Soviet SSBN strategy

[Bubblehead Nuke]

Originally Posted by ikalugin

Submarines operated in the wartime stance, ie limited their exposure to hostile action, did not use standard peacetime deployement routes,
were authorised to use wartime equipment and tactics (such as self propelled imitators).

Oh, I see..

The Soviet submarine navy does not practice its job at all when they go to sea. On anything other than combat ops they allow themselves to be trailed, make noise, and generally be easy to track on purpose.

Thank you. It all makes sense now. Wow.. that is DEVIOUS.

[ikalugin]

Originally Posted by Bubblehead Nuke

Oh, I see..

The Soviet submarine navy does not practice its job at all when they go to sea. On anything other than combat ops they allow themselves to be trailed, make noise, and generally be easy to track on purpose.

Thank you. It all makes sense now. Wow.. that is DEVIOUS.

Sadly, as I am a rather socially inept person it is hard for me to understand if this is sarcasm.

As to the statement itself - this is not (exactly) what I talked about. In peacetime there are restrictions both for conveniency (ie use of standard inter-theatre deployment routes, G-loading and speed limits on aircraft, etc) and for operational security (ie use of advanced decoys, radiating for radars, etc).

Atrina and to lesser extend Aport are of interest because of how those restrictions were lifted and the results they have achieved (ie during Aport K-147 shadowing USN SSBNs for extended period of time, the interactions with NATO ASW forces). The other operation of interest in that respect would be operation Bohemoth, where a Delta launched a full SLBM salvo and thus proved that it was operationally possible.

But I guess one can just stick to one's sense of superiority, atleast as far as the secrecy and language barriers stay.

[Breakerchase]

It's very tempting to doubt a writer's credibility no naval matter for having "never served in the Navy or even held a security clearance", but to quote Fred T. Jane in Eric Grove's The Future of Sea Power: "it would be a bad day...if the principle ever gets established that unless a man is an actor he is incapable of criticising the actions of a drama...the contention world work out that 'you cannot tell whether an egg is good or bad unless you are a hen."'.

[Bubblehead Nuke]

Originally Posted by ikalugin

Sadly, as I am a rather socially inept person it is hard for me to understand if this is sarcasm.

As to the statement itself - this is not (exactly) what I talked about. In peacetime there are restrictions both for conveniency (ie use of standard inter-theatre deployment routes, G-loading and speed limits on aircraft, etc) and for operational security (ie use of advanced decoys, radiating for radars, etc).

You are correct in your statement. There are operations restrictions that may not apply in actual combat.

However, due to the operating environment of ships and subs those operation constraints pretty much define how they are going to perform in real life. A ship is not going to go twice as fast, a sub is not going to suddenly be able to dive twice as deep or half its noise signature just because combat started. These are things that are designed in when constructed. So if you see a ship operated one way somewhere, then you can pretty much bet it is going to operate the same way elsewhere.

Now things like radar and active sonar ARE things that you can control. But you to train with them in order for them to be useful and effective in combat. You spy on us, we spy on you, and we all learn what the other guys sensors and weapons are good at and NOT good at. I am not saying that is right to spy, but that is the facts of life.

With this being said your statement being that things are different when they went on those ops because they were allowed to 'use a wartime stance' is just garbage. The ONLY way they could be construed to have made a difference is if the Soviet navy was intentionally operating stupidly at other times. Hence my use of sarcasm.

I was in before the cold war settled down. We had a saying what was repeated OFTEN on deployment: "The Red Bear is MANY things, but dumb ain't one of them." It was a manta that kept you on your toes and thinking.

But I guess one can just stick to one's sense of superiority, atleast as far as the secrecy and language barriers stay.

The sense of superiority statement could be made right back at you. You are reading a report and stating that it was fact. I read lots of things. Some of it makes for a pretty good laugh when you know the rest of the story.

Our own SSN's could not track a boomer that wanted to be hidden and that was with us knowing that they were going to be in a pre-defined box for a specific amount of time. Stating that a soviet SSN tracked one for hours on end seems a little far fetched to those of us who tried and failed to track our own boats. I am not doubting that you make have gotten some kind of track on one. But one that could be used for a shooting solution? No, I highly doubt that.

Now don't get me wrong. I admire what the soviet sub force was able to do all things considered. They had some really good designs and some wild out of the box thinking. Some of it WAS copied by our navy. The same is true in the rest of the WORLDS arms forced. The Soviet military has some good thinkers and designers.

In truth the Soviet navy is not a blue water force but more of a self defense force. For that role they were very well designed and they had sound tactics. It does not mean that we did not pick those tactics apart and exploited deficiencies in the equipment and tactics.

As far as the statements that I have made that you disagree with. It is fine for you to disagree with them. That is the purpose of communication.

I do not know your background nor have I asked you to elaborate. But taking a holier that thou position and just repeat a report as the writ of god? Come on now, lets be real.

[C-Wolf]

Recently declassified and released related reading:

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingr...0005512850.pdf

Parent article: http://www.popularmechanics.com/mili...ne-sonar-soks/

[Delgard]

Should we be seeing more Yankees in 1984?

And, I gather that near-ice activity wasn't so much a capability at the time. Moving in the ice flows would take longer than simply zipping down and through the GUIK gaps to the Atlantic, but safer. Was it that sonar was just not up to the task operating in the ice flows of north end of the Denmark Strait?

I guess these are analytical questions towards the '68 to '84 timeframe scenarios.

If I was a Yankee skipper, I would have attached a fishing motor to an iceberg and let it tow me silently to the US East Coast.

[ikalugin]

Originally Posted by Delgard

Should we be seeing more Yankees in 1984?

And, I gather that near-ice activity wasn't so much a capability at the time. Moving in the ice flows would take longer than simply zipping down and through the GUIK gaps to the Atlantic, but safer. Was it that sonar was just not up to the task operating in the ice flows of north end of the Denmark Strait?

I guess these are analytical questions towards the '68 to '84 timeframe scenarios.

If I was a Yankee skipper, I would have attached a fishing motor to an iceberg and let it tow me silently to the US East Coast.

There are obvious peacetime navigational issues (ie if you operate under the icepack and suffer a reactor failure you are in big trouble) which is why where possible other routes were used, for example for inter theatre transfer between Northern and Pacific Fleets.

[ikalugin]

With this being said your statement being that things are different when they went on those ops because they were allowed to 'use a wartime stance' is just garbage. The ONLY way they could be construed to have made a difference is if the Soviet navy was intentionally operating stupidly at other times. Hence my use of sarcasm.

Yet in case of the Soviet force this was the reality as:
- transfer routes (bases->Atlantic)
- tactics (evasion tactics)
- equipment (self propelled imitators)
were wartime restricted (with exceptions - ie Atrina).

This follows the "surge" logic Soviets in general and Soviet Navy in particular used.

While one could disagree with that logic (ie citing the possibility of a surprise attack) it nonetheless existed. If one does not understand this logic one makes the common mistakes in understanding the Soviet forces and the scenarios, under which those would be deployed and thus the the likelly outcomes of such scenarios.
The prime example (other than the nuclear forces we have discussed here already) would be the large, conventional land war in Europe post Ogarkov reforms, where many analysts assumed that, for example, NATO would be capable of conducting the lengthy (30-90 days) re-deployment of forces under REFORGER and that Soviet Navy would be attempting to deny such re-deployment and as such was built for this mission, and through that perception lense the Soviet Navy (including the Naval Aviation assets it had) was analysed.

(I applogise for not citing fully, as I am pressed for time and capability to respond adequately)

[ikalugin]

Originally Posted by C-Wolf

Recently declassified and released related reading:

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingr...0005512850.pdf

Parent article: http://www.popularmechanics.com/mili...ne-sonar-soks/

1972 dated report

From which I get the impression that the report does not account for Victor-II class, which was the first class to have specific noise reduction measures (ie rafting), which were subsequently improved on later classes (such as Victor-III). As such this report may be misguiding when considering 1980s subsurface picture.

[C-Wolf]

Subsequent noise quieting for the Victor class were inadequate. The first boat that was an acoustic challenge to the US was the NATO code-named Akula.

For the purposes of the game as the time periods are set now, the Russian submarine force was quite detectable. --As in freight train loud, and easily picked up by the Q-5.

CCC

[ikalugin]

Aport and Atrina show otherwise.

Which Akula? Which Victors (IIs and IIIs)? There are significant internal (within the same class) differences there.

p.s. there is a convenient graph here (it counts combat submarines in general):

 

Depending on the year (ie after Soviets went with noise reduction on the late 2nd and then 3rd generations of submarines) there would be different ammount of "silent" submarines in service (ie 21 Victor-IIIs by 1984, 6 more Victor-IVs by 1992, then the whole Sierra/Akula can of worms). So while there would be submarines which would be fairly loud (the whole first generation, part of the 2nd generation) for the game time line, there would also be fairly quiet ones as well.

The 1972 vintage CIA report presented here reinforces my impression that the US parties at the time (and it appears still) did not (do not) understand the nature of the Soviet ASW development (I can show the significant developments that report misses), nor are aware of Soviet experience. For example the whole Afalina shebang is missed.

p.p.s I can provide a short overview of Soviet noise reduction evolution for the relevant time period.