Here we go again-Ukraine once again

[Skybird]

And another point scoring for Orban. The EU has, as he demanded, cancelled sanctions against war-mongering patriarch Kyrill.


And according to Reuters, the US will sell Ukraine four Gray Eagle combat drones. It s not yet certain, however, whether Congress will pass the sale. There is a plan to accelerate the training of drone pilots so that they will need only a fraciton of the usual training time. I wonder whether such plans can wqork. If it were that simple, why has one not shortened regular training protocols already before, as routine? Obviously there are then deficits left. But war commands its own demands.

[Dargo]

Taiwan has imposed a ban on the sale of modern chips to Russia and Belarus in response to the invasion of Ukraine.

This week, Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) published a list of strategic high-tech goods that are barred from export to Russia and Belarus, reported DigiTimes. The ministry stated exports of these high-tech commodities are also banned from Belarus because it could help Russia bypass the sanctions.

Firms from these two countries are now banned from purchasing Taiwan-made microprocessors or microcircuits which have any of the following specifications: performance speeds of 5 gigaflops or above, clock frequency rates in excess of 25 MHz, an external interconnection with a data transfer rate of 2.5 MB/s or greater, more than 144 pins, or a basic propagation delay time of less than 0.4 nanoseconds... https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4557937

[Dargo]

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a deeply flawed military operation, from Moscow’s assumptions about an easy victory, to a lack of preparation, poor planning, and force employment. Less attention has been paid, however, to Russian force structure and manpower issues as a critical element now shaping outcomes in this war. Plans rarely survive first contact with an opponent and militaries invariably must adapt, but strategic force structure choices can prove decisive. Force structure reveals a great deal about a military and its assumptions of what wars it plans to fight and how it plans to fight them.

Some of the most significant problems being experienced by the Russian armed forces are the result of conscious choices and tradeoffs. These decisions help explain many of the observed struggles the Russian armed forces have had in combined arms operations, fighting in urban environments, and attempts to hold terrain. The full extent of Russia’s personnel weaknesses has become clear during this war. As it stands, the Russian military has a shortage of manpower — especially infantry. The Russian military also compromised by establishing a partial mobilization force. Consequently, the Russian army was optimized for a short and sharp war while lacking the capacity to sustain a major conventional conflict at “peace time” manning levels. The Russian armed forces are now pressed to sustain operations in Ukraine and attempting what amounts to a partial mobilization to stem the prospect of significant reversals on the battlefield... https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/no...-force-design/

[Ostfriese]

Originally Posted by Dargo

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a deeply flawed military operation, from Moscow’s assumptions about an easy victory, to a lack of preparation, poor planning, and force employment. Less attention has been paid, however, to Russian force structure and manpower issues as a critical element now shaping outcomes in this war. Plans rarely survive first contact with an opponent and militaries invariably must adapt, but strategic force structure choices can prove decisive. Force structure reveals a great deal about a military and its assumptions of what wars it plans to fight and how it plans to fight them.

Some of the most significant problems being experienced by the Russian armed forces are the result of conscious choices and tradeoffs. These decisions help explain many of the observed struggles the Russian armed forces have had in combined arms operations, fighting in urban environments, and attempts to hold terrain. The full extent of Russia’s personnel weaknesses has become clear during this war. As it stands, the Russian military has a shortage of manpower — especially infantry. The Russian military also compromised by establishing a partial mobilization force. Consequently, the Russian army was optimized for a short and sharp war while lacking the capacity to sustain a major conventional conflict at “peace time” manning levels. The Russian armed forces are now pressed to sustain operations in Ukraine and attempting what amounts to a partial mobilization to stem the prospect of significant reversals on the battlefield... https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/no...-force-design/

A very interesting read, thanks.

[August]

Originally Posted by mapuc

Yes the Ukrainian have several type of ASM now. Their own Neptun. Harpoon From Denmark and naval target robot Robot 17 system from Sweden.

Markus

Well, you know the old Subsim saying:


"There are two types of ship sailing the seas, Submarines and Targets"

[mapuc]

Originally Posted by August

Well, you know the old Subsim saying:


"There are two types of ship sailing the seas, Submarines and Targets"

Here's more about this Swedish ASM system

At a joint press conference earlier today Sweden’s Minister of Defense Peter Hultqvist and Minister of the Interior Mikael Damberg announced that Sweden will be sending Robot 17 sjömålsrobot (naval missiles). Developed by Bofors the Robot 17 is Sweden’s manpacked anti-ship version of the AGM-114C Hellfire.

https://www.overtdefense.com/2022/06...es-to-ukraine/

Markus

[August]

Originally Posted by mapuc

Here's more about this Swedish ASM system



https://www.overtdefense.com/2022/06...es-to-ukraine/

Markus

Looks lethal.



You know one thing that is becoming clear to me is that drone delivered munitions are rapidly becoming dominant weapons on the battlefield. Like a poor mans Air Force with an ever bigger sting.

[Rockstar]

Originally Posted by Skybird

Biden announces delivery of HIMARS MRLS systems with ammunitions of 70 km in range. This has been long time coming.

…

I don’t believe there is a 70km range missile. HIMAR/MRLS systems range options are 128km, 165 km or 300km.


What the exact details are of the missiles we’re sending them is unknown. But according to U.S. Secretary of State Blinkin and U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Bridgett Brink. We are trusting Ukraine not to launch missiles into Russia.

I wish I could find the video where I heard Blinken say if this war escalates it will be Putin’s fault not ours or Ukraine. I could be wrong, but the timing and the way he said it gave me that uneasy feeling things are going to heat up.

edit: according to Lockheedmartin they are developing a 499 km range missile too. Maybe they’ll test it out in Ukraine.

[Skybird]

HIMARS ammunitions:

M26: 32 km
M26A1/A2: 45 km
M30/31: 70 km
MGM-140 ATACMS: 300 km


In Germany it is known and used as MARS II

[Skybird]

I yesterday red a small mpiece of an article that unfortunately ois hidden behind a paywall. A former KGB colleague of Putin spoke, they were together in some internal KGB seleciton process to some elite unit in the KGB, this man passed and made it, but he said Ptuion was refused. Interestign was what he gave as explanation for that rejection, it was becaue the KGB specialists came to the cocnlusion that by personality Putin were too unable to fully forsee the consequences of his decisions, and that this would mean too much risk for a KGB specialist/agent.

[Skybird]

An excerpt from https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/der-ander...nnt-ld.1686958

In proposing a compromise peace, Kissinger admittedly did not have Munich in mind, but another historical analogy - the Treaty of Versailles. The victors of World War I imposed such harsh conditions on the Germans that they never accepted the "Dictate of Shame."

Hitler then shattered the European order of 1919, so Kissinger was simply reminding everyone that all parties must accept a peace deal if it is to endure. That remains true a century later. Humiliating Putin is not a good precondition for a stable solution. Peace can only be achieved with Russia, not against it. All fantasies of being able to teach the "madman in the Kremlin" a final lesson are therefore nothing more than - fantasies.

Kissinger, however, concealed something. Any lasting order presupposes a balance of power. As soon as one power dominates, it will try to dictate its terms. Despite the Ukrainians' initial successes, the Kremlin's war machine is outnumbering Ukraine's. Although Russian losses in men and materiel are likely to be high, Moscow has the larger arsenal. Moreover, Russian forces are no longer dispersed, but limit their offensives to the Donbass.

In this way, they benefit from shorter supply routes and can concentrate their firepower. They are slowly but surely making territorial gains and are preparing for a long war of attrition. For on the Ukrainian side, too, the ranks of the fighters are thinning; there is a shortage of weapons, fuel and all kinds of supplies.

The war has already lasted a hundred long days, and Ukrainian units are no longer boldly striking from ambush. In the meantime, conventional fighting is taking place. Here, for all their tactical shortcomings, the Russians are in their element.

A balance of power is far from existing. David is still fighting Goliath. Advising the victim to give in to the aggressor at this point in time does not show strategic foresight, but a lack of empathy.

Moreover, the proposal completely misses the mood in Kiev. No matter who you talk to at the moment, whether representatives of the Ukrainian government or the opposition, the answer is identical: Ukraine will fight until the invaders are driven out. That includes Crimea.

In its unconditionality, the war goal may be unrealistic. It is also clear that at some point the question of compromise will arise. For this war will not end with the total victory of one side and the unconditional defeat of the other. But who has the better cards in the end will be decided on the battlefield and not in Washington, Berlin or Paris.

To now publicly formulate war aims from a safe distance only fosters a suspicion that is already virulent in Eastern Europe: The major powers are getting on with Russia without taking the smaller states into consideration. This experience is deeply etched in the memory - whether with the Polish partitions or with the Yalta and Potsdam conferences after World War II. Selensky and his followers know the West, so they fear a second Ukrainian partition.

The first partition happened after the Russian invasion of the Donbass and annexation of Crimea. At that time, Germany and France urged the warring parties to reach an agreement in Minsk. Everyone knew that it was a sham. Moscow never had in mind to fulfill the terms of the treaty. The war was only postponed.

However, Europe had peace for the time being, and that was most important to Paris and Berlin. Nothing has changed in this respect. Bloodshed somewhere in the East is still embarrassing to them today. The prehistory must not be ignored when appealing to "reason" and "prudence" in Kiev. These words are inevitable ciphers for the Western wish that the troublemaker Ukraine would back down. The Minsk agreement embodies a diplomacy of the strongest, in which the weakest end up being treated badly.

The war has lost momentum, and the opponents are struggling tenaciously for every square meter. Military history knows enough examples where the decisive blow followed a phase of apparent exhaustion. A Russian breakthrough is not out of the question, although another scenario is more likely: the war will not end with a beacon, it will slowly consume itself. At some point, psychology and resources will tip the balance.

There is no lack of perseverance on the part of the assaulted. This makes the supply of heavy weapons and ammunition all the more important. Only then, when the time is right, will the Ukrainians be able to compromise confidently instead of having to endure dictates as the defeated. Supporting Ukraine with weapons is not an obstacle to a peace of understanding but, on the contrary, its indispensable prerequisite.


The aggressor will cease hostilities and consider withdrawal - of whatever kind - only when he senses that the determination of the opponents is not weakening. A war of attrition is a test of nerves.


Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

And European unity is slowly diminishing, Putin's best man in Europe Victor Orban playing a significant role in this.


Edit: Further quoting the text:

Macron and Scholz act as if the fate of Ukraine is secondary to them. The impression may be wrong, but perception is also a reality. This is especially true in war, where combat morale can be the deciding factor. At this level, Berlin and Paris are making themselves unwilling helpers of the Kremlin.

In 2014, Franco-German mediation led to Putin getting off scot-free and being able to keep his looted property. Berlin soon returned to business as usual and signed the contract for Nord Stream 2. All's well that ends well - except for Ukraine. Putin is hoping for history to repeat itself.
(...)

Those who call for a quick ceasefire and a compromise peace based on today's front are ready to divide Ukraine once again. The Russian occupation of most ports and a blockade of the port of Odessa would severely affect the country's economic viability.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)

[Skybird]

Bubble-Olaf and the president of the ukrainian parliament, Ruslan Stefantschuk.






Why do i think of Asterix and Obelix now?

[Catfish]

Originally Posted by Skybird

Bubble-Olaf and the president of the ukrainian parliament, Ruslan Stefantschuk. [...]
Why do i think of Asterix and Obelix now?

Indeed I have no idea, Asterix is an intelligent frenchman neither weaseling around nor reluctant to fight, when it comes to helping friends and allies against aggressive invasions ...

[Skybird]

Catfish is a party-pooper.

[Reece]

I second that motion!!

BTW, I beat him on Whack a Squirrel, now that's bad!!