Here we go again-Ukraine once again

[August]

[Skybird]

France announces it wants to deliver recce wheel tanks AMX-10RC to Ukraine. How many, is not known. The tank design is from the early 70s. France plans to ohase out those it still has in use, parts of these seem to now go to Ukraine. The wheel tank is armed with a 105mm tank gun, so while it can hunt other armoured vehicles like IFVs, and MBTs, it needs to catch the latter from flanks and rear sectors, because the 105mm is not potent enough anymore to reliably penetrate frontal MBT armour. The tank has wheels, and is amphibous. Myself I think of it as a swimming Leopard-1 on wheels. Its relatively heavily armoured for a recce tank or light and medium MBT, but does not compare to a heavy MBT, in no way.

[Ostfriese]

Originally Posted by Skybird

France announces it wants to deliver recce wheel tanks AMX-10RC to Ukraine. How many, is not known. The tank design is from the early 70s. France plans to ohase out those it still has in use, parts of these seem to now go to Ukraine. The wheel tank is armed with a 105mm tank gun, so while it can hunt other armoured vehicles like IFVs, and MBTs, it needs to catch the latter from flanks and rear sectors, because the 105mm is not potent enough anymore to reliably penetrate frontal MBT armour. The tank has wheels, and is amphibous. Myself I think of it as a swimming Leopard-1 on wheels.

It sounds very much like an evolution of the tank destroyer concept of WWII. Fast, highly maneuverable, heavily armed but lightly armored, ideally suited for hit-and-run attacks aimed at the sides or rear of MBTs.


If used correctly they could cause havoc among Russian tanks.

[Skybird]

Bubble-Olaf cannot like what he sees.





https://www.military-today.com/artillery/amx_10_rc.htm

[Skybird]

Very good analysis why Scholz refuses to accept reality. His failure is not so much an intellectual, but a psychological one. The expalnation is very alarming, becasue it shows there is little reason to assume the German government will ever get its acts together. Die Welt writes in this very good analysis:

Our chancellor's dangerous Russia thought bubble
[Hear-hear, Skybird is not the only one mentioning Scholz in combination with thought bubbles ]
Chancellor Scholz has not pursued Germany's security policy and military capability to act with any pressure and has let almost a year pass virtually idly by. This has to do with the fact that German policy on Russia has nestled itself in a dangerous thought bubble.

The turnaround that Chancellor Scholz announced is not progressing. At the end of 2022, Defense Commissioner Eva Högl complained that neither the structures for more rapid procurement had been created for the Bundeswehr, nor had sufficient personnel been recruited - 20,000 service posts had not been filled - and equipment was worse than before the war.

At the time, Army Inspector General Lieutenant General Alfons Mais had said, "The Bundeswehr, the army I am allowed to lead, is more or less bare." After ten months of war waged by Russia against Ukraine, the Bundeswehr is in an even worse position.

Högl now complains that the Bundeswehr "lacks personal equipment such as helmets, backpacks, protective vests, as well as smaller and large equipment - from radios, ammunition to tanks.... The Bundeswehr is short of almost everything."

This also has to do with the fact that Ukraine, which Germany wanted to support with 5000 helmets at the beginning of the war, has since received weapons and ammunition. But at the same time, it is surprising that the equipping of the Bundeswehr is proceeding so slowly when the chancellor attaches so much importance to this goal.

It is true that the Chancellor repeatedly points out that Germany is safe because it is protected by its NATO allies. But this is precisely the free-rider mentality in security policy that Germany has long been accused of. At the same time, this negligence pays insufficient attention to Germany's obligations to NATO.

Why did the chancellor not pursue the security policy and military capacity to act with more pressure and let almost a year, a quarter of his time in government, pass virtually idly by?

An answer can be found when it is asked which way Scholz thinks the war in Ukraine can be ended. In an interview with the "Süddeutsche Zeitung," Chancellor Scholz said in mid-December 2022 about ending the war: "Russia must realize that this cannot continue. Putin must end the war, withdraw troops and thus create the possibility for mutual understanding."
The consistency with which Scholz speaks of "differences of opinion" is a significant indication of what he really thinks

The subsequent question, "Do you think it's possible, then, that this will happen in 2023? And what can you do to make that happen?" he answered thus, "When we will get to that point, I can't say today. It is important that we do not let the thread of talks with Russia break, despite the major disagreements. If we don't talk, it becomes even less likely that Russia will end the war."

Enough criticism has already been written about the phrase that there are "disagreements" with Russia. The one I found most accurate was the one that elaborated that differences of opinion existed as to whether Pizza Hawaii was within the bounds of good taste (unfortunately, I could not agree with the criticism because, for me, differences of opinion are not possible in this regard; the answer is clearly no).

Since Chancellor Scholz also spoke of "differences of opinion" during his visit to Moscow before the Russian attack on Ukraine, this is particularly noteworthy. For apparently nothing so grave changed in the Chancellor's thinking with Russia's attack and its turning point in time that he wanted to change his vocabulary. And this, when he is confronted day in and day out with the observation that language creates reality and that formulations are therefore of great importance, so that in the meantime doctors or pharmacists are supposed to make way. In this respect, the consistency with which he speaks of "differences of opinion" is a significant indication of what Scholz really thinks.

Scholz indicated before the above-quoted formulation that German support for Ukraine would continue to follow three guidelines, namely, first, to support Ukraine to the best of its ability, second, to prevent a direct NATO confrontation with Russia, and third, to refrain from Germany going it alone.

It is obvious, however, that Ukraine's supporters have drawn completely different conclusions from Russia's war, as became clear only recently when the German government offered Poland Patriot defense systems, Poland proposed to supply them to Ukraine, Germany refused, and the U.S. announced that it would supply the Patriot systems to Ukraine.

Even within the German government, there is no unified line on Ukraine policy, as the FDP and Greens do not speak to Scholz on this issue as if they were in a joint government. The Greens and FDP are demanding that Ukraine be supplied with the Leopard 2 main battle tank, while Scholz and the SPD are refusing. So what is the German chancellor's goal in supporting Ukraine? To this end, the interview quoted above is revealing.

For Scholz has so far refused to formulate that Russia must lose this war. Apart from the fact that Russia can only be denied the theft of land and that no one intends to attack Russia behind its territorial borders, the formulation that Russia must lose the war is otherwise intended to indicate that Russia's imperialist intentions are to be limited from the outside with effective countervailing power vis-à-vis Russia. Scholz's formula, Russia must not win, Ukraine must not lose, has a different flavour, because it implies that Russia will suffer a defeat, but it should not be limited in its claims by power. It should understand the situation.

The above-quoted answer of Scholz also goes in this direction. "Russia must realize..." - and in order to achieve this insight, it is necessary to talk to each other. Now, Russia has always clearly stated its goals in the war from the very beginning. They are: the recognition of the annexations, the demilitarization of Ukraine, the liquidation of the elites and their supporters, and the eradication of "Ukrainian" directed against Russia, as well as the demilitarization of the country.

Therefore, at first glance, it is not obvious on what basis Scholz wants to talk to the Russian side. For he calls these goals, emphasized by Russia at all times, a dictatorial peace that must be prevented. But how?

Scholz's answer is: through talks that should lead to an understanding. This is a deeply rooted attitude that has dominated thinking about international politics in Germany for more than twenty years. It is that the international order, the norms and rules that shape it, is constructed by actors in common speech acts. When actors shape common attitudes in discourse with each other, they shape reality.

It would be surprising if Scholz and his environment had not been influenced by this way of thinking, which had a lasting impact on conferences and expert discussions in Germany. In any case, what he says about ending the war is very much in line with this way of thinking. "Russia must realize...". The insight is to end the war, not the means of power mustered against Russia.

Accordingly, it is not the power of arms and money that shapes reality, but it is the understandings that are collectively agreed upon by the actors, it is the convictions that collectively prevail. Democratic governance in international politics, norm entrepreneurship and civil power were the keywords that not only became discourse-determining in a bubble stemming from the peace movement of the 1980s, but also still balance the mental limbo of some politicians to this day.

This has nothing to do with reality. With the reality of one's own world view and the desired expectation of how the world should be, however, very much. For some of those who bear responsibility for German politics, this is apparently more formative than the connection to reality. Freely following the motto "Being detunes the consciousness", they have settled down splendidly in their thought bubble and wonder why reality does not adhere to their imaginings.

Another example of this view of international relations could be observed right at the beginning of Scholz's term in office, when he refused for a long time to mention the Nord Steam 2 pipeline by name. As if it would disappear from the agenda if it remained unnamed.

Scholz's visit to China was also marked by this, as the most important result, which he has always emphasized since then, was the joint declaration that no nuclear weapons should be used. As if, by banishing the danger with words, it were really over.

Admittedly, it is positive that China and Germany made this declaration. The contrast with the slowness with which the Bundeswehr has been upgraded for the past 11 months, namely practically not at all, makes the emphasis of the joint speech even more glaring. For in the issues relevant to power politics, energy dependence on Russia was reduced, but this was seen less as a security policy task than an economic policy one.

And it is questionable whether this would have happened so quickly without the corresponding pressure from the European allies. The fact that Scholz is already talking about the fact that with a "Russia capable of peace ... at some point there can also be coexistence again" is on the one hand correct, but because of the lack of a turnaround it points once again in the direction that the German government assesses the threat emanating from Russia differently than it does in many other European states.

Edward Lucas has put this in a nutshell: The fact that Germany does not draw any conclusions from Russia's behavior, not only since 2022, may let the country sleep well. The other European states are losing sleep over this behavior of the largest EU member. For they know that the new European security order is currently being created not by insight, but by power and strength.

Conclsuion: Scholz is really dangerous for Europe.

[mapuc]

You know more about what German have given in military aid to Ukraine.

In a discussion on fb a friend wrote.

Why isn't Germany helping Ukraine ?

This made me do a search and I found this page

https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-war-ho...elp/a-64160984

As I see it Germany is sending help both military and civilian aid.
The question is of course-Is it enough ?

Markus

[Skybird]

Germany indeeds have sent more than many others, but it stubbornly refuses ot do what it could do and what woudl be needed. Scholz doe snot weant Russia to loose or be defeated, especialyl not with German weapons, and all what he has sent fulfills the criterion that it cannot "defeat" Russia. Its not more than a sign held up that says:" He Russia, stop here, and become reasonable".

Therefore, no Leopard-2s, no Leopard-1s, no Marders. Scholz doe snot want Russia beign defeated (I say thats iocne ölong, didn'T I). He wants to promote superior socialdemocratic reasoning by creating the historic example of Russia becoming sane due to Scholz' superior psychological mindgame, and illustratign the superiority of German reasoning and pedagogic political education of the Russian leader. Finally, he wants to prove the suepriuroty of the German potlical model of defining reality not on grounds of facts, but opprutnsitic reframing strtageies. Int his, he is in fact extrnmeely close to Trump and others. Reality is not somethign that sets the framer, but is something that is negotiable, is endlessly manpulatable, is the result of reframing efforts like the reputation of a product is the result of a marketing campaign by advertising experts and psychologists.

Ekelhaft.

In the end, the existence of a penultimate, final, objective reality is being denied, and not just metaphorically, but literally. Like Trump denies it, too. If you look at Germany, you see this reality-denial at work on all levels and in every aspect of German inner politics. Its like a new form of neutron bomb that exactly kills neural tissue and brain cells.

[Ostfriese]

Germany sent more military exports to Ukraine than to any other nation in 2022 (about 25% of all military exports). This includes Gepard AA tanks (nifty beasts, I remember them from my time in the army), PzH 2000 self-propelled artillery and IRIS-T anti-air-missiles.
A great many arguments are made about sending Leopard 1 and 2 tanks (which hasn't been done so far). I definitely don't know enough about the arguments in this case, so please don't ask me whether it'd be a good idea to send those tanks to Ukraine or not.

[mapuc]

Originally Posted by Ostfriese

Germany sent more military exports to Ukraine than to any other nation in 2022 (about 25% of all military exports). This includes Gepard AA tanks (nifty beasts, I remember them from my time in the army), PzH 2000 self-propelled artillery and IRIS-T anti-air-missiles.
A great many arguments are made about sending Leopard 1 and 2 tanks (which hasn't been done so far). I definitely don't know enough about the arguments in this case, so please don't ask me whether it'd be a good idea to send those tanks to Ukraine or not.

Gepard AA tanks, IRIS-T anti-air-missiles is defensive weapon types.
PzH 2000 self-propelled artillery is both used in offensive and in defensive.

Been thinking-Have Germany mostly been sending defensive weapon systems to Ukraine ?

Sending Leopard 1 or 2 or would mean Germany goes from passive(if I got it correctly) to offensive supporter to Ukraine

Markus

[Ostfriese]

I'm sure Skybird and I have very different opionions on this, which doesn't mean that his opinion is wrong.


I personally think that sending German tanks to Ukraine would additionally antagonize Russia, and while I understand that there are good reasons to do so I still don't want this to be done lightly.
No nation so far has send western tanks to Ukraine, so far Ukraine has only received former Soviet tanks.


On the one hand sending Leopard tanks to Ukraine would bring Germany (and thus NATO) closer to a war with Russia. On the other hand I simply am not sure that an open war with Russia can be avoided at all (which would mean that sending tanks to Ukraine or not wouldn't make any difference).

[mapuc]

Originally Posted by Ostfriese

I'm sure Skybird and I have very different opionions on this, which doesn't mean that his opinion is wrong.


I personally think that sending German tanks to Ukraine would additionally antagonize Russia, and while I understand that there are good reasons to do so I still don't want this to be done lightly.
No nation so far has send western tanks to Ukraine, so far Ukraine has only received former Soviet tanks.


On the one hand sending Leopard tanks to Ukraine would bring Germany (and thus NATO) closer to a war with Russia. On the other hand I simply am not sure that an open war with Russia can be avoided at all (which would mean that sending tanks to Ukraine or not wouldn't make any difference).

We also has to remember the war history between Germany and Russia/Soviet

Markus

[Skybird]

Originally Posted by Ostfriese

I'm sure Skybird and I have very different opionions on this, which doesn't mean that his opinion is wrong.


I personally think that sending German tanks to Ukraine would additionally antagonize Russia, and while I understand that there are good reasons to do so I still don't want this to be done lightly.
No nation so far has send western tanks to Ukraine, so far Ukraine has only received former Soviet tanks.


On the one hand sending Leopard tanks to Ukraine would bring Germany (and thus NATO) closer to a war with Russia. On the other hand I simply am not sure that an open war with Russia can be avoided at all (which would mean that sending tanks to Ukraine or not wouldn't make any difference).

Look at the kill score the Himars and the Western artillery systems have fed to the Russians. They have lost thousands of troops due to these weapons. Has this brought America and Germany with the delivery of Mars-2 (German term for Himars) closer to a war with Russia? And if Western tanks bring, in your view, Western nations closer to a war with Russia , why then does the delivery of Sovjet-made tanks not? And finally, how is that the Germans are so terribly afraid of their own shadow moving - with much more at-risk states like Poland and the three Baltic states having much more reason to be concerned: but nevertheless sending Ukraine EVERYTHING THEY CAN, and at much greater cost to their own stocks, if standardizing weapon deliveries to economy and population sizes?


I know your arguments, because as you and me know, here in germany we hear right these arguments all day long. But they are all inconsistent. They are self-contradictory.



And how can it be that Scholz just around ten days ago talked in front of German economy leaders about that after the war Germany will do business with Russia again and implying, indicating, that German companies must not fear for their lost Russia contacts, they will get them back...??


Scholz does not want Russia to lose the war. And that is no subtle implication anymore. Its obscenely obvious.

[Skybird]

Originally Posted by mapuc

We also has to remember the war history between Germany and Russia/Soviet

Markus

Hitler and Stalin decided over Poland as if Poland were something non-existent and an entity without own will. Germans and Russians also wanted to dispose of Ukraine entirely according to their will, considered it a land mass whose population had no rights of self-determination. Bubble-Olaf is completely in this tradition with his fooling around - and he is even too stupid to even notice this. And so he leads Germany once again onto the wrong side of history. History repeats itself.

[Ostfriese]

As I said: I certainly don't agree with you, in my opinion there's way to much populistic opinion and way too little thoughtful consideration in your words. Which, as I would like to underline again, does not mean that you are wrong - I just consider your suggestion to be far to much on the path of recklessness.

[Dargo]

Originally Posted by Ostfriese

I'm sure Skybird and I have very different opionions on this, which doesn't mean that his opinion is wrong.


I personally think that sending German tanks to Ukraine would additionally antagonize Russia, and while I understand that there are good reasons to do so I still don't want this to be done lightly.
No nation so far has send western tanks to Ukraine, so far Ukraine has only received former Soviet tanks.


On the one hand sending Leopard tanks to Ukraine would bring Germany (and thus NATO) closer to a war with Russia. On the other hand I simply am not sure that an open war with Russia can be avoided at all (which would mean that sending tanks to Ukraine or not wouldn't make any difference).

Sahra Wagenknecht, the German leftist [parliamentary deputy] of Die Linke (The Left party), and she quite openly says: Why should we lose energy, money, and so on, putting ourselves in danger, fighting for some war far away… endangering our welfare, the welfare, as she puts it, of our working people? Her idea is basically: Let Ukraine perish so that we don't have to pay higher prices for electricity or whatever, and this is pure egotism. Now, the pacificists say, the front is more or less stabilized, let's push for peace negotiations, give Russia part of Ukraine. But are these pacifists aware that we arrived at this stage of relative stabilization of the front precisely because of the immense Western help in Ukraine? The Western intervention has opened up the chance for peace. Without Western intervention helping Ukraine, the country would probably be occupied, and then you can probably go on, to Moldova, the Baltic States, pressure on Finland and so on and so on. The Western intervention has already antagonized Russia, a couple of tanks will not undo that. Instead of being afraid of this, will they push Russia too far? Shouldn't we be glad of this? The Ukrainian will to resist is one of the few examples of authentic popular resistance, they did the impossible Ukraine cannot win without very strong Western help including tanks.