did not speak of it.

Mr Polk thinks that, although he does not suppose that his Naval Experts would raise objections on the point, he wishes to make a reservation on point 6 of the Committee’s draft. Similarly, he feels he must make a reservation on point 11 of the draft, concerning the handing over of the fourteen tank vessels which had been demanded. He believed, further, that on this point it might be possible to find a text which would satisfy at once the American Delegation on the one hand, and the British and the French on the other.

M Berthelot states they have already taken care to avoid a text which appeared to imply a decision by the American Government on property in these vessels.

Mr Polk adds that the American Government does not consider that the demand for the handing over of those tank vessels can be maintained.

M Berthelot wishes to remark that the Supreme Council had taken a decision on the subject,5 namely that a German obligation existed although, as between the Allies, the question might be examined anew.

Mr Polk does not wish to raise, at that time, the question in its entirety, but could not help remarking that if the decision which M Berthelot recalls, has not been taken, there would not have been a violation of the Armistice, in that case, on the part of the Germans. He is hoping that the Drafting Committee will prepare a text which would permit of an agreement.

M Henry Berenger states that they do not at that time have to examine the question of real property in the tank ships, nor what is the legal position of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft. That is a question which belongs to the Reparations Commission; for the moment the question is: why have the ships which had been demanded in virtue of certain clauses of the Armistice, not been delivered, especially at a time when tonnage and fuel are everywhere the universal need. He thinks the British Delegation believes, as he does, that there is there a real obstruction on the part of Germany.

Mr Polk thinks that the question before this meeting was to revise the protocol and not to discuss in its entirety the question of the tank ships which, however, he was ready to discuss. He simply wishes to make a reservation, and he is convinced that the Drafting Committee would manage to agree on a text which would not bring up the whole question.

Mr Berthelot says that a distinction should be made between the two points: 1st, the attitude of the Allies towards the Germans: the Germans have been asked to deliver the ships, they ought to do it. 2nd, if the Supreme Council had several times decided that the tank ships are to be sent to the Firth of Forth it is no longer a matter of settling the question in substance; and discussion remains possible as between the Allies and America. But it is important to introduce in the protocol a clause! If they were not to do so they would unintentionally be deciding the question in substance and to the advantage of Germany.

Mr Polk thinks that the remarks of M Berthelot are probably true, but as time is short, he would for the moment confine himself to making a reservation.

M Clemenceau concluded that it is understood, then, that the protocol will contain a clause on that subject, but for the moment the Council decides to reserve the text.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks with regard to point No. 12 of the Committee’s draft whether it would not be advisable to examine it at the same time as the draft reply to the German note of October 12th on the sale of Aeronautical materiel which figured on the agenda of that morning.

M Fromageot thinks that the question will present itself more profitably a little later. He will have some observations to make which will satisfy the technical experts; and at that time could also be examined the draft reply which Sir Eyre Crowe mentioned. He adds that, following point No. 12, it would be right to alter the text of the paragraph beginning with the words, “A certain number of stipulations, etc”; it should read: “Unexecuted or incompletely executed stipulations” so as to take into account the observations offered some time before by Marshal Foch. M Clemenceau says that they then have to decide what reparations they are going to exact for the Scapa Flow incident.

Captain Fuller points out that the Naval Experts have not been able to come to an agreement. The Representative of the United States had made a reservation on the subject of floating docks that ought to be exacted.

Commandant Le Vavasseur states that he has submitted - and his British, Italian and Japanese colleagues are of the same opinion - that it is inadvisable to specify the percentage of large and small docks that ought to be demanded for the tonnage that is to be replaced. They think it sufficient to fix only the total, leaving it to the Commission of Naval Control to make the choice. The American Delegate alone is of a different opinion.

Commandant Le Vavasseur repeats that they all agree upon the principle that the handing over of Naval materiel ought to be demanded and agreed also upon the amount of tonnage that should be claimed as reparation. Their difference exists in the proportion as between large and small docks.

Captain Fuller agrees that is the situation.

Mr Polk wishes to ask for what reason they cannot specify at this time the proportion of great docks and small docks to be delivered.

Captain Fuller replies that it is because this raises the question of the docks at Danzig, for it is at Danzig that two of the biggest docks Germany possesses are situated.

Mr Polk says that, in the absence of his naval experts, it is difficult for him to take a decision. He feels, however, as he has already stated to the Council, that this question brings up the problem of the extent of Germany’s ability to make reparation, and for that reason comes within the province of the Reparations Commission; he confines himself to making a reservation and proposes that the discussion be resumed that afternoon.

(This proposal is adopted.)

M Fromageot wishes to draw the attention of the Council to the third obligation which the protocol imposes on Germany, to take into account the remarks which has been presented to the Committee by technical experts. They, therefore, proposed to alter the text which the Council had before it in the following manner:

"Third - to make over to the Allied and Associated Governments the value of the Aeronautical materiel which had been exported, according to the decision that would be given, and the estimate made or notified by the President of the Commission on Aeronautical Control, as provided in article 210 of the Treaty of Peace, before the 31st January, 1920."

It is the President of the Commission who will decide whether the exported materiel is civil or military, and who as a result of that decision, will determine the sum that Germany ought to pay.

S Scialoja remarked that the notification to Germany would be made by the President, but that the decision would have to be taken by the Commission itself.

M Fromageot explains that the technical experts have agreed that the President be trusted with the power of deciding whether the materiel in question is civil or military.

Captain Roper states that the Supreme Council has had to make a decision on this point on the 29th September on the point being raised by the British Delegation. In the text prepared by the British Delegation the President had been mentioned, but in their minds it was clear that the President was merely the interpreter of the Commission.

M Berthelot adds that this means the decision of the Commission as notified by the President.

M Clemenceau explains that of course the Commission could always delegate its powers to the President.

M Fromageot made the comment that the two following paragraphs, Nos. 4 and 5 on page 4, ought to be omitted in the light of the explanations just offered by Marshal Foch, but that the Drafting Committee thought that there was still ground for adding to the final paragraph the following phrase which was dictated by the analogous terms of paragraph 18 of the annex to part VIII of the Treaty; “Germany pledges itself not to consider these measures as acts of war.”

M Clemenceau does not think this a very happy addition. What are they going to do if Germany should refuse to sign that phrase.

Marshal Foch announces himself quite hostile to that phrase.

S Scialoja wishes to raise another question. In his opinion it will be well to ask the Germans to come armed with full powers to sign the Protocol, but expressly on the understanding that that Protocol would not be still subject to ratification by the National Assembly. We

Are they not to take this precaution they would expose themselves to the anomaly that the Treaty would have come into force while the protocol was in the air; for certain articles of the German Constitution left it an open question whether the document that they wished to have the German representative sign would be valid without ratification by the legislative authorities.

M Fromageot wishes to point out that in their draft note it is stated on Page 28 that the German representative who is to sign the protocol must be armed with full powers.

S Scialoja explains that this means full powers to sign, but it is necessary that this signature should hold Germany without ratification.

M Fromageot thinks it would be sufficient to modify the first paragraph on Page 2 of the draft note in the following manner:

“The German Government is therefore asked to give to the German representatives, authorized to sign the procès-verbal for the deposit of ratifications, full powers to sign at the same time the protocol of which a copy is hereto attached and which provides without further delay for this settlement.”

(It is decided to approve the draft Protocol prepared by the Drafting Committee to be signed by a representative of the German Government upon the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace, with the following modifications:

(1) Page 1, paragraph 1: “The obligations have not been executed or have not been entirely fulfilled.”

(2) Page 1, paragraph 2: Eliminate the words, “within a period of thirty-one days ending on December 11, 1919."

(3) Page 1, paragraph 3: This paragraph to be entirely eliminated.

(4) Page 1, paragraph 4: Eliminate in the second line the word, “immediately” and add to the fourth line the words, “as soon as the Allies judge opportune.”

(5) Page 1, paragraph 6: In the third line substitute the word, “coercive” for “consecutive”.

(6) Page 1, paragraph 7: In the third line substitute the word, “fiduciary” for the word, “judicial”.

(7) Page 2, paragraph 2: Add at the end of this paragraph the words, “and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over”.

(8) Page 2, paragraph 3: This clause is provisionally reserved.

(9) Page 2, paragraph 4: line 1, substitute for, “Clauses of the Armistice, “Armistice Convention”.

(10) Page 3, paragraph 3: The first part of this paragraph is reserved, and at the end thereof are to be added the words, “and various other merchant vessels”.

(11) Page 3, paragraph 5: Between the words, “unexecuted” and “stipulations” insert the words, “or incompletely executed”.

(12)
Page 4, paragraph 2: Add at the end of this paragraph, “and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over”.

(13) The next paragraph is reserved provisionally.

(14) Page 4, paragraph 4: This paragraph to be modified so as to read: “To deliver within a period of ten days, from the date of the signature of the present Protocol, the machinery and engines of submarines U–137, U–138, and U–150 by way of reparation for the destruction of submarine UC–48, as well as of the three engines of submarine U–46, which still remained to be delivered in reparation for the submarines destroyed in the North Sea.”

(15) Change paragraph 5 on Page 4, to read: “. … according to the decision that will be taken, the estimate made and modified [notified] by the Aeronautic Control Commission as provided for in Article 210 of the Treaty of Peace and before January 31, 1920.”

(16) To omit the two last paragraphs of the same page.

It is further decided that on account of the changes made in the Protocol, the first paragraph on page 2 of the draft note to the German Government should be modified in the following manner:

“The German Government is therefore asked to give to the German representatives authorized to sign the procès-verbal for the deposit of ratifications, full powers to sign at the same time the Protocol of which a copy is hereto attached and which provides without further delay for this settlement.”)

4. The Council has before it a draft reply prepared by the French Delegation Draft Reply to the German Note Upon the Sale of Aeronautical Matériel

Sir Eyre Crowe proposes to refer this draft back to the Drafting Committee for examination, and also to state whether the text thereof agrees with the resolutions which have just been taken.

(This proposition is adopted)

(It was decided:

(1) To refer back to the Drafting Committee the draft reply to the note from the German Government dated October 12th.9 (See Appendix “D”.)

(2) That the Drafting Committee will decide whether the note and the protocol which the Allied and Associated Powers have decided to send did not render superfluous the sending of that specific reply.)

5. The Council has before it the report from the Central Territorial Committee concerning the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier, and a draft reply from the same Committee to the Bulgarian note concerning Thrace.

M Laroche explains that the Committee has not been able to agree. Although it is unanimous, as far Thrace is concerned, in refusing the Bulgarian claims, on the contrary, a disagreement exists on two other points. Two delegations, the American and the Italian, are of the opinion that there should be a modification of the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier line as it is defined in the conditions of Peace, in two places, namely in the region of Tsaribrod and in the region of Bossiligrad. On the contrary, the three other Delegations are of the opinion that the original conditions should remain. With regard to the Dobrudja, the Committee is equally divided. On September 5, the Supreme Council had decided to examine the question of the Dobrudja when it would reply to the Bulgarian propositions. At the preceding meeting, Sir Eyre Crowe had proposed that they should confine themselves to answering the Bulgarians that the question should not come up in a Treaty between Bulgaria and the Allied and Associated Powers, but the American and Italian Delegations insisted that the question should be examined anew: As far as they were concerned, the question was bound up with that of the Serbian frontier. That was the opinion of the majority of the Commission. In justification of the changes which they proposed to make in the conditions of Peace, the American and Italian Delegations laid stress on arguments which were already known, and they also emphasized the feeling which was being shown in Bulgaria, they were afraid that the decision of the Conference would leave behind them lasting marks of resentment. These arguments were not of sufficient value for the majority. The Majority as a matter of fact, pointed out that the Serbian Delegation was familiar with the Peace conditions: Should the Council change them at the last minute, the Serbian Allies would be the ones to experience that feeling referred to by the minority Delegations. The majority was of the opinion that the reasons which had modified the line of the former Serbo-Bulgarian frontier were still good: they had wished to protect in the Vranje region the Belgrade–Salonika railroad from a Bulgarian aggression; indeed, it should not be forgotten that it was in that region, and by reason of the proximity of the railroad to the former frontier, the Bulgarian attack had begun in 1915.

Mr Polk wishes to remark that as far as the Dobrudja was concerned, he thinks it might be sufficient to insert a phrase on the subject in the covering letter; that the Allied and Associated Powers would declare, for instance, that the time had not come to discuss the question. Should the majority insist, he would not oppose himself to that decision, but he wished to state that he would have to make a formal reservation in the name of the American Government. The Dobrudja might become a cause of future war in the Balkans, and America would have some difficulty in interfering in a conflict which might be brought about by that question. He therefore wished to ask that this reservation be set forth upon the record: that the American Delegation would prefer the insertion in the covering letter of a line stating that the matter would be taken up with Romania. Was the Supreme Council hostile to this solution? He does not wish to hide the fact that it seems to him a great pity, at a time when they were guaranteeing the protection of Minorities, to go against the rights of these Minorities in the Dobrudja.

M Pichon remarks that the Treaty of 1913 which had decided the future of the Dobrudja was prior to the war; there is no reason why they should change it as far as Romania is concerned.

S Scialoja does not wish to insist that the question of the Dobrudja should be taken up, but he, however, thinks that it could very well be said that it does not concern the Treaty with Bulgaria.

Mr Polk reiterates the fact that he does not ask for the insertion of a disposition to that effect in the Treaty itself, nor even for the addition of a phrase in their reply to the Bulgarian counter-propositions; he is only asking that some words to that effect might be put in the covering letter.

M Clemenceau thinks this amounts to the same thing; such a phrase would be offering a pretext for war.

M Laroche continues his comment, and says that in the region of Tsaribrod, the Serbians had asked for a rectification of frontiers as far as the Dragoman Pass which protects Sofia. The Conference does not wish to go so far, but they have to point out that there is a series of mountain railways which in that region converge on Pirot and which consequently are the roads leading to Nisch; that was the traditional road of the Bulgarian invasions. It had appeared to them that there was reason for giving to the Serbians the strategic key of that road: indeed Serbia does not have any more claims to set up against Bulgaria, and therefore it was right to believe that there would be no further ambition to satisfy in that direction. On the contrary, Bulgaria will not cease to claim Serbian territories and on that side, the reasons for aggression subsisted. As a matter of fact the rectification of frontiers in question would only have the effect of passing approximately 20,000 inhabitants under Serbian authority.

M Laroche states that the report of the Minority had been distributed and that he was ready to read it.

Mr Polk wishes to bring out certain points: first, should they consider the text of their first Peace conditions as intangible? Secondly, when the question had come up for the first time, M Tardieu had told them that it was only a matter of 7,000 Bulgarians being turned over to Serbian authority. On verifying these figures, it was found that as a matter of fact, it was a total of nearly 42,000 Bulgarians being turned over as against 93 Serbian inhabitants. The only possible justification for this proposed change was to give the Serbians the means to attack Sofia without being stopped by any intermediary obstacles. He, therefore urges the Supreme Council to think over the consequences entailed in a decision which meant the handing over of 40,000 Bulgarians to the Serbians, so as to facilitate a Serbian attack upon Sofia. Even in Serbia the wisest people had seen that this would be a mistake which would make more difficult their mission of conciliation. He did not wish, however, to retard in any way the hour of Peace, but he felt it was his duty to express a very definite protest on this question.

M Laroche wishes to answer Mr Polk’s arguments by stating briefly that 40,000 Bulgarians in a total population of 4,000,000 inhabitants does not represent a very large figure. They had not left Sofia without protection since they had let the Bulgarians keep the Dragoman Pass which formed a defensive strategic position of the greatest value; and should it be found correct that they had ensured advantages to the Serbians, the reason was that they were convinced it was the Bulgarians who would attack. A concession at Tsaribrod would not make the Bulgarians forget either Stroumitza or Monastir.

S Scialoja agrees with the American thesis. The arguments of the majority, as a matter of fact, do not seem convincing in the least. The ethnographic question is a clear one: This is a question of a population purely Bulgarian, of a territory which was Bulgarian by its nature and history. The only argument which had been invoked was that of the railway; on this point, he wished to bring their attention to the fact that there were other points on which the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier came nearer thereto than in the Bossiligrad region. Why then base upon the existence of a railroad the determination of a frontier? From the military standpoint, they could no more give Serbia the means of invading Bulgaria than give Bulgaria the means of invading Serbia. If Serbia had legitimate fears, one might, to allay these impose on Bulgaria the disarmament of the entrenched camp of Slivnitza. The truth is that Serbia wishes to have an open door on Sofia. They ought to be working to insure equilibrium; they should not admit the violation of those very principles of peace which they are striving to establish. There will always be causes for war, it was not for them to try and bring them about. It is clear that Bulgaria will never admit that the Serbs get an open road to Sofia. Lastly, he wished to remark that the text which they had communicated to the Serbs was only a draft, and that they had a perfect right to change it.

M Laroche states that at the present time, from a strategic point of view, the Serbs were in a position of clear inferiority. It the line of the present frontier which had allowed in 1915 the Bulgarian invasion. The Peace conditions which they had handed to Bulgaria, at the same time as to all their Allies, were more than a simple draft. They would be taking a very serious responsibility should they modify these conditions. As for the disarmament of Slivnitza, which S Scialoja proposes, this will appear to the Bulgarians as much more serious than the loss of Tsaribrod.

Mr Bowman resumes the arguments of the minority as follows: First, he thinks it is useless to reinforce the feelings of reciprocal hostility between the Bulgarians and the Serbs; secondly, the minority does not consider that reasons existed to foresee an invasion of Serbia by the Bulgarians. Bulgaria was vanquished, and the Treaty disarms her as well on land as on sea. Precautions had been taken to prevent her reorganizing an army; under these conditions she could not think of starting a new war for a long time. It is correct that in the Bossiligrad region, the railroad was at a distance of about ten miles from the frontier. It is proposed to withdraw this frontier to twice this distance, although the population was entirely Bulgarian; the minority would consent to accept this modification, but the case of Tsaribrod was entirely different. The frontier on that point formed a salient which protected the railroad, and on the other hand, in the southwest, on a point where they had been asked to rectify the line, the frontier came much nearer to the railroad. The American and Italian Delegations were aware of the fact that if one wished to modify the frontier line, the new line as proposed was a good one, but the question was whether such modification was necessary. They still thought that no sufficient reasons were adduced to justify such a change; and when, on the other hand, they pointed out that this was the question of greatest interest to Bulgarian opinion, that it would likewise in itself be sufficient to prevent a rapprochement between Serbia and Bulgaria; that further the draft proposed to them was even opposed by influential men in Serbia, they deem it their duty to maintain their conclusions.

Sir Eyre Crowe stated that Mr. Polk was perfectly right in saying that the Peace conditions which they had handed to the Bulgarians were not unalterable. Any modification was difficult when it bore upon a question which had been discussed for many months and which had been the result of compromise. As a matter of fact the only new point brought up at this meeting was more complete statistical information. All the other arguments had already been discussed, and he admitted that in the first Commission, all the military experts had agreed that the proposed frontier did not give the Serbians offensive military advantages, but only defensive. They were now told that the idea of protecting a railroad had no sense, and that a strategical argument could never be adduced as against an ethnical one; he would point out that the Yugo-Slavs had said the same thing about the line proposed for the new Italo-Slav frontier. In preparing the treaties, they had had to make compromises on all points. Why maintain that in this question particularly principles were sacred? Would it not be wiser to stand by the clauses on which they had agreed? They were as a matter of fact assured that the Bulgarian Delegation would sign the Treaty in any event: on the contrary the conversations he had had with the Serbs had convinced him that if they were to make concessions to Bulgaria so as to facilitate in Sofia a signature which appeared certain, they were running the risk of having the whole treaty jeopardised at Belgrade. The Serbian Delegation which had arrived in Paris was in a difficult situation: it was ready to sign the Treaty with Austria. If this new sacrifice were imposed on Serbia, would the delegation still be able to sign? Their common desire was to sign Peace as soon as possible. They were sure to have the Bulgarian signature; ought they to jeopardise the Serbian signature?

M Pichon wishes only to add one word to Sir Eyre Crowe’s statement. The Serbian Delegates had told him that a concession would mean for certain political men a decisive argument in favor of the refusal of Serbia’s signature. On the other hand, the intentions of Mr. Trumbic were conciliatory. Had the Bulgarians deserved that the Allies should bully the Serbs? He does not think so.

Mr Polk wishes to rectify on one point the statements of Sir Eyre Crowe: the American and Italian experts had never accepted the new line of frontier, they had always pointed out its dangers. The new line was not the work of the Commission, the Supreme Council alone had decided in its favor.13 He does not wish to complicate a difficult situation and he accepted that the Council should maintain its former decision, but in that case he felt it his duty to protest, to point out once more the dangers of such a decision, and to repeat that this decision was made against the advice of the American Delegation. The American Delegation did not wish to assume any responsibility whatsoever in the event of future conflicts which this decision might bring about.

S Scialoja wishes to associate himself with Mr Polk’s declaration.

(The meeting then adjourns.)

Sailor Steve · 11-01-19, 08:19 PM

Saturday, November 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.

...

Jimbuna · 11-02-19, 07:17 AM

2nd November 1919

United Mine Workers led by John L. Lewis (pictured) announce a strike involving 400,000 miners in the U.S.

Stable lads on strike at Epsom.

Sailor Steve · 11-02-19, 12:25 PM

Saturday, November 2, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

Jimbuna · 11-03-19, 09:21 AM

3rd November 1919

Aftermath of War

Sir R. Wemyss created Baron.

Latvian War of Independence: The Latvian Army, supported by Estonian armored trains and the British Royal Navy, launches its counterattack.

Jimbuna · 11-04-19, 11:19 AM

4th November 1919

Count Terauchi Masatake, Marshal of the Japanese Imperial Army, 1st Governor-General of Korea, and 9th Prime Minister of Japan, has passed away.

Sophia Tolstaya, wife of Russian author Leo Tolstoy, has passed away.

Lady Astor, pictured when a candidate in the by-election in Plymouth in 1919, Lady Astor won the election and became the first woman to serve as an MP, in the House of Commons, as a Unionist.

Ship Losses:

Lesbos (Belgium) The cargo ship ran aground on Cross Sands, in the North Sea off Great Yarmouth, Norfolk, United Kingdom and was wrecked.

10-28-19, 09:00 AM	#4201
Jimbuna Chief of the Boat Join Date: Feb 2006 Location: 250 metres below the surface Posts: 181,217 Downloads: 63 Uploads: 13	28th October 1919 Ruins of chateaus destroyed by Bolshevik forces in Poland. __________________ Wise men speak because they have something to say; Fools because they have to say something. Oh my God, not again!! GWX3.0 Download Page - Donation/instant access to GWX (Help SubSim)

10-28-19, 08:05 PM	#4202
Sailor Steve Eternal Patrol Join Date: Nov 2002 Location: High in the mountains of Utah Posts: 50,369 Downloads: 745 Uploads: 249	Tuesday, October 28, 1919 PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30 Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers. ... __________________ “Never do anything you can't take back.” —Rocky Russo

10-29-19, 09:14 AM	#4203
Jimbuna Chief of the Boat Join Date: Feb 2006 Location: 250 metres below the surface Posts: 181,217 Downloads: 63 Uploads: 13	29th October 1919 U.S. Congress passes the Volstead Act, which establishes the prohibition of alcohol. The bill was vetoed by President Wilson, but Congress overrode the veto with a two-thirds majority. Shaku Sōen, Japanese Buddhist monk who was the first Zen Buddhist master to teach in the U.S. and raise awareness of Zen Buddhism in the country, has passed away. Ship Losses: Frej (Sweden) The wooden schooner, en route from Åbo to Malmö, sank after striking a mine in the Baltic, west of Gotland. The crew survived. __________________ Wise men speak because they have something to say; Fools because they have to say something. Oh my God, not again!! GWX3.0 Download Page - Donation/instant access to GWX (Help SubSim)

10-29-19, 09:20 PM	#4204
Sailor Steve Eternal Patrol Join Date: Nov 2002 Location: High in the mountains of Utah Posts: 50,369 Downloads: 745 Uploads: 249	Wednesday, October 29, 1919 PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30 Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers. 1. The Council has before it a report from the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, dated October 23, 1919, a note in three parts from the British Delegation dated October 23, 24 and 25, 1919 and a letter from the Minister of Finance to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. General Weygand reads and comments upon the report dealing with the violations of the clauses of the Armistice, the preparation of which had been entrusted to the Armistice Commission at Cologne. Captain Fuller reads and comments upon the notes from the British Delegation dealing with violations of the Naval Clauses of the Armistice. M de Celle reads and comments upon the letter from the Minister of Finance to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, and adds thereto the following observations: The Germans were to have supplied a complete list of the plunder and thefts committed by them; there were numerous omissions in the lists supplied. It had been indicated clearly to the Germans that in matters of specie and personal property omission might occur only in exceptional cases and that they should be made known within twenty-four hours of their discovery. The despatch of a new truckload of property had just been made known to them. They had to acknowledge that the German delegates in Paris are actually doing their best to give satisfaction. Similarly, the documents which Clause 13 of the Protocol of Spa, dated December 1st, 1918, had in mind, concerning notes issued by towns during the German occupation (list of printed notes, lists of notes whose issue had been authorized, list of notes actually issued, list of water-marked paper stocks, etc.,) had not so far been supplied, notwithstanding the formal promise made by Germany to send them before December 10th, 1918. Those lists were of extreme importance in order to discover and suppress possible forgery. Lastly, as for the recovery of objets d’art, if those that belonged to public museums had been restored this was not the case with objets d’art or furniture taken from private houses. The Germans profess that there has been no official storage of these objects: they know, however, that the experts who had superintended their collection had worked publicly and that furniture and pictures had been carefully packed for transport. It was impossible to admit, as the Germans pretended, that the vanished furniture had been used merely for furnishing posts of command or dugouts. M Clemenceau asks whether a member of the Council wishes to make any remark. Sir Eyre Crowe wishes for the moment to leave aside the two most serious violations of the Armistice, namely, the question of the Baltic Provinces and the Scapa Flow incident, to which he intends to return. As for the other violations it is important to adhere to this: that obligations incurred by the terms of the Armistice be retained when the Treaty comes into force. Guarantees to this effect are necessary. If their legal advisors are of the opinion that the stipulations of the Armistice will no longer subsist with the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, it is absolutely necessary to oblige the Germans to sign a special Protocol assuring to the Powers every possible guarantee corresponding to the guarantees of the Armistice. Mr Polk agrees with Sir Eyre Crowe that the legal advisers should be consulted. S Scialoja finds the difficulty to arise out of the fact that the conventions of the Armistice, while constituting a veritable treaty, has been imposed in military form. He thinks there are grounds for preparing a Protocol enumerating all the obligations still to be fulfilled, but what sanctions would the Council still wield since the coming into force of the Treaty would deprive it of the sanctions which the Armistice afforded? It is necessary that the Protocol itself incorporate sanctions. Sir Eyre Crowe maintains that for the very reason adduced by S Scialoja, he has drawn the distinction between the more important and the less important violations of the Armistice: is not such sanction necessary for the less important violations? M Clemenceau thinks that they do not wish to commit themselves to a perfectly futile manifestation; a definite date has to be fixed. As a matter of form it would be well to say that unless the obligations undertaken were fulfilled they would have to demand sanctions which, as it seemed to him, ought to be of a military nature for in reality there are no others. Therefore, in the Protocol a list of all the so-called secondary violations of the Armistice had to be prepared. He thinks it hardly possible to say to the Germans that they will not have the Treaty come into force until after the execution of those clauses: it would be sufficient to say that if the clauses are not fulfilled, sanctions of military nature would be imposed. The questions of Scapa Flow and of the Baltic Provinces remain. In the former matter they had done nothing; on the latter they had decided upon a course of action the preceding day. Would it not be necessary to know what sanctions they would employ if the mission of General Niessel arrived at no success? Mr. Polk asks whether it is intended to tell the Germans what sanctions will ultimately be applied. M Clemenceau says there certainly is no such intention. It would be sufficient to say that there would be some sanction: but of course the Germans would have to sign the Protocol before the Treaty would come into force. Mr Polk remarks that the Protocol should be submitted first to the Council, which would then have to discuss the question of sanctions. M Clemenceau agrees. Mr Polk inquires whether the Council has communicated to the Dutch Government the note sent to Germany relative to the delivery of ships she had sold to Holland. Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Dutch Government has been informed of such a note having been sent and told that if it claimed property rights in the ships in question, it would have to justify its claims before the Council. Sir Eyre Crowe reverts to the violation of the Armistice committed in the Scapa Flow incident. The Council had been apprised some time ago of a British proposal on the subject. The sinking of the ships could be considered either the individual act of the officers and crews, or an act for which the German government is responsible. The British Delegation believes that there are grounds for holding the government responsible. In the latter case reparation was due for the value of the sunken ships, cost of salvage of the ships, cost of surveying the anchorage, buoying the wrecks and any subsequent expenses incurred, e.g, in clearing the anchorage of wrecks, etc. It is proposed further that reparation should be in kind, for example in the surrender of the five light cruisers that Germany still possessed and of floating docks, cranes, harbor craft, etc.; that the Germans should be asked further to supply to the Armistice Commission a complete list of this material, delivery of which the Armistice Commission would be authorized to accept. M Clemenceau says that they are agreed in considering the German Government responsible. Mr Polk states that he does not yet have the report of his naval experts on the question and asks that it be adjourned. Sir Eyre Crowe maintains that if they hold the German Government responsible, they can, as the British Delegation believes, repatriate the German officers and seamen of the crews which had been taken prisoner on the destruction of the fleet. M Clemenceau proposes to discuss that question on the following day. Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to remark further that in the matter of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces the terms of the Armistice are repeated in the body of the Treaty. In that respect, therefore, they do have guarantees. (It is decided: (1) To ask the Drafting Committee to prepare a Protocol to be signed by the Representative of the German government before the Treaty comes into force and to contain, along with the list of the unfulfilled clauses of the Armistice, an undertaking by Germany to fulfill those clauses within a prescribed time under penalty of such measures which the Allied and Associated Powers would reserve to themselves in the event of noncompliance; (2) That the question whether the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces and the Scapa Flow incident were to be explicitly mentioned in this Protocol be provisionally reserved.) 2. General Niessel wishes to point out to the Council that it would be difficult for his Mission to leave the Monday or Wednesday following; his Italian colleague has not yet arrived and General Turner’s officers will not be in Paris before the end of the week. Lastly there will be difficulties from the point of view of railroad transportation. M Clemenceau says that General Niessel will leave on Wednesday at the latest. M Clemenceau thinks that they might agree provisionally that the expenses of the Mission will be divided between the Allies. M Berthelot explains that for the moment it was only a question of the immediate expenses of maintenance and voyage. Mr Polk says that it would be best that each Power supply the expenses of its own representatives. (It is decided that, subject to later examination of the question by the Supreme Council, each Power should pay the expenses of its representatives on the Inter-Allied Baltic Provinces Military Commission. 3. The Council has before it a note from the New States Commission asking the Supreme Council for instructions. M Kammerer reads and comments upon the first part of the note. S Scialoja thinks it preferable to insert in the Bulgarian Treaty a clause by which Serbia and Romania would incur the same obligations as those of article 46 of the Treaty with Greece. M Kammerer suggests that if, in the Treaty with Bulgaria, the same terms are inserted which had prevented Serbia from signing the Treaty with Austria, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would not sign the Bulgarian Treaty; the result would correspond to the second procedure suggested by the Commission. Mr Polk wonders whether, if they make it possible to sign the Bulgarian Treaty without inserting therein the same terms as in the Austrian Treaty, they might not leave it optional to certain powers to sign one Treaty and not the other. It is most important, he thinks, to tell the Romanians and the Serbs that if they do not sign the Austrian Treaty neither will they sign the Bulgarian Treaty. M Kammerer agrees that the insertion of a new article might be possible; he thinks, however, that it would be disagreeable to the states concerned for the Council to tell them that they could not sign the Bulgarian Treaty before signing the Austrian Treaty. Mr Polk does not see that they have to modify a treaty so as to satisfy a power that refuses to sign. M Pichon considers the second method preferable; they will inform the Romanians and Serbs that they cannot sign the Bulgarian Treaty unless they signed the Austrian Treaty. The Council will thus be in possession of a further means of bringing pressure to bear upon them. Sir Eyre Crowe considers that there should be on the agenda of an early sitting of the Council, the question of the signature of the Austrian Treaty by the Romanians and Serbs. M Pichon said Mr Trumbic has arrived and that General Coanda has left Bucharest the previous day. According to a telegram he had received that morning, he thinks the signature probable. Sir Eyre Crowe’s information does not give him the same impression. Mr Polk is in a similar situation. He has the feeling that the Romanians wish simply to gain time. M Kammerer reads and comments upon the second part of the report of the New States Commission. Sir Eyre Crowe asks what right Bulgaria has to set up as champion of the Turkish cause. M Kammerer explains that it is not Turks properly speaking, but Turkish subjects who had taken refuge in Bulgarian territory. The Italian Delegation is afraid that Serbia is preventing their exercising that right of option which the 1913 treaty gives them, but which the outbreak of war had made impossible. There is no doubt that the insertion of special clauses in the Treaty would be unpleasant enough for Serbia. Sir Eyre Crowe maintains that it is always dangerous to modify a treaty once it has been signed, and that the Allied and Associated Powers had already signed the Minorities Treaty. M Kammerer explains that it is the Italian Delegation that insists upon that solution. Sir Eyre Crowe asks if there is any evidence to show the Turks intend returning into Serbian territory? Mr Polk explains that it is a question of Macedonian refugees. M Pichon asks whether, instead of changing the text of the Treaty, a procedure which as Sir Eyre Crowe had pointed out, presents serious disadvantages, they could not demand of Serbia written declarations on the point? M Kammerer is of the opinion that Serbia would prefer that solution. S Scialoja points out that in the Bulgarian Treaty a clause could be inserted analogous to that in which Greece was placed by Article IV of the proposed Greek Treaty. M Kammerer says that the Commission has judged that this involves difficulties and that there is no point in concealing the fact that the insertion of a clause of such nature in the Bulgarian Treaty would be extremely disagreeable to the Serbs. S Scialoja maintains that Serbia would have to restore to its refugees the right of option which the outbreak of war had prevented them from exercising in the prescribed time. M Pichon believes that Serbia should make the declaration in a letter. (It is decided: (1) That the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should make known to the Roumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegations that these latter countries will not be allowed to sign the Treaty with Bulgaria before having signed the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty; (2) That the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government be asked to make known by written declaration that it would authorize its Ottoman subjects who, owing to the war, had not been able to avail themselves in the prescribed time of the right of option envisaged by the Treaty of 1913, to take advantage of that right.) 4. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation dated October 27th. (After a short discussion it is decided to refer to the military representatives at Versailles, for examination and report, the request for instructions addressed to the Supreme Council by the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany. 5. The Council has before it a draft note to the German Government, prepared by the Polish Commission. (It is decided to approve the draft note to the German Government on the question of municipal elections in Upper Silesia as prepared by the Polish Commission.) 6. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation dated October 27th. M Pichon considers it logical to adopt the proposal, which conforms to previous decisions of the Supreme Council. Mr Polk asks who will fix the salaries. M Pichon says it will be a matter for deciding as in analogous cases. (It is decided: (1) That the salaries and allowances of the temporary Administrator of the Free City of Danzig and his staff, and of the Administrative Staff of Memel should be a charge upon local revenues; (2) That the rate of these salaries and allowances should be fixed by the Sub-Committee on the Execution of the Treaty with Germany.) 7. The Council has before it a report of the Commission entrusted with examining the question of the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners from Siberia. Captain de Corvette Fabre reads and comments upon the report of the Commission. Mr Polk thinks that the order of repatriation could be modified by financial considerations. As regarded the Czechs, an agreement had been arrived at, which placed the immediate expenses of repatriation on Great Britain, the United States and France. No account has been taken so far of the Poles, the Romanians and the Serbs. Perhaps the United States will be led to assume responsibility for this repatriation. In any case, he is obliged to remark that the financial rulings of the United States Treasury Department forbid his government from participating in expenses of a provisional nature that might be subject to a later readjustment among the Powers; the United States could only make direct advances to the small nations concerned. M Pichon holds that the thing to do at the moment is for each Power to appoint a financial expert and a political representative to be attached to the Commission actually existing. Captain de Corvette Fabre remarks that the Commission is qualified to deal only with prisoners. It is therefore asking the Council to decide whether it will be competent to deal likewise with the volunteers of friendly nationalities who ought to be repatriated. M Kammerer insists on the necessity of the Commission being empowered to deal with volunteers as well as prisoners. The two questions are bound together from the point of view both of transport and of finance. Sir Eyre Crowe does not think his Government inclined to participate in the expenses of repatriating 250,000 German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners; they had the repatriation of their Allies to consider. M Berthelot holds that distinction must be made between repatriation of their Allies and of prisoners belonging to one of the enemy powers: from the humane point of view these were alike; politically, there are raised questions of quite different kinds. The Council has already decided that the repatriation of enemy prisoners should wait until after that of Allied volunteers. They are informed that the Germans have already been trying to conclude private contracts with Japanese ship owners. If they are to let Japanese shipping companies repatriate enemies who are ready to pay a very high price, the effect would be disastrous, and it is important that Mr Matsui should draw the attention of his government to the question. Mr Matsui states that his government has informed him that the statement that ships have been chartered on behalf of Germany is incorrect. The Japanese government has no ships at its disposal; and private ship owners have concluded agreements to charter ships for the purpose of repatriating Czechs. Once the Treaty comes into force it would be for each government to get into direct touch with the ship owners. He had already acquainted Tokyo with that decision of the Supreme Council, which had in mind giving priority to the repatriation of the Allies. M Kammerer holds that they can and, indeed, ought to leave to the Germans the care of arranging the repatriation of their prisoners. It is for the Commission only to make sure that that repatriation should not precede the repatriation of volunteers of friendly nationalities. Captain de Corvette Fabre points out that it is exactly for that reason that the Commission had asked enlargement of its powers. It had been formed originally to organize the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners of war, but had found itself confronted by a resolution of the Supreme Council which specified that the repatriation of those prisoners should not take place until after the repatriation of volunteers of friendly nationalities. So long as the repatriation of those volunteers had not yet begun, the Commission could not work to any purpose. Mr Polk thinks that the Commission could confine itself to examining the repatriation of prisoners without taking any executive steps. Sir Eyre Crowe asks why the Commission should have to concern itself with German and Austrian prisoners of war at all. Article 215 of the German Treaty envisages the setting up of a special commission, for the repatriation of prisoners. This question was its peculiar concern, and he understands that it was forming a Sub-Commission to take care of this particular case. Captain de Corvette Fabre states that the Commission refers to in article 215 had to deal exclusively with enemy prisoners taken by the Allied and Associated Powers; the repatriation of prisoners from Siberia taken by the Russians did not concern it. Indeed practically all the prisoners in Siberia had been taken by the Russians, and it would be impossible to repatriate them without authorization of the Government of Omsk which might wish to retain them as hostages. M Pichon acknowledges that they have no legal obligation towards enemy prisoners who had been retained in Siberia. (It is decided: (1) That the Commission entrusted by the Supreme Council with studying the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners from Siberia should examine at the same time the question of repatriating the volunteers of friendly nationalities; (2) That, in view of the consequent extension of their powers and because of the complexity of the problems raised by the question of repatriation, each of the Allied and Associated Powers should nominate to the Commission representatives for political and financial questions. (The meeting then adjourns.) __________________ “Never do anything you can't take back.” —Rocky Russo

10-30-19, 06:54 AM	#4205
Jimbuna Chief of the Boat Join Date: Feb 2006 Location: 250 metres below the surface Posts: 181,217 Downloads: 63 Uploads: 13	30th October 1919 The International Labour Organization holds its first conference in Washington D.C., with French socialist politician Albert Thomas as its first director. Anti-Bolshevik cavalry under General Denikin marching in Kharkov. Pilot and navigator of the Alliance plane that attempted a London to Australia flight. __________________ Wise men speak because they have something to say; Fools because they have to say something. Oh my God, not again!! GWX3.0 Download Page - Donation/instant access to GWX (Help SubSim)

10-31-19, 07:00 AM	#4207
Jimbuna Chief of the Boat Join Date: Feb 2006 Location: 250 metres below the surface Posts: 181,217 Downloads: 63 Uploads: 13	31st October 1919 U.S. transport ships in Trebizond Harbour, Ottoman Empire (Turkey) Barbed wire barricade protecting the home of German War Minister Noske in Berlin due to unrest in the city. Ship Losses: Fazilka (United Kingdom) The cargo liner was wrecked on Great Nicobar Island, India. __________________ Wise men speak because they have something to say; Fools because they have to say something. Oh my God, not again!! GWX3.0 Download Page - Donation/instant access to GWX (Help SubSim)

10-31-19, 06:11 PM	#4208
Sailor Steve Eternal Patrol Join Date: Nov 2002 Location: High in the mountains of Utah Posts: 50,369 Downloads: 745 Uploads: 249	Friday, October 31, 1919 PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE There are no meetings today. __________________ “Never do anything you can't take back.” —Rocky Russo

11-01-19, 08:23 AM	#4209
Jimbuna Chief of the Boat Join Date: Feb 2006 Location: 250 metres below the surface Posts: 181,217 Downloads: 63 Uploads: 13	1st November 1919 A train crash at Vigerslev, Denmark results in the deaths of 40 people. upload images for free Damaged streets in Riga after fighting occurred between Latvian and Estonian troops against the German-backed West Russian Volunteer Army. A padre placing a wreath on a fallen soldier's grave in a cemetery near Cologne, Germany following World War One on 1st November 1919. Ship Losses: Volturnus (United Kingdom) The coastal cargo class ship was sunk in the Kattegat 5 miles Southeast of the Skaw light vessel by mines. __________________ Wise men speak because they have something to say; Fools because they have to say something. Oh my God, not again!! GWX3.0 Download Page - Donation/instant access to GWX (Help SubSim)

11-01-19, 08:19 PM	#4211
Sailor Steve Eternal Patrol Join Date: Nov 2002 Location: High in the mountains of Utah Posts: 50,369 Downloads: 745 Uploads: 249	Saturday, November 1, 1919 PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30 Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers. ... __________________ “Never do anything you can't take back.” —Rocky Russo Last edited by Sailor Steve; 11-27-19 at 06:53 PM.

11-02-19, 07:17 AM	#4212
Jimbuna Chief of the Boat Join Date: Feb 2006 Location: 250 metres below the surface Posts: 181,217 Downloads: 63 Uploads: 13	2nd November 1919 United Mine Workers led by John L. Lewis (pictured) announce a strike involving 400,000 miners in the U.S. Stable lads on strike at Epsom. __________________ Wise men speak because they have something to say; Fools because they have to say something. Oh my God, not again!! GWX3.0 Download Page - Donation/instant access to GWX (Help SubSim)

11-02-19, 12:25 PM	#4213
Sailor Steve Eternal Patrol Join Date: Nov 2002 Location: High in the mountains of Utah Posts: 50,369 Downloads: 745 Uploads: 249	Saturday, November 2, 1919 PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE There are no meetings today. __________________ “Never do anything you can't take back.” —Rocky Russo

11-03-19, 09:21 AM	#4214
Jimbuna Chief of the Boat Join Date: Feb 2006 Location: 250 metres below the surface Posts: 181,217 Downloads: 63 Uploads: 13	3rd November 1919 Aftermath of War Sir R. Wemyss created Baron. Latvian War of Independence: The Latvian Army, supported by Estonian armored trains and the British Royal Navy, launches its counterattack. __________________ Wise men speak because they have something to say; Fools because they have to say something. Oh my God, not again!! GWX3.0 Download Page - Donation/instant access to GWX (Help SubSim)

11-04-19, 11:19 AM	#4215
Jimbuna Chief of the Boat Join Date: Feb 2006 Location: 250 metres below the surface Posts: 181,217 Downloads: 63 Uploads: 13	4th November 1919 Count Terauchi Masatake, Marshal of the Japanese Imperial Army, 1st Governor-General of Korea, and 9th Prime Minister of Japan, has passed away. Sophia Tolstaya, wife of Russian author Leo Tolstoy, has passed away. Lady Astor, pictured when a candidate in the by-election in Plymouth in 1919, Lady Astor won the election and became the first woman to serve as an MP, in the House of Commons, as a Unionist. Ship Losses: Lesbos (Belgium) The cargo ship ran aground on Cross Sands, in the North Sea off Great Yarmouth, Norfolk, United Kingdom and was wrecked. __________________ Wise men speak because they have something to say; Fools because they have to say something. Oh my God, not again!! GWX3.0 Download Page - Donation/instant access to GWX (Help SubSim)